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General Editor

William Z. Slany

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PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.

The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

This volume was initially prepared under the general supervision of Frederick Aandahl and, at a later stage, of William Z. Slany, his successor as General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Paul Claussen provided detailed research and review for the volume and was responsible for the final stages of publication.

The following members of the Office of the Historian prepared sections of this volume: Lisle A. Rose (military and economic policies in the Near and Middle East; relations with Egypt and Greece); Charles S. Sampson (Morocco); Joan M. Lee (Middle Eastern petroleum; relations with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and Libya); David H. Stauffer (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria); David W. Mabon (Israel, January–June); Paul Claussen (Israel, July–December); Carl N. Raether (Turkey); John A. Bernbaum (Yemen); and William Z. Slany (general policies with respect to Africa; relations with the Gold Coast, Liberia, Tunisia, and the Union of South Africa).

Anne K. Pond, formerly Chief of the Documentary Editing Section, performed most of the technical editing on the volume. The work was completed under the supervision of Margie R. Wilber in the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief). Francis C. Prescott compiled the index.

WILLIAM Z. SLANY
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

EDITOR'S NOTE:—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

A, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
A/PER, Office of Personnel, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
Actel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
ADC, Aide-de-Camp
AdCom, Advisory Commission to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
AF, Air Force
AF, Office of African Affairs, Department of State; African
AFL, American Federation of Labor
AFOPD, Office of the Director of Plans, United States Air Force
AIOC, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
AKEL, *Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou* (Progressive Party of the Working People), the Communist Party of Cyprus
AL, Arab League
Amb, Ambassador
AMC, Additional Measures Committee of the United Nations
Aminoil, American Independent Oil Company
ANC, African National Congress, the principal black African political group in South Africa
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
AP, Associated Press
Aramco, Arabian-American Oil Company
ARC(S), Air Resupply and Communication (Service)
ARMISH, American Military Mission with the Iranian Army
Att, Attaché
AUB, American University at Beirut
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BIS, Bank for International Settlements
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BPC, Basra Petroleum Company
BPD, barrels per day
BSL, *Banque de Syrie et du Liban* (Bank of Syria and the Lebanon)
C/S, Chief of Staff
Caltex (Cal-Tex), California Texas Oil Company, Limited
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
CG, Commanding General
CG/CoCom, Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control export of strategic goods to Communist countries, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group
CGT, *Confédération Générale du Travail* (General Confederation of Labor), in France
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
c.i.f., cost, insurance, and freight
CINCNELM (C-in-C NELM), Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CIO, Congress of Industrial Organizations
cirgram, circular airgram
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
CO, Commanding Officer

CoCom, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control export of strategic goods to Communist countries
Cominform, Communist Information Bureau
ConGen, Consulate General
C.O.S., Chief(s) of Staff (British)
CP, Commercial Policy Staff, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State
CPP, Convention People's Party, a Gold Coast political party
cpt, counterpart
DAF, Dhahran Airfield
Def, Department of Defense; defense
DefMin, Defense Minister
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Delli, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Representative on the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Depintel, Department of State circular information telegram
Depreftel, Department of State reference telegram
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DirGen, Director General
DMPA, Defense Materials Procurement Agency
D.O.T., Dependent Overseas Territory
D.P.B., Defense Production Board, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DRN, Division of Research for Near East and Africa, Department of State
E, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
E/L, Labor Adviser, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
EAL, Ethiopian Air Lines
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECA/F, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to France
ECA/G, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece
ECA/T, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Turkey
ECA/W, headquarters of the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington
Ecato, series indicator for telegrams from the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington to its missions abroad
ED, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
EDA, *Eniaia Demokratiki Aristera* (United Democratic Left), Greek political party
EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Embdes, Embassy despatch
Emboff, Embassy office
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EPD/ECA, European Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration
EPEK, *Ethniki Prodeftiki Enosis Kendrou* (National Progressive Union of the Center), Greek political coalition
EPU, European Payments Union
ETS, exploratory talks with the Soviet Union; also a series designation for United States position papers prepared for the exploratory talks with the Soviets
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Europe
Exim (Ex-Im) Bank (Eximbank), Export-Import Bank of Washington
FAC, Foreign Aid Committee
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization
FBO, Division of Foreign Buildings Operations, Department of State
FCN, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (treaty)
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Far East
F.E.B., Financial and Economic Board, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
FEC (FECOM), Far East Command
FinMin, Finance Minister
FM, Foreign Minister

FMACC, Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee

FOB, free on board

FonAff, Foreign Affairs

FonMin, Foreign Minister (Ministry)

FonOff, Foreign Office

FonSecy, Foreign Secretary

FRBNY, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

FSO, Foreign Service Officer

FSR, Foreign Service Reserve Officer

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State

GA, General Assembly of the United Nations

GADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly; also Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation

GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GEA, Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State

GER, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State

GNA, Grand National Assembly (Turkey)

Gov-Gen, Governor-General

GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State

Histadrut, *HaHistadrut Hak'lalit shel Ha'Ovdim Ha'Ivrim B'Eretz Yisrael* (General Federation of Workers in Israel)

HM, His Majesty

HMG, His Majesty's Government

HRH, His Royal Highness

IAD, Division of Acquisition and Distribution, Department of State

IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

ICJ, International Court of Justice

IG, Iranian Government

IMF, International Monetary Fund

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IPC, Iraq Petroleum Company

ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State

ISAC, International Security Affairs Committee

Istiqlal, Moroccan Independence Party

ITO, International Trade Organization

JAMMAT, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Advisory Group

JUSSGSA, Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia

KOC (Kuoco), Kuwait Oil Company

L, Legal Adviser, Department of State

LA, Latin America

L/ARA, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

L/E, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

L/EUR, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State

L/NEA, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State

L/T, Office of the Assistant for Treaty Affairs in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/UNA, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State

Legdesp, Legation despatch

Legtel, Legation telegram

Lib, Liberia(n)

LibGovt, Liberian Government

Lidel, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Representative on the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya

LOC, lines of communication

LS, Syrian pound

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAC, Mixed Armistice Commission

Mapam, *Mifleget HaPo'alim HaM'uhedet* (United Workers Party), Israeli political party

MATS, Military Air Transport Service

MD, Munitions Division, Department of State

MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance

MDAA, Mutual Defense Assistance Act

MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program

ME, Middle East

MEC, Middle East Command

Medreco, Mediterranean Refining Company

MilAtt, Military Attaché

Min, Minister (Ministry)

MinFin, Minister (Ministry) of Finance

MinFonAff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MMS, Metals and Minerals Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

MN, Monetary Affairs Staff, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State

MPC, Mosul Petroleum Company

MRP, *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, a French political party

MSA, Mutual Security Agency

MSP, Mutual Security Program

MTDP, Medium Term Defense Plan

mytel, my telegram

NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems

NAT(O), North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)

NCO, noncommissioned officer

NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Near East

NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State; Near East and Asia

NEA/P, Officer in Charge of Public Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State

NEAT, Near East Air Transport Company

NECDB, Near East Cooperative Defense Board

niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

NIOC, National Iranian Oil Company

NSC, National Security Council

NSRB, National Security Resources Board

NYT, The *New York Times*

OCI, Overseas Consultants, Inc.

OIF, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

OII, Office of International Information, Department of State

OIR/GE, Special Adviser on Geography, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State

OMA, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

OMP, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

OSAF, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSR, Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948

ourtel, our telegram

P, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

P/POL, Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

P–51, piston engine fighter aircraft

PA, procurement authorization

Pak, Pakistan

Palun, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Representative on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine

PC, participating country

PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission (United Nations)

PED, Petroleum Policy Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

P.L., Public Law

PLDC, Palestine Land Development Company

PM, Prime Minister

POC, Peace Observation Commission

POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants

P.P.S., *Parti Populaire Syrien*, the Syrian National Party

PRA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

PriMin, Prime Minister

PRS, Program Planning and Evaluation Staff, Department of State

PSB, Psychological Strategy Board

PWOC, Pacific Western Oil Company

RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

Rapun, series indicator for telegrams from or concerning the United States Member of the Advisory Commission to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

RDA, *Rassemblement démocratique africain*, a West African nationalist political movement

reDeptel, regarding Department of State telegram

reftel, reference telegram

remytel, regarding my telegram

Repto, series indicator for messages to the Economic Cooperation Administration headquarters in Washington from the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948

S, Office of the Secretary of State

S/A, Office of the Ambassador at Large, Department of State

S/ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State

S/MSA, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Mutual Security Affairs)

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/S-CR, Correspondence Review Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/S-PR, Protocol Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

SA, Saudi Arabia

SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

SACME, Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East

SAG, Saudi Arabian Government

SC (SECCO), Security Council of the United Nations

SecGen, Secretary-General

Secto, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State or his delegation in connection with conferences of Foreign Ministers

SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe

SOAFR, Union of South Africa

Socony, Standard Oil Company of New York

SYG, Secretary-General

TA, trade agreement

Tapline, Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company

TCA, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State

TCO, Technical Cooperation Officer

Telac, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington

Telecon, telecommunication conference

TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series

TL, Turkish lira

Toeca, series indicator for telegrams to the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington from its missions abroad

Toisa, designation for telegrams dealing with matters within the responsibility of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State

Tomap, designation for telegrams concerned with the Mutual Defense Assistance Program

TopSec, top secret

Torep, series indicator for messages from the Economic Cooperation Administration headquarters in Washington to the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State or his delegation in connection with conferences of Foreign Ministers

Totec, designation for telegrams dealing with technical assistance

TSO, Truce Supervisory Organization of the United Nations

TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority

TWA, Trans-World Airlines, Inc.

U, Under Secretary of State

U/FW, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Fisheries and Wildlife)

UGCC, United Gold Coast Convention, a Gold Coast political party

UGTT, *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens*, a Tunisian nationalist trade union organization

UKDel, United Kingdom Delegation

UKFO, United Kingdom Foreign Office

UN, United Nations

UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State

UNCCP, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

UND, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

UNE, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNO, United Nations Organization

UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

Unpal, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Representative on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine

Unrap, series indicator for telegrams to or concerning the United States Member of the Advisory Commission to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNRWAPNE (UNRWA, UNRWAP), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

UNSCOB, United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans

UNTS, United Nations Treaty Series

UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization

UP, United Press

urdesp, your despatch

urtel, your telegram

USA, United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USDel, United States Delegation

USG, United States Government

USIE, United States Information and Educational Exchange Program

USIS, United States Information Service

USN, United States Navy

UST, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions

WHO, World Health Organization

WPC, World Peace Congress (Conference)

LIST OF PERSONS

Editor's Note:—The identification of persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. Historical personages alluded to in the volume and certain minor officials are not identified. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary.

In this list and in other editorial material throughout the volume (document headings, footnotes, and editorial notes), every effort has been made to provide recognizable and consistent transliterations of names of individuals from countries using non-roman alphabets. The transliterations adopted for proper names were those most commonly used by the Department of State at the time, or in documents or official publications of the countries concerned. (In the case of Arabic names, differences arise in the transliteration of vowels. The editors have generally rendered the definite article as *al-* rather than *el-*, and have omitted diacritical marks.) The editors have in all cases retained the spelling used in the original documents.

Abboud Pasha, Ahmed, Egyptian financier and industrialist.
Abdul Ilah, Amir, Crown Prince and Regent of Iraq.
Abdul, Monem, Egyptian Minister in Switzerland; Egyptian Representative at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah, Shaikh of Kuwait.
Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud, Prince of Saudi Arabia.
Abdullah ibn Hussein, King of Jordan; assassinated July 20, 1951.
Abul Huda (Abul al-Huda), Tawfiq, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Jordan, from July 25, 1951.
Acheson, Dean G., Secretary of State.
Adams, General Donald B., USA (Ret.), U.S. Point Four Representative to the Iraqi Development Board until July 1951.
Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor and, from March 1951, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Ahmad ibn Yahya. *See* Yahya.
Alamanis, Stelios, former EPEK Member of the Greek Parliament; Greek Minister of Agriculture, from October 1951.
Alexander, Archibald S., Under Secretary of the Army.
Allen, Roger, Head, African Department, British Foreign Office.
Allen, Ward P., Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, from November 1951.
Alpar, Nahit, Financial Counselor of the Turkish Embassy.
Alphand, Hervé, Director General of Economic, Financial and Technical Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.
Amr, P. H., Egyptian Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
Andersen, Holger, Director, Refugee Office, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
Anschuetz, Norbert L., Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs, Department of State, until September 1951; First Secretary of the Embassy in Greece, from October 1951.
Aras, Tevfir Rustu, Turkish Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
Arnold, Major General William H., USA, Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey.
Asha, Rafiq, Syrian Consul General at New York.
Atasi, Adnan, Syrian Minister in France.
al-Atasi, Faydi, Syrian Foreign Minister, August–November 1951.
al-Atasi, Hashim, President of Syria until December 1951.
Attlee, Clement R., British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, July 1945–October 1951.
Auriol, Vincent, President of the French Republic.

Austin, Warren R., Representative at the United Nations and Representative on the Security Council; President of the Security Council in August 1951.

Averoff, Evangelos, Liberal Member of the Greek Parliament; Greek Foreign Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, from October 1951.

Avner, Gershon, Director, West European Department, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Awalt, Fred H., Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Azcarate, Pablo de, Principal Secretary of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

al-Azm, Khalid, Syrian Prime Minister, March–August 1951.

Azzam Pasha, Abdul Rahman, Secretary General of the League of Arab States.

Badra, Mohamed, Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs.

Bakr, Abdullah, Iraqi Minister in the United States.

Balluseck, Daniel J. von, Netherlands Representative at the United Nations; President of the United Nations Security Council in April 1951.

Bancroft, Harding F., Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State; Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Collective Measures Committee.

Barbour, Walworth, Counselor of the Embassy in the Soviet Union.

Barco, James W., Acting Deputy Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Barrow, John Ralph, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Political Officer at the Embassy in Iraq, from September 1951; Second Secretary of the Embassy and Counselor, from October 1951.

Baxter, William O., First Secretary of the Embassy in Turkey.

Bayar, Celal, President of the Republic of Turkey.

Beale, Wilson Thomas Moore, Jr., Officer in Charge, Economic Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, from April 15, 1951.

Bebler, Ales, Yugoslav Representative at the United Nations; President of the United Nations Security Council in September 1951.

Bechhoefer, Bernhard G., Officer in Charge of International Security Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.

Bele, General Refet, Turkish member on the Advisory Committee of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

Bell, John O., Assistant Director, International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary.

Ben Gurion, David, Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

Ben Youssef, Salah, Tunisian Minister of Justice; Secretary General of the Néo-Destour Party.

Benard, Jean-Pierre, First-Secretary of the French Embassy in the United States.

Bendor, Shmuel, Director, United States Department, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Bennsky, George M., Jr., Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury.

Bergus, Donald C., Second Secretary and Consul at the Legation in Lebanon; assigned also to Cairo, Tehran, Baghdad, Amman, Jerusalem, Jidda, Damascus, and Sana'a.

Berry, Burton Y., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, from August 1950; Acting Assistant Secretary, from December 11, 1951.

Bethune, Mrs. Mary Macleod, Founder and President-Emeritus, National Council of Negro Women and Bethune-Cookman College, Daytona, Florida.

Bevin, Ernest, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until March 1951.

Bingham, Jonathan B., Assistant Director for Non-European Affairs, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State; after October 1951, Deputy Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration.

Bishop, Max W., Department of State Member on the National Security Council Staff, July 1949–July 1951; Consul at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, from July 1951; Consul General at Dhahran, from September 1951.

Bissell, Richard M., Jr., Deputy Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration.

Blaisdell, William M., Deputy Chief, Mediterranean Branch, European Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration.

Bland, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A., Jr., USAF, Air Attaché at the Embassy in the Union of South Africa.

Blandford, John B., Jr., U.S. Representative on the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), assigned at Beirut with the personal rank of Ambassador, March 17, 1951; Director of UNRWA, from July 1951.

Blandy, Admiral William H. P., USN (Ret.), Former Commander in Chief, Atlantic, and U.S. Atlantic Fleet until February 1, 1950.

Blaustein, Jacob, President, American Jewish Committee.

de Blesson, Jacques, French Deputy Resident General in Morocco.

Bloom, Hyman, Consul at Accra, Gold Coast.

Boggs, Samuel W., Special Adviser on Geography in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State.

Bohlen, Charles E., Minister of the Embassy in France until March 1951; thereafter, Counselor of the Department of State.

de Boisanger, Claude Bréart, French Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, until July 1951.

Bolté, Major General Charles L., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, until February 12, 1951; promoted to Lieutenant General and appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army, February 13, 1951.

Bonbright, James C. H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Bonnet, Henri, French Ambassador to the United States.

Bonsal, Philip, Minister of the Embassy in France.

Bossavy, Colonel Georges, Chairman of the Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.

Botsio, Kojo, Gold Coast Minister of Education and Social Welfare.

Boudali, Nouri, Assistant Secretary General, *Union Général Tunsiens du Travail* (Tunisian Nationalist Trade Union Federation).

Bouhafa, El Abed, Executive Secretary of the Committee for Freedom of North Africa in the United States.

Bourgerie, Elmer H., Director of the Office of African Affairs, Department of State.

Bourguiba (Bourghiba), Habib, President of the Néo-Destour Party in Tunisia.

Bowker, Sir Reginald James, Superintending Under Secretary of State of the Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Brannan, Charles F., Secretary of Agriculture.

Bray, William H., Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State.

Brougham, Robert I., Vice-President and Treasurer, Arabian-American Oil Company.

Browdy, Benjamin G., President, Zionist Organization of America.

Brown, Ben H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Brown, Constantine., Reporter and Columnist for the Washington *Star*.

Brownell, George A., Special Adviser to Secretary of the Air Force, 1950.

Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador to France.

Bruins, John H., Counselor of the Legation in Lebanon.

Bunche, Ralph J., Director, Department of Trusteeship, United Nations; formerly Acting U.N. Mediator in Palestine, 1948–1949.

Burns, Major General James H., USA (Ret.), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, until January 11, 1951; thereafter, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Burns, Norman, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Burns, Robert L., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Burrows, Bernard A. B., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States.

Busson, Rene, President and Director General, Banque de Syrie et du Liban until June 1951.

Butler, Victor S., Under-Secretary, British Ministry of Fuel and Power.

Butrick, Richard P., Director General of the Foreign Service.

Byington, Homer M., Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.

Byrd, Richard W., Counselor of the Embassy in Australia.

Cabell, Major General Charles P., USA, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Cabot, Thomas D., Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State.

Caffery, Jefferson, Ambassador to Egypt.

Cameron, Warde M., Assistant Legal Adviser for Administration and Foreign Service, Department of State.
Campbell, John C., Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs, Department of State.
Cannelloupoulos. *See* Kanellopoulos.
Cannon, Cavendish W., Minister in Syria.
Cardozo, Michael H., Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State.
Carney, Admiral Robert B., USN, Commander in Chief United States Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Carns, Colonel Edwin H. J., USA, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Casabianca, Marcel, Head of the French Section of the Tunisian Grand Council.
Case, John C., Vice President and Director, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc.
Cassell, C. Abayomi, Liberian Attorney General.
Chapman, Alec, Washington Representative, Arabian-American Oil Company.
Charles, Sir Noel Hughes Havelock, British Ambassador to Turkey.
Chenik, Sidi Mohamed, Tunisian Prime Minister.
Cherine Bey, Ismail, Commander of the Egyptian Frontier; Egyptian Government Liaison Officer with UNRWA.
Childs, Archie W., Consul General at Lagos, Nigeria, from April 1951.
Childs, J. Rives, Ambassador to Ethiopia, from May 14, 1951.
Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer, Leader of the Conservative Party in the British House of Commons until October 1951; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, from October 26, 1951.
Clapp, Gordon R., Chairman of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, 1949.
Clark, Harlan B., Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria-Iraq Affairs, Department of State, from October 1949; First Secretary and Consul of the Legation in Syria, from March 1951.
Clark, Lewis, United States Representative on the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya, with the personal rank of Ambassador.
Cochran, H. Merrill, Ambassador to Indonesia.
Coe, Robert D., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.
Collins, General J. Lawton, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
Comay, Michael, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Connally, Tom, Democratic Senator from Texas and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Connelly, Bernard C., First Secretary of the Embassy in the Union of South Africa.
Conrad, William E. F., Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.
Contee, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond E., USA, Member of the United States Military Training Mission in Liberia.
Cordier, Andrew W., Executive Secretary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Coulson, J. E., United Kingdom Alternate Representative at the United Nations.
Crawford, Boyd, Staff Administrator and Committee Clerk, House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Crocker, Edward S., Ambassador to Iraq.
Crowe, Smith N., Jr., Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.
Cyr, Leo G., Officer in Charge of Northern African Affairs, Department of State.
Czyzak, John J., Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State.
Dafni, Reuven, Israeli Consul at Los Angeles until early 1951; thereafter, Press Officer and Spokesman, Israeli Foreign Ministry.
Daridan, Jean, Minister Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States.
Davies, Ralph K., President, American Independent Oil Company.
Davis, Rear Admiral Arthur C., USN (promoted to Vice Admiral, February 1951), Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Davis, Lieutenant Colonel John J., USA, Army Attaché at the Embassy in the Union of South Africa.
Davis, Monnett B., Ambassador to Israel, from February 26, 1951.
Davis, Owen, First Secretary of the Australian Embassy in the United States until autumn 1951.
Davis, Richard H., Officer in Charge of U.S.S.R. Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State.
Davis, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R., USA, Operations Division, Mediterranean and Middle East Branch.

al-Dawalibi, Maruf, Leader of the Syrian People's Party; President of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies until November 1951; designated Syrian Prime Minister on November 28 and deposed that same day; formally resigned on December 1.

Day, Brigadier General Edwin M., USAF, Commanding General, Dhahran Airfield, from February 1951.

de Blesson. *See* Blesson.

Delaney, Peter, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury.

de Margerie. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.

Dembo, Morris, Third Secretary of the Embassy in the Union of South Africa.

Dennis, Gabriel L., Liberian Secretary of State.

Dennis, William E., Liberian Secretary of the Treasury; Chairman of the Joint (U.S.-Liberian) Commission on Economic Development.

de Paul, Carter N., Jr., Chief, Mediterranean Branch, European Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration.

de Ridder, Bennett L., Colonel, Belgian Army; Deputy and sometime Acting Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine.

Dixon, Ben Franklin, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.

Dixon, Sir Pierson John, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; British Representative on the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission.

Dondero, Raphael, Assistant Comptroller, Budget Execution, Office of the Director for Mutual Security.

Dönges, Theophilius Ebenhaezer, Minister of Interior of the Union of South Africa.

Dorman, John, Consul at Tunis.

Dorr, Russell H., Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Mission to Turkey.

Dorsey, Stephen P., Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Dorsz, Edmund J., Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.

Drake, J. Frank, Chairman of the Board, Gulf Oil Corporation.

Drew, Gerald A., Minister in Jordan.

Du Bois, Jean E. S., Belgian Minister to Israel.

Duce, James Terry, Executive Vice President, Arabian-American Oil Company.

Dudley, A.A., Head of United Nations (Economic and Social) Department, British Foreign Office.

Dudley, Edward R., Ambassador to Liberia.

Dulles, Allen W., Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

Duncan, Admiral Donald B., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), from March 1, 1950; promoted to Admiral and appointed Vice Chief of Naval Operations, August 10, 1951.

Duncan, Enoch S., Consul at Kuwait.

Duncan, Henry B., Liberian Secretary of Public Works and Utilities.

Durnan, James J., Desk Officer for British Territories in Africa, Office of African Affairs, Department of State.

Du Toit, Major General Christian L., Chief of the General Staff, Union of South Africa.

Eakens, Robert H.S., Chief, Petroleum Policy Staff, Department of State.

Eban, Abba, Israeli Ambassador to the United States.

Eddy, Colonel William A., USMC (Ret.), Consultant to the Arabian-American Oil Company.

Ede, James C., British Home Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons until October 1951.

Eden, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from October 27, 1951.

Efteland, Robert G., Secretary, International Security Affairs Committee, Department of State.

Egeli, General Yusuf Adil, Commanding General of the Turkish Fifth Army Corps.

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight David, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe.

Elliot, Air Chief Marshal Sir William, RAF, Chairman, British Joint Services Mission.

Emery, George H., Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State.

Erasmus, François Christiaan, South African Minister of Defense.
Erhardt, John G., Ambassador to the Union of South Africa, 1950–1951; died February 18, 1951.
Erkin, Feridun C., Turkish Ambassador to the United States.
Erskine, Lieutenant Colonel Sir George W. E. J., G.O.C. British Troops Egypt, and Mediterranean Command.
Esenbel, Melih, Counselor of Turkish Embassy in the United States.
Esin, Seyfullah, Turkish Minister to Israel.
Evans, Trefor E., Joint Secretary of the Middle East (Official) Committee, Middle East Secretariat, Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.
Evans, Major General Vernon, USA, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission to the Iranian Army.
Eytan, Walter, Director General, Israeli Foreign Ministry.
Faisal II, King of Iraq.
Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, Prince, Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Viceroy of Hejaz.
al-Faqih, Shaikh Asad, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States.
Farag, Ibrahim, Egyptian Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs.
Farmer, Garland R., Jr., Office of African Affairs, Department of State.
Farouk I, King of Egypt.
Farra, Jamal E. D., Secretary General, Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Fawzi Bey, Mahmoud, Egyptian Representative at the United Nations.
Feinberg, Abraham, President, Development Corporation for Israel.
Feisal. *See* Faisal.
Feld, Nicholas, Officer in Charge of West Central and East African Affairs, Department of State, from September 1951.
Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., Acting Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Department of State, from January 1951.
Ferguson, John H., Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
Fife, Vice Admiral James, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
Finletter, Thomas K., Secretary of the Air Force.
Fischer, Maurice, Israeli Minister in France; Israeli Representative at the United Nations.
Flett, Martin Teall, British Under Secretary of the Treasury.
Ford, Richard, Counselor of the Embassy in Israel until February 1951.
Forrestal, James V., Secretary of Defense, 1947–1949.
Forsyth, Douglas D., Secretary of the Department of External Affairs of the Union of South Africa.
Foster, William C., Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration until September 1951; thereafter, Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Fowler, Robert William Doughty, British Commonwealth Relations Office; Member of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations.
Franks, Sir Oliver S., British Ambassador to the United States.
Fraser, Sir William, Chairman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Frederick, Major General Robert, USA, Chief of the U.S. Joint Military Aid Group in Greece, from May 1951; assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, October 1951.
Frisbie, Bryan R., Minerals Attaché at the Embassy in the Union of South Africa.
Fritzlan, A. David, First Secretary of the Legation and Consul in Jordan.
Fryer, E. Reeseman, Chief, Health, Manpower, and Education Division, Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), from February 1951; Assistant Administrator, Near East Field Operations, TCA, from October 1951.
Fuhrman, Osmond C.W., Australian Minister to Israel.
Funkhouser, Richard, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, from January 1951.
Furlonge, Geoffrey W., Head of the Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.
Gaitskell, Hugh T.N., British Chancellor of the Exchequer until October 23, 1951.
Gallad (Galal-Eddine) Bey, Ahmed, Director General of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry.
Gallman, Waldemar, J., Ambassador in the Union of South Africa, from October 18, 1951.
Gardiner, Arthur Z., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
Gargoni, Khalid, Counsellor to the King of Saudi Arabia.
Geren, Paul, Second Secretary of the Legation in Syria.

Gerig, O. Benjamin, Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State.

Ghiardi, John F.L., Assistant U.S. Treasury Representative at Cairo.

Gibson, Sir Horace Stephen, Manager Director, Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd.

Gifford, Walter S., Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

Giustiniani, Raimondo, Italian Minister to Israel.

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council.

Glubb, Lieutenant General John Bagot, British Officer Commanding the Arab Legion in Jordan.

Gnade, Richard E., Officer in Charge, Lebanon-Syria-Iraq Affairs, Department of State, from October 5, 1951.

Godley, G. McMurtie II, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.

Goldmann, Nahum, Chairman, American Section, Jewish Agency for Palestine.

Gordon, David L., Economist with the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in France.

Gorlitz, Samuel J., Assistant Chief for Public Loans, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Department of State.

Grady, Henry F., Ambassador to Iran until September 1951.

Greenhill, Denis A., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.

Grigoropoulos, Lieutenant General Theodoros, Head of the Greek National Army General Staff, March–May 1951; Head of the Greek National Defense Staff, from June 1951.

Gromyko, Andrey Andreyevich, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister.

Gross, Ernest A., Deputy Representative at the United Nations and Deputy Representative on the Security Council.

Gulick, Clarence Swift, European Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration.

Guyon, Edouard-Felix, French Minister in Israel.

Hachad, Farhat, Secretary General of the *Union Général Tunisiens du Travail.*

Hadraba, Theodore, Counselor of the Embassy in Turkey.

Haikal, Yusuf, Minister of Jordan in the United States.

Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia.

Hains, Colonel Peter C., USA, Deputy Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Hakim, George, Counselor of the Lebanese Legation in the United States; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, from November 10, 1951.

al-Hakim, Hassan, Syrian Prime Minister, from August 1951.

Halaby, Najeeb E., Jr., Assistant for International Security Affairs to the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Hamilton, Charles W., Vice-President (Foreign Production Division), Gulf Oil Corporation.

Hamilton, Brigadier General Pierpont M., USAF, Chief of Policy Division, Directorate of Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force.

Hamilton, William L., Jr., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.

Hamza, Fuad Bey, Counselor to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.

Handley, William J., Labor Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Harding, Charles L., Director, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc.,

Hare, Raymond A., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

Harriman, W. Averell, Special Assistant to the President; Chairman of the NATO Temporary Council Committee, from September 1951; Director for Mutual Security, from October 1951.

Haselton, George H., Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Hassett, William D., Secretary to President Truman.

Havenga, Nicolaas C., Minister of Finance and leader of the Afrikaner Party in the Union of South Africa.

Hay, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Rupert, British Political Representative at Bahrein.

Helm, Sir Knox, British Minister in Israel.

Helou (Hilou), Charles, Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, after July 1951.

Hemba, Alton W., Staff Assistant, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Henderson, Loy W., Ambassador to India (accredited also to Nepal), until September 1951; thereafter, Ambassador to Iran.

Herlitz, Esther, First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in the United States.

Herzog, Colonel Chaim, Military, Naval, and Air Attaché, Israeli Embassy in the United States.
Hewitt, Warren E., Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.
Hickerson, John D., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
Hill, C. Reed, Technical Cooperation Officer in Liberia; member of the Joint (U.S.-Liberian) Commission on Economic Development; Chief of the Liberian Economic Mission.
Hill, W. Martin, Deputy Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
al-Hinnawi, Colonel Sami, Syrian military officer; leader of *coup d'état* in August 1951.
Holmes, Julius C., Minister in the United Kingdom.
Hope, Mary E., Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.
Hopkinson, Daniel K., Director, European Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration.
Horowitz, David, Director-General, Israeli Ministry of Finance.
Hoskins, Harold B., Consultant to the Department of State.
Hourani (Haurani, Hawrani), Akram, Syrian member of Parliament, Founder of the Arab Socialist Resurrection (*Ba'th*) Party, and former Syrian Minister of Defense.
Howard, Harry N., United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.
Howard, John B., Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.
abul-Huda, Tawfiq. *See* Abul Huda (Abu al-Huda), Tawfiq.
Hudson, Manley O., international law counsel to the Saudi Arabian Government.
Hull, Lieutenant General John E., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, U.S. Army, January–July 1951.
Humelsine, Carlisle H., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.
Hussein ibn Talal, Prince of Jordan.
Hyman, Semah Cecil, Economic Counselor of the Israeli Embassy in the United States.
Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia.
Idris I (Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Sanussi), King of Libya, from December 24, 1951.
Ilah, Amir Abdul. *See* Abdul Ilah, Amir.
Imlay, Dorothy W., Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State.
Ingersoll, Rear Admiral S.H., USN, Director, Strategic Plans, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Jackson, Basil, Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Jacquet, Raymond, Director General of Political and Administrative Service, French Residency General in Tunisia.
Jacquin de Margerie, Roland, Assistant Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.
Jaddid, Major G., Chief, Syrian Delegation, Syria–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission.
Jago, John W., Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.
Jakins, H.G., British Political Agent in Kuwait.
al-Jamali, Mohamed Fadhil, Iraqi Representative at the United Nations.
Jamieson, K.D., Second Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.
Jansen, Ernest George, Governor General for the Union of South Africa.
al-Jarbi (Jerbi), Ali Bey, Libyan Foreign Minister, March–December 1951.
Jarvie, Basil J., Counselor of the South African Embassy in the United States.
Jebb, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn, British Permanent Representative at the United Nations, President of the United Nations Security Council in July 1951.
Jenkins, Major General Reuben E., Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece.
Jessup, Philip C., Ambassador at Large; Representative at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Johnson, Louis A., Secretary of Defense until September 1950.
Johnson, U. Alexis, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, from February 4, 1951; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, from November 30, 1951.

Jones, G. Lewis, Jr., Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Jones, J. Jefferson III, Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State.

Jones, Owen T., First Secretary of the Embassy in Israel.

Jooste, Gerhardus Petrus, South African Ambassador to the United States.

Juin, General Pierre Alphonse, French Resident General in Morocco, until January 1951; Inspector General, French Armed Forces, from January 1951.

Kanellopoulos, Panayotis, joint leader of the Populist-Unionist (LEK) Party in Greece.

Kaplan, Eliezer, Israeli Minister of Finance.

Karaosmanoğlu, Fevzi Lutfi, Turkish Minister of State for Marshall Plan Affairs until March 9, 1951.

Kartalis, George, former EPEK Member of the Greek Parliament; Greek Minister of Coordination, from October 1951.

Katz, Milton, United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, until September 1951.

Keeler, Erwin P., First Secretary of the Embassy in Israel, from April 1951.

Keren, Moshe, Counselor, Israeli Embassy in the United States.

Khalil, Akmar, Senior Jordanian Representative on the Jordan–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission.

el-Khouri, Faiz, Syrian Minister in the United States; President of the Syrian Delegation at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

al-Khuri, Bishara, President of Lebanon.

Kiefer, Alexander F., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.

King, Charles D. B., former President of Liberia, 1923–1930; Liberian Ambassador to the United States, from 1949.

Kirkbride, Sir Alec, British Minister in Jordan.

Knight, Sir Henry, British Representative on the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

Knight, Ridgway B., Acting Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, from March 1950; subsequently, Officer in Charge; Acting Deputy Director, from February 16, 1951; Adviser on NATO Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, from July 1951.

Kollek, Theodore (Teddy), Minister of the Israeli Embassy in the United States.

Kopper, Samuel K. C., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Köprülü, Fuad, Turkish Foreign Minister.

Köymen, Hulusi, Turkish Minister of National Defense.

Kuter, Major General Laurence S., USAF (promoted to Lieutenant General April 10, 1951), Commander, Military Air Transport Service, Andrews Air Force Base.

Kyrou, Alexis, Greek Representative at the United Nations.

Labonne, Eirik, French Resident General in Morocco, 1946–1947.

Labouisse, Henry R., Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, until March 1951; Director, Planning Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, from March 1951.

Lacoste, Francis, French Alternate Representative at the United Nations; President of the United Nations Security Council in February 1951.

Lalor, Rear Admiral William G., USN (Ret.), Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Lambrakis, Demetrius, publisher of the Athens newspapers *To Vima* and *Ta Nea*.

Landon, Major General Truman H., USAF, Director of Plans, Headquarters, United States Air Force, until February 1951.

Lapham, Roger D., Chief, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece.

Laskey, Denis S., United Kingdom Alternate Representative on the United Nations Security Council.

La Tour du Pin Verclause, Geoffrey, Division of African-Levant Affairs, French Foreign Ministry, until October 1951; on special mission in Morocco, from October 1951.

Lavon, Pinhas, Israeli Minister of Agriculture.

Lawton, Frederick J., Director, Bureau of the Budget.

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council.

Lecheres, General Charles, Chief of Staff, French Air Force; Chairman, French Joint Chiefs of Staff, French Representative, Military Committee, North Atlantic Council.

Lee, Major General Robert M., USAF, Director of Plans, Headquarters, United States Air Force.

Le Roy de la Tournelle, Guy, Director General of Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Lescuyer, Jean, French Ambassador to Turkey.

Levy, Walter J., Petroleum Consultant.

Lewis, Charles W., Jr., Consul General in Istanbul.

Lewis, Geoffrey W., Deputy Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State.

Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistani Prime Minister.

Lie, Trygve H., Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Lincoln, Francis F., Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.

Linder, Harold F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Loftus, John A., Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Lourie, Arthur, Israeli Consul General at New York; Israeli Deputy Representative at the United Nations.

Lovett, Robert A., Deputy Secretary of Defense, until September 1951; thereafter Secretary of Defense.

Luc, Robert, Head of the Near East Division, French Foreign Ministry.

Ludlow, James M., Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.

Lynch, Andrew G., Consul General at Tripoli.

Lynch, Thomas J., General Counsel, Department of the Treasury.

MacArthur, Douglas II, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until February 1951; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in France and Adviser on International Affairs to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Macatee, Robert B., United States Representative on the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

Macgregor, Gordon, Technical Cooperation Administration.

Maffitt, Edward P., Adviser for Security Council and General Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations.

Makleff, Brigadier General Mordechai, Israel Defense Army.

Maktos, John, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Malan, Daniel François, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Malania, Leo, Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Malcolm, Colonel Marion, USAF, Head of the Military Rights Division, Assistant for Air Bases, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of Defense.

Malik, Charles, Lebanese Minister in the United States.

Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister; Soviet Representative at the United Nations; President of the United Nations Security Council in June 1951.

Mangano, Philip A., Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Maniadakis, Constantine, joint leader of the Greek *Politike Anexartetos Parataxis* (Independent Political Array).

Mansfield, Michael J., Democratic Congressman from Montana; Representative at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mansur (Mansour), Prince, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense until May 1, 1951.

Marchal, Léon, French Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, from July 15, 1951.

Marei Bey, Ali, Director of Protocol, Egyptian Foreign Ministry.

Margolies, Daniel F., Deputy Director, Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.

Margrave, Robert, Munitions Division, Office of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State.

Marjolin, Robert Ernest, Secretary General of the Organization for European Cooperation.
Markezinis, Spyros B., leader of the New Party in Greece.
Marshall, Charles Burton, Member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
Marshall, George C., Secretary of Defense until September 17, 1951.
Martin, Edwin M., Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.
Mathews, Elbert G., Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State; Consul at Istanbul, from June 18, 1951, Consul General at Istanbul, from September 20, 1951.
Matienzo, Eduardo Anze, United Nations Commissioner for Eritrea.
Matthews, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State.
Mattison, Gordon H., Counselor of the Embassy in Egypt.
Mavros, George, Greek Minister of Finance, from February 2, 1951.
McBride, Harry C., Administrator, National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
McBride, John W., Office of African Affairs, Department of State.
McBride, Robert Henry, United States Consul at Rabat, Morocco until September 1951; with the Embassy in France, from September 1951.
McCloy, John J., United States High Commissioner for Germany.
McDaniel, Bruce W., Appointed Chief of the Technical Cooperation Administration Mission to Israel, October 14, 1951.
McDermott, Michael J., Special Assistant for Press Relations to the Secretary of State.
McFall, Jack K., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
McGhee, George C., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, from October 1949; Ambassador to Turkey, from December 1951.
McJunkins, Orren R., Deputy Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Turkey.
McWilliams, William J., Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State.
Meeker, Leonard C., Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Meier, Oscar W., Officer in Charge of African Economic Affairs, Department of State, from March 1951; Chief of the Economic Mission in Liberia, 1946–1950.
Melas, Leonidas, Greek Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
Meloy, Francis E., Jr., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State.
Memminger, Robert B., First Secretary of the Embassy in Greece.
Menderes, Adnan, Turkish Prime Minister.
Menzies, Robert G., Australian Prime Minister.
Merchant, Livingston T., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, until November 1951; thereafter, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs.
Meron, Gershon, Director, Economic Division, Israeli Foreign Ministry.
Merrell, George R., Ambassador to Ethiopia until March 17, 1951.
Milicević, Nikola, Yugoslav Minister to Israel.
Milne, Matilda L., Assistant Chief, Exchange Rates, Monetary Affairs Staff, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State.
Minor, Harold B., Minister in Lebanon, from September 1951.
Misha'al al-Saud, Amir, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation, from May 1951.
Mitchell, William, Special Adviser to the Secretary of the Air Force.
Moatsis, John, former *Chef de Cabinet* in the Government of Greek Prime Minister Nicholas Plastiris, April–November 1951.
Mohammed al Amin, Sidi (Sidi Mohammed Lamine Pasha), Bey of Tunisia.
Mohammed ben Youssef, Sidi, Sultan of Morocco.
Moline, Edwin G., Acting Chief, Economic Defense Staff, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State, from April 10, 1951; Chief, from November 21, 1951.
Monem, Abdul Mostafa Bey. *See* Abdul Monem, Mostafa Bey.
Monsma, George R., Officer in Charge of International Organization Affairs, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State.
Moodie, Colin T., Counselor of the Australian Embassy in the United States.
Moore, C. Robert, Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.
Moore, W. F., President, Arabian-American Oil Company.
Moreland, William D., Consul in the Consulate General at Dakar, French West Africa.

Morrison, Herbert, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, March–October, 1951.

Morse, Peter K., Office of the General Counsel, Economic Cooperation Administration.

Mosadeq (Mossadegh), Mohammad, Chairman of the Iranian *Majlis* oil commission and leader of the Iranian National Front; Iranian Prime Minister from April 29, 1951.

al-Mulki (Mulqi), Fawzi, Jordanian Minister of Defense until December 1950.

Muniz, João Carlos, Brazilian Representative at the United Nations; President of the United Nations Security Council in October 1951.

Muntasir, Mahmud, Libyan Prime Minister, from March 1951.

Murphy, Carl, President of the *Afro-American* newspapers.

el-Nahas Pasha, Mustafa, Egyptian Prime Minister and President of the Wafd Party.

Naif, Emir, Regent of Jordon, July 20–September 6, 1951.

Nash, Frank C., Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, until July 1951; thereafter, Assistant for International Security Affairs to the Secretary of Defense.

Nashashibi, Azmi, Senior Jordanian representative on the Jordan–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission; Under Secretary in the Jordanian Foreign Ministry.

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

Newell, George T., Vice President, Manufacturers Trust Company.

Newton, James D., Petroleum Policy Staff, Department of State.

Nitze, Paul H., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

Nkrumah, Kwame, Leader of Government Business (Prime Minister) of the Legislative Assembly of the Gold Coast; leader of Gold Coast Convention People's Party.

Noble, Donald, Assistant Legal Counsel, Arabian American Oil Company.

Norton, Sir Clifford John, British Ambassador to Greece.

Nuri al-Said. *See* al-Said, Nuri.

Ofsthun, Colonel Sidney A., USAF, Chief, Plans and Programs Division, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense.

Ohliger, Floyd W., Vice President in Charge of Government Liaison in Saudi Arabia, Arabian American Oil Company.

Ohly, John H., Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance, until January 8, 1951; thereafter, with International Security Affairs (ISA), Department of State; from October 1951, Assistant Director for Policy and Program Development, ISA.

O'Keefe, Brigadier General Richard J., USAF, Commanding General, Dhahran Airfield.

Ordonneau, Pierre, Member of the French Delegation at the United Nations.

Oudot, Emile, Senior Director and, after June 10, 1951, temporary President and Director General of the *Banque de Syrie et du Liban* in Lebanon.

Pace, Frank, Jr., Secretary of the Army.

Packard, Major General Sir Charles Douglas, Commander, British Military Mission in Greece, 1949–1951; Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, 1951–1953.

Pahlevi, Mohammad Reza Shah, Shah of Iran.

Paige, Robert D., Foreign Program Officer, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece.

Palmer, Ely E., United States Representative and Chairman, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.

Palmer, Joseph 2d, First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Papagos, Field Marshal Alexander, Commander in Chief of Greek Armed Forces until May 1951; Head of the political movement known as "Greek Rally", from August 1951.

Papandreou, George, Greek Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Coordination, and Minister of Religion and National Education, until July 1951; leader of the George Papandreou Party.

Papapolitis, Savvas, EPEK Member of the Greek Parliament, 1951; Greek Minister of Commerce, from October 1951.

Papaspyrou, Demitrios, former EPEK Member of the Greek Parliament; Greek Minister of Justice, from October 1951.

Parker, Paul C., U.S. Treasury Representative in the Middle East.

Parsons, J. Graham, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.

Patrick, Captain G. Serpell, USN, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.

Patterson, Jefferson, United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

Paul, Norman S., Deputy Assistant for International Security Affairs to the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Pelt, Adrian, United Nations Commissioner in Libya.

Penfield, James K., Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

Perillier, Louis, French Resident General in Tunisia.

Perkins, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Peurifoy, John E., Ambassador to Greece and Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece.

Phelps, Vernon L., Chief, Trade Agreements Branch, Commercial Policy Staff, Department of State.

Pinder, Frank E., United States Agricultural Adviser in Liberia.

Pinkerton, Lowell C., Minister in Lebanon.

Pipinelis, Panayotis, former Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Plakias, John N., Consul General at Dakar, French West Africa.

Plastiras, General Nicholas, Prime Minister of Greece, from October 1951; joint leader with Emmanuel Tsouderos of the National Progressive Union of the Center (EPEK).

Plitt, Edwin A., Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier until April 1951; thereafter, Senior United Nations Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State; member of the U.S. Delegation Staff of Advisers at the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Politis, Athanase G., Greek Ambassador to the United States.

Politis, John, Greek Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs until August 1951; Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, August–September 1951.

Polk, Judd, Chief, British Commonwealth and Middle East Division, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury.

Popper, David H., Deputy Director, International Organization Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

Porter, Paul R., Assistant Administrator for Program, Economic Cooperation Administration; Acting United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, from September 1951.

Porter, William J., Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.

Potamianos, Haralambos, Private Secretary to Paul, King of the Hellenes and Honorary General Aide to the King.

Power, Thomas F., Jr., Principal Secretary, United Nations Mission in Libya; Personal Representative in Libya of the United Nations Secretary-General.

Proctor, David, Vice President and General Counsel, Gulf Oil Corporation.

Puaux, François, Deputy Director of the Protectorates, French Foreign Ministry.

Puaux, Gabriel, French Resident General in Morocco, 1943–1946.

al-Qudsi, Nazim, Syrian Prime Minister, until March 1951.

Quevedo, Antonio, Ecuadorian Representative at the United Nations; President of the United Nations Security Council in January and December 1951.

al-Quwatli, Shukri, former President of Syria, 1943–1949.

Rafael, Gideon, Israeli Alternate Representative at the United Nations.

Rahim, Mohamed Kamil Abdul, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States.

Ramati, Colonel Shaoul, Israel Defense Forces; Officer in Charge, Israeli Delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions.

Ranney, Frederic G., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.

al-Rawi, Ahmad Eban Said Ibrahim, Under Secretary, Iraqi Foreign Office, 1949–1951; Iraqi Minister to Jordan, from March 3, 1951.

Ray, George W., Jr., General Counsel, Arabian-American Oil Company.

Raynor, G. Hayden, Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until March 1951; Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, from March 1951.

Razmara, General Ali, Iranian Prime Minister, from June 26, 1950 until his assassination on March 7, 1951.

Redecker, Sydney, Consul General at Johannesburg.

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State.

Reinstein, Jacques J., Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, from August 1951.

Rendis, Constantine, Greek Minister of Interior, from October 1951.
Rhoades, Ralph O., Vice President, Gulf Oil Corporation.
Richards, Arthur L., Counselor of the Embassy in Iran.
Richardson, W. Garland, First Secretary of the Embassy in Liberia.
Richey, Earle J., Office of African Affairs, Department of State.
al-Rifai, Samir, Jordanian Prime Minister until July 1951.
Riley, Major General William E., USMC (promoted to Lieutenant General, May 1951), Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
Ritter, Paul, Swiss Consul General at Tel Aviv.
Rives, James H., United States Public Works Adviser in Liberia.
Robertson, General Sir Brian H., Commander in Chief, British Middle East Land Forces.
Rockefeller, Nelson A., Chairman of the Presidential Council on Technical Assistance.
Rockwell, Stuart W., Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
Roosevelt, Anna Eleanor (Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt), United States Representative to the Commission on Human Rights, United Nations Economic and Social Council; Representative at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Root, John Frick, Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.
Rosaz, Gabriel, Attaché, French Embassy.
Rosenson, Alexander M., Associate Chief (Chief from October 1951), Monetary Affairs Staff, Department of State.
Ross, John C., Deputy Representative on the Security Council; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Rountree, William M., Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.
Ruffner, Major General Clark L., USA, Deputy Assistant for International Security Affairs to the Secretary of Defense.
Rusk, Dean, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
al-Sabban, Muhmmad Surur, Saudi Arabian Minister of State.
Sadawi, Bashir, Leader of the National Congress Party in Libya.
al-Said, Nuri, Iraqi Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.
Sakellariou, Vice Admiral Alexander, Royal Hellenic Navy (Ret.), member of the Greek Parliament as co-leader of the National Re-Creation Front until 1951; Greek Minister of National Defense, from October 1951.
Saleh, Abdullah Mulla, Personal Secretary to the Shaikh of Kuwait.
de St. Hardouin, J. Tarbe, French Representative on the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
Salaheddin Bey, Mohamed, Egyptian Foreign Minister.
Saleh, Alayar, Chairman of the Iranian National Oil Company, National Front Deputy, and President of the Joint Oil Committee.
Salha, Najib Bey, Saudi Arabian Deputy Assistant Minister of Finance.
Sandifer, Durward V., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Sands, William L., Jr., Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.
Sanjabi, Karim, Iranian Minister of Education, from May 1951.
al-Sanussi, Sayyid Muhammad Idris, Amir of Cyrenaica; King Idris I of Libya, from December 24, 1951.
Sarper, Selim, Turkish Permanent Representative at the United Nations; President of the United Nations Security Council in May 1951.
Satterthwaite, Livingston, Deputy Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.
Saud. *See* Ibn Saud.
Saud ibn Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.
Sauer, Paul O., Minister of Transport of the Union of South Africa.
Savut, Ilhan, Turkish Alternate Representative on the United Nations Security Council.
Schuman, Robert, French Foreign Minister.
Scott, Major General Stanley L., USA, Director, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense.
Selo, Colonel Fawzi, Syrian Minister of Defense in the Cabinet of Nazim al-Qudsi, until March 1951; in the Cabinet of Khalid al-Azm, March–July 1951; and in the Cabinet of Hasan al-Hakim, August–November 1951. Syrian Chief of State, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense, from December 1951.

Seraggedin (Sirag el Din), Fuad Pasha, Egyptian Minister of Interior and Finance and Secretary General of the Wafd Party.

Setser, Vernon G., Commercial Policy Staff, Department of State; Chief, Economic Treaties Branch, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, after July 30, 1951.

Shalit, Meir, First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in the United States.

Sharett, Moshe, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs; President of the Israeli Delegation at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Shaw, Barkley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force.

Sherman, Charles B., Liberian Treasury Economist; Economic Adviser to the Liberian Government.

Sherman, Admiral Forrest P., Chief of Naval Operations.

Shiloah, Reuven, Special Adviser to the Israeli Foreign Minister.

al-Shishakli (Shishikli), Colonel Adib, Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, from May 31, 1951; temporary Syrian Chief of State, December 1951.

Shukairy, Ahmad, Syrian Representative at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly; Assistant Secretary General of the League of the League of Arab States.

Shullaw, J. Harold, Dominion Affairs Officer, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.

Silaw. *See* Selo.

Silver, Solomon, Technical Cooperation Administration.

Silver, Warren A., Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State.

Sims, Harold, Officer in Charge of West, Central and East African Affairs until August 1951; thereafter, Consul General at Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.

Sirry Pasha, Hussein, Egyptian Prime Minister until January 1951.

Slessor, Sir John C., Marshal of the British Royal Air Force.

Slim, Field Marshal Sir William J., Chief, British Imperial General Staff.

Smith, Mary L., Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

Smith, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell, USA (General from July 27, 1951), Director of Central Intelligence.

Snoy et d'Oppuers, Baron Jean-Charles, former Chairman of the Council of the Organization for European Cooperation.

Snyder, John, Secretary of the Treasury.

Snyder, Lucille, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

Sofianopoulos (Sophianopoulos), John, joint leader of the Democratic Camp, a coalition of political parties of the extreme left in the Greek parliamentary elections of March 1950.

el-Solh, Riad, Prime Minister of Lebanon until February 1951; assassinated on July 16, 1951.

Soulie, Gaston, Assistant Chief of the Cabinet of the French Residency General in Morocco.

Spalding, Major General Sidney P., USA (Ret.), assistant to Major General James H. Burns during World War II.

Sparks, Joseph S., First Secretary of the Embassy in Egypt.

Spencer, John, Adviser to the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry.

Spofford, Charles M., United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council; Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies and of the European Coordinating Committee.

Stabler, Wells, Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Department of State.

Stanton, William Q., Consul General at Lagos, Nigeria, until April 1951.

Steel, Christopher E., British Minister in the United States.

Stein, Eric, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Stephanopoulos, Stephen, joint leader of the Greek Populist-Unionist Party, incorporated into the Greek Rally in August 1951; member of the Greek Parliament.

Stevenson, Sir Ralph Clarmont Skrine, British Ambassador to Egypt.

Stinebower, Leroy D., Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State.

Stowell, Major General James S., USAF, Commanding General, Continental Division, Military Air Transport Service.

Strang, Sir William, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sturgill, Robert G., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, from August 1951.

Stutesman, John H., Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iran from June 1949; Counselor of Embassy in addition to Second Secretary, from June 20, 1951.

Sulaiman, Abdullah, Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance.

Sulaiman, Hamad, Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister of Finance.

Surur (Suroor) al-Sabban, Muhammad. *See* al-Sabban, Muhammad Surur.

Swayzee, Cleon O., Labor Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Sweeney, Joseph, Attaché at the Embassy in the Union of South Africa.

Swett, Trevor W., Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State.

Tabet, Kerim, Egyptian journalist and writer; former Press Adviser to the Egyptian Royal Cabinet; Adviser, Egyptian State Broadcasting.

Takla, Philip, Lebanese Minister of Finance, from June 1951.

Talal ibn Abdullah al-Hussein, Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; proclaimed King on September 5, 1951.

Tate, Jack B., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State.

Taxis, Colonel Samuel G., USMC, Chairman, Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.

Taylor, Fred E., Office of the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary of State.

Taylor, Major General Maxwell D., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, U.S. Army, February–July 1951.

Tenney, E. Paul, First Secretary of the Embassy in Iraq until May 1951.

Thayer, Robert A., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Thornburg, Max W., foreign industrial consultant.

Thorp, Willard L., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Tibbetts, Margaret Joy, Attaché at the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

Tobin, Maurice J., Secretary of Labor.

Tomlinson, J. D., Adviser in the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State.

La Tournelle. *See* Le Roy de la Tournelle.

Trott, Alan Charles, British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

Truman, Harry S., President of the United States.

Tsakalotos, Lieutenant General Thrasyvoulos, Chief of the Greek Army General Staff, from June 1951.

Tsaldaris, Constantine, leader of the Populist Party in Greece; member of the Greek Parliament.

Tsarapkin, Semyen Konstantinovich, Soviet Alternate Representative at the United Nations.

Tsiang, Tingfu F., Chinese Representative at the United Nations; President of the United Nations Security Council in November 1951.

Tsouderos, Emmanuel, Greek Minister of Coordination; joint leader with General Nicholas Plastiris of EPEK, the National Progressive Union of the Center.

Tubman, William V. S., President of Liberia.

Tufts, Robert W., Member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

Tuqan, Ahmad Bey, Jordanian Foreign Minister, March 1–April 17, 1951.

Turkel, Harry R., Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Greece, from June 5, 1951.

Twe, Didwo, leader of the Liberian United People's Party, 1949–1951, and the Liberian Reformation Party, from April 1951; candidate for President of Liberia in May 1951.

Twining, General Nathan F., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

Tyler, S. Roger, Jr., Consul at Jerusalem.

Ustun, Gündoğdu, Acting Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

Vallat, Francis, member of the United Kingdom Delegation at the United Nations.

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

Van Fleet, Lieutenant General James A., USA, former Director, Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece, 1948–1950, and Chief, Joint U.S. Military Aid Group to Greece, until July 17, 1950.

van Laethem, Gabriel, Second Secretary of the French Embassy in the United States.

Venizelos, Sophocles, Greek Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Provisional Minister of National Defense, until October 1951; thereafter, Greek Deputy Prime Minister.

Ventiris, Lieutenant General Constantine, Inspector General of the Greek National Army, 1949–March 1951; thereafter, Honorary General Aide to Paul, King of the Hellenes.

Vigier, Henri, United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization.

Villard, Henry S., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

Vimont, Jacques, Secretary General of the Tunisian Government (French Residency General in Tunisia) until March 1951.

Voizard, Pierre, Minister of State for Monaco, until December 1951; French Resident General in Tunisia, from December 1951.

Vorys, John M., Republican Congressman from Ohio; Representative at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Waddell, Major E. L., Jr., USA, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

al-Wadi, Shakr, Acting Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Wadsworth, George, Ambassador to Turkey.

Wagner, Joseph J., Consul at Nicosia, Cyprus.

Wainhouse, David W., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State; Adviser at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Waldo, John A., Jr., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Walmsley, Walter N., Jr., Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large.

Ward, Angus, Consul General at Nairobi.

Warren, Avra M., Ambassador to Pakistan.

Watts, Philip H., Member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

Webb, James E., Under Secretary of State.

Wellons, Alfred E., Office of African Affairs, Department of State.

White, Lincoln, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

White, Major General Thomas D., USAF, Director of Plans, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, from February 1951.

Whiteman, Marjorie M., Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State.

Wiens, Henry, Program Review Officer, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in Turkey.

Winslow, Richard S., Secretary General, United States Mission at the United Nations.

Wooldridge, Rear Admiral Edmund T., USN, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council.

Worcester, Douglas J., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Wright, Vice Admiral Jerauld, USN, Deputy United States Representative, NATO Standing Group.

Yadin, Major General Yigael, Chief of Staff, Defense Army of Israel.

ibn Yahya, Ahmad, Imam of Yemen.

Yamut, General Nuri, Chief of Staff, Turkish General Staff, Turkish Army.

Yassin, Shaikh Yusef, Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister.

Yingling, Raymund T., Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State.

Yost, Charles W., Minister at the Embassy in Greece.

Young, Richard, International Law Counsel to the Saudi Arabian Government.

al-Za'im, Husni, Former Syrian Prime Minister (April–June 1949).

Zain, Queen of Jordan.

Zeineddine, Farid, Syrian Representative at the United Nations.

Zigdis, John (Ioannis), Liberal and later EPEK party Member of the Greek Parliament; Greek Minister without Portfolio, from October 1951.

Zorlu, Fatin Rüstü, Assistant Secretary General for Economic Affairs, Turkish Foreign Ministry.

LIST OF SOURCES

The principal source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central (decimal) files of the Department of State. Documents from the central files were supplemented by materials from Department of State "lot" files (retired decentralized office files) and post files (records retired by United States missions overseas). The editors also examined files of the Economic Cooperation Administration located in the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. Presidential papers in the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri became available only after this volume had been compiled.

A list of lot files used in the preparation of this volume follows, with information concerning their origin, scope, and size.

CFM Files, Lot M 88

Consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of heads of state, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955, prepared by the Records Service Center, Department of State. (249 feet)

Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on official visits by European heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences, including North Atlantic Council sessions, attended by the Secretary of State during the years 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (13 feet)

***Daily TS Summary*, Lot 52–242**

Master set of the Department of State internal publication *Daily Top Secret Summary* for the years 1945–1951, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. (4 feet)

ECA Telegram Files, FRC Acc. No. 53 A 278

Serial telegram files of incoming and outgoing Economic Cooperation Administration telegrams for the years 1948–1951, as maintained by the Administrative Services Division of ECA and subsequently retired by the Mutual Security Agency. These files, now administered by the Agency for International Development, are located in the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. (249 feet)

INR–NIE Files

File of National Intelligence Estimates and Special Estimates retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

IO Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, comprising official United Nations documentation and classified Department of State records on United States policy in the United Nations Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and *ad hoc* committees for the period from 1946 to date. (More than 100 feet)

IO Files, Lot 71 D 440

Master file of classified records and correspondence of United States Delegations to sessions of the United Nations General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, as maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State. (48 feet)

ISAC Files, Lot 53 D 443

Files of the International Security Affairs Committee, Department of State, 1951. (2 feet)

McGhee Files, Lot 53 D 468

Copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1949–1951.

NAC Files, Lot 60 D 137

Master file of documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State.

NE Files, Lot 57 D 177

Files of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the Department of State, 1928-1953, particularly concerning Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. (2 feet)

NE Files, Lot 58 D 332

Files of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the Department of State, 1949-1956, particularly concerning the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. (2 feet)

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, covering the years 1947–1953. (42 feet)

S/ISA Files, Lot 52–26

Records of the Office of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State, covering the years 1949–1951; part of Accession No. 62 A 613 of the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland.

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. (17 feet)

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. (43 feet)

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence, and related Department of State memoranda, for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (20 feet)

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for the years 1947–1963. (9 feet)

Secretary's Letters, Lot 56 D 459

Serial master file of correspondence of the Secretary of State for the years 1945–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. (3⅓ feet)

Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444

Comprehensive chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda and memoranda of conversation for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (15 feet)

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 238

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1949–1952, memoranda of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1951–1952, and the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversations with Senator Tom Connally of Texas for the years 1950–1951, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (1 foot)

State–JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 1951–1959, and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (3 feet)

Under Secretary's Meetings, Lot 53 D 250

Master file of records of meetings, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary's meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (3 feet)

UNP Files, Lot 58 D 224

Miscellaneous subject files of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, covering the years 1943–1956. (8 feet)

UNP Files, Lot 59 D 237

Subject files of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, covering the years 1946–1957. (3 feet)

THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST[1]

UNITED STATES MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST: THE DRAFTING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL; THE CONFERENCE OF MIDDLE EAST CHIEFS OF MISSION AT ISTANBUL, FEBRUARY 14–21; THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS TO ESTABLISH A MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

Editorial Note

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum dated August 5, 1948, to the Secretary of Defense which the latter circulated to the National Security Council (NSC 19/3; *Foreign Relations*, 1948, volume III, page 933) on the subject "Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies in Africa", stated that, in formulating a statement of the requirements of the United States with regard to the former Italian Colonies, they found it necessary to appraise the position and security interests of the United States not only with respect to those territories, but to the entire area of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The appraisal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of United States security interests in the entire area indicated the following strategic requirements:

a. Denial to any potentially hostile power of any foothold in this area.

b. Maintenance of friendly relationships which could be promoted by social and economic assistance, together with such military assistance as might be practicable in order to insure collaboration by the peoples of the region in the common defense of the area.

c. Development of the oil resources in the area by the United States and such other countries as had or could be expected to have a friendly attitude toward the United States.

d. Assurance of the right of military forces of the United States to enter militarily essential areas upon a threat of war.

e. Assurance of the right to develop and maintain those facilities which were required to implement *d* (Memorandum by Secretary of Defense Forrestal for the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 2 August, 1948, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East").

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[1] For previous documentation on United States policy regarding this region, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1 ff. Policy respecting Greece and Turkey in 1951 is largely treated in context of the NATO Pact in vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.

A memorandum for the files, August 5, 1948, by Max Bishop of S/P, indicates that the Forrestal memorandum was circulated in the NSC, then placed in National Security Council custody without any further action being taken (S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East"). The National Security Council produced no papers dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East regions as a strategic entity prior to the close of 1950.

On November 29, 1950, however, Assistant Secretary of State McGhee sent a memorandum to Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup informing him of the "strong belief in NEA that an NSC paper on the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East would be very useful in helping to coordinate State and Defense and U.S. and U.K. planning in relation to that area and possibly to reorient somewhat our political, economic, and military programs in the countries of the area." McGhee described the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area as embracing the following countries: Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the Arab States, including Egypt and Libya. He added that the country-by-country approach to the problems of the area which, by implication, had superseded any regional planning of importance, had "repeatedly proved inadequate as a basis for the formulation or expression of our policies". McGhee concluded by offering a brief, rough outline of the contents of a possible National Security Council paper on the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East (S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East").

On December 11, Jessup incorporated McGhee's memorandum in a draft memorandum to James S. Lay, Jr., the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, and the following day Lay submitted the Jessup memorandum to the Senior Staff of the National Security Council for consideration (S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East"). There is no record in the Department of State files as to the action taken by the Senior Staff of the National Security Council, but presumably they directed the Department of State to draft a paper along the lines initially outlined by McGhee on November 29; and on December 27, 1950, McGhee submitted to the Secretary of State the memorandum on "Proposed US Political and Military Actions Required to Assist the Countries of the Middle East in the Defense of the Area Against Aggression", printed *infra*.

The subject of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East was considered at the Senior National Security Council Staff meeting on December 29, 1950; and in a memorandum of January 3, 1951, Walter N. Walmsley, Jr., Special Assistant to Ambassador at Large Jessup, informed McGhee that the Senior Staff had agreed that (*a*) the Central Intelligence Agency should prepare an intelligence estimate on local attitudes and conditions in the region which affected the protection of United States interests and the realization of United States objectives, and (*b*) the Department of State should prepare the initial draft of a policy paper on the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East for consideration by the Senior Staff (S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East").

On April 5, 1951, George H. Haselton of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, submitted to Max Bishop, then serving as National Security Council Staff Member under Ambassador at Large Jessup, the first draft of a paper entitled "Statement of Policy With Respect to the Eastern Mediterranean–Iran Area." A copy of this draft paper along with an enclosed military analysis for the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is in S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East". On May 2, 1951, Intelligence Estimate Number 17, "Estimate of Reactions to Varying Degrees of U.S. Military Commitment and Activity in the Near East," prepared by the Intelligence Estimates Group, Department of State, was circulated to various interested Bureaus and Agencies within the Department. A copy of this estimate is in S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East". On May 25, the first draft of a National Security Council Staff Study on "The Position of the United States With Respect to the General Area of the Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf" (which for National Security Council Staff Study planning purposes included Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Arab States, Aden, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, Libya, and the waters and islands of the area) was circulated to various interested Bureaus and Agencies in the Department of State by Haselton. A copy of this draft study is in S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East".

Throughout the remainder of 1951 and well into 1952, the Departments of State and Defense as well as the Central Intelligence Agency worked on a series of draft papers dealing with this problem (in S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East"), with a number of other executive agencies, including the Office of Defense Management, the Psychological Strategy Board, and the National Security Council, submitting or receiving draft comments. No final agreed paper on the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East emerged during 1951, and indeed the scope and scale of the study was steadily reduced to focus upon Iran, Israel, and the Arab States, particularly in light of the admission of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The final Department of State paper submitted to the National Security Council Staff in 1951, "The Position of the United States With Respect to the General Area of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East", December 27, is printed on page 257.

S/P–NSC Files : Lot 61 D 167 : "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East"

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 27, 1950.

Subject: Proposed US Political and Military Actions Required to Assist the Countries of the Middle East in the Defense of the Area Against Aggression

In the light of present world events, it is believed that more positive US political and military action is required if the Middle East* is to be successfully defended, and the US and its Western Allies are to make war-time use of Middle Eastern oil, bases and manpower.

Justification for Review of Policy

Among the basic elements justifying a review of US policy and actions in the Middle East at this time are:

(1) US actions have not adequately reflected the NSC findings that the defense of the Middle East is "vital" to the defense of the US.

(2) The UK, which has primary responsibility for the defense of the area, lacks both manpower and resources successfully to defend the area and has no plans for defense of the Saudi Arabian oil fields and the Dhahran Air Base.

(3) Loss of the Middle East to the USSR would be a great psychological loss to the free world generally, and particularly to Western Europe and the members of the British Commonwealth who attach special importance to the sea, land and air routes of the area.

(4) Access to Middle Eastern oil is essential to Europe and would be essential to the US in a long war. Russia could never consolidate a European conquest without Middle Eastern oil.

(5) Important naval, land and strategic air routes and bases exist in the area. Dhahran and Wheelus Fields would be put to immediate strike and post-strike use by the USAF, in the event of global war.

(6) If the West does not participate effectively in defense of the Middle East, it is doubtful that the support of the Middle East countries could be regained after a war. If the US itself does not participate, American prestige in the area would be lost and American firms might not be permitted to resume their oil concessions and other interests following "liberation".

(7) Turkey's fighting power, potentially the greatest in free Europe outside the United Kingdom, could not be effectively realized if Soviet forces surround it from the East and South.

Proposals:

The following proposals seek to maximize, at minimal cost to the US, the will of the people of the area to cooperate with the West in resistance to the USSR; to translate that will into a coordinated indigenous effort to resist the Soviet advance; and, if the area is overrun, to harry and sabotage the invader, to aid downed Allied airmen and to assist in liberation.

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*"Middle East" in this paper includes the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab States including Egypt and Libya. [Footnote in the source text.]

The key proposal around which other steps will center is:

A US decision and unilateral public statement that the US has a vital security interest in the defense of the Middle East as a whole, and that the US, consistent with its obligations under the UN and with our other commitments, is prepared to assist the countries of the Middle East in the defense of the area against aggression.[1]

Within the framework of the overall declaration described above, t is proposed:

(1) To let it be known informally to the governments of each country in the area that an overt Soviet aggression in the area would ead inevitably to global war.

(2) To continue to supply military equipment to Greece, Turkey, nd Iran. In the case of Turkey, substantially to increase military upplies as conditions permit, and to consider other forms of assistnce, economic and otherwise, as are required to permit Turkey to ncrease the size of the regular army and to have stand-by equipment or maximum mobilization of reserves. (A separate memorandum on he subject of support for expanded Turkish military strength is being prepared.)

(3) In conjunction with the UK, to embark upon a policy of trengthening the indigenous defense forces in the other countries of he Middle East who will participate in the defense of the area, on he basis of equal-to-equal partnership. If necessary to achieve the ooperation of the Arabs, we should urge the UK to offer to renounce ts existing treaty rights in Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, if and when lternative and adequate security arrangements can be made.

(4) To deliver at an early date token amounts of US arms to Middle Eastern states not now receiving them, who will participate n the defense of the area. To advise these states that when supply and lobal priorities permit, more substantive quantities of arms would be elivered, for needs not met from the UK or other sources.

(5) As proof of US determination, to station at an early date a attalion of US Marines at Dhahran Airfield in defense of the air eld and oil fields, as a means of meeting Ibn Saud's needs for American assurances, and for the morale effect upon the Near East generally.

(6) To supply promptly small US and/or UK training missions nd individual service technicians to states asking for them.

(7) To arrange "show-the-flag" visits by USAF planes and Navy essels in friendly countries, in agreement with the Governments oncerned.

(8) The US, UK and Commonwealth to agree, in conjunction with nhabitants of the area (Turkey in particular) to plan and to attempt o hold as close as possible to the "outer ring" (the Turkish-Iranian ountain line which will protect the maximum defensible area of the Middle East with its oil, manpower, and strategic facilities). The deense of the "outer ring" would thus become the target for which pro-

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[1] See editorial note, p. 150.

vision would be made in the Allied power build-up, once more pressing needs elsewhere are met.

(9) To establish (for political as well as military reasons) a combined US–UK command structure in the Middle East which would stimulate basic cooperation among the states of the area not now possible through indigenous organizations or groupings such as the Arab League. This structure would not alter the fact that the UK and Commonwealth have primary responsibility for the defense of the area. It would, however, make much more attractive to the Arab States and Israel the establishment of a direct relationship between the US–UK command and the respective military authorities in each country. The US–UK command structure would include the naming of a British Commanding Officer, the naming of a US Deputy Commander and, if possible, the naming of US country advisers or commanders for the combined US–UK structures in Greece, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The US Deputy Commander should have a political adviser supplied by the Department. If and when shipping and supply conditions necessitate, the US–UK command structure should have a supply counterpart along the lines of MESC in World War II.

(10) To streamline Washington procedures so that reasonable requests for aid within the capability of the US to supply are met promptly. To the wavering states in the Middle East, delay in action is considered evidence of disinterest: the maxim "he gives twice who gives quickly" is particularly applicable to this area.

(11) Through technical and economic assistance, both directly and through the UN, to make it clear to the peoples of the Middle East that they as individuals will benefit from the victory of the West; many poverty-crushed Middle Easterners feel that life under the USSR could not be worse than the life they are now leading.

(12) By the early placing of orders for raw materials and manufactures for war purposes (notably in Egypt and Israel), to get such industry as exists in the Middle East behind the Allied war effort and to expand such industry where practicable.

[Annex 1]

Paper Drafted in the Department of State[2]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

RE-EVALUATION OF US PLANS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

1. US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The following US Government policy was approved on November 24, 1947:[3]

". . . The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States. . . . In carrying out this policy the United States should be prepared to make full use of its political, economic, and, if necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective. . . . One of the greatest dangers to world peace may be the failure of the Soviet Union to understand the extent to which the United States is prepared to go in order to maintain the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It should, therefore, be the policy of this Government to make evident in a firm but non-provocative manner the extent of the determination of the United States to assist in preserving in the interest of world peace the security of the area."

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[2] The source text does not indicate the identity of the drafting officer(s) nor the date prepared.

[3] For the full text of the Department of State memorandum from which this passage was taken, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 575–576.

Although the Defense Department, or branches of the armed forces, have at times indicated a preference for the designation "critical" rather than "vital", nevertheless the US and UK Joint Chiefs of Staff as recently as October 26, 1950 [4] agreed that "the Middle East in war is of importance second only to Western Europe".

The security interests of the United States in the Middle East [†] are primarily:

(1) The oil resources of Arabia, Iraq and Iran.

(2) Important naval and strategic and tactical air bases.

(3) Communications and transportation between the West and the Far East.

(4) The political and military importance of the Middle East bridge between the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa.

United States security interests in the Middle East, especially when viewed in their interrelationship with the similar British security interests, involve the region as a whole. For this reason a country-by-country approach is inadequate as a basis for the formulation of area plans and our policies and actions toward any one country must be framed in the light of our objectives with respect to the area as a whole.

2. OCTOBER CONCLUSIONS OF US–UK JOINT CHIEFS

In the October discussions of the US and UK Joint Chiefs, the following conclusions were reached:

US and UK military representatives in the Middle East will be directed to undertake a joint fact-finding review of present capabilities and projected requirements for the defense of the so-called "outer ring". The "outer ring" is anchored on Turkey in the west and runs southeastwards along the Zagros Mountains of Iran, thus embracing most of the Middle East and giving some protection to the oil fields in southern Iran and Arabia. This plan goes far beyond the limited concept of defending the Suez Canal area which the British proposed as the most feasible plan considering probable British and US capabilities in the foreseeable future. It is noteworthy that even the defense of the Suez area is, according to the British, beyond the probable capability of the UK and the Commonwealth and involves a deficit which only US forces, particularly air forces, can meet.

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[4] For documentation on the Middle East discussions between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff in October 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 188 ff. For documentation on the entire range of discussions undertaken by the Chiefs in October 1950, see *ibid.*, vol. iii, pp. 1686 ff.

[†] The term Middle East, as used herein, refers to the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Turkey and Iran, Israel and the Arab States including Egypt and Libya. [Footnote in the source text.]

Noting that there is "growing evidence pointing toward the requirement for at least a portion of the Middle East oil throughout the war", the US and UK Chiefs concluded that further study should be given to this question. Present US planning is based on the assumption that Middle East oil would not be essential for the Allied war effort for the first two war years of a global war. Should the study ordered by the US and UK Chiefs reveal that some Middle Eastern oil is indispensible throughout the war, US plans for defense of the area would have to be altered significantly. In this connection Soviet and European oil resources are so limited that the USSR could not consolidate a victory in Europe without Middle Eastern oil.

3. DISPARITY BETWEEN US PLANNING AND US INTERESTS

The US Joint Chiefs informed the UK Joint Chiefs in October 1950 that the US "will be unable to commit forces to [the Middle East] [5] during, at least, the first two years of war." In view of the limited British capability in the area and the limited defensive capabilities in being on the part of the countries of the area, this statement clearly implies that the United States contemplates the abandonment, without even a token defense effort, of most if not all of the Middle East in time of global war.

The JCS decision rests, of course, on the unpleasant fact that United States capabilities are inadequate to protect our vital interests everywhere at the same time: the Middle East has been written off reluctantly in favor of theaters of higher priority. Since last October, however, major changes have occurred in the world situation: the rate of US buildup has been increased; organizational progress has been achieved in Western Europe and the chances of the Middle East remaining tranquilly on the side of the West without some practical evidence of Western interest have greatly declined.

No one will challenge the fact that plans to abandon the Middle East fail to provide for our security interests there: we believe that a re-evaluation of our Middle East plans is called for in the light of the US program for increased military stature and preparedness.

The present unfavorable trends in the world arise according to NSC 68/2 [6] "from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims". In the development of adequate programs and plans a balance must be maintained between global and regional plans and between areas of differing priorities. "Commitments in one area must not be permitted to jeopardize capabilities to act in other areas. Anxiety for the general position must not prevent adequate actions in particular situations." (November 10 draft of Annex 8 to NSC 68/1)[7]

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[5] Brackets in the source text.

[6] NSC 68/2, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," dated September 30, 1950, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 400.

Abandonment of the Middle East without defense in time of war cannot be justified on the ground that the USSR and its satellites have the capability through an all-out effort to occupy the entire Middle East. By such reasoning the United States would not be justified in defending the Japan-Ryukyus-Philippine chain of bases in the Western Pacific, part or all of which the USSR and Communist China could either neutralize or occupy through an all-out effort in time of war. Instead, our plans should be based on our estimate of the probable effort which the Soviets are likely to exert in the area and on our judgment as to the extent to which our interests in the area justify the commitments which may be necessary to deter or defeat the estimated Soviet effort. NSC 68/1 states that the Defense Department, in determining military requirements, has proceeded on the bases that "the US should have a military strength sufficient to meet her two fundamental obligations: (*a*) Protection against disaster; (*b*) Support of our foreign policy". In weighing what military action may be required for survival itself, account must be taken of the disastrous effect which the abandonment of the Middle East without an effort at defense would have upon the political position of the United States in its relations with the peoples of the Middle East in the post-war period. The likelihood cannot be ignored that, even in advance of war, the inevitable knowledge of the Middle East peoples that the US plans to abandon them can, under an intensified Soviet war of nerves, cause political deterioration and defection throughout most of the Middle East with worldwide political repercussions.

It is our belief that a small fraction of the total US military production and manpower can, if properly applied, produce results far out of proportion to the magnitude of the effort expended.

4. DISPARITY BETWEEN US AND UK PLANNING

In the Middle East the US and UK have similar security interests. All the more striking, therefore, is the absence of any similarity between US and UK plans for the protection of their interests in the Middle East. UK plans, in spite of heavy commitments in other areas, call for the commitment of British forces to defend part of the Middle East. US plans envisage no commitment of American forces to the Middle East for at least the first two years of war. This disparity between US and UK plans had some justification under the World War II concept of British primary responsibility for the defense of the area. Yet, while UK plans envisage (and US plans endorse) British defense of the Suez area and protection of the Iranian oil fields in which British interests are paramount, neither US nor UK plans call for—nor would we probably consider desirable without US local command—British defense of Dhahran Air Field and the oil fields of Arabia in which American interests are paramount.

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[7] NSC 68/1, not printed, was an interim report. For documentation on the NSC 68 series, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 126 ff.

5. IMPORTANT FACTORS IN RE-EVALUATION OF PLANS

In addition to the factors noted above there are other important reasons why our Middle East plans should be reappraised. To follow the time-honored assumption that the US can rely upon the UK to defend the Middle East is to indulge in wishful thinking: British capabilities are too small to be a sound basis for the defense of the US interests in the area. The military weakness of the UK is well known throughout the area; this adversely affects the political position of the UK in negotiating with local governments regarding key defense facilities in the area. Most local governments, if they had to choose, would prefer to rely on American rather than British aid; alternatively they would much prefer joint US–UK support.

There are two important post-war consequences to be considered in connection with our present plans. First, if our total oil requirements for a global war of several years duration were to be obtained solely from Western Hemisphere sources, the over-production of the oil wells would damage the fields so as to delay significantly, if not preclude resumption of normal production in the post-war period. Second, if the British alone put up a token resistance in defense of the Middle East and the protection of the oil fields of Iran while the US withdraws after demolition of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia without firing a shot, the local political reactions might be so adverse to the US as to severely handicap American re-entry into the area and to give the UK a strong commercial and political advantage in their post-war relations with the local governments. The peoples we plan to abandon in war are the same peoples we must continue to work with upon liberation and in the post-war period, when access to local resources and facilities would have to be re-negotiated in an adverse atmosphere.

The protracted debate between the State and Defense Departments and among the three branches of the armed service over the issue of whether the Middle East is "vital" or merely "critical" for purposes of US strategic planning has an interesting sidelight. The position of the Defense Department is motivated in part by two tactical considerations. In the first place, Defense hopes that by adopting a lower priority for the area than the British do, the result will be that the UK will exert itself to do more for the defense of the Middle East than would otherwise be the case. In the second place, the priority assigned to the Middle East substantially affects the inter-service competition between the branches of the armed services for their quotas of the military appropriations. Thus, if the Middle East is deemed "vital" and ground forces are committed to its defense, the Navy would require very considerable equipment and facilities to supply and defend the sea and air lanes on which such ground forces would be dependent. Such an increase in the Navy's share of appropriations would be at the expense of the other service branches.

Whatever role these tactical considerations may play in relations between the US and UK or among the US armed services, it is obvious that they must not be mistaken for the principles which should govern US strategic planning.

6. DIRECTION OF RE-EVALUATION

We believe that a re-evaluation of US plans in relation to the Middle East is urgently required in connection with the accelerated military build-up in which the United States is now engaged.

The direction of such a re-evaluation should be, in our judgment, away from the concept of primary British responsibility and toward the concept of combined US–UK responsibility and active US–UK cooperation in the development and implementation of plans.

[Annex 2]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State [8]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

THE POTENTIAL MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

I. AVAILABLE MANPOWER IN THE NEAR EASTERN AREA

The Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) contain about 40,000,000 people. Approximately 9,000,000 are males between the ages of 15 and 49 of whom 4,430,000 would be physically fit for military service under Western standards. Israel's population is about 1,056,000. 342,000 of these are males between 15 and 49 of whom 255,000 are physically fit for military service.[9]

II. THE CONDITIONS AND ATTITUDES OF THE NEAR EASTERN PEOPLE

Literacy and living standards are low among the larger part of the Arab population. Certain areas such as Yemen are quite backward.

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[8] A notation on the source text indicates that this paper was drafted by Samuel K. C. Kopper of NEA on December 27, 1950.

[9] Footnote in the source text reads: "See Appendix A." Appendix A, which gives a tabular breakdown of available manpower in the Near Eastern area, is not printed.

The morale of the people differs in the several Arab states. However, it cannot be considered high at the moment, although its potentialities are good. The Arab populations have, in general, a common language, religion, heritage, culture, and similar problems. For the most part the Arabs, particularly the governmental leaders, have a basic antipathy towards communism, although communism could make inroads among the poorer classes. However, while the Arab is fundamentally more inclined toward the West, his feelings are colored by his oppositions to imperialism and his dislike of the policy of the West (particularly the United States) on Palestine.[10]

Israel has a higher standard of living and literacy than the Arab states. The morale of the people is high. The economy of the country is precarious, however. The people are for the most part of European extraction and differ greatly from the peoples of the surrounding Arab states in temperament, outlook, energy and approach to their problems. Their approach is essentially western, although it has not as yet been possible to detect any deep friendly attitude toward the West.

III. THE MILITARY POTENTIALITIES OF NEAR EASTERN MANPOWER

a. The Arab has had little chance during the past 30 years to demonstrate whether or not he can be molded into an effective fighting man. Prior to the end of the first World War, people of Arab stock had demonstrated from time to time over the centuries a capacity to perform military service in a competent and efficient manner under most arduous conditions. Since 1919 there has been little real effort made to build up strong, well-trained and well-equipped military units in the Arab states except for the development of the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force in Jordan by the United Kingdom. However, during World War II almost a million people were used for activities in support of the military. This constituted an important source of support manpower. Nevertheless, there has been a lack of competent military leadership throughout the Arab world. Training facilities have been almost non-existent. Governments have been beset by internal bickerings and lack of experience. On the other hand, it would be possible to mold an effective fighting unit in each of the Arab states or among the states as a whole provided: (1) The peoples of Arab states believe they are striving for something basic and real to their families, homes and countries; (2) the government and peoples of the Arab states feel that they are being treated as partners and not as pawns; (3) competent leadership and training is provided and (4) equipment and matériel are supplied as they become available. It is generally agreed that the absence of training, leadership, matériel and cooperation was the cause of the Arab debacle in Palestine. Jordan clearly indicates that military units can be built up. It would take time, but NE believes that within a two-year period much could be accomplished.

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[10] For documentation on the Palestine question, see pp. 559 ff.

b. Israel stands in contrast to the Arab states. There is a higher proportion of trained manpower of military age in Israel, much of which was trained by the UK or in Central European armies. Though far less in number than in the Arab states, the manpower of Israel could be more quickly developed for military purposes. A political problem of first magnitude would exist in the deployment of Israeli forces in other parts of the Near East. Israel would need matériel and probably some training assistance. Just as in the Arab states, the people must understand that from their participation in an allied effort they would be fighting for things which are essential to their survival. There is little evidence that there is any general realization of this in Israel as yet.

IV. THE USE OF MILITARY MANPOWER

The best methods of using military manpower would be (1) to stimulate the effective buildup of armies in the friendly countries and (2) to develop units for support purposes, labor battalions and the like. The training of foreign units to serve with our troops might be the next best alternative. It would not be desirable to establish a Foreign Legion under American leadership. The development of a Foreign Legion in the Arab world would probably be difficult because of (*a*) the bad connotation of the concept of a Foreign Legion (i.e., French Foreign Legion in Arabic North Africa) and (*b*) the lack f something national in its composition. Under present circumstances Arabs would make good mercenaries. The admission of volunteers o our Armed Forces is not as satisfactory as the building up of armies n individual countries or the area as a whole. The difficulties of adustment are too great. Finally, it is possible that the potentialities f the Arab world and Israel might well be realized by the development of collective forces under the UN Uniting for Peace Resolution.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THE USE OF NEAR EASTERN MANPOWER

The United States' prestige in the Arab states of the Near East, ile probably not as low as it was in 1947 and 1948 is nevertheless t as high as it was in 1945. In Libya and Israel our prestige is still rly high.

The NSC has stated that the area is of critical importance to the urity of the United States. The strategic location of the Near East, importance of the vast oil reserves and the value of the bases in poli, the Cairo-Suez area, Dhahran and Iraq are recognized.

The Near Eastern nations are at a point of decision as to whether to cast their lot irrevocably with the West, to remain neutral or to drift into the Soviet orbit.

At the present time any decision to make more use of Near Eastern manpower must take into account the fact that for the time being there would have to be separate programs for Israel on the one hand and the Arab states on the other.

The development of the use of manpower in the Arab states might well have a beneficial effect in other parts of the Moslem world, i.e., Pakistan, Iran, etc.

If the United States and the Western nations could clearly demonstrate now to the Near Eastern nations our interest in their survival, it is believed that we could align them with the West against the communist threat and that the manpower resources could become of increasing value over the next several years. If, however, there is no real interest demonstrated in the fate of the Near Eastern peoples, the area with its manpower potential may be lost to the West for many years to come.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. There exists in the Near East military and quasi-military manpower potential which would be of great value to the United States.

B. This manpower potential, to be effective, will require leadership, training and equipment.

C. Before use can be made of the manpower the Near Eastern states will want to be sure that:

(1) the Western nations are really interested in their survival;
(2) the Western nations will treat the Near Eastern states as partners and not as lackeys;
(3) help in the form of training and equipment, etc., will be made available over a period of time, and
(4) in the post-hostilities period, should war come, the wishes and views of the states will be taken into full account.

D. If the West does not demonstrate an interest in the fate of the Near East, the manpower potential of the area and the position of the West (oil wells, bases, cultural institutions, etc.) may be irretrievably lost for many years to come.

780.5/1-551 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET Moscow, January 5, 1951—1 p. m.

1292. Embassy believes that desire Israel to be included in development western plans Near Eastern Defense (Depintel January 3, 1 a. m.)[1] should not be considered in isolation from general context regional Near Eastern security requirements.

It would appear prudent at this stage to consider danger that with our major attention focused Far East and Europe, Soviets may be planning to disturb relatively quiet and neglected Near Eastern garden this year. Form which such Soviet moves may take range from stepping up internal subversive programs and creating mass unrest through activity local Communist groups to armed revolts supported by Kurdish and Azerbaijan "volunteers" from Soviet Union. Further, should Soviets be determined on precipitating World War III this year, it is possible that major Soviet military moves elsewhere might be accompanied by outright invasion certain Near Eastern areas by Soviet military forces primarily with view to denying to West strategic and petroleum assets of this region. Not to be overlooked is question whether Soviets would undertake large-scale war of sustained duration without including in plans maneuvers calculated to assure for themselves access to Near Eastern oil. Soviet invasion Near East would, of course, be characterized by them as defensive step to prevent Anglo-American aggressors from using Near East as *place d'armes* against Soviet motherland. Whether contingency that we may face in Near East during coming year falls in first or second category, it is clear that present obviously weak and defenseless condition Near Eastern countries constitutes open invitation to Soviets to indulge in direct or indirect aggression that area.

As pointed out in Moscow's despatch 294, December 11[1] Soviets have in past months followed position ostensible friendliness towards most Near Eastern countries. Softening-up process particularly noticeable in Iran but trade agreement concluded with Afghanistan early 1950 may fall in same category. Sociability displayed by Vyshinski at recent UNGA session towards Arab delegations was part of pattern. Such lulling of suspicions may well be prelude to surprise expansionist moves in area. Embassy believes time has come to establish working relationship between NATO and non-Communist Near Eastern countries as recommended Embtel 651, September 8. Israeli bid for US military support affords us some leverage bring about at least degree *rapprochement* between Israel and Arab states which would make possible taking positive steps towards Near Eastern regional collective security arrangements.

Merely to associate Israel with present Greek-Turkish defense pattern would be futile gesture in view unprotected character Arab hinterland surrounding Israel. Furthermore, to give Israel priority in this matter over Arab states would obviously exacerbate Arab emotional antipathy towards US and West generally and play directly into Soviet hands. What is required in Embassy's view is larger regional security organization embracing in addition to Israel and Arab states, Greece, Turkey, Iran and perhaps Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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[1] Not printed.

Embassy appreciates heavy burden now resting on US in terms Far Eastern and European commitments and problems but believes that our positions in both these areas would be seriously jeopardized if we permitted ourselves to be outflanked through Soviet incursion into vital Near East middle region.

Department pass London, Paris. Sent Department 1292, repeated information London 239, Paris 306.

BARBOUR

641.74/1-551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, January 5, 1951—7 p. m.

3766. In conversation today, Furlonge told EmbOff that FonOff remains convinced for present at least, that it would be unwise move to attempt solve Anglo-Egypt proposal within framework NE defense arrangement. FonOff continues believe that UK requirements in area can best be obtained through bilateral arrangements with states concerned, although alternative suggestions (such as UK-Egypt-Turkish pact) continue to receive attention. In foregoing context, Furlonge went on to say that attention also being given present time to possibility of some kind defense arrangement with Israel and that there had been number of recent indications that Israel might be willing enter into arrangement involving cooperation in war time and possibly even in peace time. FonOff and War Office now examining rights and facilities which UK might require in Israel and Furlonge mentioned specifically use of Israeli ports, right of passage for British troops through Israel and possibly right station troops in Israel. He emphasized whole question in most embryonic stage and that there are many political and military problems which must be studied further before it is decided whether or not proceed with proposal.

We asked Furlonge if FonOff was concerned with effect which such an arrangement might have on UK relations with Arab states. Furlonge replied FonOff had naturally given this question intensive thought and was continuing to do so. Inevitably there would be howls from Arab states, but he thought there was good possibility that UK might be able calm them by emphasizing that close association of this kind between UK and Israel would represent security gain to Arabs in view of restraining influence it would give UK on Israelis. We also asked if there might not be danger that Arabs would interpret such an arrangement as indication that Israeli troops might be used to supplement British forces operating in Arab states in event of hostilities. Furlonge said FonOff had this problem very much in mind and had strongly emphasized to military that there could never be any question of treaty provision for utilizing Israeli troops in Arab states in time of war and that it would be necessary give Arabs firm assurance on this score.

General Robertson planning visit Israel February 17 and Furlonge himself will be there shortly before that time if his present plans for trip through area are approved. Furlonge indicated FonOff hopes that thinking on this question may be developed before that time to point where, if favorable decision taken, Robertson may be able take preliminary soundings with Israeli authorities.

Department pass Amman; sent Department 3766, repeated Ankara 12, Baghdad 43, Cairo 8, Jidda 40, Amman 40, Beirut 24, Damascus 17.

GIFFORD

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1951.

Subject: Third Progress Report on NSC 47/2:[1] "United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States."

NSC 47/2 was approved as Governmental policy on October 20, 1949. It is requested that this Progress Report as of December 26, 1950, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

1. *Israel–Arab Attitude Toward the United States:*

The outlook for maintaining the good-will and Western orientation of the peoples of the Near East improved during the period under review in both Israel and the Arab states. The severe anti-American campaign in the latter countries, especially virulent in Syria and Egypt, ceased almost entirely. While considerable bitterness toward the US remains in the Arab states as a result of the Palestine hostilities,[2] the formerly active expression of it subsided late in the summer. This resulted in part from initial UN successes in Korea,[3] and from Arab absorption with problems unrelated to Palestine. There was a growing Arab realization of the seriousness of the international situation. United States efforts to convince the Arabs of its impartiality as between them and Israel were also partly responsible.

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[1] Dated October 17, 1949; *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, p. 1430.

[2] For documentation on the Arab-Israeli controversy of 1948–1949 over the future status of Palestine, see *ibid.*, 1948, vol. V, pt. 2, pp. 533 ff. and *ibid.*, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 594 ff.

[3] For documentation on Korea, see volume VII and *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume VII.

The Government of Israel has shown an increasing willingness to depart from its policy of "non-identification" with East or West and to support the West. Indications of this tendency have been Israel's support for the UN Korean effort, anti-Communist speeches by Government officials, and confidential offers of mutual assistance arrangements with the United States. In this Israel has probably been prompted primarily by great economic need, which only the United States can fill, by the decline of the pro-Soviet opposition within the country, by the continued refusal of the USSR to permit Russian Jews to emigrate to Israel, and by the realization that in the event of a major war Israel would be completely cut off from the Western sources of supply upon which it so greatly depends.

2. *US-UK-French Cooperation:*

United States-United Kingdom cooperation in matters relating to the Near East has continued. Discussions have been carried on in Washington by British and American military officials regarding, among other things, Near Eastern defense.[4] Assistant Secretary McGhee held conversations in London with British officials on a wide range of subjects concerning the Near East.[5] In the area, American and British representatives have on several occasions concerted their approaches to the local governments and continue their routine consultations on all matters of interest.

Discussions of Near Eastern problems have also been held with the French Government, and cooperation with that Government in such matters as exchange of information on arms shipments continues.

3. *Arab Refugees:*

The situation of the Arab refugees has not moved significantly toward a permanent solution. Since the United Nations Relief and Works Agency did not receive the full financial support of UN members, its efforts were perforce confined chiefly to relief measures and to very limited works projects. The Agency therefore recommended to the fifth session of the General Assembly that an additional fund be established, for use only for projects involving permanent reintegration of the refugees. A resolution to this effect was adopted on December 2, 1950. By their public acceptance of this resolution, and by private statements, Arab representatives have indicated that they regard resettlement of most of the refugees in Arab territory as inevitable. The US Government is prepared to ask Congress for a contribution of sixty percent, or $30 million of the $50 million authorized under the resolution.

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[4] For documentation on United States-United Kingdom military and political talks regarding the Near East held in July and October 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 188 ff.

[5] For documentation on Mr. McGhee's discussions with Foreign Office officials at London in September 1950, see *ibid.*, pp. 192 ff.

4. *Arab–Israel Relations:*

Meanwhile, Israel-Arab relations have been strained by a series of border incidents, some of which have been brought before the UN Security Council. A resolution was adopted by the Security Council on November 17, 1950, which expressed the hope that the Mixed Armistice Commissions would be able to resolve such problems, and recommended that the parties refer their disputes to the Mixed Armistice Commissions. Discussion of the Arab item on repatriation of Palestine refugees and the conclusions of the Palestine Conciliation Commission report in the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly provoked considerable Arab–Jewish bitterness. A joint resolution was finally passed by the General Assembly on December 14, which urges the parties to seek agreement by negotiations either with the PCC or directly and establishes an office under the PCC to deal with the problems of refugee compensation, repatriation and resettlement. This resolution may represent the beginning of an improvement in Arab-Israel relations, since it is the first resolution recommending negotiations that has been supported by the Arab states. All of the Arab states voted in its favor, with the exception of Iraq, which, with Israel, abstained.

5. *Jerusalem:*

The fifth session of the General Assembly was unable to reach agreement on any resolution for the Jerusalem area. Thus, the respective parts of the City continue in the *de facto* control of Israel and Jordan. In view of the failure of the Assembly to take definitive action, the likelihood of the establishment by the UN of a regime involving territorial internationalization has receded further. However, the UN will probably consider the problem again next year. Its failure to act this year does not materially affect the situation in the Near East.

6. *Point IV Aid:*

An important step has been taken toward raising the economic level in the Near East countries. Funds have been appropriated for Point IV technical assistance, and the necessary administrative organization is being established. Point IV agreements are in various stages of negotiation between the countries of the Near East and the US.

7. *Israeli Economic Situation:*

In Israel, meanwhile, the economic situation has steadily worsened. The continued high rate of immigration, coupled with declining gift funds from abroad and a consequent shortage of foreign exchange, has occasioned further austerity measures within the country. There is also a shortage of investment capital, which is particularly serious in view of Israel's expectation to absorb its increasing population through industrialization. As a result goods are in short supply, making for high prices, and the growing labor force cannot be fully employed.

Besides the imposition of domestic economic controls, the Government has sought to encourage investment by foreign capital through the creation of favorable terms for it, and has initiated an intensive drive for funds in the United States and Israel. It hopes to raise one billion dollars in the United States by various means, including US Government grants, and an additional five hundred million, chiefly in Israel.

So long as immigration continues at its present rate (approximately 12,000 monthly), and the Arab economic blockade is maintained, it is evident that Israel will depend for its financial support largely upon United States Jewry. Decreasing returns from the annual drives of the United Jewish Appeal would seem to indicate that there will be considerable difficulty in reaching the present goal. As a result, it is likely that living standards will have to be sharply reduced in Israel and immigration will, in one way or another, have to be cut back, if only because of lack of funds to finance it.

8. *Instability in the Arab States:*

All of the Arab states with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Yemen contain significant elements of unrest and instability. Until recently an exception could have been made of Jordan, but with the annexation of Arab Palestine, elements have been introduced into the country which may well cause increasing instability.

During recent months there have been marked evidences of unrest in Egypt. This has been due to the strong and bitter conflict between the Government party and the opposition parties, the failure of the Government to carry out its election promises, and growing dissatisfaction with the King himself, and in particular with his personal advisers. While the King and the Government made certain concessions in order to placate the dissatisfied elements, currents of unrest continue to exist. In addition public feeling against the continued presence of the British in the Suez Canal Zone has run high and there were a number of disturbances during November. The Government is making particular efforts to maintain public order while discussions between the British and the Egyptians continue on the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. It should be noted that failure of these discussions would probably lead to widespread civil disorder.

Fundamentally Iraq and Lebanon are unstable in the sense that popular unrest is widespread and deeply rooted. In both countries dissatisfaction with the government is rife; in Lebanon chiefly because of the flagrant corruption of officials, in Iraq because of generally reactionary policies of the Government and Palace and the impression that the UK is in real control. In both, however, the governments have been successful in preventing effective organized opposition through bribery, political patronage, and other political maneuvers including outright suppression at times.

In Syria instability has been more overt than in other Arab states, but has been confined mainly to the Army and top political leaders without severe repercussions among the populace. Actually the population of Syria is relatively advanced and stable in comparison with other NE countries. Intrigue among army officers and political leaders has led to several military coups in the last eighteen months, but it appears now that Syria has a government soundly based constitutionally and controlled by the most progressive and popular group in the country. The army is willing to restrain itself somewhat from intervention in affairs of state, except where matters apparently affect its vital interests. The Prime Minister, Nazim Qudsi, is an able and constructive leader who seems to enjoy the army's confidence. However, there is evidence of considerable intrigue in Syria, fomented in part by other Arab states, and further violent changes of government are an omnipresent possibility.

9. *Evaluation*

Developments affecting the implementation of NSC 47/2 have been about equally balanced between the favorable and the unfavorable, while over-all progress in achieving the objectives of this policy has been disappointingly slow. While the policies recommended in NSC 47/2 are generally still applicable, it is believed that changed world conditions possibly warrant a reconsideration and redraft of the paper. The Department is giving the matter careful and continuous consideration.

James E. Webb

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Military Assistance"

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)[1]

TOP SECRET

[Washington,] January 27, 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: United States plans in relation to the Middle East have been the subject of several recent discussions between Department representatives and top officials of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs individually and the Operations Deputies as a group.[2]

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[1] Drafted by John B. Howard, Regional Planning Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

The position of the Department in these discussions has been that more affirmative United States action is required to safeguard our vital security interests in the Middle East. The need for such action is made urgent by the political deterioration which has taken place in the area to such an extent that it is questionable whether the United States, without taking more affirmative action, can continue to count on the support of many of the Middle East countries.

I wish to make it clear at the outset that the proposals advanced by the Department do not involve the United States in a Middle East security pact or in a commitment of combat forces in the Middle East. I understand the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel such steps are not possible under present circumstances because our main effort must be in Western Europe and because of our commitments in the Far East. Nor do our proposals affect the primary responsibility of the United Kingdom and British Commonwealth to provide armed forces for the defense of the Middle East. Within these limits, however, we believe that the considerable assistance which the United States is now furnishing to certain individual countries of the Middle East can be made more effective, and British primary military responsibility for the area can be made more meaningful, through the coordination of American, British and indigenous efforts under a concept of the defense of the Middle East as a whole.

The programs of military aid to Greece, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia are currently under review by our Departments. Apart from the problems relating to those individual programs, I wish to ask for the views of the Department of Defense on the following proposals:

1. That the United States make it clear to all of the countries of the Middle East that the United States in coordination with the United Kingdom is prepared to assist them in strengthening their capabilities to defend the area as a whole against aggression.

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[2] On January 2 and again on January 4, 1951, McGhee held discussions with members of the Department of Defense, including General Hamilton of the Air Force, General Collins of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries Finletter of the Air Force and Pace of the Army as well as with Averell Harriman on the subject of reevaluation of Middle East plans (memorandum of conversation, January 2, 1951; memorandum by McGhee for Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, January 4, 1951, 780.5/1-451). On January 23, 1951, Messrs. Matthews, McGhee, Cabot, Howard, Villard, and Emery of the Department of State met with Generals Burns, Bolté, Spalding, and Landon and Admirals Davis and Ingersoll to discuss military assistance to the Middle East. During the course of this conversation, General Bolté reiterated the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they would "insist" on the implementation of the U.S.-U.K. agreement of October 26, 1950, "to the effect that the Middle East is the primary responsibility of the British." Bolté added that "an extremely difficult supply situation" precluded shipment of the kind of military equipment to the Near Eastern countries which McGhee was pressing for (Memorandum of conversation, January 23, 1951; S/ISA Files: Lot 52-26: "Mideast General").

2. That the United States furnish small training missions and individual service technicians to the Arab States and Israel to assist them in the development of fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain and to the defense of the Middle East as a whole.

3. That the number of Arab and Israeli trainees in the United States military schools be increased.

4. That the United States furnish, in conjunction with the training in paragraph 2, token quantities of arms and ammunition (of the order of magnitude of $5–10 million) to the Arab States and Israel on a cash reimbursable basis, making it very clear that greater quantities cannot be made available for another 12–18 months.

These token quantities could be diverted from the programs for Greece, Turkey and Iran by delaying deliveries to these countries: if such a course is absolutely necessary, we believe on political grounds that the diversion should be made.

5. That the United States discuss with the United Kingdom the establishment in the Middle East of a combined military mission, or establishment of a separate United States military mission for the purposes of:

> *a.* stimulating and coordinating the military efforts of all of the Middle East countries for the defense of the Middle East as a whole;
>
> *b.* creating stability in depth in the Arab States and Israel so as to enable Greece, Turkey and Iran to make the most effective use of the fighting power we are developing there;
>
> *c.* coordinating in terms of the concept of area defense the activities of the United States and United Kingdom military missions in the individual countries; and
>
> *d.* stimulating and coordinating, with appropriate backstopping in Washington and London, United States and United Kingdom planning to make the maximum effective use of available resources for the defense of the area.

I am enclosing a document which contains further information explaining the views of the Department. It has been suggested that it would be useful to hold, and we would welcome, a discussion of our proposals with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Acheson

[Annex]

Paper Drafted in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs[3]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

THE MIDDLE EAST

In the light of present world events and the projected U.S. build-up in military strength, it is believed that more affirmative U.S. action to safeguard the vital security interests of the U.S. in the Middle East* is necessary, and can be accomplished *without making any guarantees of combat forces.* The present paper approaches the problems of U.S. security in relation to the Middle East as a whole from a political standpoint. It takes into consideration the absence of any adequate indigenous political basis for joint action by the countries of the area, and their increasing desire for U.S. participation in Middle East defense.

JUSTIFICATION FOR REVIEW OF OUR MIDDLE EAST PLANS

(1) U.S. actions have not adequately reflected U.S. policy that the security of the Middle East is vital to U.S. security. U.S. plans are inadequate to protect our important security interests in the oil, the air and naval bases, the communication and transportation facilities, and the general strategic location of the Middle East.

(2) The benefits of our present efforts in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia can be more fully realized, and indigenous defenses in the Middle East as a whole can be maximized through relatively small additional U.S. efforts in the area.

(3) The U.K., which by agreement with the U.S. has assumed primary military responsibility in the Middle East, is in a position of declining political influence in the area and lacks the capability of successfully defending the area even with probable Commonwealth support. The U.K. has no plans for the defense of Saudi Arabia, in which U.S. interests are predominent, and lacks the intimate working relations with the Turkish, Greek and Iranian armed forces which

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[3] An initial draft of this paper was submitted with a covering memorandum, neither printed, to McGhee on January 12 by John B. Howard, regional planning adviser of NEA (780.5/1-1251). On January 15, McGhee sent the revised version, herein printed, to the Secretary of State with a covering memorandum, not printed, requesting approval of the revised paper as a statement which could serve as a basis for a discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Jessup, Cabot, Matthews, and himself. McGhee also included a draft of the letter from Acheson to Marshall, to serve as a memorandum of transmission to the Department of Defense (780.5/1-1551). The source text was subsequently used as the basis of discussion of Middle East policy during the State-JCS meeting of January 30, *infra*.

*"Middle East" in this paper includes the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the Arab States including Egypt and Libya. [Footnote in the source text.]

the U.S. enjoys through the military missions and aid programs in those countries.

(4) The lack of a positive U.S. approach to the area and the increasing suspicion of the Middle East peoples that the U.S. has left the defense of the area to the British and will play no part in the event of war, is producing political disaffection and deterioration. The risk is increasing that if the U.S. does not take a more positive attitude important areas of the Middle East will swing away from the West and toward the U.S.S.R., with the resulting encirclement of Turkey and the loss of her full military effectiveness, even without war or in advance of war. Only direct U.S. participation in building up the defenses of the area as a whole can provide the confidence required to halt this adverse trend and prepare the Middle East for allied military use in the event of war.

(5) If the West does not participate determinedly in defense of the Middle East, it is doubtful that the support of the Middle East countries could be regained after the war. If the U.S. itself does not participate, American prestige in the area would be lost and it is doubtful whether American firms would be permitted to resume their oil concessions and other interests following liberation.

(6) It must be assumed that the Kremlin is fully aware that Soviet denial of Middle East oil to the West would profoundly affect the economic and strategic power of Western Europe and, conversely, that Soviet control of Middle East oil would not only greatly enhance Soviet power but would be indispensable to Soviet consolidation of a conquest of Western Europe.

PROPOSALS

The following proposals seek to maximize, at minimal cost to the U.S., the will of the people of the Middle East to cooperate with the West in resistance to the U.S.S.R. both now and in event of war; to translate that will into a coordinated indigenous effort to resist the Soviet advance; and, if the area is nevertheless overrun, to harry and sabotage the invader and to assist in liberation. The basic features of the proposals are a radical strengthening of Turkey's armed forces, which is currently being considered independently: the development of stability-in-depth in the Arab States and Israel; and the stimulation and coordination of local area defense efforts through combined U.S.-U.K. leadership in the area.

(1) Turkey's fighting power, the keystone of the defense of the Middle East, should be more fully developed. Military and economic assistance to Turkey should be increased as conditions permit so as to give Turkey a greater war reserve, permit it to increase the size of the regular army, and provide stand-by equipment for mobilization of reserves. Turkish participation in the defense of Greece and Iran

should be explored. Military and economic aid to Greece and Iran should be moderately expanded.

(2) The U.S. should make it clear that because of vital U.S. security interests in the Middle East, the U.S., consistent with its U.N. obligations and its other commitments, is prepared to assist the countries of the Middle East in strengthening their capabilities to defend the area as a whole against aggression.[4] (This does not mean any guarantee of forces to the countries concerned and no such inference should be given.)

(3) The U.S. and U.K. should concurrently strengthen the forces of the Arab States and Israel, on a basis of partnership with us, in such a way as to promote their stability and pro-Western orientation. The U.S. and U.K. should undertake and accelerate such measures as:

(*a*) Technical and economic assistance that will help convince the peoples of the Middle East that they will benefit as individuals as well as states, from the victory of the west;

(*b*) Development of fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain;

(*c*) Initiating limited arms supply programs, required to achieve (*b*), to certain of the Arab States and Israel by early delivery of token quantities.

(*d*) Furnishing on request small U.S. and U.K. training missions and individual service technicians, increased training of local military personnel in U.S. and U.K. schools;

(*e*) Making, in agreement with local governments, "show-the-flag" visits by air force planes and naval vessels; and

(*f*) Placing of orders in local industries for needed raw materials and war material.

(4) The U.S. should join the U.K. in establishing a combined military mission, or a closely coordinated separate U.S. military mission, for the Middle East as a whole. Such a mission would stimulate cooperation among the states not now possible through indigenous groupings in the absence of a U.S. underwriting commitment. A direct relationship should be developed between the chiefs-of-staff in each country and the U.S.– . . .,[5] or U.S., Middle East mission. The chiefs of the U.S. military missions in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia would act as U.S. country advisers within the U.S.–U.K., or U.S., Middle East structure. The establishment of the U.S.–U.K. or U.S. mission for the Middle East would not alter the fact that the U.K. and Commonwealth have primary responsibility for the defense of the area and the provision of forces therefor. It would, however, make much more attractive to the Arab States and Israel, through the establishment of a direct relationship of each to the Middle East mission, the development of a regional pattern of military planning.

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[4] See editorial note, p. 150.

[5] Omission in the source text.

(5) The defense of the "outer ring" (the Turkish-Iranian mountain line), if militarily feasible, is politically the most desirable line of defense of the Middle East and should become the target for which provision would be made when the U.S. and allied power build-up makes this practicable.

(6) Contingent upon a resolution of the Kashmir dispute, the participation of Pakistan in the defense of Iran should be explored. Consideration should also be given to the military cooperation, as soon as political conditions permit, of Yugoslavia with Greece and Turkey.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, January 30, 1951[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 6, 1951.

Participants:	
General Bradley	Mr. Matthews
Admiral Sherman	Mr. Nitze
General Collins	Mr. Lay
General Twining	Mr. Gleason
Admiral Davis	Mr. Tufts
Admiral Wooldridge	Mr. Marshall
Admiral Lalor	Mr. McGhee
General White	Mr. Rusk
General Landon	Mr. Jones
Admiral Blandy	
General Bolte	

GENERAL BRADLEY: We agreed to discuss the Far East today, but it has been suggested that we have a brief discussion of the Middle East in view of the fact that Mr. McGhee is about to leave on a trip to the area.[2] We have just received the State Department paper,[3] and have, therefore, not had an opportunity to study it. I note that the paper suggests that the United States should make clear to all countries in the Middle East that the U.S. and the U.K. would give them assistance. One of the French officers here for the Pleven talks[4] told me that he had heard of a secret Mediterranean conference on the Middle East between the U.S. and the U.K.[5] He was much disturbed about this, and I told him that probably the conference to which he referred was merely a regular meeting between Admiral Carney and the Middle East Commander.

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[1] Drafted by Robert W. Tufts of the Policy Planning Staff. The discussion of McGhee's paper (Annex, *supra*) on the Middle East comprises pp. 1–23 of the source text. Thereafter, the remainder of the meeting (pp. 24–37) was taken up with a discussion of NSC 101/1 "Avoidance of Extension of Hostilities in Korea"; for a memorandum of a portion of this discussion dealing with China, see vol. VII, p. 1566.

[2] McGhee traveled to Istanbul for the meeting of the Middle East Chiefs of Mission, February 14–21 and from there to Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, for the South Asian Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers, February 26–March 2. For documentation on the Istanbul meeting, see pp. 50 ff. Regarding the South Asian Regional Conference at Nuwara Eliya, see vol. VI, pt. 2, p. 1664. A partial itinerary of McGhee's tour through the Near East may be found in the editorial note, p. 49.

[3] Reference is to paper entitled "The Middle East"; see annex, *supra*.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Would it perhaps be fair to suggest that the U.K. may have deliberately given the French the impression that the U.S. and the U.K. were collaborating on Middle Eastern problems?

GENERAL BRADLEY: I think that is probably so. I know that the British have told the French about previous discussions with us.

MR. MATTHEWS: I also have the impression that the British give these indications to the French of U.S.-U.K. collaboration.

MR. MCGHEE: The French Ambassador came in to see me two weeks ago to suggest that the U.S., U.K., and France should have talks on Middle East security problems. I did what I could to discourage him.

MR. RUSK: The French have also approached me with the same suggestion concerning Far Eastern problems.

MR. MATTHEWS: The French are afraid that we will set up a Combined Chiefs of Staff with the British and will leave them out.

GENERAL COLLINS: I think we should take a definite stand that we will discuss with the U.K. matters of mutual interest to the U.K. and the U.S., and that we will likewise discuss with the French matters of mutual interest to France and the United States, but that we will not set up a global organization of the three powers to discuss all problems.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I agree with that. We should tell the British and the French the same thing: we are not going to have a three cornered world outfit.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I think that we have got to take that attitude.

MR. NITZE: If it makes sense to have an arrangement with the U.K. in the Middle East, I think we should do it and tell the French that we are doing it. We should not shy away from it simply because it worries the French.

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[4] For documentation on the visit of Prime Minister Henri Pleven to Washington, January 29–31, see the compilation on France in volume IV.

[5] Reference is to the talks at Malta on January 23–24 between Admiral Carney, Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and Sir Brian Hubert Robertson, British Commander in Chief Middle East Forces. No record of these conversations has been found in Department of State files. However, at the close of a second series of conversations at Malta between Carney and the three British service chiefs responsible for the Middle Eastern area which took place March 10–13, a letter, designated Mil/3039/ME, was sent both to the British Chiefs of Staff and to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This letter is printed, p. 94.

General Bradley: We have got to come to that. Ambassador Bonnet comes over here all the time to complain about one thing or another. I think our reply should be, "so what?"

Mr. Matthews: The French believe that we are cooking things up every day with the British.

Mr. McGhee: I am sorry to take up the problems dealt with in our paper on such short notice. We have had discussions of these problems with your operational deputies. The paper stems from our growing concern over the deteriorating political situation in the Middle East. We have understood your objectives in the Middle East and your position that the United States cannot assume large new commitments in the area.

We have recently found evidence that the smaller states in the area are becoming increasingly concerned about their future and want some assurances about their defense. There is a danger that they might defect—not only in the event of a shooting war, but perhaps even in the cold war.

Nothing in the paper involves guarantees with respect to U.S. military forces. The paper raises no question of a pact or of guarantees to defend. Neither does it question the primary responsibility of the U.K. for the defense of the area. We would, of course, hope that the U.K. could get in position to exercise this responsibility.

Our principal objective in these recommendations is to make sure that our major investments in Greece, Turkey, and Iran are effective. I regard the proposals now before you as a kind of insurance that the investment will be effective. What we are after is not so much defense in depth as it is stability in depth. Turkey must not be upset by a defection in Syria, which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Turkish armies to fight effectively.

We fully agree that Turkey should be our major reliance in the Middle East. We want to give separate consideration to the question of whether we should not now increase our rate of investment in Turkey—and perhaps also in Greece and Iran, but we also believe that a regional approach to the problem of Middle Eastern defenses is called for. Such a regional approach is the objective towards which we should strive in the Middle East.

The U.K. has grudgingly accepted responsibility for this theater; but it has only 11,000 combat troops in the area and is planning only for the defense of the Suez Canal. It could not do much to help Greece, Turkey and Iran. We have recently had some questions raised in Athens between the American and British Ambassadors, because neither of them was clear on who, as between the U.S. and U.K., was responsible for Greece and what this meant. I think there has not been a full realization of the implications of British responsibility for the area. I understand your view that the U.K. and the Commonwealth should bring up their troop strength in the Middle East. I believe, however, that there should be some mechanism—some organization—for coordinating with the British just in case we may want it at some later time to build up forces in the area.

As you know, the British position in the Middle East rests on treaties with a number of the Middle East countries, the treaties with Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. Lately, the British have been under strong criticism and attack because of certain of these treaties. They admit they must give way to the strong nationalist sentiments, particularly in Egypt. It is very difficult for them to get the cooperation of the Arab States. This cooperation would be much easier to obtain if the United States could participate in coordinated activities along the lines suggested in this paper.

We have to remember that there is no indigenous political basis for cooperation among the countries in the area. The divisive elements in the Middle East situation exceed the integrative forces. Therefore, if cooperation is to be achieved, it must be under the stimulus of external influences. The United States or the U.S. and U.K. could provide that stimulus but the U.K. cannot do it alone.

The people in the area are more and more concerned about their security. They have serious doubts about the ability of the U.K. to defend them. Not much effort would be required of us to increase greatly their sense of security. It would involve only a small amount of material assistance, and a few countries, really only Syria, Lebanon, and Israel; since the other countries in the area are already receiving assistance under other programs or are being taken care of by the British, as, for example, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. Only token shipments would be required from us at this time. These would stimulate hope in the area, and encourage these countries to play a constructive part in the collective defense of the area. It is perhaps worth noting that the Iraqis assert that the U.K. is holding back their efforts. I think that Lebanon—under the arrangements here proposed—might be willing to participate in the defense of their mountain chain. Of course, the forces which any of these countries could raise would be small, but they would be at least adequate for internal security. At present we have very large military missions in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and will shortly in Saudi Arabia, and are investing about $400,000,000 annually in these countries. However, we have avoided the concept of a regional defense system, and I think we all recognize that the Greek, Turkish and Iranian forces are not yet strong enough to be decisive in any theater-wide conflict.

U.S.-U.K. cooperation could be carried out in individual countries by our military missions to those countries—such as those now in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Our missions are now engaged in some joint planning. We are, I recognize, not in a position to exercise theater responsibility. What is here proposed is not a command organization, but rather a U.K.-U.S. coordinating mechanism which could be related to the defense effort not only in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, but also in Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the other Arab countries in the area. In time, perhaps, enough defensive capabilities could be built up to hold the mountain line. We all know the importance of this objective—it is not necessary here to discuss the significance to us of the area's strategic position, and petroleum and the air installations. We need to retain these assets if we possibly can. I also think that the psychological importance of the Middle East is very great in world eyes.

It is a hard political fact, in my opinion, that if the United States does not make a determined effort to assist in the defense of the area, the U.S. will not be welcomed back to the area after another war. We have got to make a good show or we will lose any hope of post-war influence. U.S. participation in the defense of the area is necessary if only to regain our substantial oil interests after a war. In summary, we in the State Department feel that the time has arrived for more positive action in the Middle East on our part.

General Bradley: I do not differ with you on much that you have said. We have felt that it was important to be clear on the U.K. responsibility for the area. There are certain difficulties in an attempt to coordinate with the U.K. I would like to ask you whether it is your impression that the Turks are not willing to plan with the U.K. and that they would be ready to plan with us. We have a difficult situation if they are not willing to accept U.K. participation.

Mr. McGhee: That is correct; that is the present situation. I believe the Turks would, however, talk with a joint U.S.-U.K. mission.

General Bradley: We have, of course, had discussions with the U.K. Chiefs on those problems and have been trying to get together with them on our plans for the area. We also called in representatives from Greece, Turkey, and Iran in an effort to achieve coordination with these countries first. It is very difficult to persuade the Turks to engage in any planning with Greece and Iran. The Turks have a very simple mobilization plan—everyone turns out to fight and that is all the plan amounts to. We will get into difficulties trying to furnish leadership in the area and to persuade the U.K. to go along with us and to secure the coordination of all the other states. I am not sure how far we could get with an effort of this kind.

Admiral Sherman: With reference to the whole general problem, I think we should remember that the U.S. is the only country that is doing much in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. We alone have a position of leadership in these countries. If we turn leadership over to the U.K., they will get nowhere, and in the process will derogate from our own position. The relationships between the U.K. and the U.S. in Greece are very complicated. Norton has been on the sidelines and has criticized Van Fleet. Now if we talk about a U.S.-U.K. coordinating outfit in Cairo which would stand above the Greeks, that will make the Greeks very unhappy. So far as coordination of U.S. strategy is concerned, we have already provided that in some degree by the authority we have given Admiral Carney. We should strengthen that coordination—with the local U.S. missions coordinating plans in the individual countries and with Carney providing the coordination of strategic advice for the theater.

The question of responsibility and the position of these countries are not isolated problems and cannot be considered only in terms of the Middle East. All of these countries are also Mediterranean countries. In Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Iran, we now have soldiers in quantity. They are not only the northern flank of the Mediterranean as a theater and as a line of communications, but they also tie in to the problems of Western Europe. We have responsibilities through NATO in Western Europe. Greece and Turkey are now associated with the NATO effort and are, therefore, tied in with the Western European theater. Greece, Turkey, and Iran cover the Mediterranean and also the Middle East–Persian Gulf area. I find it difficult to compartmentalize these problems by arbitrary lines on a map. I agree that coordinated advice and effort on the part of the U.S. military missions are necessary. We can use existing machinery to improve this, and can strengthen the machinery for this purpose. Then if we were to establish small missions in Syria, Lebanon, etc., they could tie up with that machinery. I do not believe that this can be tied into Cairo. Greece and Turkey are reluctant to get involved with the U.K. in Cairo.

We should reserve judgment, in my opinion, on the degree to which Greece and Turkey and Yugoslavia should be tied into our plans for Western Europe, and we should not make any substantial changes in our organization for these countries until it is clear what organization we will have for the Mediterranean area in the NATO setup. We have a terrific organizational problem ahead of us. In my judgment, General Eisenhower has got to build from the inside out—from Western Europe to the Middle East. I, therefore, think that we should not try to do this organizational job for the Middle East now. I admit that this is to advise delay, but the time factor is such that the delay will not be long. It seems to me that we may want a close link to General Eisenhower's command. There will be nothing but difficulty in Greece and Turkey if we try to tie up with the U.K. in Cairo now. I recognize that this line of thought will not be of much help to you (addressing McGhee) on your trip except perhaps as a statement of principles. I do recognize the importance of the problem. It is clear that we cannot commit U.S. troops to the Middle East when we are so short of troops elsewhere. In fact, the proportion of troops available to the need for them is probably better in that part of the world than elsewhere. For the time being, we will have to content ourselves, at best, with naval and air support in this area until we have succeeded in building up Western Europe and can give, at a later time, due recognition to the potential strength of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.

Mr. Matthews: Would you (addressing Admiral Sherman) favor small missions in Syria and Lebanon?

Admiral Sherman: I am not sure. I have not given much thought to that question. Let's talk about France for a minute. As you know the Lebanese forces are all French trained. It might be politically wise to have relations with France on the problem of Lebanese defense.

Mr. McGhee: Of course, there is a strong feeling against French troops in Lebanon. They are not well thought of there.

General Bradley: Would they object to a French military mission?

Mr. McGhee: I don't think so.

General Collins: The U.S. is now on the outside periphery of the Middle East. Greece is the bridge between that area and Western Europe. The Russians can overrun Greece in the event of war—in fact, they can do this more easily, in my opinion, than the Germans did. The U.S. has large missions in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. We are not in the center of the Middle East—in the Cairo-Suez area. For my part, I am very dubious about the wisdom of a military mission in Saudi Arabia, let alone Syria, Lebanon and Israel. There are two reasons why the people in the Middle East want U.S. leadership: (1) we will furnish equipment and pay the bills; and (2) in the event of war, they think, we will send troops and aircraft to the Middle East. We are kidding ourselves and kidding them if we do anything which indicates that we are going to put forces in that area. The forces to do that are just not in sight. This is a U.K. responsibility. The U.K. would like very much to have us take this responsibility, but it is a job which the U.K. and the Commonwealth have got to do. We must stick to the periphery. If that breaks, then, of course, Cairo-Suez is the place from which to run the area. If we take responsibility for this job now, we are assuming a responsibility which we cannot meet in time of war. I am unalterably opposed to putting forces in that area. I think we should reevaluate the importance of the Dhahran airfield. It just provides us with a way out. I think an alternate field on Cyprus would be just as good and perhaps better—we could use it at all times and it would also enable us to get out of the area. The Chiefs are studying the military aspects of these problems now, but we have not reached conclusions. For one thing, we have not yet had an adequate report on what the capabilities for defense are in that area. In my opinion, we should stay on the periphery and not get down inside.

Admiral Sherman: In reviewing this paper in my shop this morning we felt that the prospect of getting something out of Greece and Turkey was such that we should not agree to reducing their programs in order to finance other programs. General Collins thinks that Greece would be overrun in the event of war. However, what will happen in the Balkans and Turkey cannot be predicted far in advance—the situation there may change rapidly. In my opinion, we would be pushed back, but, even so, we might soak up enough Russian effort to make this worth while. I have been more optimistic about Greece since it has been possible to consider the Greek and Yugoslav problems together. As to U.K. responsibility, the more I study this question, the more I feel that when we speak of U.K. responsibility, we are just getting the responsibility off our shoulders, and are not putting it elsewhere. The U.K. cannot send enough to the area to defend it, nor can the Dominions. I place a very low estimate on the U.K.'s capabilities for this job.

General Collins: I do not disagree with that; however, low as the U.K. capabilities are, ours are even lower.

Admiral Sherman: I agree, but it is not profitable to think of transferring any real responsibility to them.

General Bradley: Well, I am not sure that I am in full agreement. It is true that we are just on the periphery and that we are in the places that will count the most, but my question is, "How much more would it take to send small missions to the other countries?" What we would send to them would detract in some measure from our effort in Greece, Turkey and Iran. However, it would tend to increase our influence in depth.

General Collins: My point is simply that in doing this we would inevitably assume more responsibility.

General Bradley: I think that is right, but it does not seem to me that we would be assuming much more responsibility than we already have.

Mr. Nitze: In the Planning Staff in State we have been considering the question of the priority which we should be giving to the various theaters. We have been looking at this question in light of the fact that we can by no means be sure that the Soviet Union is not going to move against sometime in the near future; for various reasons, it seems to us that if it does move soon, a probable move would be one against Yugoslavia. For the time being, Western Europe is protected by NATO—with all the implications involved therein. It seems to us that the most serious threat of future Soviet action is in this area which we have been discussing. The real deterrent to such a Soviet move can only be, it seems to us, the possibility of our reaction to a Soviet move in this area. This also gears into our consideration of Far Eastern problems. The question is what disposition of our forces in the Far East would be most advantageous to us in the event of general war. Therefore, we thought it would be useful to raise the question of priorities for this area as against other areas in which we have responsibilities and important interests.

General Collins: It is a far cry from Yugoslavia to Iran and Saudi Arabia. We have much more interest in our over-all position in Western Europe than we do in our positions in Iran and Saudi Arabia and these other Middle Eastern countries. The Army is very much interested in Yugoslavia. We can't do anything about the Middle East, but Yugoslavia is a different story, and a more important one.

Mr. Matthews: We had hoped that we could get into a discussion of Yugoslavia at our next meeting.

General Bradley: However, when we talk about Greece we have also got to talk about Yugoslavia. I am much concerned about the Middle East. The oil there is important to us and it might be very important to the Russians, although they would have a great deal of trouble in getting it home. The Middle East is the gateway to Africa. If we lose Asia, which we seem to be in danger of doing, and lose Africa, then we will be confined to the Western Hemisphere, and that is why I am concerned about the Middle East.

At the same time, there is a limit to how many responsibilities we can take on. Our friends in Western Europe ask what, supposing we hold there for 90 days, we will do thereafter, and that is a good question. At any rate, we are committed in Western Europe and the Far East. We have just received today another new demand for assistance to Indo-China,[6] and the Philippines are a big problem. This boils down to a problem of priorities. It is a question of priorities on limited supplies of equipment that worries the Army. Where is all the equipment needed around the world to come from? Perhaps in 18 to 24 months we could allocate some to this area.

General Collins: In the event of general war, Australia and New Zealand will not be invaded. They can produce good fighters—they have done it before and they can do it again. The Australian Prime Minister told me that the Australians could send some forces to the Middle East—he didn't say how many or when. But they can do it and the U.K. has got to put the squeeze on the Commonwealth.

Admiral Sherman: I think the U.S. is going to have to put the squeeze on the Commonwealth.

General Collins: Well, I would be willing to join with the British in that.

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[6] For documentation on Indochina, see vol. vi, pt. 1, pp. 332 ff.

Mr. McGhee: The defensive capabilities that we have been concerned about in this paper are those against an attack from the Caucasus out-flanking Turkey and striking towards the Cairo-Suez area, and those against an attack from the Dardanelles toward the Cairo-Suez area. As to the question of U.S. forces, I want to emphasize that our proposals will not involve the stationing of U.S. forces in this area or their commitment in event of war. I believe that the proposals should be regarded as an insurance policy which would protect our substantial investments in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Only assistance in the order of $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 is involved, but this assistance, small though it is, might be the cement which would hold this area together.

Another question altogether is the question of whether we should increase our effort in Turkey. It is our view that we should. However, the subtraction of this small amount of $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 from even the present Turkish program would be worthwhile, in any event, as insurance to protect our investment in Turkey.

I should not have used the term "United States leadership." That does not accurately describe what we had in mind. Rather, it is that the U.S. should fit into this picture, in a subordinate role, and that the U.S. and U.K. should form an interlocking base for a regional defense effort. The proposals before us involve only a small effort on our part. They do not raise the question whether we are coming to the defense of this area in the event of war nearly as much as our present programs in Greece, Turkey and Iran raise this question already. In fact, what is involved might be described as merely a rationalization of our efforts in the area as a whole.

Admiral Sherman: Personally, I look at Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Iran not as an area into which we should put forces, but as an area in which we can find forces.

Mr. McGhee: I agree that our proposals should reduce the need for U.S. forces. It would be advantageous to us, for example, if the Turks would move across to help Iran in the event of trouble. The Russians will find that area one in which they will have very difficult line of communications problems. I know that I would not want to be a Russian Commander on the far end of a line of communications running back to the Soviet Union through country as rough as that.

General Collins: We can do a lot on this problem in Iran and we are already working on it.

Admiral Sherman: There is nothing more atrocious in my view than for the U.K. Ambassador in Greece to talk about British responsibility there because Britain has some kind of general responsibility in the Middle East. Greece is a Balkan country and Western Turkey must also be regarded as a factor in the Balkan situation. It is the

U.S. which is carrying out defense programs in these two countries, and there must be no question of U.K. control.

Mr. McGhee: The U.K. is responsible in the event of war. That is the basis of our present agreement with the U.K., which was arrived at in the September[7] conversations.

Admiral Sherman: I was not a party to any such agreement.

General Bradley: That is a problem that we should straighten out. I do not recall any such agreement.

Admiral Wooldridge: Mr. McGhee is right in saying that that is what the minutes show. Such an agreement was arrived at in the September conversations according to the minutes.

Admiral Sherman: Who wrote those minutes?

Admiral Wooldridge: I do not know who wrote the minutes. It was only my privilege to read them.

Admiral Sherman: We should disavow those minutes.

General Bradley: The basic trouble is the lack of organization in the Mediterranean area. This is a problem which General Eisenhower has got to study. He should determine what the relation of the Mediterranean theater is to his theater. Until this problem has been worked out, it does not much matter what we or the British say about the defense of this area for neither one of us can send any troops.

Admiral Sherman: We are providing assistance now and must do whatever is done in the event of war.

General Collins: We are also giving assistance to Iran.

Mr. McGhee: The question is who is responsible.

General Collins: We are responsible initially. Neither we nor the British can send more in the event of war.

Mr. McGhee: It does seem necessary to have some kind of a theater command.

General Collins: The U.K. has got to be responsible for the over-all position in the Middle East.

Admiral Sherman: This is largely a question of definition. The Middle East does not include Greece, the Dardanelles, and Western Turkey.

Mr. McGhee: But I think you will agree that Turkey has to be included in the Middle East.

Admiral Sherman: No, I think Turkey has to be divided for planning purposes. It is a big country, and it borders on the Mediterranean and it borders on the Middle East. It is just like the United States which has Atlantic and Pacific frontiers. We should confine our discussion of the Middle East to an area which excludes Greece and we should hold Turkey in abeyance for the time being. Western

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[7] Reference is to Mr. McGhee's discussions with Foreign Office officials at London in September; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 192 ff.

Turkey is not in the Middle East and Eastern Turkey is. Turkey has to be fitted into both areas.

General Collins: From the standpoint of the Turkish army, Turkey is a part of the Middle East.

Admiral Sherman: Yes, but we cannot dissociate Turkey from the Mediterranean theater.

General Collins: In the event of trouble, the Turkish army will have to pull out from European Turkey almost at once. It can probably hold the Gallipoli Peninsula for a while and deny the Dardanelles for a while. Then it will fall back into South Eastern Turkey. It will be under constant threat of a flanking movement in that area.

Mr. McGhee: Yes, an attack aimed at Cairo-Suez around Turkey.

General Collins: The Turks will fight and they should be of considerable help. We should persuade the Turks and the Iranians to do some joint planning. The Iranian mountains are really just an eastward extension of the mountains in Eastern Turkey. Evans in Tehran and Arnold in Ankara are stressing this need for joint planning to the Iranians and the Turks, and they were not unreceptive to the idea.

Mr. McGhee: One reason for our proposals is that at the time we were considering the Turkish request to join NATO, it was thought that an extension of NATO to this area would place excessive requirements and organizational problems on NATO. If this is true, the same reasoning would apply to extension of NATO to the land defense of the Middle East.

Admiral Sherman: I recall that the U.K. was urging us to regard Tripolitania as a part of the Middle East. We took a dim view of that. It is too far west.

Mr. McGhee: I do want to emphasize that these countries in the Middle East will not be willing to wait long for a rationalization of their defense problems.

Admiral Sherman: We have been talking about the facts of life in the event of war. It seems to me that we should separate these problems into two groups: (1) the problems we will encounter in the period of the cold war, such as the maintenance of stability in the area; and (2) the problems of defense in the event of a shooting war. This is a very delicate line to walk. Our job in dealing with these countries is to keep them on the rails now without giving them definite commitments at this time about what we can do for them in the event of war.

Mr. McGhee: I agree. It is our view that we cannot hold our position in the cold war much longer without more action. A little extra effort at this time would be well worth while in terms of our cold war problem. It is feared that our actions would imply commitment to come to the defense of the area, and we should keep in mind the degree to which we are already committed by our large programs in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The additional proposals and the small effort they involve would not increase our commitments.

General Bradley: As I understand your position, it is to send them a little more assistance, to establish some small missions, to give them some places in our technical schools, and so forth. That is one question. The question of U.S. leadership is another question altogether. Could the Army furnish men for these missions?

General Collins: If the missions were small we could do it, but our schools are already full and it would be very difficult to find places for officers from these countries in our schools at this time. We have got a lot of production started, and we have got to train cadres of specialists; that is what we are using the schools for.

Mr. McGhee: We would not want our proposals to stand or fall on the question of schooling, for that is a very small and insignificant part of our program. At any rate, we are only talking about 30 to 40 men.

General Collins: My basic trouble is not in the smallness or largeness of our undertaking. It is the psychological problem—the assumption of responsibility—the notion that the United States will come to the aid of these countries. We cannot do that. The U.K. must do it. We should not deal in illusions, but in realities, and we are kidding them and kidding ourselves if we take on such responsibilities.

Mr. McGhee: We are already running this risk by our programs in Greece, Turkey and Iran, and it does seem to us that we could make this small additional effort as a form of insurance and as evidence of our faith.

General Collins: I cannot agree. In my opinion, it would be an act of bad faith, not of good faith. I favor putting our effort into places where the people will fight, where the terrain is suited for defense, etc.

General Bradley: There may not be mountains in this area, but the desert is very tough, and in some ways well suited for defense. The real question is whether 200 men in Ankara will accomplish more per man than five men will accomplish per man in Baghdad. The five men might be helpful in developing the ability of the Iraqis to exploit the defensive potentialities of that country.

Mr. McGhee: I agree that the U.K. should do whatever it can, but we feel that the U.S. should do some more in its own interest.

General Collins: We have got to win the battle in Western Europe. First, last, and always, that is the big job. Even if we lose temporarily in the Middle East and hold on to Western Europe, we will be in a satisfactory position. Once the job is done in Western Europe, we can go down later to the Middle East and clean up whatever problems we find there.

General Bradley: Have we (addressing McGhee) covered all your questions? I do not want to interrupt this discussion, but we do have a lot of other ground to cover and I fear that we are getting into a range of questions which you would not want to take up in your forthcoming meetings in any event.

I think it is important to consider your proposals from the cold war point of view—the problems you raise are more a cold war problem than a hot war problem. The more solid we can keep an area, the better off we are. I can see great advantages in this.

Mr. Rusk: I think that we are "kidding" in Western Europe also for some little time to come.

General Collins: However, we should not water down our efforts in Western Europe, for this would only make the job tougher.

Mr. McGhee: I would rather give the people in the Middle East a few illusions at this time than to leave them in their present frame of mind.

General Bradley: Clearly, we are not going to resolve these issues before Mr. McGhee leaves on Sunday.

Admiral Sherman: Can we agree that we do not want to tie in with the U.K. in Cairo in any way, so far as Greece, Turkey, and Iran are concerned. Can we also agree that Greece should be regarded as part of the Balkans.

Mr. McGhee: That is difficult because we are operating on a different basis now.

General Bradley: This "agreement" must have gotten into the minutes as a result of a misunderstanding of some kind. Of course, I recognize that in the event of war the United States will not furnish a ground commander for this theater. That will be a U.K. responsibility.

Mr. McGhee: Isn't there some inconsistency here? This raises a problem of coordinating our efforts prior to a war with the U.K. responsibilities after war breaks out. Some kind of preparation would seem to be necessary if our activities at present are to gear in with the U.K.'s activities at a later date.

Admiral Sherman: The strategic coordination of military missions in Greece and Turkey is the mission of Admiral Carney.

General Bradley: However, we do not have a theater commander in this area and the U.K. does. There is a problem here which needs to be straightened out.

Mr. McGhee: The coordination of supply activities and, in general, of economic support to these areas would seem to be quite a problem in view of the divided responsibility as between a cold war situation and a war situation.

General Collins: No one has any logistic responsibilities in the event of war in this area.

Mr. McGhee: Do you mean that we are just going to cut them off?

General Collins: We will not be able to send them any supplies.

General Bradley: I agree. Our present plans call for furnishing these countries something like two months' reserve supplies. After they have exhausted those, they are on their own.

Admiral Sherman: I do not understand why it is necessary to have any discussion at this time of theater organization in the event of war.

Mr. McGhee: I am talking about joint planning activities. These have now been stopped.

General Bradley: The Greeks will be fighting in Greece, and the Turks will be fighting in Turkey. There really isn't much of a problem of coordination, even in the planning field. Possibly we can help by dropping a few bombs here and there, but that job won't be supervised by a theater commander in that area. It is hard to visualize the role of a theater commander in this area.

Mr. McGhee: There is a problem of coordinating what our own people are advising these countries to do.

Mr. Matthews: Admiral Sherman says that that is Admiral Carney's mission.

Mr. McGhee: But, in carrying out this mission, no account is being taken of what the U.K. is doing in the area.

General Collins: We are advising the Turks about what they should do in the event of war. We have pointed out to them the need for joint planning with Iran. In the event of war, the Turks plan to hold certain areas and to yield certain others. The Iranian plan involves withdrawal to the mountains. At some time, in the event of war, it will be necessary, I grant, to make plans for the entire area back in Cairo. That is the only place from which the job for the entire area can be successfully done. But here we are dealing with couverture forces—the Turks are not going to fall back and defend Cairo. We do not know at this time what the potentialities are. The Cairo job in the event of war is a U.K. responsibility.

General Bradley: You (addressing McGhee) will not want to discuss these problems anyway, will you?

Mr. McGhee: No, not at these meetings.

General Bradley: I feel that we should consider this problem from the cold war viewpoint. I think we need an NSC paper on this. We have to get a governmental position. Of course, the cold war problem is related to the possibility of general war for we cannot make too many promises during the cold war period.

Mr. McGhee: We will undertake to prepare a paper for NSC consideration. I suggest that we take up separately the misunderstanding with the U.K. on the question of responsibility in this area.

Mr. Nitze: I fear that we may confront three types of situations in the period ahead: (1) There is the cold war situation which presents the kind of problems we are now concerned with in Western Europe and the Middle East. (2) There is the situation of global war. (3) There is an in-between situation in which we might face satellite action in specific countries or areas—this is not quite a cold war or a hot war situation.

Admiral Sherman: I think we should re-group our areas a bit. We should start thinking about the Balkans as an entity and not link them up with the Middle East. It may be wise to group Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey for planning purposes.

Mr. Matthews: The danger Mr. Nitze referred to may now be very close.

General Collins: The basic problem here is a land mass problem--what is the Soviet Union going to move over the ground. Greece can be overrun as it has been overrun before.

Admiral Sherman: We got into the habit of thinking about Greece as a Middle Eastern area closely tied up with Turkey when Yugoslavia was in the Soviet camp. Now I think we have to regard Greece and Yugoslavia as an area which can furnish couverture for Italy.

General Collins: I agree. The defection of Yugoslavia—if we can make the most effective use of it—can save Italy. I believe that our forces together with the Yugoslav and Italian forces can hold a short line in northern Italy.

Mr. Nitze: Of course, no one of us knows just how to assess the risk of action this spring. Some of our people think there is a 30 percent chance, some a 50 percent chance, some a 60 percent chance that the Soviets will move somewhere in this area this spring.

General Collins: I would be all in favor of doing everything we can before the event. I would be ready to talk about a mission to Yugoslavia right now. From our point of view, it would be an excellent idea.

Mr. Matthews: I hope we can spend our next meeting on this problem.

Admiral Sherman: The Navy would also like to see some action on the Yugoslav problem.

780.5/2-1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 10, 1951—1 p. m.

4370. Following emerged from meeting February 6 Palmer and Jones with Foreign Office representatives under Bowker chairmanship:

1. FonOff deeply concerned re problem providing defense for Arab States and Israel as well as by deep fears pervading NE countries that west disinterested their fate and prepared to do little or nothing to save them. FonOff believes this anxiety provides fertile field Communist exploitation.

2. Bowker said British Government anxious reassure Arab States and Israel and to this end General Robertson has been making series of visits designed give each state picture overall NE defense problem, an idea of its role in event war and to render all British help practicable to assist states play assigned roles. FonOff and General Robertson believe "slow but steady progress" being made.

3. FonOff representatives explained demand for arms is loud in each country and supply of arms is considered gauge of western interest. UK faces everywhere in NE demands for jets and modern tanks which are not available now nor likely to be for some time. FonOff believes bare arms cupboard makes desirable maximum political, psychological and other means to steady apprehensive NE.

4. As effective political measure, Bowker put forward idea that display US–UK solidarity re NE defense would be highly desirable. He believed it would help if US would explain to Arab States and Israel that (*a*) US interested in defense of NE; (*b*) that by US–UK agreement UK has primary responsibility for defense NE and (*c*) in carrying out this responsibility UK has the support of US which will render all assistance in its power.

5. Bowker then suggested that following might be among other practical steps which might be taken to emphasize US–UK interest in NE defense: (1) top US military representative and top British military representative in each NE country might sit side by side with local military on committee organized for the discussion local and area defense matters; (2) "training teams" on which US personnel would be associated with British personnel. When requested, such teams would be sent to NE countries for as long as might be necessary to "teach them the job we think they should do in war". Bowker said obvious parent organization for training teams would be GHQ–MELF.

6. Re nature training, FonOff representatives concurred idea that simple weapons probably more effective Arab hands than complicated tanks, jets, et cetera.

7. Several references were made to recent Malta convention[1] from which it was evident UK hopes that ultimately US and UK military will agree on clear definition command responsibility. Specifically, re Arab States and Israel, British representatives indicated that program to increase indigenous confidence and resistance power must be conducted on coordinated basis under general direction commander assigned primary responsibility.

8. Bowker emphasized foregoing principally FonOff thinking. He said ideas paragraphs 4, 5, 6 above would be referred by FonOff to British service chiefs. He put them forward informally and tentatively now in light Department's concern re deterioration NE political situation as result Arab and Israeli fears that they are virtually defenseless. US representatives promised refer his ideas to Department this tentative basis.[2]

GIFFORD

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[1] Reference is to the talks at Malta on January 23–24; see footnote 5, p. 28.

[2] In telegram 4796 from London, March 7, not printed, Gifford informed the Secretary of State that the British Chiefs of Staff would probably instruct Robertson to inquire of Carney at the Malta talks of March 10–13 whether there was a possibility of some U.S. action "along lines reported Embtel 4370 February 10. Admiral Carney informed" (780.5/3–751)

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Arab States, Israel, Iran"

Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, February 10, 1951.]

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED NSC PAPER ON US POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

THE PROBLEM

1. To define and assess the policy which the United States should follow towards the Arab states and Israel, particularly in the light

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[1] This paper was drafted by Kopper (NEA/NE). The source text is labeled "Revision No. 1", and it bears a covering sheet, dated February 12 which reads as follows:

"The attached revision of the proposed NSC paper on U.S. policy toward the Arab States and Israel contains suggestions informally received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The paper as revised has NEA's complete approval. It is hoped that it can be presented to the NSC at the end of this week. Please let me have any comments you desire to make by Wednesday afternoon, February 14."

The source text appears to be the copy submitted to Bishop (S/A). Other copies may have gone to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Berry and Frank Nash, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. For the later version of this paper submitted to the National Security Council on February 28, see p. 88. The original version of this paper is included in the McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Military Assistance".

of the growing tendency in the area toward neutralism and the decline of an attitude favorable to the United States and other countries of the West.

ANALYSIS

2. NSC 47/2, October 17, 1949,[2] covering U.S. policy toward Israel and the Arab states and NSC 65/3, May 17, 1950[3] on U.S. policy toward arms shipments to this area set forth policies which should now be reviewed in the light of the material changes in the international situation.

3. The political and economic stability of the Arab states and Israel were determined in NSC 47/2 to be of critical importance to the security of the United States, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the United States and the United Kingdom have as recently as October 26, 1950[4] agreed that "the Middle East in war is of importance second only to Europe". The security interests of the United States in the area are primarily:

(*a*) Political and military importance of the area in view of its geographic position with respect to western Europe;[5]
(*b*) Oil resources;
(*c*) Military bases; and
(*d*) Communications and facilities.

4. United States objectives in the Arab states and Israel are:

(*a*) To preserve and strengthen the orientation of the nations in the area toward the West;
(*b*) To create political stability in depth as a contribution to the stability of the Middle East as a whole;
(*c*) To induce the countries to increase their indigenous defensive capabilities against the USSR and Soviet satellites; and
(*d*) To obtain the right to deploy, base and operate forces in the territories of the nations of the areas upon threat of and during general hostilities, and to lay the political ground for us to regain access to the territories of the nations of the area in event of their loss during general hostilities.[6]

5. The increasing belief, particularly in the Arab states, that the U.S. will not help the countries to prepare to defend themselves, is producing marked political disaffection and deterioration. The risk is increasing that important areas will swing away from the West toward neutrality, or even toward the U.S.S.R. It is important that this adverse trend be halted.

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[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. vi, p. 1430.

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, 1950, vol. v, p. 163.

[4] For documentation on the talks under reference, see *ibid.*, pp. 233 ff.

[5] The words "Africa and European and Asiatic Russia" were included in the original version of this paper.

[6] The original version contained the following sentence at the close of paragraph 4(*d*): "Our actions until now have not been sufficiently positive to achieve these objectives."

6. It is now in the interest of the U.S. that the U.K. maintain primary responsibility in the Arab states, other than Saudi Arabia, and Israel. However, the political influence of the U.K. in the area is declining and appropriate cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. would be in our mutual interest.[7]

7. The indigenous defenses in the Arab states and Israel can be increased through relatively small US and UK efforts in the area.[8]

8. If the Arab states and Israel do not become oriented toward the West during the cold war period, it is doubtful that the support of these countries could be obtained during a global war or regained after the war.[9]

CONCLUSIONS

9. It is in our interest to maximize the will of the governments and peoples in the Arab states and Israel to cooperate with the West in resistance to the U.S.S.R. both now and in the event of war; to translate that will into indigenous efforts to strengthen internal security to resist the Soviet advance to grant the western powers necessary military rights therein; and, if the area is nevertheless overrun, to harass and sabotage the invader and to assist in liberation.

10.[10] Steps should be taken on a combined U.K.-U.S. politico-military level to clarify the role of the U.S. and the U.K. in strengthening the Arab states and Israel.

11. Following agreements reached in the discussions held in accordance above paragraph 10. The U.K. and the U.S. should, on a co-ordinated basis undertake and accelerate the following measures with respect to the Arab States, excluding Saudi Arabia.[11]

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[7] Paragraph 6 of the original version reads: "It is now in the interest of the U.S. that the U.K. maintain primary military responsibility in Israel and the Arab states, other than Saudi Arabia. Although the political influence of the U.K. in the area has been declining in certain parts of the area, it is nevertheless still stronger than that of any other country in other parts, and it is in our mutual interest that there be cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. in order that the maximum benefit may be derived from our respective efforts in the area. The JCS has submitted a program involving [$]76,000,000 cash reimbursable assistance to Saudi Arabia. Therefore primary military responsibility for that area should rest with the U.S. but there should nevertheless, be co-ordination with the U.K. The Israeli Government is aware that the U.K. has primary military responsibility with regard to the area in the environs of Israel."

[8] The original version contains the added phrase: "particularly in the difficult terrain of the Arabian peninsula where American operated desert facilities, engineering equipment and American experience already exist."

[9] The original version contains a brief paragraph (9) at this point which reads: "Retention and use of even a part of Middle East oil production or even delayed loss of it would contribute importantly and perhaps critically to an allied war effort."

[10] In the original version, this paragraph begins with the following words: "Taking cognizance of the fact that it is in the US interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab states excepting Saudi Arabia".

[11] The original version of this paragraph substitutes the word "All" for "Following" in the opening phrase, and the words "Arab states and Israel" for "the Arab States, excluding Saudi Arabia" in the final phrase.

(*a*) Obtaining the right to deploy, base, and operate forces in the territories of the nations of the area upon threat of and during general hostilities;

(*b*) Development of fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain;

(*c*) Initiating limited arms supply programs, required to achieve (*a*), to certain of the Arab states and Israel by early delivery of token quantities;

(*d*) Furnishing on request small U.S. advisory groups and individual service technicians, and consider requests for training for local military personnel in U.S. and U.K. schools;

(*e*) Making, in agreement with local governments, "show-the-flag" visits by air force planes and naval vessels; and

(*f*) Placing of orders in local industries for needed raw materials and war materials.

12. The United States should unilaterally for Saudi Arabia and Israel undertake and accelerate all of the measures listed under paragraph 11 above, such actions to be without prejudice to measures otherwise arranged with or contemplated for these two states. In this connection the United States should keep the United Kingdom informed, as appropriate, regarding measures taken with respect to Saudi Arabia and Israel.[12]

13. Subject to the enactment by the Congress of legislation providing military assistance for Middle East States other than Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran during fiscal year 1952, appropriate authorities of the United States should develop the necessary arms supply programs in consonance therewith in order that immediate military assistance to the ground forces of the Arab States and Israel may be provided if the need for such assistance becomes urgent.

14. The United States should undertake and accelerate technical and economic assistance [13] that will help convince the peoples of the Arab States and Israel that they will benefit as individuals as well as States, from the victory of the West.[14]

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[12] This paragraph not in original version.

[13] Original version contains at this point the added phrase: "coordinated with action in para 13 above".

[14] Original version contains a paragraph 15 which reads: "The U.S. should accelerate the developments of its information program in the Arab states and Israel".

611.86/2-1251

Memorandum by Robert A. Thayer of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Deputy Director of That Office (Kopper)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1951.

Subject: Proposed NSC Paper on U.S. Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel

I have the following comments in regard to your paper.[1]

(1) The "sphere of influence" concept of letting the U.K. have primary responsibility in the Arab states while the U.S. devotes itself in particular to assisting Saudi Arabia and Israel seems to play into the hands of those Arabs who for their own reasons wish to continue to make political capital out of U.S. "favoritism" for Israel. The effectiveness of any program based upon this concept would appear to be in doubt without continuous coordination between the U.S. and the U.K. on the operating level. Certainly the self defense of the area must become mutual if it is to be a significant factor. To what extent will the U.S. and the British programs reflect different techniques, different weapons, etc.? If one assumes that the area as a whole must be defended and that the U.S. and the U.K. must cooperate in affecting this, what is the reason for continuing the "sphere of influence" concept with its air of colonialism? I do not understand the reasons which lead us to advocate this policy.

(2) I would like to suggest a clarification of the security interests of the U.S. as set forth in the paper. Does not (*a*) really mean that the area is important in terms of oil and in terms of transport and communications? The area is vital in that it lies across air and shipping routes between Europe and Asia. I suggest also that the area provides access to the continent of Africa which in turn is so important as a source of strategic and other raw materials. I would suggest spelling out (*d*) to read "The security of air and surface transport and communications routes and facilities." If possible, I think you might be specific in this regard in referring to (*a*) air routes to and from South Asia and the Far East lying across the area as well as the facilities needed to support them; (*b*) dependence of shipping routes upon the Suez Canal; (*c*) importance of the Near East in enemy hands as a base for attacks upon these routes and facilities.

(3) No mention is made in the paper of what measures, if any, are to be taken to prevent the Arabs and Israel from using the arms received against one another. This becomes of particular significance if the "sphere of influence" concept is applied in that it may place the U.S. and U.K. in competition to meet demands on the part of the Near

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[1] Presumably reference to Department of State Draft Paper on U.S. Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel, February 10, *supra*.

Eastern States for arms intended to be used perhaps for purposes other than to resist aggression from the north.

(4) Lastly, while I recognize that arms aid could bring important political benefits in terms of our interests, it seems to me that arms aid will be to a large extent [2] pouring critical material down the rat hole unless you have training programs as well as control over the use to which the arms will be put. This country gave a vast amount of material assistance to China to no avail, largely because the Chinese did not have either the knowledge, skill or will to put those arms to effective use. I suggest therefore that if we are to go into an arms aid program for the Near East that it should be an effective one designed to insure that the aid will be properly utilized. Otherwise such aid will in no way deter Soviet aggression and will merely result in a matériel loss to the West. In this sense a small program might be useless and wasteful while a larger well conceived organized program might bring the results intended.

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[2] The handwritten words "consist of" were added to the source text at this point, presumably by Mr. Thayer.

Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee toured the Near Eastern and South Asian regions during February and March 1951. He first attended the Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul, February 14–21, then proceeded to Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, via Cairo and Bombay for the South Asian Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers, February 26–March 2. For the report of the Istanbul meeting, see Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, *infra*. For information on McGhee's brief stop-over in Cairo, see editorial note, page 347. For information on the South Asian Regional Conference, see volume VI, part 2, page 1664.

Thereafter, McGhee was scheduled to arrive in Baghdad on March 20. He entered Israel from Jordan on March 27, and returned to Jordan from Israel on March 28. He arrived in Cairo on March 29, and in London on March 31. He returned to Washington on April 3. Information on his itinerary may be found in file 780.00, especially in telegram 412 to Baghdad, March 20; telegram 594 from Tel Aviv, March 29; telegram 933 to Cairo, March 29; and telegram 4456 to London, March 31. For information on McGhee's talks with Egyptian officials at Cairo at the end of March, see telegram 1001, priority, from Cairo, April 1, page 352. For information on McGhee's talks at London with British officials regarding Near Eastern matters on April 2–3, see page 356.

120.4382/3–1551

Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, Istanbul, February 14–21, 1951 [1]

TOP SECRET

PARTICIPANTS

From the Department of State:

Hon. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Chairman.

William M. Rountree, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs.

G. Lewis Jones, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

Representing the National Military Establishment:

Hon. Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force.

Admiral Robert B. Carney, Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

From the Field:

Hon. John E. Peurifoy, American Ambassador, Athens, Greece.

Hon. George Wadsworth, American Ambassador, Ankara, Turkey.

Hon. Henry F. Grady, American Ambassador, Tehran, Iran.

Hon. Edward S. Crocker, American Ambassador, Baghdad, Iraq.

Hon. Raymond A. Hare, American Ambassador, Jidda, Saudi Arabia.

Hon. Avra M. Warren, American Ambassador, Karachi, Pakistan.

Hon. Monnett B. Davis, American Ambassador, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Hon. Ely E. Palmer, United States representative, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.

Hon. John B. Blandford, United States representative, Advisory Commission, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.

Hon. Lowell C. Pinkerton, American Minister, Beirut, Lebanon.

Hon. Cavendish W. Cannon, American Minister, Damascus, Syria.

Gordon H. Mattison, Counsellor, American Embassy, Cairo, Egypt.

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[1] Authorship not indicated on source text. This was one of a series of such meetings held periodically by American diplomatic officers in various regions of the world. The previous conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission had been held at Cairo, March 7–11, 1950; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1 ff. Detailed records of the Istanbul Conference, including actual transactions of the several meetings, have not been found in Department of State files. However, several telegrams sent from the Conference, McGhee's Opening Statement, and a Regional Policy Statement on Greece, Turkey, and Iran are in the Ankara Post Files: Lot 57 F 72: "120 Istanbul Conferences". McGhee released a Statement to the press on February 23 outlining the various problems discussed at Istanbul. The Statement is published in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 12, 1951, p. 423.

A. David Fritzlan, Chargé d' Affaires, American Legation, Amman, Jordan.

Joseph Palmer, 2nd, First Secretary, American Embassy, London, England.

I

STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE MIDDLE EAST,* AND THE PROBLEM OF ACHIEVING MORE POSITIVE COOPERATION FROM THE AREA IN SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

A. *Conclusions*

1. The Conference concluded that, in the cold war period, the United States has the following military-political objectives in the Middle East: (*a*) to mobilize strength for the containment of communism; (*b*) to restore and/or to strengthen confidence in the West on the part of the Middle Eastern states; (*c*) to build sufficient military strength in each country so that it can maintain internal security and contribute appropriately to general area defense; (*d*) to construct and insure the availability of Allied air, naval, and army bases; (*e*) to organize joint staff planning for the defense of the area as a whole or of such parts of the area as may be dictated by strength availabilities; and (*f*) to make preparations to insure effective demolition and intelligence services against the possibility of withdrawals in the event of war. In the event of war, the Conference agreed that it is the objective of the United States to insure in the Middle East maximum support of the Allied war effort as directed by the designated Allied agency.

2. All Middle Eastern states are, if not already working in cooperation with the West, moving in that direction. However, Iran, although basically oriented towards the West, has shown recent signs of adapting to the Soviet power position on her border. As regards the obstacles to greater cooperation with the West, it was agreed that the fear of Soviet reprisal for such cooperation is not at the moment a dominant factor, except in Iran. In addition, resentment over the Palestine issue is not today an insuperable obstacle in relations with the West.

3. All states in the region recognize Turkey's exposed situation and its importance to Middle East defense. They would approve further aid and support to Turkey. Most of them would be expected to view with approval a special, formalized security commitment to Turkey even if it were not extended to them, although such action

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* The term "Middle East" as employed herein, denotes the entire area comprising Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Arab states, and Israel. The term "Near East" applies only to the Arab states and Israel. [Footnote in the source text.]

would doubtless lead to increased demands on their part. It is probable that the Middle Eastern states, or at least those adjacent to Turkey, would be receptive to the principle of building up Turkey in the role of a "center of attraction" around which closer regional military co-operation could be built.

4. With respect to Greece and Turkey, the Conference concluded that

(*a*) The political situation in Turkey at present reveals such a strong popular as well as official demand for a security commitment as to assure the United States of maximum flexibility in the arrangement offered and the minimum commitments required;

(*b*) If an offer is not made soon, there is reason to believe that Turkey will veer towards a policy of neutralism, which will always have a strong basic appeal; and, until a commitment is extended to Turkey, there is no assurance that Turkey will declare war unless it is attacked;

(*c*) In order to assure Turkey's immediate cobelligerency, utilization in collective security action of the military potential which Turkey is building, and immediate United States and Allied utilization of Turkish bases in the event that the United States is engaged in hostilities, a commitment on the part of the United States is required;

(*d*) If a security arrangement is offered Turkey, it must at the same time be offered to Greece; apart from this important political consideration, Greece can contribute strong defensive forces and bases;

(*e*) The moral commitments which the United States has already made to Greece and Turkey, both through the United States aid programs and through the United Nations, and the advantages accruing to the United States, would probably dictate that we take the same line of action, with or without prior legal commitment, to support them in the event of attack. If such be the case, the United States should move to get credit with Greece and Turkey now, and to make clear its support of both, as a deterrent to the Soviet Union;

(*f*) The price which the United States would have to pay for a security commitment to Greece and Turkey would consist of practicable naval and air support plus practicable resupply support, and would not involve commitment of ground forces.

Greek and Turkish accession to the NATO would not have a seriously harmful effect on United States relations with Iran, provided some separate assurance (not a commitment) is given the latter. Egypt should not be invited to associate herself with the NATO at this time, since this might well raise concurrently the question of the association by other southwestern Mediterranean nations and thus delay positive action on the major proposal for a commitment to Greece and Turkey.

5. The Conference examined the outline of the proposed NSC paper on United States policy toward the Arab states and Israel,[2]

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[2] NSC 47/4 adopted March 14, 1951. For a discussion of this document, see NSC 47/5, p. 95.

and gave it general endorsement. The Conference concluded that an essential condition to restoring stability in the Arab states and Israel in cooperation with the West is a clarification and a positive demonstration of United States-United Kingdom responsibilities for the area. This may be achieved through a unilateral United States statement of policy or through regional arrangements. In any such arrangements, it is desirable that the present leading position of the United States in Turkey and Greece be maintained. Any arrangement with the United Kingdom concerning the Arab countries should preserve the United States special interest and position in Saudi Arabia. Questions concerning the apportionment of United States-United Kingdom responsibilities in Iran, and the means of relating Iran defense problems to an eventual regional grouping were left unresolved.

6. The importance of Israel in the defense picture of the Middle East is recognized. The Arab states would not countenance the use of Israeli troops in their territories; would not like to see an armament industry being built up in Israel; and would in no circumstances use such arms. However, eventual use of the Israeli small arms production outside the Arab states would be politically practicable. The Arab states either would not object to, or would acquiesce in, a regional defense program, sponsored and supported by the United States and United Kingdom, which included participation of Israel, provided the Arabs were not required to deal directly with Israel.

7. The Conference reviewed existing collective security arrangements in the Middle East. It noted that, although the validity of the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty of mutual assistance of 1939 was reaffirmed to Turkey by both the United Kingdom and France last year, it can have little substantive value unless its secret military annex, which is wholly out-of-date, can be rewritten. The 1937 Saadabad Pact between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, is of negligible current interest to any of the signatory states. The Arab League, even if strengthened by the recently initialled League collective security pact, offers little if any basis for Arab-Allied military collaboration. While the tripartite declaration of 1950,[3] promulgated by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, has been a useful factor in stabilizing the Near East, it is not deemed to be of importance in the field of military and strategic consideration. With reference to joint Turkish-Greek staff planning talks, both Greece and Turkey believe that such talks can be profitably continued only within the framework of broad NATO planning for the defense of the Mediterranean region.

8. It is apparent that there are better prospects for real progress, both for defense and for essential economic programs, from bilateral or regional arrangements, outside of but not necessarily unconnected

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[3] For documentation on the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 828 ff., and *ibid.*, vol. V, pp. 122 ff.

with the United Nations, than from arrangements directly under the United Nations.

9. The relationship of the Middle Eastern states to the United Nations has two aspects, immediate necessities and long-range international cooperation.

(*a*) For the first, emphasis is on the defense problem. It was agreed that, although the efficacy of the United Nations in the conduct of hostilities should not be over-rated, there would be a definite advantage to Middle Eastern security in following the precedent of United Nations action with respect to Korea [4] in the event of aggressive action against Turkey, Greece, or Yugoslavia, and probably in the case of Iran. In the event of such aggressive action, the Conference recognized that the United States would have to take the lead and bear the major part of the load.

(*b*) From the long-range aspect, operations under the United Nations would be helpful in promoting the achievement of economic and social objectives, since over a period of years the United States would probably not wish to assume a major responsibility for the Middle East, in view of our heavy commitments elsewhere.

10. Even in areas under predominant British influence, the demand for increased United States aid is growing.

11. The Conference noted that the administrative organization of the three Title II military aid programs, those of Greece, Turkey, and Iran, is of the highest standard, as are the training capacities of the members of the United States military missions in the three countries.

12. With respect to our policy towards cash reimbursable and military grant aid, the latter facilitates materially the obtaining of reciprocal benefits, which is not the case with cash reimbursable aid. Moreover, it was noted that the singling out of a given country, such as Saudi Arabia, for cash reimbursable aid rather than military grant aid, because of its relatively sounder fiscal position, would react unfavorably on United States political relations with that country in the event that other countries receive grant aid.

B. *Recommendations*

1. The Conference, having concluded that the attainment of United States political and military objectives in Turkey and Greece, and consequently in the entire Middle Eastern area, required that the United States enter at the earliest possible moment into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey and Greece, recommended that the following alternative methods of securing such an arrangement, listed in order of preference, be considered urgently by the Department:

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[4] For documentation on United Nations action with respect to the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea in June 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 125 ff.

(*a*) Through adherence by Turkey and Greece to NATO,[5] either

(1) As a separate regional grouping, or
(2) Directly;

(*b*) Through bilateral arrangements between the United States and Turkey, and the United States and Greece;

(*c*) Through a multilateral arrangement among the United States, United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece;

(*d*) Through some other plan which, taking into account the complex political, military, and administrative problems involved, would still accomplish the purpose of bilateral security undertakings as between the United States and Greece and Turkey, having always in mind the factor of urgency.

Moreover, if it should be deemed urgently essential to the security of the United States that a military commitment be obtained from Turkey before the normal processes for its accession to the NATO could be accomplished, it was recommended that the Departments of State and Defense consider such steps as might legally be taken to that end.

2. It was further recommended that Greece, for military planning purposes, be considered as belonging to a Western or Mediterranean region rather than to the Middle East; that it continue to receive military aid substantially as at present, with necessary supporting economic aid; and that it be encouraged to seek appropriate arrangements for military cooperation with Yugoslavia and Turkey.

3. Turkey should be considered as having a dual interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East regions; conversely, plans for both Mediterranean and Middle Eastern defense should take Turkey into consideration; and Turkey's military strength should be increased as an independent operation as a matter of urgency, through the extension of appropriately increased military aid and economic support for the military effort.

4. Joint staff planning with Greece and Turkey should be conducted within the framework of Allied Mediterranean defense planning. Separate Turkish-Middle Eastern defense planning should be encouraged, under the principle of Turkey's dual interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

5. Iran should be considered as an element of the Middle East. It should continue to receive military aid substantially as at present, and necessary economic aid, but a continuing reappraisal of the Iranian situation should be made, with a view to a possible increase in military assistance in the light of changing circumstances. In addition, the possibility of Pakistani support for Iran should be explored. Providing such exploration warrants further action, steps should be taken to endeavor to assure Pakistani support, in the event that Iran is at-

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[5] For documentation on the adherence of Greece and Turkey to NATO, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.

tacked and offers serious resistance, as a possible major contribution to area security.

6. The United States should seek an early clarification of the United States-United Kingdom military responsibilities for the Middle East, However, even though performance under such an agreement with the United Kingdom as to responsibilities be achieved through some regional arrangement, the present leading position of the United States in Turkey and Greece should be maintained, and the United States special interests and position in Saudi Arabia should be preserved.

7. The United States should issue a unilateral public statement making known its willingness, in coordination with the United Kingdom, to assist the Near Eastern states to strengthen their capabilities to defend themselves against aggression. Such a statement would constitute an important contribution to restoration of confidence in the West; a manifestation of United States confidence in and support of the British military position; and an expression of the continuing interest of the West in the defense of the area.

8. After agreement with the United Kingdom as to the appropriate division of military responsibility, there should be developed, in collaboration with the United Kingdom, a system of military staff discussions and a system of military aid programs under which the United States would provide immediately on request small training missions, individual service technicians, and token arms deliveries to the Near Eastern states.

9. There should be no attempt at this time, because of foreseeable and obvious difficulties, to organize a Near Eastern-Middle Eastern regional security pact. However, useful orientation could be achieved and useful planning efforts undertaken, in such a manner as to be adaptable to the expected wartime theater organization. Mobilization of resources and coordination of planning should be carried out through the medium of coordinated aid programs and a closely related system of military discussions, on the basis of close United States-United Kingdom collaboration.

10. While recognizing the strategic importance of Egypt, the Conference recommended that it be brought into the general scheme of defense planning by other means than through a possible association with the NATO.

11. While the Turkish-Iranian mountain barrier cannot be regarded at the present time as a realistic defense line, it should be deemed the ultimate defense objective of the United States in the Middle East, with a view, apart from strategic considerations, to strengthening the morale of the Middle Eastern states.

12. In the event of satellite military action against Greece, Turkey, or Iran, the United States should participate as strongly as circumstances permit in a line of collective action under the United Nations.

13. With respect to the division of military assistance between Greece, Turkey, and Iran, the Conference recommended the following:

(*a*) Owing to limited Greek manpower and Greece's defensive military potential, United States military aid should be predicated on plans for reasonable defense against overwhelming assault, and ultimately on holding and securing Crete as an essential base for Mediterrean-Middle Eastern operations;

(*b*) Military aid to Turkey should be the most extensive; predicated on assurances that Turkey will not be neutral, such aid should be designed both (1) to strengthen and accelerate the training of existing forces with a view to increasing Turkey's substantial capacity to pose serious opposition to direct attack, and (2) to generate offensive power;

(*c*) For the present, military aid to Iran should be considered primarily as a cold-war measure and should not be of such volume as to be of material benefit to the enemy if Iran were overrun; but steps should continue to be taken systematically to build up a strong defensive army and to supply equipment as rapidly as it can effectively be absorbed.

14. With respect to United States policy towards cash reimbursable and military grant aid, it was recommended that all assistance should be granted on the basis of United States or Allied interests, and that reciprocal benefits should always be sought; that henceforth arms aid should be extended on the same terms to Israel and the Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to prevent damaging charges of favoritism; that conversion of the Saudi program to a grant basis would facilitate the obtaining by the United States of long-term air-base rights at Dhahran; that arms to the other Arab states and Israel should also be on a grant basis; and that cash reimbursable assistance should be considered only as a useful supplement to military grant aid.

15. Continuing effort should be exerted to clarify the respective roles of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the United Nations in connection with economic and military assistance, both for short-term and for long-term programs in the area.

16. The United States should promote operations under the United Nations for the achievement of long-range economic and social objectives in the Middle East; however, with respect to programs which would involve large financial commitments on the part of the United States, preference should be given to the concept of bilateral arrangenents, in order to reserve to the United States a greater flexibility in he execution of such programs.

17. Means should be sought to encourage the conviction in the ountries of the Middle East that United States motivation for coperation is not limited to seeking security and economic benefits, but hat it represents also a fundamental desire to assist in general evelopment.

II

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REGIONAL TRENDS AND COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. *Conclusions*

1. Cooperation between Turkey and Greece on the economic side is not extensive, but is adequate to the relatively minor common problems which exist. There is, however, a conscious effort on the part of both countries to achieve political cooperation, although the success of such efforts has been limited by lack of development of mutual security arrangements.

2. As between Turkey and Iran, cooperation is more in the economic field, particularly in use by Iran of Turkish transportation facilities, than in the political field.

3. The one regional political arrangement which has a bearing on Turkey and Iran, the Saadabad Pact, which also includes Iraq and Afghanistan, is of negligible importance.

4. The Arab League has a ten-year history of frustration because of its almost complete concentration on negative political objectives. Only lip service has been paid to constructive economic and social matters, but there is limited hope for progress along those lines. British disparagement of the Arab League probably stems to a considerable degree from the United Kingdom's inability to control what it regards as an organism of its own creation.

5. Although there is traditional desire on the part of the Arab peoples for some form of Arab union, the Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent schemes for Arab union are essentially dynastic in character, and encounter opposition both from those opposed to the dynastic system and from rival dynastic regimes. Syrian Prime Minister Qudsi's Arab union proposal differs in the sense that it would apply to all the Arab states and it is not dynastic in motivation, but there seems to be little receptivity to the idea either at present or in prospect. The conclusions regarding Arab Union reached at the 1949 Istanbul conference[6] are still valid, i.e., that, in existing circumstances, Arab Union would pose more problems than it would solve, particularly since we regard short-term stability as essential.

6. Except for certain bilateral arrangements arising from special circumstances or interests, the Greece-Turkey-Iran group and the Near Eastern group have not yet evinced interest in inter-regional cooperation with one another. However, Turkey would probably be prepared to play a role of leadership in the Near East if, as preliminary conditions, the Near Eastern states were sufficiently strengthened and Turkey itself were formally associated with the West.

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[6] For documentation on the Conference at Istanbul, Turkey, of American Chiefs of Mission in the Near East, November 26–29, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 165 ff.

7. Such interest as exists with respect to cooperation between the countries of the Middle East and of South Asia arises from the initiative of the Pakistan Government. Pakistan has an interest in creation of a regional arrangement to include Turkey, Iran, the Arab states, and Afghanistan, but is handicapped by her difficulties with India and by the potential if not present jealousy of Egypt. The international Islamic Economic Organization, largely the personal creation of the Pakistani Minister of Finance, has opened a channel for at least limited Middle Eastern-South Asian cooperation in the field of economic and social reform. Pakistan cultivates closer cultural ties with Iran, and at the same time neglects no opportunity to promote pan-Islamic cultural conferences. Pakistan's basic orientation is, however, to the West.

8. The initiation of economic and political cooperation has characterized the recent relations of Yugoslavia on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other. Thus far this cooperation has been only on a bilateral basis.

B. *Recommendations*

1. Cooperation between the Middle Eastern states in the military field should be encouraged as a contribution to increased political cooperation, and in this connection the positive results to be achieved from a regional security pact should be stressed as a supporting if not overriding justification for such a pact.

2. In its economic relations with Greece, Turkey and Iran, the United States should deal with these countries separately rather than as a group.

3. The United States should oppose creation of any new United Nations regional economic organization for the Middle East.

4. With full appreciation of the Arab League's inexperience and limitations, further effort should be made to encourage and assist the League to engage in constructive social and economic activities.

5. The United States, while not opposing, should give no encouragement to any Arab union proposals, and should inject a note of caution and concern into any consideration of this question.

6. Turkey should be supported as a more positive base for United States efforts in the Middle East, and should be actively encouraged to become a natural focal point for the Arab states, Israel, and Iran in political, economic and military matters. To this end, Turkey should be consulted by the United States on Middle Eastern matters on much the same basis as such consultation exists between the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, Turkey and Pakistan should be encouraged to form an axis of cooperation on Middle Eastern matters.

7. Although the concept of Pakistan playing a role of any importance in the Middle East is still in the nebulous stage, it presents possibilities from the economic, social, and political viewpoints, as well as from the point of view of regional security, which should be encouraged.

8. Although it would be premature to attempt to encourage regional economic and political planning between Yugoslavia and Greece and Turkey, bilateral cooperation should be stimulated. Military cooperation should be stimulated as soon as a decision is reached regarding the division of responsibility and relations between the NAT and a possible Mediterranean security grouping.

III

APPRAISAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM POWER POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE ADEQUACY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION

A. *Conclusions*

1. The United Kingdom power position in the Greek-Turkish-Iranian and Near Eastern areas has weakened. It is in the United States' interest that the United Kingdom position be maintained in the Middle East, and strengthened where it serves our interest. This is particularly true with respect to Egypt.

2. Cooperation in the political and economic fields between the United Kingdom and the United States in the Middle East has been satisfactory, with the single exception of questions relating to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (see below, section X).

B. *Recommendations*

1. The United States should endeavor to bolster the United Kingdom position in the Middle East where this can most effectively serve the United States' interest (see above, section I, concerning support for the British military position in the Middle East).

2. The Conference should go on record as expressing appreciation for the generally fine cooperation from the United Kingdom during the past year in the political and economic field (with the exception of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company problem, see below, section X).

IV

APPRAISAL OF COMMUNIST STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. *Conclusions*

1. For the short term, Soviet and communist influence are kept under fairly effective control through police action in the various states of the Middle East.

2. American aid to Greece and Turkey has been effective in enabling those countries to combat communist influence. However, the delay

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in extending aid to Iran has been made the basis of effective communist propaganda in that country. In addition, the policy of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has been a handicap in the control of communism in Iran (see below, section X).

3. The basic defects of the economic and social structure in the Arab States which are responsible for the comparatively large communist potential in that area are either not recognized or are neglected by the Governments of the Arab states.

B. *Recommendations*

1. It was recommended that the Middle Eastern Governments be encouraged to maintain and strengthen their police controls against communism.

2. It was further recommended that, in formulating programs of economic and technical assistance to the countries of the area pursuant to other recommendations of the Conference, full consideration should be given to the need for the correction of economic and social defects as an indispensable element in efforts to control the spread of communism.

V

APPRAISAL OF RIGHTIST AND ULTRA-NATIONALIST STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. *Conclusions*

1. It was agreed that all political regimes in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are reactionary or rightist in comparison with our own. Note was taken of the . . . influence of Islam and of the various vested interests in the area.

2. In the area comprising Greece, Turkey, and Iran, a political trend from the right to the center is apparent, and this is due in large measure to the more extensive influence and association of the United States with these countries. There is a reformist trend in Iran, exemplified by the land distribution and other reform policies followed of the Shah and the present Government.

3. The Conference found little real evidence of liberal trends in the Arab states, although the growing power of the parliament over the executive in Syria was recognized. However, the force of public opinion in these states, exemplified by the growing influence of Palestinians in Jordan, is becoming increasingly a factor which the Governments of the area have to take into account. In general, genuine trends towards liberalization in the Arab world are less evident in the dynastic states than in the republics.

B. *Recommendations*

1. It was recommended that United States representatives in the Middle East, using all agencies at their disposal, give appropriate

encouragement to liberal and moderate elements with a view to broadening the base of consent of the governed and producing desired reforms, suited to the culture of the particular country, which will contribute to well being and stability in the long run. From a short term standpoint, however, it is not desirable that the present degree of stability existing in the Middle East be undermined by too rapid change.

VI

REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF UNITED NATIONS ACTION DURING 1950 WITH RESPECT TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

A. *Conclusions*

Palestine Conciliation Commission[7]

1. Lack of appreciable progress toward solution of the Palestine refugee problem continues to prejudice chances of improvement in relations between the Arab states and Israel. Essential to such progress are (*a*) clarification of the present position of the Government of Israel in relation to the question of repatriation, and (*b*) a clear understanding of Israel's conception of, and proposals for dealing with, compensation as an alternative to repatriation.

2. Some hope for possible progress in 1951 may be found in the fact that, during 1950, the Arabs moved away from their earlier insistence on implementation of the General Assembly partition plan, which they have repeatedly claimed under the Lausanne protocol of May 12, 1949[8] as the basis for solution of the Palestine problem. Although the Arabs have not abandoned the principle of repatriation, and may be expected to continue to reaffirm it, they show signs of becoming more realistic as to the obstacles to any satisfactory implementation of this principle, and are giving serious thought to the alternative of compensation and to the concept of reintegration.

3. During 1950 the Government of Israel also relaxed its position somewhat as regards the question of compensation, and has given assurance of cooperation with the Palestine Conciliation Commission and its compensation committee and with the new office established under the 1950 General Assembly resolution. The Government of Israel has also shown some disposition to give further consideration to the question of blocked accounts. Some progress had already been made during 1950 on this latter question, but it is still the subject of Palestine Conciliation Commission discussions with the Government of Israel. These discussions are seeking to persuade the Israelis to recognize that these accounts offer them an opportunity to give evidence of good will, and so contribute to improvement of the general

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[7] For further documentation on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, see pp. 559 ff.

[8] For documentation on the Lausanne protocol, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 996 ff.

atmosphere in their own interest and to the immediate benefit of refugees concerned, by settling a recognized obligation with little actual sacrifice on their part.

4. Arab-Israeli negotiations, either directly or through the Palestine Conciliation Commission, for settlement of other outstanding questions cannot be expected before there has been some evident progress toward solution of the refugee problem, with reasonable assurance of continuance of effective efforts toward its final settlement.

United Nations Relief & Works Agency for Palestine Refugees[9]

5. The hard core of approximately 800,000 refugees, on relief and in temporary shelter, constitutes a serious threat to stability, and an important impediment to peace between the Arab states and Israel. On a minimum basis, these refugees cost the international community $25 million a year for relief.

6. Reintegration of 800,000 refugees is a major economic enterprise of the order of several hundred million dollars of economic investment over a period of perhaps five years. The Agency can spearhead the task through direct reintegration, especially in rural areas, financed by international funds. Many refugees of urban background and special skills should be picked up in a program of general economic development financed through other funds.

7. The United Nations has endorsed a program of reintegration, and the Arab states, notably Syria, finally have agreed to cooperate. However, the capacity of the Near Eastern countries to contribute to such a program is limited, and they desire some indication of adequate and sustained financial assistance.

8. Reintegration should be approached as an economic undertaking and service to the refugees, and political issues should be kept to a minimum. There is great need to prepare the minds of 600,000 refugees to move from present locations near Palestine to new countries, new climates and new economies, and to encourage their acceptance by the public of the countries to which they must move.

B. *Recommendations*

Palestine Conciliation Commission

1. The Commission should direct its efforts through its new office nd its compensation committee toward clarification of the attitude f the Government of Israel as regards repatriation, and toward determination of a reasonable compensation total and a proposal of the asis and procedure for compensation payments. The Commission hould make every effort to get Israel to make maximum concessions both of these respects. These efforts should be expedited to provide

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[9] For further documentation on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency r Palestinian Refugees, see pp. 559 ff.

essential information for early Commission consideration and eventual discussions with the Governments of Israel and the Arab states, and communication to the refugees at an opportune time with a view to encouraging their recognition of the desirability of settling in the Arab states. It is important to maintain as a basic principle for compensation individual property rights and individual property losses, even though compensation may finally be set up in the form of lump-sum payments under some trusteeship control.

2. Simultaneously the Commission should pursue discussions with the Government of Israel with the objective of effecting complete settlement of blocked accounts without further delay.

3. It should continue to seek a basis for negotiations to settle other outstanding questions, and to encourage such negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.

4. The United States in support of the Commission should point out to Israel that it has the territory, and the Arabs have the refugees, and that concessions have to be made by Israel. Israel needs peace more than the Arabs do, since it is now completely dependent upon air and sea communications which can be completely severed in time of war. Consequently, Israel must in some way, through unilateral, partial, or overall negotiations, make substantial concessions in the fields of territorial adjustments or refugee repatriation.

5. United States diplomatic representatives at their discretion should take advantage of appropriate occasions to encourage the parties to enter into direct talks looking towards negotiation of final peace.

United Nations Relief & Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

6. The Relief and Works Agency channel of the United Nations should continue to be utilized for direct reintegration of the refugees, with closely coordinated supporting effort by the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

7. On the basis of the new evidence of cooperation on the part of the Arab states, increased efforts should be made to finance the refugee program contemplated in the United Nations resolution, as a minimum approach to the speedy liquidation of the problem.

8. The multilateral grant aid program for refugee reintegration should be supplemented by and coordinated with economic development projects financed by local Government funds, loans, the proposed new program of United States grant aid and any other outside aid available.

9. The Relief and Works Agency should, both in administration of relief and integration programs, rely to the maximum extent possible on the local governments.

VII

REAPPRAISAL OF THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION ON NEAR EASTERN ARMS AND SECURITY

A. *Conclusions*

1. The tripartite declaration has proved a useful stabilizing factor in the Near East. The declaration was handicapped initially by the inference given through the mechanics of its issuance that the three powers were creating new areas of influence. However, it has acquired more prestige with time, particularly as a result of United States and United Nations collective action in Korea.

2. The declaration is handicapped, although it may in other ways be helped, by inclusion of the French.

3. The Near Eastern states have shown a tendency to raise the question of application of the declaration in connection with minor and irrelevant matters, most of which fall within the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commissions.[10]

4. The proposed new program for United States–United Kingdom military cooperation with the Arab states and Israel, and for United States arms supply thereto, could be presented as flowing logically from the purposes of the declaration, and could assure the latter's implementation.

B. *Recommendations*

1. Without raising the declaration in any new light, United States representatives should on appropriate occasions reaffirm continued United States support for the declaration and our determination to take effective action within and without the United Nations in event of violation of the declaration, pointing out in this connection prompt United States and United Nations action in Korea.

2. References to French participation in the declaration should be minimized, and accusations of creation of spheres of influence should be countered by statement of the facts.

3. Although each reported infringement should be considered most seriously, application of the declaration to minor and irrelevant issues should be refused. All infringements under the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commissions should be promptly referred to those bodies, not investigated independently.

4. In the event of reported or impending infringement, the United States should, in consultation with the United Kingdom and France, investigate the case immediately and, in the event it appears substantiated by the facts, take immediate action in the United Nations along the lines of that with respect to Korea and whatever other unilateral or joint action the situation calls for.

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[10] For documentation on the Mixed Armistice Commissions, see pp. 559 ff.

VIII

ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ENCOURAGING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS, AND MEANS OF EXTENDING OUR CONTACTS TO THE POPULATION AT LARGE

A. *Conclusions*

1. The United States has a high responsibility and a delicate political role to perform in those countries to which it is giving extensive economic aid. We are required to develop techniques of more or less open intervention which will insure not only that our own aid is used wisely and effectively, but that the general economic policies of the recipient governments are sound and public spirited and, if necessary, that political and governmental reforms are undertaken which will make it possible to carry out these policies.

2. The Conference noted great dangers in such intervention:

(*a*) Our programs may offend national pride;

(*b*) There are frequent attempts at wholesale transfer of American practices and institutions which may be inappropriate to the local situation;

(*c*) There is the danger of trying to change ancient habits overnight; the danger of building up a living standard which cannot be maintained in the long run on the basis of local resources; the danger of carrying reforms to their logical extremes before the intermediate steps have been assimilated; the danger of assuming such wide responsibility that the local authorities and population lose initiative and relax into total dependence;

(*d*) United States intervention is certain to arouse resentment because it attacks vested interests and infringes the authority of the recipient government.

3. In administering our aid programs, we must follow a middle course: we should not insist on perfectionism: we should not try to impose our will; we can only advise and influence in the direction of achievements of permanent value, if we are to build the capacity of the people to do things in a democratic way. In addition, our approach depends not only on adopting the proper attitude, but on careful choice of personnel, and on ingenious and patient adaptation.

4. To the maximum extent possible, we have to support influences corresponding to our own, since our moral force is our greatest asset. We cannot be opportunistic. By our moral force we must attempt to persuade or dissuade. Where it is possible in our aid programs to adopt the *servicio* principle, with Americans working side by side with the nationals of the recipient country, there is an opportunity to infuse our spirit into the people.

5. The "grass roots" program set forth by the Department is a positive and constructive approach to meeting one of the greatest needs

of the area, namely, broadening the base of contact between the United States and the people of the Middle East. This need is intensified by the success of Communist tactics within the several countries.

6. The program's success will depend in large measure upon the existence of substantive aid which demonstrates in concrete form the interest of the United States in the welfare of the people. Thus in Greece and Turkey, and to a lesser extent in Iran, the existence of economic and military aid adds great weight to the approach; Point Four and other aid to the Near East will provide some such tangible evidence.

7. The success of the program also depends in large measure upon the leadership of the Chiefs of Mission, and upon the effectiveness of efforts to orientate Mission officers in the objectives, purposes and methods of the approach. Wives of officials can be of great value in pursuing the objectives of the program and should be made an important part of the effort.

8. Private American citizens, including Americans of foreign extraction returning to their home lands, can if properly oriented have an important impact upon the development of opinions favorable to the United States. In some countries it would be advantageous to create informal committees comprised of influential Americans to guide this aspect of the program.

9. Knowledge among the local peoples and Governments of conscious efforts on our part to organize sources of American influence would have an adverse effect upon the program.

10. Private American institutions, American schools and American-country societies, represent some of our most effective tools for influencing public opinion in the Middle East.

11. Naval visits, particularly to Greece and Turkey, have been of great "grass roots" value, and could be put to even greater use.

12. The oil companies in the Middle East can, by following increasingly progressive labor policies and more effective public relations programs, exercise a more constructive influence upon the peoples of the several countries and assist in their orientation toward the West.

13. Special national sensitivities make it necessary to develop "grass roots" programs in light of the situation prevailing in each country, since methods which might be effective in one country might not work in another.

B. *Recommendations*

1. In endeavoring to encourage political and social progress in the Middle East, we should pursue the middle road of persuasion, mutual

cooperation. and development of indigenous leadership. The technique of intervention employed should be directed to two ends:

(*a*) To limiting United States intervention to the most vital issues and resisting the temptation to become involved in subsidiary issues wherein reform would be desirable but is not immediately essential;
(*b*) To development of indigenous political leadership.

2. In selection of Chiefs of Mission and key personnel, particular emphasis should be given to individuals capable of leading the peoples of Greece, Turkey, Iran and the Near East, without appearing to impose their will. The timing factor is of great importance in determining how and when we should use our influence.

3. With respect to the problem of extending our contacts to the population at large, it was recommended that the Department and Foreign Service pursue the various elements of the "grass roots" approach along the lines outlined in the Department's memorandum.[11]

4. The United States should provide, to the extent possible, substantive aid to the countries of the area to demonstrate in concrete form the interest of the United States in the welfare of the people, and thereby to give substance to the "grass roots" approach.

5. Each Chief of Mission should consider that one of his most important responsibilities is to provide leadership for the "grass roots" program in the country to which he is accredited.

6. Private American citizens should be used to the maximum extent possible, including Americans of foreign extraction returning to their home lands; moreover, in countries where it would be appropriate to do so, the Mission should bring about creation of informal committees comprised of influential Americans to guide this aspect of the program.

7. The United States should render all possible assistance to private American institutions in the Middle East, as one of the most effective tools for influencing public opinion, and should encourage the creation of or support for American schools and American-country societies.

8. Naval visits, where and when appropriate, should be encouraged for their "grass roots" value, and even more effective use made of them.

9. Every effort should be made to encourage oil companies in the Middle East to follow increasingly progressive labor policies, and in their own self interest to be more active in the field of public relations.

10. In developing programs for individual countries, careful attention should be given to special national sensitivities and attitudes.

11. Every effort should be made to expedite the assignment of adequate USIE personnel to the Middle East.

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[11] Not further identified.

IX

APPRAISAL OF ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

A. *Conclusions*

1. Present economic policies are in general successful in Greece and Turkey, but it is now desirable that increased emphasis be given to support of the military effort and to short-term economic goals and economic self-sufficiency rather than long-term projects.

2. In Iran, the approach to economic assistance through loans has not been successful, either through the International Bank or the Export-Import Bank. A real need for economic assistance still exists.

3. In the Near East, the government budgets and foreign exchange needs are in general balanced, and private capital is accumulating. Grant economic assistance is needed, however, in varying degrees in all of the Arab countries, if the internal economic level is to be raised, because of (*a*) extraordinary expenditures for military requirements; (*b*) genuine capital needs in both the government and private sectors; (*c*) the present failure of capital to direct itself into enterprises for public benefit; (*d*) and the need for acceleration through United States technical assistance and administration of development projects, which can only be insured through United States grant assistance. There can, moreover, in many countries result a more general benefit to the economy through United States influence in governmental budget and financial policy, etcetera, as a result of the influence gained through this assistance.

4. The question of grants-versus-loans hinges not only on ability of the individual country to repay, but on urgency of need, psychological background, and the possibility of the country meeting banking requirements, both in presentation and administration. Loans are available in larger quantities; they serve to make demands more realistic; and they assure more careful use. However, some Arab states and Iran have difficulty in meeting banking requirements, and delays occur which result in disillusionment. Loans give less leverage to assure general objectives with the country concerned and do not generate counterpart to achieve specific objectives.

5. Loan assistance should in general be given first priority where the project and country qualify and the time factor is not important. Loans should in many cases fit well into a background of grants, which can get under way quickly and can provide more favorable bases for the loans. Any tendency to resist loans so as to obtain grants should be opposed.

6. Reactions by and between states as to what they may consider inequitable distribution of grants can be minimized by a regional approach which conceals country allocations. Allocations might then be

on a project basis that minimizes the dollar component and maximizes technical assistance components to countries best able to pay or borrow.

B. *Recommendations*

1. In Greece, economic aid should continue substantially as at present, and should not be reduced below a level which could, through inflation, result in the loss of economic stability which has been achieved to date under the aid program, or hazard the attainment of hard-core economic goals. It is expected that the need for such aid will continue at least through 1954.

2. Economic aid to Turkey should be continued within the general framework of present policies, with emphasis on support of the military effort, on short-term as against long-term economic goals, and on countering inflationary forces.

3. A program of giant aid for economic development should be undertaken in the Near East and Iran as an essential supplement to loan assistance and local governmental funds.

4. Loan assistance in general should be given first priority where the project and country qualify and the time factor is not important. Loans should in many cases follow grants, which can get under way quickly and can provide more favorable bases for loans. Any tendency on the part of the governments of the Middle East to resist legitimate loan opportunities for grants should be opposed.

5. An integrated assistance program, whether loan, grant, or technical aid, should be worked out for each country, taking into account its special circumstances. Coordination among all agencies given assistance, whether governmental, international or private, is essential.

6. In extending grant aid, even though modest in volume, emphasis should be placed on technical assistance as the best form of economic stimulation for underdeveloped areas.

7. The procedures of the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank should be simplified in the interest of effectiveness and speed, and adapted to the particular problems of the underdeveloped countries.

8. Procedures relating to the extension of grant aid, particularly technical assistance under the Point Four program, should be simplified to permit implementation on a rapid, emergency basis as required.

X

APPRAISAL OF POLICIES OF FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN RELATION TO UNITED STATES POLICIES AND INTERESTS

A. *Conclusions*

1. The Conference reviewed the operation of foreign oil companies in the Middle East in the light of the fact that oil is the most important single factor in United States relations with the area. Eco-

nomic and political stability in the area is dependent upon realistic policies with respect to oil, and stability is being threatened by the failure of certain oil companies, in particular by the British companies, to act in conformity with and in support of the joint United States-United Kingdom policy in the Middle East.

2. The low royalty pattern followed in the past by the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the failure in the past of the former company to develop adequate production rates, and the continuation by both companies of colonial methods in dealing with local governments have led to increasing hatred of foreign oil operations. While on the one hand the British Government has agreed with the United States on the necessity for stability of the area, on the other hand, agencies of the British Government have not in fact been able to assure that British oil companies are acting in conformity with that policy.

3. The recent agreement between the Arabian-American Oil Company and the Saudi Arab Government represents a significant step forward in the development of a proper relationship between oil companies and local governments, although it is recognized that increased royalties may in fact come in part, though indirectly, from the United States Treasury. The company has considerably improved its employee welfare program, including education and training. While much is yet to be done before an ideal situation has been created, the company is headed in the right direction.

4. The policies of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran are regarded as highly unsatisfactory, and are responsible to a great degree for the present economic problems and lowered Western prestige in that country, and throughout the entire Middle East. The British Foreign Office has had scant influence upon the company, although the British Government is the majority shareholder. While there has been some indication that the company has finally recognized that it cannot force through the Iranian parliament the supplementary oil agreement without further concessions, and has agreed to advance some 35 million pounds to help meet the immediate financial crisis with which the Iranian Government is confronted, the Conference was not optimistic as to the likelihood that there had been any fundamental change in company policy, nor that there would be so long as it is under its present management. Under present circumstances the company is one of the greatest political liabilities affecting United States–United Kingdom interests in the Middle Eastern area, since it reflects the dominant control of the Iraq Petroleum Company by the minority British interests represented by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

5. In Iraq the situation is also regarded as highly unsatisfactory. Royalties paid by the Iraq Petroleum Company in the past have been

so low that the Iraqi Government has never received more than $10 million per annum for its tremendous oil resources, which could produce quantities comparable to the present Iranian and Saudi Arabian output. The country resents the fact that it has oil and is getting little for it.

B. *Recommendations*

1. In view of the Conference findings that certain oil companies, in particular British companies, have in the past threatened stability in the Middle East through reactionary and out-moded policies with respect to the countries concerned, vigorous representations should be made to the Foreign Office to the end that henceforth British companies be brought to conform to the existing joint United States-United Kingdom policies designed to promote stability in the Middle East.

XI

APPRAISAL OF EFFECTIVENESS OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND COVERAGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. *Conclusions*

1. Admiral Carney outlined a series of military intelligence requirements which are not being adequately met at the present time, namely:

(*a*) Reporting on ship cargoes entering and leaving Iron Curtain countries;
(*b*) More complete and prompt coverage of all merchant shipping in the Middle East, which is essential to the initiation of effective shipping control measures;
(*c*) More voluminous and accurate target and logistical data;
(*d*) Maps and air photograph coverage;
(*e*) . . . ;
(*f*) Extension and modernization of dossiers on important personages;
(*g*) Speeding up of intelligence reporting and dissemination.

2. Proper coordination of intelligence operations in Washington and the field is essential to avoid overlapping or conflict of directives and operations. The Conferences assumed that the Central Intelligence Agency under its present leadership will now be able to provide coordination in Washington, and noted that individual Chiefs of Mission clearly have the responsibility for field coordination. While effective field coordination depends largely on personal relationships, most delegates to the Conference seem to favor a general supervision (*a*) to keep informed on important intelligence activities, (*b*) to resolve problems, and (*c*) to prevent difficulties which could militate against United States interests.

3. . . .

4. The effectiveness of intelligence-collection activities of service attachés has been affected adversely because of too frequent rotation, apparent absence of any consistent policy of regional specialization, and their heavy burden of administrative duties.

B. *Recommendations*

1. It was recommended that the adequacy of present United States-United Kingdom intelligence cooperation in the various countries of the Middle East be explored by each Chief of Mission, with a view to formulation of further recommendations on this subject.

2. The Department should, through Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence agencies, seek better coordination in Washington of intelligence objectives and directives, and keep all Chiefs of Mission currently informed as to such objectives, directives and indications for his area.

3. The Chief of Mission, either personally or through his deputy or representative, should discharge fully his coordinating responsibilities, and should keep generally informed of all intelligence activities in his area.

4. Central Intelligence Agency should instruct its representatives to cooperate more fully with the Chief of Mission in order that he may advise them fully with respect to their plans and activities; and to be guided by the advice received.

5. Central Intelligence Agency should coordinate its activities in a given country by designation of an existing representative as coordinator, not by introduction of new coordinating personnel not engaged in substantive work.

6. Administrative demands on service attachés should be simplified, and country or area specialization should be encouraged.

7. . . .

8. The Department should find means of apprising the field of the use made of reports from the field, with frank notations where necessary as to the adequacy of such reports.

XII

APPRAISAL OF USIE OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. *Conclusions*

1. USIE operations in the Middle East are in general adequately staffed, provided the present tables of organization are filled.

2. USIE programs generally support the objectives of US foreign policy in the conference area, although their degree of success varies from country to country. Iran presents a special problem in this regard, because of the attitude of the population, the difficulties created by the Iranian Government, and the virtual propaganda

monopoly of the Soviets in northern Iran. The lack of success of the USIE program in Egypt is largely due to inadequate staffing.

3. The effectiveness of media varies from country to country. In general, mobile units are one of the most effective media, in countries where the rate of illiteracy is relatively high, and in rural areas generally. Printed matter is a less effective medium, save in countries of relatively high literacy or with important concentrations of literate elements, such as Greece, Lebanon, and Pakistan. The exchange of persons programs are of high importance. In the Near East, the Voice of America has not yet achieved satisfactory effectiveness because of inexperience, irrelevant or ill-chosen programs, "high pressure" tactics, and lack of medium-wave broadcasting facilities.

4. In most cases, USIE has been effectively integrated into our missions. However, in countries which have ECA programs, difficulties are noted in achieving successful correlation between USIE programs and the public information programs of ECA.

5. It would be a grave error to remove the public information program from the policy control of the State Department, because of the necessity for integrating the program with our foreign policy objectives.

6. It was suggested that the possibility be explored of collecting local cultural patterns and activities, to send back to the United States, as an experiment in the sharing of technical cooperation and a means of expressing our interest in the area. However, the difficulty of organizing such a program on a reciprocal basis was recognized.

B. *Recommendations*

1. USIE should refrain from too rapid expansion and should avoid direct pressure or salesmanship tactics. The USIE staffing pattern should be examined critically, with a view to avoiding its over-expansion or placing undue emphasis upon its operations in the minds of the Middle Eastern Governments and people.

2. In ECA countries, the Chief of Mission (or his Public Affairs Officer) should be given a specific directive authorizing him to coordinate all public information activities in the country of his responsibility, in order effectively to integrate USIE and ECA public relations programs.

3. In the light of the present international situation, the possibility should be explored of preparing in Washington a USIE fortnightly newsreel for dissemination abroad through mobile units and, if possible, dissemination to commercial movie houses.

4. The possibility of producing periodical news bulletins on a regional basis should be explored, since publication of news bulletins by small diplomatic missions is too complex an operation.

5. We should explore the possibility of making greater use of posters, which have been found to be highly effective in areas where there is a high rate of illiteracy.

6. The Voice of America should endeavor to obtain more time on local stations.

7. We should attempt to facilitate the supply of newsprint to the Middle East where direct public relations advantages can be obtained.

8. It was strongly recommended that the public information program remain under the policy control of the Department, in the interests of its effective integration with United States foreign policy objectives.

9. The possibility of initiating collection of local cultural patterns and activities should be explored, with a view to creating a greater measure of reciprocity in this regard.

XIII

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. *Conclusions*

1. Adequate housing for missions and mission personnel is indispensable for efficient operations. Although the Division of Foreign Building Operations has made some progress in the conference area during the past year, the Conference noted that much remains to be done, particularly in decentralization of authority and improvement of the organization of FBO, and expressed the hope that, by speeding up action, FBO will be able to prevent the newly created shortages of building materials from delaying its building program in the NEA area.

2. The frequency of transfer of officer and clerical personnel works to the disadvantage of continuity in the operations of our missions. Although there has been a slight improvement in the calibre of Foreign Service and other personnel supplied by the Department, more than half of the missions in the conference area are not only under strength on their tables of organization but, more important, in personnel on the spot. It was noted that leading sources of personnel problems in order of importance are health; homesickness; pay and allowances; lack of adaptability; lack of outside interests; poor housing; inadequate qualifications; family troubles; and mental misfits.

3. Reporting officers who might be spending their time on intelligence and political work connected with the stepped-up urgency of he cold war are burdened with the requirement of submitting unecessary economic and commercial reports. The complex of adminisrative and budget reports required by the Department is also a heavy urden.

B. *Recommendations*

1. FBO should pursue its program in the NEA area with all possible speed.

2. The Department should avoid too frequent transfers and, as far as key officers are concerned, should consider lengthening tours of duty to approximately three years even in posts previously considered hardship posts.

3. Until the Department is able to fill all the positions on a post's table of organization, demands on the mission should be reduced in a realistic manner, to the end that some aspects of the work can be jettisoned and the remainder be redistributed.

4. The Department should work out with the Department of Commerce and other interested agencies a streamlined schedule of required reports; by the same token the needs of the intelligence agencies in Washington should be made more fully comprehensible to the missions in order that voluntary reporting will be along the most useful lines. Chiefs of Mission should be encouraged to recommend deletions from the schedule of required reports.[12]

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[12] A memorandum of conversation by Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Wells Stabler, dated March 5, not printed (120.4382/3-551), indicates that a "Summary of Conclusions for the Confidential Guidance of Chiefs of Mission in Oral Presentation to Governments" regarding the results of the Istanbul Conference had been prepared either by the Department of State or by the Chiefs of Mission before their departure from the Istanbul Conference. No record of this "Summary" has been found in Department of State files.

780.5/2-1751 : Telegram

The Consul General at Istanbul (Lewis) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET ISTANBUL, February 17, 1951—6 p. m.

287. From McGhee[1] for Berry NEA. Timely arrival Department's 386 February 16[2] permitted conference consider latest draft with following results.

1. Underline general comments: Conference concurs paragraphs A, B and C part one reference Deptel. Necessity rationalize respective roles US-UK in NE seen most important. Re paragraph D agree states must be strengthened individually but action taken in each will have repercussions other states and consequently efforts must be coordinated. Only Saudi Arabia entitled preferred US treatment.

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[1] McGhee was at Istanbul for the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, February 14–21; for documentation, see pp. 49 ff.

[2] Not found in Department of State files; presumably it transmitted a further draft of the proposed NSC paper on U.S. policy toward the Arab states and Israel. However, it will be noted that McGhee was herein discussing various points which had been raised in the original undated draft outline submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 6, printed p. 24.

2. Re paragraph E we agree increased dollar program Arab States and Israel desirable but early shipment more important consideration. Conference unanimous arms aid must be extended on same term to Israel and all Arab States including Saudi Arabia to prevent damaging charges favoritism et cetera. DAF negotiation has shown limited appeal cash reimbursable aid and SAG appears likely hold out for real *quid* for very important Dhahran *quo*. Consequently conference believes Saudi program should be converted grant basis and arms other Arab States and Israel likewise grant. Cash reimbursable facilities would be useful supplement only.

3. Conference felt deletion paragraph 10 conclusions re US making clear its intention jeopardizes program since anxiety NE peoples for reassurance has been reiterated time and again at conference. Conference submits below redraft this paragraph with strong recommendation that it be incorporated NSC document.

4. Underline recommended text changes.

Paragraph 6 delete "US has recently decided make available dollars". Substitute: "US joint chiefs have submitted program involving".

5. Delete paragraph 13. Substitute "the appropriate authorities of the US should develop the necessary arms supply programs for Arab States and Israel and should seek enactment of legislation providing grant military assistance for Arab States (including Saudi Arabia) and Israel during fiscal year 1952 in order that under the legislation immediate military assistance to ground forces of Arab States and Israel may be provided on grant basis".

6. Delete paragraph 14. Substitute "program of military assistance assumes and relies upon parallel and coordinated programs of technical and economic assistance of such scope and acceleration as will convince peoples of Arab States and Israel that they will benefit as individuals through survival of their states as result of victory of the west."

7. Add following as new final paragraph.

"As an integral part of the foregoing program, the US should make it clear in manner best calculated to produce maximum effect upon peoples of area, some of whom do not feel represented by their governments that because of vital US security interests the US, consistent with its UN obligations and its other commitments, is prepared in coordination with the UK to assist Arab States and Israeli strengthning their capabilities to defend areas as whole against aggression".

8. All mission chiefs recommend strongly foregoing program as ssential meet deteriorating situation. Mission chiefs believe Arab-srael differences no bar program if conducted on balanced basis but ithout associating two parties.

9. Admiral Carney concurs generally and is sending military comments to Defense.

10. Above reply reference Deptel and only part recommendations conference will formulate.

LEWIS

611.86/2-1951

Memorandum by the Director, International Security Affairs (Cabot), to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1951.

Subject: Proposed NSC Paper on U.S. Policy toward the Arab States and Israel

We transmit without concurrence attached paper.[1] If the purpose were merely to suggest reimbursable aid we would approve. Further legislation and the reference thereto (Paragraph 6*a*) then would be unnecessary. We believe such aid should be given when arms become available beyond the needs of other allies deserving priority. But, if the purpose is to justify grant aid, we feel that a legislative request for such a doubtful area requires further study in view of the jeopardy to our aid program as a whole from including such a doubtful area.

We feel that if we extend grant aid to areas not presently threatened there is danger of becoming extended beyond our resources.

While the paper does not state with any preciseness the exact purposes that would be achieved by supplying military assistance to the Arab States or Israel, presumably this would be done to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:

1. To provide weapons which these nations need and presently do not have in order to preserve their internal security, i.e., to deal with dissident or potentially dissident elements.
2. To provide weapons for existing or projected forces of these nations on the theory that such forces, if so equipped, would in fact contribute substantially in a defense against Soviet military aggression, either on their own or in conjunction with Allied forces committed to the area.
3. To provide weapons with which military or paramilitary forces located in these nations could, in the event of Soviet conquest of the area, harass supply lines, conduct guerrilla warfare and otherwise prevent consolidation of the Soviet position.
4. To "buy" strategic bases, rights of access, etc., by providing something which these nations uniformly appear to want, i.e., weapons.

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[1] Not found. The document under reference was a later version of the paper prepared in the Department of State, February 10 (see p. 44), and submitted, after further revision, to the NSC on February 28 (see p. 88).

5. To foster the Western orientation of these countries, and, conversely, to prevent their drift toward neutralism or toward the Soviet orbit by indicating through the provision of arms that the United States (and the United Kingdom) has a friendly feeling toward them and is prepared to come to their support in the event of Soviet military aggression.

The mere statement of these possible objectives raise a series of questions which should be answered before a decision is reached to supply arms. Among these questions are the following:

1. Which of these objectives are the objectives sought?
2. In what ways could an arms program in fact contribute to the attainment of these objectives?
3. What is the proper size and character of the arms program to attain such objectives?
4. Is token assistance enough?
5. Would cash reimbursable aid succeed in its purpose?
6. Would the program be based on a plan for the area as a whole, or handled as a matter of individual political expediency or individual requirements?
7. When can the types and quantities of arms which would be required be made available?
8. What will be the impact of furnishing these weapons on other MDAP programs?
9. Is the program, if it is adopted, to be a continuing program, and, if so, what are likely to be its eventual dimensions?
10. Would the effort to secure authority to provide grant aid to his area have adverse Congressional or public effects in terms of ecuring the passage of the FY 1952 foreign aid bill and, if so, should hey nonetheless be risked?
11. What *adverse* effects might flow from the furnishing of arms o this area under the circumstances contemplated in the paper? What ffect would it have on the negotiations for the Dhahran airbase? Vould it increase the likelihood, either immediately or in the event f increased international tension, of a resumption of Arab-Israeli stilities?
12. How soon would it be possible to make any deliveries to these untries and would the delay preceding the first deliveries, or the lay following such first deliveries and preceding further deliveries, ve adverse repercussions which would outweigh any advantages?

Since earlier discussions of this matter with Mr. McGhee and ers our ISAC Committee has been organized and we believe this tter might well be placed on its agenda. We would welcome your ughts as to this.

ISAC Files: Lot 53 D 443: ISAC D-6

Paper Prepared in the International Security Affairs Committee, Department of State[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1951.

ISAC D-6

STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN A DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE FEASIBILITY OF: (A) INCREASING TURKISH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT; (B) EXPEDITING DELIVERY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO GREECE, TURKEY AND YUGOSLAVIA DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1951; (C) FORMULATING MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

. . . .

C. ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES, INCLUDING EGYPT AND LIBYA

(Supporting Data-Tab C)[2]

Background:

The Department of State has recommended that more affirmative U.S. action is required to safeguard our vital security interests in the Middle East. In the Department's view the need for such action is made urgent by the political deterioration which has taken place in the area. In order to clarify some of the issues involved, the views of the Department of Defense have been requested on the following proposals:

"1. That the United States make it clear to all of the countries of the Middle East that the United States in coordination with the United Kingdom is prepared to assist them in strengthening their capabilities to defend the area as a whole against aggression.

"2. That the United States furnish small training missions and individual service technicians to the Arab States and Israel to assist them in the development of fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain and to the defense of the Middle East as a whole.

"3. That the number of Arab and Israeli trainees in the United States military schools be increased.

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[1] A covering memorandum from ISA Committee Secretary Robert G. Efteland stated that this paper was prepared in ISAC and was intended to serve as a basis for discussion and judgment on the problems enumerated in the "Statement of Considerations". Appended to the source text, but neither printed, are, as Tab A, a problem paper prepared in ISAC on increasing the Turkish military establishment, and, as Tab B, a memorandum from the Ambassador to Greece transmitting a paper on expediting the delivery of military equipment to Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Also appended to the source text, as Tab C, is a copy of the letter from Secretary Acheson to Secretary Marshall, with annex, dated January 27, p. 21. Pages 1-6 of this paper, not printed, deal with the increase in the Turkish military establishment and the delivery of military equipment to Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia during 1951.

[2] Not printed; see footnote 1 above.

"4. That the United States furnish, in conjunction with the training in paragraph 2, token quantities of arms and ammunition (of the order of magnitude of $5–10 million) to the Arab States and Israel on a cash reimbursable basis, making it very clear that greater quantities cannot be made available for another 12–18 months.

"These token quantities could be diverted from the programs for Greece, Turkey and Iran by delaying deliveries to these countries: if such a course is absolutely necessary, we believe on political grounds that the diversion should be made.

"5. That the United States discuss with the United Kingdom the establishment in the Middle East of a combined military mission, or establishment of a separate United States military mission for the purposes of:

> "*a.* stimulating and coordinating the military efforts of all of the Middle East countries for the defense of the Middle East as a whole;
>
> "*b.* creating stability in depth in the Arab States and Israel so as to enable Greece, Turkey and Iran to make the most effective use of the fighting power we are developing there;
>
> "*c.* coordinating in terms of the concept of area defense the activities of the United States and United Kingdom military missions in the individual countries; and
>
> "*d.* stimulating and coordinating, with appropriate backstopping in Washington and London, United States and United Kingdom planning to make the maximum effective use of available resources for the defense of the area."

As the result of subsequent conversations in the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally have transmitted their views with respect to the Middle East as follows:

"Political and military conditions in ME are of such significance o the security interest of the Western nations that provision should e made for grant aid to the other countries comprising the ME area. irm programs of assistance for these countries cannot be developed t the present time but it is highly desirable that a contingency fund e provided that will permit immediate military assistance to the *round* forces of these countries if such need for assistance becomes rgent.

"Accordingly legislation should be sought which will provide a *ntingency fund* that will permit additional *grant* military assistance the amount of $50,000,000 to countries in the ME area."

iscussion:

It is recognized that, politically, the situation in the Arab States d Israel has deteriorated in recent months. That steps should be en to counter this trend is also recognized. Partially to accomplish s end, an economic assistance program is planned for the area and rogram of reimbursable military assistance to the extent of five ten million dollars has been recommended by the Department of

State. However, the form in which this assistance should be provided is a question which remains to be resolved.

One method which is within the framework of present legislative authority would provide military equipment on a cash reimbursable basis under Section 408(*e*) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act as amended. In order to provide such assistance a determination would have to be made that each country in the area "whose ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part is important to the security of the United States". Assuming that such determinations are made, the countries in question could then request procurement assistance from the United States for the required equipment for which they would agree to pay. Negotiations for such an agreement with Saudi Arabia, which has been declared eligible under this Act, are now under way.[3]

Another method, which would require new legislative authority, would involve a series of grant aid programs for the countries in the area. Under this method surveys would have to be made to determine equipment deficiencies, assumptions would have to be made that the recipient countries were unable to pay for the needed equipment and complete justifications would have to be provided for the appropriations requested for this purpose.

Still another method, also involving the steps described in the previous paragraph, would be the creation of a contingency fund within the appropriation provided for Title II countries (Greece, Turkey and Iran) which could be used in the general area upon a determination by the President that the use of the funds in the country or countries in question would be important to the security of the United States. This latter method probably would provide more flexibility in channeling equipment into the countries where maximum benefits would accrue.

If deliveries of equipment can be limited to small quantities they probably would not interfere to any greater extent with the programs under way in countries of higher strategic importance unless given a high priority. However, if major quantities of equipment are to be involved and if deliveries of that equipment are to be expedited in order to achieve our objectives in the area, the programs will have to be worked out against a background of all other MDA countries. It is inconsistent, for instance, to suggest that there be a build up of strength in Greece and Turkey as in problems A and B above, and at the same time to embark upon a program of military assistance for the Arab States and Israel by diverting equipment from Greece and Turkey as has been suggested as a possibility.

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[3] For documentation on these negotiations, see pp. 1017 ff.

Present availabilities of military equipment are strictly limited and the demands upon U.S. productive capacity are of such magnitude that deliveries of presently-programmed equipment for MDAP countries will be long delayed for certain types of matériel. The only result which can come from adding new recipients will be to further aggravate an already difficult position unless production of the needed items is stepped up substantially. Therefore, a great deal of study must be given to questions involving the relative importance of the Middle East, NATO, and the Far East; the types and quantities of equipment that would have to be provided to the Arab States and Israel in order to accomplish our objectives; and whether or not assistance in the form of military equipment is a necessary method to accomplish those objectives.

Also, study will have to be given to possible developments between the Arab States and Israel if military equipment to increase their war potential is provided.

Recommendations:

1. ISAC should determine if the security interests of the U.S. require military assistance programs for the Arab States and Israel.
2. If military assistance programs are to be instituted for the Arab States and Israel, the Department of Defense should recommend to ISAC specific country programs in terms of quantities and types of equipment.
3. If military assistance programs are to be instituted for the Arab States and Israel, ISAC should determine whether such assistance should be provided on a reimbursable basis, on a grant basis with a specific program for each country, or on a "contingency fund" basis.

S/ISA Files : Lot 52-26 : NSC General

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Director, International Security Affairs (Cabot)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 21, 1951.

PROPOSED NSC PAPER ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

I. I have read with interest your memorandum of February 19[2] commenting on the paper on U.S. policy toward the Arab States and Israel which NEA had prepared for NSC consideration. I believe that the questions which you have raised are very much to the point and that they should and can be clarified. In addition, I think that a number of the points would be valuable additions to the proposed NSC paper.

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[1] Drafted by Kopper.
[2] *Ante*, p. 78.

II. With regard to the opening paragraph of your memorandum, NEA came to the conclusion the day before Mr. McGhee left for Istanbul, February 8,[3] that it would be necessary to have some form of grant aid in the Arab States and Israel to achieve the desired objectives. For reasons which are set forth in detail in paragraph IX below, NEA now believes that a combination grant aid-cash reimbursable program should be instituted. We concur with you that aid should be given on a priority basis. We certainly do not believe that a large grant aid program should be established which would adversely affect our program in Western Europe. We have in mind a grant aid program of $50,000,000 and a cash reimbursable program of $76,000,000 (this includes the $76,000,000 cash reimbursable program already approved for Saudi Arabia) for all of the Arab States and Israel to be put into operation by July 1, 1952.

III. NEA is puzzled over the fact that you have described the area in which the Arab States and Israel are located as "doubtful". We would very much appreciate a clarification of what is meant by this. As you know, the National Security Council has determined the Arab States and Israel to be of critical importance to the security of the United States. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the United Kingdom and the United States have as recently as October 26, 1950 agreed that "the Middle East in war is of importance second only to Europe". If by "doubtful" you mean that its political orientation is a question mark, I would point out that one of our objectives in assisting this area, just as in others, is to strengthen its orientation towards the West. Obviously a small program of grant aid assistance could not be expected to build up the Arab States and Israel as a major military force, but we believe much could be accomplished in aligning this area solidly with the West.

IV. With regard to paragraph 2 of your memorandum, it has long since been determined that Greece, Turkey and Iran are very much on the front line. The position of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in relation to Turkey and Iran is quite clear. The northeastern border of Syria is less than 200 miles from the Soviet Union. Iraq is barely 150 miles. The geographic importance of the area with respect to Western Europe, Africa and European and Asiatic Russia is quite obvious. Its importance during World War I and World War II was clearly demonstrated. If Turkey and Iran are in danger, we believe it almost axiomatic that the Arab States are in a similar position. It is assumed that the USSR would be deficient in oil during war and would not only attempt to deprive the Western powers of Middle Eastern oil but would also seek to obtain it for her own use. The great debate going on in the Arab world now is whether it should align with the west or try to steer a neutral course. Basically, this stems from a fear of the USSR and a lack of confidence and military strength.

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[3] For documentation on the Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission held at Istanbul February 14–21 and attended by McGhee, see pp. 49 ff.

V. The objectives of supplying military assistance to the Arab States and Israel include all of the five points mentioned in paragraph 3 of your memorandum, with some modifications on point two. We had not envisaged that it would be possible to provide weapons in such quantity that the Near Eastern states could contribute substantially in the defense against a major Soviet military aggression. On the assumption that it might be possible to supply grant aid in the amount of $50,000,000 in cash reimbursable aid up to another $76,000,000 over the next several years and finally on the assumption that the UK would also be assisting this area, it is conceivable that 18 months or two years after the program was commenced the Arab States and Israel would be in a far better position to defend themselves, and thereby to assist in the allied effort. In this connection, I would call your attention to the fact that during the first World War the central powers were forced to divert considerable strength to the Near Eastern area to take care of underground and harassing operations.

I believe it would be useful to incorporate in the NSC paper the objectives mentioned in your memorandum.

VI. In response to question 2, MPA believes that an arms program would go a long way toward obtaining the objectives. In particular, we feel that the attitude towards the United States would change markedly for the better.

VII. At the present time we believe that the effort to build up the strength of the Arab States and Israel should, of course, be dovetailed with other efforts to build up strength in other areas. We believe that the effort should be well planned on a simple but effective basis. The proper size over a period of time would depend to some extent on what can be done during the next two years. We believe that it would not be too much to expect to aim at a $126,000,000 aid program ($50,000,000 on grant aid and $76,000,000 cash reimbursable) to be launched in the fiscal year 1952 and carried on as expeditiously as possible, taking into account priorities in other areas. Such a program would not be large and could be absorbed. We do believe that early token assistance would be highly desirable.

VIII. Early token assistance would help towards achieving several of the objectives which you have enumerated; specifically Nos. 1, 4 and 5 and possibly 3. Over a period of time token assistance would not be adequate.

IX. I do not believe that cash reimbursable aid alone will succeed in achieving what we desire to achieve. In this connection your attention is called to paragraph 2 of Telegram #287 from Istanbul, February 17.[4] This paragraph clearly indicates that we may have great difficulty in obtaining the rights we desire in Saudi Arabia unless we give some grant aid assistance. It was because we had reached the conclusion in NEA on February 8 that cash reimbursable assistance was not sufficient that we decided we should seek grant aid also. The ability to pay is conspicuously lacking in all of the states in the area except Saudi Arabia and Egypt. With respect to the two latter countries, NEA feels that partial grant assistance is essential to achieve our strategic interests.

X. We would contemplate that the program should be handled with individual states, but there should be a coordination of the assistance so that the area as a whole would benefit. We believe that the types and quantities of arms would be largely for Infantry use, Light Artillery and light tanks to become available in the next 15 to 18 months. There would also be some air and navy assistance. During this period there would be an opportunity for us to make thorough and complete plans as to how the types and quantities could be best used in the individual countries and in the area as a whole.

XI. NEA is not in a position to decide what impact the furnishing of weapons would have on the other MDAP plans. However, since we are not suggesting that the contemplated assistance be given immediately, but rather over a period of time. In addition, since the program we are suggesting is relatively small in comparison with other programs, it is difficult to see how the other MDAP programs could be adversely affected to even a small degree.

XII. As far as question 9 is concerned, we are unable to state specifically what the eventual dimensions of a program in the NE are likely to be. You will recall that it was difficult in 1947 to predict how much aid we were going to give to Greece and Turkey. At the present time, however, we do not contemplate more that $50,000,000 grant aid through June 30, 1952. Much will depend on developments in the international situation during the next year as to whether a supplementary program in the NE will be required for fiscal '53 or '54. At the present time, NEA does not believe that the Arab States and Israel would be capable of handling a program which involved more than $50,000,000 grant aid, plus $76,000,000 cash reimbursable between now and July 1, 1952. It does not seem to me that grant aid to the Arab States and Israel would have adverse Congressional or public effects in terms of securing passage of FY 1952 Foreign Aid Bill. Since the area is of critical importance to the security of the United States, NEA believes that we have an obligation to strengthen it as much as it is capable of being strengthened and, in so far as it is possible for us to do so without jeopardizing other important efforts for our own resources. We do not anticipate adverse effects flowing from the furnishing of arms to the Arab States and Israel. We believe that it would assist in negotiations for the Dhahran Air Base and for the securing of other facilities. In so far as the resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities is concerned, the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 [5] makes very clear the position of the US, UN and France with regard to any aggression by either Israel or any of the Arab States towards each other. All of the information we have received from the Arab States since that time indicates that they recognize the futility of a second round; however, in the absence of normal political relations between the Arab States towards Israel, it is necessary to be quite candid and state that the strengthening of either side is a calculated risk. However, the same can be said for West Germany and Japan.

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[4] In telegram 287, February 17, from Istanbul, McGhee reported from the Chiefs of Mission Conference that "we agree increased dollar program Arab States and Israel desirable but early shipment more important consideration. Conference unanimous arms aid must be extended on same term to Israel and all Arab States including Saudi Arabia to prevent damaging charges favoritism et cetera. DAF negotiation has shown limited appeal cash reimbursable aid and SAG appears likely hold out for real *quid* for very important Dhahran *quo*. Consequently conference believes Saudi program should be converted grant basis and arms other Arab States and Israel likewise grant. Cash reimbursable facilities would be useful supplement only." (780.5/2–1751)

XIII. In response to Question 12, we understand from the JCS that it would be difficult to make deliveries of any quantity for some time to come. However, we believe our declaration of intention to make future deliveries would have such a pronounced beneficial effect in the Arab States and Israel that there is little danger that a lapse of time would cause any serious adverse repercussions, certainly none which would outweigh the advantages. We believe that the period of time between the passage of legislation authorizing grant aid assistance and the time of the actual first major deliveries could be most profitably utilized in developing sound programs. We do believe that certain token assistance should be sent as soon as possible.

XIV. NEA understands that the JCS has approved a $50,000,000 grant aid program for the Near East. The details have not as yet been worked out. It is difficult to work them out until a general policy determination approving the principle has been made. Finally, NEA quite willingly concurs in your suggestion that this item be placed on the agenda of the ISAC Committee if you feel it desirable. We should like a firm departmental position worked out first, however.

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[5] For documentation on the Tripartite Declaration regarding arms shipments to the Arab States and Israel, issued by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France on May 25, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 975–990 and 1027–1031; and *ibid.*, vol. V, pp. 131–168. The text of the declaration is in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886.

S/S–NSC Files : Lot 63 D 351 : NSC 47 Series

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Lay)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1951.

Subject: United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel

The enclosed proposed Statement of Policy on the Arab States and Israel and the accompanying Staff Study were prepared by the Department of State after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and officials of the Department of Defense. It is requested that the proposed statement and Staff Study be circulated to the members of the National Security Council for their consideration and comment or approval. Certain of the proposed policies require legislative action. I hope therefore that this question will be considered by the Council as soon as possible.

JAMES E. WEBB

[Enclosure 1]

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council[2]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

1. The stability of the Arab States and Israel continue to be of critical importance to the security of the United States. The factors which make the area of such importance to the security interests of the United States are primarily:

a. The geographic position of the area with respect to Western Europe, Africa and European and Asiatic Russia;
b. Oil resources;
c. Military bases; and
d. Communications and facilities.

2. It is in the U.S. interest to maximize the will of the Arab States and Israel to cooperate with the United States and friendly countries in resistance to the USSR both now and in the event of war.

3. Finally, it is in the U.S. interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab States except Saudi Arabia.

4. Accordingly, the U.S. should:

a. Take steps, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, to strengthen the Arab States and Israel internally and against the threat of USSR expansionism;

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[1] Drafted by Kopper: cleared by S/A, S/ISA, BNA, and G.

[2] The text of this document was subsequently circulated to the NSC as NSC 47/3; see the editorial note, *infra.*

b. Hold politico-military discussions with the United Kingdom to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of each country in strengthening the Arab States and Israel;

5. The United States and the United Kingdom should, on an individual but coordinated basis:

a. Obtain the right to operate in the various nations upon the threat of or during general hostilities;
b. Develop local fighting groups and techniques;
c. Furnish small advisory groups and individual technicians and consider requests for training;
d. Initiate when possible limited arms supply programs;
e. Make "show-the-flag" visits;
f. Where feasible, place orders in local industries for needed raw materials and equipment.

6. Finally, the United States should:

a. Take legislative action which will permit the development of appropriate arms supply programs.
b. Undertake and accelerate technical and economic assistance; and
c. Expand and intensify the United States psychological effort toward the area.
d. Make clear, in a manner best calculated to produce maximum effect, the fact that the United States is prepared to assist the Arab States and Israel to strengthen their capabilities to defend themselves against aggression.

[Enclosure 2]

National Security Council Staff Study

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

THE PROBLEM

1. To define and assess the policy which the United States should follow towards the Arab States* and Israel, particularly in the light of the growing tendency in the area toward neutralism and the decline of an attitude favorable to the United States and other friendly countries.

ANALYSIS

2. NSC 47/2, October 17, 1949, covering United States policy toward Israel and the Arab States and NSC 65/3, May 17, 1950, on United States policy toward arms shipments to this area set forth policies which now require supplementing in light of the material changes in the international situation.

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*Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. The political and economic stability of the Arab States and Israel were determined in NSC 47/2 to be of critical importance to the security of the United States, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the United States and the United Kingdom have as recently as October 26, 1950 agreed that "The Middle East in war is of importance second only to Europe". The factors which make the area critically important to the security interests of the United States are primarily:

(*a*) The geographic position of the area with respect to Western Europe, Africa and European and Asiatic Russia;
(*b*) Oil resources;
(*c*) Military bases; and
(*d*) Communications and facilities.

4. United States objectives in the Arab States and Israel are:

(*a*) To preserve and strengthen the orientation of the nations in the area toward the United States and other nations friendly to us;
(*b*) To create political stability in depth for the benefit of Greece, Turkey and Iran and as a contribution to the stability of the Middle East as a whole;
(*c*) To induce the countries to increase their indigenous defensive capabilities against the USSR and Soviet satellites; and
(*d*) To obtain the right to deploy, base and operate forces in the territories of the nations of the areas upon threat of and during general hostilities, and to lay the political groundwork for us to regain access to the territories of the nations of the area in event of their loss during general hostilities.

5. The increasing belief, particularly in the Arab States, that the United States will not help the countries to prepare to defend themselves, is producing marked political disaffection and deterioration. The risk is increasing that important areas will swing away from the West toward neutrality, or even toward the USSR. It is important that this adverse trend be halted.

6. Retention and use of even a part of Middle East oil production or even delayed loss of it would contribute importantly and perhaps critically to an allied war effort.

7. It is in the interest of the United States that the United Kingdom maintain primary military responsibility in Israel and the Arab States, other than Saudi Arabia. Although the political influence of the United Kingdom has been declining in certain parts of the area, it is, nevertheless, still stronger than that of any other country in other parts, and it is in our mutual interest that there be cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in order that the maximum benefit may be derived from our respective efforts. The United States has recently decided to make available $76,000,000 cash reimbursable assistance to Saudi Arabia. It is in our interest that

primary military responsibility for this area should rest with the United States; but there should, nevertheless, be coordination with the United Kingdom. Israel is aware that the United Kingdom has primary military responsibility with regard to the area in which Israel is located.

8. The indigenous defenses in the Arab States and Israel can be increased through relatively small United States and United Kingdom efforts in the area, particularly in the difficult terrain of the Arabian Peninsula where American-operated desert facilities, engineering equipment and American experience already exist.

9. If military assistance were supplied to the Arab States and Israel, these states would (*a*) become more closely oriented towards the United States; (*b*) be better able to preserve internal security; (*c*) contribute after a time to the defense of the area; (*d*) be able to conduct guerilla warfare and harassing operations in the event the area or part of it is overrun; and (*e*) be more amenable to the granting of strategic rights.

10. If the Arab States and Israel do not become firmly oriented toward the United States and countries friendly to us during the cold-war period, it is doubtful that the support of these countries could be obtained during a global war or regained after the war.

CONCLUSIONS

11. It is in United States interest to maximize the will of the governments and peoples in the Arab States and Israel to cooperate in resistance to the USSR both now and in the event of war; to translate that will into indigenous efforts to strengthen internal security; to resist the Soviet advance; to grant the Western Powers necessary military rights therein; and, if the area is nevertheless overrun, to harass and sabotage the invader and to assist in liberation.

12. Taking cognizance of the fact that it is in the United States interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab States excepting Saudi Arabia, discussions should be held on a combined United Kingdom-United States politico-military level to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of the United States and the United Kingdom in strengthening the Arab States and Israel.

13. Following agreements reached in the discussions held in accordance with paragraph 12, above, the United Kingdom and the United States should, on an individual but coordinated basis undertake and accelerate the following measures with respect to the Arab States and Israel:

(*a*) Obtaining the right to deploy, base and operate forces in the territories of the nations of the area upon threat of and during general hostilities;

(*b*) Development of fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain;

(*c*) Initiating when possible limited arms supply programs, required to achieve (*a*) and (*b*) above by early delivery of token quantities;

(*d*) Furnishing on request small advisory groups and individual service technicians, and consider requests for training of national military personnel in service schools;

(*e*) Making, in agreement with local governments, "show-the-flag" visits by air force planes and naval vessels; and

(*f*) Placing of orders in local industries for needed raw materials and war materials.

14. The United States should take legislative action which will permit the development of appropriate arms supply programs. Subject to the enactment of such legislation, appropriate authorities of the United States should develop the necessary programs.

15. The United States should undertake and accelerate technical and economic assistance that will help convince the peoples of the Arab States and Israel that they will benefit as individuals as well as States, from the victory of the Free World.

16. The United States should expand and intensify the United States psychological effort toward the area.

17. The United States should make it clear in the manner best calculated to produce the maximum effect upon the peoples of the area that it is prepared to assist the Arab States and Israel in strengthening their capabilities to defend themselves against aggression.

Editorial Note

Lay transmitted the proposed Statement of Policy on the Arab States and Israel to the National Security Council on March 1 as NSC 47/3. The Staff Study on the subject was also enclosed for the information of the Council. In his note of transmittal, Lay also took note of Acting Secretary Webb's observation that as certain of the proposed policies would require legislative action, the Council should consider the draft Statement "as soon as possible". Therefore, Council consideration of NSC 47/3 was scheduled for the next regular meeting on March 7 (Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel (NSC 47/3), March 1, 1951, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series).

In a memorandum for the National Security Council on March 2, Lay reported that by agreement between the Departments of State and Defense, NSC 47/3 had been removed from the Council agenda for March 7 and was being referred to the Senior NSC Staff in anticipation of Council consideration of March 14 (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series). On March 6, the NSC Staff submitted as NSC 47/4 a revision, not printed, of the Statement of Policy, and on the following day, the Staff submitted as NSC 47/4 Annex a revision, not printed, of the Staff Study which had been enclosed with NSC 47/3. Copies of NSC 47/4 and NSC 47/4 Annex are in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series. On March 13, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, Lay circulated to the National Security Council, in connection with consideration of NSC 47/4 at its March 14 meeting, a memorandum of March 13 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. In the memorandum the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed certain amendments to NSC 47/4 and expressed the view that, with the amendments, they perceived no objection from the military point of view to the draft statement of policy in NSC 47/4.

At its 86th meeting on March 14, the National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization adopted the proposed statement of policy in NSC 47/4 subject to the amendments recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as revised in accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary of State. (For amendments to NSC 47/4, see footnotes to NSC 47/5, page 95.) The Council also noted the following statement of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Joint Secretaries (Army, Navy, and Air Force), read at the meeting by the Secretary of Defense:

> "That any proposed resultant legislation be discussed, prior to submission to Congress, with prominent senators and congressmen interested in the Israel problem and that after such discussions conferences be held with the leaders of the various Zionistic and other Jewish-American groups having an interest with this problem.
>
> "That prior to inclusion of the Arab and Israel states in MDAP legislation, serious consideration be given to the effect of such inclusion on the total presentation. The Mutual Defense Program may have tough sledding legislatively, and from a Defense viewpoint, care must be taken not to jeopardize obtaining sufficient funds for critical areas by utilizing the forum of congressional committees for diplomatic and political purposes." (NSC Action No. 451)

The draft statement of policy in NSC 47/4 and the annex as amended were designated NSC 47/5 (page 95), and were submitted to the President on March 14 for consideration. For documentation on the drafting changes proposed for NSC 47/4 and the annex to it and on the 86th meeting of the National Security Council, see S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series.

Secretary's Letters : Lot 56 D 459 : "Middle East Defense"

CINCNELM and Cs-in-C, Middle East, to the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET [MALTA,] 13 March 1951.

Mil/3039/ME

1. During our combined study of Allied capabilities for the defence of the Persian/Iraq Sector of the Outer Ring, we were continually faced with the problems of how we would overcome the weakness in the democratic front in Persia and also of how we could find both the forces required in war to meet the Soviet threat through Persia in the crucial early stages and those required to meet the over-all deficiency as the threat develops later on. Some of these forces are required to be stationed in or near Iraq in peace.

2. We recalled that in the past it had been accepted that the security of the Mesopotamian Valley and of the Persian Gulf directly concerned the safety of the Indian Subcontinent and that Indian troops had fought there at intervals through the last century.

3. It is our view that there has been no change in the strategic importance of this area to India and particularly to Pakistan nor to their mutual interests in it. Both Pakistan and India have strong land forces which are well placed to intervene promptly in this area. Pakistan is a Moslem country and is proposing to adopt the Arab language. The presence of Pakistani troops in Iraq in peace would raise less difficulties than would European troops.

4. We consider that every effort should be made to draw the attention of these two Commonwealth countries to their interests and responsibilities for the maintenance of the stability of this area, with a view to their joining us in arrangements for its defence. It is also for consideration whether Pakistan should be encouraged to enter

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[1] This combined letter was issued on the final day of the second round of the so-called "Malta talks" between British and U.S. military officials. The first round had taken place on January 23–24 and the second, and final, round between March 10–13. It was signed by Adm. Robert B. Carney, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean; Adm. Sir John Hereward Edelston, Commander in Chief of the British Mediterranean Station; Gen. Sir Brian Robertson, Commander in Chief, British Land Forces Middle East; and Air Chief Marshal Sir John Wakeling Baker, Commander in Chief, Royal Middle East Air Force.

The source text was Enclosure "C" to a memorandum dated April 24 from Col. Edwin H. J. Carns, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Mr. McGhee. Enclosure "B" was a memorandum by the British Joint Services Mission to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated April 6, and entitled "Middle East Defence," not printed. Enclosure "A" was an undated report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff containing a noncommittal draft reply the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, not printed. For further information regarding the memorandum of April 6 by the British Joint Services Mission, see the editorial note, p. 109.

into a treaty of mutual assistance with Persia and Iraq; from the military point of view this would have great advantages.[2]

R. B. CARNEY
J. H. EDELSTON
B. H. ROBERTSON
J. W. BAKER

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[2] In a memorandum of April 6 entitled "Middle East Defense", the British Joint Services Mission informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *inter alia*, that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the combined letter and were in full agreement that it was a matter of the highest importance that both Pakistan and India should assist in the defense of the Persian-Iraqi sector of the Middle East. An approach should be made to these two countries to achieve this end as soon as would be opportune; however, the British Chiefs of Staff were appreciative of the fact that owing to the Kashmir dispute, an early approach would almost certainly do more harm than good (Secretary's Letters: Lot 56 D 459: "Middle East Defense").

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 47/5

[WASHINGTON, March 14, 1951.]

THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

1. The political and economic stability of the Arab States* and Israel continues to be of critical importance to the security of the United States. The factors which make the area of such importance to the security interests of the United States are primarily:

a. The geographic position of the area with respect to the Mediterranean, Western Europe, Africa, and European and Asiatic Russia.
b. Oil resources.
c. Military bases.
d. Communications and facilities.

2. It is in the U.S. interest to offset the recently evidenced trend toward neutrality and to maximize the will of the several Arab States and Israel to cooperate with the United States and friendly countries in resisting penetration by the USSR.

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[1] In a covering note dated March 14, 1951, Lay stated, *inter alia*, that the National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization "recommend that the President approve the enclosed statement of policy, to supplement but not supersede NSC 47/2 and NSC 65/3." President Truman subsequently approved the statement of policy in NSC 47/5 on March 17, 1951 and directed its implementation by all appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government under coordination of the Secretary of State (Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council for the National Security Council, March 22, 1951, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series).

*Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Because of U.S. commitments in other areas it is in the U.S. interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab States.[2] However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue.

4. Accordingly, the United States should:

a. Hold politico-military discussion with the United Kingdom to clarify the respective participation and responsibilities of each country in strengthening the several Arab States and Israel; and

b. Take steps, correlated with the United Kingdom as far as practicable, to strengthen the several Arab States and Israel to improve their political and economic stability and to increase their will and ability to resist penetration by the USSR.[3]

5. The United States and the United Kingdom should, on an individual basis, but correlating their actions as far as practicable, and without partiality but consistent with strategic considerations as between Israel and the several Arab States:[4]

a. Attempt to resolve local differences in order that the several Arab States and Israel may be able to meet the greater threat of international communism.

b. Obtain as soon as practicable the right to deploy, base, and, upon the threat of and during general hostilities, to operate, forces in the territories of the various nations of the area.

c. Develop fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain.

d. Initiate when possible a limited arms supply program and provide early delivery of token quantities.

e. Furnish supervisory and technical personnel for the arms supply program.

f. Make "show-the-flag" visits.

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[2] In NSC 47/4 the words "except Saudi Arabia" appeared at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 13 recommended that the words "except Saudi Arabia" be deleted and that the following sentence be added: "However, the special United States–Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue during the cold-war period." At the March 14 NSC meeting the Council adopted the JCS recommendation with the omission of the words "during the cold-war period" as recommended by the Secretary of State.

[3] In NSC 47/4 paragraph 4*b* read as follows: "*b.* Take steps, in correlation with the United Kingdom to strengthen the several Arab States and Israel to improve their political and economic stability and to increase their will and ability to resist penetration by the USSR." The Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 13 recommended that the first part of the sentence be amended to read: "Take steps, correlated with the United Kingdom as far as practicable, to strengthen the several Arab States and Israel." At the March 14 NSC meeting the Council adopted the amendment proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[4] Paragraph 5 in NSC 47/4 began as follows: "The United States and the United Kingdom should, on an individual but correlated basis and without partiality as between Israel and the several Arab States:". The Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 13 recommended the following revision: "The United States and the United Kingdom should, on an individual basis, but correlating their actions as far as practicable, and without partiality as between Israel and the several Arab States." At the NSC meeting on March 14 the Council adopted the JCS recommendation after adding the phrase "but consistent with strategic considerations" following the word "partiality" as recommended by the Secretary of State.

g. Where feasible and desirable, place orders locally for needed raw materials and equipment.

6. Also, the United States should, without partiality as between Israel and the several Arab States:

a. Seek legislative action which will permit the development of appropriate arms supply programs.

b. Undertake and accelerate planned technical and economic assistance.[5]

c. Expand and intensify the U.S. psychological effort to attain the objectives set forth in paragraph 2 above.

d. Make clear, in a manner best calculated to produce the desired effect, the fact that the United States is prepared to assist the several Arab States and Israel to strengthen their capabilities to defend themselves against aggression.

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[5] In NSC 47/4 paragraph 6*b* read as follows: "Undertake and accelerate planned technical and economic assistance without partiality as between Israel and the several Arab States." The Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 13 recommended that the phrase "without partiality as between Israel and the several Arab States" be deleted from paragraph 6*b* and inserted at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 6 after the words "Also, the United States should". The National Security Council at its meeting on March 14 adopted the JCS recommendation.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series

Staff Study by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, March 14, 1951.]

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

THE PROBLEM

1. To define and assess the policy which the United States should follow towards the Arab States[*] and Israel, particularly in the light of the growing tendency in the area toward neutralism and the decline of an attitude favorable to the United States and other friendly countries.

ANALYSIS

2. NSC 47/2, October 17, 1949, covering United States policy toward Israel and the Arab States, and NSC 65/3, May 17, 1950, on United States policy toward arms shipments to this area, set forth policies which now require supplementing (but should not be superseded) in light of the material changes in the international situation.

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[1] The source text is the annex to NSC 47/4 amended in accordance with the amendments to the draft statement of policy in NSC 47/4 adopted by the National Security Council at its 86th meeting on March 14. See editorial note, p. 92. It was circulated to the Council with the Statement of Policy, NSC 47/5, *supra*.

[*] Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. The political and economic stability of the Arab States and Israel were determined in NSC 47/2 to be of critical importance to the security of the United States, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the United States and the United Kingdom have as recently as October 26, 1950 agreed that "The Middle East in war is of importance second only to Europe". The factors which make the area critically important to the security interests of the United States are primarily:

a. The geographic position of the area with respect to the Mediterranean, Western Europe, Africa and European and Asiatic Russia;
b. Oil resources;
c. Military bases; and
d. Communications and facilities.

4. United States objectives in the Arab States and Israel are:

a. To preserve and strengthen the orientation of the nations in the area toward the United States and other nations friendly to us;
b. To create political stability in depth for the benefit of Greece, Turkey and Iran and as a contribution to the stability of the Middle East as a whole;
c. To induce the countries to increase their indigenous defensive capabilities against the USSR and Soviet satellites;
d. To obtain the right to deploy, base, and, upon the threat of and during general hostilities, to operate, forces in the territories of the nations of the area and to lay the political groundwork for us to regain access to the territories of the nations of the area in event of their loss during general hostilities; and
e. To provide a correlated approach to the individual countries of the area with the purpose of reducing rivalries and furthering acceptance of a spirit of mutuality of interest among all of the countries concerned.

5. The increasing belief, particularly in the Arab States, that the United States will not help the countries to prepare to defend themselves, is producing marked political disaffection and deterioration. The risk is increasing that important areas will swing away from the nations of the free world toward neutrality, or even toward the USSR

6. Since the beginning of the Korean conflict there has been growing awareness on the part of the Arab States and Israel of their vulnerability vis-à-vis the USSR and, in most cases, of their almost total lack of an ability to defend themselves. In view of these feelings particularly in the Arab States, there has been extreme hesitancy to give any significant support to the United States program in the United Nations to combat communist aggression. The voting record of the Near East States on the United Nations resolution condemning Communist China as an aggressor in Korea shows that only Lebanon, Israel and Iraq supported the resolution, with Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia abstaining. There is a definite fear that support of the United States program will provoke retaliatory measures by the

USSR. It is also evident that the bitterness toward the United States policy on the Palestine question has contributed to an attitude of indifference on Korea.

7. The failure of the United States to make concrete offers of military assistance to these states in response to their repeated requests for aid with which to defend themselves has given added impetus to the already existing attitude that neutrality in the present conflict may present the best opportunity for their survival in an all-out war. The fact that neither the United States alone nor the nations of the free world as a group have made any clear cut declaration concerning the defense of the Arab States and Israel has given further weight to this tendency towards neutralism. In the absence of information to the contrary, these peoples assume that the nations of the free world do not intend to come to their defense. Leaders throughout the area have voiced the opinion that they are hard put to defend policies sympathetic to the free world in their countries when their countries are exposed, weak, and uncertain of the prospects of practical and effective support from the nations of the free world in the event of a further deterioration in the international situation. It is important that this adverse trend be halted.

8. Retention and use by the free world of even a part of Middle East oil production and even a delay in the loss thereof to an enemy would contribute importantly and perhaps critically to an allied war effort.

9. Because of United States commitments in other areas, it is in the interest of the United States that the United Kingdom maintain primary military responsibility in Israel and the Arab States. However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue.[2] Although the political influence of the United Kingdom has been declining in certain parts of the area, it is, nevertheless, still stronger than that of any other country in other parts, and it is in our mutual interest that there be cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in order that the maximum benefit may be derived from our respective efforts. The United States has recently decided to make available $76,000,000 cash reimbursable assistance to Saudi Arabia. It is in our interest that primary military responsibility for this area should rest with the United States; but there should, nevertheless, be coordination with the United Kingdom. Israel is aware that the United Kingdom has primary military responsibility with regard to the area in which Israel is located.

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[2] The words "other than Saudi Arabia" appeared at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 9 in the annex to NSC 47/4. These words were deleted and the sentence "However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue." was added to conform to the amendments to the Statement of Policy in NSC 47/4 adopted by the National Security Council at its meeting of March 14.

10. The weak indigenous defenses in the Arab States and Israel can be somewhat increased through relatively small United States and United Kingdom efforts in the area, particularly in the difficult terrain of the Arabian Peninsula where American-operated desert facilities, engineering equipment and American experience already exist.

11. If military assistance were supplied to the several Arab States and Israel, these states would (*a*) tend to become more closely oriented towards the United States; (*b*) be better able to preserve internal security; (*c*) contribute after a time to the defense of the area; (*d*) be able to conduct guerrilla warfare and harassing operations in the event the area or part of it is overrun; and (*e*) be more amenable to the granting of strategic rights.

12. If the Arab States and Israel do not become firmly oriented toward the United States and countries friendly to us during the cold-war period, it is doubtful that the support of these countries could be obtained during a global war.

CONCLUSIONS

13. It is in United States interest to maximize the will of the governments and peoples in the Arab States and Israel to cooperate in resistance to the USSR both now and in the event of war; to translate that will into indigenous efforts to strengthen internal security; to resist the Soviet advance; to grant the Western Powers necessary military rights therein; and, if the area is nevertheless overrun, to harass and sabotage the invader and to assist in liberation.

14. Because of United States commitments in other areas it is in the United States interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab States. However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue.[3] Accordingly early discussions should be held on a combined United Kingdom-United States politico-military level to clarify the respective participation and responsibilities of the United States and the United Kingdom in strengthening the several Arab States and Israel.

15. Following agreements reached in the discussions held in accordance with paragraph 14, above, the United States and the United Kingdom should, on an individual basis, but correlating their actions

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[3] The words "excepting Saudi Arabia" appeared at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 14 in the annex to NSC 47/4. The words were deleted, and the sentence added as follows: "However, the special United States-Saudi Arabia arrangements now existing should continue." This was added to conform to the amendments to the Statement of Policy in NSC 47/4 adopted by the National Security Council at its meeting of March 14.

as far as practicable, and without partiality but consistent with strategic considerations as between Israel and the several Arab States:[4]

a. Attempting to resolve local differences in order that the several Arab States and Israel may be able to meet the greater threat of international communism;

b. Obtaining the right to deploy, base, and, upon the threat of and during general hostilities, to operate forces in the territories of the nations of the area;

c. Developing fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain;

d. Initiating when possible a limited arms supply program and providing early delivery of token quantities;

e. Furnishing supervisory and technical personnel for the arms supply program;

f. Making, in agreement with local governments, "show-the-flag" visits by air force planes and naval vessels; and

g. Where feasible and desirable, placing orders in local industries for needed raw materials and war materials.

16. The United States should seek legislative action which will permit the development of appropriate arms supply programs. Subject to the enactment of such legislation, appropriate authorities of the United States should develop the necessary programs, and establish suitable area coordinating machinery in the field for administering the program.

17. The United States should undertake and accelerate planned technical and economic assistance that will help convince the peoples of the Arab States and Israel that they will benefit as individuals as well as States, from the victory of the free world.

18. The United States should expand and intensify the United States psychological effort toward the area.

19. The United States should make it clear in the manner best calculated to produce the desired effect upon the peoples of the area that it is prepared to assist the Arab States and Israel in strengthening their capabilities to defend themselves against aggression.

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[4] In the annex to NSC 47/4, paragraph 15 began as follows:

"15. Following agreements reached in the discussions held in accordance with paragraph 14, above, the United Kingdom and the United States should, on an individual but correlated basis and without partiality among the several Arab States and Israel, undertake and accelerate the following measures with respect to the Arab States and Israel:"

The wording of the first sentence of paragraph 15 was revised to conform to the amended wording of paragraph 5 of the draft Statement of Policy in NSC 47/4 adopted by the National Security Council at its meeting on March 14; see footnote 4, p. 96.

120.4382/3-1551

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 15, 1951.

Subject: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Middle East Chiefs of Mission Conference, Istanbul

The Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission, which was held in Istanbul, Turkey, from February 14 through February 21, 1951 under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary McGhee, was attended by the United States Chiefs of Mission in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Arab states, and Pakistan, and the United States representatives on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. The conferees had the benefit of Secretary Finletter's views on the air aspects of the Middle Eastern situation, during his brief attendance at the conference. Moreover, the presence throughout the entire conference of Admiral Robert B. Carney, Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, contributed significantly to its success.

The major recommendations arising from the conference have been the subject of separate action telegrams to the Department: (1) the recommendation for extension of reciprocal security arrangements to Greece and Turkey,[2] of which you are aware and on which NEA is taking further action; (2) military assistance to the Arab states and Israel[3] on the basis of a coordinated United States-United Kingdom effort, which has now been incorporated into NSC 47/4, approved by the NSC on March 14; and (3) the recommendation concerning the desirability of bringing the policy of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company into conformity with our foreign policy objectives in the Middle East,[4] which is being studied by NEA in the light of the present situation in Iran.

In addition, you may also be interested in the attached documents: (1) the agreed conclusions and recommendations of the conference (Tab A),[5] with special reference to section I thereof, entitled "Strategic interests and roles of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Middle East, and the problem of achieving more positive cooperation from the area in support of United States objectives";

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[1] Drafted by Mary E. Hope of NEA.

[2] Telegram 305 from Istanbul, February 21, not printed (782.5/2-2151).

[3] Telegram 287 from Istanbul, February 17, p. 76.

[4] Telegram 296 from Istanbul, February 19, not printed (120.43/2-1951) and telegrams 303 and 307 from Istanbul, February 21, not printed (888.2553/2-2151).

[5] Same as Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, Istanbul, February 14-21, 1951, p. 50.

and (2) a summary by Admiral Carney of the strategic implications of the Istanbul conference agenda (Tab B). Since the latter represents in part Admiral Carney's personal views, he has requested that it be given no distribution.

Upon his return, Mr. McGhee will give an oral summary of the conference conclusions and recommendations at the Under Secretary's meeting.[6]

Tab B

Summary of the Strategic Implications of the Istanbul Conference Agenda by Admiral Robert B. Carney, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

I. Every element of democratic strength must be mobilized for the containment of communism.

II. The control of the Mediterranean is one single task of vital importance to the defense of Western Europe.

III. Every element bordering on the Mediterranean will play a part in the control of the Mediterranean.

IV. The potential strengths of Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia are important to SACEUR in that they would undoubtedly involve the commitment of significant Russian forces.

V. Greece belongs in a West Mediterranean region rather than in the Middle East.

VI. Turkey has a dual interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and, conversely, both the Mediterranean plans and Middle East plans must take Turkey into consideration.

VII. Iran must be considered solely as an element of the Middle East and cannot effectively be incorporated into any Western defense structure.

VIII. Division of MDAP funds between Greece, Turkey, and Iran should be on the following basis:

(*a*) Greece's manpower is limited, her military potential is defensive only, and military aid should not be in excess of that required to develop defensive capacity to a reasonable degree.

(*b*) Military aid to Turkey should be the most extensive and should be predicated on the Turkish capacity for great resistance and the possibility of generating some limited Turkish offensive.

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[6] McGhee made a brief report of his trip, not printed, at the Under Secretary's meeting on April 6. He stressed the usefulness of regional conferences as a forum of interaction between Department representatives and field officers, noted the unsettled condition of countries in the Near Eastern region whom he characterized as "colonials in a transitory phase", preoccupied mainly with security rather than economic problems, argued that "the philosophy of neutralism is predominate in this area and is a most dangerous condition", and concluded that "Iran is the danger point in this area" (Under Secretary's Meetings: Lot 53 D 250: UM N–328). For McGhee's subsequent report on his trip to the State–JCS meeting of May 2, see p. 113.

(*c*) Military aid to Iran should be considered as a cold-war measure and should not be in such degree as to benefit the enemy.

IX. Assistance to Middle East countries is desirable as a means of holding their Western orientation but there can be no universal policy as to cash-reimbursable versus grant-aid. Assistance should be granted on the basis of Allied or U.S. interests and reciprocal benefits should always be sought.

X. As soon as a Mediterranean regional structure has been determined, Greece should be included in that structure.

XI. The question of commitments to Turkey should be re-examined with a view toward possible satisfaction of her desires for association with NATO. It is possible that assurance of material assistance plus an expressed intent with respect to minor naval and air cooperation might be sufficient.

XII. Security discussions, at the military staff level, should be encouraged among all elements of the Middle East with a view toward:

(*a*) Developing sensible and workable interim coordinated plans, and

(*b*) Ultimate authoritative coordination by some collective security arrangement.

(*Note:* The foregoing represents in part agreed United States military positions, in part current British-United States military opinion at Admiral Carney's level, and in part the latter's personal views which currently have no sanction.)

788.00/4–1051

Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, in Connection With the Visit to London of The Honorable George C. McGhee, April 2–3, 1951 [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, April 2, 1951.

Participants: *Foreign Office:* R. J. Bowker, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
G. W. Furlonge, Head, Eastern Department
U.S.A.: George McGhee, Department of State
James K. Penfield, American Embassy, London
John Frick Root, American Embassy, London

Subject: Near East Defense

Mr. McGhee outlined the latest US thinking on problems of defense in the Near East. Any tendency to neutralism in the Near East seemed to result mainly from a feeling of insecurity. The greatest danger to the area seemed to lie in the 18 months immediately ahead during the period when the West was gathering its strength. Therefore, our problem seemed to be primarily a short-range one and to consist mainly of restoring confidence to the countries of the area. We probably could not expect from most of them strong fighting allies and our goal was rather to build up stability and determination to resist aggression, to equip and train the countries for what limited military role they were capable of playing in defense of the area, and to establish the conditions which would enable the Turks to play their proper part in military operations. Also, we should aim to lay the groundwork and create the morale which would assure us of internal underground support should the area be lost to the enemy and one day have to be re-won. For these purposes, it would appear that we should help to build up the indigenous armed forces and to give them some sense of being associated in the overall arrangements for the area's protection.

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[1] Mr. McGhee was en route to Washington via London at the conclusion of his tour through the Near East and South Asia that included the Conference

US officials had been considering recently what more our country could do in achieving the necessary sense of security among the Arab States and Israel. In this area we considered that the UK should have primary responsibility, save in Saudi Arabia where we felt that our associations indicated that we should have a special position. It would be unwise to advertise our relationship or give any suggestion of "spheres of influence", but the problem seemed to boil down to determining to what extent the US can supplement British efforts. Between us we should try to decide what is needed to be done in each country and to determine how arrangements should be organized on an area basis. In this connection, Mr. McGhee remarked that he very definitely hoped the French would not insist in playing a role. We felt they had nothing to offer in this area and it seemed perfectly clear that coun-

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of Middle East Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul, February 14–21 and the South Asian Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers at Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, February 26–March 2. See footnote 2, p. 27. McGhee had to come to London at the close of his tour apparently in response to telegram 5003 from London to the Department of State, March 20, reporting the hopes of the Foreign Office that McGhee would be able to stop briefly on his way back to Washington for general consultations on Iran (888.2553/3–2051). The source text was transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 5 to despatch 4832 from London, April 10, not printed. In all, eight enclosures were sent with despatch 4832 including memoranda of conversations between McGhee and the Foreign Office concerning Iran, Arab refugees, Palestine refugees, Egypt, Libya, and neutralism in the Near East, and South Asia, as well as a memorandum of conversation between McGhee and Gulf Oil officials and a copy of a British Foreign Office despatch to the British Embassy in Washington covering discussions between McGhee and Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison. For the conversations regarding Arab refugees and Palestine refugees, see p. 612; for the conversation concerning Egypt, Libya, and neutralism in the Near East, see p. 356; for the conversation on South Asia, see vol. VI, pt. 2, p. 1689. A summary of the discussion reported in the source text was sent to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Gifford in telegram 5247 from London, April 5, not printed (780.00/4–551).

tries like Syria and the Lebanon would under no circumstances accept the return of French forces.

The area comprising Greece, Turkey and Iran had to be dealt with as a somewhat separate problem. Greece did not belong in the Near East at all. Turkey on the other hand had a very definite role in Near East defense but might prefer to retain a considerable degree of autonomy in area arrangements. Its position as a link between the Near East on the one hand and the Mediterranean and European defense areas on the other was a special factor to be remembered. Iran was a particularly difficult problem. It was weak and Iranians were not good fighters; moreover it was beset with serious internal difficulties. This raised the question of the part Pakistan might play in Near Eastern defense, particularly in the mountain line facing Russia. The contribution that Pakistan could make was obvious and would probably be the decisive factor in ensuring defense of the area.

It now appeared to us desirable that Greece and Turkey should be admitted to NATO. Beyond this we had no plans for defense commitments to any of the other states. Even without commitments or guarantees, however, it seemed to us that if they realized they were part of an area scheme they would acquire a considerable degree of confidence. The problem in its details was a military one. It was merely for us on the political side to set the framework. We already had military missions in Greece, Turkey and Iran and were supplying them with arms. The type of assistance we now had in mind for the Arab States and Israel was to grant them some arms, to send out technicians, to establish military missions where desirable and, with the UK, to help in weaving the whole area into a coordinated defense plan.

The great complicating factor at the moment was the dispute between the UK and Egypt on defense arrangements.[2] Mr. McGhee remarked again that the critical period lay in the next 18 months or so while the West was rearming and that in Egypt the political advantages of an acceptable settlement seemed to outweigh the strategic advantages of what might be ideal arrangements from a military standpoint. We had earlier been encouraged by learning of the compromise formula we understood Mr. Bevin had suggested but now we feared the UK might be withdrawing from such a progressive position because of Parliamentary difficulties. Mr. McGhee had gained the impression from his conversations in Cairo[3] that the Egyptians would insist on the withdrawal of all British troops within 18 months (although possibly they might allow a little more than this). We have always taken the position with Egypt that the removal of all British troops at this juncture in world affairs is undesirable, but Mr. McGhee had been impressed in Egypt with the extent to which Egyptian demands had become a political issue and also with the sympathy shown for the Egyptian position in other Arab countries.

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[2] For documentation on the dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt concerning the British military presence at Suez and the issue of the Sudan, see pp. 343 ff.

[3] See telegram 1001 from Cairo, April 1, p. 352.

Mr. Bowker said that the UK had very much in mind the desirability of giving to the Near Eastern countries a sense of partnership in defense arrangements for the area. The purpose of General Robertson's recent visits had largely been to give just such a feeling. In most places the problem came down to a question of arms and the UK was very much limited in what it could supply. It would warmly welcome any possibility of coordinating efforts with the US and any cooperation or interest we could show in meeting the problem. The British were inclined to believe that the defense of the Near East was probably not possible without the effective support of Pakistan but realized this could not be won without providing Pakistan some guarantee against India. Mr. McGhee said that it seemed to him that what really worried Pakistan was not so much the danger of Indian aggression against Pakistan's present territory as the possibility of a *fait accompli* in Kashmir.[4] He had been wondering therefore whether it would be possible for the US and UK to win Pakistan support for Near Eastern defense by giving them some assurance that we would never recognize any unilateral action taken by India in Kashmir. Mr. Bowker agreed that this was a possibility well worth exploring.

Mr. McGhee went on to say that we were considering whether and how we might make some public declaration of US interest in the Near East as a whole. We had no plans to commit troops and such assistance as we might now be in a position to provide in the event of hostilities would probably be limited to air and naval action.

Reviewing the problem as it applied to individual countries, Mr. Furlonge said that the Iraqis had plans for the expansion of their armed forces and had been told to submit to the UK a list of the arms they required. This had been two months ago and the list had still not been received. However, the UK was encouraged by the resolve of the Iraqis to strengthen their defenses and was anxious to be of help. Syria wanted arms, but pretty largely on its own terms and no doubt to have them available for use not so much against the USSR as against the Jews. Lebanon was getting practically everything it had asked the UK for and had offered its fullest cooperation. Mr. McGhee noted that Arab hostility to Israel put a limit on the fighting contribution that country could make. Its efforts in its own defense would, however, be valuable and its cooperation in providing a line of communications was likely to be essential. Mr. Bowker said that on the whole General Robertson had been encouraged by what he had found on his tour throughout the Near East.

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[4] For documentation on the Kashmir dispute, see vol. VI, pt. 2, pp. 1699 ff.

Mr. Bowker then went on to note that the proposed US policy which Mr. McGhee had been describing pertained to the assistance which the US might provide Israel and the Arab states. The UK was of course very much interested in learning about these efforts and sincerely hoped that there would be close consultation between the US and UK before any decisions or action in pursuance of the policy were taken. He understood that the US was proposing that in the next month or so there should be politico-military talks between our two countries and he wished to point out that the major problem which the UK would have hoped to work out in such talks was the question of command responsibility and the coordination of our respective efforts throughout the whole of Mediterranean and Near Eastern areas. This problem seemed to him to be a somewhat separate one from simply determining how the US might best supplement British assistance to the area comprised by the Arab states and Israel.

Mr. McGhee said that the implementation of our policy towards Israel and the Arab states really depended on two steps which had first to be taken within our own government; (1) obtaining approval of the Bureau of the Budget for the proposed arms assistance and, (2) Congressional authorization of the program. We hoped to be in a position to make token shipments of arms at the earliest possible moment. Mr. McGhee agreed that the initiative for arranging the time for the talks with the UK now lay with us and would probably depend largely on the progress in Washington in obtaining the necessary implementing legislation. He agreed that if the problem of command responsibility in the Mediterranean and Near East had not meanwhile been settled by our Chiefs of Staff, this question might be discussed in the proposed politico-military talks now under reference. He noted, however, that in Greece, Turkey and Iran it had been possible to go ahead with the military build-up without raising the question of the command and planning responsibility. Mr. Bowker reiterated the UK's belief that Anglo-American coordination in the Near East was very much tied up with the question of commands and emphasized the UK's anxiety to get an agreement on this issue.

In referring to France's sensitivity at being left out of the Near East,[5] Mr. McGhee said that it was obvious that France had no role to play in the land defense of the Near East and he and Mr. Bowker agreed on the desirability of trying to divert France's attention to the Mediterranean.

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[5] For documentation on French concern at being excluded from the Malta talks between Admiral Carney and Sir Brian Robertson, January 23–24 and March 10–13, see the French compilation in volume IV.

Another problem noted was that raised by the US proposal to make an outright grant of arms to Near Eastern countries while the British continued to sell whatever arms they could make available. Mr. McGhee appreciated the problem this might raise but said that we had concluded that to achieve the proper psychological benefits, which was our principal objective, a direct gift of US arms was preferable to any other arrangement.

In summary, the immediate importance of Anglo-American coordination in arrangements for the defense of the Near East, and a determination of the respective roles the US and UK should play area-wise and in each country, was acknowledged.[6]

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[6] During the course of a conversation on April 27 with Lewis Jones and Wells Stabler of NE concerning British defense proposals for Egypt, Denis A. Greenhill, First Secretary of the British Embassy, stated that the Foreign Office was concerned by the impression it had received from McGhee in London that the United States valued Egyptian cooperation more highly than it did the retention of strategic facilities for defense of the Middle East. Stabler replied that such an impression was "not correct" but that the United States was "considerably concerned" about the lack of progress in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Egypt").

Editorial Note

The British Joint Services Mission, in its memorandum of April 6, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the combined letter of March 13 and were in full agreement that it was a matter of the greatest importance that both Pakistan and India should assist in the defense of the Persian-Iraqi Sector of the Middle East. An approach should be made to these two countries to achieve this end as soon as it would be opportune, although the British Chiefs of Staff appreciated that because of the Kashmir dispute, an early approach would almost certainly do more harm than good. The British Chiefs of Staff had asked that their views be furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had requested JCS comments or agreement.

After reviewing the noncommittal draft reply to be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. McGhee, in a memorandum to Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, Director, Joint Staff, dated April 30, urged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff give a more positive response. He explained:

> "In doing so, I reflect the views of our chiefs of diplomatic missions in the Near East and South Asia. I recently met with these chiefs of mission at Istanbul and at Nuwara Eliya in Ceylon. Admiral R. B. Carney, Commander-in-Chief, NELM, participated in the Istanbul meeting and Captain Ernest M. Eller, USN, Commander Middle East Force, in the Nuwara Eliya meeting. It was agreed at both meetings that Pakistan, particularly, and India could play an im-

portant role in the defense of Iran and the Near East if the Kashmir dispute could be settled or its effects neutralized."

Mr. McGhee suggested that in the first paragraph of the draft JCS reply the words "of major importance" be substituted for "desirable" or, as a less satisfactory alternative, the word "highly" should be inserted before "desirable". If the change in wording should present serious difficulties "from the strictly military point of view," Mr. McGhee suggested that the words "from the military point of view" might be deleted. He expressed concern over the wording of the second paragraph of the draft reply, noting that he did not believe that "we can or should defer so completely to British political judgments in the Near Eastern and South Asian area." He proposed a new second paragraph:

> "The United States Chiefs of Staff also agree that at the present time, owing to the Kashmir dispute, an attempt to enlist Indian and Pakistani support for the defense of Iran and Iraq would be inadvisable. They are of the opinion, however, that the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff should keep the politico-military situation in the subcontinent under continuing review in order that advantage may be taken of any opportunity that may arise to secure the participation of India or Pakistan or both in the defense of Iran and Iraq." (Secretary's Letters: Lot 56 D 459: "Middle East Defense")

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 10, 1951, in a memorandum to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, replied as follows:

> "1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered your memorandum, RDC 1/16, dated 6 April 1951, and its attachment [the combined letter of 13 March], and are in agreement that, from the military point of view, it would be highly desirable for India and Pakistan to contribute forces to the defense of the Middle East.
>
> "2. The United States Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that they and the British Chiefs of Staff should each, respectively, advise the appropriate agencies of their governments of the advantages, which from the military view, would result from the participation of India or Pakistan, or both, in the defense of Iran and Iraq in order that every opportunity may be seized by those agencies to further such participation." (JCS Files)

Editorial Note

On April 17, Mr. McGhee submitted a memorandum to the Secretary suggesting action on a program of economic aid to the Near East (see page 642). This memorandum was in light of a request from the Government of Israel for a fiscal year 1952 grant of $150 million, which had generated a great deal of discussion within the United States Government. For documentation regarding the Israeli request and United States reaction to it through the end of April, see pages 559 ff.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 47 Series

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 26, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will recall that NSC 47/5, "United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel", approved by the President March 17, 1951, contained the following paragraph in the Statement of Policy:

> "4. Accordingly, the United States should:
>
> *a.* Hold politico-military discussions with the United Kingdom to clarify the respective participation and responsibilities of each country in strengthening the several Arab States and Israel; and
>
> *b.* Take steps, correlated with the United Kingdom as far as practicable, to strengthen the several Arab States and Israel to improve their political and economic stability and to increase their will and ability to resist penetration by the USSR."

Paragraph 5 of the Statement of Policy set forth certain specific lines of action to be followed by this Government in correlation with the United Kingdom.

As you know, the Departments of State and Defense are proposing, pursuant to the policy set forth in NSC 47/5, that there be legislation enacted which will make possible a limited Military Aid Program for the Arab States and Israel during the coming fiscal year. It is understood that this program may become a matter of public knowledge about the 15th of May, at which time the Congressional hearings are now scheduled to commence. This Department is apprehensive of the political and military consequences to the position of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Middle East if the first news that the United States is contemplating a grant aid program reaches the area without the proper groundwork and coordination being completed in advance with the United Kingdom.

Since the purpose of the program envisaged in NSC 47/5 is to strengthen the countries of the Middle East in correlation with the efforts of the United Kingdom, it seems to us important that we work out with the United Kingdom between now and May 15, the broad outlines of the program which will best further United States interests and those the United States shares with the United Kingdom. The attached memorandum develops the reasoning upon which this view is based and also deals with the problem of informing the French Government at a later stage of our intentions.

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[1] Drafted by Kopper and G. Lewis Jones; cleared by NEA, EUR, WE, BNA, S/ISA, S/S, and G.

I hope, therefore, that you will: (*a*) designate in the very near future the Defense side of a small State-Defense Working Group to discuss the implementation of those parts of NSC 47/5 which call for correlated United States-United Kingdom action and (*b*) agree to United States-United Kingdom politico-military talks to be held here on a Top Secret basis, commencing during the week of April 30.[2]

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

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[2] Enclosed with this letter was a copy of an undated memorandum prepared in the Department of State entitled "United States–United Kingdom Politico-Military Discussions Regarding the Arab States and Israel". This memorandum and a covering one of April 20 from McGhee to Acheson were not declassified in time for publication. (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "General")

120.4382/5–151

The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Dulles) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 1, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. BERRY: We have read with interest and appreciation the report of the Conference of the Middle East Chiefs of Mission[1] which you forwarded to General Smith on 14 March 1951.

In accordance with your request I am transmitting our comments upon those recommendations of the Conference which relate to the Central Intelligence Agency. These recommendations appear in Section XI B of the report.

. . . .

It goes without saying that we are in hearty sympathy with the sentiment expressed in recommendation 2 (on the same page). We feel, as I understand you do, that great progress has been made in this direction during recent months.

As to recommendation 4, our representatives have always been instructed to cooperate fully with the Chief of Mission and to be guided by the advice received from him. If there are any specific comments on this matter we should like to be informed so that we may be able to take remedial action.

Concerning recommendation 5, it is, as you know, our intention that the senior CIA representatives assigned to stations where there is a recognized need for coordination should have substantive responsibility for all CIA operations in their area and be authorized to deal accordingly with the Chief of Mission and other properly concerned officials.[2]

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[1] Reference is to the Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Istanbul Conference, p. 50.

. . . .

ALLEN W. DULLES

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[2] Mr. Berry acknowledged receipt of Mr. Dulles' letter in a note to the Deputy Director of the CIA dated May 29. Mr. Berry expressed pleasure "that there is such a large area of agreement in our point of view" and stated his intention to send copies of Mr. Dulles' letter to those Chiefs of Mission who were present at Istanbul in order to inform them of CIA concurrence with the conclusions of the Conference (120.4382/5–151).

State–JCS Meetings : Lot 61 D 417

State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, May 2, 1951[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON.

Participants:

General Bradley
General Collins
General Vandenberg
Admiral Sherman
General Bolte
General White
Admiral [2]
Admiral Wooldridge
General [2]
Admiral Lalor
Colonel Carnes

Mr. Matthews
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Ferguson
[Mr. McGhee]
Mr. Tufts
Mr. Gleason

. . . .

[Subject:] Report on Mr. McGhee's Tour

MR. MCGHEE: As you know, I have just returned from a meeting of our Ambassadors. Admiral Carney was at this meeting and he was very helpful. The meeting covered a wide range of problems and I would like to report on them briefly. I would like to get your judgment on a number of matters.

The Security of the Area

As a result of my trip I can re-affirm the need for a more positive policy in relation to the Arab States along the lines indicated in NSC 47/5. The basic justification for this is political. The great preoccupation in the area is the problem of security. These countries do not have arms and do not have means of developing strength. For example, Iraq wants arms. It has two divisions in the North and would like to place two more divisions in the North if the arms could be made available. The Syrian Prime Minister also told me that Syria wants arms although Syria has taken a neutralist position. The Lebanese Prime Minister told me that we can use their bases in time of war but that there must be no French involved. The Israelis also want arms. They are disappointed that the attitude of the Arab States will not permit them to play a role outside Israel. The Egyptians also want arms and are aware of the great significance of the present impasse with the British. The Egyptians have just turned down the U.K. proposal regarding the treaty. The problem is in large measure the parliamentary situation in the U.K. Bevin made a reasonable proposal, namely a phased withdrawal by 1956. The British position stiffened because of the parliamentary reaction. Egypt wants the British out in 18 months. The Egyptians are solid on the Sudan problem.[3] If the British do not accede to their wishes, the Egyptians are prepared for an impasse and for forcing the British out. They could withdraw the labor employed by the British. They could cut off the water supplies. The King and the Prime Minister do not want an impasse but public sentiment is so high that no Egyptian Government can accept the U.K. proposal. I am not sure that any agreement can be obtained. There is not much possibility of cooperation with Egypt while this problem is unsolved. The lack of cooperation may negate the value of keeping troops in Egypt. The U.K. Command does not attach much importance to keeping a striking force in Egypt. The Command does think it important to keep the headquarters in Egypt and the Command is largely responsible for the stiff British attitude.

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[1] A note on the source text reads: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." There is no indication of the drafter's identity. McGhee's report on his tour of the Middle East and South Asia comprises pages 17–29 of the source text. The first half of the meeting (pp. 1–17) was devoted to discussions of Yugoslavia, Atlantic Command, Korea, Iceland, and Israel. For the portion on Israel, see p. 655. The final portion of the meeting (pp. 29–31) was devoted to a brief discussion of the current world situation.

[2] Surname not indicated in the source text.

Nationalism

There is a rising tide of nationalism throughout the area. We must consider carefully whether we can support British policy in the Middle East. Because Britain is opposed to this nationalist development, the British are increasingly unpopular in the area and are a liability to us. This liability is such that it may exceed the military value of cooperating with them in the area.

Regional Approach

The regional approach to the problem of defense was fully justified by what I found on my visit. I am sure that there should be a small flow of arms to the area. I think we must coordinate our efforts with the British. One problem will be to reconcile our policy of giving arms with the British policy of selling arms. A second problem is what relationship should there be between the U.K. and the U.S. in peacetime in this area. We may as well face the fact that there isn't a complete meeting of the minds between you and the British Chiefs regarding the division of responsibility in the area. The Turks do not want to accept the idea of U.K. responsibility. The Greeks and the Iranians won't even discuss it. The British are primarily responsible in the Arab States although Saudi Arabia is our responsibility. However, the U.K. wants, and thinks they have, responsibility in Saudi Arabia. There has been some friction with Robertson[4] on this matter. The rest of the Arab States and Israel have been a British sphere of influence. If both we and the British provide arms, who will have responsibility? Some decision is necessary about who is to take the major initiative with Syria, Lebanon and Israel. In the rest of the Arab States the U.K. has to take the initiative. There is a question about how this should be related to the Turkish, Greek and Iranian programs.

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[3] For documentation on the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Sudan, see pp. 343 ff.

Admiral Sherman: There is no question of Greece. Greece is in the Balkans.

Mr. McGhee: I agree. But there is a question about Turkey and Iran.

General Collins: You say that these people are all worked up. Are they worked up to resist Communism or are they worked up about the problem of Israel?

Mr. McGhee: They are worked up about the need to resist Communism. For example, Iraq voted to declare the Chinese Communists an aggressor. They want to build up a defense line against a Soviet attack.

General Collins: You also said that the animosity against the British is such that the British are detrimental to our interests in the Middle East.

Mr. McGhee: I should have said animosity against the West. Our interests are the same as the Western interests in the Middle East. We want to prevent the defection of these countries in the cold war et cetera. The antagonism against the British extends to the West as a whole. If we could solve that problem we would have a plus factor in the Middle East. That would outweigh the present advantages of the British position.

Admiral Sherman: I note that you have not mentioned the French. Is this just a U.S.-U.K. problem or are the French in? My personal view is that the problem is partly the growth of national feelings and partly a shrewd estimate by these countries that the U.K. is no longer a great Power. If the U.K. agrees to one change, then these countries will demand more changes. The question for us is whether we inject ourselves into this situation and try to pick up the pieces so that the Soviet Union won't be able to pick them up or do we act as a group of nations of whom the French could be one?

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[4] Sir Brian Robertson, Commander in Chief, British Middle East Land Forces.

Mr. McGhee: Syria and Lebanon will never have French troops. The reactions in the Middle East to the French action in Morocco[5] were very severe. The French are a complete liability. There was a half day's agitation in Pakistan about the Moroccan situation. The French are selling arms on a considerable scale in this area.

General Collins: In that case, why should we give arms?

Mr. McGhee: They cannot obtain arms at the level of shipments which they need. The basic problem is a cold-war problem. They do not feel that they have any support from the French in this problem.

General Collins: They cannot at one and the same time want the French in and want them out.

Mr. McGhee: They do not want the French in.

General Collins: All that you have said this morning indicates to me that you have concluded that we should take over in the Middle East.

Mr. McGhee: That depends on how much we want to do in the area. If we had the necessary forces, it might be desirable for us to take over but I understand we do not have the strength.

Admiral Sherman: In terms of the drain on our economic and financial resources, do we not have to consider whether these grant programs of military assistance are an obstacle to doing something effective militarily? I don't think we kid the Russians much by these programs. The people who are receiving these weapons are never going to use them. Therefore, we decrease our own military capabilities by these programs.

General Collins: What is the explanation of the low rate of MDAP deliveries which Mr. Nitze mentioned? I take it that the combined drain of our assistance programs and our own defense program exceeds our productive capabilities consistent with the maintenance of a civilian economy. Therefore, we have to ask where this assistance is coming from; what programs will we cut to provide this assistance to the Middle East?

General Bradley: I remember that the Shah of Iran casually asked us for 150 tanks on his visit 18 months ago.[6]

General Vandenberg: I think that there is a solution but it is one of an old-fashioned kind. It is based on the factor which Admiral Sherman brought out. All these countries are turning to the U.S. as the dominant power. In many respects they understand the use of power better than we do. Our entire history has been opposed to the playing of power politics. When anyone puts pressure on us, we resist because that is our way of life. These other countries are used to pressure. We are trying in effect to achieve our purposes in the area by bribery; bribery will bankrupt us and, furthermore, it will prevent us from exercising power. Perhaps we should get tough and use our power. Perhaps we should tell these countries what to do. We might get farther by using old-fashioned power politics than by using assistance programs. By sending our fleet and by flying our bombers around, we would get more cooperation at less cost.

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[5] For documentation on French activities in Morocco, see pp. 1368 ff.

[6] For documentation on the visit of the Shah of Iran to the United States in November 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. vi, pp. 471 ff.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Another factor is that we supply not only equipment but the best equipment. With the development of these integrated forces and the adoption of the principle of standardization, every little NATO country wants the best equipment there is. We and the British were dominant in the 19th Century because technology was superior to human muscle power.

GENERAL BRADLEY: We have got to recognize that times have changed and that it is no longer wise to play power politics in the old way.

MR. MATTHEWS: We are in a new era and the forces of nationalism are such that power politics of the old-fashioned variety won't do the job.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I agree, however, that we cannot equip everyone.

MR. MATTHEWS: We have got to balance local advantages versus broad disadvantages.

GENERAL COLLINS: I am afraid that we are not getting forward in helping Mr. McGhee.

MR. McGHEE: I fully agree that the basic problem is the strength of the U.S. Once these countries see that we are the most powerful nation, we will be in a much better position to influence developments. Now, however, they see that we are weak. The Iranians attribute their present great difficulties to the fact that we did not provide enough aid.

Turning to Greece and Turkey, I am glad to learn that it has been decided to seek their admission into NATO. I feel very strongly that we need to give a security commitment to Turkey. Turkey is our greatest asset in the Middle East. There is a real danger that the Turks will chose neutrality if they cannot obtain a security commitment. We cannot be sure that we will have Turkey as an ally unless we extend a security commitment. They are ready to build 25 additional divisions if we will help them.

GENERAL COLLINS: With what will we equip them? Where are we going to find the equipment? We could afford to provide additional aid in the form of assistance in training et cetera and we should do this but I don't know how to solve the equipment problem.

Mr. McGhee: We should at least bring them into NATO.

Saudi Arabia

If we reduce the period for which we want access to Dhahran to 10 years and if we can get about $15,000,000 worth of aid, I think we can get the rights we want in Dhahran. I think everyone is agreed that 25 years is a longer period than we need.

Iran

The situation in Iran is very uncertain. Mossadeq is a violent Nationalist and is against all foreigners, particularly the British but including the Russians and ourselves. He is an unknown quantity. He has been the leader of the opposition party in the Majlis. Ambassador Grady is going to see him for the first time today. The vital question is, of course, the future of AIOC. We could not take the loss of the Abadan refinery. The driving force here is Nationalism. The British could have accommodated themselves to this situation but they did not meet the question when they should. As things now stand, they have lost the concession. I am not even sure that an arrangement can be made under which they would continue to run the property. The law provides and the policy is that the oil should flow to the old customers. I think that much could still be achieved. It might also be possible to get a deal by which the British would operate the property and dispose of the oil in the old markets. Mossadeq is the key to this situation. Razmara, Ala and the Shah have been dominated by the Majlis. The Shah could not run the Majlis as his father did. It is an irresponsible Parliament which could and did stymie the efforts of Razmara and Ala to govern in a constitutional way. Mossadeq, however, is master of the Majlis. He was criticized strongly during the May Day riots. I think we do not need to worry about his attitude toward the Soviet Union. If we can get on a solid basis with him, perhaps we will be able to work with him. If we can't work with him, we are indeed in a bad situation. I think we must take positive action in this situation and must specifically provide aid. Iran can stand up to the Soviet Union only to the extent that it is backed up by the U.K. and the U.S. Teheran and most of the important cities are north of the mountains. The fact that we have not extended aid to Iran accounts for the tendency to accommodate to the Soviet Union. If this tendency is to be overcome, we must provide physical evidence of aid, both military and economic.

Admiral Sherman: Can you tell us where to take this aid from? I think we have reached the position where it is necessary to budget our total aid program. It is my own view that when we have prepared such a budget we will conclude that the Middle East is a very important area. But right now if we are to provide additional aid to the Middle East, we have got to take it from the Philippine Program or the Indochina Program or from some program.

Mr. McGhee: This is a cold-war problem we are dealing with, not a shooting-war problem. We aren't asking for very much aid.

General Collins: The basic point on which I part with you is that we have to furnish aid in every such situation. It seems to me that we ought to bring whatever pressure we can on the U.K. Foreign Office so that it will bring pressure on AIOC. I think that is the point at which to apply pressure. If the British had forced the AIOC to make a compromise settlement, we would not be in this difficulty now and the Iranians would have had dollars with which to buy the equipment they want. I disagree with you that the difficulties in Iran are our fault.

Mr. Matthews: We have been trying to do just that. We have brought pressure to bear on the U.K. Foreign Office to do these things.

Mr. McGhee: We have to remember that we are dealing with Britain's most important economic asset abroad. We cannot effectively bring pressure on the U.K. in this matter. I appeared before the AIOC Board and told them about the dangers of nationalization et cetera. We talked at length with the British Ambassador here in Washington. We told him that the British were not going far enough. I regret to say that what we told him was right. When we seek a positive basis, we find time and again that a positive line on our part turns on the question of aid. Ambassador Wiley, when he was in Iran, always said that he had no tools with which to work. Ambassador Grady has said the same thing. Iran has gone down-hill. The only means I know of stopping this is to provide aid.

General Collins: We can send some aid. Of course the problem is not so much financial as it is a problem of production.

Mr. McGhee: We are only asking for $10,000,000 to $20,000,000. I know that this all adds up to a large sum but Iran is a weak spot.

Admiral Sherman: I agree but we have got to find the place to take it away from.

Mr. McGhee: The Secretary has not yet approved our proposals but I think he will. We are going to ask Congress for a special program of $50,000,000 of economic aid if he approves. I also feel that they need a larger flow of military equipment. Tanks stopped the strike in Abadan.

General Vandenberg: We cannot solve this problem until State determines the allocation of resources.

Mr. McGhee: I understand that. I will have to be a claimant with Mr. Cabot.

Pakistan

Pakistan wants to play a role in the Middle East. Public opinion in Pakistan would demand resistance to an attack on Iran. They would do almost anything if the Kashmir problem could be settled. Liaquat is strongly on our side. He has burned his bridges behind him. Pakistanis are good fighters and they can raise almost any number of men. Again, however, there is an equipment problem to be solved. With Pakistan, the Middle East could be defended; without Pakistan, I don't see any way to defend the Middle East. Of course it is hard for us to give Pakistan any guaranty against India since India is a friendly country.

General Bradley: Perhaps we should throw civilian production in the ashcan and arm these countries—Pakistan, Turkey and Western Europe.

General Collins: We have not yet taken an overall look at the Middle East in these discussions. I think we have got to do that.

. . . .

Secretary's Memoranda : Lot 53 D 444 : April–June, 1951

The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Lawton)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 2, 1951.

My Dear Mr. Lawton: The Department has presented to the Bureau of the Budget a program for economic aid to Near East and African countries and to Iran in the amount of $88 million. The Iran segment in this program, not yet considered by the Bureau, amounts to $24 million. The balance of the program of $64 million was marked by the Bureau to $50.3 million. New factors have arisen since the preparation of this program.

1. We were advised on April 20 by our Missions in Damascus, Beirut and Cairo that the Arab League have gone on record as favoring a massive program of resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the Arab states. The Arab League points out that the amount of the reintegration fund ($30 million for 1952 fiscal), established by resolution of the General Assembly, is entirely inadequate for the purposes intended. They have made the views of their members clear that they do not wish to embark on an enterprise of this magnitude without reasonable assurance from the United States and the United Kingdom of our intentions to continue such a program to conclusion. The report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East has estimated that reintegration of refugees will require at least $150 million over a five or ten-year period. The figure of $150 million is a minimal estimate based on an average cost of a thousand dollars per family.

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[1] Drafted by Arthur Z. Gardiner, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

2. The relief budget for fiscal 1952 for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency as approved by the Assembly was prepared in the autumn of 1950. Since its preparation, prices of food and related articles have risen steeply. It is now estimated that the unit costs of relief (per refugee per month) have risen from an average of $1.75 in mid-1950 to a figure of $2.50 today. Therefore, it is most unlikely that the relief operation can be carried out in fiscal 1952 at the cost of $20 million budgeted by the General Assembly.

3. There are then two grounds for reconsideration of our approach to relief and reintegration of the Arab refugees from Palestine. In view of the difficulty and delicacy of negotiations which have been patiently carried out for many months by the United Nations agency and by United States Chiefs of Mission in the Arab states in efforts to persuade Arab governments to accept the principle of resettlement, there is every reason now to attempt to meet the Arabs by indicating our intentions to carry on with this program. It is obvious that the sooner reintegration takes place, the sooner will costs of direct relief be diminished *pro tanto*.

There is some reason to believe that the United Kingdom will follow our lead if we embark on a program of this magnitude. United Kingdom authorities have indicated in the past that they were prepared to contribute to this endeavor in a ratio of $1 to every $3 contributed by the United States.

4. The Export-Import Bank has indicated that it intends to make no further loans to Israel beyond the $135 million loan already established. In the rationale of our original Israeli program, it was made clear that the program of assistance to Israel was limited to technical assistance in view of Israel's lines of credit from the Export-Import Bank, as well as Israel's ability to raise funds from private sources to balance its international accounts.

5. Israel has formally indicated to the Department its need for grant assistance. While it is very difficult to assess the appropriate magnitude of an aid program to Israel, in view of unknown factors in Israeli balance of payments probabilities, a case can be made for direct assistance to Israel. Most appropriately, this assistance should take the form of projects otherwise bankable which cannot now be so financed in view of the fact that Israel's future credit appears already fully pledged for the servicing of loans already made.

6. An overriding consideration of United States Government policy, as determined by the National Security Council, is the need to treat the countries of the Near East on an impartial basis. Senator Connally has already been informed in a letter from the Secretary that it is the Department's intention in the light of this policy to include consideration for assistance to Israel in a regional program.

In the light of the foregoing, we wish to revise the program in accordance with the following tabulation:

Items already marked by the Bureau of the Budget, including $25,000,000 for Palestine refugees	—	$50,000,000
Additional assistance for Palestine refugees	—	$50,000,000
Grant aid to Israel	—	$25,000,000

The Department proposes to seek only $50,000,000 appropriations at this time for Palestine refugees out of the total $75,000,000 authorization.

In justification of the item relating to the Arab refugees, it should be made clear that the magnitude of this problem has already been sketched in the report of the United Nations Palestine Relief Agency submitted to the General Assembly in October 1950. It was then made clear that reintegration of refugees should involve a sum of at least $150 million and that a program would require from five to ten years to complete.

Settlement of the refugees is an essential element in the stability of the Near East. Inaction would seriously impair the security interests of the United States. Assistance in solving the problem of the refugees will contribute in the long run to improvement of Israel's relations with her Arab neighbors; assistance to the Arab refugees is in a real sense direct assistance to Israel.

The action of the Arab states referred to in the paragraph numbered (1) above makes it clear that if we are to move forward we must do so in bold and decisive terms.

Expenditures for resettlement will involve, among other categories, cost of road construction, housing, tools, seed, livestock and other agricultural facilities for the rural population among the refugees. It will include housing and light industrial equipment for the non-rural refugees.

Funds made available for resettlement will not be disbursed unless there is a clear and definite understanding with the government concerned and with the refugee himself that, following the expenditure of these funds, relief operations in respect to the resettled population cease finally on a date to be agreed upon.

While Israel has formally admitted its obligations to the refugees, the financial condition of Israel will not permit Israel from its own resources to make any substantial contribution to this program for many years to come. The case on humanitarian grounds and on grounds of United States security to take prompt measures to assist the refugees in their present plight is so strong that we cannot afford to wait until Israel accumulates the funds to pay its debt.

That portion of the fund required for direct relief can of course be thoroughly documented in concrete terms based on the experience of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.

The case for grant aid to Israel in the amount of $25 million is justified on balance of payments grounds. It is further justified for illustrative purposes on a project basis, and a revised list of projects, including technical assistance projects already marked by the Bureau, can be made available to you promptly.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB

611.86/5-451

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to Major General James H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs[1]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1951.

DEAR GENERAL BURNS: As you know, the State–Defense Working Group established to discuss the implementation of those parts of NSC 47/5 which called for correlated U.S.–U.K. action met Thursday, April 26. The results of this meeting are embodied in a memorandum entitled "Assumptions, Criteria and Objectives of NSC 47/5, United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel", a copy of which is enclosed. I now wish to inform you that with the few changes of language indicated this paper has the approval of the Department of State as a general basis for the politico-military discussion with the United Kingdom called for in NSC 47/5.

You will note that the Working Group directed attention in Section VII of the memorandum to the need for the formulation of answers to several major questions of policy. I hope that it will be possible for the Department of Defense to consider these questions prior to discussions with the British.

As Secretary Acheson pointed out in his letter of April 26[2] to Secretary Marshall, it is desirable that the groundwork and coordination between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the contemplated U.S. Aid Programs to the Arab States and Israel be completed before these programs become public knowledge about May 15. It is also desirable that the French Government be appropriately informed prior to that date. I do not think it necessary, however, that the U.S. and the U.K. reach agreement on all phases of our programs prior to May 15; it should be sufficient to establish lines of policy and general directives for later implementation.

I believe that it would be desirable for the discussion with the U.K. to be handled at the same level and with the same security as the politico-military talks with the U.K. which took place in the Pentagon on October 26, 1950. In the absence of Ambassador Jessup, we propose to designate Mr. Paul Nitze and Assistant Secretary of State McGhee to represent this Department. I will appreciate knowing your thoughts on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Kopper and Jones of NE, and Frederick E. Nolting of G.

[2] *Ante*, p. 111.

[Annex]

Memorandum Prepared by the State–Defense Working Group Established To Discuss the Implementation of NSC 47/5

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

ASSUMPTIONS, CRITERIA AND OBJECTIVES OF NSC 47/5, "UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL"

(This memorandum contains the results of discussions of the State-Defense Working Group on April 26, 1951 set up at the request of the same date from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense.)

I. AREA CONCERNED AND INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND THE U.K. THEREIN

The Arab States and Israel in which the United States and the United Kingdom have an overall common strategic interest as well as special interests as follows:

Saudi Arabia: Special U.S. interests in Dhahran Airfield and oil. Special (secondary) U.K. interests in training mission in Taif; protection Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.

Egypt: Special U.K. interest in Anglo-Egyptian treaty (bases); Sudan; Suez Canal movement; Egyptian cotton. Special (secondary) U.S. interest: wartime use of British bases in Egypt; Suez Canal movement. French interest in Canal also.

Israel: Shared U.S.–U.K. interests in land communications via Israel in war; use Israeli manpower; settlement Arab-Israeli differences; naval facilities Haifa; Haifa refinery; policy of impartiality between Arabs and Jews.

Jordan: Special U.K. interest in Anglo-Jordan treaty (bases); U.K.-supported Arab Legion; opportunity Arab refugee resettlement. Special (secondary) U.S. interests similar those U.K.

Iraq: Special U.K. interest in Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (bases); IPC oil. Special (secondary) U.S. interests similar those U.K. French interest in IPC.

Syria: Neither U.S. nor U.K. possess special interests; French special interests: sale of arms; cultural and economic.

Lebanon: Neither U.S. nor U.K. possess important special interests but U.S. interested in the pipeline outlet and refinery at Tripoli, and AUB as cultural center; French special interests largely cultural and economic.

Recapitulation:

Special US Interest	*Special UK Interest*	*US–UK Shared Interest*	*French Interest*	*US–UK–France Interest*
Saudi Arabia	Egypt	Syria	Syria	Implementation of Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950
	Jordan	Israel	Lebanon	
	Iraq	Lebanon		

Note: During the early stages of the development of the program envisaged in NSC 47/5 the area concerned must be carefully restricted to states named; at a later stage the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms, Libya-Yemen and other peripheral areas may be considered for inclusion.

II. THE NATURE OF THE NSC 47/5 PROGRAM

Program is primarily a political weapon designed to strengthen the several Arab States and Israel; to improve their political and economic stability and to increase their will and ability to resist penetration by the USSR. It follows that political grounds must be accepted as justification for aid. As plans develop regarding the defense of Arabian peninsular oil, the program will take on a more positive aspect for the U.S. in Saudi Arabia.

III. FORM OF AID ENVISAGED IN NSC 47/5

Aid under the program will have the following forms:

A. *Economic*	*Source*
1. IBRD Loans	International
2. Exim Bank Loans	U.S.
3. Point IV and related	U.S.
4. Grant Aid	U.S. for all countries U.K. for Jordan
5. Procurement assistance	U.S. and U.K.
6. Refugee resettlement	U.S., U.K. and France within U.N. (possibly U.S. outside U.N.)
7. Emergency oil conservation	U.S. and U.K.
B. *Propaganda and Information*	. . .
. . .	

C. *Arms Supply—Cash and Grant*

1. U.S. arms aid must be in accord with statutory requirements; i.e., President must find arms so furnished contribute to the security of the U.S.

2. It must be assured that arms will not be used contrary to Bilateral Agreements with U.S. (i.e., Tripartite Declaration protected).

3. Impartiality consistent with strategic considerations must be preserved between the Arab States and Israel.

4. Impartiality will have to be preserved in character of arms supplied.

5. Arms aid should be associated with political *quid pro quos* that are of general benefit to the West in the Cold War; for example, the British effort in Jordan and the U.S. at DAF must be conceived as of general benefit to the West.

6. Arms aid must be handled so that the countries of the area will not neglect expenditures on economic and social betterment.

7. Arms aid can be accorded only in response to a governmental request; i.e., governments must be prepared to back their military in making requests.

8. Governments receiving U.S. aid must abide by all MDA requirements re inspection and supervision of end use.

9. Any arms aid will be within the framework of a correlated program for each country; . . .

10. Procurement assistance is the most valuable part of the program since global arms requirements will continue to exceed availabilities.

11. To conform to U.K. and French practice as well as to save U.S. funds and effort the rule will be cash reimbursable assistance; U.S. grant aid will be employed to achieve general Western political objectives; U.S. Grant arms aid will be a supplement.

12. Types of existing arms will be important factor in the supply of new arms.

13. To avoid inter-country jealousies in the area re arms aid, detailed country programs will be made known only to the countries receiving the aid and in the U.S.–U.K.–France correlation process.

14. Arms supply of all kinds from the U.S., U.K. or France should be susceptible of being shut off at short notice in the event of developments contrary to the Tripartite Declaration, *coups d'états* or riots.

IV. CORRELATION OF ARMS SUPPLY

Principal suppliers of arms will be the U.K., France and the U.S. To meet the above criteria (including the criteria imposed by U.S. legislation) a tripartite system of correlation is required. This system should not be publicized and should work so far as possible under cover.

The functions of such a tripartite system would be:

A. A means for sharing information regarding the armaments of the Arab States and Israel.

B. To provide for consultation on U.S., U.K. and French plans to fill arms requirements of individual countries on either a cash or a grant basis. *Advance* knowledge of plans will:

1. Avoid embarrassments.
2. Permit arms supplies to be fitted into programs of other countries.
3. Permit consideration re character of arms.
4. Help prevent over-expenditures on arms by individual states.

C. Keep records of arms supplied.

D. Be the system to assure arms are not used contrary to tripartite declaration.

E. Focal point for emergency shut-off of arms supplies (see Criterion 13, above).

Such a system would not possess authority to stop arms supply by any of the three members; would endeavor to operate on the grounds of common sense and honest dealing between members. Instances of serious dispute would be referred to governments for diplomatic handling.

V. U.S.-U.K. CORRELATION ON MATTERS OTHER THAN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS

NSC 47/5 indicates a number of lines of action in which the U.S. and the U.K. should correlate their activities:

A. In efforts to resolve Arab-Israel differences.
B. To secure base rights.
C. To develop fighting groups and techniques suitable to local capabilities and terrain.
D. In one of supply supervisory and technical personnel for Near East military establishments.
E. To make "show-the-flag" visits.
F. To place orders for needed raw materials and equipment.
G. Expand and intensify U.S. psychological effort to offset trend towards neutrality.

VI. CORRELATION WITH FRANCE

NSC 47/5 does not specifically envisage a correlation between the U.S., the U.K. and France on matters set forth in the preceding paragraph. However, NSC 47/5 supplements NSC 47/2 and NSC 65/3 which envisaged (*a*) collaboration between the U.S. and France, where desirable, to obtain basic objectives in the Near East, and (*b*) cooperation on regulating the flow of arms to the area. To what extent collaboration and correlation with France is feasible and desirable is a matter for early discussion with the U.K.

VII. U.S.-U.K. RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

Paragraph 3 of the Statement of Policy in NSC 47/5 does not make clear the nature of the responsibility which the U.S. should have with regard to Saudi Arabia. This should be clarified prior to U.S.-U.K. politico-military conversations. There must also be a clarification of the nature of the respective participation and responsibilities of the U.S. and the U.K. in strengthening the several Arab States and Israel. The recent conversations between the U.S. and the U.K. military leaders at Malta undoubtedly have some bearing on these questions. The settlement of the Mediterranean Command question with the British and the French is tied in closely. The State-Defense Working Group did not attempt to determine the answers to these questions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In preparation for politico-military talks with the U.K. in the near future, answers should be formulated to the unresolved questions in the immediately preceding paragraph (Section VII).

2. Departmental clearance in Defense and State should be sought for the conclusions of the Working Group as set forth above.

3. State should be asked to approach the British Embassy to arrange the U.S.–U.K. politico-military talks in the near future, having in mind the fact that these talks should take place before the program becomes public knowledge in the Budget hearings.

4. An important item on the U.S.–U.K. agenda should be discussion of the role of France in the entire program with a view to the French Government being advised of appropriate phases of the program as soon as possible and definitely in advance of it becoming public knowledge.

S/S–NSC Files : Lot 63 D 351 : NSC 65 Series

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Lay)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 8, 1951.

Subject: Third Progress Report on NSC 65/3, "United States Policy Toward Arms Shipments to the Near East." [2]

NSC 65/3 was approved as Governmental policy on May 19, 1950. It is requested that this Progress Report, as of May 8, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

1. *Important Action and Developments Affecting NSC 65/3*

Negotiations between the United Kingdom and Egypt are continuing concerning a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 under which British forces are presently stationed in the Suez Canal zone. In view of the lack of success to date of these negotiations, the generally tight arms situation, and political conditions in the United Kingdom, the British Government has been unable to agree to meet Egyptian requests for shipments of arms of a relatively high military potential. The United Kingdom, the United States, and France continue to allow the export of limited amounts of arms of low military potential to the Near East.

A special problem has arisen, however, in connection with acute border tension which has developed within the past few months in the Demilitarized Zone between Israel and Syria.[3] As a result, the United States has been carefully restricting exports of arms from this country to those two states. This modification of NSC 65/3 should be continued until the situation in the Demilitarized Zone has been cleared up.

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[1] Drafted by Robert L. Burns and John A. Waldo of NE, cleared by Ranney of BNA and Deputy Under Secretary Matthews.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 163.

[3] For documentation on the Syrian-Israeli border conflict, see pp. 559 ff.

An important action recently taken in accord with the policies set forth in NSC 65/3 was the approval by the President of NSC 47/5 on March 17, 1951 which established as government policy the need for instituting an impartial program of limited military assistance, both cash reimbursable and grant, to the states of the Near East to assist these countries to be able to play their part in the defense of the area. At the present time this Government is preparing a request to the Congress for the necessary enabling legislation authorizing an allocation up to ten percent of the funds of the Greek-Turkish program, or funds transferred to that title, to permit this government to carry out the policy set forth in NSC 47/5.

2. *General Implementation of NSC 65/3*

Close cooperation continues between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the maintenance of peace and stability in the Near East and regarding the shipment of arms to the states in the area. Collaboration with the French Government regarding the shipment of arms to the Near East continues, but to a lesser degree than in previous periods. In connection with the Syria-Israel dispute, the United States has cooperated with the United Kingdom and France on this question within the framework established by the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, but without specifically invoking the Declaration itself.

3. *Evaluation of the Policy*

The implementation of the policy set forth in NSC 65/3 has been carried out under generally favorable conditions. Note must be taken, however, of the increasing number and severity of incidents between Israel and the neighboring Arab states which may necessitate recourse to action under the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. The Syria-Israel dispute, which is presently before the Security Council, at one point in early April seriously threatened peace in the Near East. The shooting of seven Israel armed policemen and the subsequent retaliatory bombing of Syrian territory by the Israel air force emphasizes the desirability of proceeding with caution in any United States arms program for the Near East.

The policy contained in NSC 65/3 continues to be valid. Critical developments in the international situation, however, have made it necessary for this government to reexamine the policies regarding the defense of the area and have resulted in the adoption of NSC 47/5 on March 17, 1951, which will enable this country to increase the defensive capabilities of the states of the area to the extent that they are prepared to cooperate in the defense of the area as opposed to using such arms against one another.

James E. Webb

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: "Near and Middle East"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 17, 1951.

Participants: *U.S.:*
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN (Representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee, NEA
Assistant Secretary of State George W. Perkins, EUR
Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Director, NE
Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director, NE
Colonel P. C. Hains, OSD
Mr. John Bingham, S/ISA
French:
M. Henri Bonnet, Ambassador of France
Rear Admiral Georges Cabanier
M. Jean-Pierre Benard, First Secretary, French Embassy

Ambassador Bonnet was asked by the Department of State to attend a Top Secret meeting in Admiral Sherman's Office this morning. He was accompanied by Admiral Cabanier and M. Benard.

Admiral Sherman commenced the conversation by informing the French representatives that the purpose of the meeting was to inform them of a U.S. program of aid and assistance to the Arab States and Israel. Admiral Sherman explained that the Departments of Defense and State had been working on a program for assistance to the Near East for some time. This program was now being considered by the Bureau of the Budget and would be submitted to the Congress in the near future. The two U.S. Departments wished to inform the French of the general nature of the program prior to its becoming public knowledge. Admiral Sherman then asked Assistant Secretary McGhee to explain the details of the program.

Mr. McGhee spoke along the following lines: The United States has been concerned about deterioration of the situation in the Near East for some time, just as we know the French have. We are particularly worried about the trend toward neutralism. He had recently been impressed by this trend during his trip through the area. There was a "plague on both your houses" sentiment in the Near East. This had been evidenced by the voting of certain of the Near Eastern States in the United Nations on the question of action toward Communist China. In addition to the reaction toward the Western nations which had grown up during the past several years, there also seemed to be a general feeling of insecurity in the Near East. The States in the area believed that aside from the limited British commitments, there did not seem to be any plans or programs to protect the area. The Near East feels that it is being ignored. They have noticed that while other areas have received much assistance they have obtained virtually nothing and there has been no grant aid. They are acutely aware of the aid which we have given to Greece and Turkey. The fact that their northern neighbors are being strengthened does not make the Near East feel more secure. The United States had developed a program of assistance for Saudi Arabia, however, the plans for Saudi Arabia which we have developed will now be a part of the new program.

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[1] A note on the source text reads: "(This memorandum was agreed to in its present form by Jean-Pierre Benard of the French Embassy.)" An attachment entitled "Notes For Discussion With The French Re NSC 47/5 May 17, 1951" is not printed.

The U.S. Government now believes that it is necessary to give more affirmative evidence that we are interested in strengthening the area and in creating a greater will to resist any threat from the Soviet Union. The program which we have in mind is designed for the most part to obtain political rather than military objectives. At the present time, we do not anticipate that there would be a military build-up comparable to that in Turkey. Our program is essentially to obtain cold war objectives and to stimulate a feeling of security in the area.

We are seeking authority from Congress which will permit $25 to $50 million in military grant aid to the Arab States and Israel if certain conditions are met and priorities and allocations will permit. We do not desire to compete with France and the United Kingdom in developing this program. We should like them to continue their efforts in the area. We do not wish in any way to take away any of the incentive in the area to buy military equipment from France or the United Kingdom. Our program is to supplement their efforts and will in the first instance be of a cash reimbursable nature. Grant assistance will be used only where necessary. We are informing the French of our intentions within the [framework?] of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. We hope the efforts of the United States, the United Kingdom and France will be coordinated.

There is also an economic phase to the U.S. program. It is contemplated that we shall seek Congressional appropriations for economic assistance in an amount somewhat in excess of 100 million dollars. This program will be partially for economic aid to the individual states and also to assist the Arab refugees.[2] The amount which we are seeking for aiding the latter is much more than before. We believe this will help both the Arab States and Israel. We hope that France and the United Kingdom will also be able to give more since there is now an indication that the Arab States are willing to talk openly about the resettlement of the refugees. In developing the economic program as a whole, we wish to achieve a balance and to maintain impartiality as between the Arab States and Israel. We hope that this assistance will increase the incentive of the area to cooperate with the West. Congressional approval is, of course, necessary. The details of the program will have to be talked out with the French and the British later on.

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[2] For documentation on the Arab refugee problem, see pp. 559 ff.

Ambassador Bonnet inquired whether we are thinking of just Saudi Arabia or all of the States. Mr. McGhee replied that we are considering all of the States but that Saudi Arabia was the only one for which we had so far developed a program. He repeated that the program was within the spirit of the Tripartite Declaration and that there should be a coordination of French, British and American efforts.

Ambassador Bonnet then asked what machinery we had in mind to handle the economic side of the program. Would we anticipate utilizing the United Nations? Mr. McGhee said that we had not worked out all of the details of our plans. We felt, however, that the United Nations should continue the actual feeding and relief of the refugees. With regard to the resettlement projects, our present informal thinking is that there should be more direct American supervision. There should be somebody in each country, possibly from ECA, who would head the country mission and supervise the projects which might be developed. Ambassador Bonnet then observed that this appeared to be a program designed to give more than relief to the refugees; it provided for substantial economic rehabilitation. Admiral Sherman stated that this was the only way to get the very difficult problem settled. Mr. McGhee reiterated that rehabilitating refugees would help both the Arab States and Israel.

Ambassador Bonnet inquired whether ECA would be the agency administering the assistance. Mr. McGhee said that this had not been firmly decided but the assumption was that ECA would be the agency. The Ambassador then asked how we envisaged economic cooperation with the United Kingdom and France. Mr. McGhee responded that he thought there could be coordination between the United States Mission Head and those who were performing similar tasks for the French and British or with the Chiefs of Mission of France and the United Kingdom in the particular country. Ambassador Bonnet then stated that the U.S. would undoubtedly be able to supply more funds; however, France had done a lot of planning in certain of the states in the area. He stressed that real cooperation was needed. Mr. McGhee said that there was so much to be done that he did not think there should be any concern about competition. He agreed that real cooperation was needed and informed the Ambassador that we were very glad to note that France has been giving more thought to technical assistance in Syria and Lebanon.

Admiral Sherman then said that a degree of assistance to the countries in the Near East should bring that area toward the West. He added that the importance of the Near East strategically was self-evident and that it was not necessary for him to elaborate. Ambassador Bonnet agreed completely with this. The Ambassador did not think there should be big machinery to carry out programs. The essential thing was to plan in advance on the basis of real cooperation.

Mr. Benard then expressed the view that the usefulness of a program depends in part on the evolution of peaceful relations between Israel and the Arab States. He wondered whether we had any plans to bring about more peaceful conditions. Was there any way in which we could push these states into more normal relations? Mr. McGhee replied that our objective was, of course, to achieve peace and stability in the area as well as to strengthen it. However, he said that peaceful conditions would be a by-product of improved economic conditions. He did not feel that peace could be bought and, at the present time, it was obvious that the situation was not too favorable. He cited the trend away from settlement between Israel and Jordan; the fact that we had been informed by our Embassy in Cairo recently that there were no immediate signs that any peace settlement could be worked out between Egypt and Israel, and the fact that it would be extremely difficult to get any arrangement between Syria and Israel in light of the recent difficulties. However, we must continue to try to obtain more peaceful conditions whenever possible. This was the spirit of the Tripartite Declaration. We would, of course, exact as a condition to any arms assistance a commitment that there would not be any aggression on the part of the recipient state. Ambassador Bonnet agreed and said that we could not allow any steps toward war in the area. This must be realized in advance because the temptation to use the arms would be great. Mr. McGhee said that there would be a number of conditions attached to prevent aggressive use.

In response to a question from the French Ambassador as to whether Israel would be upset by U.S. supply of weapons to the Arab States, Mr. McGhee stated that the program was based on impartiality and within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration. Colonel Hains observed that we desired to maintain a balance. Under the law, we will have to have provisions for inspecting and controlling the flow of materials. There will be a group which will coordinate the supply for each country.

The Ambassador asked Admiral Sherman whether the program of military assistance would have any bearing on strategic planning for Mediterranean and Near Eastern Defense. Admiral Sherman said that it would not have any bearing; these were two distinct questions; it would be some time before the Arab States and Israel could be built up. For the time being, we did not wish to have too many voices discussing the program. The French Ambassador then thanked Admiral Sherman and Mr. McGhee for informing him of the nature of our proposed program. He understood that we would be in touch with the French Government later when our thoughts for the implementation of the program are further advanced.

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: "Near and Middle East"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 17, 1951.

Participants: *United States:*
- Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN (Representing Joint Chiefs of Staff)
- Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee, NEA
- Assistant Secretary of State George W. Perkins, EUR
- Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff
- Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Director, NE
- Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director, NE
- Colonel P. C. Hains, OSD
- Mr. John Bingham, S/ISA

United Kingdom:
- Sir Oliver Franks, Ambassador
- Air Chief Marshal Elliot, British Joint Services Mission
- Brigadier Barry, British Joint Services Mission
- Mr. Bernard Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. Denis A. B. Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy

The British Ambassador was asked by the Department of State to attend a Top Secret meeting in Admiral Sherman's office this morning. He was accompanied by Air Chief Marshal Elliot, Mr. Burrows and Mr. Greenhill.

Admiral Sherman commenced the conversation by informing the British representatives that we had asked them to meet today in order to discuss a U.S. program of aid and assistance to the Arab States and Israel. Admiral Sherman explained that the program we had in mind was a modest one but that we wished to talk it over with the British before it became a matter of public knowledge next week. He informed the British that we had already told the French of the program but that we had not discussed it as extensively as we intended to do with the British. Admiral Sherman then asked Assistant Secretary McGhee to explain the details of the program.

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[1] A note on the source text reads: "(This has been read by Mr. Greenhill, who agrees with its general contents.)"

Mr. McGhee spoke along the following lines: The collaboration between the United Kingdom and the United States in the Middle East, which goes back several years, has been very good. It is obvious that the United Kingdom had done more in the Near East over a period of years than the United States, and that there is a traditional British interest in the area. Anything which we could do at this time would be designed to help, not replace British assistance and prestige in the area. However, the United States is concerned about several things in the Near East. The trend toward neutrality had been clearly indicated recently. Egypt and Syria by their voting in the United Nations on Far Eastern issues, had demonstrated an international attitude which was highly unsatisfactory to the West. In addition, while there is now a momentary period of prosperity, the economic structures of the states in the Near East are basically unsound. A feeling of insecurity was clearly developing in the Near Eastern States. While the United Kingdom had been doing a considerable amount in places such as Iraq and Egypt and Jordan, this did not seem enough, particularly in the case of those who were not receiving any aid at all. Dr. Jamali of Iraq had stated in Washington at the time the United Nations was discussing the question of Chinese aggression in Korea [2] that it was exceedingly difficult for the Arab States to line up definitely with the Western States in opposition to the USSR when so little had been done by the West to assist these states in their problem of security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. With regard to the economic problems of the Near East as long as the question of the Arab refugees exists, resentment will continue in the Arab States toward the West. More has to be done to settle the refugee question effectively.

The overall program which we now contemplate is designed to supplement the United Kingdom program and not compete with it. Whatever is done should be coordinated with the United Kingdom. The program is an integrated economic and military plan. The economic grant aid will be somewhat in excess of $100 million. It will consist of expanded Point IV activities and greater assistance designed to settle the problem of the Arab refugees. The subsistence portion of the refugee program would continue under the United Nations. The development projects portion should be under the United States, and we would cooperate with the United Kingdom. We anticipate that there would be something in the nature of an ECA administration for the development program. We hope that it will be possible for the United Kingdom to contribute more to the settlement of the Arab refugees. We feel that we have reached the stage where it is essential to take advantage of the recently expressed willingness of the Arab States to discuss resettlement. This will involve more funds.

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[2] For documentation on United Nations discussion of Chinese aggression in Korea, see vol. VII, pp. 1 ff., and *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume VII.

With respect to the military program, a percentage of the Greek-Turkish program would be available for grant aid to the Arab States and Israel. This will be roughly from $25 to $50 million. We realize that the United Kingdom and France have been selling arms to some of the states in this area. Our program would be essentially on a cash reimbursable basis. The grant aspect would be designed to assist where there is no possibility of cash reimbursable being used. We hope to guard against any embarrassment to the United Kingdom and France when giving grant aid, but we may have to give grant aid, for instance, in Saudi Arabia to obtain facilities we very much want. We have been criticized because we have given arms everywhere else excepting in the Near East. They see the assistance given to Greece and Turkey. The objective of our arms program is not necessarily defense in depth, but rather stability in depth. It is designed to strengthen the whole Near Eastern will to defend itself and to join with the West. Insofar as possible, we wish to instill a sense of partnership in the countries of the area but without too many voices participating. It is recognized that the United Kingdom has a problem of how a partnership relationship could be worked out in Egypt.

At this point and at Admiral Sherman's suggestion, Mr. McGhee informed the British of what we said to the French about the proposed program.

Mr. McGhee then continued as follows: It is not possible to have the same degree of cooperation with France since it was our belief that the United Kingdom has the primary responsibility for the area, and we do not have any desire to bring France into a position which they do not now occupy. We expect to discuss plans for each country with the United Kingdom so that there will not be any competition. There are other problems such as command relationship which must be discussed. The basic thought behind our program is that we intend to play a more positive role. We are not, however, going to make any military commitment. We simply wish to seek, in cooperation with the United Kingdom and where practicable, with France, to build up the will of the area to resist Communism. There are other problems of the Arab States of trying to obtain a more normal relationship between the Arab States and Israel and related questions. We wish to pursue a policy of impartiality within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration. In some cases we may wish to seek *quid pro quos* such as in Saudi Arabia. We have in mind establishing a working group in coordination with the French to discuss the implementation of a number of details.

Sir Oliver Franks then responded by thanking Admiral Sherman for arranging the meeting. The United Kingdom "positively welcomes the positive evidence of this United States interest in the Near East". He hoped that there would be "no shadow of doubt about this. We are very glad that the United States is able to evince this interest. We look forward to the strengthening of our common interests in the area." The United Kingdom effort had been limited in the Near East but it would grow larger now that British strength was increasing. In any case, the United Kingdom will not regard the United States program as supplanting but rather as supplementing what the United Kingdom is doing. There is so much to be done that all we both do will not be enough. Nevertheless, the program would have to be quite carefully coordinated. There were a number of points such as the one Mr. McGhee had made about the effect of grant aid on the position of France and the United Kingdom.

At Sir Oliver's request, Mr. Burrows said that there were several questions which had come up not necessarily in order of importance.

1. The question of standardization and supply; there should not be too much diversity of equipment.
2. There was an obvious difficulty about Egypt. Whether supplies could be made available to Egypt from the United States when the United Kingdom was withholding them while Egypt was "being tiresome" was something which would have to be looked into.
3. The role of training groups and missions would have to be examined. Should there be two military missions, joint missions or specialized missions? This was a problem in regard to the present United Kingdom mission in Saudi Arabia which the United Kingdom wished to maintain there.
4. The United Kingdom believes that the supply of arms is often very useful in obtaining base rights. An important question arising from this is whether the provision of equipment by one government should or should not be used to assist another government in getting bases.
5. With regard to the spirit of partnership of the countries in the area referred to by Mr. McGhee, the United Kingdom generally shares Mr. McGhee's idea. However, it has found that the price for partnership has usually been a demand for high priority on arms and a share in strategic planning. This was a difficulty which General Robertson had experienced during his swing through the Near East recently.
6. Machinery—the United Kingdom welcomes the idea very warmly of having some system to work out details and plans of arms assistance. Without being particularly wedded to the form or location of machinery, the United Kingdom suggests that it might be a Board located in the Middle East to sift applications for arms, determine their justification, etc. He then asked to what extent the Near Eastern program would affect the Greek-Turkish plan.

Admiral Sherman said that we have not as yet made any decisions on missions. He personally felt that it was extremely important to have joint missions where there were activities of more than one country. This would be one way to stop any attempt to bargain one supplying country off against another, and it would strengthen the position of the countries composing the joint mission. Admiral Sherman went on to say that the question of partnership was a difficult one. Having representatives from a number of different countries discussing plans would not be too useful at the present time, but something had to be done to stimulate this feeling of partnership.

Air Chief Marshal Elliot said that he personally endorsed most heartily Admiral Sherman's idea of joint missions. He said that during his experience in the Near East (which has been quite extensive) he was particularly impressed by the unfortunate effects of the rivalry between the United Kingdom and France because they were not joint. This was true during the twenties. Marshal Elliot then said that he thought it most important that the civil side be associated in this bold program and that missions should be more than commodity dispensers.

Admiral Sherman agreed with the latter thought and cited our experience in Greece where, after we had established a well-rounded organization, we had much more success.

Mr. Nitze said he thought the association of the civil side was essential since we are basically trying to create a political impact in the area.

Sir Oliver Franks agreed and repeated that the United Kingdom was "not going to take a small view of this program. It is a common effort."

Mr. McGhee said that the armed supply program was part of a broader program which covers such questions as Israeli-Arab relations; the problem of the refugees; development of fighting groups, technical personnel for joint groups; which country should bear the greater responsibility; showing the flag by visits of naval officers and high officials, and like problems. These problems would have to be discussed in greater detail.

Mr. Nitze said he was somewhat worried about having a Board in the Middle East. He thought that questions could be raised as to the effectiveness of a Board located there. Admiral Sherman agreed with this. He said that a feeling might arise that the country in which the Board was located would be getting the plums. Mr. Burrows said that he had simply raised the question for discussion purposes only. He felt, however, that there should be a permanent organization of reasonably high-ranking personnel.

Mr. McGhee reiterated that we were interested in instilling the feeling of partnership insofar as possible. Since the effort is political, we must overcome the nationalist-type of reaction. He felt that the program might help the United Kingdom out in Egypt because of mutuality aspects. Sir Oliver Franks said that this was possible.

In response to a question from Mr. Burrows as to how much publicity we planned to give to the program, Mr. McGhee said that we would have to make some positive statement. This would probably take place after the program had been submitted to Congress.

Sir Oliver Franks expressed his appreciation for the information given to his Government. It was agreed that a working group would be established to look into the questions raised by the meeting. Mr. McGhee gave Sir Oliver Franks a copy of the attached paper[3] setting forth a number of the points which had occurred to us.

[Enclosure A]

Paper Drafted in the Department of State[4]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

[Subject:] Notes Re Arms Supply to Arab States and Israel, For US–UK Discussions May 17, 1951

A. *Nature of U.S. Arms Aid Program:*

Program is primarily a political weapon designed to strengthen the several Arab states and Israel; to improve their political and economic stability and to increase their will and ability to resist penetration by the USSR.

B. *Arms Supply—Cash and Grant:*

1. U.S. arms aid must be in accord with statutory requirements; i.e., President must find arms so furnished contribute to the security of the U.S.

2. It must be assured that arms will not be used contrary to Bilateral Agreements with U.S. (i.e., Tripartite Declaration protected).

3. Impartiality consistent with strategic considerations must be preserved between the Arab States and Israel.

4. Impartiality will have to be preserved in character of arms supplied.

5. Arms aid should be associated with political *quid pro quos* that are of general benefit to the West in the Cold war; for example, the British effort in Jordan and the U.S. at DAF[5] must be conceived as of general benefit to the West.

6. Arms aid must be handled so that the countries of the area will not neglect expenditures on economic and social betterment.

7. Arms aid can be accorded only in response to a governmental request; i.e., governments must be prepared to back their military in making requests.

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[3] See Enclosure A, below.

[4] Source text indicates neither the identity of the drafting officer(s) nor the date of preparation.

[5] Dhahran Airfield, Saudi Arabia.

8. Governments receiving U.S. aid must abide by all MDA requirements re inspection and supervision of end use.

9. Any arms aid will be within the framework of a correlated program for each country; clandestine purchases of *extra* arms will affect receipts.

10. Procurement assistance is the most valuable part of the program since global arms requirements will continue to exceed availabilities.

11. *To conform to U.K. and French practice as well as to save U.S. funds and effort the rule will be cash reimbursable assistance: U.S. grant aid will be employed to achieve general Western political objectives: U.S. Grant arms aid will be a supplement.*

12. Types of existing arms will be important factor in the supply of new arms.

13. To avoid inter-country jealousies in the area re arms aid, detailed country programs will be made known only to the countries receiving the aid and in the US–UK–France correlation process.

14. Arms supply of all kinds from the US, UK or France should be susceptible of being shut off at short notice in the event of developments contrary to the Tripartite Declaration, *coups d'états* or riots.

C. *Correlation of Arms Supply:*

Principal suppliers of arms will be the UK, France and the US. To meet the above criteria (including the criteria imposed by US legislation) a tripartite system of correlation is required. This system should not be publicized and should work so far as possible under cover.

The functions of such a tripartite system would be:

1. A means for sharing information regarding the armaments of the Arab States and Israel.
2. To provide for consultation on US, UK, and French plans to fill arms requirements of individual countries on either a cash or a grant basis. *Advance* knowledge of plans will:
    (*a*) Avoid embarrassments.
    (*b*) Permit arms supplies to be fitted into programs of other countries.
    (*c*) Permit consideration re character of arms.
    (*d*) Help prevent over-expenditures on arms by individual states.
3. Keep records of arms supplied.
4. Be the system to assure arms are not used contrary to tripartite declaration.
5. Focal point for emergency shut-off of arms supplies (see Criterion 13, above).

Such a system would not possess authority to stop arms supply by any of the three members; it would endeavor to operate on the grounds of common sense and honest dealing between members. Instances of serious dispute would be referred to governments for diplomatic handling.

S/ISA Files : Lot 52-26 : "Near East" : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1951—6 p. m.

727. You have been informed (Deptel 4093 to London Mar 9 [2] rptd Arabs caps and Israel) of proposed NSC statement of US policy toward Arab States and Israel to supplement but not supersede previous policies.[3] Pres approved this as national policy Mar 17.

Subsequently Dept has been formulating with Def and ECA comprehensive program to implement the new policies which are basically designed to (1) offset trend toward neutrality in certain parts area and (2) maximize will of states to cooperate with US and friendly countries to resist USSR penetration. Program now has Presidential approval and will shortly be presented publicly Congress. Underlying philosophy is so important success program that fol provided on secret basis for ur discreet use in taking Govt to which you are accredited into our confidence prior publication now scheduled about May 23 or 24.

1. USG has deep desire within limits its capabilities to help friendly countries to strengthen themselves, develop their resources, improve standards of living and facilitate participation in UN programs for collective security.

2. Prominent among factors contributing "soft" situation Arab States and Israel are (*a*) econ and social disabilities; (*b*) Arab refugees which constitute incubus on peace prospects; (*c*) despair and frustration resulting from feeling that Western nations have no interest in or plans for defense area, and (*d*) the absence of normal relations between Israel and the Arab States.

3. New program about to be submitted to Congress [4] has econ, social and mil components but does not involve formal defense commitments to Arab States and Israel. US continues back Tripartite Declaration.

4. Social component program well advanced with recent sig contracts for Point IV assistance in all Arab States and Israel.

5. Econ component consists of massive attack on Arab refugee problem solution of which will be major contribution to both Arab

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[1] Drafted by G. Lewis Jones, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, and amuel Kopper. Approved by Mr. Jones and cleared by Mr. McGhee. Sent priority o Baghdad, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, niact to Jidda and Damascus, and o London, Paris, Moscow, and Jerusalem for Ambassador Palmer.

[2] Not printed.

[3] NSC 47/5, p. 95.

[4] Reference is to the Mutual Security Program of 1951, submitted to Congress y President Truman on May 24, 1951. See editorial note, p. 150.

States and Israel. Reintegration program (probably partly conducted for US directly by ECA under "banner of UN") will be major contribution Syria, Jordan and Egypt as well as to Israel. For this purpose Dept seeking $50 million in hope that comparable increases Brit and Fr contributions will permit energetic and forthright handling of problem which Arab League members stated to be susceptible solution provided Western Powers give evidence determination push reintegration through to successful conclusion.

6. In keeping policy impartiality and as element balanced program, Dept seeking $25 million econ grant aid for all Arab States and an additional $25 million grant aid for Israel alone. Israel figure will be made public but apportionment between Arab States will be kept as confidential as possible to avoid jealousies. Needs Israel fully justify $25 million.

7. Mil aid component is new departure for US in area. It is undertaken at time when arms needs our Allies have never been greater. Consequently limited quantities arms will have to suffice for time being. Arms will be made available in correlation with UK and Fr. US mil aid will of course be subject bilateral agreements. FYI only we must extract from token deliveries mil hardware maximum psychological value in terms of indigenous will to resist aggression and where necessary polit and mil advantages which may be needed by Western nations.

8. Of first importance re mil aid is fact that if program goes through Arab States and Israel will be eligible (*a*) for procurement assistance re arms; (*b*) services of US personnel in training and advisory capacity and (*c*) to supplement purchases grant arms aid for all of the Arab States and Israel not to exceed $40 million. FYI approx $15 million of this tentatively earmarked for Saudi program. Grant aid will be used to supplement direct purchases and cash reimbursable programs. Dept well aware fact that grant arms assistance to states which have been purchasing supplies from UK and France cld adversely affect position and prestige those nations. For this reason Dept has recently informed UK and France general lines program we contemplate submitting to Congress in order that plans may be made to correlate all assistance to area and to obtain maximum benefit of both cash and grant aid irrespective its origin. (Dept Memos Conversation this subject with UK and Fr May 17[5] airpouched to you).

9. In presenting foregoing as advance notice of hoped-for but not certain program of USG you shld make it clear that this is not US bid to assume paramount power position in ME at expense Brit or Fr interests. Both these Govts given assurances this score and US hopes all phases its program can be correlated with the UK and Fr as well

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[5] See the memoranda of conversation by Mr. Kopper, pp. 130 and 134.

as with all states of the area. FYI some US–UK–Fr correlating agency will be required handle arms requests. Nature location this now under study.

10. Legislative uncertainties plus fact many operational details yet to be resolved make it impossible describe what final form program will be or when it will be approved by Congress. However, important that Govt leaders understand that this represents major US policy development. It is based on concept of balanced area approach and will be so administered. Also based on concept of impartiality and its formulation has resulted in part from careful and sympathetic appraisal of needs and desires of ME states as communicated by their leaders. Success of program, if and when it receives Congressional approval, will depend in large measure on willingness all interested states implement it in cooperative spirit.

11. Dept believes it important that Govt leaders be informed outlines program by US Chiefs of Mission before inaccurate reports gain any circulation. Where necessary you shld carefully explain Congressional machinery through which program must go before it receives final approval, thus minimizing over expectations leading to dangerous disappointments.

12. Contents this tel except Saudi mil aid figure shld be given ur Brit and Fr colleagues promptly. Dept informing UK and Fr here.

13. Leg Damascus requested inform Azzam Pasha personally and solicit his counsel re important step making outline program known to significant dels Arab League mtg even though their home Govts will be informed directly. Text pertinent portions bill to be submitted Congress will be sent soon as finalized.

14. Report action.[6]

ACHESON

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[6] See memorandum by Mr. Villard to Nitze, June 1, p. 152.

Editorial Note

Throughout 1951, the strategic and political problems of the Eastern Mediterranean area continued to preoccupy and perplex responsible officials within NATO and the United States Government. Should NATO be extended to the fringes of the Middle East to include Greece and Turkey, and if so, should a separate command arrangement be established to cover the defense needs of these countries or should their armed forces and strategic interests be fully accommodated within the existing NATO structure? The answer to these questions gradually emerged during the course of debate and discussion both within the NATO Standing Group and between United

States and United Kingdom civil and military officials in Washington and London. Greece and Turkey would be invited to join NATO as full partners. Concurrently, negotiations would begin between the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey to establish a Middle East Command which would be expanded to include Egypt and, possibly later, other countries of the Near East as well. For documentation on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO and on the development of the Middle East Command concept as it related to the problem of expanding and rationalizing the NATO command structure, see volume III, part 1, pages 460 ff. Documentation on the Middle East Command as it related to the interest of the United States in Near Eastern security matters is presented in the following pages.

PPS Files : Lot 64 D 563 : 723 Near and Middle East

Working Paper Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1951.

COMMAND STRUCTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE PROBLEM

To devise a command set-up for the Middle East which will:

1. Meet pressing U.K. need for participation in command arrangements in Europe and the Middle East.

2. Be consistent with a Mediterranean Command protecting Eisenhower's southern flank and responsible for all communications through the Mediterranean.

3. Integrate Turkey into Middle East land defense, Turkey being at the same time a full member of NATO with double responsibilities: (*a*) Balkan, Dardanelles and Aegean defense, and (*b*) defense of its Eastern frontier.

4. Attract the voluntary support of the Arab States, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and contiguous land areas as a development contributing to area security.

5. Take into account French insistence to be consulted on all Middle East matters and to participate in the affairs of Syria and Lebanon.

6. Take into account the special U.S. training and supply relationship with Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

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[1] This paper was drafted the week following the first of the United States-United Kingdom military conversations on questions of regional command, during the course of which General Collins and Admiral Sherman first seriously raised the issue of a separate Middle East Command associated with NATO and including, at a minimum, Turkish and British military units under British command. For information on these meetings, see the editorial note, vol. III, pt. 1, p. 522. Copies of this paper were sent to Bradley, Nitze, Matthews, Jefferson, Jones, McGhee, Martin, Perkins, General Taylor, Spofford, Knight, Sherman, Hull, Vandenberg, White, Admirals Duncan and Davis, and G. Lewis Jones.

7. Take into account British treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.

8. Take into account the requirement to keep Middle East oil flowing to the West.

9. Take into account the requirements for bases in the area available for immediate Allied use from D Day.

10. Recognize unlikelihood U.S. ground forces being available for deployment in the area for a considerable period.

11. Make use of the psychological force of a practical display of U.S.-U.K. (and secondarily French) cooperation and unity re Middle East defense problems.

12. Recognize that, while U.S. association with the U.K. and France will expose it to the charges of imperialism based on the records of the U.K. and France in the area, the over-all gain to area defensive capability is worth the risk.

13. Recognize the fact that strengthening the will of the peoples of the Middle East to resist will be primarily a *political* task until the Western power potential is greater than at present.

14. Recognize that the U.S. is not prepared to give a formal defense commitment at this time to Iran, Pakistan, the Arab States and Israel, but that it is prepared in conjunction with the U.K., France, and these states themselves to help plan and prepare the defense of the area.

15. Take into account the U.S.-U.K.-French Tripartite Declaration re Israel.

16. Recognize the British Commonwealth interest in Middle East defense.

17. Gradually obviate Egyptian and Iraqi difficulties with the U.K. arising out of their treaties.

18. Contribute to the establishment of a practical *modus vivendi* between the Arab States and Israel.

19. Capitalize upon the new U.S. economic, refugee, and military aid programs for the Middle East as well as other U.S. and U.K. development efforts such as Point IV, etc.

20. Take into account the need for careful time-phasing in developing Middle East security arrangements so that these will not outrun the desire of the inhabitants for the benefit of area-coordinated defense; be provocative to the U.S.S.R.; or involve the Western industrial potential in unfulfillable demands for arms.

TIMING

As indicated in paragraph 20 above, the establishment of a Middle East command structure must be carefully time-phased. The following three periods are envisaged:

1. The present (announcement, diplomatic support, etc.)
2. Cold war build-up
3. Hot war

THE PRESENT

There is a need for an early announcement of Allied interest in Middle East defense because:

1. U.K. domestic political pressure for participation in European and Middle East command arrangements.
2. The new U.S. approach to the Arab States and Israel is based on correlation with U.K. efforts and coordination with France; therefore, public emphasis is timely.
3. The Arab League is presently considering inconclusively its own defense structure in light of Syrian–Israeli dispute.
4. A new element might assist in solving current U.K. difficulties in Egypt.

BRITISH ANNOUNCEMENT

The following announcement by the U.K. is suggested:

"The defense of the Middle East* is an integral part of the world defense problem for which NATO has been instituted to handle the European, Atlantic, and Mediterranean aspects. The U.K. has been in consultation with its NATO allies generally, and the U.S. and France in particular, and announces with their concurrence that, in the event of concerted action under the U.N. to repel aggression against that area, the U.K. is prepared to offer the British Commander in the Middle East to serve as 'Supreme Allied Commander' for such Allied land and air forces as can be placed at his disposal to repel the aggressor. He would have similar responsibility for naval operations in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Southeastern Mediterranean. The U.S. and France have stated that they will support this appointment.

"The capability of many countries of the area to defend themselves even with the assistance of outside forces, leaves much to be desired. The U.K. is therefore assigning to the Commander in Chief, British Middle East land forces, the additional title and responsibility of 'Director, Middle East Cooperative Defense Board'. The CINCMELF will establish a Middle East Cooperative Defense Board to serve the states of the area having an interest in mutual defense and interested in receiving strategic guidance, training and procurement assistance. In this endeavor, the U.K. has been assured of the active support of the Commonwealth countries, Turkey, the U.S., and France. The Middle East Cooperative Defense Board is designed to assist in the creation of adequate resistance capability in the area. The 'Director, Middle East Cooperative Defense Board' will have attached to him a special advisory staff representing the states of the area interested in collaboration for area defense as well as representatives of the U.S., France, and members of the British Commonwealth most concerned."

A declaration of this kind would fit in very well with the new U.S. economic-military approach to the Middle East under NSC 47/5.[2]

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* Conceived for this purpose as the area comprising Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, the Arab States, Libya, and Israel. The U.K. might wish to leave this vague in order to avoid arousing further Iranian reaction. [Footnote in the source text.]

[2] *Ante*, p. 95.

The U.S. Secretary of State would lose no time in publicly concurring in the British announcement; the Turkish, French and Commonwealth governments would take similar action, both publicly and through diplomatic channels.

Underlying this British announcement (the British should take the lead in order to derive the most prestige benefit) would be firm U.S. concurrence in the concept of a British "Supreme Allied Commander" for the period of Hot War. Once this concept is accepted, there should be no difficulty about the U.S. correlating its activities with the U.K. during the period of the "Middle East Cooperative Defense Board".

The "Middle East Cooperative Defense Board" is conceived as a "new look" for Middle East defense arrangements, which hitherto have rested largely on bilateral British treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. The concept of this "Defense Board" might help to distract attention from the Anglo-Egyptian impasse, particularly if U.S. interest and activity clearly take place under the aegis of the Board.

It is assumed that in a period of Hot War the U.S. would appoint a Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander; there would be no objection, after our economic-military program gets under way, to the U.S. occupying the post of "Deputy Director, Middle East Cooperative Defense Board". At some stage it might be politically desirable to appoint a Turk or an Arab Deputy Director also. To integrate Israel into the area defense pattern, it would be necessary at the start for the Board to offer Israel a special Israel branch; the ultimate objective would be full Israel participation in the central Cooperative Defense Board.

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

The area of responsibility for the "Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East" whether he wears that hat, or his hat as "Director, Middle East Cooperative Defense Board", should be meshed with the command area for the Mediterranean under NATO. Careful coordination would be required at two points:

1. Mediterranean supply line
2. Turkey

The Middle East theatre is dependent upon the Mediterranean supply route and consequently the NATO Commander in the Mediterranean will have the heavy responsibility for keeping the Middle East theatre supplied, convoy protection, etc.

Turkey (presumed to have become a member of NATO) will be in both the NATO and Middle East camp. The Turks would be asked, with respect to the employment of their forces and operations in relation to the Middle East theatre, to accept the planning guidance and wartime strategic direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, who should have a Turkish Deputy. This is necessary because Turkey is the anchor of the outer defense ring of the Middle East. The NATO part of Turkey's activity will be the defense of the Dardanelles, European Turkey and activities in the Aegean and Black Sea, under a NATO command organization. It is believed that this philosophy could be sold to the Turks.

Special provision must be made to protect the special U.S. position in Saudi Arabia where we hope to secure the Dhahran air field. It would be disastrous for the Middle East command structure proposed in this paper if the U.S. should insist that Saudi Arabia must be excluded from the Supreme Commander's purview. Whichever hat the British Commander is wearing, the U.S. should acknowledge his authority so far as plans and the general character of the training program are concerned. We would assume, however, that the commander of U.S. activities in Saudi Arabia would represent the prospective Supreme Allied Commander with the function of supervising the training conducted by all training missions working in that country.

If the French insist on a positive role in the program (they may be content only to kibitz) this could only be in Syria and Lebanon. If these countries do not concur in France having a role comparable to that of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia, the question is dead because we cannot afford to jeopardize the program by forcing the French on either of these countries. If Syria and Lebanon are willing to have the French, arrangements could be made comparable to that of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia.

For obvious reasons, the U.K. would take the lead in Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan.

Nothing in the Middle East Command Structure would change U.S. supply and training responsibilities for Turkey; these two functions had best fall within the ambit of Turkey's NATO membership.

Iran represents a special problem regarding which little progress appears possible at the present time; our ultimate objective should be to have the Commander of the U.S. training mission hold some form of mandate from the British Supreme Commander. The present political situation in Iran is so critical, however, that any public suggestion of such a relationship would cause strong reaction in Iran and might jeopardize the continuance of the U.S. mission.

Pakistan is deliberately included because of expressed Pakistan interests in the defense of this area, because it is a Moslem country, and because it constitutes a direct link with the British Commonwealth. The British would take the lead in Pakistan.

Where country leadership does not fall into a natural pattern as regards the U.S. or the U.K. (e.g., Libya, Lebanon, Syria) there would be advantages in having joint U.S.–U.K. training and supply missions work in these countries.

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: 723 Near and Middle East

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1951.

Subject: Working Paper re Command Structure in the Middle East[1]

I think we will get further faster with the British if we make it very clear that our ideas with regard to the Middle East Cooperative Defense Board are put forward only as a basis for discussion. The NECDB[2] represents an ideal toward which we might work in correlation with the British if the British buy the general *cooperative concept.*

At this stage of NE politics, NE cannot assert that even one of the Arab States would at the outset jump on the NECDB bandwagon. We know that most of them would like to do so, but Arab League solidarity is such that a snap reaction might be to boycott the NECDB, and it would take a long time to unstick this boycott.

It will obviously be highly desirable to have the British announcement (page 4 of Working Paper) refer to the concurrence of Turkey, Pakistan, the Arab States and Israel in the appointment of a British "Supreme Allied Commander". These are the states vitally concerned and they will be quick to resent the *imposition* of a command structure prior to consultation with them.

If the British show themselves willing to study seriously the idea of the NECDB, the following action would be indicated:

1. U.S. and UK should seek from their Missions in the area an estimate of the reaction in each country to the ideas in the Working Paper without a direct approach to the governments concerned.
2. Reactions from Missions should be pooled with a view to tailoring the concept more precisely to the political problems in the area.
3. The revised U.S.-UK Working Paper should be discussed with the French.
4. U.S., UK and French should begin in concert to lay a careful diplomatic and military foundation in each of the states of the area in order to assure in advance their favorable reaction both to the Supreme Allied Commander and the NECDB. This stage managing in advance is of the *utmost importance.*
5. UK announcement would be made.

Time is an important element, but this, in the light of inter-Arab frictions as well as Arab-Israeli frictions, is going to be a delicate political operation which *could* fail abysmally unless it is well handled.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Near East Cooperative Defense Board (NECDB) appears to be used here and elsewhere in this memorandum as an alternative usage to Middle East Cooperative Defense Board.

I doubt whether the program we suggest in the Working Paper could be brought into being in much less than two to three months.[3]

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[3] The establishment of a Middle East Command within the overall NATO command structure became the subject of intense debate and discussion between United States, British, and French civil and military officials during the latter half of 1951. For documentation on the development of the Middle East Command proposal within the NATO framework, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.

Editorial Note

On May 24, President Truman submitted to Congress a Special Message on the Mutual Security Program in which, among other requests, he recommended $415 million in military aid for Greece, Turkey, and Iran, a portion of which would be available for other Middle Eastern nations if necessary. The President also recommended $125 million in economic aid for Middle Eastern countries, exclusive of Greece and Turkey for whom economic aid was provided as part of the aid program for Europe. The economic aid program for the Middle East also included programs of technical assistance to Libya, Liberia, and Ethiopia "whose economic problems are similar to those of the Middle Eastern countries."

In recommending his program of Middle East aid under the Mutual Security Act, the President said, *inter alia*, "The countries of the Middle East are, for the most part, less developed industrially than those of Europe. They are, nevertheless, of great importance to the security of the entire free world. This region is a vital link of land, sea, and air communications between Europe, Asia, and Africa. In the free nations of the Middle East, lie half of the oil reserves of the world. No part of the world is more directly exposed to Soviet pressure. The Kremlin has lost no opportunity to stir these troubled waters, as the post-war record amply demonstrates. . . . There is no simple formula for increasing stability and security in the Middle East. . . . But the pressure against the Middle East is unremitting. It can be overcome only by a continued build-up of armed defenses and the fostering of economic development." The President's Message on the Mutual Security Program is printed in full in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951*, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), pages 302–313. Documentation on the formulation and implementation of the Mutual Security Program may be found in volume I, pages 266 ff.

S/ISA Files : Lot 52–26 : "Near East" : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 26, 1951—4 p. m.

741. 1. Asst Secy McGhee closely fol Depcirtel 727 May 22 [2] briefed reps Arab states and Israel May 24 re proposed program. Pres's statement to Congress containing totals but not breakdowns made public May 24. Reps asked keep breakdowns confidential until figs emerged hearings. No ref made earmarking for Saudi Arabia.

2. Queried by Egypt Amb re justification 25–25 apportionment Arab states and Israel McGhee replied:

a. Arab states wld benefit economically from most of refugee 50 million—consequently Arab share more nearly 75 million.

b. Absorptive capacity and not population must be criterion economic aid: e.g. Populationwise India could absorb unlimited aid.

c. Certain Arab states well off financially due high export commodity prices and increased royalties: some states (Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) have elected not to take up all credits available to them in lending institutions.

d. Worthwhile programs (e.g. Wadi Thar Thar) require years to plan US program for one year only: 25 million figure in conjunction refugee 50 million believed about right for existing Arab absorptive capacity.

e. Israel has produced carefully documented projects in excess 25 million.

f. U.S. grant economic aid can only be supplement indigenous development efforts taking into account other sources funds and resources.

3. McGhee reminded Arabs that US is final judge of how much it gives and where it gives: US is not forcing grant aid on any NE state. If NE state elects seek US grant aid its request will be considered in light all factors.

4. Re mil assistance cash reimbursable and grant McGhee emphasized US wld require assurances and safeguards arms not misemployed in intra area aggression contrary Tripartite Declaration. Arms supply wld be correlated with UK and France.

5. McGhee emphasized to Arab Chiefs of Mission that Dept relying on them make clear home Govts various Congressional stages through which program must pass. It is liable to attack from many groups. Program cld be thrown out of balance, nullified or completely destroyed by statements from Arab world labeling program with

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[1] Drafted by Jones, Kopper, and Wells Stabler, Officer in Charge, Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs. Approved by Elbert G. Mathews, Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, and cleared by Frederic G. Ranney of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs. Sent to all posts in the Arab states and to Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] *Ante*, p. 141.

Communist-type clichés: "biased", "imperialist", "inadequate", "unbalanced", etc. If Pres's program to assist Arab states and Israel impartially with their economic and defense problems and to settle refugee problems on sound basis is subjected undue criticism it is unlikely Congress will approve program. No balanced and impartial US program cld possibly meet all the desires of all the Arab states and Israel: if this attempt at such a program fails for lack of support in area prospects dark for anything comparable in foreseeable future.

6. Helpful if foregoing facts sit appreciated by responsible Govt officials and Arab leaders such as Azzam Pasha. UK and French colleagues might help propagate idea. (Dept wld be interested receive reports on attitude and activities ur UK and French colleagues re US program).[3] Pro-program statements preferably public wld assist greatly. NE section Pres's foreign aid statement offers good peg. Report prospects such public statements.

7. Israel rep polite re idea area approach but from other sources Dept understands drive for $150,000,000 grant aid Israel is being pressed vigorously in Congress and publicly.

ACHESON

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[3] See memorandum from Mr. Villard to Nitze, June 1, *infra*.

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: "Near & Middle East, 1949–1951"

Memorandum by Henry S. Villard of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1951.

REACTION TO PROPOSED AID UNDER NSC 47/5 UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

1. Our telegrams from the Near East indicate that preliminary reaction to the "bold new policy" of economic and military aid to the Arab States and Israel, based on NSC 47/5 as approved by the President March 17, 1951, is anything but favorable. While in some instances it is admitted that the program is a step in the right direction, Arab officials are in general highly critical because Israel would receive the same amount (25 millions) as all the Arab States together. In addition, the Arabs look at the 50 million earmarked for refugee resettlement as simply a means to get Israel off the hook in regard to this problem.

2. To illustrate, the Egyptian Foreign Minister told Caffery he was "shocked" at the proposal for 25 millions for Israel and 25 millions for the Arabs; the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Jordan expressed "surprise and dismay"; the Iraqi Foreign Minister took great exception to the "imbalance" in the projected appropriation and

was "extraordinarily critical" of our policy of assistance to Israel; and the Syrian press regards the program with suspicion as designed to favor Israel or as an "apology" for our past "mistreatment" of the Arabs. The only feature that seems to be acceptable is that relating to arms aid, and even this is looked on with some skepticism as to the benefits the Arab States might gain in comparison with Israel.

3. British and French reaction in the field so far seems to be full approval by the British representatives and something less than that by the French. In Syria there are indications that the French are concerned over the possible conflict between our economic aid and established French banking and other interests. In Paris, the Foreign Office says it thinks the Arab States are not in a mood to accept offers which might tie them too closely to the West, because their neutralist attitude is growing and they tend to adopt a "blackmailing" attitude in dealing with the Western Powers. The British Minister in Tel Aviv foreshadowed that our "area approach" would not be particularly welcome in Israel, and the press there has now expressed dissatisfaction at Israel's share of the aid and its potential effect on the 150 million aid to Israel bill.

4. I have no doubt that when the good things are ready to be served up on the platter, the Arabs as well as Israel will find a way to make use of their share regardless of the apportionment. No Arab Government would be able to take the risk of passing up aid of any kind, once the appropriations are actually in sight. But I think there are at least a couple of lessons and two or three warnings to be found in the disappointing reception with which the proposed implementation of NSC 47/5 has met:

a) There is no such thing as "impartiality" in the mind of the Arab when it comes to U.S. policy toward the Arab States and Israel. The original and fundamental bitterness in regard to our Israel policy remains the same and colors all Arab thinking. An "area approach" is too likely to stir up jealousies and may only boomerang in the long run.

b) Even the prospect of assistance running into millions of dollars is insufficient to purchase, at least at first blush, the high-sounding objective of NSC 47/5: "The U.S. should undertake and accelerate planned technical an[illegible]omic assistance that will help convince the peoples of the Arab [illegible] and Israel that they will benefit as individuals as well as Sta[illegible]n the victory of the free world."

c) The willingness o[illegible] Arabs to accept the possibility of getting arms from us, as distin[illegible] economic or social aid, should make us especially careful that [illegible]'t arm them for a war against Israel instead of to resist Comm[illegible]ggression.

d) If the disposition t[illegible] a prospective gift horse in the mouth hould become generally [illegible] here, Congress would scarcely be en- husiastic about appropri[illegible] the money—at least for the Arabs. There is danger therefore [illegible]he whole program may fail of enactment unless a more appreciative attitude develops among the recipients.

e) While we can probably work successfully with the British in carrying out plans for the area, we must be on our guard that the French won't try to undermine the project somewhere along the line.

f) We should probably embark on an information campaign, at the appropriate time, to explain the motives of our assistance. In general, the cool attitude displayed by the Arabs reflects what I think is a basic characteristic: suspicion of anyone who offers them anything for free. They don't really understand how or why they should be offered economic aid—there must be some strings attached somewhere. The distrust in this instance jumps quickly to the question of Israel and what Israel is getting out of it. From here on out, I think we should be particularly careful to see that the aid we dish out is going to produce the expected returns.

HENRY S. VILLARD

780.5/6-2951 : Despatch

An Attaché in the United Kingdom (Tibbetts) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET AIR PRIORITY LONDON, June 29, 1951.
No. 6403

Ref: Embtel 6752, June 22, 1951 [1]

Subject: Commonwealth Defense Discussions

There is enclosed a copy of "Conclusions on Strategy",[2] which was given to the Embassy by the Foreign Office, a summary of the results of the recent meeting on Commonwealth Defense. This paper was agreed to by the Commonwealth Defense Ministers present (the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; Canada sent an observer) although the Defense Ministers did not have full powers to commit their governments. In fact, however, the Foreign Office said this "Heads of Agreement" was about as firm a commitment as the Commonwealth nations use among themselves. This document is also being sent to the British Embassy in Washington; the Embassy was asked not to transmit by telegram lest the Department be informed before the British Embassy. It is being furnished to the Department as an "oral communication" for information purposes and it was tactfully made clear that it would be appreciated if the Department's representatives would not raise points from the "Conclusions" with representatives of other Commonwealth Governments although the Conference agreed that the United States should be informed. If the Department wishes, after study of the document, to elicit further information, the Foreign Office said that it would do its best to oblige.

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[1] Not printed; it informed the State Department that the Commonwealth Defense meeting had decided that the United States should be told of its discussions after their conclusion. It also mentioned that the first session of the meetings had taken place June 21 and were expected to end on June 26 (780.5/6–2251).

[2] Not printed; the "Conclusions on Strategy" stated in part that the defense of the Middle East was vital to the security of the Commonwealth nations and that effective measures had to be taken for protection of the area, including the dispatch of Commonwealth forces in the event of aggression against the free nations of the world.

Other points which the Foreign Office made on the conference are:

[Here follow detailed comments on the "Conclusions on Strategy"; see footnote 2 above.]

A copy of the press release issued at the conclusion of the conference is also enclosed.[3] There was little discussion of the conference in the press because Shinwell told the correspondents that they would not receive any additional information and that he did not want much publicity.

Margaret Joy Tibbetts

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[3] Not printed here.

Editorial Note

On July 3, British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison sent Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü a memorandum proposing a "package deal" in which British support for Turkish membership in NATO was "contingent upon" Turkey's willingness to associate itself with the United States, United Kingdom, and France in establishing an integrated allied command headquarters in the Middle East and that subsequently this command be enlarged to include Egypt and the Commonwealth countries, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The Turkish response was affirmative and British officials in Washington subsequently requested United States aid in further "pressuring the Turks along this line" if necessary. See memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Bonbright, July 6, volume III, part 1, page 554.

780.5/8-251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

OP SECRET

[Washington,] August 2, 1951.

articipants: Mr. Burrows, British Embassy
Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Mr. Burrows handed to me this morning the attached summary[1] the Commonwealth Defense Ministers meeting in London in June.

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[1] Not printed.

He said he knew we had received a report on this meeting through our Embassy [2] and that this might add but little to it but nevertheless he hoped it would be useful to us.

He said the significant portion of the summary related to the position of Australia. I said, as I read it, it indicated that the Australians were continuing to hedge with respect to the Middle Eastern commitment. He said this was a correct interpretation and spoke of the importance attached by his government to obtaining an all-out comment from Australia for defense assistance in the Middle East. He said he thought this was going to depend to a considerable extent on the assurances which the Australians received from us with respect to the Pacific. I said the new Pacific Pact [3] should be helpful in this respect. He agreed but said that this would depend on how the pact operated. I indicated that this was, of course, true and that it was too early to forecast what the operation would be although I could say that the State Department desired to make something out of this organization. I said that this government was fully conscious of the importance to the British and to the general situation of the Commonwealth contributions to the Middle Eastern defense and I said that as he knew this had been taken into account in connection with the matter of troops for Korea.

Mr. Burrows closed the conversation by reiterating the hope that we would continue to keep the importance of this matter very much in mind.

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[2] See despatch 6403 from London, June 29, p. 154.

[3] Reference is to the ANZUS Pact; for documentation, see vol. VI, pt. 1, pp. 132 ff.

780.5/8-351

Statement by George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, in Support of the Mutual Security Program Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, August 3, 1951

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1951.

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

THE NEAR EAST AND INDEPENDENT AFRICA

Mr. Chairman, I want to present the case for the Near Eastern and independent African countries for consideration under the Mutual Security Program. Specifically, I should like to discuss the problems which we face in Greece, Turkey and Iran, Israel and the Arab nations, and Libya, Ethiopia and Liberia. Programs for grant economic aid are proposed for these countries as indicated on our chart,[1] and programs of military assistance are proposed for Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab nations. The sum involved for military assistance is $415 million. We also request Congressional authority to transfer 10% of the funds available for military aid to Greece, Turkey, and Iran, for assistance to Israel and the Arab States, under conditions laid down in the draft legislation which you have under consideration.

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[1] Not found in Department of State files.

I shall deal only briefly with the problems of military assistance to Greece and Turkey, since this committee is very familiar with them, and devote most of my time to a consideration of the requirements of the other countries. The Greek and Turkish programs, military and economic, have been proved by performance over the past four years. Both countries have abundantly demonstrated that they are among our staunchest allies. They have stood firm in defense of the integrity of their own territories. They have supported us in major policy issues in the United Nations. They have made noteworthy contributions to the cause of collective security in Korea. Representatives of the Department of Defense will explain the need for the military programs proposed for 1952, and representatives of ECA have already demonstrated the need for continued economic assistance.

Military assistance to Iran represents a continuation of an essential program already underway. While the Iranian situation poses special difficulties for us today, the impelling fact remains that Iran represents tempting bait to Russia in its attempt to forge a chain of satellites along its periphery. Iran's loss to the free world would jeopardize the security of the entire Middle East. Our purpose is to strengthen Iran's will to resist aggression, and to enable the Government to maintain internal stability. I should like to discuss the Iranian situation further in dealing with the economic programs which we propose in the area.

The proposal that military assistance may, under certain circumstances, be extended to Israel and the Arab States is a new one. The Department of Defense is not yet in a position to submit precise programs for the use of the funds which might be available for this purpose. Specifically, it is suggested that up to 10% of the funds made available for Greece, Turkey, and Iran might be used to provide military assistance to countries of the Near East whenever the President determines that "(1) *the strategic location of the recipient country makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area;* (2) *such assistance is of critical importance to the defense of the free* *ations and* (3) *the immediate increased ability of the recipient coun-* *ry to defend itself contributes to the preservation of the peace and* *he security of the area and is important to the security of the United* *tates.*"

Events in the Middle East are moving with such alarming rapidity that it may well prove necessary to have authority of this character for use in the very near future. We cannot allow the forces of neutralism and extremism to gain further ground in the Near East. The strategic position of the Middle East is too important to allow its conquest through Soviet subversion as a result of our indifference or inaction. The Soviet intention of dominating this area, a goal expressly stated in documents exchanged between Nazi Germany and the Soviets in 1940[2] and implicit in communist efforts to aggravate existing tensions, is all too clear. We must counter prevailing dissaffection in the Arab States and dispel their belief that the United States and other free countries have no interest in helping them to defend themselves. The provision of military assistance is the most concrete method of demonstrating our real interest in their security. In Israel, no comparable disaffection exists, but this new State, hard-pressed financially, is seeking assistance from us, and our help in providing military equipment would tend to ease its economic burdens.

Throughout the Near East, the proposed program will increase the will of governments and peoples to cooperate in resisting Soviet pressures both now and in the event of war. The program will bolster political stability and security, and thereby reduce area rivalries and tensions. It will also tend to create a favorable attitude in these countries towards requests which we may make for bases and other facilities important to United States security. Moreover, the introduction of modern training methods and reasonable quantities of up-to-date equipment, primarily small arms, is a condition precedent to the effective performance by these countries of their proper role in the defense of the Near East. Their forces could, if properly equipped, participate in the defense of their territories and in protection of lines of communication and vital installations. While these countries could not withstand an all-out Soviet attack, their ability to harass the enemy's lines of communication over exceedingly difficult terrain could be of inestimable value in the event of general hostilities.

Economic Aid

The program of economic aid represents a significant extension of the Point Four operations that have been conducted during the past year in the Near East. It is designed to complement the proposed military program and to help build "stability in depth" by bolstering the economies of the countries of the Middle East.

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[2] Reference is presumably to a German draft treaty, dated November 9, 1940, providing for the adherence of the Soviet Union to the Three-Power Pact and including two secret protocols, one of which defined the sphere of influence of each power. The draft treaty is printed as document 309 in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, series D, vol. XI: *The War Years, 1940–1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 508–510.

READEX FICHE best

Iran[3]

The Iranian program, which was prepared before events in Iran had reached the present stage of crisis, is designed to meet the country's long-range problems by increasing agricultural production and attacking poverty and disease in that country at the "grass-roots" levels. Basic to the program is the concept that the Iranian government will assume a substantial share of the expense of jointly-administered projects, with revenues anticipated from oil operations.

This program provides for expert teams of Americans and Iranians specializing in agriculture, sanitation, vocational training and public health, working at the village level. It provides for improvement in the water supply systems in the smaller towns. It looks also to the development of basic water resources for irrigation. It provides for a group of experts from the United States Public Roads Administration, which is making such a notable contribution in Turkey, with a view to improving Iran's road network. We continue to regard this as a good program, and we hope that a solution of the current difficulties between the British and the Iranians will permit the Iranian government to do their full share in carrying it out. With the dispatch of a British Minister to Iran, we are hopeful that the negotiations which Mr. Harriman has worked so hard to reestablish will achieve the objective of restoring the flow of crude and refined petroleum from Iran on terms satisfactory to the Iranian government and to the commercial interests involved.

The amount proposed for economic assistance to Iran is $24,050,000.

Arab States and Israel

Israel, as you know, has requested $150,000,000 in grant aid from the United States for the current year. The Israeli request is based on three principal factors: its stated requirements for defense; its desire to provide for an additional 200,000 immigrants in the fiscal year 1952; and the obligation which the Israeli government states that it is prepared to assume in compensating the Arab refugees who left their homes in territory now under Israel's control, during the hostilities which broke out in 1948.

An analysis of the Israeli request, which includes an illustrative program of imports to be financed by the $150 million, has led the Executive Branch of the Government to apply a different approach to Israel's requirements. In cooperation with technicians of the Treasury Department, an analysis has been made of Israel's balance of payments. We have taken into account Israel's import requirements and its probable sources of foreign exchange, including $50,000,000 still available under the Export-Import Bank loans, which totalled

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[3] Documentation concerning Iran for the year 1951 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume x.

opy available

$135,000,000. This leaves a dollar gap that will amount to somewhat less than $25 million in fiscal 1952. We have accordingly prepared an illustrative program of grant aid totalling $23,500,000.

The illustrative program for Israel is directed toward projects similar to those now being undertaken through funds available to Israel from the Export-Import Bank, namely, the production of food and the strengthening of the industrial potential of the new nation. As I have already mentioned, the program also includes authority to make grant military assistance available to Israel in addition to the proposed economic aid.

In the case of the Arab states, the problem is not so much the "dollar gap" as that of increasing the general level of production and living standards. For the wealthier Arab states which enjoy substantial foreign exchange earnings through the export of petroleum or cotton, we propose only minor technical assistance. For the poorer states in the North—Syria, Jordan, Lebanon—faced with the problems of assimilating hundreds of thousands of Palestine refugees, we propose programs very similar to those planned for Iran. We are suggesting "grass-roots" projects looking to increased food production, improved public health, and better use of water resources, together with a small component of industrial equipment. The list of worthwhile projects for these countries which can be undertaken in 1952 fiscal totals approximately $24,000,000—the same figure as the requirement for Israel based on a study of Israel's financial position. For presentation purposes, we propose identical amounts of aid for Israel on the one hand and the Arab States on the other. Although Israel, with its plans for development well under way and with its large corps of highly-skilled people, can assimilate assistance more rapidly than the Arab states, it is nevertheless in the interest of the United States that Israel and the Arab States be extended aid on an impartial basis. While impartiality does not necessarily mean equality, the illustrative division of aid for 1952 is realistic in terms of our objectives, which are to assure the cooperation of Israel and the Arab states with us in creating a situation of strength in the area.

Palestine Refugees

You are familiar with the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine, which is the principal source of tension today in the Near East. The numbers of refugees on relief have been reduced from a peak of 1,019,000 to approximately 875,000. Little repatriation or resettlement of the refugees has taken place, however, although reports from the field indicate that we may expect further progress in areas where some of the refugees are now living. Furthermore, a substantial political advance has been made with the acceptance by the Arab states of the principle of resettlement for those refugees who do not choose to be repatriated to Israel. This acceptance is subject to the condition that the rights of the refugees to compensation, or to eventual repatriation if that should prove feasible, are not prejudiced, and to an undertaking by the international community to assure that adequate funds are available to carry resettlement projects to completion.

With this background, we propose to expand the refugee program to permit massive resettlement. From the point of view of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, relief needs for the current fiscal year will total about $25 million, and funds available for resettlement are likely to prove the sole limitation on large-scale resettlement. Resettlement funds, however, will not be spent unless they offer a definite cure for a proportionate amount of the relief burden. We can be quite certain that no resettlement can take place unless funds are available, and the $50,000,000 requested as the United States contribution will go far toward solving the problem.

It has been estimated that $150 million will be required over a three- to five-year period to resettle the bulk of the 150,000 families now on relief. Recognition by the Congress of the long-term nature of this extremely difficult problem will be helpful to the Executive Branch and to those authorities in the United Nations who are struggling with the great difficulties which this mass of homeless people represent. We are hopeful that other countries will contribute a sizable amount. To date, the United States share of the cost of the program has been approximately 55%.

Independent Africa

Assistance is also requested for Liberia, Libya and Ethiopia. Total aid for these three countries is proposed in the amount of $4 million. Programs for these countries are largely limited to technical assistance, and in the cases of Ethiopia and Liberia, these programs will dovetail into the operations of the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank, respectively. Libya will be a new nation on January 1, 1952. Libya will require assistance from the international community to become a viable, self-sustaining nation. Our interest in Libya is enhanced by its strategic location. We anticipate that, in our assistance program to Libya, we shall be cooperating with both the British and the French.

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740.5/8-1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Dorsz) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1951.

Subject: Middle East Command

Participants: Vice Admiral J. Wright, Department of Defense
Mr. Cabot, S/ISA
Mr. Ferguson, S/P
Mr. Martin, EUR/RA
Mr. Dorsz, NEA/GTI

At Admiral Wright's invitation, several State Department officers visited him at the Pentagon to discuss the problems involved in establishing a Middle East command structure which might be acceptable to the parties concerned.

Admiral Wright reviewed our difficulties with the British arising from the designation of an American to serve as SACLANT.[2] In seeking compensation for their acquiescence to SACLANT, the UK originally made strong demands for a UK commander for the Eastern Mediterranean and later pressed for the top spot in a Middle East command structure. As a bargaining tool to obtain our and eventually Turkey's concurrence, the UK has linked their support for Greek-Turkish admission into NATO to that of resolution of the Middle East command structure. The command structure question has been discussed in the NATO Standing Group. The UK insists that it have the top command. We have been inclined to look with favor on a UK national serving as Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (SACME) but have not committed ourselves. The French have suggested that Greece and Turkey be under SHAPE and serve as the right flank of SACEUR. The Turks are primarily interested in obtaining a security commitment from the USA and a responsible position in the command structure. The question of their admission to NATO is secondary (State Department representatives observed that this was the case six months ago; now, however, the question of their admission to NATO is an emotional-psychological one and the Turks would be deeply embittered if their application is denied).

Admiral Wright exhibited a chart which he had prepared for possible consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 13. According to this chart, authority would flow from a Middle East Defense Board (MEDB)—a counterpart of the NAT Council—through a Middle East Standing Group (US/UK/France) aided by a Middle East Military Committee (Turkey, Commonwealth, and Middle East countries as appropriate) and SACME, headed by a UK national with US, French, Turkish and possibly Commonwealth deputies. SACME would have air and naval component commands and area commands designated as CINCLEVANT and CINCTURKEY. The Commander-in-Chief Turkey would be a Turkish national and he would be in command of all naval, air and land forces used in Turkey. CINCLEVANT (a UK or Commonwealth national) would command such troops as SACME would make available.

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[1] Copies to Matthews, McGhee, Bonbright, Parsons, and Jones of NEA.
[2] For documentation on this subject, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.

On the chart, MEDB was followed by a questionmark and Admiral Wright expressed uncertainty about the purpose of the Board. The State Department representatives indicated that their conception of the Board was that it would be an organization separate from SACME and with no authority over the Standing Group or SACME's component arms. SACME, however, would be chairman. In this capacity he would accept and consider requests from the Middle East countries for assistance in the defense field and would make such recommendations and extend such assistance as might be appropriate and feasible. In the light of this explanation, to which thesis he agreed, Admiral Wright thought that as the Board would have to negotiate with governments, it should be a political organization. The NEA representative indicated that NEA's view was that the Board should be a military one and that its contact should be with the defense establishments of the Middle East countries seeking aid and guidance. Otherwise, we might find ourselves participants in an ineffective political organization such as the Arab League. No final position was developed.

Admiral Wright said that after the JCS passes upon his paper,[3] which will be revised to reflect the idea that the MEDB is functionally disassociated from SACME, Defense will discuss the matter with the Department with a view to working out a definitive United States Government position. When such a position is reached, we might then inform the British: (1) We favor that command structure but as we are not conditioning Turkish admission into NATO on its acceptance of any specific command formula we must insist that this understanding be regarded as tentative;[4] and (2) we will exert our best efforts to get the Turks to accept this formula after they are admitted into NATO. On this basis we would hope that the British would recede from their current position and would join with us in exerting every possible effort to get Turkey into NATO at the September 15 Council meeting.

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[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] At this point in the document a handwritten notation was appended in the margin, possibly by Bonbright, which reads as follows: "I don't think we can count on firm UK support on NAT admission unless we reach a firm agreement with at least UK on command."

780.56/8-1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 14, 1951.

Participants: *State Department:*
BNA—Mr. William Hamilton
MD—Mr. Robert Margrave
NE—Mr. G. Lewis Jones
S/ISA—Mr. George Emery
—Mr. Jonathan Bingham
WE—Mr. G. McMurtrie Godley

Department of Defense:
Captain G. S. Patrick, OSD
Lt. Col. R. N. Lipscomb, AFOPD
Lt. Col. P. J. Camp, Dept. of Army, G-3
Major Ruth Briggs, Office of Military Assistance

British Embassy, Washington:
Mr. Denis Greenhill
Wing-Commander Wiles

Mr. Lewis Jones (Chairman) opened the meeting with the explanation that on May 17, 1951 the British Ambassador had been handed an informal paper entitled "Notes re Arms Supply to the Arab States and Israel" (Enclosure A),[1] with the understanding that informal British comments on this paper would be forthcoming. When this happened, a "Working Group" would be established. The British Embassy advised the Department on August 10 that it was ready to comment and this meeting had been assembled to hear the British views.

Mr. Greenhill distributed "Informal British Comments on Notes on Arms Supply" (Enclosure B)[2] and after going through this briefly, Mr. Greenhill inquired whether those present could elucidate US paragraph B.11 regarding US preference for cash reimbursable assistance. He was told that this paragraph speaks for itself, since the US must restrict the amount of its grant assistance to the greatest extent possible as well as keep in step with the UK and France.

For the information of the British representatives, Major Briggs explained the procedures used in connection with current military assistance programs. She said that the first step in connection with aiding a country is the dispatch from Washington of an Army-Navy-

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[1] Same as Enclosure A to memorandum of conversation by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, May 17, p. 139.

[2] Printed below.

Air Force-State-ECA Survey Group to draw up a list of the country's forces and needs. The Survey Group then returns to Washington, where a tentative program is prepared and approved through established procedures. When a Bilateral Agreement has been signed with the recipient country, an "initial increment" of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is sent to the country. Major Briggs said that MAAGs are tailored to the nature of the aid and the situation in the receiving country; that MAAGs have certain statutary functions involving the maintenance and proper use of arms supplied.

Mr. Greenhill inquired whether the US would be willing to operate in countries which, for security or other reasons, withheld information regarding their military establishments. He thought this situation might arise in Syria, for example. The sense of the meeting voiced by Mr. Bingham was that if a country wants US assistance, frankness with the US was a gauge of its sincerity.

Mr. Bingham stated that he did not think that the present pattern of MAAGs need necessarily be followed slavishly: the NE program is directed towards a new area in which the regional approach is desirable. Consequently, while we must preserve all of the statutary requirements involving MAAGs, he thought there could be a good deal of flexibility and that MAAGs could be small and inconspicuous if this were politically advisable. Mr. Bingham said that one MAAG conceivably could be assigned responsibilities involving the staffing of two or more countries. Colonel Lipscomb assured the group that MAAGs presented great manpower difficulties for the Services, and he was sure that Defense did not desire a proliferation of MAAGs.

Location Tripartite Agency

The next subject discussed was the location of the Tripartite correlation mechanism. The sense of the meeting was that it is premature at this time, before consultation with the French to attempt to settle on a location: if a command structure involving the US, UK, France and Turkey were established in the area, this headquarters might be the logical seat of the agency; on the other hand, a basis for deciding on a location might be the country supplying the most arms to the area.

French Participation

Mr. Greenhill, in expansion of paragraph C. of the British paper, stated that the British Government had considered the past difficulties experienced in dealing with the French on arms matters and certain objections on security grounds; nevertheless the UK felt that these risks should be accepted and the French must be in on the Tripartite agency *on a completely equal basis.*

It was agreed that as a next step the Department should hand a copy of its "Notes re Arms Supply" (brought up to date and clarified by some British drafting improvements [paragraph D.ii] [3] of British paper dealing with procedure) to the French Embassy in the near future.[4] The French would be asked to provide their comments promptly. The French would thus be brought level with the UK on this question. It was hoped that after the French had submitted their comments, the next move might be a US-UK-French Working Group.

It was agreed that the high level discussions of a "Middle East Command Structure" should not delay pressing forward on the question of the Tripartite Agency since the volume of arms sales to the Arab States and Israel is large enough to justify a Tripartite Agency starting to work immediately.

[Enclosure B]

Paper Prepared in the British Embassy

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 14, 1951.

INFORMAL BRITISH COMMENT ON "NOTE ON ARMS SUPPLY", HANDED OVER BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVES—AT MEETING HELD ON MAY 17TH

A. *Nature of U.S. Arms Programme.*

We welcome the political purpose of the U.S. programme and agree to the validity of the conception which has prompted it.

B. *Conditions of Supply.*

We are generally in agreement with the points listed in paragraph *b.* of the U.S. "Note on Arms Supply". In particular it is necessary to see that the arms are not to be used in a manner inconsistent with the Tripartite Declaration. We should also wish to be reasonably satisfied on the attitude of the recipient country in the event of war and its capacity to put the arms to use in the common cause. We also greatly appreciate the intention of the U.S. to require payment for arms supply and to limit grant aid to special cases.

C. *Co-relation of Arms Supply.*

We agree on the necessity for a Tripartite coordination agency of which the French would be full and equal members. Such an agency should, in our view, form part of, or be associated with, any Allied Command organization that may be established in the Middle East.

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[3] Brackets in the source text.

[4] A typewritten note on the source text reads: "The U.S. 'Notes re Arms Supply' will be handed to the representatives of the French Embassy on August 17." See memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Godley, August 17, *infra*.

We feel that the coordinating agency would be best located with or close to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East who are in the best position to advise on the strategic aspects of supply. Alternative site for the agency would be London.

D. *Functions of a Tripartite Agency.*

(i) We agree in general with the sense of Section C of the American "Note on Arms Supply". As we see it the Agency would make recommendations on the desirability, both on strategic and on technical grounds, of meeting request for arms submitted by the Middle East States. Its functions would be essentially advisory and its recommendations would not be binding on the three supplying governments.

(ii) *Procedure*

We do not envisage any direct contact between the Agency and the Middle East States; and we agree that so far as possible it should work under cover. We would suggest the adoption of a unified procedure whereby:

(*a*) States applying for arms would submit their requests to the Government of the supplying country concerned;

(*b*) The Government of the supplying country would despatch a copy to its own representative on the Tripartite Agency;

(*c*) The appropriate representative on the Agency would submit the recommendations of the Agency to his own Government.

(iii) *Clandestine Purchases*

We agree with paragraph 9 of U.S. Note on Arms Supply of 17th May. It should be borne in mind, however, that apart from clandestine purchases there are a considerable number of above-board purchases from sources other than the United Kingdom, United States and French Governments. These should presumably also be taken into account.

We agree that instances of dispute should be referred to Governments for settlement through diplomatic channels.

Secretary's Letters: Lot 56 D 459: "Palestine"

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. McMurtrie Godley of the Office of Western European Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1951.

Participants: *French Embassy*—Mr. Daridan
Mr. van Laethem
Mr. Rosaz
Lt. Col. Maniard from Gen. Ely's staff
Defense Department—Capt. G. S. Patrick—OSD
State Department—Mr. G. Lewis Jones—NE
Mr. G. M. Godley—WE

Mr. Lewis Jones opened the meeting by referring to the discussion, on May 17, 1951, in Admiral Sherman's office,[1] between the French Ambassador, Admiral Sherman and Mr. McGhee at which time the proposed American program to assist the Near East economically and militarily was discussed in general terms. A part of this discussion dealt with the question of the supply of arms to the Arab States and Israel. Since that time the Department of State and the Department of Defense have been giving considerable thought to this problem and have put down on paper some preliminary thoughts on how the supply of arms to the Arab States and Israel might be correlated between the U.S., France and the U.K. Mr. Jones gave a copy of this paper (enclosure A)[2] to Mr. Daridan and said that we would be extremely interested in receiving at an early date the reactions of the French Government. Meanwhile did Mr. Daridan have any questions?

After reading the document carefully, Mr. Daridan thanked Mr. Jones for making it available and said that he would refer it immediately to Paris. He continued that neither he nor the other French representatives present were in a position to make any substantive comments on the points set forth but that there might be a few paragraphs on which they would like further information. In this connection he referred to paragraph B(2) which indicated that impartiality consistent with strategic considerations must be preserved between the Arab States and Israel. Reverting to Admiral Sherman's discussion with Ambassador Bonnet Mr. Daridan asked if we were thinking of a 50–50 distribution between Israel on the one hand and the Arab States on the other.

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[1] See memorandum of conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, May 17, p. 130.

[2] Same as Enclosure A to memorandum of conversation, May 17, p. 139, with the addition of the following sentences to the end of the final paragraph:

"The procedure under which the tripartite agency would operate would be:

"1. States applying for arms would submit their requests to the government of the supplying country concerned;

"2. The government of the supplying country would dispatch a copy to its own representative on the tripartite agency;

"3. That representative, after giving copies to the other representatives on the agency, would obtain an agency recommendation on the request;

"4. The appropriate representative on the agency would submit the recommendation of the agency to his government."

Mr. Jones replied that this, of course, was an extremely delicate and difficult matter which would have to be examined with great care and discretion. We, therefore, proposed a tripartite exchange of views as outlined in Section C of the paper, for not only must we maintain strategic balance in the area but also it was felt necessary to arm the area as a whole for the reasons set forth in paragraph A.

Mr. Jones offered to explain to Mr. Daridan the criteria we considered in determining the amount of economic aid in the M.S.P. and Mr. Daridan said he would be grateful if Mr. Jones would do so.

Mr. Jones continued that we envisaged 23.5 million dollars to the Arab States, 23.5 million dollars to Israel, plus 50 million dollars to be accorded to the Arab refugees which latter sum would be largely spent in the Arab States. This would permit us to point out to the Arab States that they would be receiving 23.5 million dollars plus 50 million dollars to be spent on refugees. At the same time Israel could be advised that it would receive 23.5 million dollars and that 50 million dollars would be spent on the Arab refugees who constitute a direct threat to Israel's security. In addition to these sums the House of Representatives had recently, on its own, added 50 million dollars to be spent as the President deemed advisable on behalf of refugees entering Israel. As this figure was not included in the administration's request, we did not know whether it would survive further Congressional processes.

As regards economic assistance, Mr. Jones said this could not be granted on the basis of population; a much sounder basis is the capacity of countries to absorb economic assistance and this bears little or no relation to the number of their inhabitants. While we do not believe the Arab States could absorb more than 23.5 million dollars in aid Israel had asked for 150 million dollars. On the basis, however, of balance-of-payments factors we judged that 23.5 million dollars is the correct figure for Israel.

Mr. Daridan then referred to the question of correlating our military assistance and alluded to the rather special military and political relation that exists between France on the one hand and Syria and Lebanon on the other. He added that his Government was more and more aware of the necessity of tripartite cooperation in the area and that only by such collaboration could a serious crisis be averted.

Mr. Jones concurred with these views and stressed that this collaboration must be *with* rather than *against* the States involved and that the undercover nature of the collaboration was essential. Mr. Daridan concurred. Mr. Jones again referred to the political objective of our aid program, pointing out that it must be clear to recipients that we are trying to assist them rather than "gang up" against them.

Lt. Col. Maniard inquired whether Mr. Jones would elaborate on the question of the control or exchange of information organization, to which Mr. Jones replied that it is intentionally left vague in that we desire to receive French and British thoughts on the question and also their views as to where the body might be located most usefully. Speaking purely for himself Mr. Jones said he personally thought the mechanism might be quite simple and might consist of one or two officers from each of the countries, keeping records, exchanging information, and making recommendations. He and Mr. Daridan agreed that this would be a delicate matter in that under no circumstances should either the Arabs or the Israeli suspect that information regarding their arms requests were being exchanged: security would have to be strictly maintained.

Mr. van Laethem asked whether we envisaged any tie-in between the correlation agency and the Standing Group.[3] Mr. Jones and Capt. Patrick replied that there are obviously many theater, command, and regional decisions to be made: at this meeting we were interested principally in having the tripartite arms agency established as soon as possible. It might be adopted as a going concern by some larger command set-up.

Colonel Maniard inquired what arms we thought of giving and to whom and Mr. Jones said that this obviously had not yet been decided. We were principally concerned with improving the political and economic stability of the area, partly as a means of checking Soviet infiltration of the area but mostly for its own sake. It was necessary to reduce the gulf created by the Palestine problem. Our principal object now was to get ahead with the job of establishing some sort of a tripartite arms body.

In concluding Mr. Jones emphasized that the paper given to the French was in no way rigid and that it was merely meant to serve as a basis for future discussions and exchange of ideas with the French and British.

Mr. Daridan thanked Mr. Jones for what he called "an extremely interesting document" and said he hoped to have views of his Government in the near future.

Mr. van Laethem subsequently asked Mr. Godley what control mechanism we envisaged establishing in recipient countries. He was informed that this would depend no doubt on provisions of the legislation and also on the size and types of military equipment made available to the various nations. Some type of MAAG arrangements might be established but this would depend not only on the legislative provisions but also the results of the tripartite discussions.

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[3] Reference is to the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

740.5/8–2051

Memorandum by John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1951.

STATE–JCS MEETING AUGUST 20, 1951 ON MIDDLE EAST COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

OUTLINE FOR DISCUSSION

1. It is not entirely clear what the precise nature of the proposals now are in the Standing Group. The paper filed last week by Admiral Wright[1] contemplates arrangements under which there would be a British Supreme Allied Commander for the Middle East, with two Commanders-in-Chief under him; one of these would be the Commander-in-Chief of all forces in Turkey and the other Commander-in-Chief of all forces in the rest of the Middle East assigned to SACME. The Supreme Allied Commander would receive guidance and direction with respect to Turkey from the NATO Standing Group, and with respect to the rest of the Middle East from a Middle East Standing Group, whose members would be the same as those of the NATO Standing Group.

2. The State Department does not have any particular objections to such a proposed command arrangement but it is difficult to say now whether these arrangements will be wholly satisfactory to the other NATO members or to Turkey. Therefore we would urge that any agreements reached in the Standing Group be subject to such changes as might be necessary when discussions occur with the other NATO members and Turkey, after its admission to NATO.

3. The important points, so far as the State Department is concerned, are that it be clearly understood by the Standing Group and the other NATO members that satisfactory command arrangements in the Middle East are not a precondition of Turkish membership in NATO and that any preliminary agreement on the command arrangements in the Middle East not be handled in such a way as to suggest any U.S. commitment in advance of Turkish admission to NATO.

4. It is possible that certain French and British views as to the nature of the command arrangements in the Middle East will alter the proposal tabled by Admiral Wright last week. We should try to

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[1] Not found in Department of State files, but see memorandum of conversation by Dorsz, August 10, p. 162.

find out if we can whether Admiral Wright's proposal has been altered over the week end by the Working Group of the Standing Group.

5. The other major point to be dealt with is the question of the Middle East Defense Board. It is the position of the Department of State that the Middle East Defense Board is a necessary concomitant of the Middle East Command arrangements and it must therefore be understood that such a Board would be established simultaneously with any command. It is possible that the Pentagon will resist the idea of a military defense board, since many of the questions with which it will deal are political. If necessary, it is suggested that the State Department propose that the question of the type of representation on the Board be left open until there has been an opportunity to discuss the most appropriate type of representation with the countries in the area.[2]

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[2] At the State–JCS meeting of August 20, it was agreed to instruct Admiral Wright, the United States Representative, NATO Standing Group, that command arrangements for the Middle East could not be considered a precondition to the admission of Turkey to NATO, and that whatever arrangements would be concluded prior to Turkish admission would be subject to revision after consultation with Turkey. It was also agreed to instruct Wright to suggest consultations with the Arab States and Israel before any announcement of command arrangements was made. State Department officials also advanced the idea of a military rather than civilian Middle East Defense Board which would be established simultaneously with a Middle East Command, would be outside the Command structure, and would, in the words of Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, "be bait to get the countries of the area to do more." It was decided to defer consideration of the proposed Defense Board and to concentrate initially on the establishment of a Middle East Command (State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417).

740.5/8–2951

Memorandum by John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 29, 1951.

OUTLINE FOR STATE–JCS DISCUSSION, AUGUST 29, 1951

1. *Middle East Command arrangements.*

There is no necessity for discussing the substance of this question but it is desirable to clear with the Joint Chiefs the appropriate tactics for handling the command problem.

A. The British may feel that some announcement of the tentative command structure should be made in Ottawa.[1] This seems unwise because it would prevent adequate consultation with the Turks in advance and would inevitably give the impression that the matter had been finally decided and was in some sense a precondition to Turkish membership in NATO.

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[1] Reference is to the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council which met at Ottawa between September 15–20, 1951. Documentation on this session is in vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 616 ff.

B. The State Department feels that it may be necessary to talk to the Egyptians about the Middle East arrangements in an effort to internationalize the headquarters in Egypt and avoid the difficulties of the present bilateral arrangements between the British and Egyptians. It will not be possible to work with the Egyptians on this matter prior to the Ottawa meeting.

C. The State Department also believes that the question of some form of board or organization to secure cooperation in the Middle East on defense problems should be established at the time the command is announced, and here again it would appear better tactics to have discussions, particularly with the Egyptians, in order to determine the most effective type of organization for achieving the purpose we have in mind.[2]

[Here follow topics dealing with Egypt, Korea, and MTDP force requirements.]

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[2] At the State–JCS meeting on August 29, it was quickly agreed to discourage any effort at Ottawa to announce tentatively agreed upon command arrangements. Perkins added that recent telegrams from Cairo reporting a steady deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations had made it clear "that a premature announcement of Middle East Command arrangements might prejudice current maneuvers to bring Egypt to cooperate in a Middle East defense arrangement." Matthews stated that the hope of averting a crisis in Anglo-Egyptian affairs "lay in getting the command arrangements established in time and in such a way as to satisfy the British strategic needs and Egyptian pride" (State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417). Documentation on Anglo-Egyptian tensions over the Suez Canal Zone and the political future of the Sudan is on pp. 343 ff.

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: 723 Near and Middle East

Paper Prepared in the British Embassy[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1951.

GREECE, TURKEY, AND THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

The Turkish Ambassador in London has told the Foreign Office that as the Turkish Government had said in their reply to an earlier communication from the British Government and as Mr. Koprulu had repeated to Mr. Morrison at Strasbourg Turkey had already accepted the principle of her participation with the United Kingdom and the United States and France in an integrated Middle Eastern Organisation. There was no doubt about that. The Turkish Government would be willing to repeat this statement to us and to the United States and French Governments and to any other of the North Atlantic Treaty Governments, if they wished to put the question. Turkey was not willing however to take part in conversations with the United Kingdom, United States and French Governments about the detailed working out of this organisation until she could do so as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as Turkey became a party, talks among the Four Powers could take place; and those could be followed by talks with other powers such as Egypt.

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[1] In a covering memorandum to this document, Dorsz informed Matthews that the paper and "the text of a communication which gives the gist of instructions from Foreign Secretary Morrison to the British Ambassador at Ankara" had been handed to Perkins by Burrows on September 1. The instructions to the British Ambassador, not printed, were to ask the Turkish Government if it would agree to hold discussions with the Standing Group powers at the end of September in order that some sort of approach could be made to Egypt for the purpose of obtaining Egyptian participation in a Middle East Command. (PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: 723 Near and Middle East)

2. In the light of this communication the Foreign Office have decided that some modification will be necessary in the procedure they had envisaged for dealing with the joint problem of Turkey's admission to N.A.T.O. and the setting up of a Middle East Command Organisation. They have considered various alternatives and have come to the conclusion that the best course would be as follows:

> Agreement at Ottawa to invite Turkey and Greece to join N.A.T.O. and notification to both countries that it was now open to them to accede to the Treaty, coupled with some sort of statement that they would be regarded as "members elect". On the strength of this the United Kingdom, United States and France (if agreed among themselves) should be able to persuade the Turks to join them immediately in conversations about the Middle East Command, stressing that they would take part in the talks in this capacity. It would have to be explained to them that the reason why they were not full members of N.A.T.O. was not connected with the Middle East question but with the formalities of their assumption of the obligations under N.A.T.O. etc. Meanwhile, they might possibly begin to sit in as "members elect" at meetings of Deputies and other N.A.T.O. bodies immediately after Ottawa if they wish.

3. This means in fact that the Foreign Office agree to the entry of Greece and Turkey into N.A.T.O. without attaching any "strings" to the invitation and that they content themselves with the formal undertaking given by the Turkish Ambassador that "Turkey had already accepted the principle of participation with the United Kingdom, United States and France in an integrated Middle Eastern Command Organisation." In these circumstances the Foreign Office have instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara to make a communication to the Turkish Government on the lines of the Annex to this paper, which gives the gist of Mr. Morrison's instructions.

4. The Foreign Office wish the State Department to know of their conclusions on this subject and of the action they have taken in Ankara. In order to summarise and clarify the position they have stated that the programme as they see it should now be as follows:

> (i) The Three Powers should reach firm agreement at the Tripartite conversations in Washington on the broad principle that they will organise an integrated Allied Command in the Middle East in which

they will seek Turkish participation as soon as Turkey has been invited to join N.A.T.O. and in which they will seek to secure Egyptian participation as a price for a settlement of the base and headquarters problems in Egypt. (The sort of arrangements we have in mind for this will be discussed in the forthcoming talks on Egypt in Washington).

(ii) At the Ottawa meeting the Three Powers will simply inform the Council of their intention to make an announcement of this kind and there need not be any discussion in the Council. We agree therefore not to press any further for the inclusion of Command questions in the Agenda.

(iii) The announcement would then be made by the Three Powers with an indication that they would propose to discuss the whole matter as soon as possible with the Turkish and Egyptian Governments and at a later stage with other interested Governments in the Middle East. There would of course have to be some preparation of the Egyptian and other Middle East Governments in advance. The form of the announcement would have to be very carefully considered in order to meet the various susceptibilities of the Parties involved.

(iv) We are prepared, subject to (v) below, to agree that the announcement should not mention the nationality of the Supreme Commander since the statement that it was to be a British officer might create an unfavorable initial reaction in Egypt and prevent them agreeing even to discuss the matter. This of course does not mean that we in any way retract from the position (with which the United States Government have agreed) that Supreme Allied Commander Middle East should be a British officer.

(v) We should, however, be obliged to insist on a public statement to this effect if the final appointment of an American Admiral as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic were to be announced. We would rather see the Atlantic appointment even further delayed than prejudice in any way the prospects of selling the Allied Command idea to the Egyptians.

Conference Files : Lot 59 D 95 : "WFM Mtg. 1951"

Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1951.

[WFM T-3/1a]

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION—TRIPARTITE COOPERATION

PROBLEM

(1) To appraise the Middle East situation, and (2) to determine to what extent a Tripartite approach should be used regarding problems of peace and security in the Middle East.

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[1] A cover sheet indicates that this paper was drafted, and then revised on September 4, for use in tripartite talks at the forthcoming Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings held September 10–14, 1951. The source text was given the designation WFM T-3/1a. For documentation on the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1163 ff.

US OBJECTIVES

NSC 47/5 approved March 17, 1951, stated that the political and economic stability of the Arab States and Israel continues to be of critical importance to the security of the US; and that it is in the US interest to offset the recently evidenced trend toward neutrality (which continues) and to maximize the will of those states to cooperate with the US and friendly countries in resisting penetration by the USSR. The present US objectives are therefore:

(1) to strengthen the several Arab States and Israel politically, economically, and militarily. To this end there has been submitted to the Congress a Mutual Security Program for the Middle East;

(2) to carry out the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, and to utilize whenever practicable and desirable a Tripartite approach to Middle East problems of peace and security;

(3) without prejudice to our relations with the United Kingdom and to the states in the area, to strengthen the concept of Tripartite efforts looking toward preservation of peace and security;

(4) in collaboration with the United Kingdom and France to develop overall area security arrangements which have the general acceptance of the states in the area;

(5) to take due recognition of (*a*) nationalist sentiments in the area with a view to harmonizing them in so far as is possible with the basic objectives of the United States in the preservation of peace, and (*b*) the desire of the nations in the area to be treated as equal members of the family of nations; and

(6) to support UN efforts to bring peace and stability to the area including (*a*) the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); (*b*) the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), and the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO).

BRITISH POSITION

1. The Middle East is an area of vital importance to the British Commonwealth and of primary responsibility to the United Kingdom.

2. In common interest of Free World, British position and prestige in Middle East should be maintained.

3. Willing to participate in tripartite efforts to maintain peace and security in the area, but strongly desirous of avoiding any arrangements which will cause any diminution of British influence.

4. Cooperating in present tripartite efforts such as: the control of arms supplies, the establishment of a Middle East Command, the carrying out of the Tripartite Declaration, and UNRWA.

FRENCH POSITION

1. Believes that the Middle East is of great importance to the security of the Free World and that the situation there is explosive.

2. Believes there are advantages in using tripartite approach to problems of peace and security in the area. Attaches considerable importance to the value of the Tripartite Declaration and maintains

that as a general rule initiatives relating to problems of peace and security should be on a tripartite basis since individual initiatives furnish opportunities to countries in the area to endeavor to exploit alleged differences between the US, UK and France. French sensitivity about their role in the Near East was highlighted by their adverse reaction at being left out of the Malta talks in the late winter of 1950–1951[2]

3. Has a special interest in strengthening its influence in Syria and Lebanon, and is anxious to restore French prestige in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East as a whole.

4. Cooperating reasonably well in present tripartite efforts such as: the control of arms supplies, the establishment of a Middle East Command, the carrying out of the Tripartite Declaration, PCC, UNTSO, and UNRWA, although its financial contribution to the latter is not as large as we should like to see it.

POSITION TO BE PRESENTED

1. The US believes the general situation is such that energetic action must be taken to prevent this vital area from becoming dangerously unstable. We are taking steps both in the UN and in cooperation with others, particularly the UK and France to meet the problems.

2. The US reaffirms its complete support of the Tripartite Declaration. The US believes that this Declaration has made an important contribution to the strengthening of peace and stability in the Middle East.

3. The US wishes to utilize wherever practicable and desirable a Tripartite approach in handling problems of peace and security in the area. Nevertheless, there will probably be instances where it may be more satisfactory for the US, the UK, and France to act individually. This should not, however, do away with the desirability of the three governments keeping each other informed of their respective efforts.

4. The US believes that the growing importance of Turkey in the area requires that we consult with that government as occasion may necessitate. (NSC 47/2[3] approved October 17, 1949, states "There should also be close United States-United Kingdom collaboration wherever possible to achieve the basic objectives. In addition, the United States should bear in mind the desirability of collaborating with France and with Turkey and other Moslem non-Arab states in the area for the same purpose whenever it is feasible and practicable".)

5. US is gratified that there has been increasing collaboration between the three governments in handling arms shipments to the Near

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[2] For documentation on French reaction to the Malta talks of January 23–24 and March 10–13, see the compilation on France in volume IV.

[3] See *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, p. 1430.

East. (NSC 65/3 [4] approved May 19, 1950 called for collaboration between the three governments and was the basis for US adherence to the Tripartite Declaration.)

6. We believe that it is essential that efforts to strengthen the security of the Near East, particularly with reference to training missions, supply of military equipment and the like, should be adequately coordinated through some mechanism.

7. In the establishment of Middle East Defense arrangements we believe that due account must be taken of the attitudes of the States in the area and their desire to be treated as equal members of the family of nations.

8. US hopes that there will be strong support given to the UN efforts in the PCC, UNRWA and UNTSO to bring stability to the area. We especially hope that their financial support for UNRWA can be assured on a ratio of 3–1–1/2 or 6–3–1 for the US, UK, and French contributions respectively, in order to give affirmative evidence to the Arab States of the willingness of the major contributors to carry through the reintegration program. The ratio is about the same as that prevailing between the three in their contributions to the UN regular budget. (We have recently in collaboration with the UK and France supported firm and impartial Security Council action with regard to the Huleh situation involving Israel and Syria,[5] and in the Suez Canal restrictions question involving Israel and Egypt.[6] In addition we are seeking to strengthen PCC, and UNTSO and UNRWA.)

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[4] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 163.

[5] For documentation on the Huleh situation, see pp. 559 ff.

[6] For documentation on Suez Canal restrictions involving Israel and Egypt, see *ibid.*

786.00/9–851: Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1951—10:50 a. m.

The Department believes that recent events in the Arab world necessitate a reappraisal of the potentialities of the Arab League as a stabilizing influence in Near Eastern affairs.

There are quoted below for background purposes excerpts from conclusions reached by (1) Assistant Secretary McGhee and the British Foreign Office in September 1950 and (2) the Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul in February 1951:

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[1] Drafted by Robert L. Burns of NE. Signed for the Acting Secretary by Samuel K. C. Kopper. Transmitted for action to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman. Transmitted for information to London, Moscow, Paris, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, and Tripoli.

(1) "*The Role of the Arab League in Future Area Programs*

The United States felt that there was little possibility of taking action to strengthen the Arab League in the political field, but that it might be desirable to do something to strengthen it in the economic and social fields. The United Kingdom did not feel that it was by any means certain that the League would revive after the various shocks it had recently sustained. There was, moreover, danger that the League might develop as undesirably in the economic and social fields as it had in the political. It was agreed that it would be necessary to keep an open mind. If there seemed to be some chance of the League occupying itself in the economic and social fields, the two Governments might concert together."[2]

[Here follow the conclusions on the Arab League reached by the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul, February 14–21; see page 50.]

In the course of the visit to the United States in late 1950 of Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the League, efforts were made to convince Azzam that the League could play a valuable role in Near Eastern affairs by fostering Arab cooperation in the fields of economic and social matters. The United States Government would seriously consider the possibilities of rendering assistance in the implementation of any programs developed along these lines by the League. It was hoped that the League, heretofore held together solely by virtue of a common opposition to a realistic solution of the Palestine problem, could become a *positive* factor to "do good" in the area by re-directing its energies away from the politico-military arena. Experience has shown that the Arab's ability to work out problems on a multilateral basis will have to progress appreciably before these states are capable of coping with politics and military affairs on a regional basis.

It now appears that the League's tendency to create and compound problems in the area is increasing rather than decreasing. The meeting of the League's Political Committee in Damascus in the Spring of 1951 failed to take any constructive steps, and moreover fanned the Arabs' antagonistic attitude regarding the Huleh dispute. There is little evidence to indicate that the League is more than a tool which Egypt and various other Arab states use for their own purposes. Egypt finds the League useful in maintaining its hegemony in the Arab world and in gaining support for its own policies. In the latter connection it is realled that Egypt requested a League meeting in the summer of 1950 in order to obtain support for the position which Egypt had taken in the Security Council of the United Nations regarding Korea. Egypt also found it convenient to obtain the support of the League on the Suez restrictions question, about which the Security Council has passed a condemnatory resolution. This support will only serve to make Egypt more intransigent in connection with the lifting of the restrictions.

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[2] These conclusions were reached after a discussion of the Arab League on September 21, 1950; for documentation on McGhee's talks in London, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 192 ff.

In the case of Syria, the League was utilized to obtain support for the former's position in the Huleh dispute.[3]

There are set forth below two of the various alternative positions regarding the Arab League which are open to the United States.

> (1) In the hope of seeing the League die on the vine, this Government could, officially and unofficially, give the League—including Azzam Pasha—a cold shoulder and encourage other nations to do the same. (2) An attempt could be made to convince Egypt that the League is of little or no value to her and is in fact a burden to her development as a major international power; this could be done by extending offers of special economic and/or military assistance to Egypt, as opposed to the other states in the area, and by emphasizing to her government that Egypt is a country of much more advanced stature than the other Arab states. This would deprive the League of its main source of strength and allow internal dissention to disrupt the organization. (3) Recognizing the usefulness of regional arrangements where common interests exist, further efforts could be made to encourage the League to concentrate its activities in the technical, scientific and cultural fields.

The addressee missions are requested to furnish the Department with their comments regarding the thoughts outlined above, together with any suggestions or recommendations concerning United States policy toward the Arab League which this airgram may stimulate.[4]

Webb

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[3] For documentation on the Huleh boundary dispute between Israel and Syria, see pp. 559 ff.

[4] In despatch 748 from Cairo, September 20, Ambassador Caffery recommended recognizing the usefulness of the League and attempting to encourage its concentration on technical, scientific, and cultural fields. Harrison M. Symmes, the Second Secretary of Legation at Damascus agreed with this conclusion in despatch 176 from Damascus, September 28, as did Chargé John H. Bruins in despatch 181 from Beirut of October 4. However, Counselor of Embassy Glenn A. Abbey recommended in despatch 117 from Jidda of October 1 that a blend of suggestions 1 and 2 might prove the most "helpful and productive" since the Arab League was not a constructive force in the Middle East as its Political Committee, which was its only active arm, "customarily" became a "mere sounding board for Egyptian policy and deluded speeches destined solely for home consumption, with the result that far greater rigidity characterizes the foreign policies of the seven member states of the Arab League than might otherwise be the case". The above despatches are all in file 786.00. Throughout 1951, the Department continued to observe the activities of the Arab League, including the meetings of its Political Committee and the development of its Collective Security Pact without formulating an action policy. Documentation on the Arab League may be found in files 786.00 and 786.5.

780.5/9–851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, September 8, 1951—4 p. m.

339. Verbatim text. Fol is text paper dated Sep 8 "Proposals to Egypt on its Participation in ME Command:"[2]

"It was agreed that proposals for Egypt's participation in the ME Command shld be made to Egypt in accordance with the agreed timetable.[3] The precise nature of the presentation wld be left for further discussion and decision, but it was agreed that the proposals wld be within the framework of the fol:

The defense of the ME and specifically of Egypt is vital to the security of the free world. Similarly, the defense of Egypt can only be assured through the effective defense of the ME area as a whole. Egypt is therefore invited to participate as a founder member on the basis of full equality and partnership in an allied ME Command in the fol manner:

(*a*) Egypt to be a member of the ME Chiefs of Staff Comite and therefore a member of the ME Mil Rep(s) Comite.

(*b*) Hdqrs of the Supreme Allied Command, ME, shld include Egypt Officers on the integrated staff.

(*c*) Egypt to be a member of the ME Liaison Section of the Supreme Command Hdqrs. This Section shld provide the Mil link between the Command on the one hand and on the other the participating countries and such countries in the areas which wish to coop with the Command.

(*d*) Egypt to be persuaded to invite the location of the Hdqs of the Supreme Command in her territory.

(*e*) Egypt to be given a position of high auth and responsibility within the ME Command Structure.

(*f*) Facilities to train and equip her forces to be given to Egypt by those participating members of the Command in a position to do so.

(*g*) The present Brit base in Egypt to be formally handed over to the Egypt(s) on the understanding that it will simultaneously become an Allied base under SACME with full Egypt participation in the running of this base in peace and war.

(*h*) All Brit forces not allocated to SACME will be withdrawn from Egypt starting forthwith.

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[1] Drafted and signed for the Acting Secretary by Stabler. Also sent to Ankara as 182, London as 1410, and Paris as 1469.

[2] The paper in question emerged from a series of meetings during the first week in September between British civil and military leaders, headed by Under Secretary of State Sir Reginald Bowker and Air Chief Marshal Elliot, and members of the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. The meetings dealt with the mounting crisis in Anglo-Egyptian affairs. Following these meetings, the French were informed of the decisions and timing regarding the invitation to Egypt and Turkey (memorandum of conversation by Jones, August 30, 780.5/8–3051 and memorandum of conversation by Perkins, September 7, 780.5/9–751). No record of the United States-United Kingdom meetings has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Outlined in telegram 183 to Ankara, *infra*.

(*i*) All Brit forces stationed in Egypt in peace and war will form part of the Allied Integrated Command of SACME.

(*j*) The number of Allied Forces to be stationed in Egypt in peacetime to be determined by SACME in agreement with the Egypt Govt.

(*k*) In the event of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended Internat emergency Egypt wld grant to the Allied forces all necessary facilities and assistance including the use of Egypt ports, aerodromes and means of communication."

WEBB

780.5/9-851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1951—4 p. m.

183. Verbatim text. Fol is text dated Sept 8 "Proposed Timetable for Approach to Turkey and Egypt."[2]

"1. Tripartite Agreement in Washington.[3]

2. Agreement at Ottawa[4] to recommend invitation of Turkey and Greece subject to constitutional procedures in NATO countries.

3. Greece and Turkey to be advised of decision at Ottawa by Chairman of Atlantic Council.

4. Immediately after (3) full information to the Turkish Government on proposed Middle East Command by US–UK and French (?) Ambassadors with the immediate object of securing Turkish agreement to an approach to the King of Egypt. The Ambassadors might convey to the Turkish President high level messages from the President[5] and the Prime Minister. If Turkish reaction to initial approach is favorable, agreement should be sought for immediate arrival of a special US–UK (and French?) military or politico-military mission to continue discussions.

5. Simultaneously with (4) the Australian, New Zealand, and South African Governments to be informed by the UK of the command proposals and the proposed approach to the King of Egypt.

6. As soon as Turkish concurrence is obtained a confidential approach to the King of Egypt by the UK, and subsequently the US, Ambassadors, in order to determine the best form and manner of discussions with the Egyptian leaders on the new approach. Approach to the Egyptian Government in light of the King's advice with assistance possibly being sought from the Turks and French.

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[1] Drafted and signed for the Acting Secretary by Stabler. Repeated to Cairo as 340, London as 1411, and Paris as 1470.

[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] Reference is to the Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, at Washington, September 10–14; for documentation, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1163 ff.

[4] Reference is to the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, Ottawa, September 15–20; for documentation, see *ibid.*, pp. 616 ff.

[5] See editorial note, p. 187.

7. Subject to (4), military or politico-military mission will go to Turkey and subject to reaction of Egypt at the time of the completion of its work in Turkey, the mission will then proceed to Egypt.

8. As soon as possible after the approach to Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel to be informed of the general terms of the plans under consideration.

9. Shortly prior to the public announcement other interested states to be informed of the forthcoming establishment of a Middle East Command.

10. As soon as consultations with Turkey and Egypt have reached the stage where public announcement would not be prejudicial, a public statement regarding the command structure, including the nationality of SACME, should be made.

11. Discussions in Washington on the details of the Middle East Command between the Standing Group and Turkey, Egypt, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa leading to final agreement on the Command Structure."[6]

WEBB

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[6] Telegram 184 to Ankara, repeated to Cairo as 341, London as 1412, and Paris as 1471, reported the text of the timetable as handed to the French, which included the following variations: Paragraph 4 of the timetable given to the French read: "Full Info to Turk Govt on ME Command through Dipl channels with the immed object of securing Turk agreement to an approach to the King of Egypt". Paragraph 6 read: "As soon as Turk concurrence is obtained a confidential approach to the King of Egypt in order to determine the best form and manner of discussions with the Egypt leaders on the new approach. Approach to the Egypt Govt in light of the King's advice". Paragraph 7 of source text deleted from timetable handed to French. Paragraph 8 of source text modified in timetable handed to French to read "At an appropriate time" an approach would be made to Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (780.5/9–851).

780.5/9–1151

Position Paper Drafted in the Department of Defense[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 1951.]

THREE POWER ACTION REGARDING AN ALLIED MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

THE PROBLEM

To reach agreement with the French and the British prior to the Ottawa Council meeting on the actions to be taken to develop an Allied Command in the Middle East.

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[1] The source text was sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to a memorandum from Secretary Marshall to Acheson, dated September 11 which read: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the enclosed paper be accepted as the United States position concerning lines of action by the United States, United Kingdom and France to create an Allied Middle East Command. I concur with their recommendation and request your agreement to the actions contemplated. This position paper is considered to be in harmony with recent detailed conversations with United Kingdom representatives concerning Egypt and its relation to a Middle East Command."

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

1. The Three Powers should reach firm agreement at the tripartite conversations in Washington on the broad principle that they will organize an integrated Allied Command in the Middle East with Turkish participation, and in which they will seek to secure Egyptian participation. Such action to begin upon the invitation to Turkey to join NATO.

2. The United States is basically opposed to establishing any formal political association between the countries participating in an Allied Middle East Command. The United States seeks only the improvement of military defense arrangements. In the event that some political structure in the Middle East might have to be agreed to as a condition to successful arrangements, the development of such a structure, including its relationship to NATO, should not prevent reaching early military recommendations as to the command relationship between NATO and such a Middle East Allied Command.

3. The United States is agreeable to a British officer's being appointed as the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East.

4. Those aspects of the higher military direction for the Allied Middle East Command which relate to the defense of Turkey will primarily be the concern of NATO.

5. At the Ottawa meeting the Three Powers will simply inform the Council of their intention to seek an harmonious defense arrangement in the Middle East with the countries concerned. There should be no conclusive action on this matter in the Council.

6. Following Ottawa the matter of forming a Middle East Command and its relationship to NATO would be discussed as soon as possible initially with the Turkish and Egyptian Governments, and, at a later stage, with other interested governments. A representative of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting in behalf of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, United Kingdom and France, would carry out the initial discussions as arranged by diplomatic representatives.

7. The United States military representative would also invite representatives of the Turkish and Egyptian Governments to participate in discussions with the North Atlantic Treaty Standing Group on these matters with the objective of agreeing to a Middle East Command and of recommending at the next NATO Military Committee meeting a relationship between NATO and an Allied Middle East Command.

8. As soon as consultations with Turkey and Egypt have reached the stage where public announcement would not be prejudicial to negotiations, a public statement regarding the command structure, including the nationality of SACME, should be made.

9. For reasons of military necessity it is the United States' objective to appoint SACLANT [2] by the conclusion of the next Council meeting, now scheduled for the last of October. Prior to this time, if sufficient progress concerning the Allied Middle East Command is not reached so as to receive United Kingdom agreement to the appointment of SACLANT, it is the intent of the United States to propose reconsideration of the North Atlantic Ocean Command.[3]

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[2] For documentation on matters relating to the appointment of a Supreme Commander, Atlantic, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.

[3] On October 19, G. Lewis Jones informed Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, that the State Department had "carefully considered this paper" and concurred in general with the stated position, adding that the Department was already in touch with Defense "on plans and action connected with the Middle East Command" and that certain steps which the two Departments had agreed upon were "already in progress". (780.5/9–1151)

740.5/9–1251

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1951.

Subject: Importance of Egypt to the Middle East Command Structure

You are aware that informal politico-military talks were held September 5–7 with representatives of the British Government in Washington with a view to aligning US–UK policies towards Egypt in preparation for my talks with Messrs. Morrison and Schuman, and as a foundation for the establishment of a Supreme Allied Commander Middle East, in whose headquarters American, French, and, it is hoped, Turkish and Egyptian officers will participate. A prerequisite to an approach to Egypt on this question is an invitation to Turkey to join NATO. If all goes well, an approach to Egypt by the US, UK, France (and, we hope, Turkey) will take place during the last week in September.

In order to assure the continued availability to the West of the vital British base in the Suez Canal area and, at the same time, to meet the strongly-voiced demands of Egyptian nationalists for "evacuation" and "unity of the Nile Valley" (the Sudan Problem),[2] the UK, in conjunction with the US and France, will propose to Egypt that the Suez base be transferred from UK auspices to the multilateral auspices of a Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East (SACME). To make the proposed new arrangement acceptable to the Egyptian Government will require that a number of concessions and incentives be given Egypt. While these will come primarily from the UK, the US share of the effort will be [to] give procurement and training assistance, grant arms aid and very limited economic aid, all under MSP. The Defense Department considers that there is no adequate substitute for the Egyptian base; consequently, provided Egypt is willing to cooperate with SACME, it will be necessary to give Egypt preferred treatment in arms and other ways as the price of securing our objectives. If Egypt does not elect to cooperate with SACME, we will go through with the establishment of the Middle East Allied Command (with headquarters elsewhere than in Egypt) but at the same time we will wish to *withhold* favors from Egypt.

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[1] Drafted by G. Lewis Jones, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. A covering memorandum written by Wells Stabler, Officer in Charge of Egypt nd Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, urged that the points raised in the source ext should be discussed with President Truman as soon as possible so that e might be aware of some of the problems involved in creating a Middle East ommand structure and the position of Israel with regard to it. The source text nd Stabler's covering memorandum were concurred with by EUR and the olicy Planning Staff and sent to Acheson via the Executive Secretariat and atthews.

[2] For further documentation on this problem, see pp. 343 ff.

The singling out of Egypt for preferred treatment in exchange for its cooperation is likely to cause certain other Arab States to seek comparable treatment. Saudi Arabia is already receiving considerable assistance from us. Within the limited scope of the MSP, we would like to meet these demands to the extent possible but with the proviso that recipient states cooperate with SACME.

Israel presents a special problem in connection with SACME. The mission of SACME is to defend the Middle East as a whole, and thus the defense of Israel is clearly one of its responsibilities. There is little doubt that Israel will be prepared to cooperate fully with SACME. On the other hand, the Arab refugees and the creation of Israel has in large measure brought into being the neutralist tendencies in the Arab States which, it is hoped the establishment of SACME will overcome. Whether Egypt and the other Arab States will cooperate with SACME is still in grave doubt. One of the ways to influence the Arab States against SACME is the public association of Israel with the Allied Command at this formative stage. In consequence, the US, UK, France (and possibly Turkey) may find it desirable to remind Israel that its security vis-à-vis the Arab States is still protected by the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, and to ask Israel not to insist upon a prominent role in the new Allied Command until it is firmly established with the Arabs.

This will require considerable forebearance on the part of Israel, particularly when matériel US and Allied aid is given Egypt as a part of the buildup of Egypt to play a major role in the defense of the Middle East. On the other hand, Prime Minister Ben Gurion and the other important Israelis have always asserted that Egypt is the key to peace between the Arab States and Israel, i.e., if Egypt will sign a peace treaty, the other Arab States will do likewise. One of the important objectives behind the establishment of the Allied Command structure is that it will give Egypt and the other Arab States something more productive to think about than their feud with Israel and thus pave the way for an eventual peace settlement.

It is provided that SACME through his liaison organization will work closely but quietly with Israel from the establishment of his Command. Israel will not, however, be offered the same status in the Command that Turkey and Egypt will enjoy if they accept the proposals which the UK, US and France will make to them.

The foregoing is set forth in the expectation that you may be approached by people who will state that Egypt, which still claims to be at war with Israel, is receiving treatment in the new Command structure preferential to that accorded Israel. The answer is that the new Command, with Egypt in full and equal partnership with the US, UK, France and Turkey does not alter Israel's security position; provision has been made for Israel's participation in the work of the Command, the existence of which offers Israel increased hope for an eventual peace settlement with Egypt and the other Arab States.

It is recommended that you approve the policy set forth above.[3]

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[3] Acting Secretary of State Webb handed this memorandum to President Truman on September 17. On September 24, Mr. Truman informed Secretary Acheson that he had read the memorandum and that it seemed entirely appropriate to him. He instructed Secretary Acheson to take whatever action was deemed necessary to carry out the plan. (Memorandum of conversation between the President and Acting Secretary Webb, September 17; memorandum of conversation with the President, September 24, Secretary's Memoranda: Lot 53 D 444: Sept–Oct, 1951)

Editorial Note

Near Eastern regional problems, including the Middle East Command, were discussed at the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France at Washington, September 10–14. On September 20, the North Atlantic Council, meeting in its Seventh Session at Ottawa, recommended the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. For documentation on the Washington Foreign Ministers meeting and on the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, see volume III, part 1, pages 1163 ff. and 616 ff., respectively.

Telegram 214 to Ankara of September 20 contained the text of a message from President Truman to President Bayar informing Bayar that Turkey's accession to NATO "will give rise to many practical problems" of regional command, and Truman proposed "conversations of a purely preliminary nature between your Govt and Reps of some of the members of the NATO" with regard to the pos-ible establishment of a Middle East Command which was conceived as a possible adjunct to NATO. Truman added that he would be glad to send General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "our highest Mil Rep," perhaps accompanied by high British and French military representatives to Ankara to discuss various NATO organizational problems including the Middle East Command.

In telegram 283 from Ankara of September 24, Ambassador Wadsworth reported that he had handed the message contained in telegram 214 to Bayar and had added "A new question;" to wit: Would Turkey be willing to join the United States and United Kingdom "in urging on Egypt acceptance of a similar invitation that it too participate as a founding member in setting up MEC." In telegram 289 from Ankara of September 25, Wadsworth reported that Foreign Minister Köprülü had indicated in a subsequent meeting that while he viewed with skepticism the dispatch to Ankara of a formal tripartite military mission, an informal group headed by General Bradley would be welcome and that Turkey "very warmly" accepted the invitation to cooperate with the United States and United Kingdom in approaching Egypt at an early date regarding membership in a Middle East Command. For telegrams 214, 283, and 289, see volume III, part 1, pages 576, 578, and 580.

780.5/9-2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Colin Moodie, Counselor of Australian Embassy
Mr. Owen Davis, First Secretary of Australian Embassy
NE—Mr. G. Lewis Jones
BNA—Mr. Shullaw
NE—Mr. Stabler

Summary

Mr. Moodie and Mr. Davis were requested to call at the Department this afternoon. Mr. Jones informed them that the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Australia was delivering an invitation today to the Australian Government on behalf of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France requesting it to participate in the Middle East Command structure. We had instructed our Embassy in Canberra[1] to inform the Australian Government that we considered the establishment of a Middle East Command of great importance to the defense of the Middle East and the free world, and to express the hope that Australia would be able to accept the invitation. Mr. Jones pointed out that although the action on this matter was being taken in Canberra, we wished to keep the Embassy here advised. He emphasized the top secret character of this information.

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[1] In telegram 64, priority to Canberra, September 22, not printed (780.5/9-2251).

Mr. Moodie said that his Government and Embassy had received a general indication of this development but that they were not aware that the invitation was to be issued so soon. He was unable to give any idea as to what his Government's reaction would be to this invitation since he had received no word from Canberra on this matter. He asked a number of questions regarding participation in the Command, its structure, the position of Israel, and the attitude of Turkey. Mr. Jones gave him general information on these subjects but pointed out that many of the details could only be worked out on a military, technical level, and that this could be done only at such time as it was possible to go ahead with the formal establishment of a Middle East Command. Mr. Moodie recalled that Australia might not be very popular in Egypt as a result of certain incidents during World War II. He wondered whether this would in any way affect the Egyptian attitude.

Mr. Moodie said that he would like to keep in close touch with us on this matter.[2]

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[2] The same day, September 24, Jones informed representatives of New Zealand and the Union of South Africa that invitations were then being extended to their respective governments to join the Middle East Command structure (Memoranda of conversation: 780.5/9-2451). In telegram 85 from Pretoria of September 29, Ambassador Gallman reported that the Union of South Africa accepted the invitation to participate in the establishment of a Middle East Command subject to the "clear understanding" that the Union would not dispatch troops to the Middle East "until called upon do so in interest Union's obligations in event war" (780.5/9-2851). In telegram 106 from Wellington of October 2, Ambassador Scotten informed the Secretary of State that the New Zealand Government accepted the proposal to participate in the Middle East Command and would send a delegation to take part in discussions, "but indicated apprehension lest inclusion Egypt have adverse results" (780.5/10-251). In telegram 122 of October 3 from Canberra, Richard Byrd reported that the Australian Government had agreed to take part in discussions concerning the MEC and agreed in principle to participate in the Command with the stipulation that terms of announcement were to be agreed in advance by Australia. "PriMin [Menzies] made clear ultimate government position will be affected substantially by arrangements made for higher political direction by MEC." The Prime Minister also "emphasized participation MEC means substantial political problem for government which will have to maintain position after announcement that Australia has no troop commitment" (780.5/10-351).

740.5/9-2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 26, 1951—9 p. m.

247. Dept most appreciative prompt and understanding response Turks as outlined Embtel 289 Sept 25.[2]

Dept can appreciate reluctance Turk Govt to discuss mil and Command arrangements prior to action by legislative bodies of present NATO members to formally accept Turkey in NATO. We believe Turks shld know, however, that NATO members were informed at Ottawa that we were considering sending high milit officer to discuss milit arrangements with Turks on informal basis and that UK and France might do likewise. Hence we do not feel that smaller NATO nations wld react unfavorably to informal Tripartite mission.

We have taken position that no command setup can be prepared for prelim consideration by present NATO nations until matter is discussed with Greece and Turkey. Furthermore no NATO command structure involving Grk-Turk participation can be approved by NATO until Grk and Turk Reps are officially sitting as members of the Milit Comite and Council, fol their acceptance into NATO. It was our idea that the top milit reps of the US, UK and France, were the ones who shld discuss command arrangements with the highest Turk authorities. We considered this arrangement as being the one which wld indicate to the Turks and the Grks our appreciation of their importance in the org and that it warranted a visit by our highest milit auths.

The procedure wld be that after discussions on the NATO command arrangements, the ideas of the Turks and Grks wld be incorporated, along with the ideas of the other nations concerned, into a staff study which wld then be presented to the milit reps of all the countries concerned including Greece and Turkey. After further comments from these nations, the paper wld then be amended as necessary and resubmitted to those nations, in order that all NATO nations, including Greece and Turkey can be prepared to act on it in the Milit Comite and Council mtgs after the formal admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.

While we believe the above to be important, we also believe it is urgent that MEC arrangements be worked out earliest and we do not see how this can be done without discussions between representatives of the US, UK and France and Turkey. While Turkey may feel that Gen Bradley can appropriately discuss ME Command arrangements informally with Turks on behalf all three, Dept requests you pt out to Turk FonMin why we feel Bradley-Slim-Fr Mission is so important. UK will lead in presenting proposals to Egypt. If Bradley alone visits Turkey this likely be interpreted by Egypt as reflecting adversely UK status MEC in which Brits will play major role. Slim-Bradley-Fr visit designed originally emphasize solidarity powers and multilateral character proposals partly as background for approach Egypt. Thus while we fully understand reasons why Turk desire to restrict visit to Bradley, we are nevertheless confronted with above dilemma and wld appreciate Turks giving matter most serious consideration. We believe another important factor from Turk viewpoint is that tripartite mission wld give Turks valuable opportunity to present their views on MEC to highest level mil reps of three countries.

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[1] Drafted by G. Lewis Jones, Wells Stabler, and C. Robert Moore of GTI. Cleared by Perkins and by Colonel Storke of Defense. Approved for transmission and signed for the Secretary by Burton Y. Berry. Repeated to Paris, Cairo, and London.

[2] Summarized in editorial note, p. 187. See vol. III, pt. 1, p. 580, for full text of telegram.

Re Arab states, we agree with Turk Govt that we must proceed with caution and careful preparation. While undoubtedly there will be elements in those states opposed to any form of collaboration with Western powers, we believe that MEC will gain support, perhaps gradual at first, because (1) it may be basis for settlement Anglo-Egypt question and (2) it provides structure for ME defense in which Arabs are vitally concerned. We consider that multilateral nature of MEC, including Turkish participation, has important appeal and shld be stressed. On balance therefore we believe tripartite milit mission to Turkey wld have desirable impact on Arab States and set stage for multilateral coop.

Due other pressing commitments, it may be ten days before Bradley or tripartite mission can arrive in Turkey. Despite this delay we wld welcome Turk reaction on above earliest.

Pls keep Brit colleague fully and simultaneously informed on all developments (urtel 290 Sept 26).[3]

ACHESON

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[3] Not printed.

780.5/9-2851: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 28, 1951—noon.

252. Fact Bradley unavailable visit Turkey for approx 10 days (Deptel 247 Sept 26)[2] provides additional time persuade Turks de-

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[1] Drafted by Jones and Stabler, and signed for the Under Secretary by Burton Y. Berry, cleared by GTI and EUR. Repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris.

[2] *Supra.*

sirability Tripartite mil visit and goes some way toward meeting Turk views re hasty consideration such important matters. At same time we are faced with dilemma re Egypt Govt which, unless substantive proposals are received in very near future, may find itself forced abrogate treaty on short notice.[3] Current developments Iran[4] might bring matter to head rapidly.

We wld greatly prefer more leisurely course of action (Plan A) now proposed i.e. Tripartite mil visit to Turkey and full discussion with Turks re NATO and MEC, followed by multilateral approach to Egypt led by UK and including Turkey. However, in view possibility sudden deterioration Egypt situation, it wld be desirable have agreed emergency course of action (Plan B) which wld permit substantive approach to Egypt re MEC before or during mil visit Turkey.

Main difficulty Plan B is that in order succeed we wld have to give Egypts as much substance re MEC as possible if Egypt Govt were to use Plan B disclosures to keep lid on rising popular pressure for abrogation. However, to give Egypts substance MEC or even outline without Turk agreement wld to some extent freeze MEC proposals and thus wld seriously prejudice consultations with Turks on this matter. We have discussed Plan B tentatively with Brit Emb, Wash, in order to ascertain FonOff views re possibility you and Brit colleague might approach Turk Govt to obtain its suggestions re way out this Egypt dilemma and its views what might properly be said to Egypts re MEC and Turk participation therein, bearing in mind that once we approach Egypt, we must have some broad details and not generalities in hand. Obviously Plan B not feasible without Turk agreement. In addition, their participation would enhance its success.

Dept wld appreciate your urgent views re feasibility Plan B for consideration along with Brit FonOff comments.

FYI Press of events in Egypt stressed today in Dept conversation with Turk Emb Rep.

WEBB

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[3] Reference is to the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty regarding British military rights in Egypt. For further documentation on Anglo-Egyptian disputes over this treaty and also the Sudan, see pp. 343 ff.

[4] Reference is to the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by Mosadeq; see p. 544.

Secretary's Letters: Lot 56 D 459: "Near & Middle East"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs (Moore)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin—Turkish Ambassador
Mr. George C. McGhee—Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. C. Robert Moore—GTI

Ambassador Erkin expressed his warm thanks to Mr. McGhee for his helpfulness in working for the action taken by the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa with respect to the admission of Turkey to NATO. While indicating great pleasure at the decision, he also indicated concern that Turkey's admission to NATO is apparently being linked to its participation in the Middle East Command. He knew that we had sponsored Turkey's admission to NATO on an unconditional basis, but he felt that the British associated the two actions very closely. Newspaper comment and other events since Ottawa were stimulating Turkish suspicions that there are indeed conditions to its formal admission to NATO.

Mr. McGhee replied that there was no question about the action taken at Ottawa—Turkey's admission to NATO is to be unconditional. Apart from that, however, we and the British have been giving a great deal of thought to the creation of a Middle East Command with Turkish, Egyptian and Commonwealth participation. We want to discuss our ideas with the Turks very soon and are hopeful that we can all agree on the form of the Command to be set up. We feel it logical that there should be a British Supreme Commander. The British have troops and bases in the Middle East. Some of the Commonwealth countries will make contributions to the Command. We would not want the Supreme Command, nor we were sure, would the Turks. However, these are all problems to be discussed and worked out together.

Ambassador Erkin commented that he had very limited information as to the nature of the proposed Middle East Command, particularly with reference to Turkey's obligations. Mr. McGhee emphasized that the plans for the Command are sketchy and that they will be developed more fully after the talks with the Turks, which is one of the purposes of the proposed Bradley–Slim–French visit. The Generals will also wish to discuss with the Turks the NATO command structure and their membership in the various NATO bodies. The NATO Command arrangements resulting from Greece and Turkey's inclusion in NATO will have to be submitted to the Military Committee of NATO and ultimately for approval to the North Atlantic Council on which Turkey and Greece will be represented. In view of the influence which the British and French have on some of the other NATO members, Mr. McGhee felt that the Turkish Government would find it useful for the high British and French military representatives to accompany General Bradley to Turkey as NATO Command arrangements discussed with all three would be assured sympathetic consideration and approval by the Council.

The conversation then turned to Egypt. Mr. McGhee pointed out that the situation there impels us to act quickly in seeking agreement with all interested governments, including Egypt on the creation of a Middle East Command in the hope that such action may avert unilateral abrogation by Egypt of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Information from the very highest sources leads us to fear that some substantive proposals with respect to the Command have to be made to the Egyptian Government within the next ten days or so, in fact, probably before the visit of the three Generals to Turkey, if abrogation is to be averted.

Ambassador Erkin referred to his conversation with Ambassador Rahim at San Francisco several weeks ago. At that time the latter had indicated that the Egyptian Government would take no action on abrogation before the third week in November, in view of the various hints that some satisfactory multilateral formula would be proposed to it very soon. Ambassador Erkin stated he had seen Ambassador Rahim again yesterday but no change in the time schedule had been suggested. He expressed the opinion that the Egyptians would be delighted to have some formula suggested to them that will bring a solution to the Treaty problem as well as to their security problem.

The Ambassador asked if we had had any report on President Bayar's reaction to President Truman's messages. Mr. McGhee referred to Ambassador Wadsworth's very interesting and helpful conversation with President Bayar at the time the messages were delivered and to the President's very favorable reaction to these messages, later confirmed by Ambassador Wadsworth's subsequent conversations with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Mr. McGhee commented that the Turkish Government apparently welcomed a visit by General Bradley but felt the time was not appropriate for a visit by the British and French Generals. We have since asked Ambassador Wadsworth to explain in more detail why we think an informal visit by the highest military representatives of these countries is important and we are hopeful that the Turkish Government will agree with us as to the advantages of such a visit. A visit to Turkey by General Bradley alone might be interpreted by Egypt as reflecting adversely on the British status in the Middle East Command in which the British will play a major role. A visit by the three Generals would emphasize the solidarity of the Powers and the multilateral character of the proposals to be made to Egypt. In fact, it might be very difficult for General Bradley to make the trip to Turkey alone because of the complications that might be created.

Ambassador Erkin reiterated at this point two difficulties, which in his personal view, may complicate the solution of the Middle East Command problem. First is the apparent relationship between Turkey's participation in the Middle East Command and its membership in NATO. Regardless of the true facts, discussion on the proposed Middle East Command before Turkey's formal admission to NATO will be interpreted by the Turkish public as confirming that admission is conditional. The second difficulty arises through the proposed appointment of a British General as Supreme Commander. The Ambassador feared that a British Supreme Commander would be unacceptable to the Egyptians and, in fact, that the Egyptians would object to any British troops on Egyptian soil. They might, however, accept the idea of mixed troops.

Mr. McGhee emphasized that Turkey as a NATO member will enjoy all the rights and privileges of full membership and that there should be no concern over the possibility that NATO membership will be conditional. He added that he recognized the difficulties involved in obtaining Egyptian acceptance of the Middle East Command idea and a British Supreme Commander. We were, however, counting on the Turks to help us to convince them of the desirability of this proposed solution. Obviously the details of the Middle East Command have to be discussed with all of the proposed participants. As they are primarily military in nature, our qualified military men should sit down together, and we hope very soon, to work them out.

In closing the interview, the Ambassador stated that President Bayar's reply to President Truman's public message had been sent from Ankara and he hoped to receive it in a few days. He believed there would also be a second message replying to President Truman's secret message and that he would like very much to deliver both messages in person to President Truman. He will, however, let us know when he is prepared to do this.

780.5/9–2951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 29, 1951—3 p. m.

258. 1. Brit Emb Wash informed Dept Sept 28 that FonOff be-

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[1] Drafted by G. Lewis Jones and Stabler. Cleared by McGhee, Perkins, Dorsz, and Moore of GTI, Admiral Wright and Colonel Storke of Defense. Approved for transmission by Jones. Repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris.

lieves that because delay Bradley and info Cairo tel 364 Sept 26,[2] some approach to Egypt along lines Plan B (Deptel 252, Sept 28)[3] will have to be made before tripartite mil visit and that consequently FonOff now sees program in three stages "First stage: Immed appeal Egypts by US and (we hope) Turkish Govts to do nothing precipitate;

Second stage: attempt by US and Brit Ambs in Ankara to get Turk concurrence within next few days in broad approach to Egypts about future MEC and what it offers for Egypt, in a form which will not prejudge details of Turkey's participation in Command;

Third stage: visit by Gen Bradley and Field Marshal Slim (and Fr Gen) to Ankara and perhaps Cairo in which we hope agreement wld be reached on gen shape of Command."

2. Re first stage above Dept stated Cairo already instructed this sense and that we concur re desirability Turk approach Egypts (Deptel 253, Sept 28 to Ankara).[4]

3. Re Second stage above Dept advised Brit Emb that Plan A (Deptel 252 Sept 28) preferable and shld be carried out if Egypt sit permits. We hoped combined approaches Egypt (para 2 above) wld provide additional time needed. However, Dept considers it prudent to have Plan B agreed in advance with Turks and available for emergency use if sit Egypt suddenly deteriorates before tripartite mil visit. Turk acquiescence is essential Plan B approach to Egypts which wld be greatly enhanced if Turks act in concert with US, UK and we hope Fr.

4. We pointed out that Turks before acquiescing Plan B wld want to know in some detail what wld be told Egypts. Consequently, in consultation with Brit Emb fol draft (for submission to you and ur Brit colleague for comment and Brit FonOff for approval) was approved jointly as representing maximum which Turks and later Egypts might be told prior tripartite mil visit.

"Points for use by UK and US Ambassadors, Ankara in securing cooperation of Turkish Govt in approach to the Egyptians and later for use by UK, US and possibly Turkish Ambassadors, Cairo.

1. The defense of the ME and specifically of Egypt is vital to the security of the free world.

2. The defense of Egypt and of other countries in the Middle East against aggression from outside the area can only be secured through the cooperation of the interested powers including those not territorially part of the area.

3. The defense of Egypt or any other part of the Middle East can only be assured through the effective defense of the area as a whole and the coordination of this defense with that of adjacent areas.

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[2] Not printed; it reported an interview between Egyptian King Farouk and British Ambassador Stevenson at Cairo in which the King stated that domestic pressures for an early abrogation of the 1936 Treaty were becoming irresistible (641.74/9-2551).

[3] *Ante*, p. 191.

[4] Not printed.

4. It therefore seems desirable to establish an Allied Middle East Command (MEC) in which the countries able and willing to contribute to the defense of the area should participate. France, Turkey, UK and USA are prepared to participate with other interested countries in establishing such a Command.

5. Egypt is invited to participate as a founder member of the Middle East Command on a basis of full equality and partnership with other founding members.

6. Similar invitations are being issued to Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, who have indicated their interest in the defense of the area.

7. Egypt will be given a position of high authority and responsibility within MEC and the MEC HQ will include Egyptian officers on the integrated staff.

8. Facilities to train and equip her forces to be given to Egypt by those participating members of the Command in a position to do so.

9. The present British base in Egypt to be formally handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding that it will simultaneously become an Allied base within MEC with full Egyptian participation in the running of this base in peace and war.

10. All British forces not allocated to MEC will be withdrawn from Egypt starting forthwith.

11. All British forces stationed in Egypt in peace and war will form part of the MEC.

12. The number of Allied forces to be stationed in Egypt in peacetime to be determined by MEC in agreement with the Egyptian Government.

13. In the event of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended international emergency, Egypt would grant to the allied forces all necessary facilities and assistance including the use of Egyptian ports, aerodromes and means of communications.

14. The structure and organization of MEC will be worked out in the near future by representatives of the founding members."

5. You will note that above is based on Deptel 182 Sept 8 [5] and that by telescoping first part attempt has been made avoid introducing Command Structure details which must remain for mil talks.

6. Concert your comments re above with your British colleague.

7. Re third stage above Dept view is that visit Bradley, Slim and French General to Turkey (and possibly later to Egypt) still key element to MEC success and that use Plan B in emergency would in no way detract from importance tripartite military visit.

WEBB

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[5] Same as telegram 339 to Cairo, p. 181.

780.5/9–2951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 29, 1951—3 p. m.

1890. Re Middle East Command (Deptel 1468 Sept 8 and subsequent).[2]

1. Since President's message to Greece and Turkey were shown Schuman at Ottawa (Ottawa Secto 22 Sept 19 to Dept rptd Paris unn)[3] there has been no direct contact with Fr re MEC, although UK has advised Fr associated itself with MEC invitations to Austral, NZ and So Afr (Deptel 1753, Sept 22).[2]

2. Deterioration sit Egypt and lack of Fr decision re MEC have caused US and UK proceed up to this point without Fr (except in Commonwealth approach). However, view multilateral character MEC and Fr agreement in principle to MEC we believe Fr shld be kept informed in gen of devels and given opportunity of associating itself with US, UK and possibly Turks in steps now in execution or under contemplation.

3. Pls take fol action vis-à-vis Fr:

(1) inform FonOff in gen of steps which have been taken since Presidential messages;

(2) invite Fr participation in approach to Egypt re no precipitate action (Deptels 1766, Sept 24; 1797, Sept 25; and 1856 Sept 28);[4]

(3) inform Fr re Plan A and Plan B (Deptels 1852,[5] Sept 28; 1889 Sept 29[6]) and indicate that we shld be glad have their collaboration in formulation Plan B and its discussion with Turks.

4. Brit Emb Wash recommending FonOff instruct Brit Amb Paris take similar action and you shld concert with Brit colleague.

WEBB

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[1] Drafted by Stabler, cleared by NEA, EUR, GTI, WE, and signed for the Acting Secretary by G. Lewis Jones. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Cairo.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed, but see summary of telegram 214 to Ankara in editorial note, p. 187. The complete text of telegram 214 is in vol. III, pt. 1, p. 576.

[4] None printed.

[5] Same as telegram 252 to Ankara, September 28, p. 191.

[6] Same as telegram 258 to Ankara, *supra*.

780.5/9–2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT ANKARA, September 29, 1951—6 p. m.

310. Supplementing para 4 mytel 305 Sept 28[1] (rptd Paris 8, London 5, Cairo 11):

(1) FonMin again phoned this morning to say PriMin with himself attending would receive me at noon. They had carefully studied my memo of Sept 27 (a close paraphrase of Deptel 247 Sept 26) and had had second meeting with Brit Amb Sept 28.

(2) Brit Emb had already told us of that mtg. Its details were reported to London by tel dated Sept 28 rptd to Brit Emb Wash. In brief, Turk PriMin agreed to instruct Turk Amb Cairo to support current Brit and US *démarches* designed to deter Egypt Govt from denouncing 1939 treaty.[2]

(3) PriMin opened our meeting by saying in substance: "I appreciate very particularly your Depts prompt and detailed reply to my request for its views as given us in your memo. I have read it most carefully myself. It is clear and to the point. The FonMin and I will submit it to Turk Cabinet today for formal action; but as of now I can tell you with one hundred percent certainty that we accept all its proposals."

(4) In ensuing conversation both Mins spoke fully by way of elaboration this assurance. On question of Turk *démarche* to Egypt, highlights of their remarks were: (*a*) As they had yesterday assured Brit Amb, they were prepared immediately to support UK and US representations to King Farouk and to Egypt Govt. This they could do as of now on grounds of vital common interest in defense of ME. Their démarche would be wholly friendly, but at same time firm and wld indicate Turk solidarity with three great powers (assuming France too made similar *démarche*).

(*b*) Turk view was that such *démarches* shld "help elucidate Egypt's own difficulties while insisting always on nefast [?] results of treaty denunciation" and shld "not avoid any character of exercising pressure on Egypt independence, but positively expressed particular interest in strengthening Egypt as a collaborator of great powers."

(*c*) Turk recommendations to Egypt can however be much more effective if Turk Govt knows what Brit and US Ambs have already said to King and Nahas and what UK and US Govts propose to instruct them to say in elaboration thereof. In short Turk Govt too is most keenly interested to know, at earliest date agreeable to US and UK, at least basic premises and general outline of specific proposals to be made to Egypt.

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[1] Not printed; it reported on a conversation with the British Ambassador as to the views outlined to him the previous day by the Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü regarding an early approach to Egypt. Paragraph 4 of this telegram informed the Department that the Embassy had prepared and submitted to the Turkish Government a "closely reasoned" memorandum setting forth the arguments for the early establishment of a Middle East Command along lines suggested in telegram 247 to Ankara of September 26. (780.5/9–2851)

[2] Mistaken reference to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.

(5) I replied that two most important major premises appeared to be, first, that Anglo-Egyptian differences could best be settled if taken above plane of bilateral negotiations and put within framework of multilateral agreement for defense of ME and, second, that, viewing matter realistically, this could best be done by org of MEC in which Egypt and Turkey, together with three Brit Dominions, could participate on equal footing as founding members together with the three principal NATO powers—in short establishment of an Allied command for ME defense supplementing and not, as some Turk opinion feared, independent of, NATO.

(6) PriMin commented that that much he had understood and had already represented to his own cabinet. On that premise, he was prepared to proceed. He hoped, however, to learn more. What, for instance, was to be relationship between MEC and commands already established for defense of NA community, and what were our ideas as to position and role of Turkey in such commands and relationship?

(7) I was able finesse this question by saying that it was exactly for purpose of preliminary discussion and frank exchange of views on such highly important matters that we had proposed early visit of mil mission made up of highest NATO mil reps, including Gens Bradley and Slim.

(8) Except for incidental comment touching chiefly on emotional susceptibilities of other Arab Govts and peoples any need for careful dipl and psychological preparation before approaching them in matter of MEC, our conversation ended on this note, with PriMin assuring me early visit of NATO mil mission would be most welcome.

(9) I shld much appreciate early insts, as detailed as presently possible, in re PriMins comment and query in para 4 (*c*) above.

Sent Dept 310, rptd info Cairo 12, London 6, Paris 9 (for MacArthur).

WADSWORTH

780.5/10-151: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, October 1, 1951—2 p. m.

1946. From MacArthur. US element SHAPE fully shares deep concern (set forth Deptel 252 to Ankara[1] rptd Paris 1852 and other tels exchanged between Dept and Ankara and Cairo) re possibility of sudden deterioration Egypt situation resulting in Egypt taking rigid position vis-à-vis UK which would involve denunciation Anglo-Egypt treaty and prevent satisfactory solution to Middle East Command. Thinking here is that we (US, UK, Turks, and we hope French) should approach Egypt soonest possible and suggest talks (even if not going into details of MEC) so that King and moderate elements Egypt would be in position to oppose any sudden move by extremists on grounds that conversations re MEC must first be held.[2]

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[1] Dated September 28, p. 191.

Sent Dept 1946; rptd info Ankara 19, London 479, Cairo 36.

BRUCE

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[2] In telegram 1636 from London, October 4, Ambassador Gifford reported that after receipt of telegram 1808 from the Department "and phone call from MacArthur expressing Eisenhower's concern delay in approaching Turkey and Egypt" the matter was again taken up with the Foreign Office and that only "final flash of Cabinet clearance" remained before the United Kingdom would join the United States in approaching Egypt on the MEC (780.5/10–451).

Editorial Note

The Embassy in France was informed by Webb in telegram 1915, niact, to Paris, October 1 that the French Government should not be informed of the contemplated quadripartite approach to Egypt until the United States and United Kingdom had reached full agreement on the Plan B proposals, and the Embassy was explicitly requested not to approach the French Government regarding telegrams 1889 (printed as telegram 258 to Ankara, page 195) and 1890 (page 198) until further instruction. The Embassy in France informed the Secretary of State in telegram 1976, niact, October 2, that the British Embassy had telephoned to state that the British Foreign Office had just revealed the outline of Plans A and B to French officials in London and had instructed the Embassy in Paris to "follow up here" with the French Government. In telegram 274 to Ankara, October 2, repeated to Paris as 1943, Cairo as 487, and London as 1789, Webb reported that present arrangements called for General Bradley and a small American military party to visit Ankara between October 12 and 15, and the recipients were authorized to inform the governments to whom they were accredited accordingly. Ambassador Wadsworth reported from Ankara in telegram 318, niact, October 3, that he had informed the Turkish Foreign Office that day of the contents of telegram 274. The same day, Webb instructed the Embassy in France in telegram 1955 that in view of the British action taken as reported in telegram 1976 from Paris, the French Foreign Office should be brought up to date "on general developments re MEC since President's messages to Turk President [Bayar] including our recent approach to Egypt re no precipitate action." Ambassador Bruce was also instructed to "outline Plan B (but not furnish text) and reasons underlying it, emphasizing, however, that precise nature proposals under this plan not yet finalized."

Thereafter, British and American officials in both Paris and Washington seem to have conferred and agreed upon a firm proposal for implementing Plan B based upon British Foreign Office cables 4691 of October 1 and 4751 of October 3 to the Embassy in Washington, neither of which is found in Department of State files (telegrams 1982 and 2016, niact, from Paris, October 3), but see a summary of telegram 283 to Ankara, October 4, in the editorial note, *infra*. On October 4, Ambassador Bruce reported that the British Embassy had presented to the French Foreign Office that day a new paper on the MEC based upon Foreign Office cable 4751 to the Embassy in Washington. Bruce added that "On reading new Brit suggestions Margerie told Brit Min French shld have little difficulty in accepting them." All other telegrams cited above are in file 780.00.

Editorial Note

On October 4, 1951 Acting Secretary of State Webb transmitted to the Embassy in Turkey in telegram 283 the verbatim text of a British Cabinet Paper approved that day and sent to the Department of State via the British Embassy. This Cabinet Paper dealt with points to be used by the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, United States, and France in Turkey in securing the cooperation of the Government of Turkey in a joint approach to the Government of Egypt regarding establishment of a Middle East Command. The points included: stress on the need for joint defense of the Middle East area against outside aggression and the establishment of a Middle East Command as the best means of accomplishing such an end; the expressed interest of, and subsequent invitations to, the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to join the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, and Egypt in establishing such a Command; direct invitation to Egypt to become a founding member of such a Command structure; the willingness of the United Kingdom to supersede the 1936 Treaty and to retain in Egypt only such troops as were allocated to a Middle East Command should Egypt decide to become a founding member; the necessity for Egypt to provide base rights and other facilities and assistance to such a Middle East Command; that in exchange for the stationing of "Allied" troops on Egyptian soil, Egypt would enjoy a position of "high authority" within the Middle East Command; and, finally, that the detailed organization of the proposed Command and its precise relationship to NATO remained to be worked out. A copy of telegram 283 to the Embassy in Turkey, October 4, 1951 is in Department of State file 780.5/10–451.

In telegram 325 from Ankara, October 6, 1951, top secret, priority, Ambassador Wadsworth reported that he had received telegram 283 and that his British and French colleagues had received similar instructions. As a consequence, the three Ambassadors had called on the Turkish Prime Minister who read the text of the British paper contained in telegram 283 with satisfaction and promised to submit it to the Turkish Cabinet with strongest recommendations that instructions be telegraphed to the Turkish Ambassador at Cairo "to support our govts' representations there." The Prime Minister "added that he personally believed suggested approach was 'only possible one today' and should be made immed." Telegram 325 is in file 780.5/10–651.

780.5/10–551

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) and the Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Dorsz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1951.

Subject: Points for Talks with General Bradley, October 5, 1951, 12:15 p. m.[2]

1. *Would General Bradley be willing for a State Department Representative to Accompany Him?—*

The United States Ambassadors at Ankara and Cairo must be the principal political representatives in the talks which will be held with Turkey and which may be held with Egypt. The State Department representative would provide background information and assistance to Ambassador Wadsworth and Ambassador Caffery and might be able to answer questions of General Bradley's staff. The British are sending to Ankara their Egyptian expert—the head of the African Department of the Foreign Office. The French also contemplate sending advisors from their Foreign Office: we do not know at what level.

2. *Visit to Egypt—*

The political approach may have to be made to Egypt before or during the visit of the General to Turkey. If the Egyptians respond favorably to the political approaches, it might be most helpful for the three Generals to visit Egypt after Turkey. However, this must depend upon developments in Egypt and upon the recommendations which are made by the Ambassadors in Egypt.

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[1] Drafted by Stabler of NE and Moore of GTI.

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

3. *Comparison Between Egypt and Iran*—

The situation in Egypt on the surface is calm but this calm is illusory. The Egyptians are fully aware of Iran's success vis-à-vis the British.[3] Abrogation of the 1936 Treaty[4] could touch off the powder keg in Egypt and the position of the British and other foreigners would become most difficult. There is much comment in the Egyptian press and elsewhere regarding possible measures against the British should the Treaty be abrogated. *We must act as soon as possible.*

4. *New Deal for Egypt in MEC*—

If MEC is to be accepted by Egypt, the United States, UK and France must make a *genuine* effort to make the Egyptians feel that they are given a genuinely New Deal and that they will henceforward be treated as equals. Already there is some evidence that the British Chiefs of Staff are thinking in terms of "whittling down" the proposals worked out with Defense and State early last month.[5] General Bradley will have to check efforts of this kind on the part of the British and remind them that the New Deal must not be vitiated by wishful thinking.

5. *Turkish Preoccupation With Eisenhower Command*—

General Bradley should be reminded of the symbolic importance to the Turks of falling under the Eisenhower Command. Under present plans Turkey would be the only NATO country not falling under that Command and it may be very difficult for the Government to accept an important role in the Middle East Command without being able to show to the Turkish people that it is likewise participating in NATO in the same manner as all other NATO countries.

6. *NATO Status Unconditional*—

The Turkish press and Turkish public opinion are sensitive to suggestions that Turkey's formal admission to NATO is *contingent* upon its willingness to participate in the Middle East Command. Extreme care should be taken to make clear that Turkey's admission to NATO is not conditional, but that the urgency of the Egyptian problem impels the countries interested in the security of the Middle East to move ahead rapidly in setting up a Middle East Command.

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[3] Regarding the Iranian situation, see p. 544.

[4] For documentation on the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the 1936 Treaty regarding British rights at Suez, see pp. 343 ff.

[5] The reference proposals are contained in telegram 339, to the Embassy in Egypt, September 8, p. 181.

7. *Turks Collaborators*—

The Turks should be made to feel that they are collaborators with us (and the British and French) in working out the details of the Command. They feel that they have considerable to offer, not only militarily but through their own experience in dealing with Middle Eastern countries.

8. *Turkey and the Middle East Standing Group*—

Turkey will undoubtedly seek membership on the Middle East Standing Group as the one country in that area which is contributing strength to the Command. The presence on the proposed Standing Group of France, which is contributing virtually no strength, will make it difficult for the Turks for internal political reasons to accept a lesser status in the Command. *Therefore, good sound practical reasons must be advanced as to why the Middle East Standing Group should comprise only the United States, the United Kingdom and France.*

9. *British Supreme Commander*—

The Turks will not welcome the idea of a British Supreme Commander. They would prefer an American Supreme Commander. Again the problem is one of convincing them of the logic and practicability of a British Commander.

10 *Formal Understanding Re MEC Must Await Formal NATO Status*—

The Turks will undoubtedly be unwilling to enter into any formal understandings on a Middle East Command until their inclusion in NATO has been formalized.

11. *Egypt and Turkey Equal in MEC*—

Ancient associations and rivalries will make Egypt unwilling to accept a status inferior to that of Turkey in MEC (see paragraph 8 above). This is a sound reason against British suggestion transmitted to Admiral Wright this morning. EUR has a number of other reasons against the British proposal.

12. *Press Release*—

A Department of Defense release on Bradley's visit is now needed in view of press reports from London and Paris. We would like to have this cleared with the Department before it is issued.

Editorial Note

On October 6, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herbert Morrison, cabled the Egyptian Government that he confidently hoped to be able to advance definite defense proposals by October 10. However, on October 7, the Egyptian Government of Nahas Pasha submitted to King Farouk its Bills declaring abrogation of both the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan Condominium Agreements of 1899. The following day, October 8, Nahas Pasha placed these Bills before the Egyptian Parliament and cited 18 precedents justifying unilateral abrogation. The Bills were enacted on October 15 (*Survey of International Affairs*, 1951, pages 281–282).

In telegram 532 sent niact to Cairo on October 9 and repeated niact to London, Paris, and Ankara, G. Lewis Jones, signing for Secretary Acheson, reported that the British Government "feels strongly" that the Egyptian action toward abrogation "should not deter presentation new proposals as they stand", and that publication of these proposals should reveal their "reasonable" nature to the world at large. Jones added that the Department of State supported the British position both with respect to presentation and publication of the proposals (780.5/10–951).

However, in telegram 1762, niact, from London of October 10, Ambassador Gifford reported that Stevenson, the British Ambassador in Cairo, "recommends delay of several months in putting MEC proposals to Egyptian Govt." Gifford added that the Foreign Office had rejected this recommendation for the reasons already advanced to Washington and also because "chances Egyptian acceptance of proposals will probably be even less in several months time since by then Egyptian Parliament will probably have completed work on legislation thus further freezing situation" (780.5/10–1051). But that same day, Ambassador Caffery in Cairo lent his support to Stevenson's recommendation. In telegram 447 he reported "We 4 Ambassadors are firmly of opinion . . . that if we were to present proposals now they wld be rejected by Egypt Govt with great popular applause. They wld be pulled to pieces in the press and Parliament. Publication without presentation would be almost as bad." Caffery added that "My 3 colleagues are telephoning along these lines to their respective govts . . . We all 4 are very positive about this" (780.5/10–1051).

Wells Stabler, signing for Acheson, replied to Caffery's views in telegram 547, niact to Cairo, of October 11. Stabler informed Caffery that the Department of State had carefully considered telegram 447 from Cairo and had been informed of Stevenson's views by the British Embassy in Washington. But the Department continued to agree with the reasoning set forth in Ambassador Gifford's telegram 1762 from London of October 10, and, moreover, "need for MEC is urgent, and has importance on its own merits beyond current Anglo-Egypt dispute. We had hoped MEC wld serve as vehicle settle this dispute but always intended proceed with MEC whether Egypt participated or not" (780.5/10–1051). In telegram 2126 from Paris, October 11, Ambassador Bruce reported that "Despite misgivings on successful outcome," French Foreign Minister "Schuman has agreed that out of solidarity with British and ourselves," Ambassador Couve de Murville "will be instructed to associate himself with *démarche* to Egyptians" (780.5/10–1151). In telegram 560, niact to Cairo, of October 12, McGhee informed Caffery that the instructions contained in telegram 547 to Cairo of October 11 were confirmed "and we consider four Ambs shld proceed with approach to Egypt Govt without further delay" (780.5/10–1251). Ambassador Wadsworth informed the Department of State in telegram 345 from Ankara, October 12, that "Turkish Govt still of opinion that presentation of proposals to Egyptian Govt should not be postponed" (780.5/10–1251).

480.008/10–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1951.

Participants: M. Jean Pierre Benard, First Secretary of French Embassy
Mr. S. K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director of NE
Mr. George Emery, S/ISA

M. Benard called at his request this afternoon to inform the Department of France's reactions to the proposals Mr. Lewis Jones had submitted to M. Daridan in mid August regarding arms supplies to the Arab States and Israel.[1] M. Benard said that the French Government agreed to the general principles and appreciated the motives of the United States in making the suggestions to enable the countries in the Near East to become stronger. He said that France felt the program should be carried out. Furthermore, France, from its experience in Syria and Lebanon, believed that the well regulated supply of arms in the area contributed to the integrity and independence of the area.

His comments on the specific paragraphs of the August memorandum were as follows:

Para B–5. France agrees to the principle that supplies should be made available on the basis of mutual interest. However, France does not believe political prices should be placed on supplies. Commitments may cause difficulties. France believes that we should be cautious in trying to obtain specific *quid pro quos*.

Para B–8. Detailed requirements imposed on the supply of arms might provide difficulties.

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[1] See memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Godley, August 17, p. 168; for the paper regarding the proposals, see p. 139.

Para B–13. France concurs. Our individual countries benefits should not be known. Implementation should be on a bilateral basis. It should not appear that shipments of arms are coordinated.

With regard to the tripartite organization, M. Benard said that France believed it should be an advisory group and not an executive board with power to make decisions. The organization should conduct its business with as little disclosure of its business as possible. It should not act as a "red tape" organization which would delay the implementation of arms policies. The organization should be small. It might be composed of three military officers and three political officers. Since it would presumably be located in Washington, the three military officers might well come from the staff of the Standing Group and the political officers from the State Department and British and French Embassies.

With regard to the operation of the organization, M. Benard felt that proposed arms contracts should be placed before the group which would then pass or reject them. The tripartite group should not take any retroactive action except in extreme cases or where political conditions had changed radically.

M. Benard referred to the Anglo-French non-substitution agreement of 1945. Nothing done by the Tripartite arms organization group should give rise to the suspicion that the non-substitution agreement was being changed. I said this was a matter between the United Kingdom and France. We were interested in getting the Tripartite machinery working.

Editorial Note

On October 12, Morrison sent a personal message to Acheson in which he urged, *inter alia*, that the abrogation of the 1899 and 1936 agreements should not deflect the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey from presenting the Middle East Command proposals to Egypt. "The support of the United States with that of France and Turkey in presenting these proposals will do more than anything else at the present time to convince Egypt of their value to her and to bring her as we hope she will be brought to play her part with us all in this great task." Should Egypt decisively reject the Middle East Command proposals, and should she then seek to force Britain out of the Suez base by pressure, force, blockade, or other harassment, then, Morrison assured Acheson, British forces would determinedly hold the base for the use of whatever Middle East defense forces might be raised under the Middle East Command. "The plain fact will be that the British as I have said intend to hold the Egyptian base. If the Egyptians agree to participate in the Middle

East Command well and good and the base would become an Allied base. But if there is no agreement with Egypt we still intend to hold the base so that it may be available for use by the Allies." For Morrison's message to Acheson, see page 398.

780.5/10-1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, October 12, 1951—9 p. m.

463. Fol is precise text to be delivered tomorrow:

"1. Egypt belongs to free world and in consequence her defence and that of Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratic nations.

"2. Defence of Egypt and of other countries in Middle East against aggression from without can only be secured by cooperation of all interested powers.

"3. Defence of Egypt can only be assured through effective defence of Middle East area and coordination of this defence with that of adjacent areas.

"4. It therefore seems desirable to establish an Allied Middle East Command in which countries able and willing to contribute to the defence of the area shld participate. The United Kingdom, the US, France and Turkey are prepared to participate with the other interested countries in establishing such a command. Austral, New Zealand and Union of South Africa have moreover indicated their interest in the defence of the area and have agreed in principle to participate in the command.

"5. Egypt is invited to participate as a founder member of Allied Middle East Command on basis equality and partnership with other founder members.

"6. If Egypt is prepared to cooperate fully in the Allied Middle East Command organization, on the lines described in annex, his Majesty's Govt for their part wld be willing to agree to the supersession of the 1936 treaty and wld also be willing to agree to withdraw from Egypt such Brit forces as are not allocated to the Allied Middle East Command by agreement between Egypt Govt and the govts of other countries also participating as founder members in Allied Middle East Command organization.

"7. As regards the armed forces to be placed at disposal of Allied Middle East Command the provision to that command of necessary strategic defence facilities such as military and air bases, communications, ports etc., Egypt will be expected to make her contribution on same footing as other participating powers.

"8. In keeping with spirit of these arrangements Egypt wld be invited to accept position of high authority and responsibility within Allied Middle East Command and to designate Egypt officers for integration in Allied MEC headquarters staff.

"9. Facilities to train and equip her force will be given Egypt by those participating members of the Allied command in position to give them.

"10. The detailed organization of Allied Middle East defense organization and its exact relationship with North Atlantic Treaty organization have yet to be worked out in consultation between all powers concerned. For this purpose it is proposed that all founding members of the Allied MEC shld send mil reps to mtg to be held in near future with object of preparing detailed proposals for submission to govts concerned.

"Technical Annex:

"1. In view of Egypt's importance to Middle East defence it is expected that, in common with other participating powers who are making similar contribution to defence of area.

> "(*a*) Egypt will agree to furnish to the proposed Allied MEC organization such strategic defence and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable for organization peacetime of defence of Middle East, and
>
> "(*b*) She will undertake to grant forces of Allied MEC all necessary facilities and assistance in event of war, the imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency—including the use of Egypt ports, airfields and means of communication.

"2. It wld also be hoped that Egypt wld agree to Allied Supreme Commander's headquarters being located in her territory.

"3. In keeping with spirit of these arrangements it wld be understood:

> "(*a*) That the present Brit base in Egypt wld be formally handed over to Egypt on understanding that it wld simultaneously become Allied base within the Allied Middle East Command with full Egyptian participation in the running of this base in peace and war.
>
> "(*b*) That the strength of the Allied forces of participating nations to be stationed in Egypt in peacetime wld be determined between participating nations including Egypt, from time to time as progress is made in building up forces of Allied MEC."[1]

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[1] In telegram 473 from Cairo of October 13, Caffery informed the Secretary of State that he had just seen the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to present the contents of the source text. Caffery added, *inter alia*, "He took careful note of what I had to say, thanked me and said that of course he had not yet read proposals but he hoped that it was not a gang-up against Egypt. I assured him to contrary. He said he expected necessary laws to be voted Monday in Parliament for treaty abrogation Sudan, etc." (780.5/10-1351)

pages tigh

Sent Dept niact 463, rptd info London priority 176, Paris priority 60, Ankara priority 45.

CAFFERY

Editorial Note

In telegram 2095 from Paris, October 9, Ambassador Bruce reported that at a meeting that morning at SHAPE, General Bradley and British and French military officials unanimously and strongly agreed that if the tripartite military mission could proceed from Ankara to Cairo to make presentations to Egypt regarding the Middle East Command, assisted by Turkish representations, "such action might be most helpful in preventing present Egypt situation from deteriorating further . . ." (780.5/10-951). In telegram 446 from Cairo of October 12, Ambassador Caffery stated that as of that day, the four Ambassadors (United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey) were very uncertain as to the repercussions of a visit from Generals Bradley and Lecheres and Field Marshal Slim to Cairo "especially as discussions on bills abrogating treaty, etc. will begin in Parliament on Monday" (780.5/10-1251). In telegram 472 of October 13, Caffery informed the Department of State that he had asked the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs about the possibility of a visit by General Bradley and had been told that "visit wld not be expedient now" (780.5/10-1351). In telegram 337 of October 13 to Ankara, repeated niact to Cairo, London, and Paris, Wells Stabler, signing for Secretary Acheson, informed Wadsworth and Bradley that in view of telegram 472 from Cairo, the State and Defense Departments concurred that "Gen Bradley and other Gens shld not proceed Egypt" (780.5/10-1351).

Editorial Note

General Bradley arrived in Athens on October 10, accompanied by Field Marshal Slim and General Lecheres for discussions with Greek officials concerning Greek accession to NATO. For information on the talks in Athens, see telegram 1707 from Athens, October 12, and telegram 349 from Ankara, October 12, in volume III, part 1, pages 594 and 596. On October 12, the three-man mission and its accompanying staffs arrived in Ankara for talks with Turkish governmental and military officials concerning Turkey's role in NATO and in the proposed Middle East Command.

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Ankara Embassy Files : Lot 57 F 72 : 320 NATO/MEC 1951 Oct–Dec

Record of the Conference of United States, United Kingdom, and French Representatives With Turkish Prime Minister and Staff at Ankara on October 13 and 14, 1951 [1]

TOP SECRET [ANKARA?, undated.]

Present were:

U.S.:
- Ambassador Wadsworth
- General Bradley
- General Arnold

U.K.:
- Ambassador Sir Noel Charles
- Field Marshal Slim
- Major General Packard
- Brigadier General Swynnerton

French:
- Ambassador Jean Lescuyer
- General Lecheres
- General Vernoux
- Vice Admiral Misoffe

Turkey:
- Prime Minister Menderes
- Foreign Minister Koprulu
- Defense Minister Yalnan
- General Yamut
- General Okan
- General Egeli
- Admiral Ulusan
- and Staff Officers

The Prime Minister convened the conference at 10:10 with brief words of welcome to the U.S., U.K. and French representatives.

General LECHERES explained briefly the purpose of the visit to Ankara, pointing out that it was of an exploratory nature in connection with the admission of Turkey to full membership in NATO, that the meeting would be mainly concerned with the military aspects of the membership of Turkey in NATO, particularly the question of the proper command arrangements which would be made with respect to Turkey, and that it was not intended that any decisions be made at this conference but that the discussions and exchanges of views would be used later in the preparation of a staff study or an initial draft paper on the command arrangements for Turkey.

Marshal SLIM then gave an explanation of the NATO organization, referring to a wall chart on which the organization was set out diagrammatically. He explained the places in which there would be a Turkish representative following the formal admission of Turkey to NATO. He emphasized the three nation character of the Standing Group and pointed out that the main purpose of the Standing Group was to conduct the strategic direction of NATO and to issue commands to the several military commands of NATO.

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[1] The source text does not indicate the author of this document, the date on which it was drafted, whether the minutes were formal or informal, or whether they were the agreed record or simply a U.S. draft.

General **Bradley** then gave an exposition explaining in more detail the various commands (supreme commanders) of NATO and the strategic problems which influence NATO. First, he reviewed the threat which demanded a common pact to prepare to defend against possible aggression. Soviet Russia has 175 divisions in existence and can expand to over 300. Their Satellites in the West can furnish 60 to 65 divisions, China 200 to 300 divisions, with varying degrees of efficiency, training and equipment. The Soviet Air Force has an estimated 20,000 planes of various types available. The Soviet Navy is not so formidable, but is placing its main emphasis on submarines designed to threaten LOC's.

He then discussed the Pacific Area generally, admitting that the Russian threat in the Pacific did not directly involve NATO but was of interest to NATO in view of present U.S. commitments there to meet the threats, particularly in Japan, Okinawa and Korea. Although the war in Korea is serious, the U.S. has allocated there only the bare minimum of forces needed. In FEC, U.S. has approximately 250,000 Army troops, 70,000 Navy personnel and 90,000 Airmen; of course, part of these forces could be shifted quickly to other theaters, such as the NATO area, if necessary. In the rest of the Pacific, he pointed out the Naval Command at Honolulu which commands all naval vessels in the Pacific not allocated to FECOM. Also, the U.S. has recently entered into bilateral pacts with the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia.[2]

General **Bradley** also pointed out present commitments of the French in Indo China and the U.K. in Hongkong, Singapore, Malaya and Borneo, all of which sap the overall strength of those nations.

General **Bradley** then discussed general relations between the U.S. and its western hemisphere neighbors, including the close coordination with Canada and the Interamerican Defense Board,[3] handling U.S. relations with South America.

In discussing the Canada–U.S. Regional Planning Group,[4] General **Bradley** pointed out that in the last two world wars the U.S. had joined late, but in a third world war, an aggressor might well hit the U.S. first, using air to knock out the U.S. production capacity so important to NATO and the world, if Russia has several hundred planes which might be so used, on two-way missions, or on one-way non-return or refueling missions. A main feature of our defense arrangement with Canada, therefore, involves defense against this long range air as well as U.S. bases from which we can hit back, as, for instance, in Alaska. Also the U.S. and Canada closely coordinate coastal patrols against possible hostile submarines.

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[2] For documentation on bilateral pacts between the United States and the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia, see vol. VI, pt. 1, pp. 132 ff.

[3] For documentation on the Inter-American Defense Board, see vol. II, pp. 970 ff.

[4] For documentation on the Canada–U.S. Regional Planning Group, see *ibid.*, pp. 870 ff.

The North Atlantic Ocean Command (SACLANT) is, except for a few bases, almost entirely a naval command, and as such is closely tied in with the U.K. Home Command and all other NATO nations bordering on the Atlantic.

The European Command under General Eisenhower, stretching from Norway to the Mediterranean, is designed to meet aggression through the Baltic, Germany, or through the Alps into Italy. Until Turkey and Greece join NATO, SACEUR's right flank will be protected only by the independent forces of Turkey, Greece, Egypt and the Middle East. Also, Yugoslavia may be on our side, thus permitting close coordination of the NATO right flank with the rest of the NATO forces in Europe. This is very important because of the possible routes of attack through the Black Sea and through the Middle East, which would threats [*sic*] against the whole Mediterranean, North Africa and the rest of the African Continent. A suitable organization against those threats is necessary not only in hot war but also in the cold war. Also the U.S. needs certain North African bases for its long range strategic bombers.

General **Bradley** stated that the question before the conference was how to best meet those problems in fitting Greece and Turkey into NATO. He emphasized that no decisions were to be made here, but that we should discuss all angles of the problems, setting out their various advantages and disadvantages.

For example, maybe it would be advantageous to extend SACEUR's right flank. We must coordinate the defense of the Black Sea exits. On the other hand, that extension presented some serious disadvantages. SACEUR already has a front of maximum effective width. General **Bradley** stated that at the end of World War II he had a 600 mile front under his command (narrow compared to SACEUR's front) and that was a very serious job for one commander to handle. He was very doubtful that SACEUR's right flank should be overextended to include Greece and Turkey.

He then discussed broadly the need for a command in the Middle East to guard against thrusts to the Middle East and to the Black Sea. We must realize that a Middle East Command involving NATO and also Non-NATO nations would be complicated, mainly because all NATO forces such as U.K. forces must be under NATO, but that

Non-NATO nations such as the Commonwealth Nations and other nations in the Middle East should not be under NATO responsibility. But for the maximum unified effect of Army, Navy and Air Forces in the Middle East, those forces must be under some unified command.

Another reason prompting a MEC is the present situation in Egypt. The Egypt-Suez Area is a vital necessity for the defense of North Africa and Africa. Unless Egypt joins a MEC and the forces therein become Middle East forces, not merely U.K. forces, we may at some time be threatened on our and Turkey's right flank and rear. This MEC would certainly offer a mutual defense arrangement for all, and maybe the only way to salvage the present situation in important Egypt.

General **Bradley** emphasized that whatever command organization is set up, the present method of sending U.S. supplies to Turkey must continue under present arrangements there, not through SACEUR or SACME, both in peace and in war.

Marshal **Slim** stated that whatever command Turkey is in, ME security is vital for Turkey's continuing supply. He pointed out that if any Eastern Mediterranean country, such as Palestine, was taken by the enemy, enemy air bases there would very much complicate supply to Turkey.

General **Lecheres** agreed with all that had been said on the importance of the Middle East, especially the Suez Area, in Turkey's defense of itself.

General **Bradley** suggested that many ideas had been advanced and that it might be a good idea to adjourn now, in order that the Prime Minister could discuss those ideas in private with his staff. He also made a suggestion, that, in order to consider all possible views, it would be desirable for a Turkish representative to report to the Standing Group in Washington for continuing work with them from day to day. He pointed out that the military representatives there were of about two star rank and suggested that maybe the Turkish Military Attaché could so serve.

Marshal **Slim** advised that the Turkish officer sent be the one who would eventually be the official military representative for Turkey, for continuity.

General **Lecheres** agreed on the necessity for taking time to study from all angles the complicated command aspects.

The Prime Minister concurred in postponing further discussions of such deep matters until this afternoon. He, however, needed some clarification after hearing the various points for and against Turkey joining either MEC or the European Command, and that this presented a unique arrangement which would include both NATO and Non-NATO forces in the MEC. This presented certain difficult legal and political points. He agreed on the need for defense in the Middle East.

Marshal SLIM stated that we had no firm proposal on the MEC structure, but pointed to the necessity for setting up a general MEC first, and then at a later time discussing with Turkey the details of this structure and at the same time consider the complicated legal, political, etc. points which the Prime Minister had mentioned. He stated that he did feel that SACME must be under the Standing Group, which body would have a dual function, both in and out of NATO. Also, he pointed out that in a MEC there should be a military committee similar to that of NATO, with all member chiefs of staff represented. He emphasized the happy position of Turkey in such an arrangement, since it could play a leading part in each military committee. Of course, Turkey, since it would be providing most of the forces for MEC, would have the right to suitable rank in that command.

The Prime Minister then emphasized that two different problems, entirely apart in time and nature, were presented. He explained that the question of Turkey's entry into NATO was different from that of setting up a pact in the Middle East. The first question was of immediate importance, but the question of Turkey in the Middle East could wait.

Marshal SLIM agreed generally but stated that Turkey's entry into NATO is an accomplished fact, and what remained was the question of how best Turkey could support the other nations in NATO. If for her own defense, Turkey can accomplish this best by retaining full NATO membership and at the same time support or join a MEC, this might be the best thing for Turkey and all of us.

The Prime Minister pursued the point. Turkey had already expressed approval of its part in guarding Middle East defense by some MEC. He believed that Turkey's entrance into NATO had strengthened that organization, while on the other hand, by agreeing to set up a MEC Turkey had contributed to the peace of that area, because thus Turkey would be in the position of covering certain vital Arab parts of that area.

Marshal SLIM agreed with the Prime Minister but reminded him of his statement that Turkey would protect some nations south of it, but he pointed out that if those countries were invaded it would be from the east, and therefore best protection for them would involve Turkish forces coming into that area south of Turkey or at least maintaining very close liaison. Therefore, it would be of great advantage to Turkey to be in a MEC, where Turkey could give its full views on the operation of that command. Also, the Prime Minister should consider the undoubted advantages to Turkey of being in

NATO, which in no way affects the Middle East. Turkey would also be one of the main and founding members of this MEC.

The Prime Minister replied that Turkey's position offered good defense for any aggression from the north. However, he agreed that Turkey must also consider attacks from the east which might surround her, and was therefore much interested in this MEC. Yet, this was a separate problem from Turk membership in NATO. Apart from that, Turkey could deal with setting up a MEC, and could go carefully into the matter of considering the contractual engagements of the Middle East Non-NATO nations.

Marshal **Slim** pointed out that military forces in MEC would be almost entirely from Turkey, U.K. and U.S. U.K. would furnish the bulk of the Navy, U.S. and U.K. the air, and Turkey, U.K and Commonwealth Nations the land forces. He reiterated that the best possible way to get started was to set up a major-nation committee (U.S., U.K., France and Turkey) and then invite other ME nations to join.

General **Lecheres** stated that he supported **Slim**'s points. There were many preliminary political approaches and *démarches* to consider with respect to a MEC, but militarily it is urgent that an efficient command be organized in the Middle East, in view of General **Bradley**'s strategic survey. He reemphasized the urgency and pointed out that, if we can all agree to a military solution, we would facilitate and accelerate the political solution which must follow.

The Prime Minister answered simply that we were discussing a project of interest to both NATO and Non-NATO nations in the Middle East and that the major nations specified by Marshal **Slim** were all members of NATO. Therefore, the immediate consideration should be separate from a MEC which would contain both NATO and Non-NATO nations. How did NATO plan to set up such an organization? Again he said that the setting up of a command in NATO involving only NATO nations was the immediate problem; the other was a long range problem.

Marshal **Slim** stated that he had been trying to say what the Prime Minister had just said but emphasized that it was urgent to set up a MEC. We major nations could set this up quickly with the NATO nations, plus Commonwealth, and then we could invite the others to join.

General **Bradley** suggested that a question of the Prime Minister was as yet unanswered: What did the other NATO nations think of setting up a MEC?

The Prime Minister explained that he had asked would the other NATO nations agree to this uniting in a MEC.

General **Bradley** explained that this facet was discussed at length at Ottawa. It had been realized by all there, especially the north flank NATO nations, that the problem presented many difficulties, but all agreed that the best way to protect the right flank of Europe was by a unified command in the Middle East. He suggested that he would be glad to discuss from a blackboard a tentative MEC which had been considered at Ottawa; again he emphasized that this would be on a basis of discussion only, with no agreement intended.

The Prime Minister agreed to General **Bradley**'s suggestion.

It was agreed to adjourn and to reconvene from 1700 to 1900 this evening.

The conference recessed at 1330.

Saturday Afternoon, 13 October

The meeting was called to order at 1700.

Present were those listed above.

General **Bradley** presented on the blackboard the proposed Command Organization and presented it strictly as a possible basis for discussion. He outlined the various aspects under which the Standing Group would act in a dual capacity, the fact that the Turks would be represented on both military committees, and the difficulties inherent to setting up an ideal solution.

The **Foreign Minister** stated that it was apparent that the principal difference between the two organizations outlined on the chart resides in the fact that, in its suggested Middle East arrangement, there is no higher political body similar to that in NATO. He stated his belief that all nations participating in such a defense arrangement would express the desire for a similar political body to be set up. He stated his belief that the sooner a command arrangement was set up the better, in view of the important advantage it presented to all concerned. He went on to state that this belief was based on the fact that this arrangement would have to include extra NATO as well as NATO countries. He then said that in view of the fact that the NATO Organization already existed, whereas the Middle East Command was only a project, it would be logical for Turkey, upon admission into NATO, to take her place within an existing Command Organization of NATO. Any other solution would cause Turkey to feel that she was being treated in a different manner.

General **Bradley** expressed appreciation of the expression of these views and realized the weaknesses of the proposal (no equivalent political body). He went on to explain the manner by which a solution might be arrived at by means of a Mediterranean Pact. He explained the reasons because of which, at this moment, the U.S. did not feel it desirable to participate in such an arrangement. He assured the Turks that no idea existed to give them any position different to that of any other country in view of their key position in the Organization.

He raised the point of the non-responsibility of other NATO nations in respect to the non-NATO countries of the Middle East. He touched on the solution of having the Commander of the Middle East wearing two hats and receiving his directives from the Standing Group for NATO matters and from the Middle East Standing Group for purely Middle East matters, the two Standing Groups comprising the same persons.

The Turks having stated that they would present their observations in a Memorandum,[5] General **Bradley** stated he would be pleased to take these back and study them carefully during the preparation of the Staff Study.

The Turkish **Prime Minister** requested clarification on a sentence in the press communiqué with reference to the Athens Conference. The sentence was "Great progress has been made towards the integration of the Greek forces into NATO." As Turkey is anxious to make progress in the same direction, he raised the question as how the result was obtained.

To refer back to a point raised in the morning, he wished to restate that Turkey considers that they are two separate problems: 1) The entrance of Turkey into NATO, and 2) The creation of a Middle East Command comprising NATO and non-NATO nations. He wished to consider these matters in greater detail as he felt there appeared on the part of the U.S., the U.K., and France a tendency to solve these two problems at the same time, whereas, he considered this should be kept separate.

He recognized the urgency of the defense of the Middle East. He stated that the rights and mutual obligations of Turkey and other countries should be clearly set forth before this organization was set up. He stated that the proposal for a Middle East Command arrangement tended to cause a dispersal of Turkish forces and to cause them to "slide" towards the Middle East. He repeated that he considered the integration of Turkey as the first step. He spoke about the key position of Turkey in the Middle East, which placed her in a position to be able to contribute all the more to the defense of the Middle East. He stated that in all collective military arrangements it should be presupposed that each member country should assure its own defense against aggression before expanding its possible frontiers with what forces might remain available. He stated the anomaly of the existence, in a Middle East Command, of non-belligerent nations, and of the difference in contributions and commitments between Turkey and these countries. He repeated that he had no intentions of trying to prove the uselessness of a Middle East Command and enumerated the general lines along which he thought that such a Command should be based; those nations which have already expressed willingness to join the Middle East Command should, as of now, determine the scope and nature of their contributions with regard to area commands and with regard to mutual obligations. He stated the possibility that Egypt might refuse to participate. If the U.S., the U.K. and France were to guarantee the Middle East, the result of this would be to eliminate the weakness which might exist on the southern flank of Turkey outside of her territory. He insisted especially on a guarantee from the U.S. Apparently, to return to the question of the integration of Turkey in the existing NATO Organization, he stated he believed Turkey should be under the command of SACEUR, because Turkey covers directly and indirectly the approaches to the Mediterranean. Turkey was the only nation in such a position as to be able to serve as a base for a counter-offensive against Russia via the Black Sea and the Danube. He pointed out that the Turko-Russian frontier of 2,200 kilometers was an important aspect, that being a neighbor of Russia, Turkey was at the start of the shortest route toward Russian sources of oil, her industry and her raw materials. He stated that Turkey was an element of the defense of Europe against Russia. He felt that if Turkey was separate from Europe, her position in relationship to Europe would be similar to that of the European Command in relationship to the Atlantic Command and that this was not in conformity with realities.

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[5] Not found in Department of State files.

He then explained that he believed that the shifting of the frontier of SACEUR to include Turkey would not create unwieldiness, in view of the greater improvement of modern communications.

He summed up by repeating the separate nature of the two problems and by stating that he felt that the problem of the integration of Turkey into NATO should take precedence.

He stated that by the rapid solution of this problem Turkey would be in an equal position to that of the other nations desiring to create a Middle East Command.

In connection with the second problem (creation of a Middle East Command) he repeated that the Turkish Government had proved the great importance they attached to this question by declaring formally their agreement in principle to the creation of a Middle East Command in which Turkey would participate as a founding member.

He felt it important to complete these problems separately but felt that time could be saved by broaching the preliminaries of the solution of the second problem at the same time as the first.

General **Bradley** stated that it was not possible to try to give an answer to all the views that had been expressed. The most important objective had been for us to obtain these views, but would comment briefly on some of these questions.

With reference to the question raised on the communiqué about Athens, General Bradley made the point that he felt that great progress had been accomplished here after this exchange of views. He further stated that he doubted all agree as to the separate nature of the two problems, none of them depended on the ratification by Parliament, which he thought was well under way. (?)

With regard to reference of dispersal of Turkish forces he stated that such a dispersal was not contemplated but that the forces of Turkey in Turkey would need coordination with those of other areas as well as with Naval and Air Force which might have to move in and out of the area.

With reference to the difficulties concerning an additional defense area, he stated that this did not alter in any way the military contributions which the U.S. might make in this area. General Bradley said that both the Departments of State and Defense were agreed that we could operate militarily in this area under a common arrangement as outlined.

The question of the necessity of France, the U.K. and especially the U.S. insuring the security of the Middle East area, he stated that no nation or group of nations could insure the security of other areas, that it was already difficult to insure one's own defense against air attack. It was necessary for us to study the arguments advanced on Command structure while preparing the document. It was true that Commands are set up on the basis of structural areas but, in all cases, it was necessary to have the closest possible liaison with adjoining Commands. It is true that the North Atlantic area is a large one but it is nearly entirely Naval and it is difficult to separate functional responsibilities in the organization routing and protection of convoys in the Atlantic. He repeated his assurance to the Turks that they should have a fully equal position in any agreed Command structure, stated the preparation of any document of this nature is the mission of the Standing Group which was anxious to get the Turkish views as soon as possible as it takes time to get agreement by 14 people.

General **Bradley** then repeated and expanded upon General **Eisenhower**'s Memorandum[6] and said it would also have to be taken into account in the preparation of the document.

He realized the important of the two legal questions raised in respect to the Middle East Command, i.e.: The responsibility of other NATO nations in the case of a direct attack against Turkey as well as the question of the responsibility of NATO nations in case of attack against non-NATO Middle East countries.

It appeared to General **Bradley** that we had agreed on two points: 1) the hope of a prompt ratification of the entrance of Greece and

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[6] Not found in Department of State files.

Turkey and, 2) a general agreement on the principles of a Middle East Command, this being the object of a necessary and very important study. This study would include the legal questions which had been raised which was partly military and to a large extent political. Progress had been made in this Conference toward the integration of Turkey into NATO.

Field Marshal **Slim** first assured Turkey it was never the intention of the U.K. that Turkey should be in NATO except as a full, complete and co-equal member, nor was it the idea of having Turkey in the Middle East Command until she were a full member of NATO. He agreed entirely on behalf of his country and his colleagues on the necessity of setting up some Middle East Command as soon as possible. He believed that such an organization would be as much in the interests of Turkey as of the other nations. All efforts of the Standing Group have been directed toward this, in order to see how best Turkey could be fitted into a general defense plan. He quoted from General Eisenhower's Memorandum, which pointed out the great importance of close coordination between SHAPE and the Middle East. He went on to say with regards to political control of the Middle East Command that Turkey be represented on the Council of the Military Committee of Chiefs of Staff, who would thus participate in the political and military directives to the Standing Group. If it were possible (and he quoted General Bradley) to have the Middle East under the Middle East Standing Group, which is equal to the NATO Standing Group, Turkey would be in full control of the Middle East Command.

He stated that the degree of control exercised by Turkey would be equal to that of the U.S., the U.K. and France, with the exception of the Standing Group. He said we cannot contemplate the Middle East Command without Turkey in the Middle East. If Turkey were in the European Command she would be one of many, but if she were in the Middle East she would be one of the most important nations in NATO. But he agreed with General Bradley that these exchanges of views had been satisfactory.

General **Lecheres** agreed with the U.S. and U.K. about the important progress accomplished in this Conference. France desires Turkey in NATO as soon as possible, as a full member of the first importance, independent of any Command arangement which might be agreed to. He noted with interest the importance attached to the Middle East Command and stated that this point of view was the same as that of France.

He felt it essential to make use of the proposal advanced by General Bradley as a means of supporting a quick solution, i.e.: The proposal that the Standing Group, plus a Turkish representative, undertake to study the Command of the Middle East, giving to this study the scope that it deserves. The importance of coordinating with SACEUR would allow us to arrive at a solution which could satisfy the legitimate preoccupation expressed by the Prime Minister.

A general discussion ensued in which it was decided to defer the questions of *Item 6* until Sunday. With regards to the press communiqué it was decided that the Turkish Government would prepare the communiqué for the approval of the others. It was agreed that the communiqué register the fact that important progress had been realized in connection with the integration of Turkey into NATO.

The meeting was adjourned at 8:35 p.m.

Sunday Morning, 14 October

The meeting was reconvened at 1130 hours.

Present were those listed above.

Item 6—Equipment for Turkey.

General **Bradley** quoted the Memorandum distributed by Turkey the night before. He stated that supplies to Turkey would be continued on the same basis by the same method and that the Mission would be maintained under NATO regardless of Command arrangements. He referred to the equipment which so far had been supplied to Turkey as "capital", that is, initial equipment for new forces. The rate of supply we try to maintain depended on: 1) forces available to receive and use, and 2) the ability to get the necessary funds from Congress. As to the rate of production, he touched on certain categories of equipment as being replacement and maintenance rather than initial. He referred to hopes expressed by Congress that all our Allies will soon be able to undertake the problem of maintenance and spare parts, thus relieving our own industries of this burden. He made reference, also, to the ammunition problem, in which Turkey has already begun to implement the facilities of manufacture. He referred to the role of the nation in advising us on Turkey's requirements. He referred to the 1952–1953 programs, transmitted to Washington, and their objective as being the increase of efficiency of the Turkish Forces. An important point was to assure Turkey the U.S. had no idea of changing its method of supplying equipment.

General **Lecheres** had little to add. He understood the anxiety of Turkey over external aid, all the more so because France was and still is in the same situation. He referred to General Bradley and stated that the entrance of Turkey will bring clarification, in view of the representation of Turkey on the D.P.B., F.E.B., etc.

Field Marshal **Slim** stated that the U.K. is already supplying many other nations of the Dominions and others in the world. In the Middle East area they are supplying all the equipment to Iraq, Trans-Jordan and certain quantities to Egypt. When the Middle East Command will have been set up the deliveries will be increased. If Egypt comes in on a cooperation basis deliveries to the Egyptian Army and Air Force will be increased.

With regards to Turkey the important objective is to see to it that full equipment from the U.S. sources go to the Turkish forces as quickly as possible. He felt that Turkish representation in the D.P.B., and F.E.B. and other NATO bodies would receive the full sympathy of the U.K.

The Prime Minister thanked General Bradley for the declarations, as well as Field Marshal Slim, and stated the important advantages derived from receiving arms and equipment for the Forces. He stated his belief that Aid to Turkey has been well placed. He made compliments to General ARNOLD and the AMBASSADOR. He touched on economic aid from the U.S. and its influence on economic recovery. He referred to General Lecheres and agreed with what he said. He stated Turkey is in the position of cooperating with the U.S., the U.K. and France in the maintenance of democratic ideals and our common civilization. He stated he was slightly embarrassed (his Memorandum) to appear to be asking for so much, but has no wish to appear to be driving a bargain. Quotes "Turkish self-respect is equal to that of all other nations." Took consolation in the fact that the arming of Turkish forces was in the interest of all nations. Stated then that Turkey has 1½ million fully trained Reserves. Active forces actually in service and also fully trained amount to more than 300,000. The number of officers on active service is 30,000, and Turkey has more than 70,000 Reserve officers. From the above there is, in addition, the geographic situation of Turkey to consider, with great capacity of Turkey to defend the right flank of NATO as well as Arab States and the Middle East, as is obvious. In addition, points out the importance of the strength of Turkey to the defense against possible aggression against the Balkans as well as being a deterrent to aggression against the Balkans. Also points out the possibility of social and political development of the people of Turkey. Points out that Turkey is in a position such as to constitute defense against attack from the north as well as defense against the spreading of aggression to the Mediterranean. As a result of her special situation Turkey has been forced to participate in various wars in this area at the price of many sacrifices. With reference to possible backward aspects of Turkey's economy, including even aspects of misery and poverty, he stated this was not due to the nature of the Turkish people but to her geographic situation and her history.

He stated that evidence of this was available in the fact that Turkey spent more than 50% of her budget on military expenditures. In clarification of this he stated that the Defense Budget equaled 580 million Turkish Lira. This figure equals 40% of the total budget. One must consider, however, the expenditure of 200 million T.L. by other

Government Departments for defense (this position can be given in detail) therefore, total defense expenditures amounted to 780 million T.L., i.e.: 50% of the budget. He did not believe any other country has spent so large a proportion of its budget in this manner. He stated that when all other countries demobilized and went on a peace-time footing, Turkey continued her military expenditures. The above are the reasons for the lack of economic development comparable to that of other countries.

He expressed gratitude for Marshall Aid but stated that Turkey only receives 1.1% of total Marshall Aid.

Expressed the desire to repeat the fact that any aid to Turkey in view of her capacity, her qualifications, and her military potential were more important than aid to be given to any other country. With reference to his Memorandum he believed that 30-35 Divisions completely and fully equipped would place Turkey in the position of being able to alleviate the burden of the G.P. [Great Powers?] nations as well as to be able to contribute materially to the peace of the world.

He said that having discussed the question of peace in the Middle Eastern area and the Arab countries, if one were to suppose that Turkey did not exist, it would be easy to see that these countries would now be behind the Iron Curtain. He stated that Turkey would contribute with great enthusiasm as a founding member of the Middle East Command. If this fully equipped force existed in Turkey today, the security of the Middle East area would be insured. The situation on the eastern flank of Turkey and among the Arab countries in Turkey's rear is obvious to all. Do not think it necessary to comment on the Iranian situation. Stated that the Arab countries were divided and without unity, and that their total contribution should they get together would be of the order of 2 or 3 Divisions.

In conclusion, a fully armed and equipped Turkey would not only be effective in the defense of the Middle East but would also be an element in the political security of that area. In making a request for equipment and arms to increase the Turkish forces, we do not only wish to strengthen ourselves but try to be in such a position as to make an increase in the contribution to the general security of all. A strong Turkey would always be an important element of consideration, should Russia contemplate aggression.

Only two points remain: (1) Turkey is inhabited by people anxious to defend themselves by force against aggression and to subdue the aggressor, and 2) while anxious to subdue the aggressor, Turkey is very proud to cooperate with NATO where the U.S., the U.K. and France stand for the highest ideals of democracy and the defense of the liberties of nations and peoples.

In closing *Item 6* he requested all Generals to take his views into consideration, and repeated the capabilities and talents of Turkey, as well as the contribution to be made to the common cause. He stated that if a little aid, much aid, or no aid at all were forthcoming, Turkey would not falter in her course.

Field Marshal Slim said we appreciate and value the strength, determination, resources and potentialities of Turkey. He expressed welcome to NATO.

General Lecheres stated the importance of the entrance of Turkey into NATO, the fact that we had here been able to define the work which must, most urgently, be undertaken in order to arrive at a decision.

General Bradley said he did not wish to talk further, felt that he had said enough for the Turks to realize the high regard of the U.S. He felt it was a good thing to have the Turks statements in our notes, so that all people working on the study could be apprised of them. The Turkish Prime Minister expressed thanks to the 3 governments for sending their highest military representatives. [Thought] this was a good sign for the security of Turkey.

After this exchange of compliments the meeting was closed and a sub-committee convened to consider the communiqué.[7]

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[7] On October 15, the Turkish Government issued a communiqué which stated that the conversations had resulted in a "complete identity of views"; that, in view of the fact that the security of the Middle East was a matter of common concern, it had been considered necessary and useful that a Middle East Command be established; that the Turkish Government had "recognized in principle the value of such a Command and had of its own accord intimated its views to the Governments concerned"; and that a Turkish military mission headed by a general would visit Washington. Before departing for Paris that day, Generals Bradley and Lecheres and Field Marshal Slim, issued a statement endorsing the Turkish communiqué. For further information on the conference, see telegram Depto 537 from London, October 31, in vol. III, pt. 1, p. 602.

780.5/10-1651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 16, 1951—7 : 46 p. m.

584. You shld deliver note to FonMin immed along fol lines: "The US Govt greatly regrets the decision of the Egypt Govt to reject the proposals which were made to it by the Govts of US, Fr, Turkey and UK.[2] It is the sincere belief of the US Govt, which had collaborated closely with the other three Govts in their formulation, that the pro-

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[1] Drafted by Stabler, cleared by McGhee, Perkins, and Matthews, and personally approved for transmission and signed by Acheson. Repeated to London, Paris, and Ankara.

[2] On October 15, the Government of Egypt notified the U.S. Government of its rejection of the proposals presented to it on October 13 by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey ("Statement by Secretary Acheson," October 17, 1951, Department of State *Bulletin*, October 29, 1951, p. 702). For further information on the Egyptian rejection of the four-power proposals, see despatch 921 from Cairo, October 9, p. 392.

posals offer a sound basis for resolving the Anglo-Egypt Treaty Ques in a manner wholly consistent with Egypt's position as an independent and sovereign power.

The US Govt considers that the recent action of the Egypt Govt with respect to the abrogation of the Anglo-Egypt Treaty of 1936 and the 1899 Agreements concerning the Sudan is not in accord with proper respect for internatl obligations and for its part believes it to be without validity. This action must be regarded as a serious retrograde step in the endeavors of the free world to develop systems of cooperative defense and in efforts to promote world law and order.

The US Govt expresses the strong hope that great restraint will be shown by all parties concerned in the present situation. At the same time the US Govt wishes to make clear that it will hold the Egypt Govt responsible for any loss of life, injury or damage to American citizens or property which may occur because of the lack of adequate measures of public security."

Emb urgent comments requested re desirability publication this note after delivery.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] Ambassador Caffery replied in telegram 506 from Cairo of October 17 that if relations with the British required that the note be published, then he agreed it should be, but if it were more important to "keep the door open" vis-à-vis Egypt, then it would be unwise to publish it at that moment (780.5/10–1751). In telegram 593 to Cairo of October 18, McGhee, signing for Acheson, informed Caffery that the note would not be published (780.5/10–1751). Acheson, meanwhile, released a statement to the press on October 17 which closely paralleled the wording of the note contained in the source text. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 29, 1951, p. 702)

780.5/10–1651 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 16, 1951—7:46 p. m.

357. (1) Egypt rejection MEC proposals will raise many ques in Arab States and Israel re future course of action by four powers. Dept considers it of highest importance that four powers continue to show same solidarity as has been evidenced in approach to Egypt and that they make quite clear that Egypt action will not deflect them in any way from determination establish MEC. Consequently Embs Paris, London, Ankara, shld seek concurrence fol line of quadripartite action Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman without delay. We feel it essential that NE states receive authoritative reply to ques

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[1] Drafted by Jones and Stabler, cleared by Perkins, Nitze, Moore, Raynor, and, in substance, by Defense. Personally approved for transmission and signed by Acheson. Sent for action, priority, to Paris, London, Ankara; sent for information, until instructed, to Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman; sent for information only to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Tehran.

"What will four powers do now?" from four powers in manner best suited local circumstances. Answering ques more important than manner presenting ans but important maintain quadripartite aspect.

(2) Fol points wld be made by US, UK, Turk and Fr Reps.

(*a*) Founders MEC are disappointed by Egypt rejection of proposals after what quite obviously was hasty and casual consideration. We can only conclude that this precipitate action was taken in the heat of a domestic polit situation since the merits inherent in the far-reaching proposals are self-evident. Founders must hope as friends of Egypt that future study of the proposals may lead to a change in the Egypt attitude fol a second and more thoughtful look.

(*b*) Founder members of MEC have always recognized possibility that Egypt wld not be willing to cooperate in MEC at the outset and had decided that need for such coop security enterprise of such importance to the defense of the ME area as a whole that MEC wld be established irrespective of Egypt decision.

(*c*) US wld say, and other founders wld bring forward their own inducements, that as evidence of US seriousness of purpose with regard to MEC that US will in near future approach Govt to which accredited in connection with possible econ and mil assistance programs under MSP legis. This will be done through Amer Chief of Mission with a view to discussing with state concerned programs of assistance in both fields. From time MSP appropriations authorized NE states will be eligible for arms procurement assistance on a cash reimbursable basis and to supplement such purchases some US grant arms assistance may be available. Supply arms in either category will be coordinated by US, with UK and Fr (principal suppliers) through machinery set up under MEC framework: it will difficult for US to justify aid to states which do not cooperate with MEC. We confid expect econ funds available shortly for firm allotment.

(*d*) US considers it important that NE states shld consider most seriously giving their agreement in principle to collaborate with MEC. We hope this decision will be taken on basis what MEC has to offer welfare of state concerned and without reference Egypts action. Once a state has indicated its decision in principle its views and needs can be better taken into account in formulating MEC details. FYI Cyprus is being considered for HQ MEC.

(3) If asked whether US backs UK in retaining its forces as at present in the Suez base, US Rep wld be authorized to reply that US considers Brit forces in Egypt by right conferred under the 1936 Treaty which, as the Secy said on Oct 10, the US does not consider subject to unilateral abrogation. You may also make point that purpose of MEC is to build stability and strength in an area where defense capabilities of states are dangerously limited. Consequently, until MEC has succeeded in improving the levels of area defensive capabilities, the US wld consider the evacuation of the Suez Base without adequate substitute for strength withdrawn as a retrograde step from the point of view of the MEC objective. The US does, of course, look forward to the time when the states of the ME, including Egypt, will

possess indigenous mil capabilities sufficient to assure the defense of their terrs and the area as a whole. In this event the US believes the role of non-ME powers in time of peace shld be minimal.

(4) London, Paris and Ankara shld use this tel to ascertain whether these Govts still firm on decision set up MEC and whether they agree approach by Chiefs of Mission suggested above is most effective manner advising ME Govts of this intention. If so, UK, Fr and Turks may wish send comparable instrs (with counterpart considerations Para 2 (c)) to NE capitals in order arrange approaches similar those under Deptel 1976 Oct 11 to London.[2]

(5) As soon as agreement above approach obtained from UK, Fr and Turk missions Arab caps will be further instructed. Tel Aviv will receive special instructions.

Acheson

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[2] Not printed; it requested Gifford to inform the Foreign Office urgently of the desire of the Department of State that shortly following presentation of the MEC proposals to Egypt, quadripartite approaches should be made to the other Arab states and Israel to inform them in confidence of the MEC concept as embodied in the proposals to Egypt. A united approach by all four ambassadors to the governments to which they were accredited was recommended as the best policy, but if that were impossible, separate approaches made on the same day were strongly urged "Since quadripartite approach is basic in MEC concept" and the Department of State "believes common front four powers shld be apparent all stages." In closing, Acheson stated his particular wish "to avoid approaches giving impression traditional 'spheres of influence' still exist". (780.5/10-1151)

780.5/10-1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET London, October 17, 1951—8 p. m.

1891. Depcirtel 357,[1] October 16 discussed with Bowker today. He confirmed HMG still firm in decision set up MEC and felt it important make it clear our determination act vigorously to implement proposals. He seemed doubtful at first re desirability approaching other Arab States at this time, however, on grounds: (1) we did not want give impression of chasing after them; and (2) impression gained as result Ankara talks that Turks much more interested in NATO than MEC. He seemed think this might require further convs with Turks re their role and that it might be better four powers review whole question and determine command structure before going to other ME states.

We pointed out that if we delayed matter this long, other Arab States wld probably be galvanized into common front with Egypt as result Arab League meeting. We said it seemed to us that, although hopes might not be bright, we shld nevertheless strike now in hope obtaining coop other states and possibly isolating Egypt on this question. Insofar as Turkey concerned, we pointed out she was also being asked join this approach which it seemed to us wld have effect, if she agreed, of committing her further to MEC. Bowker seemed impressed with these arguments and, at end of conv, seemed entirely favorable to proceeding along lines suggested by Dept, with following two suggested changes:

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[1] *Supra.*

(1) Addition of sentence at end para 2(*b*) along following lines: "The Egypt rejection has therefore not in any way altered our determination proceed with our plans";

(2) Omission of penultimate sentence para 2(*d*) beginning "Once a state has indicated".

Effect of foregoing suggested changes wld be to make clear our determination proceed in any event and to remove any implication other ME states can affect shape of command, which Bowker thought wld be most unwise.

Foregoing were prelim reactions only. Bowker promised urgent consideration and will try give us reply tomorrow.

Sent Dept 1891, rptd info Ankara 27, Cairo 59, Paris 744.

GIFFORD

780.5/10–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET CAIRO, October 18, 1951—3 p. m.

511. When note[1] was delivered (remytel 506, October 17)[2] Under Secretary Ministry Foreign Affairs, who is ordinarily a reasoned individual, spent half hour tearing MEC proposals apart.

I must remind Dept that our Ambassadors expected this type of reaction, and it was for this reason that we so earnestly recommended that proposals not be put forward at this time (mytel 447, October 10).[3]

Having torn them to pieces, we cannot hope that Egyptians will give any further consideration to proposals as they now stand. If we are to take advantage of crack in door remytel 506 we will have to come up with proposals which at least will have to be reworded. We must realize that Egyptians can only think of the problem in terms of past history, and cannot see the realities of the present World situation. We must not expect them to consider the problem logically.

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[1] Contained in telegram 584 to Cairo, October 16, p. 226.

[2] Not printed, but summarized in footnote 3, p. 227.

[3] Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 205.

Sent Dept 511, rptd info London 209, Paris 89, Ankara 71.

CAFFERY

780.5/10–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, October 18, 1951—7 p. m.

1915. Further to Embtel 1891, Oct 17.[1] Following are HMG's views (cleared by PriMin) re further approach to Arab states outlined Depcirtel 357, Oct 16:[2]

1. FonOff confirms its desire see two changes contained para 2, Embtel 1891 for reasons stated third para that tel. With respect second change, however, FonOff now goes further and wld prefer delete para 2 (*d*) altogether on basis it creates too much of an impression we are chasing after states in area and that their attitude may affect our decision re proceeding with MEC. FonOff wld prefer whole tenor of communication to be strong indication our determination go ahead with MEC without exhorting states to cooperate. It thinks such exhortation may boomerang and maintains it knows of no instance when appeal to reason has prevented undesirable actions in Arab League. We have endeavored persuade FonOff that it wld be wise at this juncture to make every effort to persuade Arab states look at whole question rationally rather than emotionally and that we feel this was burden of Dept's suggested communication. We said we wld agree firmness might be what is required in event we were talking to Egypt, but we are not; we are talking to states where we still have opportunity for rational appeal. We recalled that further explanations in Arab ears at time tripartite declaration had done much prevent precipitate rejection. FonOff unconvinced, however, and feels we must give impression determination to proceed undeterred by any developments in area.

2. For reasons similar to foregoing, FonOff hopes we wld agree deletion final two sentences para 3, which it regards as indication of weakness when one of strength required. We have argued these two sentences not essentially different from position taken by Bevin in his plan for phased withdrawal from Suez area and that it wld be wisdom on our part to reassure NE states that we do not intend maintain peacetime forces in area forever, but FonOff continues feel strongly that point. It seemed feel, however, there wld be no objection re making oral replies along lines these two sentences in event we were queried by govts concerned, but felt it wld be mistake volunteer it.

3. FonOff feels different approach required for Jordan, which has already given indication its willingness cooperate. Para 2 (*c*) in particular raises complications in view treaty and UK supply of Arab

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[1] *Ante*, p. 229.

[2] *Ante*, p. 227.

Legion. FonOff maintains Jordan is already getting all the aid it requires thru established channels from UK sources and, while FonOff does not want to suggest what we shld say to Jordan Govt, it nevertheless hopes that communication confined points *a* and *b* might be found sufficient, with preface taking cognizance of Jordan's indication of willingness to cooperate.

4. Re Iraq, UK cld not make communication along lines para 2 (*c*), since UK has treaty obligation supply Iraq with arms. FonOff did not indicate any objection our speaking along this line, however.

5. Most UK cld probably say with respect para 2 (*c*) to Arab States other than Iraq and Jordan wld be statement along lines fourth sentence re coordination of supply and difficulty of justification aid to noncooperative states. Wording has not yet been worked out.

6. In view fact communications four govts wld probably not be identical in view different treatments para 2 (*c*), FonOff feels separate approaches preferable. We have urged strongly approaches shld be in order local precedent, but FonOff has not yet reached decision on this point. We suggest, added support on this point by Dept with Brit Amb Washington wld be helpful, as there is still some feeling UK shld go first Iraq and Jordan in view treaty position those two countries.

7. UK strongly in favor proceeding urgently these approaches, as soon as details worked out four capitals and considers report today that Egypt has called for Arab League polit comite mtg enhances necessity fast action.

8. FonOff suggests that approaches should be closely followed by simultaneous public announcements in four capitals re four powers' determination set up MEC.

Tel on foregoing lines being sent Brit Embs Washington, Paris, and Ankara with instructions endeavor coordinate approaches with those countries.

In view fact considerable further coordination apparently necessary, we are not repeating this by tel to NE capitals, but are leaving it Dept's judgment whether repeat this and Embtel 1891 those missions.

Sent Dept 1915, rptd info Ankara 28, Cairo 62, Paris 761, Jidda, Baghdad, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Beirut unn.

GIFFORD

780.5/10-1851 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 18, 1951—8 p. m.

2272. Embtel 2248 Oct 17[1] rptd London 559, Ankara 39, Cairo 61. La Tournelle has just informed me that FonOff has instructed Bonnet to see Secretary and state Fr position along fol lines re MEC situation in reply to points made in Depcirtel 357, Oct 16:[2]

(1) Fr are in full agreement as to need for continuance closest possible cooperation between four govts concerned in ME defense.

(2) Fr believe it wld be most inopportune at present time and under present circumstances to approach Arab states with a request that they join MEC. Fr feel that in present state of public emotion govts of these countries wld not dare take a stand which wld represent lack of solidarity with Egypt if Egyptian situation quiets down, then matter can be reconsidered. The four govts concerned shld keep in close contact so as to determine earliest possible opportune moment for making approach to Arab States.

(3) Amb. Bonnet will reaffirm importance of complete solidarity and exchange of info between US, UK and Fr and will give indication as to undesirability of possible mediation by any one of these three govts in any dispute involving an Arab State and one of the other Western govts.

La Tournelle told me he had no info as to final position Brit Govt wld take in this matter.

I first asked La Tournelle whether FonOff had envisaged possibility of making a *démarche* to the Arab States indicating to them clearly our determination to continue activities and plans in connection with ME defense without perhaps raising issue of their joining MEC. He replied in negative stating that he thought our public statements and press reports wld be sufficient to make them realize that we wld continue our efforts. I then said that the object of the quadripartite approach which we had suggested had been precisely to counteract the effect in these Arab States of the wave of emotion flowing from Egypt and that we had thought that this type of approach might prevent a crystallization in a negative sense of their attitude. To this he replied that Fr Govt's analysis of situation, based upon its info, was as he had stated.

Sent Dept niact 2272, rptd info London 569, Ankara 41, Cairo 63.

BONSAL

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[1] Not printed; it reported on a conversation which Bonsal had with Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Assistant Director General for Political and Economic Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry, in which the latter "emphasized French support for immediate continuance efforts to establish MEC regardless Egyptian rejection" and the hope that the Foreign Ministry would complete preparation of a reply to British Foreign Secretary Morrison's message to Foreign Secretary Schuman emphasizing determination to remain at Suez (780.5/10-1751).

[2] *Ante*, p. 227.

780.5/10–1951 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 19, 1951—7 : 42 p. m.

371. 1. Dept has considered points in London's 1915 Oct 18 [2] and Paris' 2272 Oct 18 [3] and believes that reaction so far re MEC in Arab States (except Egypt) and Israel requires immed action by four powers in Arab caps and Tel Aviv in order encourage whatever pro-MEC attitude exists. It is obvious from tels from London and Paris that immed agrmt cannot be reached on all points Depcirtel 357 Oct 16.[4]

2. Consequently, Dept now proposes that four powers reach immed agrmt on fol approach to Arab States (except Egypt) and Israel and that we continue meanwhile efforts reach agrmt between four powers for future use on certain other points in Depcirtel which have caused difficulty. Dept wishes stress that we did not intend suggest that ME states (except Egypt) be exhorted join MEC. We believe that four powers shld merely inform these states that four powers intend establish MEC and that we hope Arab States and Israel, independently of Egypt attitude, will give most serious consideration to whole ques which involves vitally their security and welfare.

3. We propose that UK, Fr, Turkey and US reps Arab caps (except Cairo) make fol pts on quadripartite basis: First, use Para 2(*a*) Depcirtel 357; Second, use Para 2(*b*) Depcirtel 357; Third, sponsoring powers MEC hope NE states will give most serious consideration to what MEC means in terms their welfare and security. As sponsoring powers proceed in formulation details and org MEC with a view to its early estabmt, views NE states wld be most welcome and helpful. However, States shld be left in no doubt that four powers intend estab MEC and will not be deflected or retarded in this intention.

4. Dept also feels that four powers shld be prepared to repl to queries re UK position in Egypt and for its part US rep wld b authorized reply that US considers Brit forces in Egypt by righ conferred under '36 Treaty and to point to Secy's statements of Oct 1 and 17.[5] US rep wld also be authorized make other points containe Para 3 Depcirtel 357 including last two sentences as US view.

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[1] Drafted by Stabler and G. Lewis Jones, approved and signed for the Secr tary by McGhee, cleared with BNA and WE. Sent niact to London, Paris, a operations priority via military channels to Ankara. Repeated for informati to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Tehran.

[2] *Ante*, p. 231.

[3] *Supra*.

[4] *Ante*, p. 227.

[5] On October 10, Secretary Acheson released a statement taking note of t introduction in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies of draft legislation to abrog

5. Dept strongly hopes that UK, Fr, and Turkey will agree to this greatly simplified approach being made at once. We feel valuable time already lost and such favorable reaction as we have recd from Arab states may change for worse after Arab League mtg if four powers gave impression vacillation.

6. Immed fol tel suggests line rep four powers shld take in Tel Aviv for which immed agrmt also requested.

7. Emb London shld inform FonOff re Para 8 London reftel that Dept considers further formal statement re MEC not neces since as far US concerned intention proceed with MEC has been made clear.

8. Emb Paris shld emphasize to FonOff that above suggested approach has been designed meet Fr views as expressed numbered Para 2 Paris reftel and that we attach great importance earliest action Arab Caps (except Cairo) and Tel Aviv. FYI Fr Amb has not approached Dept.

9. Emb Ankara shld urge FonOff give earliest agrmt and so instruct its reps.

ACHESON

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the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreements of 1899 providing for joint administration of the Sudan. The Secretary then stated that "None of the agreements in question provides for abrogation. The U.S. Government believes that proper respect for international obligations requires that they be altered by mutual agreement rather than by unilateral action of one of the parties." The full text of the Secretary's statement is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 22, 1951, p. 647. The Secretary's statement of October 17, took note, with "genuine regret" of the Egyptian rejection of proposals for a Middle East Command (*ibid.*, October 29, 1951, p. 702).

780.5/10-1951 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 19, 1951—7:42 p. m.

372. Addressee missions instructed seek FonOff concurrence fol line to be taken on quadripartite basis in Tel Aviv re substance follow-up approach now contemplated Depcirtel 371 Oct 19.[2] Dept believes method handling approach Israel shld be left to discretion reps Tel Aviv so long solidarity MEC founders apparent Israel Govt.

2. Israel shld be informed that approaches being made Jidda, Baghdad, Beirut, Amman, Damascus along lines Depreftel and that

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[1] Drafted by Stabler and G. Lewis Jones, approved and signed for the Secretary by Stabler. Sent for action to London, Paris, Ankara. Sent for information until instructed to Tel Aviv. Sent for information only to Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] *Supra.*

we are not going further than Para 3 (third) Depreftel re invitations Arabs because they are unlikely accept this time.

3. In informing Israel Govt, reps wld state that sponsoring powers providing above info enable Israel also have full picture latest devels and to permit Israel on same basis as Arabs carefully consider importance MEC.

4. If pressed re ques invitation Israel assoc itself MEC, reps wld be authorized state (*a*) no invitations yet issued and (*b*) at present time for obvious reasons it wld be prejudicial MEC if Arab attention were diverted from inherent merits of proposals and distortedly focussed upon idea that through MEC they might be assocd with Israel.

5. Reps wld state that as sponsoring powers proceed with discussions re MEC blueprint, Israel's views will be welcomed, i.e. Para 3 (third) Depreftel.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

In telegram 2321, niact, from Paris of October 20, Ambassador Bruce reported that the French Government agreed to the proposed approach to the five Arab governments and Israel, outlined in circular telegrams 371 and 372, "and is tonight dispatching telegraphic instrs to its missions in countries concerned." However, the Foreign Ministry stressed its continuing belief that such an approach had little chance of inducing Arab cooperation at the moment and therefore the representatives of the four powers should "underline" that their approach constituted no more than a notification of intent and not a further invitation (780.5/10–2051). In telegram 1949, niact, from London, October 20, Ambassador Gifford reported that the Foreign Office had discussed circular telegrams 371 and 372 and that while it was "somewhat disappointed new suggestions do not go further towards meeting Brit points" reported in telegram 1915 from London (*ante*, page 231), nonetheless an approach was desirable. However, the Foreign Office continued to object to the inclusion of any suggestion of a hope that at some future date the countries of the Middle East, including Egypt, would become sufficiently powerful as to assume their own defense burdens and it also expressed the hope that "Ambs can avoid giving impression we want views NE states just at this particular juncture, making it clear we wld expect receive them at later date as Command develops" (780.5/10–2051).

In telegram 357 to Ankara of October 21, Stabler, signing for Acheson, urged that Turkish agreement be immediately obtained for a quadripartite approach to the Arab states and Israel (780.5/10–2151), and Ambassador Wadsworth replied in telegram 383, niact, from Ankara of October 23 that he and his British and French colleagues had submitted nearly identical notes to Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü, and that after subsequent consultation with Köprülü, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had replied that a parallel rather than joint approach be made to the Arab governments preceding by approximately a week that made to Israel (780.5/10-2351). Stabler, signing for Acheson, replied in telegram 363 to Ankara of October 24, that parallel approaches were satisfactory to the United States Government but that they should be made simultaneously to Israel and the Arab states and no later than October 27 (780.5/10-2451). Ambassador Wadsworth in telegrams 389 and 390 from Ankara of October 24 and 25, respectively, reported securing Turkish agreement on these points (780.5/10-2451 and 780.5/10-2551).

Arab reactions to this fresh four-power *démarche* on the Middle East Command were mixed. In telegram 436, niact, from Beirut, October 26, Minister Harold B. Minor reported the Lebanese Foreign Minister as stating that the delicate situation then existing in the country forced Lebanon to assume a "somewhat 'reserved'" attitude toward the MEC (780.5/10-2651). Minister Gerald Drew informed the Secretary of State in telegram 117 from Amman, October 27, that the Jordanian Prime Minister "was cordially uncommunicative" to the quadripartite approach, "merely expressing hope we could have further convers on MEC as plans progressed" (780.5/10-2751). Ambassador Raymond Hare reported from Jidda in telegram 219 of October 27, that Khaireddin Zerelky, the acting head of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office, had received the four-power presentation in a "friendly fashion, even including reference approach Israel which he said manifestly of serious concern to all Arab States and our examination of reasons for so doing helpful." However, Zerelky added that it was "unfortunate presentation project coincided with Egypt crisis" as this naturally induced the Egyptian Government to "see in proposals new move by Brit to induce others to underwrite their imperialistic designs" (780.5/10-2751). In despatch 428 from Baghdad of November 1, Ambassador Edward S. Crocker reported that in conversation, Iraq's Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations and President of the Chamber of Deputies Mohamed Fadhil al-Jamali had remarked "that Iraquis found two principal obstacles in the way of their adherence to the MEC; one concerned the French and Turkish troops and the other the undefined relation of Israel to the pact" (780.5/11-151).

Conversations between various United States diplomatic officials in the Middle East and representatives of the countries to which they were accredited concerning the Middle East Command took place throughout the remainder of 1951 and were reported in telegrams and despatches which may be found in Department of State file 780.5.

880.00 FA/10-2351 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, October 23, 1951—7 : 23 p. m.

385. Passage MSA Appropriation Act October 19 makes available $65 million economic aid to Arab States in form contribs to PRA plus bilateral aid.

Now possible make massive approach problem economic development as sketched Clapp report. While delay final Cong action most unfortunate, now must make up for lost time to conduct effective 1952 operations. Legis has set pattern which may be followed subsequent years, and 1953 programming is also matter urgency.

To provide missions and PRA full background for negots propose send Gardiner and Fryer representing McGhee and Bennett to area leaving Washington October 30 to be available brief period concentrating efforts Damascus, Amman and Baghdad where assume best MSA opportunities. They shld arrange see Blandford and Macatee soon. Beirut pls cable if mtg Beirut or Paris October 30 more convenient.

TCA teams described Deptels October 19 will be available work out details program.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted and transmitted by Mr. Gardiner, cleared by NE, S/ISA, TCA, and UNA. Sent to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Beirut, Damascus, Amman.

[2] Reference is to a series of telegrams sent to various Near Eastern missions stating that the projected expanded technical cooperation aid program for the region, beginning with Fiscal Year 1952, required that the Technical Cooperation Administration organize regional operating divisions in Washington to provide line administration for all programs (telegram 141 to Jidda, telegram 155 to Damascus, telegram 359 to Beirut, October 19, in file 880.00 TA/10-1951).

780.5/10-3151

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 31, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Now that the intention to establish a Middle East Command has been made public knowledge, the Department believes it would be desirable for the founding members (US, UK, France, Turkey and the three Commonwealth nations) to state publicly at an early date the basic political philosophy of the Command and some of the principles under which it will operate with a view to developing pro-MEC sentiments in the Arab states and

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[1] Drafted by G. Lewis Jones and Stabler. Cleared by Nitze, Parsons of RA, Coe of BNA, Hoskins of NEA, and Moore of GTI.

Israel. While MEC is, of course, a military organization created for the defense of the area, we must stimulate a favorable disposition toward the Command on the part of the nations of the area. This in turn is a pressing political problem of considerable difficulty and magnitude as indicated by the Egyptian situation.

At the present time the only knowledge which prospective associates have of MEC is what they have been able to deduce from the proposals made to the Egyptian Government and the statement of our diplomatic representatives in making these proposals known to them. These proposals were prepared specifically for Egypt. Now that Egypt has rejected them it is important for the future of MEC to restate in more general terms, for the other states of the area, the principles underlying the MEC concept. If, after having announced that we intend to proceed with the establishment of MEC, the founder members can say nothing further until January-February when the Congress will be in a position to ratify the entrance of Greece and Turkey into NATO, Egyptian and other hostile propaganda against MEC will have greatly reduced the likelihood of other Arab states being willing to associate themselves with MEC.

MEC has a number of important aspects:

a. 1. Defense of the Middle East (Defense).
  2. Definition of MEC area (State–Defense).
  3. MEC relationship to NATO (State–Defense).
  4. Role of Turkey in MEC (State–Defense).
b. Detailed organizations of MEC, including location of MEC Headquarters (Defense).
c. Steps required to secure association of Arab states, Israel and other interested states with MEC (State–Defense).

The foregoing list emphasizes the very broad range of politico-military considerations involved in MEC. The interconnection of State–Defense interests is also brought out in NSC 47/5 of March 14, 1951 and the President's message to Congress in connection with MSP.[2]

This letter is devoted primarily to point *c*, above, which is among the most important since MEC becomes something of an anomaly if no ME state other than Turkey is willing to be associated with it. Points *a* and *b*, above, have sufficiently firm characteristics to be susceptible of solution. Point *c*, however, involves a complex of hatreds, neutralism, Communism, nationalism, xenophobia, and the aftermath of Western imperialism and will require a painstaking educational campaign with the states concerned.

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[2] Reference is to the President's Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program, May 24, 1951; see the editorial note, p. 150.

The Department believes that in order for MEC to be accepted by the NE states it must be presented with elements which will capture the imagination of these states as a "New Deal". The difficult point will be to persuade the leaders of the Arab states, in the face of Egyptian-generated hostility, to recognize the importance of MEC to welfare and security of their countries and to lead public opinion to desire association with MEC.

Enclosed is a set of principles largely drawn from previous documentation on MEC, including the proposals to Egypt and the US–UK politico-military talks from which the proposals emerged. These principles also contain a few additional ideas consistent with previous documentation which would enhance the "sales value" of MEC in the area. It would be extremely helpful to have the comments of the Department of Defense upon the enclosed statement in so far as it might affect the ultimate form which MEC will take. It should be emphasized that the wording of the statement is tentative and that in its present form it represents the general thoughts of the Department. It may be desirable to dress up the language from the point of view of public appeal.

When the Defense Department has commented upon the enclosure and, subject to its concurrence on the principles set forth, it is suggested the next step should be to seek the concurrence of the UK, France, Turkey, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa. It is important to the success of MEC that all of us have the same principles in mind. In seeking the concurrence of the other states, it should be made clear that these would be general principles only and that the details of the MEC structure which would be created on the framework of these principles would be worked out at a meeting in Washington as suggested in point X of the proposals to Egypt.

It is doubtful, of course, that Turkey would be willing to make any firm commitment regarding MEC until it is a full-fledged member of NATO and until its aspirations with regard to participation in NATO are satisfied. This being understood, however, we feel that there would be no harm in asking the Turks to consider and comment upon a set of "principles".

If the principles could be agreed among the states named, this in itself would be an achievement. However, we would hope that the states concerned would concur in jointly making these principles public at an agreed time which would have the maximum impact on the Arab states and Israel.

It would be appreciated if you could have urgent attention directed to this question. It would be particularly useful if the Secretary, who is now in Paris, could discuss this matter with the UK and French Foreign Ministers at an early date.[3]

Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State:
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

[Annex]

Draft Statement of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa on the Basic Principles of the Middle East Command[4]

In establishing the Middle East Command, the seven founder countries state that they are guided by the following principles:

1. The United Nations is a world response to the principle that peace is indivisible and that the security of all states is jeopardized by breaches of the peace anywhere; at the same time it is incumbent upon the states of any area to be willing and able to undertake the initial defense of their area.

2. The defense of the Middle East is vital to the free world and its defense against outside aggression can be secured only by the co-operation of all interested states. (Proposals I and II to Egypt.)

3. The Middle East Command is intended to be the center of co-operative efforts for the defense of the area as a whole: the achievement of peace and security in the area through MEC will permit social and economic advancement.

4. A function of the Middle East Command will be to assist and support the states associated with it in developing the capacity of each to play a role in the defense of the area as a whole against outside aggression. Problems of an intra-area nature will continue to be handled bilaterally or multilaterally in accordance with the UN

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[3] Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster, under a covering letter of November 3 to the Secretary of State, transmitted a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated November 2, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed general concurrence in the principles of the draft statement but recommended a number of changes in the draft in the interest of accuracy and clarity. They also advised the Secretary of Defense that it had to be recognized that "the establishment of a Middle East Command as has been proposed would be most difficult under current conditions in the Middle East, and that considerable departure from original concepts may have to be made." Acting Secretary Foster, in view of the JCS comment, informed the Secretary of State that he was forwarding the JCS memorandum with the thought that the two departments "should continue to develop new concepts which will meet the changing conditions in the Middle East as they occur." He concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Department of State did not agree to all of the changes in the draft proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the draft statement was discussed informally between representatives of the two departments on November 3. A later agreed version of the draft statement was sent to Secretary Acheson in Paris in telegram Tosec 13 of November 7; see footnote 3, p. 243.

[4] Drafted by G. Lewis Jones and Stabler. Cleared by Parsons, Coe, Hoskins, and Moore.

Charter, the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, the Armistice Agreements, and the several Treaties of Alliance.

5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset will consist primarily of planning, the provision of advice and training missions to the Middle East states upon request, and the coordination of arms supplies and the training programs for Middle East nationals in foreign countries.

6. Facilities to train and equip forces of participating nations will be provided by those participating members of the Middle East Command in a position to do so. (Proposal IX to Egypt.)

7. The Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, will command forces placed at his disposal and will develop plans for the operations of all forces within the area (or to be introduced into the area) in time of war or international emergency. However, the placing of forces under command of SACME in peacetime is not a prerequisite for association with the Middle East Command. Movement of those troops placed under SACME's command within the territories of states associated with the Middle East Command will be made only with the agreement of the associated state concerned.

8. It is anticipated, although details have yet to be settled among founder members, that at the outset the Middle East Command will consist of a small headquarters staffed by officers representing the founder members and the Middle East states associated with the Command. The duty of the Middle East Command commander and his staff will be to the corporate defense enterprise represented by the Command. National interests will be represented at M.E.C. HQ. through a Liaison Organization.

9. Flags and insignia used by Middle East Command will be of special, non-national design to emphasize its cooperative area character.

10. States associated with the Middle East Command will during peacetime have final decision as to the use by Middle East Command of their national territories and resources. SACME, on behalf of states associated with MEC, will reach agreements with the states concerned regarding the rights and obligations which go with MEC association.

11. Notwithstanding the wide differences which exist among the states of the area in resources, size, and population, the Middle East Command will preserve the democratic principle of equality of the states associated with it. (Proposal IV to Egypt.)

12. The broad mission of MEC and its cooperative character make it necessary that all states, whether territorially or not part of the area, act on the basis of the best interests of the cooperative defense of the area.

13. The creation of the Middle East Command is a response to the present lack in the Middle East of organization, capacity and experience to defend the area. (SG 80/4)[5] When the necessary indigenous organization and capacity for area defense has been created through the efforts of the Middle East Command, the peacetime role in MEC of those countries not territorially part of the Middle East should be minimal.

14. The founder members of MEC do not regard the initial form in which MEC will be organized as unchangeable; they believe MEC should evolve in the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide for the defense of the ME area as a whole.

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[5] Regarding this NATO defense paper, see vol. III, pt. 1, p. 573.

740.5/11–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, November 6, 1951—11 p. m.

Secto 14.[2] I. Fol is text MEC principles as provisionally agreed today between US UK and France (Deps Secto 8) for issuance by US UK France and Turks (possibly joined by South Africa, New Zealand and Australia).[3]

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[1] Repeated to Ankara, London, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman.

[2] Acheson was in Paris between November 6–24 in connection with the opening of the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly. During the course of his stay, he took the opportunity to meet frequently with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom to discuss outstanding problems facing the three countries.

[3] Between November 4–8, Acheson, Eden, and Schuman held a series of meetings to define common policy on the establishment of a Middle East Command using as a basis of discussion a draft proposal submitted by Eden on November 4 and transmitted to the Department in telegram Secto 4 on November 5. This proposal was redrafted on November 6 and sent to the Department in telegram Secto 8 of November 6, with Secretary Acheson's editorial comments following the same day in telegram Secto 9 (740.5/11–551).

The Department of State on November 6 informally furnished the Office of the Secretary of Defense with its comment on a revision of the draft statement of principles, *supra*, prepared subsequent to the receipt of Secretary Acheson's comments. The Secretary of Defense, under a covering letter dated November 7 to the Secretary of State, transmitted the revised draft statement as amended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the military point of view perceived no objection. The Secretary of Defense concurred in the JCS version of the draft statement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had deleted paragraph 6 of the Department of State revision and had amended paragraph 5 to read as follows:

"5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset will be primarily one of planning and providing the Middle East states on their request with assistance in the form of advice and training. It will also coordinate requests for arms and equipment submitted by states in the area willing to join in its defense and will forward such requests, with recommendations of SACME, to

Footnote continued on following page.

"In proceeding with their announced intention to establish the ME Command, the Govts of the US, UK, France and Turkey state they are guided by fol principles:

1. UN is world response to principle that peace is indivisible and security of all states is jeopardized by breaches of peace anywhere; at same time it is incumbent upon states of any area to be willing and able to undertake the initial defense of their area.

2. Def of the ME is vital to free world and its def against outside aggression can be secured only be cooperation of all interested states.

3. ME is intended to be center of cooperative efforts for def of area as a whole; achievement of peace and security in area thru the MEC will bring with it social and econ advancement.

4. A function of MEC will be to assist and support the states willing to join in the def of the ME and to develop capacity of each to play its proper role in def of area as a whole against outside aggression. It will not interfere in problems and disputes arising within the area.

5. The task of MEC at the outset will be primarily one of planning and providing the ME states on their request with assistance in the form of advice and training. It will also coordinate requests for arms and equipment submitted by states in the area willing to join in its def. Such assistance will be provided upon request by sponsoring states of MEC in a position to do so.

6. Supreme Allied Commander, ME, will command forces placed at his disposal and will develop plans for operations of all forces within area (or to be introduced into area) in time of war or international emergency. However, the placing of forces under command of SACME in peacetime is not prerequisite for joining in common effort for def of the ME. Movement of those troops placed under SACME's command to or within the territories of states joining in def of ME will be made only with the agreement of the state or states concerned and in full accord with their national independence and sovereignty.

7. While details have yet to be formulated by the sponsoring states, at outset MEC will be an integrated Allied command and not a national command. The responsibility of SACME will be to ensure the effectiveness of the corporate def enterprise represented by the command. All states joining in this enterprise will become members on a basis of equality of the Middle East def liaison org which is to be the link between the command and the countries ready to join in the def of this area.

8. Any facilities granted to SACME in peacetime by states joining in the def of the ME will be the subj of specific agreements.

9. The broad mission of MEC and its cooperative character make it necessary that all states, whether territorially or not part of the

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

sponsoring states of the Middle East Command which are in a position to provide such matériel."

In telegram Tosec 13 of November 7, the Departments of State and Defense sent to Paris their version of the basic principles on the Middle East Command which, with several textual changes, was the same as the "Draft Statement . . . on the Basic Principles of the Middle East Command" submitted to the Department of Defense as the annex to Matthews' letter to Lovett of October 31, *supra*. Tosec 13 noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived no objections to this Draft Statement from a military standpoint. (740.5/11–751) area, act on basis of best interests of the cooperative def of area; MEC naturally will not further the national interest of any particular state.

10. Ultimate objective of MEC is to supply such deficiencies as exist at present in org and capacity for defense in the area so that the peacetime role of the states of the area in ME def will progessively increase, thus permitting the role of states not territorially part of ME to be reduced proportionately.

11. Sponsoring states of MEC do not regard initial form in which MEC will be organized as unchangeable; they believe MEC shld evolve in the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide for the def of the ME area as a whole."

II. Above text still subj amendments but we must move fast to meet Nov 10 publication date which means form text by Nov 8. Both UK and France seem firm on wording above and US amendments shld be substantive since each change involves so many time consuming clearances.

III. Also provisionally agreed with UK and France is fol timetable.

1. Agreed draft of principles by Nov 8.
2. Instruct Arab caps (except Egypt) and Israel to arrange quadripartite approaches in most convenient manner to home govts on Nov 9 or as soon thereafter as possible. (*Note:* since door is still open for Egypt to accept proposals made to her she will not be made object of new quadripartite approach—Egypt will be merely informed principles as courtesy.)
3. Four powers to hand agreed principles to ME FonMins present Paris simultaneously with second stage above.
4. Four govts arrange publish statements Wash, Paris, Ankara and London.

IV. See Secto 15 for reaction to text by Turks FonMin.[4]

Bruce

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[4] *Infra.*

740.5/11–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

Paris, November 6, 1951—11 p.m.

Secto 15. 1. Text MEC principles as quoted para 1 Secto 14, November 6[2] to Dept handed FonMin Köprülü today as Secy, Eden and Schuman this morning agreed shld be done. Dept reps promised Köprülü Emb Ankara wld get text promptly into hands Sec Gen Turk FonOff. Ankara pls report Dept and Paris when this done.

2. Köprülü discussion lasted 2 hours. He said principles wld have to be cleared Ankara but he did not appear averse to idea statement. His detailed comments follow.

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[1] Repeated to Ankara and London.
[2] *Supra.*

3. *a.* FonMin expressed concern re para 4 feeling that final sentence re intra-area probs might be interpreted by Arabs as constituting license for Israel to commit aggression without fear retaliation by MEC members. He laid great stress on necessity reassuring Arabs this score. We asked whether he wld prefer original wording to effect intra-area probs wld continue be handled in accordance UN Charter, Tripartite declaration, armistice agrmts and treaties alliance, but FonMin did not take to this idea presumably because of ref to tripartite declaration to which Turkey not party. FonMin preferred "less detailed formula" which wld at same time reassure Arabs in connection their fears vs. Israel. We agreed attempt find new wording.

b. FonMin apprehensive association 3 dominions with statement wld have in Arab eyes appearance of "ganging up". He expressed strong preference restricting declaration of principles to four powers.

c. On several occasions, FonMin referred necessity tailoring new proposals to peculiar psychological atmosphere prevailing Arab states; he showed particular concern re danger rebuff if principles not responsive questions ME states have in mind. He therefore suggested we shld take further soundings with states without indicating in any way we were contemplating issuing new statement. When soundings completed, he thought we cld review them to ensure our replies were responsive in all essential details. We pointed out previous approaches had elicited number reactions and that it was with these in mind we had evolved set principles. They might not be responsive all questions Arabs have but it wld be impossible give them 100 percent satisfactory. Present set principles were honorable, honest and shld commend themselves to Arabs. FonMin expressed himself as satisfied with this explanation.

d. FonMin emphasized conviction it wld be mistake for us give impression we desire answer from Arab states at this point re association MEC. We expressed complete agrmt, explaining purpose new *démarche* solely to clarify points which have been bothering Arabs and not to force them to state their position at this time.

e. FonMin stressed importance of avoiding leaks re principles before they are handed ME govts and ME FonMins here. He also felt simultaneous publication desirable.

4. Emb Ankara requested follow up and make certain timetable para 3 Secto reftel understood Ankara. We will give Köprülü and transmit Ankara text changes in response para 3 (*a*) above.[3]

BRUCE

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[3] On November 8 in Secto 23, Secretary Acheson sent to the Department the definitive United States, United Kingdom, French, and Turkish text on the Middle East Command as agreed to that day. The four countries also agreed to a simultaneous release of the text in Washington, London, Paris, and Ankara at 6 p. m. Paris time on November 10 (740.5/11–851). The text is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1951, pp. 817–818.

780.5/11-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET

TEL AVIV, November 11, 1951—1 p. m.

466. PriMin Ben Gurion asked me to call on him late yesterday p. m. and in presence of DirGen FonOff Eytan said he wished have preliminary conversation re MEC before Cabinet considers matter formally.

He explained Israel sympathetic with purposes MEC and appreciative great importance of decision defend region. Believes his country can be of real assistance, but feels its assoc can be just as effective and less embarrassing to all concerned if its relationship is informal. He does not exclude possibility of working thru MEC but refers to danger adverse Arab reaction if undue or untimely attention directed to Israelis connection with Command.

As to Israel it has two fears: first, that Jewish immigration from Iron Curtain countries might be stopped as reprisal if Israel's cooperation too much publicized; and second, that Israel might be exposed to aggression by neighbors if they were to know the exact size of Israel's standing army. It wld not have misgivings on the latter score with respect to the US and UK and wld favor arrangements with them rather than MEC, which he feels wld necessitate having to reveal milit secrets to Arabs.

He believes Israel cld make substantial contribution to area defense in (1) manpower (2) repair facilities (3) transport facilities such as air fields, ports, roads, railways (4) manufacturing milit supplies such as small arms, ammunition etc. And (5) stockpiling facilities.

Comment follows.[2]

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated to all Arab capitals, Ankara, London, and Paris.

[2] In telegram 467 from Tel Aviv of November 11, Davis reported that Ben Gurion had further stated, *inter alia*, that Israel could be counted upon to cooperate in any future MEC as 80 percent of the nation approved the current foreign policy; that Israeli manpower was increasing, and training was improving; that he hoped a future MEC would adopt American arms and, finally, that he hoped to see "Amer as well as Brit troops in area for morale and other reasons" (780.5/11-1151). In telegram 356 to Tel Aviv of November 15, Samuel K. C. Kopper, signing for Acting Secretary Webb, requested Davis to inform Ben Gurion that the United States appreciated his views about the MEC "which indicate clearly Israel's full understanding importance MEC to defense NE area." Kopper added that the Department of State recognized that certain regional problems, i.e., a satisfactory method to provide for Israeli-Arab cooperation, would have to be worked out before an MEC could come into true being. "Since MEC is regional Coop enterprise," Kopper concluded, "we naturally look to time when Israel will be able assume proper role in MEC. You may assure PriMin that sponsoring powers will keep Israel informed Re MEC developments and you personally will be glad to continue Pres discussions with PriMin as he may see fit" (780.5/11-1551).

740.5/11-1851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 18, 1951—9 p. m.

Tosec 40. For the Secretary from McGhee. We have been much disturbed by report in Delga 233 Nov 17[2] that Egypt FonMin is exerting "tremendous pressure" on heads Arab Dels to persuade them issue joint statement or separate statements either Tues or Wed supporting Egypt's rejection MEC as well as its position on Anglo-Egyptian question. Since focal point Arab activities re MEC now seems to be Paris, we believe it wld be most helpful, provided you had opportunity and found it convenient, if you cld talk to heads Arab Dels (except Egypt) and impress upon them great importance which we attach to MEC and grave mistake Arab States wld make if they rejected MEC. We are certain that your personal intervention wld have profound effect at this critical stage.

We have instructed missions Arab caps (except Cairo) approach Govts along lines Deptel 2997 Nov 18[3] and you might desire use this material shld you find it possible see heads Arab Dels. [McGhee.]

WEBB

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[1] Drafted by Stabler of NE.
[2] Not printed.
[3] *Infra.*

320/11-1751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 18, 1951—9 p. m.

2997. For Secretary, Amb and GADel.

1. Malik's report of Salaheddin's efforts in Paris (Delga 233 Nov 17)[2] is most disturbing. Although aware that Egypt has been doing its utmost to line up Arab support for its position on Anglo-Egyptian problem and MEC, Malik's report is our first indication that Salaheddin's efforts appear to be meeting with success. Leb suggestion re US approach to Ibn Saud is, of course, not new element since Amb Jidda has had full discussions with SAG and Dept has been in close touch here with Saudis, including DefMin Prince Misha'al, now visiting US. However, view reported trend in Paris, we feel that further endeavors shld be made immed not only with SAG but also with other Arab States which have not yet taken position on

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[1] Drafted by Stabler, cleared in draft with McGhee. Also sent niact to Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, London, Ankara. Repeated to Tel Aviv and Cairo.
[2] Not printed, but see telegram Tosec 40, *supra*.

MEC. We shall suggest UK, Fr, and Turks make similar endeavors, but US will take action in any event. Consequently missions Arab Caps (except Cairo) shld approach Govt to which accredited at highest level you believe desirable along fol lines, basing this approach on reports re Egyptian activities which we have recd from Paris and elsewhere (but preserving Leb confidence):

2. US recognizes, as do its allies and friends, that Anglo-Egyptian sit is urgent problem which requires earliest solution and that until solution is found, unrest generated in Egypt will be reflected in NE area as whole. We are anxious to find reasonable and peaceable solution this problem and will leave no possibility for its solution unexplored. We still consider MEC offers hopeful avenue for settlement. However, still more important is what MEC can mean in terms welfare and security NE area. We sincerely believe that rejection MEC by Arab States merely to support Egypt position wld be catastrophe for Arab States and wld be dangerously contrary their own individual interests which, in our view, shld be paramount consideration. In proceeding with our intention to establish MEC we continuously recognize difficulty which wld confront Arab States if sponsors MEC press them state their position until they are prepared to do so and therefore sponsors have made particular point of preserving for Arab States their flexibility of position and opportunity for careful consideration and study MEC developments. Approach made last week re statement of principles is evidence this attitude.

It is with regret we have received reports from Paris and elsewhere that Egypt FonMin in Paris is pressing Arab States to reject MEC forthwith, apparently not on basis its merits, which we steadfastly believe it has but because Egypt wishes support for its precipitate actions, irrespective of individual interests other Arab States. We fully understand Egypt's important position in NE area and natural affinity Arab States toward each other, but we wld find it most difficult to understand action by Arab States which wld freeze their position re MEC, simply to respond to Egyptian FonMin's demands.

We therefore hope that Govt to which you accredited will continue to maintain its fullest flexibility and independence of action vis-à-vis MEC and will consider this question only on its merits.

3. Embs Paris, London and Ankara shld inform FonOff US making above approach and we hope similar instrs will be sent Fr, UK and Turk Dipl reps Arab caps.

4. GADel Paris shld inform Malik in strictest confidence our appreciation his helpful attitude and give him substance above approach.

Webb

Editorial Note

On November 21, the Soviet Union dispatched a Note to the Egyptian Government condemning the proposed establishment of a Middle East Command. Similar notes were sent that day to Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel, and on November 22 to Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. The Soviet Note to Egypt is published in full in Denise Folliot (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs*, 1951 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1954), pages 429–431, hereafter cited as *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1951. The Soviet Note to Saudi Arabia of November 22 is paraphrased in telegram 279 fom Jidda, November 27 (780.5/11-2751).

On November 24, the Soviet Union dispatched Notes to the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey condemning the "new aggressive plans, expressed in the establishing of a Middle Eastern Command in an area located not far from the frontiers of the Soviet Union." The Soviet Note is published in full in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1951, pages 432–433.

780.5/11-2451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 24, 1951—9 p. m.

459. Re Sov notes US, UK, Fr, Turkey Nov 24 protesting against initiation MEC as subordination countries concerned to aggressive NATO (Moscow's tel 898, Nov. 24)[2] we anticipate inevitable some days elapse before formal reply can be concerted four Govts and in order avoid giving Sov charges unopposed propaganda field that period contemplate release promptly when Sovs publish their notes interim statement fol line.

1. Confirm receipt Sov notes.
2. MEC like NATO is proposed as defensive arrangement accordance UN charter necessitated by Sov aggressive hostility.
3. US Govt will concert with other Govts to determine action to be taken on Sov notes.

Pls inform Br, Fr, Turks accordingly.[3]

WEBB

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[1] Drafted and signed for the Acting Secretary by Walworth Barbour of EE. Cleared by NEA and RA. Sent also to Paris and London, repeated to Moscow and Rome.

[2] Not printed; see editorial note, *supra*.

[3] Between November 27 and December 13, the four governments exchanged a number of draft proposals and notes in reply to the Soviet message of November 24. Documentation on these notes and proposals is in Department of State file 780.5.

Editorial Note

Regional command problems within NATO and the creation of a Middle East Command were discussed at length during the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome, November 24–28, 1951, documentation on which is in volume III, part 1, page 693 ff.

The possibility of "revamping" the Middle East Command proposal in such a way as to "give more flattery to the Egyptian vanity" was raised by Berry during the course of a brief report on conditions in Egypt during the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting of December 12. For the portion of this meeting dealing with Egypt and the Middle East Command, see page 434.

780.5/12–1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, December 13, 1951—12:01 p. m.

2889. Dept has now recd texts proposed UK, Fr and Turk replies to Sov note Nov 24 re MEC. Dept believes there is substantial accord and no difference in principle between the notes. Final version of text US reply will be sent to Emb Moscow within next several hours. Dept understands from Brit Emb here that Fr believe note shld be delivered by 14th with publication 24 hours later. Dept agreeable to this. We have suggested to Brit Emb time of release be ten in morning Wash time Sat Dec 15.

I. Embs London Paris and Ankara requested inform respective FonOffs:

(*a*) US believes that there is substantial accord between four Govts on principles contained in respective notes and that notes shld now be presented USSR; (*b*) US agreeable to presenting notes to USSR Dec 14 if reps four Govts Moscow are able to concert action and obtain appts that day.

II. Emb Moscow requested concert with UK Fr and Turk colleagues in seeking appt with Sov Fon Ministry Dec 14 to present notes. Dept has agreed with Brit Emb here that notes might be presented in order of dipl precedence. If impossible arrange presentation Dec 14 inform Dept and Embs London, Paris and Ankara immed.

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Kopper of NE, cleared with EE, BNA, WE, S/S, RA, and GTI. Approved and signed for Secretary Acheson by Kopper. Also sent niact to Paris as 3465, Ankara as 510, and Moscow as 408.

780.5/12-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—8:26 p. m.

522. I. Turk Chargé Esenbel called on Acting Asst Secy Berry today to inform Dept of Turk concern over divergence in tone and substance between proposed US and Turk notes on one hand and Brit and Fr notes on other in reply Sov note Nov 24 re MEC. Esenbel expressed view Brit and Fr drafts did not take "counter-offensive" tone which his Govt felt most desirable. He made same points Acting SecGen Turk FonOff made to Amb Wadsworth Dec 14 (Ankara's 534 Dec 14[2] to Dept, rptd London, Paris and Moscow). He expressed strong hope Brit and Fr notes cld be amended to bring them more into line with US and Turk notes.

II. Dept informed Esenbel that it was our opinion that there was substantial accord between four Powers and no difference in prins between four notes. While there were some differences in tone, four notes did contain substantially same prins. In addition each note contained separate and individual points of strength not contained in other notes. Effort was also made to point out to Esenbel how most of prins in Turk note were covered in Brit and Fr notes even though in different language and in less detail. Esenbel was also reminded that there had originally existed some differences of opinion between Fr and Brit Govts on one hand and US and Turk Govts on other as to manner in which Sov note shld be answered. At time of receipt of Sov note Dept had impression UK and Fr did not wish go into any gt detail but simply wished reject contentions Sov note firmly and without equivocation. Dept said that it had felt orig Brit draft was not sufficiently strong and had therefore made five specific recommendations to Brits, all of which had been incorpd in revised Brit draft. Finally, since US was generally satisfied with all of notes and Turk Govt was satisfied with US note, this seemed be matter between Turk Govt and Brit and Fr Govts. We did feel, however, it was of greatest importance that there be complete accord between all four Govts before notes were presented to Sov Union and Turk views wld be studied most carefully and sympathetically.

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[1] Drafted by Kopper, cleared in substance by NEA and EE, approved and signed for Secretary Acheson by Kopper. Also sent priority to Moscow as 417, London as 2932, and Paris as 3507.

[2] Not printed; it reported a conversation between Ambassador Wadsworth and Turkish Acting Secretary General Ustun in which Ustun complained that while the Turkish and United States draft replies to the Soviet note of November 24 were "firm in tone, solid in substances", the French and British drafts were not. Wadsworth added, *inter alia*, "In short Turk Govt view is that, if US holds to its text, Turk will hold to its on condition Brit and Fr approach our position". (780.5/12-1451)

III. Brit Emb Wash has informed Dept UK considers its present draft quite adequate and sees no necessity for any further change. Recipient missions are aware Fr views as rptd by Emb Paris today (Paristel 3555 Dec 14, rptd Ankara 84, London 956, Moscow 107).[3]

IV. While Dept is of opinion that notes as they now stand constitute entirely adequate replies, and is further of belief that there is consid merit in having differently worded and constructed replies in that it will make clear that responses are those of individ Govts concerned and not "dictated" by any one Govt, we nevertheless believe that Turk views shld be given careful consid partic in light of Turkey's position in ME and vis-à-vis USSR. Whatever changes in present UK, Fr and Turk texts can be worked out between three Govts to bring greater harmony will undoubtedly be entirely satis US. Embs Ankara, Paris and London shld so inform respective FonOffs.

V. We share opinion Fr FonOff that it wld be wise delay presentation notes and that it wld not be desirable ignore their views in view fact Turks are newly acting in close concert with UK, Fr and US. However, as matters stand now we doubt whether it will be poss iron out differences by Monday, Dec. 17. Date presentation is in our opinion not as impt as attainment of gen agrmt. Therefore, Emb Moscow shld not present US note until four Govts concerned have attained this agrmt and four Embs Moscow have been given green light. At that point it might be best for Embs in Moscow to determine exact date, giving us forty-eight hours notice if poss.

ACHESON

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[3] Not printed.

780.5/12–1751 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT Moscow, December 17, 1951—1 p. m.

1030. Re para 5 Deptel 417, December 14.[2] At meeting this morning with Fr, Brit and Turk Ambs, Turk said instructions from Ankara dated December 15 authorized him deliver MEC note in association with rest of us. We agreed that unless any one of us instructed contrary to deliver notes at half hour intervals beginning 5 p. m. Moscow time Tuesday December 18. Fr Amb suggested texts be released in respective capitals 4 p.m., Paris time Wednesday, December 19.

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[1] Repeated niact to Paris, Ankara, and London.

[2] Same as telegram 522 to Ankara, December 14, *supra*.

Urgent reply requested.[8]

CUMMING

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[8] In telegram 523 to Ankara of December 17, Kopper, signing for Secretary Acheson, requested "Reply in clear urgently affirmative or negative to fol question: 'Is Turk Govt now generally satisfy re dely [delivery] notes on MEC?'" (780.5/12–1251) In telegram 546 from Ankara of December 18, Ambassador Wadsworth replied that the Turkish Foreign Office had confirmed that the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow would present Turkey's note "today" provided the Soviet Foreign Office would receive the representatives. In telegram 548 of December 18, from Ankara, Ambassador Wadsworth informed the Department of State of some last minute changes in the Turkish note (780.5/12–1851).

780.5/12–1951: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT Moscow, December 19, 1951—3 p. m.

1048. Re mytel 1041 Dec 18[2] rptd London 168, Paris 404, and Ankara 20. At 1:30 p. m. handed Gromyko note re MEC.[3] After reading note carefully he said his preliminary observations were as fols:

Impossible for Sov Govt to agree with contents note: Sov position clearly expressed in notes given to US and other three govts concerned with establishment MEC and this position connected with aggressive policies pursued NATO and the US Govt; the allegations contained in my note were without foundation. I called his careful attention to statements "there has been no aggression whatsoever originating from countries members of NATO and MEC. There will not be any". Gromyko answered that there were other allegations in note which were "inaccurate and out of place" and had no bearing on the issues involved.

Gromyko made his remarks in calm quiet tone without any undue emphasis or heat.

CUMMING

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[1] Repeated niact to London, Paris, and Ankara.

[2] Not printed; it reported the arrangements made between senior officials of the United States, United Kingdom, French, and Turkish Embassies and the Soviet Foreign Office to deliver and receive the notes replying to the Soviet Note of November 24 concerning the MEC.

[3] The text of the U.S. reply to the Soviet Note of November 24 was sent to Moscow in telegram 409, niact of December 13 (780.5/12–1351). The reply was subsequently made public and is printed, along with the British Note of the same date, in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1951, pp. 433–436, and also in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 31, 1951, pp. 1055–1056.

780.5/12-2151 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 21, 1951—11 p. m.

Delga 780. No distribution GADel or Embassy for eyes only Berry and Jones (NEA) from Ross.[1] Fawzi Bey sent for me very urgently this afternoon. He said he wanted to discuss a non-GA matter with me. He then went on, with considerable intensity of manner, to suggest the possibility of Azzam Pasha seeing Eisenhower informally. The basic purpose of such interview wld be to compare notes and develop an up-to-date picture of the present situation as seen from both sides. By both sides Fawzi Bey explained he meant (*a*) relationships within the free world family and (*b*) between the free world and the other side, that is the problem of defense.

In making this suggestion Fawzi said that there has been a very confused situation during recent weeks, in particular since the "untimely" presentation of the 4 power proposals for MEC. The "untimely" presentation plus certain unfortunate features of the substance thereof put a "spoke in the wheel" and caused existing confusion to become more confused.

I asked Fawzi Bey what he meant by unfortunate features and he referred in reply to the way in which the proposals were presented, the preamble and part relating to Sudan. Fawzi emphasized that "we cannot allow existing confusion to stand in the way of the vital necessity of our working together".

By way of further background Fawzi said that Salaheddin was suffering from frustration. He wanted to remain a friend of the US but felt frustrated because he felt his overtures met with rebuffs. Fawzi said Salaheddin was sincere and truthful in this feeling and also sincere and truthful in the feeling of wanting to be a friend "even with the UK". He said Salaheddin had no illusions and no connection of any kind with Moscow.

On the other hand Fawzi went on, Salaheddin has a clearcut but not an obstinate concept of what his country is entitled to not only for the good of Egypt but for the good of the free world.

Fawzi said we must get over the hump which keeps us from seeing things eye to eye. He said this hump is the antiquated approach of "imposition from the outside instead of comradeship". He said that without an approach based on comradeship none of us can be strong or safe. On the basis of comradeship, however, Egypt and the other Arabs will be prepared to put "millions" in the field in def of freedom and our common interests.

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[1] This telegram was subsequently sent by the Department of State to Cairo and London. (780.5/12-2151) John C. Ross was Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Fawzi then said he wanted to tell me something "very confidentially" which had not been true until today. He said "we accept withdrawal of the Brit on a gradual basis. For local polit purposes it wld have to be stated that withdrawal was immed but it wld be a scheduled withdrawal". This wld be possible Fawzi said if agreement cld be reached upon a system of common def and on the build up of the econ of the area which is the backbone of the defense of the area. Fawzi said they had a realistic appraisal of all we are doing and of all our difficulties but he said we have come to a time when all of us must "stretch ourselves a little further".

Fawzi said it wld not do simply to return to consideration of the MEC proposals. He said there shld be a real straightforward and not a "tricky" overhauling of these proposals. By "overhauling" it seemed clear Fawzi meant discussion. I asked him what he meant by use of the word "tricky" which seemed a little unfortunate. He said he did not mean tricky in that sense but rather in the sense of vague or diplomatic. He said "let's not try to be clever in regard to such matters".

Against the foregoing background Fawzi said he thought that a talk between Azzam and Eisenhower "cld be helpful" before the Churchill-Truman-Eden-Acheson conversations.[2] At least it wld not be harmful.

Fawzi said they had no idea at all of working behind the backs of the UK or of making things difficult before the Washington talks. On the contrary he said they wld be very happy if agreement cld be reached in the Washington talks on a new approach. He said we must try again and if one thing did not work to keep on trying again.

I asked Fawzi whether I had understood correctly that he was suggesting that Azzam see Eisenhower alone or that Azzam and Salaheddin shld see Eisenhower together. Fawzi said that he was suggesting that Azzam see Eisenhower alone and that this was with the "clear understanding and agreement of Salaheddin". He said that if Eisenhower shld prefer seeing Azzam and Salaheddin together, that, of course, cld be arranged. He went on to say that if Azzam saw Eisenhower it wld thereafter be a good idea for Azzam to have an opportunity to talk with some of Eisenhower's aides.

Referring to all of the foregoing I told Fawzi I was not in a position to make any comment but that I wld commit myself to mention one or two points. First, I observed that since Fawzi had suggested that the purpose of the proposed interviews wld be to compare notes on relationships within the free world and between the free world and the other side, there were, of course, the usual diplomatic channels available for discussion of such matters. Second, Eisenhower was of course a very busy man. Third, I did not know whether Eisenhower wld consider that it was within his competence to discuss the matters ref to by Fawzi.

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[2] Scheduled to be held at Washington in January 1952.

Fawzi observed that the last 2 points were of course considerations we wld have to take into account. On my first observation, however, Fawzi said that we cld of course put on frockcoats and deal with matters in that way. He then stressed that he had in mind a mtg of "a very informal character".

I made no further comment. Fawzi asked me to think over his suggestion and said he wanted to keep in close touch with me during next few days.[3] [Ross.]

ROOSEVELT

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[3] In telegram 941 to Cairo of December 22, G. Lewis Jones, signing for Secretary Acheson, requested comments on Fawzi's proposals, adding "Depts reaction is that affirmative response Fawzi suggestion wld be further build-up of Salaheddin and wld therefore be contrary to efforts bypass him. Moreover, we doubt very much Eisenhower cld involve himself in question so far removed NATO competence. Subject your comments Dept feels Fawzi shld receive no encouragement on this idea and shld be told that usual Dip channels are available for such discussions Egypts may wish to have or proposals Egypt may wish to make" (780.5/12–2151). Ambassador Caffery replied in telegram 938 from Cairo of December 24 that he concurred in the Department's reaction to the proposed Eisenhower–Azzam meeting (780.5/12–2451). In telegram Gadel 552 to Paris, December 26, Samuel K. C. Kopper, signing for Acheson, informed Ross that in view of Cairo's concurrence with telegram 941, Fawzi should be "tactfully discouraged from pursuing Eisenhower–Azzam Mtg" and Kopper proceeded to make the same subsequent points to Ross as had been made by Jones in telegram 941 to Cairo (780.5/12–2451).

PPS Files : Lot 64 D 563 : "Villard"

Draft Study by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 27, 1951.

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE GENERAL AREA OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST*

PROBLEM

1. To determine U.S. national objectives and policies with respect to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East countries.

ANALYSIS

2. Geographically the area has great strategic importance. It lies at the land, sea and air crossroads of three continents. It contains

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[1] The source text indicates that this was a draft prepared by Henry S. Villard of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff for the NSC Staff.

* The term "Middle East" is used in this paper to refer to the Arab States, Iran, and Israel. Turkey is excluded because our policy toward Turkey is determined within the NATO–ERP framework. [Footnote in the source text.]

copy available

important Western military bases, the Suez Canal, Dardanelles and Bosphorus and has natural defensive barriers in its mountains and deserts. It lies close to Soviet centers of industry, population and oil resources.

3. Approximately half the world's known oil reserves are in the Middle East. Access to these rich oil reserves is of great importance to the Free World in peace and war. Detailed discussion relating to oil in this area may be found in the NSC 97 studies and related papers.[2]

4. The maintenance and defense of Western interests in the Middle East is so important to the over-all position of the West that it is in the interest of the United States to take whatever appropriate measures it can, in the light of its other commitments, to maintain and defend these interests.

5. The extension of Soviet control over the Middle East would mean a violent shift in the world balance of power. It is necessary to counter efforts in this direction by the Soviet Union—and this is one of the objectives of U.S. policy in the Middle East. There is, however, little danger that the Soviet Union will take aggressive military action against the Middle East as a whole unless it has decided to initiate general war. The problem of preparing for general war, and the measures to be taken in the Middle East should be determined in accordance with strategic plans for conducting a general war with the Soviet Union.

6. The major threats to Western interests in the Middle East lie in the growing instability within the Middle Eastern states and in the tensions and hostile attitudes between, first the Arab States and Israel and, second, the Arab States and the Western powers, notably the U.K., and in the prevailing attitude of neutralism. The major problem for the United States in the Middle East is to find ways of dealing with these threats.

The US and UK Roles in the Area

7. In the past the United States has relied primarily on the U.K. for the maintenance and defense of Western interests in the Middle East. However, the rapidly declining ability of the U.K. to maintain and defend Western interests in parts of the Middle East now creates the need for a review and restatement of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. In some countries where the British have been unable to discharge this responsibility, the United States has assumed it. Greece and Turkey are examples of the transfer of major responsibility from the U.K. to the United States in this part of the world. Also, where

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[2] For documentation on U.S. interest in Near and Middle East petroleum, see pp. 268 ff.

the United States has major military and economic interests, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, U.S. influence has largely replaced U.K. influence.

8. However, the ability of the U.S. to exercise influence in the area is limited and it is desirable for the U.S. to work closely with the U.K. (and the Commonwealth countries), France and Turkey. To the extent that the exercise of influence requires the use of force by a Western power as a necessary and appropriate means of maintaining and defending Western interests in the area, it is in the U.S. interest that the U.K. provide such force.

9. The declining ability of the U.K. to maintain and defend Western interests in the Middle East does not appear to be primarily due to the inadequacy of British military forces in the area. On the contrary, the British probably have sufficient military forces in Cyprus, Egypt, and Iraq to take local military actions that might become necessary in the area. The decline of British capabilities is a complex phenomenon. It is partly a result of the decline of the U.K. as a world power. It is in important measure a reflection of the nationalist aspirations of the Middle Eastern states—accompanied and intensified by the desire to end what they regard as unjust exploitation and by the belief, fostered by the creation of the United Nations and adoption of the UN Charter and by the coming to independence of Pakistan, India, and other Asiatic nations, that a new era has begun in international affairs. It is also traceable in part to the discontent of the peoples of the area with their social and economic conditions—a factor which weakens the grip on power of the ruling classes and which therefore weakens the ability of the West to maintain stability in these states by working through the ruling classes.

10. This analysis makes it doubtful that it would be possible for the U.S. or the U.K., or both together to maintain and defend Western interests in the area in the 19th century fashion. In fact, it seems clear that the West must work toward the establishment of a new basis and a new kind of relationship with the Middle Eastern states. The change to a new basis will not, of course, be clean-cut. Western power and prestige, exercised directly and through ruling groups, will continue to be important factors in the maintenance of stability within the area. There may well be occasions, as in Egypt at the present time, when the West will have to be prepared to use force to maintain its interests or to accept the loss of these interests. Whatever the U.S. can do to bolster both generally and locally the power and prestige of the U.K. will assist the U.K. in maintaining stability in the area and will reduce the need for direct action by the U.S. or other Allied powers—*provided that* the Western posture toward the area comes

more and more to be regarded by the states in the area as being in harmony with their basic interests.

THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

11. Despite the weakness of their military position, the states of the area have learned neither the value of unity nor the collective strength they might attain by banding together. Local rivalries divide the nations, and this political fragmentation militates against the development of any regional cohesion and regional concepts. The Arab League is a weak reed upon which to build any area program, and would be weaker still if it were not held together by its antipathy toward Israel.

12. Egypt, Iraqi, Iranian, Jordan and Israeli armed forces have received some equipment from British and American sources and have benefited in the past from military tutelage but, in general their standards are not comparable to Western ones. (The Arab Legion in Jordan is British trained and of higher caliber than its Arab neighbors' forces, but its strength is less than one division.)

13. While the foregoing considerations present serious obstacles to a unification of forces for the immediate present, the fact remains that, in the event of failure of efforts to secure coordinated action, as by the establishing of a Middle East Command, the opportunity exists for building up military strength in individual countries and thus enhancing their powers of resistance to aggression. Thus those countries which contain economic, communication or base facilities highly important to our strategic aims may be strengthened unilaterally, and strong political reasons may exist for strengthening the nations of the area. Our most important economic resource of this region is oil, and to protect it, consideration should be given to insuring priorities of military assistance to friendly forces in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Important strategic communication routes and bases (the Suez, Bosphorus, Dardanelles, bases in Saudi Arabia) indicate that consideration should be given to insuring priorities of military assistance to friendly forces in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It has recently been agreed that some military assistance should go to Syria in order to increase its political stability and secure its orientation toward the West.

14. The United States maintains hope that some of the various political barriers dividing this area may be gradually lowered by the Middle East states working together against the common threat of aggressive communism through participation in a Middle East Defense arrangement.

15. The Middle East Command—assuming that the present obstacles to the participation of the Middle Eastern states in this com-

mand can be overcome—if handled adroitly, could help in various ways to deal with the problem of maintaining and defending Western interests in the area:

a. To the extent that fear of Soviet aggression deters the governments of the Middle Eastern countries from taking needed measures, the acknowledgment by the United States of its interest in the security of the area together with its readiness to participate in the MEC should help to overcome that fear. It should thereby help to build internal strength and to strengthen the will of the people to resist any Soviet aggression.

b. To the extent that the decline of British power and prestige is a factor contributing to instability in the area, the association of the U.S. with the U.K. in the MEC should help to demonstrate the joint interests of the U.S. and U.K. and thus lead to an increase of British prestige and respect for Western power. Furthermore, the cooperation of the British and the Middle Eastern states in the MEC should tend to provide increased opportunities in a favorable climate for efforts to settle disputes between them.

c. To the extent that the desire for "equal treatment" is a factor affecting relations between the Middle Eastern states and the Western powers, the principles underlying the MEC and its institutional character should help by assuaging this desire of the Middle Eastern states.

d. To the extent that tensions within the area are a source of instability, cooperation in the MEC on problems related to the defense of the area as a whole against outside aggression should be helpful, for it should tend to be reflected in increased regional cooperation and understanding in other than military matters.

e. To the extent that the weakness of the present governments in the Middle East is a factor contributing to instability, the MEC should be helpful by providing opportunities to the Western powers for bolstering these governments in various ways in order to increase the local power and prestige of the governments.

16. In order to provide a sound foundation for the development of U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it seems desirable, if politically practicable, to obtain a Congressional endorsement of the growing interest of the United States in the security of the Middle East and specifically of U.S. participation in the MEC. The acknowledgment of this interest contained in the quadripartite statement of principles of November 10 and the commitments implied by U.S. participation in the MEC are major developments of U.S. foreign policy, about which the Congress should be consulted and its support, at least for appropriations, will be necessary.[3]

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[3] There follows at this point in the source text a handwritten addition which reads as follows: "The MSA act now contains a general evaluation of US interest in the security of the Middle East. An amendment of this language to strengthen it and to refer specifically to the MEC appears to be the most desirable form of Congressional action that is most feasible."

17. Congressional action, if any is sought, should be such as to:

a. Make it unnecessary to secure reciprocal commitments from the Middle Eastern States.
b. Avoid raising Arab-Jewish problems, as a treaty would.
c. Give the U.S. maximum freedom of decision and action in implementing our undertaking and in reacting in the event of an attack on the area.
d. To avoid, unless we desired it, the proliferation of international institutions on the NATO pattern.[4]

18. To bolster the likelihood of success of the Middle East Command it may be desirable to furnish considerable U.S. personnel to advise the staff of this command. Further, in order to help friendly nations who desire to help themselves become stronger it may be desirable to furnish military assistance missions to show U.S. interest and to bolster political, psychological and economic efforts. The U.S. should not undertake to commit forces in the area, but should retain flexibility in this matter and arrive at a decision on the employment of U.S. forces only in the light of particular circumstances as they may exist.

Social and Economic Problems in the Area.

19. The low standards of living in the Arab countries and Iran engender mass discontent, perpetuate political and social instability and ferment and increase the vulnerability of these impoverished peoples to the blandishments of communism. A growing awareness of and dissatisfaction with these conditions is apparent. Social revolution may be impossible to prevent but it might be guided to insure friendliness to Western powers. Society is predominantly feudal in character in the majority of states and established governments often appear unable to adapt themselves to changing circumstances and to contribute sufficiently to higher standards of living and the demands of their peoples. Responsibility for the people's lot is often shifted to the colonial and imperialistic practices attributed to the Western powers, and communist propaganda supports this criticism. A strong movement towards neutralism and xenophobia has resulted.

20. The establishment of the MEC and the most effective possible use of the MEC as an instrumentality for serving U.S. interests in the area will not alone solve the problems confronting the U.S. in the Middle East. It will be necessary in addition to work with the governments of these states in improving the basic social and economic conditions in the area. In developing and carrying out these programs it will be necessary to make compromises between long-term and short-term considerations. In the long term it is probable that the present

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[4] Section 17 of the source text is enclosed in handwritten brackets, presumably in light of the textual addition mentioned in footnote 3 above.

ruling groups will lose more of their power—unless they prove able to adjust their outlook and to assume leadership of the changing social and economic and political development of their countries. In the short term, however, the West depends greatly on these groups for the maintenance of stability in the area, and will often find it necessary to work with and through men and groups competent to exercise power, but with whom it is not in full sympathy. It would probably be necessary, however distasteful it may be, to funnel a considerable amount of our economic assistance through these groups in order to bolster their hold on power. Where this is necessary, our attempt should be to modify the policies of these groups in ways desirable from the long-term point of view, but we should not deliberately sacrifice important short-term interests because of our view as to what constitutes the desirable long-term course of development.

21. Insofar as social and economic actions in the Middle East are concerned, the U.S. and the U.K. (and where desirable France) should support each other by concerting their policies so as to make the most effective use of their respective capabilities in the area. It will probably be necessary in the U.S. national interest over the next several years to continue our programs of economic aid to the countries of the Middle East, including the resettlement of refugees, along the lines provided by MSP.[5] Somewhat larger sums may be required later on than the $125 million authorized for 1952. In carrying out these programs it may be desirable to concentrate on pilot projects susceptible of having early regional application and on programs productive of tangible benefits at an early date for many people. Such programs should carefully avoid the appearance of partiality to Israel, and in implementing military aid under MSA it will be necessary to give due regard to the dangers of an arms race between the Arabs and the Israelis. We should also explore ways and means of developing consultation and collaboration on social and economic problems among the states associated with MEC in order to promote nonmilitary enterprises of benefit to the region as a whole.

22. The U.S. has been viewed with distrust by the Arab States in the last few years because of the responsibility ascribed to it for the establishment of Israel as a nation. In order to overcome this distrust it will be necessary to intensify present psychological efforts in the area. For this purpose it should be possible to draw upon the reservoir of good will, which is probably still existent, engendered by U.S. philanthropic and educational agencies and by the practices of U.S. oil companies in the area.

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[5] For documentation on the Middle Eastern refugee problem, see pp. 559 ff.

23. Only in the case of Iran is there a present serious possibility that the communists might be able to come to power by internal action. There is also in the case of Iran the possibility that a Soviet occupation of the northern provinces might occur in certain circumstances. This move would probably not be made by the Soviet Union except to exploit what the Soviet rulers might regard as a safe and favorable opportunity arising from internal chaos in Iran or as a counter to efforts by the West to maintain and defend its interests in Iran. The Iranian case is thus a special one.

24. Excluding an attack via Turkey which will be covered by the NAT commitment, an attack on the Middle East can only be made through Iran. Iran has not yet been invited to join the MEC. The permanent exclusion of Iran from the MEC and more particularly its exclusion from the area covered by the recommended concurrent resolution by the Congress would set Iran apart and indicate that the U.S. and its Western allies might react differently to an attack on Iran than to an attack on the rest of the Middle East. This would increase the dangers in the Iranian situation [and] it is therefore recommended that Iran be included in the area covered by the resolution and as soon as possible after a settlement of the oil problem, in the MEC.

25. The greatest danger in the Iranian situation, however, is that Iran will come under Soviet control through the coming to power in Iran of the Tudeh Party or other extremist groups. The United States should continue its efforts to assist the British and Iranians to settle their dispute and should be prepared to take such financial measures as might be necessary to prevent the collapse of the Iranian Government through the inability of that government to meet its current operating expenses, but such assistance should be kept to a minimum in order to maintain pressure for a settlement of the oil problem.

26. . . .

780.5/12–1951

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 29, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Middle East Command, in which the United States announced its intention to participate along with the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Turkey, involves many problems, a few of which were outlined as follows in Mr. Matthews' letter to you of October 31, 1951:[2]

"A. 1. Defense of the Middle East (Defense).
  2. Definition of MEC area (State-Defense).
  3. MEC relationship to NATO (State-Defense).
  4. Role of Turkey in MEC (State-Defense).

B. Detailed organization of MEC, including location of MEC headquarters (Defense).

C. Steps required to secure association of Arab states, Israel and other interested states with MEC (State-Defense)."

Group A of these problems will have to be worked out in such consultations as those which took place in Rome on November 27, 1951[3] but, as General Bradley and I indicated on that occasion, these problems should not be allowed to impede planning for the establishment of the Middle East Command. This letter is devoted to the desirability of proceeding with the establishment of the Middle East Command (points B and C above).

This Department considers it would be desirable from political point of view that there be established on Cyprus not later than March–April of 1952 a Middle East Command headquarters, as a going institution with United States, United Kingdom, French, Turkish and possibly Commonwealth staff officers in residence. The Four Powers have stated publicly their intention to proceed with the establishment of the Middle East Command. We believe that the United States should use its influence and resources to accelerate the transformation of MEC from a paper enterprise into an established physical entity.

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[1] Drafted by G. Lewis Jones, cleared by Matthews, S/P, BNA, GTI, WE, NEA, RA, and S/S. The source text indicates that this letter was signed by Acheson on December 28. A covering memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Burton Y. Berry, of December 19, stated that it was deemed necessary to establish a State–Defense Working Group on MEC in order to assist in developing the advance planning necessary on the United States part prior to discussions with the other proposed founding countries. The proposed Working Group "would study the practical problems of a politico-military character which will have to be faced and formulate recommendations as to the position which the United States should take" (780.5/12–1951).

[2] *Ante*, p. 238.

[3] Reference is to the discussions on the MEC during the meetings of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome, November 24–28, 1951; for documentation, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 693 ff.

The MEC is at the very least a quadripartite enterprise with which Australia, New Zealand and South Africa will also be associated. Since MEC headquarters will be located initially on the British territory of Cyprus, it is logical that the United Kingdom should take the initiative in formulating plans for the headquarters. However, the British military authorities are, we understand, still hopeful that it will be possible to locate MEC headquarters in Egypt and, consequently, are inclined to postpone as long as possible preparations and planning for a headquarters on Cyprus. There is no doubt that Egypt would be the best location for the headquarters and it was for this reason that Egypt was offered founder status in the MEC. However, under the present circumstances, this Department sees no possibility of the Anglo-Egyptian impasse being resolved in the course of the next few months in such a way that it will be possible to locate MEC headquarters in Egypt. Since actions have a greater impact than words upon Middle Eastern States, we would like to see the necessary planning undertaken now so that the Cyprus headquarters can be opened in the first part of next year. We believe that the political impact of the early inauguration of the headquarters will be both favorable and profound.

Since the "cold war" objectives of MEC are politico-military in character, we believe that it would be desirable to initiate at this time an informal State–Defense working group to study the various practical problems connected with the establishment of the MEC headquarters. We suggest that this should be a clearing house for ideas and that the establishment of such a working group would itself be a stimulus to the United Kingdom in getting on with the job.

Subject to your concurrence with the general idea, I suggest that Defense channels be used to advise the United Kingdom of the establishment of this Working Group which at an early meeting would:

a) set down for consideration by higher authority the unresolved questions such as those discussed at Rome,

b) fix its own terms of reference,

c) prepare a schedule of work which would result in a preliminary statement of the United States position to be advanced in early discussions with the United Kingdom, France and Turkey as well as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa,

d) work out a suggested time table for discussions with other interested states (*c* above).

I would be glad to know whether you concur in the foregoing suggestions and your ideas as to how they can be implemented most effectively. It will be desirable, of course, to keep the working group as small as is consistent with the accomplishment of its purpose.[4]

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

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[4] Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett replied to the Secretary of State in a letter dated February 11, 1952, in which he expressed general agreement with the suggestions for the early establishment of a Middle East Command headquarters. He emphasized, however, that it was the Department of Defense position that establishment of a Middle East Command "must not be allowed to jeopardize the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty." As for the details of effecting coordination of effort between a Middle East Command and contiguous NATO commands, he stated, they could not be determined until Greece and Turkey had become members of NATO. "Any arrangements which tend toward integration of the two commands (the British 'two-hat' concept) should be opposed."

Secretary Lovett concurred in the proposal to establish an informal State-Defense Working Group to study the problems connected with the establishment of a Middle East Command, for which the Joint Chiefs of Staff would provide the Department of Defense representation, but he objected to notifying the British:

"Prior to the time that a United States position on the matter of the Middle East Command Headquarters is reached, I do not agree with your suggestion that the United Kingdom be informed of the establishment of the Working Group. When the United States position is reached, it is agreed to use Defense channels to advise the United Kingdom of this Working Group." (780.5/2-1152)

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST[1]

INR-NIE Files

National Intelligence Estimate[2]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 8 January 1951.

NIE-14

THE IMPORTANCE OF IRANIAN AND MIDDLE EAST OIL TO WESTERN EUROPE UNDER PEACETIME CONDITIONS*

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the importance of (*a*) Iranian oil production and (*b*) total Middle East oil production to Western Europe in time of peace.

ASSUMPTIONS

That access to (*a*) Iranian oil production, and (*b*) total Middle East oil production is denied to the Western Powers by means other than war.

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[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 9 ff.

[2] This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is one of a series of high-level interdepartmental reports first published in the fall of 1950 by the Central Intelligence Agency. Each Estimate was intended to be the most authoritative interpretation and appraisal of a situation available to policymakers and to present the coordinated expression of the best intelligence opinion from among several departments and agencies. The priorities and frames of reference for a proposed Estimate were set by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This Committee was composed of the Director of Central Intelligence, who served as Chairman; the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence; and the Chiefs of Intelligence of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The organizations represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee drafted sections of an Estimate in accordance with their respective fields of responsibility; the Department of State provided all political and some economic sections. An integrated draft paper was discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups under the coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates, then submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for final revision and approval. Provision was made for the notation of dissent where unanimity did not exist. Immediately upon approval, a National Intelligence Estimate was published by the Central Intelligence Agency and forwarded to the President, the appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the National Security Council.

*[Note on the title page.] This estimate has been prepared in response to a request from the Senior Staff of the National Security Council. The basic data were supplied by an interdepartmental *ad hoc* committee of technical representatives of ECA, the Petroleum Committee of the Munitions Board, the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and State, and CIA. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 30 December 1950.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The amount of crude oil and refined products now exported from Iran could be derived from other areas by small increases in crude production and by fuller use of available refining capacity. At the rates of consumption and levels of prices prevailing at the end of 1950, the extra annual dollar charge to Europe of procuring this amount of oil elsewhere would be about $700,000,000.†

2. Loss of Iranian oil production and of the refinery at Abadan would temporarily have an adverse effect upon Western European economic activity, and would impose severe financial losses particularly upon the British, who control all the oil production of the country. Although the effect of the loss of Iran on the volume of petroleum which could be made available to Western Europe might be overcome in a relatively short time by developing reserves and building refineries elsewhere, the financial effects would be overcome slowly, if at all.

3. If all Middle East oil production were to be lost, a cutback of about 10 percent in the total oil consumption of the non-Soviet world would have to be imposed, even after a maximum practicable increase of production from other sources. This would call for substantial rationing in the United States as well as elsewhere. International allocation would be required. At the price level of late 1950 a net increase in dollar requirements of from $1 to $1.2 billion would occur if Western Europe, after a cutback of 10 percent in its consumption, were to procure from alternative sources an amount of oil sufficient to make up for the loss of Middle East imports.

4. It is estimated that if a cutback of 10 percent from present levels of oil consumption were imposed on Western Europe, it would permit maintenance of industrial production at approximately the levels of late 1950, and of transportation at the extreme minimum necessary for that purpose. No appreciable expansion of industry, whether for normal economic development or for rearmament, would be possible, unless economies were effected, expansion of industry and transportation facilities were accomplished only with solid fuel-utilizing equipment, and possibly some conversion of existing petroleum-using

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† Figures in this paper representing estimates of extra annual dollar costs and of the extent of oil shortages which would result from a loss of Iranian or Middle Eastern oil are indicative rather than exact. They will hold true as given only as long as oil prices stay at the levels of late 1950, and oil production and consumption continue at the rates currently estimated for the fiscal year 1950–51. The general effect of the rearmament programs in the US and in Western Europe will presumably be to raise the consumption of oil, and probably also to raise its price. These factors would tend to make the oil of the Middle East more important to the western economies, and to cause its loss to be even more severely felt than is indicated by the figures cited in this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]

equipment were made. Rationing even to reduce consumption by 10 percent would present great difficulties in time of peace.

5. No way can be foreseen at present by which a satisfactory adjustment, over a longer period of time, could be made to the total loss of Middle East oil, unless new reserves are proved elsewhere, or new sources of energy developed. Western Europe therefore would not be able to compensate for the loss of Middle East oil save by profound changes in its currently planned economic structure.

DISCUSSIONS

1. Total petroleum requirements of Western Europe (including the UK) for the fiscal year 1950–51 are estimated at 66 million metric tons, of which 42.5 million will be imported as crude and 20 million as refined products; the remaining 3.5 million tons will be derived from indigenous sources. Of the total import requirements, 43.8 million metric tons, representing 70 percent, will come from the Middle East. In addition, international bunkers of 6 million tons and US military supplies aggregating approximately 2.5 million metric tons will be lifted in the Middle East area.

2. Of the total requirements of Western Europe, it is estimated that Iran alone will supply the following:

Millions of Metric Tons

	Percent of WE Requirements
Crude Oil	
7	16
Refined Products	
6.3 (including British Military)	31
Bunkers	
4	67

3. It is estimated likewise that of total Western European requirements, the entire Middle East area will supply the following:

Millions of Metric Tons

	Percent of WE Requirements
Crude Oil	
38	90
Refined Products	
8.3	40
Bunkers	
6	100

Loss of Iranian Production

4. If Iranian oil should cease to be available, the seven million metric tons of crude oil by which Western Europe would thereby fall short (according to the 1950–51 estimates) could be more than made up by increasing the output of British companies operating elsewhere in the world. Indeed it could all be replaced, at some additional dollar

cost, from the other producing areas of the Middle East. Replacement for the balance of Iran's crude oil output (that processed at Abadan) could also be obtained outside the Soviet sphere by releasing shut-in production and by more rapid drilling of known reserves.

5. Loss of the Abadan refinery, with its capacity of 27 million metric tons per year, would call for much more difficult adjustments than would the loss of Iranian crude oil output. There is now in the non-Soviet world, outside Iran, enough refining capacity to process an additional amount of crude equal to that now going through the Abadan plant. If Abadan were lost, however, at least six months would be required to place marginal plants in operation, to change the composition of refinery output, to alter tanker routings, and to complete the redistribution of crude oil among the other refineries.

6. To acquire from other sources the amounts of crude oil and refined products which Western Europe now imports in one year from Iran would involve an extra dollar expenditure of about $700,000,000, assuming the level of prices remained the same as that prevailing at the end of 1950.

7. Loss of Iranian oil production and of the refinery at Abadan would temporarily have an adverse effect upon Western European economic activity, and would impose severe financial losses particularly upon the British, who control all the oil production in the country. Although the effect of the loss of Iran upon the volume of petroleum which could be made available to Western Europe might be overcome in a relatively short time by developing reserves and building refineries elsewhere, the financial effects would be overcome slowly, if at all.

Loss of All Middle East Oil

8. The loss of all Middle East oil production would reduce the current supply of crude oil in the non-Soviet world by about 93 million metric tons per year. By increasing production to the greatest degree feasible in areas still accessible, this shortage could be reduced to about 53 million metric tons, which is equivalent to about 10 percent of estimated 1950–51 total oil consumption in the non-Soviet world. Sufficient refining capacity would be available to process the reduced total supply of crude, but the problems of readjustment and allocation mentioned in paragraph 5 above would, of course, be greater, and the time required to carry them out would be longer.

9. The maximum cutback in Western European oil consumption which would still permit maintenance of industrial production at approximately the levels of late 1950, and of transportation at the extreme minimum necessary for that purpose, is estimated to be about 10 percent. Such a cutback would permit no appreciable expansion of industry, whether for normal economic development or for pur-

poses of rearmament, unless economies were effected, expansion of industry and transportation facilities were accomplished only with solid fuel-utilizing equipment, and possibly some conversion of existing petroleum-using equipment were made. Moreover, the 10 percent cutback would cover only about 6.6 million metric tons out of the total deficiency of 53 million. Hence it is clear that even if Western Europe were restricted to less than 90 percent of its estimated 1950–51 consumption, the loss of all Middle East oil would make substantial rationing necessary in the United States. Despite the fact that the US is virtually self-sufficient in oil production, it would have to cut its consumption by at least 10 percent. International allocation would immediately become necessary.

10. At the price level of late 1950 a net increase in dollar requirements of from $1 to $1.2 billion would occur if Western Europe, after a cutback of 10 percent in its consumption, were to procure from alternative sources an amount of oil sufficient to make up for the loss of Middle East imports.

11. No way can be foreseen at present by which a satisfactory adjustment, over a longer period of time, could be made to the total loss of Middle East oil, unless new reserves are proved elsewhere, or new sources of energy developed. Though the Middle East now contributes only 18.4 percent of total non-Soviet production, it contains 44.4 percent of proved reserves outside the Soviet orbit. A very large proportion of the presently contemplated increase in non-Soviet oil supply is expected to come from the Middle East. Western Europe, therefore, would not be able to compensate for the loss of Middle East oil save by profound changes in its currently planned economic structure.

Special Effects Upon the United Kingdom

12. The effects of a loss of Middle East oil upon the UK, though no less adverse, would be somewhat different in nature from the effects upon most other Western European countries, in which the physical shortage of supply and the expenditure of dollars necessary to replace it would be the factors most immediately paramount. Even after the loss of the Middle East, British companies would own about 35 percent of available crude production apart from that in the US and Canada—i.e., they would control more than one-third of the *exportable surplus* of oil available to the non-Soviet powers. (US companies would own about one-half of crude production outside the US and Canada.) There would be more than enough oil under the control of the British to supply all their domestic requirements, plus bunkers and military liftings, if they chose to give priority to domestic re-

quirements over other markets. Hence, the UK would have a fairly strong bargaining position in the negotiations which would be necessary for the international allocation of available oil supplies, after the loss of Middle Eastern output.

13. On the other hand, the financial setback to the British resulting from the loss of their enormous investments in Middle East oil, especially in Iran, and of the receipts both in dollars and in soft currencies which arise from them, would tend to offset any special advantages which the UK might derive from its ownership of other sources of supply. Loss of the economic (and strategic) power which the UK now possesses by virtue of its control over the production and distribution of Middle East oil would also be a factor of utmost importance. Finally, the effects which a total loss of Middle East oil would indirectly exert upon the general structure of international trade and payments would be especially adverse to the UK because of its extraordinary dependence upon overseas trade.

TABLES

[Here follows a list of the tables printed below.]

TABLE I

ESTIMATED IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED PRODUCTS INTO OEEC COUNTRIES 1950-51

(1,000 MT/Y)

From—	Crude	Products	Total	Crude (percent)	Products (percent)	Total (percent)
Eastern Hemisphere:						
Middle East (Includes US military)	38,065	8,321	46,386	89.69	41.39	74.16
Other		100	100		.50	.16
Total	38,065	8,421	46,486	89.69	41.89	74.32
Western Hemisphere:						
USA	150	1,850	2,000	.35	9.20	3.20
Caribbean	4,067	9,604	13,671	9.58	47.77	21.86
Other	160	230	390	.38	1.14	.62
	4,377	11,684	16,061	10.31	58.11	25.68
Grand Total	42,442	20,105	62,547	100.00	100.00	100.00

TABLE II

ESTIMATED INTERNATIONAL BUNKER LIFTINGS (REFINED PRODUCTS) IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA

(1950-1951)

	1,000 mt/y	Percent
From Iran	4,000	66.67
From other Middle East	2,000	33.33
Total	6,000	100.00

TABLE III

CONTROL OF WORLD CRUDE RESERVES

(1950–1951)

Area	United States		British		Other		Total 1,000 mt	Percent of world total
	1,000 mt	Percent	1,000 mt	Percent	1,000 mt	Percent		
Eastern Hemisphere:								
Middle East								
Iraq	170,445	23.7	378,288	52.6	170,445	23.7	719,178	7.2
Kuwait	753,424	50.0	753,424	50.0	......	......	1,506,849	15.1
Saudi Arabia	1,232,877	100.0	......	......	......	......	1,232,877	12.3
Iran	......	......	958,904	100.0	......	......	958,904	9.6
Bahrein	......	......	21,917	100.0	......	......	21,917	.2
Total	2,156,746	......	2,112,533	......	170,445	23.7	4,439,725	44.4
East Indies Islands	62,172	31.3	136,450	68.7	......	......	198,631	2.0
OEEC Countries	5,834	20.0	7,293	25.0	16,044	55.0	29,171	.3
Total	68,006	......	143,752	......	16,044	......	227,802	......
Western Hemisphere:								
US and Canada	3,713,562	100.0	......	......	......	......	3,713,562	37.0
Mexico	......	......	......	......	116,438	100.0	116,438	1.2
Caribbean Exporting Areas	888,865	61.5	550,663	38.1	5,781	0.4	1,445,309	14.5
Total	4,602,427	......	550,663	......	122,219	......	5,275,309	......
Other	......	......	......	......	......	1.4	45,316	.5
Total World							9,987,972	

TABLE IV

OWNERSHIP OF WORLD CRUDE PRODUCTION

(1950–1951)

Area	United States		British		Other		Total 1,000 MT	Percent of world total
	1,000 MT	Percent	1,000 MT	Percent	1,000 MT	Percent		
Eastern Hemisphere:								
Middle East								
Iraq	1,720	23.7	3,810	52.5	1,720	23.7	7,250	1.44
Kuwait	9,500	50.0	9,500	50.0	......	......	19,000	3.77
Saudi Arabia	29,750	100.0	......	......	......	......	29,750	5.91
Iran	......	......	35,000	100.0	......	......	35,000	6.95
Qatar	476	23.8	1,048	52.4	476	23.8	2,000	.40
Bahrein	......	......	1,500	100.0	......	......	1,500	.30
Total	41,446		50,858		2,196		94,500	18.77
East Indies Islands	3,350	31.3	7,350	68.7	......	......	10,700	2.13
OEEC Countries	538	20.0	681	25.0	1,563	55.0	2,782	.55
Total	3,888		8,031		1,563		13,482	
Western Hemisphere:								
US and Canada	288,750	100.0	......	......	......	......	288,750	57.36
Mexico	......	......	......	......	10,000	100.0	10,000	1.99
Caribbean Exporting Areas	55,055	61.5	34,108	38.1	327	0.4	89,490	17.77
Total	343,805		34,108		10,327		388,240	
Other	......	......	......	......	......	1.4	7,110	1.41
Total World							503,332	

TABLE V
OWNERSHIP OF WORLD REFINING CAPACITY
(1950–1951)

Area	United States		British		Other		Total 1,000 MT	Per-cent of world total
	1,000 MT	Per-cent	1,000 MT	Per-cent	1,000 MT	Per-cent		
Eastern Hemisphere:								
Middle East								
Haifa	......	......	800	100.00	....	......	800	.02
Kuwait	625	50.00	625	50.00	....	......	1,250	.25
Saudi Arabia	6,500	100.00	....	......	....	......	6,500	1.30
Abadan	......	......	27,500	100.00	....	......	27,500	5.52
Tripoli	142	23.75	285	42.50	173	28.75	600	.01
Bahrein	8,000	100.00	....	......	....	......	8,000	1.61
Total	15,267		29,210		173		44,650	
East Indies Islands	3,200	31.68	6,900	68.32	....	......	10,100	2.03
South & East Asia	......	......	....	......	....	......	2,500	.50
Australia & New Zealand	......	......	....	......	....	......	650	.01
Northern Africa & Spain	......	......	....	......	....	......	3,450	.69
OEEC Countries	......	......	....	......	....	......	44,429	8.92
Total	3,200		6,900		....		61,129	
Western Hemisphere:								
United States	......	......	....	......	....	......	300,000	60.20
Canada	......	......	....	......	15,500	100.00	15,500	3.11
Mexico	......	......	....	......	8,350	100.00	8,350	1.68
Caribbean Exporting Areas:								
Colombia	1,420	100.00	....	......	....	......	1,420	.28
Venezuela	7,007	57.2	5,243	42.8	....	......	12,250	2.46
Peru	1,452	96.8	24	1.6	24	1.6	1,500	.30
Ecuador	......	......	230	100.00	....	......	230	.00
Trinidad	......	......	4,750	100.00	....	......	4,750	.95
Netherlands W. Indies	21,000	53.5	18,300	46.6	....	......	39,300	7.89
Total	30,879		28,547		23,874		383,300	
Other Latin American	......	......	....	......	....	......	9,250	1.86
Total	30,879		28,547		23,874		392,550	
Total World							498,329	

TABLE VI
LOSS OF IRANIAN OIL
(Millions of Units)

1. Production—physical quantities (1950–51)	
a. Crude	35 MT/Y‡
b. Refined	25 MT/Y
2. Loss of crude imports from Iran by Western Europe	7.5 MT/Y
3. Dollar element of cost in replaced crude	$55
4. Loss of refined products imported from Iran by Western Europe and Sterling Area	25 MT/Y
5. Annual dollar cost of replacing refined (Item 4)	$765–775
6. Gross dollar cost of replacing crude and refined (Items 3 and 5)	$820–830
7. Dollar savings—equipment and services	$110–120
8. Estimated *net* dollar cost annually (Item 6 minus Item 7)	$710

TABLE VII
LOSS OF ALL MIDDLE EAST OIL
(Millions of Units)

1. Production—physical quantities (1950–51)	
a. Crude	94.5 MT/Y
b. Refined	44.7 MT/Y

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‡MT/Y Metric tons per year. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. Loss of crude imports from Middle East by Western Europe	43.5 MT/Y
3. Dollar element in replaced crude	$800
4. Loss of refined products imported from Middle East by Western Europe and Sterling Area	38 MT/Y
5. Annual dollar cost of replacing refined (Item 4)	$1,200
6. Gross dollar cost of replacing crude and refined (Items 3 and 5)	$2,000
7. Dollar savings—equipment and supplies, profits to Bahrein Petroleum Co., dollar element in goods furnished Middle East by Western Europe, etc	$600
8. Estimated *net* dollar cost annually assuming no cutback in current requirements (Item 6 minus Item 7)	$1,400
9. Ten percent cutback would save	$300

886A.2553/1–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1951.[1]

Participants: Mr. Terry Duce, Aramco
PED—Mr. Moline
NE—Mr. Funkhouser

In discussing the new agreement Mr. Duce stated *inter alia:*

1. Aramco cleared up all 12 outstanding demands of the Saudi Arab Government by the December 30 Agreement.[2] Disagreements over Tapline however were not included in these negotiations and would have to be discussed separately. Mr. Duce was not worried about the latest Saudi Arab demands on Tapline for protection expenses.[3] (Saudi Arabian Government now earns nothing from Tapline directly. 15 years from the completion of the line Tapline must pay transit fees.)

2. Under the December 30 Agreement Aramco submits to the two Saudi Arab tax laws: the October 20% profits tax and the December 27 50% profits tax. It was not made clear how the taxes were

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted on January 19.

[2] For previous documentation on the Aramco-Saudi Arabian Government Agreement of December 30, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 9 ff. Duce met with Department of State officials so they could obtain details of the Agreement, pending a Washington visit by top Aramco executives who had participated in the negotiations. A memorandum from Funkhouser to McGhee, dated January 25, stated that at a January 26 luncheon top Aramco officials would fill in the gaps that remained in the Department's information after this January 10 discussion. Among points to be raised by the Department at the luncheon were questions about the way Saudi Arabian taxes were to be levied, whether the Saudi Arabians would see the Aramco books, and whether Aramco considered its profit-sharing type of agreement adaptable to the situations in Iran and Iraq. (NEA Files: Lot 57 D 177: Saudi Arabia–Aramco, 1951) No memorandum of conversation of a January 26 Aramco luncheon has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Telegram 433 from Jidda, January 10, reported the Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister of Finance had met the previous day with the Aramco–Tapline representative to the Saudi Arabian Government and again raised the question of payments for the protection of Tapline (886A.2553/1–1051).

applied or how they operated with respect to U.S. taxes. It appears that the 20% tax is responsible for the largest bite of Aramco profits since it reportedly is levied before U.S. taxes. The 50% December 27 tax is reportedly levied after U.S. taxes.

3. Saudi Arab income is calculated by taking 50% of company profits after expenses have been deducted. Mr. Duce gave the following company figures covering 1950. (These figures were given in utmost confidence and should not even be quoted back to Mr. Duce.) Aramco showed 1950 profits $292,000,000, expenses $66,000,000, U.S. taxes $6,000,000. Mr. Duce did not explain the $6,000,000 U.S. tax. Of the remaining $220,000,000 net profit, the Saudi Arabian Government would get $110,000,000: $58,000,000 for royalties and rents, $8,000,000 duties, $32,000,000 as 20% tax and $12,000,000 as 50% tax. These figures would change significantly in 1951, particularly since the royalty would under the new agreement be reduced from the free market rate of gold ($12.00 rate per gold sovereign or 32¢ per barrel) to the legal rate or approximately 21¢ per barrel.

4. Mr. Duce stated that the new Saudi Arab tax laws virtually eliminated all U.S. taxes. He however emphasized that the U.S. Government would still receive 8% tax on dividends to parent companies, 30% tax on stockholders dividends and the 10.5–21¢ duty on oil imports from Arabia. If 300,000 barrels a day were imported into the U.S. from Arabia, Mr. Duce added the U.S. Government would earn some $20,000,000. Mr. Moline expressed astonishment that any such rate of imports of Arabian oil into the U.S. might be contemplated.

5. Mr. Duce stated that any specific figures on the Aramco Agreement and any interpretation regarding the way the new taxation would work would have to be given the Department by Mr. Brougham, the Financial Vice-President of Aramco. Mr. Duce doubted whether Aramco would request any decision on tax credit from the Treasury Department at this time. He stated that the company would probably file their income tax returns showing taxes paid to the Saudi Arabian Government and await developments.

6. Mr. Duce calculated that 1950 royalties would come to approximately 56¢ per barrel. Mr. Duce stated that submerged areas would fall under the profit-sharing arrangement with the only difference being that the royalty figure would continue to show a 5¢ per barrel greater return than on the mainland. The total return on any submerged area production would however be 50% of net profits as on the mainland. Mr. Duce seemed to expect that the two concessions might be unified. He had no comments as to whether the drilling obligations on these submerged areas might be eliminated.

7. By the new agreement Aramco gained the privilege of paying royalties in any currencies collected from oil sales and/or gold. The company might pay in gold if they could buy gold at IMF prices. Mr.

Duce was asked whether payment in gold would not again be so profitable to the Saudi Arabs that it would be a difficult diet to drop. There was no comment.

8. The new agreement also called for elimination of the 5¢ premium on company rial purchases. Mr. Duce was inclined to minimize this feature of the agreement.

9. Mr. Duce was informed that the Department was anxious to secure a copy of the new agreement and to have the details explained, particularly the meaning and operation of the two Saudi income taxes. Mr. Duce stated that the agreement was 99% approved by the Aramco Board and that the Department would receive a copy immediately following final approval, expected January 15.[4] He asked if a full review by Messrs. Davies, Brougham and other top officials who participated in the negotiations would be desirable from the Department's point of view and was assured that it would be.

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[4] On April 17 Duce sent Fred Awalt an Aramco pamphlet entitled "Agreements between Saudi Arab Government and Arabian American Oil Company," containing copies of agreements between Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government from the original Concession Agreement of May 29, 1933, to the end of 1950. Included were copies of the Agreement of December 30, 1950; the Saudi Arabian Royal Decree of November 4, 1950, imposing an income tax on individuals and companies; and the Royal Decree of December 27, 1950, imposing an income tax of 50 percent of the net operating income of petroleum companies. (886A.2553/4-1751)

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Petroleum"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1951.[1]

Participants: Assistant Secretary McGhee
Colonel J. F. Drake, Chairman, Gulf Oil Corporation
Mr. D. Proctor, Vice President and General Counsel, Gulf Oil Corporation
NE—Mr. Funkhouser

Colonel Drake stated that his company anticipated Kuwait demands for a profit-sharing arrangement following the Aramco model. Although Gulf would expect to stop Kuwait demands considerably short of Aramco royalties (estimated at approximately 56¢ a barrel for 1950) the company would like to put itself in a position to obtain the same U.S. tax credit Aramco expects to get, thus taking major burden of any royalty increase off the company. Any sharing of profits formula as well as the tax credit, according to Colonel Drake, was now prevented by the corporate set up of Kuoco and its non-profit provisions. The Kuwait Oil Company is a British Corporation which sells oil at cost plus one shilling.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted on January 17.

Colonel Drake stated that the company was considering corporate changes whereby the Gulf share of Kuwait oil would be owned directly by an American company with a British subsidiary operating the concession at the present arrangement of cost plus one shilling. U.S. company would sell oil at world prices, show taxable profits and, if Kuwait levied an income tax, would be in the Aramco position of obtaining U.S. tax credit. Colonel Drake indicated that some opposition could be expected from the British to this arrangement but believed that the British would have the same control over Kuwait operations as exist under the present arrangement. Colonel Drake stated that he wished to inform the Department of these ideas and hoped that he could count on the Department's support for making these changes.

Colonel Drake reviewed briefly the background of the Kuwait Oil Company showing acquisition of the Kuwait concession was due exclusively to Gulf's efforts and that they had only been prevented from obtaining a 100% American concession by the Foreign Office. It was at that time that Foreign Office insisted that not only half the concession be given to the Anglo-Iranian Company but that the American share should be worked through a British subsidiary. Mr. Proctor stated that Gulf would approach the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the tax free reorganization which they hoped to effect.

Mr. McGhee in answering different questions stated *inter alia* that the State Department as in the case of Aramco could not advise oil companies on specific terms which should be offered concessionary countries. In the case of the Aramco contract, the Department did not recommend that the 50-50 arrangement be offered nor was the State Department called to approve the contract once it was signed. He stated that Gulf might be well advised to discuss the tax features with the Treasury Department and particularly pointed out the possible danger of being made a party to any avoidance of U.S. taxation. Mr. McGhee stated that as in the case of Aramco the U.S. Government would be glad to support the company in its negotiations with the Sheikh of Kuwait along general lines should such support become necessary. Mr. McGhee felt however that the British Government was in the best position to assert influence on the Sheikh of Kuwait and could be counted on to do their best to keep the Sheikh's demands within reason.

Mr. McGhee stressed the importance of encouraging the Sheikh of Kuwait to put any increased royalties to capital formation, development of useful facilities, education, etc. Putting these additional royalties to optimum use would also be facilitated by presence of British advisers on the spot.

It was felt that the British could agree to the corporate change suggested by Gulf, particularly in that it appeared that British control would be in no way jeopardized and in that their pressure on the company to give up 50% of their concession and to work through a British subsidiary seemed to place on them an obligation to put the American company in the position to take advantage of any tax benefits which Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would be able to profit by.

Mr. Proctor stated that another reason for Gulf's desire to change the corporate structure of their Kuwait operations was a fear that the British Government might move farther into the nationalization of industry; Gulf would be most reluctant to have its properties in Kuwait taken over by British Government nationalization of Kuwait Oil Company, Ltd.

Colonel Drake stated that in arguing for less than the 50-50 profit sharing deal it would be mentioned that Kuwait oil was of lower quality and value than Saudi Arabian and Iranian oil, that it was recognized by ECA price schedules that transportation of Kuwait oil was more expensive than either Iranian or Saudi Arabian oil; the Trans Arabian pipeline, it was added, made it even more difficult for Kuwait to make the same profits as Aramco. Colonel Drake minimized chances of any early completion of the Middle East pipeline in which he stated Gulf could obtain a position if they so desired.

Colonel Drake stated that he was sailing for London March 2 for talks with AIOC and the U.K. on the above matters, promised to keep the Department informed of any developments, and thanked Mr. McGhee for the informative discussion. Mr. McGhee stated that the Department would give these problems close attention and reaffirmed the Department's interest in assisting Gulf in any foreign problems which developed.

886A.2553/1-1851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 18, 1951—7 p. m.

254. Brit Emb reps Jan 15 raised question SAG-Sheikdoms boundary dispute [2] and expressed hope Dept wld use its influence keep Aramco out of negots. UK prepared take similar step with Brit oil companies. UK felt oil co meddling overtly or behind scenes wld

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] For previous documentation on the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdoms in the Persian Gulf and the setting up of a factfinding commission to handle the matter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 9 ff. The British Government handled foreign relations for the Shaikhdoms and was negotiating with Saudi Arabia on their behalf.

jeopardize success negots. Specific ref made Fact Finding Boundary Comm as body from which oil co shld be excluded.

Reps stated Brit component Comm wld consist of Pelly, rep Brit Emb Jidda, Brit surveyor and possibly FonOff legal adviser in addition to native guards and reps each Sheikhdom concerned.

Dept pointed out SAG component Comm might feel at disadvantage without Western technicians to match talent Brit component. Dept agreed in principle oil co abstention desirable but as practical matter doubted whether this entirely possible. Re speaking Aramco in sense desired by UK Dept expressed desire consult you since Aramco likely reveal Dept's action to SAG if and when Aramco aid sought and SAG wld take this as evidence indirect US intervention in dispute which US anxious stand aside. Dept stated situation might occur later in which US cld assist its Saudi and Brit friends toward settlement and therefore it might be well keep US capacity for impartial good offices unimpaired.

Recommendations requested.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] Telegram 501 from Jidda, February 2, advised the Department of State that Aramco had been careful to avoid identifying itself directly with the frontier problem and felt none of its personnel should participate in the forthcoming negotiations. Aramco was, however, prepared to make available to the Saudi Arabian Government, for consultation on factual aspects of the tribal question only, a member of its staff who had made a detailed study of the matter. Aramco had also informally suggested Richard Young, a member of its legal staff, for the position of legal counsel to the Saudi Arabian Government. The Ambassador suggested the Department tell the British of Aramco's position, since it would go far to meet the British request without having put the U.S. Government in the position of having imposed the solution. (886A.2553/2-251)

886A.2553/1-2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

JIDDA, January 23, 1951—1 p. m.

466. ReEmbtel 449, January 16.[2] While en route Dhahran by Aramco plane January 16, Owen of Aramco told me he had just received letter from Finance Minister re tapline protection. Translation had not been completed but appeared to be ultimatum to meet Saudi demands or face temporary closing of line. Before my de-

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

[2] Not printed; it reported a conversation between Owen and Hare. Owen did not believe the Saudi Arabian Government would close the line down but said Aramco had learned that its offer, reported in telegram 433 from Jidda, January 10, had never been forwarded to Riyadh. He believed the Finance Minister and Salha were trying to hold Aramco up for more money, while merely informing Riyadh that the company was intractable without mentioning its counter-offer. (886A.2553/1-1651)

parture from Dhahran yesterday Owen gave me details of contents letter but said had not yet been decided what action to take.

Following are principal points in letter:

1. All blame for delay and inaction placed on tapline;
2. Tapline offer (Embtel 433, January 10)[3] "Absolutely unacceptable".
3. "Final settlement on this subject is", as outlined Embtel 433, on condition commencement construction is not delayed longer than 2 weeks from January 16;
4. If company unable accept number 3 above, "Government suggests" Aramco "pay immediately $4 million on account" in order permit SAG commence building program. Discussions re settlement may then be later resumed "at Government's convenience;"
5. If Aramco unable accept either number 3 or 4 above, "Government will find itself obliged to take administrative measures to stop temporarily the flow of oil through the pipes" until satisfactory solution reached;
6. SAG would greatly regret such action, but Government has waited so long it considers company solely responsible for these consequences;
7. Letter concludes that "Government will not accept company interference with arrangements which Government makes for maintenance of security in its country and protection of company's people and property which Government guarantees to maintain and preserve. However, it is up to Government alone to decide the type of this preservation and method of carrying it out."

HARE

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[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 276.

886A.2553/1-2551: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 25, 1951—8:05 a. m.

FYI Preliminary views of the Dept regarding the Aramco 50/50 profit-sharing agreement are submitted for general guidance and background as follows:

(1) Near East oil is so valuable to Western economic, political, and strategic interests that an increased share of the profits for Near East producing states is warranted as a means of providing increased incentive for cooperation by Near East peoples and governments.

(2) The Venezuelan profit-sharing formula has been known to and demanded by oil producing Persian Gulf states.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Funkhouser and cleared in draft by Moline, G. Lewis Jones, Kopper, Awalt, C. Vaughan Ferguson, Satterthwaite, and Ranney. It was sent to London, Cairo, Tehran, Jidda, Baghdad, Moscow, Paris, Basra, and Dhahran.

(3) The introduction of the partnership principle in Saudi Arabia resulted from the company's own decision.

(4) In the Dept's view it represents an eminently defensible basis on which Near East concessions can be stabilized since it is equivalent to the highest existing formula and appears basically fair.

(5) The introduction of the partnership principle to the Near East is believed to have been a realistic and dramatic answer to the Communist line regarding foreign oil company imperialism.

(6) The rapidity of the Aramco-SAG negotiations eliminated the development of the bitterness, anti-oil company and anti-West feeling evident in Iranian oil negotiations.

(7) The Dept believes in general that the 50/50 principle will probably increase the basic stability of oil concessions in the Near East, notwithstanding the immediate unsettling effect on other concession contracts in the area and the social problems raised by increased income in areas of limited beneficiaries.

(8) Until full details are known, the Dept must reserve comment on the tax aspects of the Aramco agreement. Although we can properly publicize and capitalize on the American aspects of the Aramco deal which will bring Saudi Arabia in 1950 approximately 56¢ a barrel payments as opposed to the approximate 33¢ a barrel payments offered Iran and Iraq, we cannot at this point criticize AIOC and IPC as companies less liberal than Aramco because of this profit-sharing arrangement. Aramco hopes for U.S. tax credit for most or all of their Saudi Arab taxes. If this hope is realized, the U.S. Government, not the company, may be the source of increased payments to Saudi Arabia.

(9) Provisions allowing Aramco to pay in any currencies accruing from oil sales and at IMF exchange rate are welcomed by the Dept and should have a salutary effect in the area.

(10) Full details of the Aramco agreement have not yet been given the Dept but our further views will be forwarded when details received.

ACHESON

887.2553/2-2851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 28, 1951—7 p. m.

372. Dept concerned with unclarified and potentially explosive situation Deptel 341 Feb 8[2] and urtel 469 Feb 21.[3] Action described Deptel, particularly nationalization, wld have unfortunate effects throughout ME oil area at this time. Since IPC denies receipt letter reftel declaring concessions invalid, Ryan interests apparently bid on concession areas validly held by others. Dept wishes forestall any undermining valid concession contracts and make clear its position lest Iraqi interpret silence as tacit approval Ryan actions.

If no objection perceived, you shld hand note to Iraq Govt along fol lines:

"USG has been informed that American oil interests have made an offer to Iraq Govt regarding development of Iraq oil resources. This was reportedly done on the basis of official statements to the effect that Iraq Govt considered Iraq Petroleum Company to have defaulted on their contracted obligations and that concessions were therefore invalid. USG is concerned with this report, particularly since American interests are involved in bidding on concession areas which the

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Funkhouser and cleared by Moline.

[2] Not printed; it reported information given to the Department of State by a member of the Ryan Oil Company on February 6. He told the Department the Iraqi Government planned to cancel the Basra Petroleum Company concession held by the Iraq Petroleum Company because of a breach of contract, and then form a national company, under the management of the Ryan Company, to develop the Basra concession. He claimed that even if the company were not guilty of a breach of contract the Government would argue that nationalization was a sovereign right of the state and the solution to the slow development of Iraq's oil reserves. (887.2553/2-851)

[3] Not printed; it advised the Department of State the Embassy was unable to confirm the existence of an alleged letter, mentioned by the Ryan Company, from the Government of Iraq to the Iraq Petroleum Company in the fall of 1950. The letter supposedly declared the company's concessions were invalid because it had failed to fulfill its contract obligations. (887.2553/2-2151)

Later investigation by the Embassy revealed the Government of Iraq did deliver a letter to the company's chairman in August 1950. Telegram 497 from Baghdad, March 3, reported that during the contract negotiations in London the preceding summer the chairman declared the terms of both the Basra Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company were too onerous and were impossible to fulfill. A confidential note delivered to him stated that no one had forced the company to sign those contracts, and the government would be delighted to release the Iraq Petroleum Company from any obligations is considered too onerous. The Director General of Oil Affairs, however, told a Embassy representative the present Government of Iraq had no intention o invalidating the contracts, but he could make no promises regarding the futur if the British continued to refuse the just claims of Iraq. (887.2553/3-351 Telegram 499 from Baghdad, March 5, reported the Foreign Minister indicate the Government of Iraq did not consider the Iraq Petroleum Company in defaul of its contract. The Ambassador's impression was that the August 1950 letter wa an informal communication, written largely for effect; but at the same time th activities of the Ryan Company were not unwelcome to the Government of Ira which hoped to profit from their effect on the Iraq Petroleum Compan (887.2553/3-551)

USG has no reason to believe are not covered by valid contracts. USG wld appreciate clarification of this situation by Iraq Govt." [4]

WEBB

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[4] Despatch 2084 from Baghdad, May 9, enclosed a copy of the note given to the Government of Iraq on March 3 and the answer received on May 9, which said the authorities had no information on any official contacts on the matter. According to the Ambassador, the evasive answer was based on the theory that conversations with members of the Ryan Company were informal, rather than official. (887.2553/5–951)

887.2553/3–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State

SECRET BAGHDAD, March 17, 1951—6 p. m.

541. Embassy concerned recent oil developments Iran and Iraq which seriously threaten stability whole ME area and [garble] logical consequences policy British directed AIOC, IPC, and KOC groups. While foregoing was emphasized Istanbul conference,[1] action [garble] is producing situation which may have lamentable results. With nationalization in balance in both countries and with high powered representatives of Ryan group attempting stampede IG into action re Basra concession here (Embtel 512, Mar 9)[2] Emb believes highest level consultation between Wash and London shld take place without delay and we feel if nationalization effected at Teheran, it wld strengthen hand of elements here clamoring for similar action. Brit Emb here has recommended IPC send high-ranking IPC representative to Baghdad, so far without result. It wld appear to this Emb that IPC shld take such action without being urged. No evidence that IPC group yet sufficiently aware explosive potentialities situation. Suggest US partners be fully and urgently briefed by Dept.

Was any action taken on telegram from Istanbul conference that Amb London be instructed approach FonOff on AIOC policy? [3]

Brit Emb fully aware situation in Iraq and we are fully and frankly consulting together.

Emb believes further inaction by US and UK Govts in pressing oil companies to correct inequity situation existing between IPC and

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[1] For a report of the Istanbul Conference, see "Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission, Istanbul, February 14–21, 1951," p. 50. In particular see Section X for an appraisal of the policies of foreign oil companies in the Middle East in relation to U.S. policies and interests, p. 70.

[2] Not printed; the Ambassador had informed the Department of State the Ryan Company's legal adviser presented the argument that a sovereign government could invalidate or nationalize the Basra concession for failure to produce oil and that the British Government had set a precedent by nationalizing industries in its own country, therefore it could not logically object. (887.2553/3–951)

[3] Telegram 410 from Washington, March 20, reported that consultations with the British had been scheduled (887.2553/3–1751).

IG which may be legally unassailable will have results fatal to stability.

CROCKER

886A.2553/3-1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1951.[1]

Subject: Meeting with Aramco on Boundary Dispute in Southeastern Arabia.

Participants: Judge Manley O. Hudson, International Law Counsel to SAG and Aramco
Mr. Richard Young, Assistant to Judge Hudson
Mr. J. Terry Duce, Executive Vice President of Aramco
Mr. George Ray, Legal Counsel of Aramco
Mr. William Owen, Aramco
L/NEA—Mr. Maktos
PED—Mr. Newton
U/FW—Mr. Taylor
NE—Mr. Kopper
NE—Mr. Awalt

Summary:

This meeting was a continuation of a series of similar meetings held from time to time since January 1949. Like previous meetings this one was characterized on the part of Aramco by outspoken criticism of the general British attitude in the area and Mr. Ray stressed the need of offsetting the British in "throwing their weight around" in the Gulf. Judge Hudson took over the conversations in the early part of the meeting. He said that on February 9 Aramco received a request from the King that it provide information and other assistanc to the SAG in preparation for the meeting of the joint fact-finding commission at Bahrein which is expected to be held in the near futur The King specifically asked for the services of Mr. George Rent whose research forms the principal basis for the Saudi Arabian claim in the area in dispute. Mr. Ray reiterated at this point that Aramco' interests were absolutely non-political and that it had no desire t encourage the SAG to extend its claims to any particular area. H said that they were obliged, however, to do exploratory developmen work in any area which the SAG considered to be theirs.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on March 21.

Mr. Young is leaving for Saudi Arabia in the next few days to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in preparing for the first session of the fact-finding commission. He said that the commission would devote its attention to geographical features, tribal considerations and to any other factors which either government believes will assist its case. The area in which the commission will interest itself will be the territories in dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi eastward to Buraimi and south to the twenty-second parallel of latitude. It was brought out in connection with the terms of reference of the commission that although the British have gone on record to the effect that zakat and tribal migrations are irrelevant to territorial claims, the commission can investigate these and any other matters without prejudice to the case of either side.

Mr. Ray and Judge Hudson both emphasized again the desirability of direct contact between the SAG and the ruling Sheikhs of the areas concerned. It was explained that the Department was in agreement and had made such a recommendation to the British in London in May 1950. The British refused to entertain the suggestion as damaging to their prestige and position in the Gulf but they did accept the idea of Sheikhal representation in consultative capacity. The occasion was also taken to remind the visitors of other instances where the Department had taken positions which were helpful to the SAG. The Department had suggested mutual restraint upon both sides in order to keep areas in dispute free of any oil company activity which might prejudice the claims of the opposing side or incite sharper rivalry in the area. The Department had also pointed out to the British that it was unfair of them to expect the SAG to provide a justification of its claims to the disputed areas unless both sides did so simultaneously. It was also pointed out that we had suggested to the UK that it cite its authority for negotiating on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. It was also explained that we had expressed our disappointment over British action in destroying some of the island markers which had been erected by the Saudi Arabian Government. We did not consider such action conducive to creation of a suitable atmosphere for conducting friendly negotiations for settlement of the disputes in question. Judge Hudson and Aramco representatives were very pleased to know that we were departing from what they considered to be an attitude of aloofness and had assumed one of constructive impartiality.

887.2553/3-2151: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, March 21, 1951—2 p. m.

5029. Ref: London despatch 4403 Mar 15, 1951.[2]

1. FonOff petroleum officer today confirms that Gibson IPC manager director planning visit Baghdad approx April 1 through 10. Anticipate Gibson will be prepared discuss steps for undertaking negots with Iraq Govt aimed at 50–50 profit sharing arrangements similar Aramco plan. IPC apparently prefers that Iraq Govt shld initiate request for royalty agreement along these lines, but FonOff suggested to Gibson it wld be more desirable for IPC make offer to negot on such plan first. Reported Gibson did not give assent immed this suggestion, but FonOff believes he may assume initiative in Baghdad and inform Iraq Govt that IPC is willing commence negots. FonOff rep mentioned Gibson had considered visiting Baghdad sooner, but Brit Amb there advised present situation not serious enough to require this.

2. FonOff rep mentioned that while IPC probably cld presumably adjust its corporate structure to permit operation under plan similar Aramco agreement this wld be difficult in view different nationalities of IPC partners. Mentioned US partners cld obtain full relief from US taxes for taxes paid Iraq under profit sharing plan; Brit companies eligible for 50 percent relief; but Fr wld evidently receive no exemption from Fr taxes. Appeared from conversation that IPC now examining various alternatives for complying with 50–50 plan but as yet have not progressed very far in working out actual procedure.[3]

GIFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Baghdad and Cairo.

[2] Not printed; it advised the Department that the Iraq Petroleum Company was considering the necessity of revising its royalty agreement but had no definite plans for negotiations with the Iraq Government and was under no pressure from it. The director of the company informed the Embassy there had been surprisingly little reaction in Iraq to the recent Aramco agreement in Saudi Arabia, but the company was watching the situation closely and its managing director planned to visit Iraq in April. (887.2553/3-1651)

[3] Telegram 5389 from London, April 12, reported the Iraq Petroleum Company board had heard Gibson's report of his trip to Baghdad and had met that day to begin formulating its position for the forthcoming royalty negotiations with Iraq (887.2553/4-1251).

880.2553/3–2651 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY AMMAN, March 26, 1951—7 p. m.

164. From McGhee. In effort clarify question of future of oil concessions in Middle East, which at present preoccupies not only Iran and Iraq but to a considerable extent all Middle East producing and pipeline transit countries, fol is put forward to Dept as well as to capitals concerned for comment as background for my discussions in London on April 2 and 3. I will naturally not expect go further than informal exchange of views. The fol conclusions are proposed with respect to the issues involved (Egypt being excluded as a special case):

(1) That the question can only be resolved by establishment of more precise and comprehensive US–UK Middle East oil policy and by closer coordination of future US–UK action.

(2) That financial receipts, at least by SAG, Iran and Iraq, shld be on the same or on a demonstrably comparable basis. Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar might be persuaded catch up gradually in light of their lesser needs.

(3) That the basis for receipt shld be simple enough to be generally understood in the countries concerned, shld provide a return per barrel at least equal to that under the new Aramco contract, and shld not sound less equitable than the 50–50 concept. This is complicated by the fact that Aramco's 50–50 arrangement is after US taxes and consequently can never provide a uniform basis as between US and UK companies. It is difficult, on the other hand, to see how AIOC can settle for less than 50–50 before taxes, which, with profits from other operations even if restricted to those in Iran, wld probably put AIOC ahead of Aramco and weaken Aramco's contract. Organizational structure of IPC does not of course, lend itself to the 50–50 approach.

(4) That over a period of time allocation of production between countries shld be related to their productive capacities and financial needs. Iraq is the only country with any real complaint along this line at present.

(5) That full benefits to peoples of producing countries and consequently full appreciation contributions of US, UK and companies, can only take place if all receipts are invested in sound development projects which will constitute permanent compensation for depletion principal physical asset producing countries possess.

(6) That the present failure of certain producing and transit countries to get refining capacity adequate for their needs and the present pricing system for petroleum products, constitute greater liabilities to the producing companies through irritation which threatens their producing and transit concessions, than can be compensated for by the profit derived by the same countries as marketeers. A "basing point" pricing system is subject to legitimate criticism by both producing and transit countries. One cannot defend the principle that the price of coal in Newcastle shld be that in Pennsylvania plus carriage to Newcastle.

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[1] Repeated to Tehran, Baghdad, Jidda, London, Damascus, and Beirut.

In light of the foregoing, the fol course of action is suggested for consideration:

1) That the US and UK, after consultation with their companies concerned, make at the earliest opportunity a joint statement of Middle East oil policy based insofar as possible on the above conclusions. Such a policy might state at the outset that both govts consider the oil resources of Middle East to be the inalienable and indisputable natural heritage of the peoples of Middle East who must in the final analysis receive the benefits from its exploitation and whose govts are its ultimate owners.

Such a declaration might point out, however, that in light of the unique capital, technical and admin contributions which western oil companies have made and can make and the fact that production of oil in Middle East is dependent on outside markets which have been developed by western companies, a basis exists for fair contracts between Middle East Govts and companies assuring maximum financial realization to Middle East countries and fair returns to companies and at same time permitting both make maximum contribution toward a common effort.

It might be further pointed out that such contracts shld result in working partnership between countries and companies which shld make question of nationalization irrelevant. Since experience all over the world has shown that the principle of sharing of profits between country and company is an equitable arrangement and one conducive to the interests of both parties the US and UK Govts support this principle as a policy in the Middle East.

The proposed declaration might also include some gen statement to the effect that allocation of production between countries shld be on an equitable basis, and that receipts from oil shld, in justice to Middle East peoples whose fast depleting oil is their principle asset, be invested in sound economic development projects.

The declaration might further state that producing and transit countries shld be assured adequate supplies of refined products at fair prices related to actual costs, and that this shld be done in the manner best suited to the desires and interests of the country concerned. It is suggested that nationalization of distribution in those countries desiring it might to a considerable extent relieve pressure for nationalization of production, and that if this proves to be the case the companies might be well advised to assist the govts in developing the necessary marketing facilities.

2) In execution of the foregoing policy, it might be best, at least at the outset, not to attempt to clarify the complex issue of whether the 50–50 split is before or after taxes of the country in which the company is domiciled for reasons previously given. It would appear preferable to either: (*a*) let each company work out with the country concerned what the 50–50 arrangement actually means in practice and how it shld be implemented, attempting if fair not to exceed the Aramco per barrel figures, or (*b*) adopt a flat royalty rate per barrel, adjustable from time to time, based on the Aramco formula, which could be offered Iraq and Iran, and possibly later the smaller sheikdoms. Since the Aramco formula appears to be generally regarded in

the Middle East as a fair basis and is at present the most favorable in the Middle East, it might be accepted without further clarification of the tax issue and provide a relatively stable base for all countries for an indefinite period. Such action may, however, serve to highlight the tax issue.

3) Since the move for nationalization has gone so far in Iran special measures will probably have to be taken to reflect this fact. Probably, as in Mexico, the word concession must be abandoned. Perhaps the oil resources must be placed ostensibly under the control of some Iranian auth, which in turn will negotiate and supervise an operating agreement with AIOC providing for suitable AIOC technical control and 50–50 division of profits. The solution may take the form of an Iranian company with AIOC represented and having operating, if not ostensible control. It is believed that generous concessions of a formal nature wld be justified if the ultimate objective, which shld be to assure operational control by the companies and adequate profits to reflect their past investment and to justify their continued participation as operator, is achieved. It is hoped that the Brit companies are by now sufficiently chastened to recognize this as a Middle East fact-of-life. It is believed that the US Govt shld not allow itself to get involved in the details of any new agreement such as the extent to which AIOC profits outside Iran are included.

4) The joint US–UK declaration might envisage creation of a neutral commission, with US representation, to arbitrate any points of issue involved in putting into effect the proposed new policy.

5) It is believed that participation in a declaration corresponding to that above might, without getting the US Govt directly into the Iranian and Iraqi negots, provide useful basis upon which AIOC and IPC can have some hope of negotiating a stable agreement with their respective govts. It shld also serve to stabilize the situation in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and the Sheikdoms. It is believed that such a declaration shld preferably be made prior to the report of the Majlis Oil Commission now scheduled in about two months.

The comments of all addressees are invited. [McGhee.]

FRITZLAN

880.2553/3–2651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Cairo [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 29, 1951—7 p. m.

933. For McGhee. Dept believes you shld explore in London all possible action recommendations which cld favorably affect unstable ME oil situation and believes Amman 164 Mar 26 [2] subject to fol reservations provides useful background for these discussions. Dept understands FonOff officials and Victor Butler still intending proceed

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Funkhouser and cleared by Moline and Loftus. It was repeated to London, Tehran, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus, Moscow, Dhahran, and Basra.

[2] *Supra.*

ghtly bound

Washington after your return at which time more definitive action regarding US–UK ME oil policy can be taken. Reservations are: (*a*) Dept doubts whether any meaningful US–UK Govt and industry agreement or declaration on basic ME oil policy can be reached, particularly in time to affect pressing situations Iran and Iraq. (*b*) In view your limited stay London and crowded agenda, Dept believes discussion and development all appropriate specific action recommendations re Iran and Iraq more urgent than action embracing whole ME oil area. (*c*) Dept fears joint US–UK declaration might convince Irans of united front against their nationalization with further jeopardy to continuing flow of oil and Western orientation of Iran. (*d*) Anglo-American declaration for ME consumption spotlights US-UK control ME oil which fits Commie line. (*e*) Production allocation arrangements described in para 4 believed undesirable. (*f*) Re proposed creation of neutral commission, although Dept advocated this in principle, it was effectively opposed by Brit and US Govt and industry circles and is of questionable applicability at this time to immediate Iran and Iraq situation.

Dept views re specific problems Iran and Iraq subject separate telegram.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] Telegram 4456 to London, March 31, p. 296.

887.2553/3–2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BAGHDAD, March 29, 1951—4 p. m.

573. Emb highly gratified at initiative reflected by Asst Secy State McGhee in Amman's tel 26 to Dept 164,[2] looking toward high level conversations with UK in effort clarify future oil concessions ME. We have closely studied conclusions and recommendations to which we give gen approval.

Basic motivation US approach to UK is of course to seek cooperation in restoring ME stability which has been dangerously and almost wantonly undermined by anachronistic policies pursued by AIOC leadership supported by portions of Brit Govt and not effectively checked or controlled by Brit FonOff which was thus derelict in its essential duty, namely, intervening to prevent occurrence of unfortunate situation which has now arisen, both in Iran and potentially in Iraq.

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[1] Repeated to Tehran, Jidda, London, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Cairo for McGhee.

[2] Dated March 26, p. 289.

If we appear to have labored this point (Embtel 541)[3] somewhat both at and since Istanbul, it is to justify US intervention (especially with ref to Iran) in that superficially wld appear to be a strictly Brit family affair. Fact is in light of cold war joint US–UK policy for stability ME has been sabotaged by UK to extent described foregoing para.

Projected approach to AK [*UK*] may be expected produce desired results and if understanding reached we believe situation, especially in Iraq will be salvaged. However, essential that public reaction ME countries be kept constantly in mind. Thus simple formula principle is excellent. Necessary to follow upon suggested declaration both from public relations angle and to assure prompt implementation of declaration by companies. It wld be fatal to make declaration otherwise.

Evidence that extreme care necessary in both wording and fol thru on declaration. The fol point out some items of especial delicacy.

Conclusion number 4 Amman tel will, of course, be well accepted Iraq. However, there are many obvious complications in application. Moreover, this might well be most vulnerable principle from free enterprise point of view and traditional Amer policy against cartels. Thus it may be attacked at home and by Soviets. Nevertheless, it is basically desirable from angle of justice in eyes of ME countries appraise particular question re desirability mentioning neutral commission in declaration because implies lack of faith in companies working out problem with ME countries. Govt sponsorship recd appear bad public relations.

Provision refinery capacity each country wld tend satisfy national aspirations. This is true in Iraq where IBRD now considering feasibility refinery for loan. Oil companies wld gain popularity by clearly indicating they wld cooperate and assist establishment. Such cooperation essential to success refinery project in Iraq.

Conclusion No. 5 excellent. However, must consider possible public reaction. Cld be attacked ground foreign imperialistic dictation. Nevertheless, believe every reasonable effort short of incurring possible imperialistic charge shld be made to bring on sound development projects. In Iraq, present development board affords likely medium.

Because importance exchange views, quick meeting McGhee and Ambs this area wld be advisable prior London talks.

CROCKER

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[3] March 17, not printed. It reported the Embassy was concerned about oil developments in Iran and Iraq and believed high-level consultation between London and Washington should take place without delay. (887.2553/3–1751)

880.2553/3-3051 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY DAMASCUS, March 30, 1951—6 p. m.

494. Re Amman 164, March 26,[2] from McGhee. Procedures proposed by McGhee for formulating oil policy seem to us excellent as policy and practical as means of facing up to immediate problems.

We suppose proposed declaration to serve double purpose: First, as statement of agreed policy and directive for company negots; and second, as public relations document for polit effect. We wonder if it wld be practicable to have two documents. The first, which perforce must be rather long and technical in language, wld be designed primarily for talks with companies and govts though it need not be withheld from interested segments of the public. The second wld be straightforward statement in simple language for press and popular consumption and to degree possible shld give impression that policy goes beyond declaration of principles and intentions and points up practical operation contemplated under those principles.

As for specific points of recommendations:

1. We assume "neutral commission" to convey idea of breadth and detachment. Way might be found nevertheless for Arab representation.
2. Experts will not overlook fact that passage in fifth para of recommendation (1) regarding "producing in transit countries, et cetera, at fair prices related to actual cost" wld accentuate existing marketing companies' problem in Syria of governmental dissatisfaction with present price structure for petroleum products. Wld seem preferable for US and UK to urge companies involved to make good offer for expeditious solution this problem if possible without implication of pressure under public statement.
3. Syrian special interest at moment is construction of refinery for domestic requirements. Although SPC committed to build refinery within five years provided no other company does so, suggest oil companies might benefit through increased goodwill by cooperation with Syrian Government construction near future.

CANNON

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[1] Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, London, Tehran, and Cairo for McGhee.

[2] *Ante*, p. 289.

880.2553/3-3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

LONDON, March 31, 1951—noon.

5169. Re Amman's 164, March 26.[2]

1. We believe present ME oil problem calls for type of initiative suggested reftel. Concur that some declaration of western position seems desirable to impress on ME producing countries mutuality of ME and western interests and to convince them western govts anxious to insure that ME countries receive greatest possible benefit from development their oil resources.

2. To extent UK now greatly alarmed over threat to ME oil resources and anxious work closely with US, time propitious for advancing US ideas re handling ME oil problems and attempting achieve satis agreement on common policy. While we believe it necessary to aim at achieving and implementing common policy soonest, it shld be recognized there may be considerable difficulties and delay since:

(*a*) UK inclined move more slowly than US in dealing with ME oil problem and will probably hesitate submit their investments to common policy except on their terms;

(*b*) There appears be divided counsel among Brit about best course action (some UK officials convinced need for far-reaching concessions to Iranian demands, while others together with AIOC apparently hope to salvage maximum from present polit situation by continuing use tactics of applying pressure at proper places);

(*c*) Detailed consultations with companies will be necessary. Therefore, proposed program probably cannot be achieved quickly enough deal with immed pressing problems Iran and Iraq, which may meanwhile require separate measures.

3. Believe it desirable avoid at present time complex and controversial problem allocation of production among various countries and neutral commission to arbitrate points of issue.

4. Before making policy declaration it appears necessary carefully consider possible psychological reaction from ME countries. In particular question advisability joint US–UK statement which might create impression that US and UK ganging up on ME countries and tend to increase resistance to west. Joint statement might also provide propaganda target claiming US–UK cartel exploitation of ME. Further complicating factor is Dutch and Fr interests in oil resources which altho minor compared US–UK participation are important to those countries and will require acknowledgement. Finally wld emphasize that if it proves advisable to issue any policy declaration

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[1] Repeated to Tehran, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] *Ante*, p. 289.

it shld be simple, understandable and capable of prompt implementation in order to be effective.[3]

GIFFORD

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[3] Additional comments on telegram 164 were received from the Embassies in Cairo, Beirut, Jidda, and Amman. Documentation is in Department of State file 880.2553 and the Tehran Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 17.

888.2553/3–3151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 31, 1951—4 p. m.

4456. For McGhee. Fol for ur background use London are Dept's tentative views on specific action recommendations re Iran and Iraq (Deptel 4418 Mar 29).[2]

Re Iran Dept believes Brit plan, if as reported Deptel 4392 Mar 28,[3] represents dangerous course. (This connection not certain Brit Govt is in fact seriously considering course outlined reftel, altho London's 5142[4] adds weight this possibility.) Whereas Dept fears consequences Iran nationalization of oil co, Dept believes these considerably less serious than those involved in Brit plan. Current Iran oil situation now believed jeopardizing, in order of US natl interests, (*a*) world peace, (*b*) stability and Western orientation Iran, ME and perhaps Moslem world, (*c*) continuance flow of oil essential to West, (*d*) stability ME and other fon oil concessions and (*e*) Brit balance of payments position. Strong course Brit appear to be considering wld seriously endanger (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*), whereas if handled as suggested below, Dept believes (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) interests wld have best chance of being retained with oil still available to free world even assuming spread oil nationalization.

Since US recognizes right of sovereign state to nationalize, provided prompt and adequate payment made, and since Dept believes equitable solution must be predicated upon UK recognition that "nationalization principle has become law of Iran" and "what is done cannot be undone" as already reported as FonOff's view (London's 5044

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Funkhouser and Moline and cleared by Coe, Ranney, and Raynor. It was repeated to Baghdad, Tehran, Jidda, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Same as telegram 933 to Cairo, p. 291.

[3] Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume X.

[4] Not printed; it reported on the British attitude toward political and oil problems in Iran and advised the Department of State that any complacency which might have existed before the recent crisis in Iran had given way to genuine alarm over the prospect of losing the British investment and oil supplies vital to the British economy. The closing sentence read: "UK Govt will be under strong Parliamentary and domestic pressure do utmost to protect Brit interests in Iran and there seems be no intention within govt or anywhere else allow Iran investment be lost for want of any determined action."

Mar 21 [5]), Dept suggests alternative plan beginning with UK or AIOC statement issued immed in Iran oil field and population centers that co will abide by decision reached by IranGov will endeavor to maintain unbroken and peak production and employment during Oil Commission studies and endeavor to reach mutually profitable agreement under which the interests of Iran and the Iran people wld be fully protected in the development, operation, and distribution of Iran oil and the flow to world consumers maintained. This move believed required to reverse deteriorating situation, show Iran that West interested in Iran best interests, and protect flow of oil against strikes and shutdowns. Risks to other fon concessions of such publicity believed less important to national interest than allowing Iran situation to drift or attempting reported Brit plan.

With populace convinced strikes and terrorism not required to protect nationalization decision, continued flow of oil shld be assured with atmosphere calmed for proceeding with directives given Oil Commission. In such atmosphere, moderate and rational Iran officials cld operate as recommended Tehran's 2102 Mar 18 [6] and cld be more effectively influenced by fon experts including US (DeGolyer, Levy, Thornburg, etc.), Venezuelan or UK nationals.

During transition period action recommendations Amman's 165 Mar 23 [7] should be implemented, particularly well publicized US-UK-IBRD aid and US-UK-Moslem state denunciation of terrorist (USSR) methods. Heavy US-UK publicity should be given benefits earned by 50–50 arrangements by private industry in SA and Venezuela and importance to Iran of stable conditions in oil industry.

AIOC negotiators cld meanwhile endeavor work out "nationalization" formula with degree of Iran control of co depending on ability of negotiators and success of above actions. Strategy wld presumably start by suggestion incorporation in Iran of co, progressively yielding as necessary to permit Irans in management positions, as stockholders, as directors. Final offer might be on basis management contract under Board Iran supervisors.

Problem of preventing USSR from demanding equal treatment might be handled by demonstrating arrangement involved no new concession and by strengthening Iran will and ability to resist commercial instruments of USSR.

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[5] Not printed; it advised the Department of State that it would be advised by the British Embassy in Washington about the results of high-level meetings in the British Government concerning the line of action to be adopted as a result of the recent developments in Iran.

[6] Not printed; it reported to the Department of State on a suggested British program of action in Iran.

[7] Presumably this refers to telegram 165 from Amman, March 27, not printed, in which McGhee suggested some possible U.S. lines of action with respect to the situation in Iran. He recommended, among other things, that it might be worthwhile for the Department of State to attempt to obtain public statements of friendly officials in other Muslim countries denouncing acts of violence such as the recent assassinations in Iran.

Brit of course shld understand that any reasonable policy they follow in effort to salvage situation will have our full support.

Re Iraq believe precarious situation existing can be saved by immediate imaginative action IPC. Believe important also this matter not be allowed to drag until Iran case closed if further impetus nationalization Iraq and more costly solution to be avoided. Recognize difficulties solution along Aramco line but understand co considering various solutions this problem. Wld urge that IPC partners examine possibility of package offer including (*a*) prospective production Kirkuk with some allowance in oil for 20% clause for Mosul concession, (*b*) increased production Basra with 20% oil clause honored to counter Ryan offers, (*c*) loan for refinery and management thereof on fee basis and (*d*) distribution through KOC in Iraq but at price levels in line with Iraq plans for products local refinery. In order reduce Iraq desire to nationalize, wld particularly urge surrender any areas Iraq which co has no present intention develop.

In line with para 6 analysis Amman 164 believe IPC shld recognize inevitability local refineries and low priced petroleum products on nationalized basis in ME producing or transit countries unless co by aggressive action beforehand gives to govts equivalent thereof. ME peoples must be made to feel personally direct benefits of oil by fullest distribution and utilization of cheap fuel. The cost to cos of this type adjustment insignificant in relation total interest in area and cld be acknowledged without enduring the bitterness of nationalization which otherwise threatens.

ACHESON

883.2553/1-2551 : Instruction

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

No. 24

The Secretary of State refers to the Legation's despatch No. 323 of January 25, 1951[2] in which the Legation discusses the likelihood that Syria will nationalize petroleum marketing and requests that the Department provide, for use in informal discussions with Syrian officials, background material tending to show the economic disadvantages of nationalization.

The Legation indicates that the Syrian inclination toward nationalization of petroleum marketing is prompted by the problem of high prices. The Syrian attitude toward this problem is but one reflection of the general dissatisfaction of Near East states not only with oil concession development and returns but also with prevailing prices and marketing practices. Ideally the solution would seem to lie in the adoption of a Near East price basis which would result in substantial reductions in retail price levels and would offset much of the prevailing criticism on which interest in nationalization is based.

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[1] This instruction was drafted by Newton, and cleared by Fassberg, Funkhouser, and Roberts. It was repeated to Beirut.

[2] Not printed.

The Department has expressed to American interest operating in the area its concern regarding current Near East attitudes to both existing concession contracts and prevailing marketing practices, and the dangers inherent in an indifferent attitude toward them. Whether they and British oil interests might be induced to adopt a more liberal price regimen by a Syrian threat to nationalize petroleum marketing is open to speculation. Although the Department recognizes the right of any nation to nationalize industries assuming adequate compensation for the interests affected, it does not favor nationalization. In the Syrian case it considers nationalization of petroleum marketing to be an undesirable solution to this problem. Nonetheless the Department questions the wisdom, even in informal talks, of putting a one-sided brief—rather than an objective discussion of the proposal to nationalize petroleum marketing—before the Syrians. Such approach to this problem as the Legation makes should not be construable as informal pressure to discourage a decision to nationalize, which would be liable to generate suspicion of United States motives in international economic affairs and increase hostility toward United States and British interests in the Near East.

Informal objective consultation may, however, suffice to discourage Syrian officials contemplating nationalization as a solution to the price problem, particularly if it appears that previously unforeseen consequences and difficulties must be faced. In its informal talks with Syrian officials, the Legation should, therefore, suggest that the following points receive careful study before a decision is made:

A. *Effect of Nationalization on Domestic Economy*

1. A decision to nationalize petroleum marketing implies that adequate supplies of petroleum products are available. In the case of Syria, given that relations with Lebanon are not further strained, a large share of the domestic requirements may be derived from the IPC refinery at Tripoli. There will, however, be a serious gap between total consumer demand and the availability of supplies from this source. Assuring the adequacy of supply involves, therefore, the availability of foreign exchange to cover import needs, and some thought should be given to the drain on Syria's sterling and dollar reserves which this may occasion.

2. If, after nationalization, adequate supplies were not available, what effect would a severe curtailment of supplies have on (*a*) Syria's industrial development, (*b*) essential transport, and (*c*) Syrian economy.

3. In the event that adequate supplies cannot be maintained, how would the Syrian public react to a new rationing of petroleum products and how would the reimposition of rationing affect the stability of the Government.

B. *Syrian Responsibility in Nationalization Program*

Should the Syrian Government decide to nationalize petroleum marketing, consideration must be given to compensating United States, United Kingdom, French and Lebanese interests owning storage and distribution facilities in Syria. Compensation implies either substantial foreign exchange outlay at one time or a prolonged additional drain upon Syrian foreign exchange reserves. Nationalization can, of course, be accomplished without making compensation in foreign currency; or without making any form of compensation. Either of these alternatives leads to strained relations with the nations involved and may have a direct influence on the availability of supplies.

C. *Effect of Nationalization on Future Private Investments in Syria*

The impact nationalization of petroleum marketing is likely to have on future private investments in Syria should not be overlooked. Due consideration should be given the extent to which private enterprise would be willing to make further capital investments in Syria in view of the nationalization of an important sector of the Syrian economy where private enterprise had substantial investment. An immediate consequence may be the suspension of oil exploration now underway and a reluctance of other possible investors to take up the concession area, if abandoned.

D. *What Effect Will Nationalization Have upon the Efficiency of Distribution of Petroleum Products*

The decision to nationalize petroleum marketing implies that an organization ready to assume the task of distributing and vending petroleum products has been created. While it is probably true that most of the private companies' service personnel will be willing to accept state employment, it remains for the state to provide competent managerial people. Failure to replace the management of the private companies with a competent administration will almost certainly result in an inefficient—and more costly—system of distribution.

Additional costs, if lack of efficiency cannot be overcome, will be a charge upon the state for both salaries and expenses.

E. *How Will Nationalization Affect State Revenues and Prices of Products*

The decision to nationalize petroleum marketing implies the State's readiness to assume responsibility for assuring distribution and vending of petroleum products. Should operating expenses prove to be more costly than under private management, so that the profit margin enjoyed by private enterprise were eliminated, a reduction in retail prices could be accomplished only through a reduction in the tax income derived by the State, since the State would be obliged to defray a greater operating overhead while reducing the margin between the cost of products and their sale price.

NE Files : Lot 58 D 332 : "Saudi Arabia—Boundaries"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1951.[1]

Participants: Mr. Harley Stevens, Aminoil
NE—Mr. Jones
NE—Mr. Funkhouser
NE—Mr. Awalt

Summary:

Mr. Stevens made reference to the letter of March 15, 1951 addressed to the Sheikh of Kuwait by Mr. Ralph K. Davies, President of Aminoil, a copy of which was sent to the Department,[2] regarding arbitration of Aminoil's concession covering the three islands of Qaru, Kubbar and Umm al Maradim. He said that he wished no action on the part of the Department but wanted only to keep us informed of the company's position. He gave a brief résumé of the background to the dispute and suggested that the principal difficulty in the matter was the fact that the Sheikh who had been well acquainted with this problem had died in January 1950 and that the new Sheikh had not been sufficiently briefed on the matter. He said that KOC had waived its right of arbitration under Article 18 of its 1934 agreement in favor of making a different approach directly to the Sheikh for adjudication of their claim. This claim was submitted in June 1949 and was rejected by Sheikh Ahmed in July. Having elected to seek a ruling on their claim through that procedure instead of through recourse to Article 18, Aminoil felt that KOC had no right to revert to the said Article simply because the procedure first directed resulted unfavorably for them. Mr. Stevens also said that the present Sheikh Abdullah had agreed to arbitration only because he thought that Article 22 of the Aminol concession made it obligatory. He also said that it was Aminoil's belief that the Sheikh could not abdicate his responsibilities for Sharia' law; . . . and that the acts of his predecessor were binding upon the present Sheikh. Despite the legality of their position, however, Mr. Stevens said that he did not believe that the Sheikh of Kuwait would request KOC to withdraw its request for arbitration.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted on April 10.
[2] Copy not found in Department of State files.

Mr. Stevens said that he had heard from two unofficial sources that his company was seeking to obtain from the Iranian Government the managership of the AIOC interests recently nationalized by that Government. He said that he had also heard that the Department had suggested that these interests should have American management. Both Mr. Jones and Mr. Funkhouser disabused him of any idea that this Government endorsed such a development. On the contrary, he was told that to do so would lend substance to Soviet propaganda and would expose this Government to bitter criticism from the British. He said that he had been sure that such would be the case but he was glad to have confirmation. He said, however, that if future events should indicate that the Iranian Government would be receptive to bids from American companies, his company would be interested in making a bid for the managership.

The third subject of conversation Mr. Stevens asked to be completely off the record. During a recent conversation with PWOC representatives in California the subject of delimitation of the submerged area attributing to the Kuwait neutral zone was discussed and it was decided that a joint approach should be made to the Department. He accordingly wished that a meeting with Mr. McGhee could be arranged for representatives of both Aminoil and PWOC jointly. He said that it was the hope of the two firms that the Department would undertake to persuade Aramco to be generous in agreeing with the two firms to a division of the sea bed between their respective areas that would be advantageous to the latter. It was pointed out to Mr. Stevens that a problem of this kind was not one which oil companies could settle between themselves but was a more fundamental problem which could only be settled by an agreement between the sovereign governments concerned on the basis of principles of international law. It was also pointed out to him that settlement of this problem in the Kuwait area was only a part of the picture of the same problem which existed in other parts of the Persian Gulf, all of which would be decided on the basis of common principles and as a part of the same pattern. It was explained, moreover, that Mr. McGhee was very heavily occupied since his return from abroad and that it would be better if the group would settle for a meeting with interested officers of the Department under the chairmanship of

Mr. Berry. Mr. Stevens thought that would be agreeable and hoped the meeting could be arranged for Thursday or Friday of this week.[3]

A final suggestion mentioned by Mr. Stevens was in connection with the DLG program. No details were discussed and it was suggested that Aminoil should communicate on this subject with the political agent in Kuwait who undoubtedly was sufficiently informed on the subject by Sir Rupert Hay.

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[3] Stevens met with Barnabas Hadfield of Pacific Western Oil Company, Berry, and other members of the Department of State on April 12 to ask for the Department's help in persuading Aramco to accept their division of the seabed. Berry said the question of national boundaries was a matter which had to remain with the governments concerned, and he did not believe the Department could properly intercede in the problem. He suggested, however, that the companies might discuss the matter in hope of reaching an agreement which they might present to the respective governments. (Memorandum of conversation; 886D.2553/4-1251)

880.2553/4-1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, April 14, 1951—1 p. m.

5434. 1. Drake, chairman Gulf, called on me yesterday prior his departure for US to report status Gulf's discussions with Anglo-Iranian Oil Co on problem of increasing Kuwait's oil revenues. Drake says impasse has been reached with Fraser, chairman AIOC, who objects Gulf transferring its 50 percent interest Kuwait concession to separate US corp which Gulf proposed be set up for purposes. Fraser apparently now concedes necessity giving Kuwait benefits comparable Aramco terms, but due to his objection to transferring Gulf interest to US subsidiary, it has not been possible to discuss other details of proposed arrangement for increasing revenues. Drake firmly convinced necessary apply Aramco principle to Kuwait order given Sheik terms which wld compare favorably with those given to Saudi Arabia, permit Gulf take advantage of US tax credit, and avoid necessity raising basic Kuwait royalty rate (thus increasing fixed charges which might make Kuwait oil non-competitive).

2. Order to solve this impasse Drake believes it may be necessary for Dept to make high level approach to Brit Govt in support Gulf's position to HMG will "persuade" Fraser change his stand. Drake plans consult with Dept on this matter next week following his return. Proctor and Hamilton, Gulf Vice Presidents, remaining London until latter part of April to work out detailed arrangements if above problem can be resolved.

Altho specifically pressed, Drake cld not explain what valid reasons Fraser has for objecting to Gulf proposal.[1] Drake seems assume that basic reason is Fraser's reluctance to see what he fears is further American penetration into Kuwait.

Drake says Gulf willing continue all safeguards Brit interests now applying under present set-up.

GIFFORD

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[1] Telegram 4833 from Washington, April 21, advised the Embassy in London the president of Gulf had assured the Department there was no question of a separate concession. The reorganization was being sought by Gulf "solely secure maximum US tax benefit without altering management *status quo*." The Department had been discussing the matter with British officials in Washington and suggested the misunderstanding might be resolved by a fuller explanation to the British Foreign Office and further discussion between Gulf and its British partner. (880.2553/4-1451) Telegram 5579 from London, April 24, reported the Foreign Office was reexamining Gulf's proposal, since it appeared that the possible complications involved in transferring the title of Gulf's interest to a U.S. corporation might not be as serious as previously feared. (880.2553/4-2451)

887.2553/4-2351

Memorandum of Conversation, by James Newton of the Petroleum Policy Staff

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1951.[1]

Participants: Colonel Guillaumat, Director of Fuels
Mr. Gabriel Rosaz, French Embassy
Department: Mr. Edwin G. Moline—PED
Mr. Richard Funkhouser—NEA
Mr. James Newton—PED

Invited to expose the views of the French Government regarding a new agreement between the IPC and the Iraq Government, Mr. Guillaumat first mentioned the importance of Iraqi oil to France and French interest in maximizing Iraqi production. He had, however, called to ascertain what views on a settlement in Iraq the United States Government now entertained, particularly in view of the recent Aramco settlement in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Moline said that the United States Government had not altered its previous views, but that, in the light of the Aramco settlement, it was now clear that a new agreement with Iraq of the same magnitude was inevitable and that the key to reading a satisfactory agreement seemed to be increased production. As regards the IPC big inch pipeline the United States Government likewise had not changed its views, and there had been no decision within the Government to alter the rate of licensing despite some criticism on the matter. Any slow down in the rate of pipe delivery, Mr. Moline explained would be due to production problems and probably would not delay completion of the pipeline beyond schedule.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted on May 10.

With regard to steel for the pipeline, Colonel Guillaumat mentioned French anxiety lest pipeline delivery delays occasion an unfortunate reaction in Iraqi public opinion but expressed his view that the delivery delay was not yet serious. With regard to the Basra concession Colonel Guillaumat explained the delays which had occurred in developing this field and said that these factors would afford the company an excuse valid until next January. He felt, however, that the company should begin producing as early as possible. Mr. Moline concurred and said that while the delay was probably excusable one reached the point where meeting only minimim contractual obligations was not likely to satisfy a highly critical Government. It was his view that IPC would have to promise substantially more than minimum requirements. Colonel Guillaumat said that he hoped that a substantial increase in Basra production would be achieved but mentioned that the French Government was somewhat concerned about the lasting powers of any new agreement, noting that the Iraqis were renewing their demands for increased benefits although IPC-Iraqi negotiations had been concluded only as recently as last August. Mr. Moline noted that the settlement did not apply to Basra and Mosul.

Mr. Moline said that the whole Iranian problem might have been avoided had an imaginative offer been made before the situation was allowed to degenerate and indicated that, in view of the situation in Iran, an early, generous settlement in Iraq was necessary. Colonel Guillaumat said that it was the French Government's desire to see a settlement in Iraq worked out as rapidly as possible.

Mr. Moline said that he did not understand the French concern over American proposals involving changes in the corporate structure of IPC. Colonel Guillaumat explained that the IPC was not like Aramco when the parent companies were of the same nationality, but a company where several national interests were involved. If the IPC were transformed into a profit-making company, returns would presumably be made in dividends payable to the shareholders. The French were not interested in dividends but in oil. Too, if the reorganization were to take place, the French dividends would be subject to foreign (U.K. or Iraqi) regulations.

Mr. Funkhouser inquired whether French interests had attempted to work out a formula with other IPC parent companies. Colonel Guillaumat said they had but without success and indicated that the French company might lose its right to buy oil at cost. Mr. Moline said he thought the cost of production concept need not be a barrier as regards Iraqi oil for it could be very flexible. Imposition of new taxes would, for example, add to production costs and the Iraqis might get their share in that fashion. Colonel Guillaumat said that

that, in effect, was what American companies had proposed. Mr. Moline said he thought that the principle of equal participation ought to be recognized and that this should be generally on a 50–50 basis without specific relation to Saudi Arabian revenues. The alternative as proposed by the French would present the difficulty of having to publish Saudi Arabian royalty rates and get comparisons on a cents per barrel basis. Colonel Guillaumat said that the application of the other complex Aramco formula would be impossible but Mr. Funkhouser asked whether a profit-sharing formula would not be a more stable solution and royalties more flexible than a specific per ton rate. Mr. Moline pointed out that Venezuelan revenues were not specifically known. They varied from year to year and on a per barrel basis probably exceeded the Saudi Arabian returns.

Colonel Guillaumat said the solution would be more easily applied by a profit making company and anyway the French feared that discussions prior to reaching a settlement along these lines would be too lengthy. Mr. Moline said the problem was that of convincing the Iraqis that they would be getting a fair deal. Colonel Guillaumat said he thought Middle East Governments would never accept a reduction in revenues which might occur under a profit-sharing formula, particularly if prices rose. Mr. Moline said that a price formula reflecting the increasing importance of Middle East oil was needed and that although it might be difficult to attain, the alternative, with the problems they would create, would be even less attractive.

On two other matters, the bulk terminals in French West Africa and the refinery licenses, Colonel Guillaumat had no comment to make. As the conversation ended he indicated that IPC inter-company talks were scheduled to begin in London this week.

800.2553/5–351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 3, 1951—7 p. m.

5027. For Ambassador Gifford from McGhee. Drake expressed great appreciation Emb's support and reported considerable degree understanding with Fuel and Power and FonOff. States approval Gulf plan founders only on point made by Victor Butler that only Commonwealth registered corps can hold concessions in Commonwealth including Brit protected areas.

Pls again approach FonOff at highest level you consider desirable and inquire whether this policy in fact followed and if so on what basis. Shld be made clear that in inquiring re policy and in particular its applicability to Kuwait, as indicated below, Dept shld not be considered as approving such policy on general grounds in view possible discrimination involved. Dept feels that even if alleged policy re commonwealth corps is followed (1) an exception cld be made in case of Kuwait Sheikhdom in view its special relationship to UK, (2) UK cld admit exception as done previously, i.e., Aminol (Kuwait Neutral Zone), Barber Asphalt (Trinidad) without significant effect above policy and (3) general benefits flowing from Commonwealth registration co wld be less than those from specific Gulf proposals. (Deptel 4952 Apr 28.)[2]

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Funkhouser and cleared by Jones, Moline, Raynor, Ranney, and Beale.

Drake convinced personal word from you wld help immeasurably. You are given full discretion to act as forcefully as you feel appropriate and necessary resolve issue. [McGhee.]

ACHESON

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[2] Not printed; it stated the contract changes Gulf wanted would be an internal matter only and would not affect the contract with the Sheikh of Kuwait, and Gulf was prepared to sign any binding agreement, for any length of time, guaranteeing no operational, management, or other change affecting Kuwait. The closing paragraph advised the Embassy: "Drake rptd above to Dept Apr 25 with emphasis on securing co from risk UK nationalization, which fact should not of course be communicated to UK. He requested and was promised continued Dept support here and in London." (880.2553/4-2451)

887.2553/5-951: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

LONDON, May 9, 1951—6 p. m.

5853. Ref: Embtel 5740, rptd Baghdad 64, Paris 2202, Tehran 112, May 3.[2] Emb reps talk with Jersey officials reveals fol as status Iraq Petroleum Company position re increasing Iraq oil revenues.

1. All owning groups of IPC are agreed that payments to Iraq shld be approx equivalent per ton with that Saudi Arabia receives from Aramco.

2. Gibson, IPC managing director, authorized negot on either of two alternatives: (*a*) arrangement for 50–50 profit-sharing or (*b*) plan to yield identical results but payments to be computed in such a way as to avoid continuing examinations of cost of oil with Iraq, since Fr object to discussion of costs with IG. AIOC, Shell and Amer group wld like use income tax route to increase payments to Iraq and establish Iraq trading companies to be sub taxes. Fr, while

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[1] Repeated to Baghdad, Paris, and Tehran.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Gibson was flying to Baghdad on May 3 to begin negotiations with the Government of Iraq, and the Embassy would advise the Department when it had more information on the company's terms. (887.2553/5-351)

more conciliatory to this type plan, still showing reluctance adopt this course,[3] and Gulbenkian continues refuse submit income taxes. Apparently, IG's preference for form which plan shld take will play prominent part in settling differences between owing groups.

3. Under either alternative, Gibson instructed obtain undertaking from IG that oil revenues payable to Iraq may be made by third parties, thus leaving door open for groups to set up their Iraq trading companies to be taxed shld they decide take tax route.

4. Understand IPC will attempt apply same terms finally agreed on its concession to Mosul and Basrah concessions, but otherwise no major changes contemplated in terms MPC and BPC concessions.

5. IPC plans that future royalties to Iraq wld be figured on official London exchange rate, but company willing negot settlement present "gold clause" dispute. Understand company willing pay something over pounds 1 million to settle matter out of court.

6. Reps owning groups remaining London to work out such inter-company matters as may be necessary as Baghdad negots progress.

7. Understand Harding, who has returned States to report Socony Board, also making full report to Dept.[4]

GIFFORD

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[3] Telegram 6823 from Paris, May 9, reported the French were cool to the idea of a 50–50 sharing of the profits via the taxation of the Iraq Petroleum Groups, except as a last resort if the other formula for 50–50 sharing proved unacceptable to the Government of Iraq (887.2553/5–951).

[4] Telegram 703 from Baghdad, May 12, advised the Department of State of the first meeting of the Iraq Petroleum Company representatives with the Government of Iraq negotiating committee. Company officials reported that the atmosphere was satisfactory, and they had advanced two proposals based on the Aramco agreement for 50–50 profit sharing. (887.2553/5–1251) Telegram 752 from Baghdad, May 30, reported that negotiations had reached a point where no further progress would be apparent for the time being. The company representatives expected to return to London within a week but informed the Embassy they expected to reach an understanding before they left that would be the basis for a formal agreement to be signed during the summer. (887.2553/5–3051) Despatch 2170 from Baghdad, June 1, advised the Department that the specific terms of the probable agreement were not available, but the agreement would provide for a 50–50 division of the profits. (887.2553/6–151)

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468 : "Petroleum"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1951.[1]

Subject: Discussion of AIOC Problem with U.S. Oil Companies Operating in Middle East

Participants: NEA—Assistant Secretary McGhee
Jersey—B. B. Howard, P. Anderson, G. Keogler
Gulf—R. Rhoades, C. Wisner
Aramco—J. T. Duce
Socony—J. C. Case, T. Kelly
Caltex—(Bahrein Petroleum Co.) W. H. Pinckard, M. Lipp
Pacific Western—B. B. Hadfield
Superior—R. Johnson
GTI—Mr. Rountree
GTI—Mr. Ferguson
NE—Mr. Jones
NE—Mr. Funkhouser
PED—Mr. Moline

Mr. McGhee reviewed in particular detail the history of the AIOC controversy in Iran including past and present political developments. Mr. McGhee stated that our objectives in order of importance were to maintain peace, to keep Iran on the side of the West, to maintain the flow of oil, and to protect concession rights in Iran and other parts of the world. He stated that it had been and continued to be the U.S. view that as a minimum nationalization had to be accepted as an accomplished fact. He stated that the U.K. to date had not made an offer which we felt had any chance of being accepted by the Iranians. Unfortunately, our position and activities vis-à-vis either the Iranians or the British could not be profitably made known to the public at this time. If we made it known that we favored British acceptance of nationalization in order to salvage at least an operating contract, the U.K. would believe their position sabotaged. There also could be adverse consequences in other oil producing states to such a public U.S. acceptance of nationalization. On the other hand, if we publicly opposed nationalization, the Iranians would accuse the West of conspiracy and there would be a good chance that they would turn their backs on the West. Mr. McGhee mentioned that we could not oppose on legal grounds the sovereign right of a foreign state to nationalize and even if there were no such legal position and precedent there existed no effective means of persuading Iranians to revoke nationalization other than by the use of force. We considered force no solution even if we were in a position to use it.

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[1] This memorandum was prepared on May 18.

Mr. McGhee stated that the U.S. position could be expressed in simple terms: We were urging the U.K. to come up with an offer which was capable of being accepted in Iran. This we would support fully. We had reason to believe our course in Iran had placed us in a position where our influence still meant something. We were also forcefully pressing the Iranian Government to sit down with the British to discuss the problem and we were pointing out all the difficulties Iran would face trying to operate the oil fields without AIOC.

Mr. McGhee mentioned that the U.K. press had accused the Department of not supporting the U.K. position, of forcing them to accept nationalization which we ourselves do not favor, of permitting the development of a situation out of which U.S. companies would profit which was the Commie line. Mr. McGhee described how important it was for us to prevent US–UK relations from becoming more strained at this point. Mr. McGhee added that on the other hand Iranians were highly resentful of the US–UK high level discussions on the Iranian oil problem and other indications that the U.S. and U.K. were ganging up on Iran to prevent nationalization. Mr. McGhee mentioned the delicate position which currently obtained in Iran, stressed the deep feeling of xenophobia, and added that nationalism was a force which usually proved successful. The U.S. Government was anxious to keep that nationalistic fervor working at least not counter to aims whereas the activities of the Tudeh were endeavoring to align the Nationalists with their objectives.

Mr. McGhee asked for the individual company reactions to our handling of the Iranian situation, what the industry as a whole felt about the possibility of U.S. companies involving themselves in Iran, what impact Iranian nationalization was having in their concession areas and what could be done to protect their position in their different concession areas. Mr. Keogler expressed the following views (*a*) The U.S. Government might make a firm stand publicly and privately against nationalization and unilateral cancellation of contracts; (*b*) it was disadvantageous to have the Iranian Government decide what damages should be paid to the company; (*c*) Iranian oil was in effect already nationalized so that nothing necessarily need be changed; (*d*) there would be an adverse impact on all other contracts in the world if Iranian expropriation were successful; (*e*) American businessmen would be discouraged from operating anywhere in the world if such lawlessness and such legal interpretations proved successful; (*f*) international law was principally made up of accepted or unaccepted principles which were subject to extremely varied interpretation; (*g*) it might be necessary to develop the proper international principles to reach a successful solution of this vital international problem and (*h*) perhaps the U.S. Government or U.S. industry should indicate that they would not handle the oil. Mr. Case stated (*a*) that this might be a time to use force since such vital oil could not be allowed to be lost; (*b*) that nationalization in the U.K. was different from Iranian nationalization in that to his best knowledge no foreign interests were directly affected by nationalization in the U.K.; (*c*) that if international law could not support opposition to nationalization then the matter should be decided on the basis of fundamental principles which should not allow such arbitrary action and disregard for the international obligations and responsibilities which all sovereign states should accept; (*d*) that Iran would face many difficulties over the years by such action; (*e*) that Iranian production might fall off drastically and development move ahead faster in other regions in order to make up the loss for Iranian oil; (*g*) that there were many difficulties involved in attracting technicians, obtaining supplies, equipment, in keeping up with technical improvements, and in paying compensation to AIOC if such in fact were contemplated. Mr. Howard stated that Iranian credit would be seriously impaired and Iran's future adversely affected by the loss of foreign capital. Mr. Brewster felt that some of these fears and reactions might be publicized by industry and that industry might particularly speak its mind on the inadvisability of U.S. companies involving themselves in Iran. Mr. McGhee asked if the other companies represented had similar opinions regarding the inadvisability of working in Iran at this time. Different company representatives stated that this was entirely true as regards their own companies but could not speak for the industry as a whole. It was the consensus that the industry itself could not take steps to dissuade those not represented at this meeting from adopting similar policy. Not only was the expression made that the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission would have objections to this voluntary "restraint of trade" but that any industry ban would be disregarded by any company so interested. Mr. Howard expressed the view that if any U.S. group went in it would amount to cutting the industry's own throat since "concession jumping" would be fatal for concessionaires in other parts of the world. "Highway robbery" was the expression used by Mr. Case and he stated that it could not be possibly considered by responsible companies. Mr. Pinckard added that it would probably be most embarrassing to the U.S. Government at this point as well as to U.S. industry. Mr. Pinckard also stated that the time might conceivably arrive however when it might be advisable to have U.S. technicians rather than technicians of an unfriendly country.

Mr. McGhee asked the group if they knew of any U.S. companies actively discussing operations in Iran. Only negative responses were made to that point. Mr. Howard mentioned that the Ryan group was interested in getting the Basra concession away from the Iraq Petroleum Company and that operations in Iran might similarly have appeal to this group but made it clear that he had no indication that such was the case. Mr. McGhee stated that he had felt that this would be the position that American companies would take and he fully concurred with the thought that aloofness on the part of U.S. industry would seem appropriate at this time. He mentioned that were American interests to offer to run AIOC's installations our relations with the U.K. would be seriously affected and that the opportunity for the U.K. to pick up the pieces from this controversy would be lost. This it was stated was the party line which the Communists were currently exploiting; unfortunately it was being given press support in the U.K. McGhee also agreed however that if it appeared that situation so deteriorated that it became a choice between either Communist technicians or U.S. technicians, the Department undoubtedly with U.K. support would have already urged U.S. companies to take action.

In answer to the varied views and suggestions by industry representatives, Mr. McGhee expressed the following positions. He reiterated and re-emphasized the Department's dilemma with regard to public statements as listed above, i.e. alienation of either the U.K. or Iran with consequent adverse effect on any compromise. Mr. McGhee developed the U.S. position regarding nationalization at considerable length stating that there were many precedents for nationalization, that the government position had been and continued to be in accordance with U.S. international declarations and agreements that we could not oppose the right of sovereign states to nationalize as long as prompt and effective compensation were paid. He referred to the Mexican, Bolivian and Central European expropriations. He mentioned that the oil industry was fully experienced, however unhappily, with the facts and precedents in this regard. He stated our Legal Advisers felt that no court of international law would reverse any Iranian decision to nationalize even if jurisdiction over such a problem were accepted. It was stated to industry representatives that even assuming there had been no contrary body of legal precedent and opinion in this respect, there existed no known method other than the use of force making the Iranians reverse their nationalization decision. This was perhaps the real key to the situation; the legal aspects providing the shadow of the problem, how to apply pressure in any effective way was the substance. "Nationalization" sentiment in Iran was ubiquitous and deep-seated; it was confused with "independence". It was doubted whether even threats to boycott Iran by U.S. companies would be effective or appropriate in view of the fact that Iranian oil, particularly Abadan production, was currently irreplaceable, that Iranian xenophobia went so deep that failure to sell their oil would be preferred to revoking nationalization and that such a boycott would provide an opportunity for Russian action. Mr. McGhee stated that the U.S. Government here and in Iran was continuing to impress the Iranians with the difficulties of developing their oil resources without the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and specifically mentioned the shortage of technicians, specialized material, tankers and other facilities, the adverse impact on the Iranian economy of inefficiently handled oil development, the tendency for traditional Iranian customers to develop more stable alternative sources of supply to the long run detriment of Iranian oil development, and the difficulties of attracting other foreign capital into Iran following unilateral cancellation of a legitimate contract. Mr. McGhee stated although we could not make a strong stand against the sovereign right of a foreign state to nationalize, we were strongly opposing unilateral cancellation of contracts. Mr. Hadfield expressed the view that this too would appear to be a tenuous position since the sovereign state could divest private individuals of property rights and there was little difference between property rights and contractual rights. He advised against taking refuge in what he considered a weak position.

Mr. Howard stated that it was tragic that there was no solution to this problem. Mr. McGhee stated that he could not concur that there was no solution and indeed felt that there was no reason for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company not to continue operating in Iran, that it depended on the way the British behaved and how we acted in bringing this situation about. Mr. Howard expressed the view that the next move would appear to be up to the British and that they should make an offer which was capable of being considered favorably by the Iranian Government. Mr. Howard wondered whether the U.S. Government felt that the policies of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were conducive to such a settlement and specifically asked whether the Department had confidence in Sir William Fraser's ability to facilitate the resolution of this problem. Mr. McGhee declined to state the Department's views on the individuals concerned with AIOC policy and added that it was unnecessary to describe AIOC's method of operating to American industry representatives.

Mr. McGhee stated that the U.S. Government highly valued the prestige which it had developed not only in Iran but in the Middle East area and although we had to be extremely careful about risking this prestige, it was urgent to go as far as we could to support the continued operations of the British oil company. Mr. McGhee described various types of operating arrangements which U.S. Government felt could meet the irresistible Iranian demand for “nationalization”. He stated that the government was fully aware and had been for at least the past year of the potential danger which nationalization of AIOC would have on other concession contracts in the world. It was obvious that if Iran won better terms than the profit-sharing agreement or in other words if nationalization proved successful, it would be difficult to prevent other oil producing states from moving the same way. The dilemma was particularly acute since the West might have little alternative but to try to make whatever form of "nationalization" resulted in Iran a success.

There was some discussion of how to resolve the dilemma of opposing sovereign rights of governments to do anything they wanted within their own boundaries. No mention was made of the possible usefulness of some international oil forum to which both countries and companies could turn. Mr. Duce subsequently mentioned that in the last analysis no contract could keep an oil company secure if the foreign state wished to make it difficult for the company to operate and that the only practicable solution was to keep the government satisfied with the company operations.

Mr. Rhoades mentioned that even if a contract violation were established, there would be no apparent means of collecting damages since the Iranian Government had ultimate control in determining the amount of such payments. Mr. McGhee stated that compensation was the last thing AIOC wanted. He reported that there was no satisfactory basis for protecting AIOC against nationalization and that in the view of our lawyers Article 21 did not override the sovereign right of Iran to make that decision. He added that the U.K. did not take the position that Iran could not nationalize. Mr. Pinckard stated that it was probably difficult for the British Government to take a strong stand against nationalization in view of their own actions in this field.

Mr. McGhee stated that the U.S. Government was anxious to employ induction rather than coercion to Iran. He felt that threatening Iran could result in a break with the West. The limitations however which would apply to such a forceful policy in Iran might not necessarily apply however to similar moves in other oil areas. He expressed the view that concessions in other parts of the Middle East and Latin America seemed relatively secure from nationalization. He felt that the example which Aramco had set in its fast, effective negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government was the way to secure the stability of other concessions by "keeping ahead of the game" and by removing pressures before they became acute.

Different industry comment was made expressing the view that Iranian oil was essential to the West, that Iran was negotiating with an effective gun in the back of AIOC, that the West was not in a position to threaten Iran as effectively as Iran could threaten the West, that the industry had some skepticism over whether or not companies not represented at the meeting would make advances to Iran regarding the development and handling of Iranian oil and made some expressions of criticism regarding reported AIOC moves such as cutting off advanced royalty payments. Regarding a public statement which would serve to protect the validity of concession contracts in other parts of the world, industry representatives expressed various conflicting views which resulted in deferring to whatever decision the Department believed best.

Mr. McGhee stated that if it were possible to find any silver lining to the serious storm which existed, it might be that if any Iranian leader could make an agreement with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and get away with it, it would have to be a man as popular as Mossadeq. Other favorable features of Mossadeq's current power were that he was honest, he was anti-Russian, he had promised that Iranian oil would continue to its present consumers and that British technicians would continue to be used.

Mr. McGhee ended by expressing the hope that the Department had described to the satisfaction of industry the complexities of the Iranian problem, the merits and demerits of the bad alternatives now open and the policies and action which the Department followed and was contemplating. He apologized for holding the industry representatives for such a long meeting. He hoped to obtain the confidence and continued advice of the oil companies primarily affected by these developments. On behalf of the industry representatives Mr. Pinckard thanked Mr. McGhee for his thorough and detailed explanation of the problems involved in the Iranian issue and expressed sincerest congratulations for what he considered the best possible handling of an "impossible" situation.

886D.2553/6-451

Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1951.

Subject: Gulf Oil Company Difficulties Regarding Kuwait Concession

Participants: Colonel Drake, Chairman, Gulf Oil Corporation
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Funkhouser

Colonel Drake stated that on June 1, 1951 Mr. Jackson, Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Anderson, Comptroller, of Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company conferred with the following officials of British Government at joint meeting:

Representative of Foreign Office
Representative of Ministry of Fuel and Power
Representative of Treasury and Tax Authority
Representative of Bank of England
Representative of Inland Revenue

Messrs. Jackson and Anderson presented the tentative agreement which Gulf Oil Corporation and AIOC had reached relative to increasing the revenue of the Sheikh of Kuwait from oil concession now in the possession of Kuwait Oil Company, Ltd.

No representative of Gulf was permitted to attend this meeting. After the meeting Mr. Jackson reported to Gulf that at the meeting no objection to the proposal was raised by anyone except the representative of Inland Revenue who made following statement:

1. Kuwait—a British protected state—has no income tax and doesn't need one.
2. If Kuwait is permitted to impose an income tax, such action might have wide repercussions on revenues of British Government—for example, similar action might be taken in Iraq and Persia.
3. If Kuwait imposes such a tax, it might not come within the purview of British Finance Act of June 1950, granting tax credit to British corporation operating in foreign countries.
4. Memorandum to above effect is to be delivered to Chancellor of Exchequer by said Inland Revenue representative.

Mr. Jackson told Gulf representative (Mr. Proctor) that he thought Inland Revenue Department could finally be induced to approve proposal of Gulf and AIOC, but that it might take several months to do it and suggested that as a "stop gap", the royalty to Kuwait be increased to about 30¢ per barrel on a temporary basis, without prejudice to a final settlement along lines of Gulf–AIOC proposal.

Mr. Jackson told Mr. Proctor, also, that Inland Revenue representative suggested that U.S. Government be informed of possible harmful effect on British Government revenues that might result from income taxes imposed by British protected states.

Mr. Proctor told Mr. Jackson that Gulf was strongly opposed to any further delay in this matter and therefore could not agree to the proposed "stop gap". This means that an impasse has now been reached unless British Government overrules the Inland Revenue representative.

Mr. Proctor has informed Mr. Palmer and Mr. Penfield of U.S. Embassy in London of what occurred at above meeting of June 1, 1951, and asked that Ambassador Gifford see Mr. Morrison, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, immediately and urge that Gulf–AIOC proposal be pushed through with all possible speed. Mr. Palmer and

Mr. Penfield promised to help but doubted if anything further would be done without instructions from Washington.

Mr. Proctor said that Victor Butler of Ministry of Fuel and Power was not at June 1 meeting owing to attendance at the International Petroleum Conference in The Hague, but Mr. Proctor is to see him today (June 4).

Colonel Drake stated that only with the cooperation of Mr. Jackson of AIOC could Gulf have overcome the traditional Fraser stubborness. Colonel Drake stated that Sir William Fraser had openly taken the position that he would not agree to the Gulf proposals. Colonel Drake also stated that Sir William Fraser appeared extremely bitter about the operations of American companies in the Middle East, specifically he blamed Aramco for AIOC difficulties in Iran.

Mr. McGhee thanked Colonel Drake for bringing this information to the attention of the Department and stated that he would ask Ambassador Gifford to intercede again in this matter.[1] Mr. McGhee added that the British Government should be able to resolve the impasse which existed in U.K. Government circles. Colonel Drake made an appointment to see Mr. McGhee on June 6 to learn the results of the action contemplated.

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[1] Telegram 5644 from Washington, June 4, advised the Embassy in London of this conversation and reported the Department of State hoped the British Government could make an immediate and favorable disposition of the problem. McGhee believed the Ambassador's personal intercession would be appropriate, and he suggested that early announcement of a new profit-sharing agreement in Kuwait would have a beneficial effect on the negotiations in Iran and Iraq. (886D.2553/6–451)

Telegram 6347 from London, June 5, informed McGhee the Embassy had been in close touch with Gulf officials and the British Foreign Office and had been informed that the Anglo Iranian Oil Company would sign a long-term agreement with Gulf that day and meet with the Foreign Office after the signing. Since the Foreign Office had informed the Embassy the Inland Revenue Office should reach a decision within the next week, the Ambassador did not think his personal intercession at the present time would be helpful but promised to continue to watch the situation closely. (886D.2553/6–551)

886D.2553/6–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

LONDON, June 6, 1951—7 p. m.

6402. Gulf reps told us last night that when they went around to see AIOC yesterday to sign agreement on principles of plan to increase Kuwait's oil revenues (Embtel 6374, June 5),[2] Jackson told them that he was sorry that he was unable to sign. He vaguely mentioned necessity putting draft agreement to company's fin comite on July 14, but Gulf reps were unable to get any clear explanation as to why Jackson unable sign agreement then and there. Jackson did, however, state that he regarded document as agreed but just was not able sign it then.

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[1] Repeated to Basra.

[2] Not printed.

Moreover, mtg with FonOff, which Victor Butler was arranging, did not take place yesterday and Gulf has not yet been able ascertain reasons therefor or determine whether mtg will be arranged later.

Until inland revenue has formulated its position (which shld be in next few days) and we know its precise nature, it is difficult for us to take further steps.[3] We have, however, spoken to Gaitskell, who has promised to look into matter, and are keeping in close touch with FonOff and Min Fuel and Power.

GIFFORD

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[3] Telegram 6568 from London, June 14, reported the British Department of Inland Revenue might not insist on knowing the position of the U.S. Treasury regarding the eligibility of an Aramco-type tax for credit against U.S. taxes before it decided on the Kuwait case. The Ambassador, however, thought it would help to expedite the British decision if the Department of State could obtain a Treasury ruling or inform the British that it was not possible to obtain a Treasury ruling prior to an audit of the tax returns. (886D.2553/6–1451)

886A.2553/6–2051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt)

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] June 20, 1951.[1]

Subject: Meeting with Aramco on Jurisdictional Dispute in Persian Gulf and Southeastern Arabia.

Participants: Mr. Richard Young—International Law Counsel to SAG
Mr. J. Terry Duce—Executive Vice President, Aramco
Mr. George Ray—Legal Counsel, Aramco
Mr. Alec Chapman—Washington Representative, Aramco
OIR/GE—Dr. Boggs
L/NEA—Mr. Maktos
U/FW—Mr. Taylor
PED—Mr. Newton
NE—Mr. Jones
NE—Mr. Awalt

Summary:

Mr. Jones welcomed the opportunity to hear Mr. Young and invited him to open the discussion on the subject as he saw fit. Mr. Young said that he was in Saudi Arabia from the end of March to mid-June where he had discussed extensively with Saudi Arabian officials the problem of the boundary and island disputes and the best means of preparing the case for the Saudi Arabian Government. He said that the British note of April 25, 1951, while friendly and conciliatory on the whole, had broadened the problem to include certain islands over which Saudi Arabian sovereignty had never heretofore been challenged. He said that he had no explanation why this was done because he thought that claims to these islands would tend to weaken the British case inasmuch as their geographic position so strongly supported Saudi Arabia's claim. He suggested that the British may possibly have wished to create an issue upon which they would be willing to give way readily in the hope thereby of creating good will and improving their bargaining position. He said that Sheikh Yusuf Yassin had suggested the advisability of enlarging the boundary discussions to include the area below latitude 22 degrees north and define the frontier between Saudi Arabia and the Hadramaut. Mr. Young said that he had dissuaded Sheikh Yusuf from inclusion of this question until such time as definite facts could be ascertained regarding this area.

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[1] This memorandum was prepared on June 21.

Mr. Young said that it was his impression that the fact finding commission, whose initial session was intended for early fall, would be postponed because of Emir Feisal's visit to London.[2] His reasoning, he said, was based on two points; first, that the subject would probably be discussed in substance in London and secondly, because Sheikh Yusuf had told them that he planned on making no reply to the British to their note of April 25 until after the Feisal conversations in London had taken some form. Meanwhile, he said, he and Judge Hudson had been asked to prepare material on the jurisdictional disputes for the London session. He also said that Sheikh Yusuf and Sheikh Abdullah had expressed the hope on behalf of the SAG that the United States would support Saudi Arabia in its negotiations so that it could deal with the British on an equal basis.

Mr. Jones expressed his surprise that Mr. Young had such a distinct impression that the London visit of Emir Feisal would lead to detailed discussion of specific agenda items. The Department's information, he said, was that the SAG preferred such conversations on the jursidictional problem should rest with the fact finding commission and that Emir Feisal's visit was primarily for the creation of good will for discussions on a very general basis of various outstanding problems. It was hoped thereby to create a friendly atmosphere of broad benefit to general United Kingdom-Saudi Arabian relations. Mr. Ray said he thought it would be very difficult to create a friendly tone without discussion of substance especially in face of the general hatred and suspicion of the British throughout the whole Middle East. He added that it was his belief that the invitation to Emir Feisal was a British effort to delay the meeting of the fact finding commission and he urged that this Government should use its influence with the British to avoid any such delay. Mr. Jones replied that the Department would be disappointed if the London meeting is in fact a delaying tactic because we have consistently urged that the negotiations progress as rapidly as possible and have anticipated an early meeting of the fact finding commission.

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[2] Telegram 712 from Jidda, June 4, advised the Department of State that an invitation had been received by Prince Faisal to go to England in August to review Saudi Arabian-British problems, including the matter of the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. The Ambassador reported that he had suggested Faisal accept the invitation, with the understanding that it would be a courtesy visit only, but Faisal could take advantage of the situation to discuss Saudi Arabian concerns on broad lines, rather than negotiating on specific questions. (711.56386A/6-451) Telegram 725 from Jidda, June 7, informed Washington that Faisal had accepted the British invitation to visit London on the understanding there would be general discussions of mutual interests, rather than a specific agenda (711.56386A/6-751). Information on Prince Faisal's visit to London is in the memorandum of conversation of September 25, p. 330.

Mr. Maktos referred to Mr. Young's mention of Saudi Arabia's hope for US support and asked him if there are any legal positions which are so strong that the USG could legitimately take a position or whether it was a case of supporting Saudi Arabia for political reasons. Mr. Young said he thought there might be a strong legal position with respect to some of the islands. Mr. Maktos suggested that even in the case of the islands, jurisdiction might be effected by territorial water and seabed considerations which perhaps should be settled first.

Mr. Jones observed that we are meeting in the shadow of Iran which is the beginning rather than the end of a chapter. During this period, he said, we may need every factor in the picture that is useful to us and one of those is the special British position in the Gulf, generally, including the Sheikhdoms. Mr. Ray said that the British must develop good will in the area for its own salvation and one of the best ways of doing this, he thought, was to allow direct negotiation between King Ibn Saud and the Sheikhal rulers. He said that Britain will have trouble in the area so long as they insist upon being dictators and bulliers rather than negotiators. It was pointed out to Mr. Ray that the Department concurred in his view that direct negotiation between the parties immediately concerned would be very helpful toward a prompter and more friendly solution to the problems and that we had made such a recommendation to the British in London in May 1950. Our recommendation, however, was unacceptable and while we deplored it, it was thought that modifications of British control in the area was something which would have to come slowly and not be forced. Mr. Jones pointed out that the United States must also show solidarity with the British in the Near East, generally, and that we hope the Iranian affair will persuade the British of the wisdom of a fair and friendly approach. Our formal position, he said, must be that we are friends of both parties in these jurisdictional disputes and that we want them to reach agreement as soon as possible. He also observed that in his estimation Saudi Arabia was not in a position where the British could bully it considering the important special interests of the United States in that country as well as its expert legal assistance.

Mr. Ray complained that he had learned that the Department had taken the position in a memorandum it sent to the Embassy at Jidda that Saudi Arabia was overreaching itself in some of its claims. He said that Aramco had always cooperated 100 percent with the Department in making information known to it and Aramco hoped that the Department would similarly cooperate with it. It was pointed out to Mr. Ray that the Department had never made a secret of its attitude toward some of the Saudi Arabian claims or to a similarly exaggerated position assumed by the British. Moreover, he was informed, the Department had frankly told Aramco of its attitude on more than one occasion and in particular it had been so advised at a meeting similar to this on March 19, at which Mr. Ray, himself, was present.

Mr. Young said that he understood that certain work was being done by the British on division of the seabed in the Persian Gulf. He was told that such a division had been worked out between Bahrein and Qatar and was a matter of public property but that no other delineations had been made that the Department was aware of. Mr. Young said that it was also his understanding that a large scale division had been made in the "Boggs–Kennedy Report" and asked whether the Department did not believe Saudi Arabia might object to our collaboration with the British in such a project without reference to Saudi Arabia. It was observed that the Boggs–Kennedy Report had no political implications and that it was strictly technical and explanatory only. He was also informed that it had not been accepted by the Department as an official position. Mr. Boggs confirmed that this was the case and observed further that he had done work of this kind in most other parts of the world also and that his studies had never been the subject of complaint by states concerned.

880.2553/6-2251 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, June 22, 1951—6 p. m.

6765. At mtg yesterday at FonOff Emb was given statement of HMG's position re Kuwait oil negots. FonOff stated that AIOC was now prepared proceed with arrangement for settlement in Kuwait without awaiting decision from inland revenue on question of UK tax relief. HMG considers however, that the two fol alterations in present proposals are desirable.

a. The provisions for payments to Shaikh shld be revised to allow division of profits before deduction of foreign tax. Stated that HMG did not consider reduction of Shaikh's share net profits on account of foreign tax is justifiable in principle, and it is understood IPC partners have recognized this in their proposals for Iraq.

b. AIOC has been advised that in HMG's opinion an increase in Kuwait oil royalties is justified in view of gen level of royalties elsewhere and HMG reserves right if necessary to give same advice to Shaikh. FonOff indicates it is matter of decision for Shaikh and HMG will not insist on this point. Reference was made however, to AIOC Gulf agreement of principles, providing that if Shwuh or HMG insist, companies prepared to raise royalty to not more than twice present level.

MinFuel also advised Gulf of foregoing position yesterday. Gulf reps wish maintain principal of splitting profits after deduction of foreign tax, since this is in line with Aramco plan and also serves as check on further royalty increases. Understand Proctor requesting permission from Gulf board to make compromise proposal that unrelieved portion either US or UK tax may be deducted before splitting profits with Kuwait, with such deduction to be calculated on basis which is most favorable to Shaikh. Hence under present US laws allowing full tax relief, there wld actually be no deduction of foreign tax in Kuwait, but principle wld be preserved.

On June 20 Gulf and AIOC signed principles of agreement similar to those pouched Dept in Emb despatch 5905, June 6.[1] It appears therefore if prompt agreement can be achieved on alterations suggested by HMG, companies cld commence negots with Shaikh at early date.

HOLMES

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[1] Not printed; it contained a copy of the draft letter of agreement covering the Gulf-Anglo-Iranian plan to increase the oil revenues of the Shaikh of Kuwait, which was to have been signed on June 5 (886D.2553/6-651).

886D.2553/6-2551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief, Monetary Affairs Staff (Rosenson)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 25, 1951.

Subject: Kuwait Oil

Participants: Colonel Drake, Gulf Oil Company
NEA—Mr. McGhee
Other Company representatives and Department Officers

The only issue discussed was whether, in the contemplated arrangement with Kuwait for a 50-50 division of the profits, taxes paid in the U.K. (by the AIOC) and in the U.S. (by Gulf) should be deducted from gross profits before the 50-50 split. At the present time it would make no difference to Gulf as the company expects that its payments to Kuwait under the plan would exceed its tax liability to the U.S. and that the U.S. Treasury would offset the payment to Kuwait against its tax liability. However, if taxes here should go up or certain exemptions and depletion allowances which American oil companies are now enjoying should be eliminated, it would be a serious matter for Gulf to have to pay a heavy tax in the U.S. and, on top of that, pay Kuwait 50% of its gross profits.

The U.K. Foreign Office wants the two companies to share profits with Kuwait before deductions for taxes at home. No one at the meeting knew what is behind this position, as the alleged reason—i.e., to help the Sheikh of Kuwait—is not taken seriously. It was surmised that one possible reason was a desire on the part of the U.K. that both companies should pay an equal amount to the Sheikh. At the present time Gulf would pay more if "foreign" taxes were first deducted. This is because Gulf would pay no taxes in the U.S. (now) whereas AIOC, being entitled to only partial credit for its tax payment to Kuwait, would still have a tax liability to the U.K. Thus on the basis of prior "foreign" tax deductibility the profit pie which AIOC would divide with Kuwait would be smaller than the Gulf pie.

In an effort to meet this point the Gulf representatives in London have made a counter-proposal under which (*a*) the principle of "foreign" tax deductibility would be preserved; (*b*) the "foreign" tax deducted would be the same for both companies and would be either the U.K. or British tax liability, whichever was smaller.

Mr. McGhee was sympathetic with the company's point of view and thought that the British proposal would endanger the 50-50 arrangement that has already been made between Aramco and Saudi Arabia by encouraging the latter to increase its demands.

He advised the company to stick to its guns and said that in the meantime the Department would inquire from London to see if it is possible to ascertain what the motives of the Foreign Office are.[1]

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[1] Telegram 6118 from Washington, June 25, asked the Embassy to find out if the British Government's stated objections to the Gulf proposal represented its true reasons for objecting (880.2553/6-2551). Telegram 40 from London, July 3, reported the Ambassador felt the British position was firm, and was based on what it considered its responsibility to the Shaikh of Kuwait as his protecting power (880.2553/7-351).

880.2553/7-1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, July 10, 1951—4 p. m.

178. Gulf reps report that Shaikh's London rep appeared pleased with company's proposal for 50–50 sharing profits which was presented in mtg July 6. Fol detailed verbal explanation of proposal, during which company reps emphasized plan had been drawn up with idea of making fair offer and avoiding any bargaining over terms. Kemp said his immediate reaction was that plan seemed reasonable. Company stressed that proposals were patterned after Aramco plan and so far Kemp has not questioned inclusion principle deduction foreign taxes. Company has provided Kemp with copies of SA tax provisions and has arranged several subsequent informal mtgs with Kemp and Abdulla Mulla Saleh (Shaikh's rep now here from Kuwait) to offer any explanations required.

Detailed procedure not yet formulated, but presumably proposal will be referred to Shaikh by Kemp. If acceptable, steps will be taken to prepare tax decree and make corporate modifications necessary for implementing plan which company hopes will become effective Oct 1. Since Shaikh's consideration and necessary adjustments may require some time, Proctor and Hamilton departing for States July 11 aboard *Niew Amsterdam* with tentative plans return London approx early Sept to finalize agreement. Pertinent documents being airpouched.[1]

GIFFORD

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[1] Despatch 195 from London, July 11, not printed.

Editorial Note

Despatch 77 from Baghdad, July 23, advised the Department of State of developments in the Iraq Petroleum Company negotiations since the return of the company representatives to Baghdad on July 9.

A final agreement was being reduced to writing and the Embassy expected it to be signed as soon as the Prime Minister returned from Amman, where he was attending the funeral of the assassinated King Abdullah of Jordan. Enclosures to the despatch included an undated proposal submitted to the company by the Iraq Government, a copy of the proposals submitted by the company in return, dated July 19, and draft copies of the letters to be exchanged by the Prime Minister and the Managing Director of the company. (887.2553/7-2351) Telegram 69 from Baghdad, July 23, informed the Department the IPC negotiators had left Baghdad that day for London. The Ambassador expected the proposed oil agreement to be approved by the Iraq Council of Ministers the following day, and he reported the terms of the agreement were believed to be the most favorable in the world. (887.2553/7-2351)

Despatch 155 from Baghdad, August 14, reported the Iraq Council of Ministers had approved an agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company and enclosed the text of an official government communiqué announcing that fact. The agreement, which would become effective after ratification by the Iraq Parliament, was to be retroactive to January 1, 1951. (887.2553/8-1451) Telegram 159 from Baghdad, however, advised the Department that the Prime Minister had not actually signed the letters covering the agreed proposals, and on August 23 he had made one major and three minor demands for the company to satisfy before he would sign. (887.2553/8-2451)

On September 17 the Prime Minister departed for London to reopen negotiations, and on September 20 the Minister of Economics and Director General of Economics joined him (despatch 288 from Baghdad, September 24, 887.2553/9-2451). Telegram 1535 from London, September 26, advised the Department that the Prime Minister and the company had come to an agreement on minimum payments and production, but the Prime Minister wanted assurances from the
British Government that Iraq's sterling revenues would not be
blocked. The British Foreign Office assured him the Government had
no intention of blocking the sterling in question under normal cir-
umstances, but he questioned the phrase "normal circumstances,"
nd planned to consult his Council of Ministers on the matter.
887.2553/9-2651)

Telegram 1578 from London, October 1, advised Washington that
he Iraq Minister of Economics had signed an exchange of letters
overing the new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company on
ehalf of his government, without raising the question of sterling use
87.2553/10-151). Despatch 357 from Baghdad, October 15, enclosed
translation of a press conference held by the Prime Minister on
ctober 9, in which he reported to the press on the signing of the
w agreement. The despatch read, in part, "It would thus appear

that the discussions concerning the proposed IPC agreement are now at last concluded, pending final drafting of the text of the agreement and its submission to Parliament for ratification." (887.2553/10–1551)

Despatch 561 from Baghdad, December 15, reported that the proposed oil agreement had not been sent to the Parliament and therefore could not be ratified until after the Parliament reconvened on January 10, 1952. The Embassy at that time anticipated ratification of the agreement when it was presented to the Parliament. (887.2553/12–1551) A number of previous communications from the Embassy had speculated that, although the agreement contained a clause giving Iraq the right to renegotiate the agreement if any neighboring country received a better contract for its oil, the Prime Minister was delaying ratification until he could see the end result of the negotiations between the Government of Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Despatch 589 from Baghdad, December 31, reported the Prime Minister had informed the local Iraq Petroleum Company representative that he would put the agreement before the Parliament on January 12. (887.2553/12–3151)

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468 : "Petroleum"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, July 27, 1951.][2]

Subject: IPC Negotiations in Iraq

Participants: Mr. Charles Brewster, Socony
Mr. Thomas Kelly, Socony
Mr. Paul Anderson, Jersey
NE—Mr. Jones
NE—Mr. Funkhouser
NE—Mr. Barrow
NE—Mr. Kopper
PED—Mr. Eakens

On July 27, 1951 Messrs. Brewster and Anderson discussed the IPC offer to the Iraq Government, the main points of which were:

(1) 50/50 profit-sharing before foreign taxation.
(2) Applicable to all three concessions in Iraq.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was attachment B to a memorandum from Funkhouser to McGhee, dated October 12, concerning an appointment that afternoon with Ambassador Bonnet, who was expected to discuss the IPC Agreement, among other topics (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Petroleum"). Attachment A was a copy of an airgram to Paris, not further identified and not found attached, and attachment C was a copy of telegram 1535 from London, September 26. For additional information on telegram 1535, see the editorial note, *supra*.

[2] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on August 13.

(3) Minimum annual royalty never to be less than the value of 25% of the oil produced.
(4) One-eighth of the oil produced payable in kind.
(5) Payments retroactive to January 1, 1951 for IPC concession and January 1, 1952 for MPC and BPC concessions.
(6) If signed by Council of Ministers, agreement to be put immediately into effect.
(7) For payments to continue agreement must be ratified by May 1, 1952, otherwise reversion to present status.
(8) IMF rates used throughout.
(9) Production program of 22 million tons a year by January 1954 from IPC and MPC; 8 million tons a year by December 1955 from BPC.

Other points made included:

(1) New York officials did not know of reported letter exchange allowing the Iraq Government to reopen negotiations if outcome of Iranian problem resulted in more beneficial terms to Iran.
(2) Not known whether oil for the Iraq refinery would be over and above one-eighth now allowed.
(3) Unclear as to terms covering disposal of Iraq share of crude.
(4) IPC promised to step up completion date of 30-inch pipeline to April 1952, at which time 100,000 barrels a day would move through the pipeline. Use would be made of northern half of inoperative Haifa pipelines. Company felt that this move which cost the company $3,000,000 extra had been a help in the negotiations. The company has little concern over export licenses for steel pipe now since all but 60 miles, due in October and November were assured.
(5) IPC partners expect to go through involved reorganization establishing local subsidiaries be established in Iraq to buy crude oil at cost from IPC, to transport the oil to the Iraq border and to sell the oil at international prices back to IPC parents. The profits of this operation will be subject to an Iraqi income tax which will result in the 50/50 profit-sharing on all IPC operations within Iraq exclusively.
(6) IPC calculated its costs at 23 shillings per ton at this time, decreasing to 13 shillings per ton after the 30-inch line is opened. The selling price of crude over the same period is presently calculated at 94 shillings per ton, decreasing to 73 shillings per ton. 94 shillings minus 23 shillings equals 71 shillings or 66¢ a barrel. Thus, it appears that Iraq royalties will be greater than those in Saudi Arabia due primarily to greater benefits resulting from closer proximity to major markets. The profit on Saudi Arabian crude is determined on the basis of Persian Gulf prices or $1.43 whereas Iraq values its crude at $2.41 Sidon minus pipeline charges to Kirkuk. Saudi Arabian authorities can be expected to examine this price question closely.
(7) The view was expressed that the greatest asset in the new agreement would currently lie in its propaganda value, i.e. all major producing states in the world, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, had now been offered or adopted the Venezuelan 50/50 profit-sharing formula. This could be used as a stabilizing platform for the concessions themselves and for the impact on opinion in Iran.

(8) All agreed that many things could prevent final ratification of the agreement, that the two years delay over the AIOC-Iran ministerial agreement in Iran might be paralleled, that events in Iran probably provided the chief determinant as to whether an Iraqi Government and/or Parliament could see their way clear to sign this agreement.

890.2553/8-2351 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 23, 1951—8:10 a. m.

It would be useful for all Embassy officers to be well briefed on the status of oil company negotiations throughout the Middle East so that in their conversations with foreign nationals the broadest contribution to the realization of our objectives in oil can be made. The Department seeks *inter alia* (*a*) to defend oil company performance against further attack by Commies, xenophobes, etc., (*b*) to prevail on producing states to make optimum use of royalties. Objective (*a*) may be gained by stressing (*b*). The next phase in Middle East oil may well be increased efforts to get more than 50–50 or take over increased control of companies; attack may provide some defense against such developments. The following talking points may be useful in private conversations, particularly for officers who are not in close contact with oil developments:

(1) All major Middle East producing states have either been offered or have accepted the 50–50 "partnership" profit-sharing formula based on the highly lucrative petroleum laws of Venezuela. Venezuela as largest producing country in the world after the U.S.A. earns over $600,000,000 per year by this agreement. Aramco offered this formula to Saudi Arabia last year; SAG now earns well over $100,000,000 per annum on much smaller production. IPC has offered the Iraq Government this formula; with the completion of the 30-inch Mediterranean pipeline within the next eight months Iraq will similarly earn well over a $100,000,000 per year. The Kuwait Oil Company has offered the small and sparsely settled Sheikhdom of Kuwait the exceptional returns from this formula. If Iran would agree to such a profit-sharing arrangement, they could be expected to earn in the neighborhood of $200,000,000 per year.

(2) Middle East states have been carrying out an aggressive campaign to get more money out of foreign oil companies. This has resulted in driving foreign oil companies out of Egypt, Syria and temporarily Iran to the economic disadvantage and also apparently to the regret of the states themselves. Now that foreign oil companies

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[1] This airgram was drafted by Funkhouser and cleared by Eakens, Dorsz, Meyer, Jones, and Roberts. It was repeated to Ankara, Athens, Tehran, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Colombo, Kabul, Karachi, New Delhi, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Izmir, Nicosia, Salonika, Istanbul, Aden, Basra, Haifa, Port Said, Alexandria, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Dacca, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore, and Madras.

are doing their part by making such large financial concessions, it remains to be seen what good will come from these huge revenues. Middle East states are faced with a great challenge: is this money to be used constructively to raise the standard of living throughout the Middle East and to minimize the incidence of poverty, disease, ignorance and despair and consequently the spread of Communism, revolution and political murder or will this money result in only benefit for the few as heretofore. Foreign oil operations make it possible, for example, for Kuwait to have one of the highest standards of living in the world since Kuwait will earn enough money to pay each Kuwaiti without working approximately $2.50 per day. Contribution of oil producing states to the welfare of all Arab states as well as their own welfare could be much greater, i.e., contributions to Arab Refugee relief, educational institutions, hospitals, etc. Performance to date has not been impressive.

(3) The Department hopes that comparison of cents per barrel royalties can be generally avoided and the common and equitable principles of the 50–50 profit-sharing stressed instead. The uniformity of the 50–50 principle and its widespread adoption thus provides an opportunity for stability. While profits obviously will vary among the different oil producing states, these can be explained, for example, by transportation distance from major consuming areas. Thus Venezuela earns 65 to 85¢ per barrel, Iraq (proposed) 65 to 75¢ per barrel, Saudi Arabia 55 to 60¢ per barrel, Kuwait (proposed) 45 to 50¢ per barrel. These will vary from year to year and the sooner Middle Easterners can stop making this calculation the better. It is believed that few Venezuelans know the varying cents per barrel rates of return but rather know the gross income.

(4) In the major producing areas such as Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, government leaders have to take the position that they are getting at least as good a deal as their neighbors and preferably better in order to forestall opposition to either existing or pending contracts. Officers at these posts should know of the particularly advantageous terms offered by the local oil concessionaire and should be prepared to stress them where appropriate. The Department, however, in its publicity and propaganda activities must, particularly in view of the Iranian situation, stress the similarity of the 50–50 profit-sharing arrangements adopted or being adopted by the major producing countries of the Middle East and Venezuela. This line will be kept out of Iraq and Kuwait insofar as possible in view of unfinished negotiations which might be adversely affected.

Acheson

NE Files : Lot 58 D 332 : "Saudi Arabian Boundaries"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1951.[2]

Subject: The August Conversations in London Between Prince Feisal and the British Foreign Office.

Participants: Aramco—J. Terry Duce, Executive Vice President
Judge Manley O. Hudson, Advisor on International Law
Richard Young, International Law Counsel to SAG
George W. Ray, Jr., Legal Counsel
Donald Noble, Assistant Legal Counsel
OIR/GE—Sophia A. Saucerman
U/FW—Fred C. Taylor
PED—Robert H. Eakens
L/NEA—John Maktos
BNA—William L. Hamilton
NE—G. Lewis Jones
Richard Funkhouser
Fred H. Awalt
Robert Sturgill

Summary:

Mr. Jones opened the meeting by expressing the Department's gratification that so much progress was apparently made during the talks in London.[3] Mr. Ray said that he went to Taif July 7 to meet with Prince Feisal at which time Feisal requested copies of everything in great detail pertaining to the history of the boundary disputes. This material was prepared by Judge Hudson and George Rentz, and was delivered to His Royal Highness in Paris just prior to the London meeting.

Judge Hudson emphasized that neither he nor Mr. Young had ever asked the SAG to seek any particular boundary, but had merely provided the legal position on claims advanced by the SAG.

With reference to the island disputes, Judge Hudson said that two years ago he had suggested that the SAG place markers on all islands it claimed to substantiate its claim to them. He said that none of the islands involved, except Maqta, was previously claimed for Kuwait in the 1913 or 1923 international discussions. In 1949[4] and during the recent London conversations the British made further claims on these islands to include Farsi, Arabi, Kurain, Karan, Maqta, Harkus, Janah and Juraid. The UK receded from these claims one by one, however, until only Farsi remained, and no grounds for this claim were offered.

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[1] Attached to this memorandum of conversation were a translation of an agreed summary of the London talks, a British paper entitled "Anglo-Saudi Arabian Frontier Negotiations," dated August 17, and a memorandum on the division of the seabed between Bahrein and Saudi Arabia, presented by the British Delegation at the London talks on August 10.

[2] This memorandum was prepared on September 28.

[3] A Saudi Arabian Delegation, headed by Prince Faisal, and a British Delegation, headed by Herbert Morrison, met in London from August 8 to 24 to discuss boundary problems between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Bahrein, and the Trucial Shaikhdoms.

Shifting to the islands in dispute between Saudi Arabia and Bahrein, Judge Hudson said the British claimed both North and South Bainah, whereas the SAG offered to split 50–50 on the two islands based on proximity, the SAG to take North and Bahrein to take South Bainah. With regard to the shoals, the Judge stated that the British ignored the logic of proximity by claiming Fasht Abu Saafa because a possible oil structure existed in the area, and offered Rennie Shoals to Saudi Arabia.

At this point Mr. Young described the British and SAG methods of establishing a median line. The British line is predicated upon a prior delimitation of territorial waters. The Saudis offered a more direct and practical method which involved drawing straight lines from the nearest opposite points in the two territories where sovereignty was not disputed. The mid-points of these lateral lines were then joined in a series of straight line segments which formed the proposed median line. Little variation occurred between the lines determined by these two methods, but the Saudi Arabian proposal had the double advantage of following straight rather than curved lines and could be determined on the basis of points not in dispute.

Mr. Young said Prince Feisal had not wanted Judge Hudson or Saba Habasha Pasha with him. Rentz went along to translate and he (Young) participated only because he happened to be in London on other business and was asked to do so. He said it was his impression that the SAG was much more familiar with the problem than the British and that Feisal's attitude was constructive and moderate while the British were rather pedestrian and unimaginative. But both sides seemed to have a disposition to settle. He also said the water boundary between the Kuwait Neutral Zone and Saudi Arabia was mentioned by the British but was not discussed. Similarly, division of the Kuwait Neutral Zone was suggested by the British as advisable, but no conversations on the subject were conducted.

With reference to land boundaries, Judge Hudson said the British emphasized the importance of sedentary peoples in establishing the boundaries, taking no account of nomadic peoples. They failed to consider that the tribes are both nomadic and sedentary at different seasons. The Saudis, the Judge said, proposed a meeting with the ruling Sheikhs, including both those in special treaty relations with the British and those who are not. He said Prince Feisal insisted that *rulers*, not deputies, attend. It was observed that it would be unfortunate if participation were not more flexible, for it is not unlikely that some of the rulers could not attend for perfectly good reasons. Judge Hudson said Feisal was hopeful the conferences could be held in January or February, and the British agreed in principle to the meeting. The Judge pointed out that the Fact-Finding Commission might be retained as an adjunct to the conference. The Saudis also proposed that all activities in the areas in dispute be suspended. There was also tacit agreement that the Persian Gulf median line not be discussed because this would raise too many other problems. Judge Hudson also observed that all fishing, pearling, and navigation rights would be preserved on shoals, islands, and submarine areas.

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[4] For documentation on 1949 negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the British, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 91 ff.

886D.2553/10-451

The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the General Counsel, Department of the Treasury (Lynch)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. LYNCH: Although I can in no way comment on the tax features involved in the Gulf Oil Corporation's reorganization of their interest in the Kuwait Oil Company or in the plans of the Kuwait Oil Company to give the Sheikh of Kuwait a 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement, I am glad to submit the following observations arising out of our Middle East policies:

First, the Department of State has generally followed a policy of encouraging American corporations to operate directly in the Middle East area rather than through subsidiaries in third countries. This latter method of operation results in a weakening of United States influence over American interests in the area of operations. While certain undesirable features of Gulf's present contracts with the British Government and interests remain unchanged in the proposed reorganization, the Gulf proposals do envisage the establishment of a direct American ownership of one-half of the assets in the Kuwait concession. Through this reorganization the Company also hopes to protect itself against the possibility of any eventual nationalization of the British oil industry.

Secondly, the stability of oil concessionary arrangements with Middle Eastern states has a direct effect on the stability of the area and the total United States national interest in the area. As you know, developments in Iran have had a seriously disrupting effect on the Middle East oil situation. The Arabian-American Oil Company avoided similar frictions in Saudi Arabia by offering a 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement which followed the concessionary pattern existing in Venezuela. Similar terms have now been offered to Iraq and Kuwait, two areas of vast oil resources and of great interest to the United States. The Department has felt that the establishment of equitable and comparable arrangements in the major producing oil areas of the Middle East would have a beneficial effect on the overall stability of the area. Contrariwise, the prevention of the adoption of such arrangements could, particularly at this time, have an unstabilizing effect on Middle East oil concessions and on our national interest in the area. In so far as this reorganization makes practicable a 50/50 offer by the Kuwait Oil Company, it does contribute to the above policy objectives.

Sincerely yours,

George C. McGhee

86D.2553/10-2551

he Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury (Snyder)[1]

P SECRET

Washington, October 25, 1951.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I would like to present for your con-
leration the Department's position regarding the Kuwait Oil Com-
ny's concession contract renegotiation with the Sheikh of Kuwait
d its implications on United States foreign policy objectives in the
a.

Some 46 billion barrels of oil or half of the world's oil resources
in the Persian Gulf area. These oil resources are essential to the
stern world. Retention and use of a part of this oil is vital to the
ional security of the United States. The stability of concession
tracts in the area are consequently of paramount interest to the
e Department and essential to the stability of the Middle East
whole.

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his letter was drafted by Funkhouser on October 24 and cleared by McGhee,
, and Eakens. It was attached to a memorandum from McGhee to the
tary of State, dated October 24, recommending that the Secretary sign
etter. The memorandum advised the Secretary that the Treasury Depart-
considered the Department of State letter of October 4 indicated no im-
nt interest in the Gulf problem and had suggested that if the Department
te had a position it felt Treasury should take into consideration it should
t that position in a new letter. The closing paragraph of the memorandum
"It seems obvious that Treasury wants State to take responsibility for
sitive decision to Gulf. They refuse to say how soon they will take this
n or what the decision will be without any representations from State.
as we cannot tell them what decision to make, we can and should make
ur position that they should make up their minds one way or the other
iately, and the attached letter has been prepared for that purpose."

Developments in Iran have had a seriously disrupting effect on the Middle East oil situation. The Arabian American Oil Company avoided similar frictions in Saudi Arabia by offering a 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement which followed a concessionary pattern existing in Venezuela. Similar terms have now been accepted by the Iraq Council of Ministers. By reorganizing its Kuwait interests under direct American ownership, Gulf Exploration Company would be placed on a similar basis to the companies operating in Saudi Arabia and Iraq in regard to its ability to offer a 50/50 arrangement to Kuwait. I attach great importance to the earliest possible decision by the Treasury Department on this reorganization issue.

It has been estimated that the Sheikhdom of Kuwait contains the largest proven oil reserves in the Persian Gulf. The Burghan Field is considered the largest oil field in the world. Reorganization would give the Gulf Exploration Company a direct rather than indirect interest in these immense oil resources. The Department strongly favors this direct interest. There is only one American oil company producing oil in the whole Persian Gulf region. A direct Gulf interest in Kuwait would mean that 70% of current production of the Middle East would be subject to direct American ownership. Even if Iran were producing at full capacity, American interests would with such reorganization of Gulf interests directly own well over half of Middle East production. By direct ownership the attainment of overall United States foreign policy objectives as well as the removal of certain disadvantageous aspects of the present contract could be better effected. These disadvantageous aspects now include possibility of negotiation of industry by the British Government, pre-emptive purchase rights by the British Government, and restrictive trade arrangement written into the 1933 contract. As you know, the State Department is largely responsible for overcoming original British objections to even indirect American company participation in Kuwait oil development and for most recently securing for Gulf Exploration Company British permission to have a direct American interest in the concession.

I understand the top ranking officials of the Gulf Exploration Company have been in London many weeks awaiting a decision from the Treasury Department on their reorganization application. The earliest possible decision regarding Gulf's application for reorganization would contribute to the resolution of our Middle East oil problems. This is particularly desirable at this time.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB

NE Files: Lot 57 D 177: "Saudi Arabia, Aramco"

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1951.

Mr. Ohliger has been called back to New York by Aramco to discuss the "recent and drastic" demands by the SAG on the company, the quote being Aramco wording. He and Mr. Duce will undoubtedly wish to review with you[1] the various points raised which may be as follow:

1. About February of this year the Saudi Arabian Ambassador stated that if US corporate taxes were raised, the SAG would wish to revise its Aramco agreement so that the Government would not have to share the tax increase out of its profits. The tax increase has now been passed and Aramco is presumably considering some modification in the profit split to meet SAG requirements.

2. On August 10 the King went into a tirade with Ambassador Hare re Aramco shortcomings and an alleged insult. Mr. Ohliger went to Riyadh the following week to discuss these issues which were largely emotional but were basically involved in the SAG need for more ready cash. Aramco accounts are normally paid several months behind actual production and the King asked Mr. Moore for a statement of the outstanding amount. The need for cash became increasingly urgent before Mr. Moore had returned to New York to act on the King's request. The King's explosion followed and prompted expeditious action from Aramco which produced a statement and arranged for an advance in funds from Chase National Bank of $25,000,000 at $5,000,000 per month.

3. On October 18 Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman objected to royalty payments in sterling in excess of 25 percent. The October sterling payment was 37 percent. Aramco understood the 25 percent maximum applied only to the last half of 1950, but Sheikh Abdullah considers it indefinite. Aramco also says that the SAG is receiving no more actual sterling than before, but that the increase in percentage is due to the reduction in the gold sovereign royalty rate from $12 to $8.25.

4. The SAG is dissatisfied with the need of Aramco for referring important decisions to New York. It wants responsible authorities able to make decisions right on the spot.

5. In order to be sure it is getting its full 50 percent cut, the SAG wants price information.

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[1] The Aramco officers met with McGhee the following day; memorandum of conversation of the October 30 meeting, *infra*.

6. Prince Faisal wants Aramco to surrender its concession lying west of the Dahana. Presumably he wishes to give some other firm a concession in that area (possibly Alireza) which is not being utilized by Aramco. It will probably be difficult—and inadvisable—for Aramco to avoid turning back this area if it is not going to develop it in the near future.

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Petroleum"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt) and Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1951.[1]

Participants: Mr. Terry Duce, Executive Vice President, Aramco
Mr. Floyd Ohliger, Vice President in Charge of Government Liaison in Arabia, Aramco
Col. Eddy, Special Consultant, Aramco
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Kopper
Mr. Funkhouser
Mr. Awalt

Summary:

Mr. McGhee expressed his pleasure at seeing Mr. Ohliger back again and hoped that his presence did not mean that there were grave developments in Arabia. Mr. Ohliger said that there were several issues raised recently by the Minister of Finance but that the problem which he thought most important of all had not yet become a demand on the part of the SAG. This, he said, was the growing interest among Saudi Arabs of purchasing stock in Aramco. This was true not only of wealthy merchants but also of some of the royal family including the Crown Prince who wished to invest money for his sons so that they could be financially independent of Government revenues in the future. The Company had suggested, Mr. Ohliger said, that they might invest in the parent companies but this was not acceptable to Saudi Arabs, first because they had less interest in investing abroad than in putting their money in Saudi Arabia, and second because investment in the parent companies would subject them to payment of a thirty percent income tax in the United States. Mr. Duce thought the urge to invest in home industry could be converted to development of satellite industries such as a fertilizer plant, lamp black industry, cement plant and ceramics which could be established in connection with the petroleum industry.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted during the period October 31–November

Mr. Ohliger was asked what objection there was to allowing Saudi Arabs to invest in Aramco itself. Mr. Ohliger replied that the sale of stock would offer the possibility of some of it getting into the hands of Jewish investors which would be objectionable to the SAG. He admitted, however, that it would be possible to control initial sales and to restrict transfer of stock by purchasers in such a way as to avoid Jewish investment. The real reason, it developed for Aramco objection to sale of stock was that there was only $11,000,000 of stock outstanding while the value of the firm exclusive of the oil reserves was substantially in excess of this amount. Consequently, any change in its stock position might require revaluation and subject the company to a very heavy capital gains tax.

Mr. McGhee asked whether there was likely to be any impact in Saudi Arabia of the firm's liability to US taxation. Mr. Ohliger replied that there was none as yet but if taxes the company pays the Saudi Arabian Government are determined to be not deductible from US income tax, the SAG would undoubtedly crack down and insist that Aramco be made a Saudi Arabian corporation which would mean that no income tax would be payable in the US at all.

Mr. Ohliger said that there seemed to be developing in Saudi Arabia an urge to have a Saudi Arabian on the Aramco Board of Directors. This was prompted, he said, more by considerations of prestige than by any expectation that such a member could make an important contribution to their deliberations. Mr. McGhee asked why it would not be a good idea to appoint someone because of the good will which will undoubtedly arise from it. Mr. Ohliger disagreed saying that it would only enhance the prestige of the individual and not of the country generally. Mr. McGhee inquired whether the people of Saudi Arabia were generally satisfied with Aramco. Mr. Ohliger said that he was quite sure that such was the case although there was a considerable disappointment in the present loose control the King maintained over the country and his court. He added that these views were representative of about 25 percent of the population who were the more alert and substantial section of the population. He said that for the most part people were satisfied with the prospect of Crown Prince Saud succeeding to the throne. He stated that Aramco would have no difficulty in surviving the transition period when succession occurred even, he added, a forceful one if Saud's succession is contested and if the event occurs in the next year or two. He could not guess what circumstances might prevail beyond that period.

Another demand made by the SAG, Mr. Ohliger said, was that the company relinquish the Dahana area from its concession. He expressed the firm belief that this request which emanated from Prince Faisal was prompted by pressure on the Prince from other interests who coveted the area for a separate oil concession. He suggested that these interests might be the Australian, Mr. Cotton, who spent several months in Arabian waters on his yacht the early part of this year, or the influential Alireza merchant family of Saudi Arabia. Prince Faisal had made the request, he said, on the grounds of the special religious importance of the Dahana area which could not admit non-Muslem enterprise there. Mr. Ohliger said the area had no religious significance whatsoever and the reason advanced was merely a pretext. The company had, therefore, refused the request of Prince Faisal and stated that it would give up areas in its concession only in accordance with the terms of the relinquishment program envisaged in the concession agreement. In this connection Mr. Ohliger said it was interesting to have learned (although he cautioned that no word of this should get back to Saudi Arabs because Aramco was not supposed to have the information) that Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman wrote to the King a week ago suggesting that all areas of Saudi Arabia outside the Aramco concession should be made over to British oil interests since the British had lost so much in Iran. Mr. McGhee expressed surprise that Sheikh Abdullah should be so considerate of British losses and so willing to assist them in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. McGhee inquired whether nationalization of oil in Iran would be likely to embarrass Aramco in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Ohliger replied that it could not do so for if Saudi Arabia wanted to nationalize, they would be glad to hand it over tomorrow and work out an arrangement with the Government for the operation of the company. The biggest ace in the hole for the company in such an event, he said, would be the necessity of the Government assuming the responsibility for operating costs which he said were running at the rate of $150,000,000 a year at present. Under the circumstances, he expressed his confidence that the company could work out an equitable agreement even under the cloak of nationalization. Mr. McGhee left to attend another meeting but remarked that he hoped that the outcome of conversations being conducted with Mr. Mossadegh would not embarrass Aramco.

The rest of the meeting was spent discussing (*a*) the $1.43 discount price and its effect on SAG–Aramco relations, (*b*) the possibility of accelerating the Aramco relinquishment program in order to satisfy SAG demands for new concession areas, (*c*) SAG demands that Aramco's Jidda office be given more authority, and (*d*) precedents involving participation of local government and private investors in oil companies. Re (*a*) Aramco representatives stated that SAG had neither been told nor prevented from knowing that Aramco calculated its profit-sharing on a basis of $1.43 rather than the posted price of $1.75. Mr. Ohliger added that SAG was now asking for price information, that they would undoubtedly notice the price difference but that Aramco could explain this difference satisfactorily on the basis of customary discounts for long-term contracts. He admitted it might be more difficult to explain the fact that Aramco parents immediately sold the same oil for $1.75. Re (*b*) Mr. Duce repeated that the relinquishment program would not be speeded up but would follow the terms of the concession agreement. He added, moreover, that faster exploitation of unused areas could not be accomplished because of the supply problems involved, but agreed that the company might remain under attack for monopolizing so much of undeveloped Saudi Arabia. Re (*c*) Mr. Duce stated that this problem could probably not be resolved in view of the necessity of clearing important decisions with the four parent companies. Re (*d*) Mr. Ohliger stated that the Pacific-Western and Aminoil precedents had had no influence on local demand for stock participation in Aramco in that only private investors were involved. Mr. Eddy agreed that the incentive for local participation in oil operations would be difficult to divert to other industries and that the good effects of such industrial development might arrive too late to be of much help to Aramco in any short-run difficulties. Mr. Duce discussed the Venezuelan situation in which the Gomez family and their friends drew considerable personal profit from oil operations only to end up fleeing the country at the dictator's death and the subsequent internal disturbances.

887.2553/11-2351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 23, 1951.

Subject: New IPC Agreement with Iraq

Participants: Mr. C. S. Brewster, Socony Vacuum Oil Company
Mr. Paul Anderson, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey)
Mr. Thomas Kelly, Socony Vacuum Oil Company
NEA—Mr. A. F. Lager
NE—Mr. Kopper
NE—Mr. Gnade
NE—Mr. Funkhouser
PED—Mr. Eakens

Mr. Brewster reviewed developments surrounding the September nd October negotiations with the Iraqi officials in London. He decribed the long hours of work required of the lawyers representing he five groups; he mentioned that the Iraqis showed complete cooperation during the negotiations; he stated that their only preoccupation was to remove points from the new contract which would be seized on with profit by the opposition and to develop phraseology which could be translated comprehensibly into Arabic. Mr. Gibson, IPC General Manager, was the official IPC negotiator whenever Nuri was involved; with Pachachi and Mahmoud, Herridge and Lawson of IPC handled the negotiations. Various representatives of the different groups were brought in when specific problems arose. Herridge and certain IPC lawyers were back in Baghdad putting the legislation, contracts and translations into final shape for the reopening of the Majlis in December. They would remain on hand to answer questions during the debates. Nuri was quoted as being confident of early ratification.

Mr. Brewster stated that the IPC agreement consisted of the original agreement, amendments to the original agreement and a new agreement. He stated that there was no agreement with regard to the passage of the necessary income tax legislation. Whereas the companies desired an income tax passed before the new agreement was ratified, the Iraqis claimed that the opposition would prevent them from passing such legislation without having first debated the merits and demerits of the agreements for which the income taxes were intended. The company was proceeding on the assumption that the tax law had been passed. It developed that IPC would pay its income tax on a current basis. This differed from the Aramco case in Saudi Arabia and was likely to give Aramco trouble.

The company tried to tie the contract to IMF rates but settled on making the contract a sterling agreement in which they were free to deal at prevailing sterling rates. The Iraqis wished to have their sterling payments made only in Baghdad. An agreement was worked out allowing the company to pay pounds to an Iraqi account in London or supply Baghdad banks with London bankers' drafts. The Iraqis tried to get a commitment from the British Government to the effect that the U.K. would never block Iraqi sterling balances as was done in the case of Iran. The U.K. Government was unable to make this guarantee but a compromise was reached with the U.K. Government guaranteeing that sterling involved in oil development would not be blocked.

In case of disagreement over payments the agreement calls for a 90 day cooling off period before the Iraq Government is permitted to suspend shipments. It provides for an additional 90 days before the Iraq Government can cancel the contract. These clauses can only be invoked upon failure of the company to make proper monetary payments. Failure of the company to fulfill any other obligations is not involved in oil suspension or contract cancellation clauses.

To implement the new agreement Socony is forming four subsidiary companies, one U.S. and one U.K. company each with subsidiaries in Iraq. Each of the other partners in IPC will form at least one Iraq subsidiary each; the Iraqi subsidiaries are required in order to take advantage of the income tax route. The U.K. subsidiaries will handle oil trade within the sterling area; the U.S. subsidiaries all other trade. For example, Socony will assign its assets in the Near East Development Company to a new 100% subsidiary, Socony Overseas Supply Company. Socony Overseas Supply Company will have a British subsidiary, Standard Fuel Oil, Ltd. and an Iraq subsidiary as well. Standard Fuel Oil, Ltd. will also have an Iraq subsidiary for sterling area trade. The French on the other hand can avoid French taxation by forming a Moroccan subsidiary and its Iraq incorporated counterpart.

The Iraq subsidiaries of IPC partners will buy Iraq crude at the prevailing rate of "cost plus a shilling", carry the oil to the Iraq border where it will be sold back to the original company at world prices and a profit thus made. It will be on this profit that a 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement will be based. The details of this arrangement include the following points. (Principal details are given in Baghdad and CIA reports.)

Subsidiary No. 1 will deal in "rights" which will be assigned to it for nothing. These rights, which are to buy this oil at the cost of production (plus one shilling) plus transportation within Iraq, will be sold to subsidiary No. 2. The Iraq subsidiary will sell this oil back to subsidiary No. 1 at the Iraq border. This price will be $1.75, the Mediterranean posted price ($2.41) minus (67¢) transportation costs to the Iraq border and a long-term discount. Production and transportation costs in Iraq are estimated at approximately 24¢ leaving the company with a $1.50 profit which will be split 50/50 or 75¢ each. Both subsidiary No. 1 and subsidiary No. 2 will show a profit. (Estimated at 86% for subsidiary No. 2 and 14% for subsidiary No. 1.)

The total payments will be determined first by payments to Iraq of 25% of the value of Kirkuk and Mosul and 33⅓% of the value of Basra crude. The rest of the 50/50 will be made up by income tax. Iraq is free to take ⅛ of the oil produced from Iraq in kind and sell it as they desire or force the company to buy the oil without discount. The value of this crude will be posted prices. The profits shared will be made on the basis of a discount price for the company. For Basra oil this discount will be 90½ shillings posted price minus 78½ shillings per long ton (IPC price) or 32¢ per barrel. 32¢ per barrel has been worked out to conform with the 32¢ per barrel Aramco discount. The company argues that this discount follows the normal pattern of international oil trade in which companies merit cut prices for buying large quantities over long periods. The company states it has informed the Iraq Government of the details of this discount arrangement in order that no misunderstanding or accusations develop that the arrangement is not a true 50/50. The company realizes that this point may be a source of conflict in the future. Department officers pointed out at great length the dangers to be anticipated from this 60-40 profit division which went under the name of 50/50. It was mentioned that Venezuela does not allow such discounts. The companies state that in the earlier stages of their 50/50 agreement in Venezuela discounts were allowed.

Other points included: (1) Gulbenkian had caused no serious obstruction to date but was expected to demand that the other companies pay part of his income tax, since he had been accustomed to getting his oil at cost. (2) The company estimates that in 1953, 20¾ million tons will come from the IPC concession, 1¼ million tons from the Mosul areas, and 8 million tons from the Basra concession. The Mosul pipeline is being constructed now to K–2 where it will be tied into the "southern 12 inch line". (3) The minimum payments guarantee is such that if the price of crude oil drops from $2.41 to $1.90 the company will receive less than 50/50. (4) If the tax fails to bring the Iraq share to 50/50, a "make-up" payment will be added. It is anticipated that the "make-up" payment will be needed for 1950, 1951.

Mr. Anderson mentioned that the new agreement might have serious repercussions within the international oil business. He mentioned (*a*) that the Iraq royalty per barrel was considerably more favorable than any in the Middle East, (*b*) that IPC was paying income taxes on a current basis unlike Aramco in Saudi Arabia, (*c*) that price adjustments for gravity would result in two prices being posted in the Persian Gulf.

EGYPT

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE SUEZ CANAL ZONE AND THE SUDAN; CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER EGYPTIAN ABROGATION OF THE 1936 ANGLO-EGYPTIAN DEFENSE TREATY AND THE 1899 CONDOMINIUM AGREEMENT REGARDING THE SUDAN[1]

641.74/2–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET — CAIRO, February 12, 1951—2 p. m.

860. Review current status of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations with British Embassy reveals following salient points:

1. There is growing Egyptian uneasiness at delay in resumption of negotiations. This is being shown by both Egyptian Ambassador London and Egyptian FonMin.

2. Stevenson is having difficulty quieting this uneasiness and Salah-ed-Din has told him that Egyptians will face serious difficulties if negotiations not resumed by first week of March.

3. FonOff has told Stevenson that British proposals may differ from those that Bevin originally put forward to Egyptians,[2] and that Bevin has still to consider the new proposal which may take several weeks because of his illness.

4. Stevenson has not informed Egyptians delay this length in prospect but has pointed out to FonOff:

a. If proposal too much changed from original, Egyptians may well shy off from them;

b. Something must be done to give Egyptians feeling that progress being made. He suggests early resumption sterling negotiations[3] if political negotiations must wait upon Bevin's recovery. Also that arly resumption of certain arms shipments be considered.

5. Stevenson feels that Egyptians will never accept agreement on defense matters only, and suggests that FonOff authorize him to start discussions on Sudan. He has formulated certain proposals—which

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[1] For previous documentation on these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, ol. v, pp. 284 ff.

[2] In telegram 3884 from London, January 12, not printed, Ambassador Gifford eported, *inter alia* and without elaboration, "Bevin's suggestion for progressive ithdrawal from Egypt" (641.74/1–1251).

[3] For information concerning the sterling balance negotiations, see despatch 90 from Cairo, March 16, p. 348.

are being reported by despatch.[4] Briefly these provide for exchange of notes between British and Egyptian Governments providing for earliest practicable "self-government" Sudan followed by self-determination by Sudanese as to form government they desire. Agreement might also provide for standing Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese supervisory council to assist in putting into effect of agreed principles.

6. Stevenson realizes Egyptians may well refuse such proposals but believes such refusal should be made matter of record and would represent moral victory in that Egyptians would be put in position of rejecting principle of self-determination.

7. Current thinking British C.O.S. being included in despatch mentioned paragraph 5. Stevenson believes it would be unrealistic for British to put forth proposals which would provide for any effective British control of bases after 1956.

8. In my opinion Stevenson's concern at delays is much justified. He cannot hold off Egyptians much longer.

CAFFERY

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[4] No. 1942, *infra*.

641.74/2-1351 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, February 13, 1951.

No. 1942

Ref: Embtel 860 February 12, 1951[2]

Subject: Current British thinking re Egyptian demands.

The reference telegram described briefly the current situation regarding Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. The following information supplements the reference telegram, and should be read in conjunction therewith.

The British Ambassador's proposals with regard to the Sudan (largely formulated by the Counselor of the British Embassy, J. Wardle-Smith, recently returned from a 6,000 mile trip of the Sudan) are as follows:

The British Government would propose a basic agreement (to be embodied in an exchange of notes). Three principles would be emphasized:

1. The need for close and friendly ties between all peoples of the Nile Valley (Wardle-Smith prefers that this specifically mention Egypt and Sudan, because Nile Valley includes other countries).

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[1] Drafted by Counselor of Embassy George H. Mattison. Copy to London.

[2] *Supra*.

2. It would be agreed that the common aim of the British and Egyptian Governments was the establishment of self-government in the Sudan as soon as practicable. Thereafter, the Sudanese people would have the right to choose freely the form of government under which they desired to live.
3. The wide differences of race, religion and political development requires the closest cooperation between Egypt and Great Britain with the Sudanese.

If these principles were agreed to they would be embodied in an exchange of notes in which the Egyptians would state their views on what they thought the future of the Sudan should be. The British would reply welcoming that system or any other which the people of the Sudan might choose. (Wardle-Smith prefers the word *accepting* instead of *welcoming* and hopes to persuade his Ambassador in this sense.)

The agreement might also provide for a standing Anglo-Egyptian Sudanese Supervisory Council which would be established for the specific purpose of putting into effect the principles enumerated in the proposed exchange of notes.

The British Embassy feels that the Egyptians may not find these proposals acceptable. However, it believes that there would be a tactical advantage to having such refusal on record. It would give the British a good moral case as far as world opinion goes, in that the Egyptians would be on record against an arrangement providing for self-determination after the achievement of self-government.

This Embassy is in entire concurrence with the view taken by the British Ambassador, namely that Anglo-Egyptian negotiations cannot be concluded on the basis of a "defense" settlement alone. The Sudan has been far too much of a political issue in Egypt to be totally gnored in a prospective settlement of outstanding Anglo-Egyptian roblems. There is a chance, however, that the British proposal out- ned above, would prove acceptable. It is essentially a face-saving evice for the Egyptians, as it gives very little away of the British osition on the Sudan. Self-government must be established as soon "practicable". The Sudanese would have the right to determine at form of government they desired. The crux of the matter might ll rest on such variance of wording as "welcoming" versus "accept- " the Sudanese decision. The Egyptians might well regard the rd "accepting" as a form of concomittent which would be sold to Egyptian public.

he second part of this despatch deals with the current thinking he British Chiefs of Staff, and what they propose recommending oreign Secretary Bevin. (Paragraph 7 of reference telegram)

he Chiefs of Staff have examined the prospect of a "temporary" in Israel. They found that it would cost approximately 50 million ds and 8 years to construct.

British Embassy comment: The British Treasury's objection to such a move would be acute, and the political disadvantage of the Egyptian reaction would be obvious.

The Chiefs of Staff think in terms of a phased evacuation, starting immediately, to be effectuated by 1956, with the gradual replacement of essential technical units by civilians (obviously army in civilian dress).

British Embassy comment: The Egyptian government would be ready to accept a certain number of "civilians" but not any really effective number.

The Chiefs of Staff propose that the base be leased from the Egyptians after 1956 for an agreed sum.

British Embassy comment: It would be impossible to negotiate an agreement with the Egyptians for the lease of practically the entire Canal area. Possibly workshop areas, and desert storage could be leased, but nothing as extensive as the area presently occupied by British forces.

The Chiefs of Staff propose that arrangements be concluded with the Egyptian government whereby the administrative control of the base after 1956 remain with the British government, but that the Egyptian government participate with the British government in the joint lease hold.

British Embassy comment: The Egyptian Government would be unlikely to agree to British administration of the base. As far as Egyptian participation in the joint lease hold, the British Embassy "hasn't a clue what the C.O.S. mean".

The Chiefs of Staff propose that the Egyptians be responsible for the policing of the base and that suitable indemnity be arranged for losses sustained from pilferage.

British Embassy comment: This is the height of an unrealistic approach. Admittedly the rate of pilferage is high now, and would be excessively high under Egyptian policing; but, to expect the Egyptian government to indemnify the British government for pilferage from a leased base reflects a total lack of appreciation of the realities of the local situation.

As can be seen from the comments of the British Embassy it did not look with favor on the Chiefs of Staff proposals. The British Ambassador, as indicated in Para 7 of the reference telegram, has expressed the opinion that it would be unrealistic for the British to consider occupation of the base after 1956. Stevenson advocates plans for the progressive evacuation of the Canal area to be completed by 1956. Whatever rights (if any) of reoccupation in the event of war which may be secured will be to the British advantage. To a large extent the effectiveness of such reoccupation rights will depend on the extent to which the concept of "joint defense" is developed. In this connection Stevenson feels that the British are not in a position to talk "joint defense" as long as they are withholding certain essential arms shipments from the Egyptians. The withholding of such shipments implies lack of faith in the possibility of joint defense arrangements and also gives rise to justifiable suspicions of political pressure among Egyptians. This is particularly unfortunate among certain elements of the Egyptian armed forces who have been British trained and are basically friendly. They see, for instance, planes grounded for lack of spare parts and other equipment immobilized through the British embargo.

Stevenson recommends certain steps be taken to alleviate this situation. The 208th Squadron (R.A.F.) is about to be converted to jets. The Spitfires which comprise this squadron are now slated for shipment to either India or Pakistan. The Egyptians are anxious for these, and the British Ambassador believes that they should have them. The knowledge that these had been disposed of elsewhere would certainly cause ill feeling. There is also an outstanding question of 20 Bailiol trainers. The British Embassy believes that these should also be delivered. Shipment of certain Meteor jets previously processed for delivery should be allowed.

The British Embassy has yet received no reply to its comments and suggestions to the Foreign Office. Aside from the ever difficult attitude of the Egyptians, it is obvious that Stevenson is worried about the somewhat unrealistic approach of the British Chiefs of Staff to the problem. He also feels that the Foreign Office may be banking too heavily on the previous success of stalling tactics. With these views, this Embassy is in entire concurrence. It is at least a minor miracle that serious disturbances have not already occurred over the long protracted negotiations.[3]

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

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[3] In despatch 2042 from Cairo, February 27, Caffery reported, *inter alia*, that British Ambassador Stevenson had informed him "The British Chiefs of Staff seem to be coming around to a more realistic view of the negotiations with the Egyptians over base rights in the Suez area. Their thinking now tends towards a staged evacuation until 1956, with leasing of base rights thereafter. An annual rental figure of L.E. 2,000,000 is being considered." Caffery added that it was the British hope that these proposals would receive final Cabinet approval by the middle of March and that then the British Ambassador would be in a position to resume negotiations with the Egyptian Government. (641.74/2-2751)

Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary of State McGhee visited Cairo on February 22–23, 1951 en route from the Middle East Chiefs of Mission meeting at

Istanbul, February 14–21, to the South Asian Conference of Diplomatic and Consular Officers at Eliya Nuwara, Ceylon, February 26–March 2. Because of the brevity of his visit, McGhee held only one meeting with Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Salaheddin Bey who "was so much more interested in talking about Egyptian grievances in general and about Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in particular, and to a lesser degree about the Palestine problem, that Mr. McGhee had little opportunity to talk about the Istanbul Conference." With respect to Palestine, Salaheddin "brought out nothing new." With regard to Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, he warned McGhee of waning optimism and "emphasized that in case the negotiations failed he would be faced with a very difficult internal situation." McGhee expressed the opinion that the negotiations would eventually be satisfactorily concluded. (Despatch 2027 from Cairo, February 26, 110.15 McG/2–2651) McGhee also held a press conference on the afternoon of February 22 at the USIE auditorium in Cairo, a transcript of which is in file 110.15 McG/4–351. McGhee and his party departed Cairo at 4:30 a. m. on February 23 for Bombay.

McGhee subsequently revisited Cairo at the end of March on his way to London and Washington, and a summary of his conversations with Egyptian officials were transmitted in telegram 1001, priority, from Cairo, April 1, page 352. A partial itinerary of McGhee's tour through the Near East in February and March 1951 may be found in the editorial note, page 49.

874.10/3–1651 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, March 16, 1951.

No. 2190

Ref: Embtel 938 of Mar. 12, 1951 and Embtel 942 of Mar. 13, 1951
Cairo Despatch 1766 of Jan. 26, 1951 [1]

Subject: Long-term Settlement of Anglo-Egyptian Financial Negotiations

Mr. Leonard Waight, U.K. Treasury Representative in the Middle East, and Serag el Din Pasha, Egyptian Minister of Finance, signed a letter of understanding on March 11, 1951, signifying that agreement in principle has been reached on a long-term settlement of Egypt's sterling balances. The settlement was announced in a press communiqué issued jointly in Cairo and London on March 15. The actual terms of the new agreement are now being drafted and it will probably be signed by the end of this month or early in April.

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[1] None printed.

The agreement in principle includes the following points:

(1) Under the arrangements now concluded, Egypt and the United Kingdom mutually consent to consider £ 80 million as minimum sterling held in the blocked (or Number 2) account at the end of the period of releases; the remaining £ 150 million of the present holdings (approximately £ 230 million) in the blocked account will be subject to release;

(2) £ 25 million will be released immediately following the signing of the agreement; of this sum £ 14 million will be converted into dollars;

(3) Thereafter, £ 10 million will be released every year for 9 years beginning January 1, 1952.

(4) There will be additional releases commenced in 1951 of £ 5 million per annum up to a total of £ 35 million whenever Egypt's sterling holdings in the No. 1 account fall below £ 45 million.

(5) If at the end of the ten-year period all or part of the £ 35 million has not been transferred from the Number 2 to the Number 1 account, Great Britain will make annual releases of £ 10 million, with final release of £ 5 million on July 1, 1963;

(6) The U.K. undertakes to facilitate the supply of petroleum products (excluding dollar lubricants) to Egypt against payment in No. 1 account sterling up to a total of £ 11 million per annum c.i.f. for 10 years, commencing in 1951.

It will be noted that the settlement represents considerable concessions by both countries from their respective positions of a month ago, which were outlined in Cairo Despatch 1766. Under the circumstances most favorable to the Egyptians, total releases will be completed by January 1, 1960; under circumstances least favorable to Egypt, or in the event of no utilization of the automatic replenishment provision because the No. 1 account total does not fall below £45 million during the life of the agreement, total releases will be completed by July 1, 1963. The U.K. Treasury has provided assurances that the £ 80 million, which will remain in the No. 2 account after all releases have been made, will not be scaled down unilaterally at any time during the period of the new agreement. Britain also agrees to initiate discussions on settlement of the sterling remaining in the blocked account prior to the termination of the agreement.

Thus, the long-term settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian financial negotiations may be summarized as follows:

	£ million
Currently blocked sterling (#2 account)	230
Blocked sterling at end of period covered by agreement	80
Total releases from #2 to #1 accounts during term of agreement	150

Releases from #2 to #1 accounts	£ million
Immediate release	25
Of this sum convertible into dollars	14
Annual fixed release, beginning January 1, 1952	10
Automatic replenishment of #1 account whenever it falls below £ 45 million:	
annually up to	5
or maximum of	35
Period of releases 10–13½ years	
U.K. undertakes to facilitate Egypt's imports of petroleum products annually, up to	11

Begin confidential section The successful conclusion of a long-term settlement of Egypt's sterling balances obviates the need for protracted yearly negotiations on the matter of releases and should help the Egyptian Government in financially programming many necessary developmental projects. The outright conversion of £ 14 million (nearly $40 million) will be a substantial increment to Egypt's currently favorable hard currency position. Furthermore, the undertaking by the United Kingdom to facilitate Egypt's imports of petroleum products (e.g., kerosene, gas, diesel oil, lubricants from sterling sources, etc.) up to a total of £ 11 million annually through 1960 should result in considerable savings in dollar terms for Egypt, inasmuch as Egypt's imports of petroleum products in recent years have been paid for largely with dollars; under the yearly arrangements for 1949 and 1950, the United Kingdom undertook to supply Egypt with petroleum products from sterling area sources up to £ 5.0 million and £ 7.5 million, respectively. While the dollar content of petroleum products which Egypt obtains under the terms of this agreement will presumably decrease, Mr. Waight estimates that the average dollar costs borne by the United Kingdom for such products supplied to Egypt will approximate £ 6.5 million annually. In effect, therefore. the United Kingdom may provide Egypt with dollars and dollar products amounting to approximately $220 million during the next ten years. (*End confidential*)

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

641.74/3-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 28, 1951—noon.

5100. We understand full Cab will probably on April 2 consider Egyptian defense proposals drawn up by JCS with advice of

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

Stevenson and Fon Off. (We have been unable obtain substance these proposals but suspect they are along lines Cairo despatch 2042, Feb 27.[2]) Stevenson meanwhile postponing return Cairo.[3] Head Fon Off African Dept tends feel Cab will either approve proposals substantially as drafted or drop them altogether as he thinks it unlikely it will feel competent temper with plan which represents much hard work and careful consideration by JCS and top Fon Off officials. Fon Off officials feel Morrison appreciates international implication of problem and note that Bevin while now less influential will be able add his weight in constructive way. Also possibly significant is fact that Parliamentary critics of govt in sterling debate last week avoided specific reference defense negots and are certainly conscious govt's difficulties in dealing with Egypt on this question with all that is at stake for UK national interest.

At same time it is undeniable that Cabinet seriously concerned over obviously difficult Parliamentary situation and danger that further concessions to Egypt may be challenged. Apart from govt's anxiety over possibility of adverse vote is knowledge substantial criticism within Labor ranks of UK policy on Egypt. This is predicament which will have to be worded out by govt according to its own best lights.

Furthermore, Fon Off and Stevenson not at all sanguine Egypt wld accept offer. They fear already difficult situation wld be complicated by Egyptian insistence Sudans aspirations.

In above circumstances I do not believe it wld be wise or constructive for me at this time to approach Morrison as suggested Deptel 4344, Mar 23.[4] We are, however, taking every appropriate occasion to stress at Fon Off Departmental level importance US attaches to early satisfactory defense settlement with Egypt. Will review situation with McGhee next Monday with view to determining what helpful further action we can take.

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[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 347.

[3] Caffery had reported in telegram 927 from Cairo, March 9, that Stevenson "tells me he is leaving Sunday for London and hopes to see Bevin Monday. [British] Chiefs staff will consider Fayid [the British base in the Suez Canal Zone] business same afternoon and Bevin will probably take him before defense committee on Friday 16th and probably to Cabinet meeting on Monday 19th. Stevenson hopes return Cairo 21st." (641.74/3–951)

[4] Not printed; it reported the Department of State's concern that majority opinion in Parliament seemed clearly opposed to any further concessions to Egypt as reported in telegram 5043 from London of March 21 (641.7494/3–2151). It further stated that "While we appreciate difficult situation in which Brit Govt finds itself this time we consider settlement treaty problem with Egypt of urgent importance and earnestly hope there will be no recession from progressive position which UK understood to have adopted in recent months. Situation Iran is having serious repercussions Egypt and other ME countries and we believe it important agreement be reached with Egypt soonest possible, otherwise dangerous and explosive situation might well be created consequences of which wld be difficult counter." Ambassador Gifford was informed that at his own discretion he could "put above views informally to Morrison or anyone else in FonOff you believe appropriate." (641.7494/3–2351) Regarding the Anglo-Iranian dispute over nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, see p. 544.

GIFFORD

641.74/4-151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, April 1, 1951—7 p. m.

1001. Course long discussions McGhee and Egypt FonMin [2] reviewed Anglo-Egypt negots. Salaheddin said Egypt agrees receive Brit forces in Egypt during time of aggression against Brit, Egypt or adjacent countries, but cld not accept Brit forces in peace time. Salaheddin has insisted during negots that Brit evacuation take place within one year allowing what he termed adequate time for raising standards 10,000 Egypt combat troops plus 400 pilots as allowed by the treaty (or 20,000 if necessary) to take over defense job. Fayed to be maintained by Egyptians in good working order. Salaheddin said Bevin had agreed to principle of transfer responsibility but Egyptians concerned new Brit tune after Bevin turned over to Morrison seeming indicate going back on what Bevin agreed to. Egypt FonMin said Egypt had no concern Brit Parliamentary conditions. He said, "I did not speak to Mr. Bevin in his personal capacity but I spoke to him as Secy of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom". He insisted also Sudan problem inextricably bound with problem evacuation. Re Sudan FonMin stated he had agreed to two year transition period and that though Bevin tried separate questions Egypt cannot accept such separation and is determined agreement is conditional on both situations. He said "our attitude regarding this question is that we and our compatriots the Sudanese are agreed that the Sudan shld have its own govt and parliament in unity with Egypt represented by the Egypt crown for foreign policy, defense and currency and other matters which Egyptians and their compatriots the Sudanese may agree to".

McGhee explained US had not been, and not willing now become, party Anglo-Egypt negots though we had discussed and will continue to discuss problems with both in friendly vein. In this connection McGhee said US recognized (1) "You have certain legitimate nationalistic aspirations which your people feel very deeply about", (2) "The Brit have what they consider certain rights under the treaty and we believe that they have genuine desire to make a contribution to the solution of problem at hand"; and (3) "There is a consideration of defense of Middle East itself both for individual countries concerned and for defense of entire area. Defense of Middle East is an area problem, we have always felt". McGhee said US had welcomed news of progress in Anglo-Egypt negots and hoped retrogression not real. We appreciate Egypt patience, hope it will continue, but believe problems as Suez and Sudan shld not be linked; it is better to keep them separate. He promised discuss problems London.

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[1] Repeated to London and the Arab capitals.

[2] McGhee revisited Cairo at the end of March as part of his tour of the Near Eastern and South Asian regions discussed in editorial note, p. 49.

Salaheddin said, "I wld like assure you that we wld not limit ourselves to question at hand from the Egypt aspirations point of view by itself; we have looked at it, too, from Brit viewpoint, providing, of course, that they are within reasonable bounds from the point of view of Middle East defense. I think that the Middle East countries shld have the first right in the defense of their own territories but as to the Brit, all others come in as allies when war actually breaks out. This is the basis of what we offer the Brit. We also offered them that we undertake to maintain the base so that they may depend on it at the outbreak of war".

He said also, "There is no doubt that the final result will depend very much on the assistance that is given to these armies and on the economic assistance that is given to these people.

"To sum up, Egypt and the Arab countries, of whose tendencies I know quite a lot, are prepared to contribute their share in the general preparedness to face aggression to maintain peace and unity of the free nations of the world, but they insist that they shld have first say in their own territory and that the help and assistance of other countries comes secondary and when it is needed, but not to leave the whole burden of defense to other countries".

Also, "As to the question of separating the unity of Egypt and Sudan and question of evacuation it is improbable that the Egypt people will accept it in anyway".

Also, "If it is not possible to have these two questions settled on the basis of satisfying our national aspirations the Egypt people can not understand how we can side with the bloc which includes the Brit when they are violating our rights. On the contrary, the Egypt people will be more inclined to take a stand against Brit in defense of these rights".

Salaheddin said Egypt awaiting Brit Amb return from London, that if decision he brought not realization Egypt national aspirations no Egypt Govt cld continue talks as people wld demand stop to talks, and abrogation 1936 treaty and 1889 agreement. This cld only mean quarrel with Brit with no visible end. Salaheddin asked what McGhee cld do to avoid this. He said on his part he was prepared (though not having consulted PriMin or Cabinet) to increase evacuation period to 18 months and Sudanese transition period to three years.

McGhee said, "I accept this as a statement of your policy. Of course I recognize that it is subject to change in light of its submission to the Cabinet but I believe also the PriMin is likely to accept it as his view. We, I think, must deal with it as the views of the Egypt Govt; therefore we take it seriously and will give it every consideration".

Also, "Without any attempt to rebut Your Excellency's position, we wld like to give few comments.

"We entirely approve of the development of the indigenous defensive forces of the Middle East and feel that the Brit themselves fully accept that principle even though they may not appear to do so at times. One of the purposes of the tripartite declaration was to furnish the Middle East an opportunity to play a part in Middle East defenses. We took that decision in the face of considerable criticism in our own country. We took that position in order to make it clear that the furnishing of arms to Egypt for defense purposes was a good thing from the standpoint of our own foreign policy. In Istanbul we discussed the defense of the Middle East and we recognized there are many gaps which shld be filled and we as a govt approached such matters entirely from the standpoint of dealing with countries of the Middle East in the hope that they will maximize their own defense capabilities".

Also, "At Istanbul I felt that our real problem in the Middle East is a relatively short-ranged problem in that the principle danger of Soviet invasion is the relative weakness of the West. We are re-arming and assisting nations elsewhere to re-arm and feel that in a short period of time we will have more than fulfilled that purpose. There is a situation now which is a situation of war. We are fighting in Korea. The type of action which the Greeks knew recently was actually a shooting war and they know that this type of war short of localized action cld break out again. That is why we thought that this present time shld be considered as a state of internal emergency corresponding to a state of war. During that period every effort shld be made to maximize defense efforts. No matter how large an army the Egyptians able to build the Middle East also needs all other foreign troops which cld be brought in. I am certain that Brit realizes that troops in this area cld not be for a colonial type of regime as before but to defend the Middle East against Russia."

"I cannot believe any grievances against the Brit cld be considered even in the same light or aura as the menace which threatens the whole Middle East. And you have a new type of imperialism which demonstrates itself to be worse than any imperialism the Brit imposed. You have seen what happens when this imperialism is imposed upon a friendly nation.

"I believe that Brit is extricating itself generally from the colonial type of govt. They have given up most of the countries in the world which they had under the old colonialism. I think that they find themselves in an awkward position of international emergency now. They see also all the interests of the Middle East and the friendly world threatened by Russian aggression".

Also, "Can say that in general I hope that the Brit position when it comes to you will find basis for discussion will lead to a settlement of the problem. I think you do realize the dangerous situation the Middle East wld be in if you found yourself in an impasse with Brit".

Also, "I hope you and the PriMin will agree that the leaders of great states shld not only lead but follow public opinion. Go as far as you can toward meeting their point of view and working out a solution which will be satisfactory to both. In light of what has happened in Iran, our govt wld greatly regret if some new drastic situation were brought about which wld bring up nationalist feelings which cld lead no where.

"We can assure you that we cld never revert to colonialism which the world has known in the past. We feel that this calls for an evolutionary type of action for nations who find themselves in a position which have a certain aura of colonialism".

Salaheddin accepted McGhee analogy threat Russian imperialism versus Brit but contended Egypt masses do not. He concluded by asking wthat US attitude wld be in case break between Egypt and Brit. McGhee replied, "cld not possibly answer that question at this time".

CAFFERY

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788.00/4-1051

Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, in Connection With the Visit to London of The Honorable George C. McGhee, April 2–3, 1951[1]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, April 10, 1951.

Participants: *Foreign Office*
R. J. Bowker, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
Roger Allen, Head, African Department
M. N. F. Stewart, Assistant Head, African Department
D. V. Bendall, African Department
Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson, British Ambassador to Egypt

U.S.A.
George C. McGhee, Department of State
James K. Penfield } American Embassy, London
John Frick Root }

Mr. Bowker said the UK had been giving intensive thought to what new defense proposals it could offer Egypt. The results were now before the British Cabinet. It was not known when the Cabinet would be able to reach a decision but Ambassador Stevenson was planning to return to Cairo at the end of the week. Mr. Bowker asked that information about these proposals be treated in the strictest confidence. They consisted in substance of the following:

1. The phased withdrawal of all British troops and British headquarters between now and the termination of the present treaty in 1956;
2. A British-staffed civilian base thereafter under overall Anglo-Egyptian control on the basis of a leasehold agreement;
3. An Air Defense Pact enabling HMG to keep RAF squadrons and ground defense organization in Egypt after 1956;
4. The right of re-entry into Egypt of British and allied forces in event of war.

In addition, the UK would propose to assist in the progressive build-up of the Egyptian armed forces, to whom the responsibility for internal defense and security would fall.

Mr. Bowker said that the UK realized that Egyptian insistence on linking the Sudan with the defense question gravely complicated the whole matter. The UK was ready to discuss the Sudan with Egypt but it was difficult to make the concessions that Egypt was demanding. There could be no question of entering into a bargain over the Sudan. The development of self-government and of national identity in the Sudan had already gone too far to permit any settlement which did not have the approval of the Sudanese, whom the British were convinced by and large were unwilling to accept Egyptian suzerainty.

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[1] Drafted by Root. The source text was transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 6 to despatch 4832 from London, April 10, not printed. For further information on McGhee's visit to London, April 2–3, see footnote 1, p. 104.

Mr. McGhee explained that the US did not want to become a party to the Egyptian problem. Our military officials agreed on the importance of the Suez base, however, and we had continued to support the British position on every occasion as strongly as we could. Recently, however, we thought we had detected some change in British thinking on the strategic problem.

Mr. McGhee said that on his recent visit to Cairo he had had several meetings with Salah El Din, the final one lasting for two and a half hours. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had insisted that Egypt must have agreement on a phased withdrawal to be completed within one year. Mr. McGhee thought there was some prospect that the Egyptians might extend this to eighteen months or at the maximum perhaps a little more. The Egyptians maintained that during the British withdrawal their own armed forces should be built up to take over the defense responsibility. Salah El Din had said that if hostilities broke out in any of the countries adjacent to Egypt, the British troops and their allies would be allowed to return. Salah El Din had also emphasized that there could be no decision without an agreement on the Sudan. He had acknowledged that the Sudanese should determine their future, but the Egyptian position was that this could not be done while the Sudan was under British control. The Egyptians, said Mr. McGhee, seemed to be convinced that the Sudanese would want to enter into some union with Egypt under the Egyptian Crown, with Egypt perhaps responsible for such matters as foreign affairs, defense and finance. The Egyptians looked on the UK position in the Sudan as one of aggression.

Mr. McGhee said that, in his discussions with Salah El Din, he had made a long and forceful plea stressing the opportunity open to the UK under its treaty with Egypt to contribute to the defense of Egypt in the present critical international situation and the importance of the British role in the defense of the Near East as a whole. He had explained that he understood the nationalist aspirations underlying the Egyptian position but that it should be recognized that British troops in the area were not there for the purpose of restoring any form or degree of colonialism but purely for safeguarding against aggression from without. Our belief was that all the factors involved in the negotiation between Egypt and the UK could be reconciled. We hoped that Egypt would not close the door to an agreement with Britain until at least it had studied the counterproposals we understood the British were preparing. In the judgment of the US (Mr. McGhee had told the Egyptians) we were in a state approximating war. There were already open hostilities in Korea and Iran was exposed to great danger. There was no evidence that Russia would not move into the Near East. Normal peacetime conditions did not prevail and the situation called for exceptional measures. During this critical period every effort should be made to build up the defensive forces in the Near Eastern countries, but nevertheless no matter how large an army the Egyptians might build, Egypt and the Near East would still need the assistance of foreign troops. It would be too late to look for outside help when the invader reached adjacent countries. The US was convinced there was no danger of any reversion to colonialism but rather that the real threat of imperialistic rule came from Russia.

Mr. McGhee said that he had also argued with Salah El Din that the stationing of British troops in the Canal Zone should not be linked with the problem of the Sudan. They were unrelated issues.

Mr. McGhee went on to impress on his British listeners that we considered the situation in the Near East so delicate that one more incident—an impasse between the UK and Egypt for example—could be extremely dangerous and was in fact unthinkable. For this reason he would strongly urge the UK to keep its position on an agreement with Egypt as flexible as possible and not take any final, irrevocable stand. He said that the British Chargé in Cairo had mentioned to him the desirability of sweetening any treaty arrangement with Egypt by obtaining an Egyptian concession on its present Suez Canal embargo. Mr. McGhee urged that these dissimilar problems not be related. He did not very well see how Egypt could back down from its present stand on the Suez Canal question so long as Iraq, foregoing great revenues, continued to maintain its embargo on the flow of oil through the pipeline to Haifa.

Mr. McGhee said he had been greatly impressed at the extent to which the Anglo-Egyptian dispute had become a political issue in Egypt and, indeed, throughout the whole of the Near East. Even Iraq and Jordan, which themselves had close relations with the UK, were sympathetic to Egypt, and there was a general desire throughout the Near Eastern countries to see the Egyptian position met. All this was a very unsettling influence. Along with the Iranian oil problem and Palestine issue, the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was one of the three major foci for dissatisfaction and unrest in the area.

Mr. McGhee said he had the impression that Egypt, by withholding such essential supplies as labor and water, could render the British position in the Suez Canal Zone very difficult, if not untenable. It would be hard for the UK to justify retaliatory measures and of very doubtful wisdom to try to use force. He thought we must ask ourselves quite seriously whether the liability of political unrest throughout the Near East did not outweigh the military value of adhering to British treaty rights. An impasse with Egypt, he reiterated, could well nigh be fatal and he would again urge the UK to maintain a flexible attitude towards the Egyptian demands perhaps even with a view to meeting them. The critical period in the Near East would come during the next year-and-a-half to two years, while the West was building up its strength, and it was during this time that we must seek to hold the Near East together and to restore its confidence in its internal strength and security.

Mr. McGhee thought that an alternative to complete withdrawal might be the use of forces with some multilateral flavor. Salah El Din did not commit himself on this point but the Egyptians have in the past intimated that such an arrangement might be acceptable. Perhaps some UN complexion could be put on the situation. With the evolution of our own policy it might be possible for the US to play some part, possibly through assigning a US Deputy Commander under General Robertson. Complete withdrawal or some multilateral force seemed to be the only two possibilities. Mr. Bowker and Ambassador Stevenson indicated they were not sanguine about the prospect of Egyptian acceptance of a multinational force. The Egyptian position with them had been that no foreign forces could be stationed on Egyptian soil.

Mr. Bowker noted with interest all Mr. McGhee had said and in reply wished to emphasize that the object of the British proposals was precisely to reconcile all the factors which Mr. McGhee had mentioned, in particular to meet Egyptian aspirations and at the same time to safeguard British and Western interests. The UK was anxious to try to find some means of obtaining Egyptian cooperation, some *modus vivendi* over the critical period. He thought that the British proposals now under consideration within the UK Government could form the basis for an agreement. Ambassador Stevenson said he would fully agree that the problem at hand was, so far as Egypt was concerned, a sentimental one and required a sentimental solution.

Mr. McGhee then said he had received an indication from some British sources he preferred to leave unnamed that the UK might be prepared to use force should all other measures fail to obtain the *modus vivendi* over the critical period. He thought that the British forces now in the Suez area could be used to seize Cairo. Mr. McGhee said that in his opinion it would be most unwise to resort to force and he hoped the British were not contemplating such an extreme. Ambassador Stevenson affirmed that force would not be used while he was HMG's representative in Cairo unless there was a danger to British life and limb and Mr. Bowker agreed that the resort to force was the last thing the UK wanted; on the other hand it was obviously the right and duty of the government if the safety of the British

htly bound

citizens was at stake. Mr. Bowker added that, as to Mr. McGhee's reference the undesirability of linking the Suez Canal and treaty questions, the important point for the UK Government to consider was that they were in fact already being linked by the British parliament and public.

Ambassador Stevenson said that with regard to the Sudan, the Sudanese would not give up independence and did not want Egyptian suzerainty. A solution to this difficulty was not easy to see, but he thought that it might be possible to establish a set of principles for governing the determination of the Sudan's future which would be difficult for the Egyptians to refuse publicly.

Mr. McGhee said that we had given Egypt no encouragement that we could supply them with arms and had usually referred them to the UK. Ambassador Stevenson noted in this connection that in the past there had been some difficulty in securing American permission for the release to Egypt of lend-lease equipment held by the UK. He understood that it was now necessary to refer all available supplies of this sort to NATO for any demand which might exist there. Mr. Penfield observed that delay in the past probably arose primarily from the administrative difficulties in arranging for the necessary clearances.

Libya

Mr. McGhee said he was not abreast of the latest developments concerning arrangements for obtaining base rights in Libya. The US had always felt, however, that it would be unwise to link the question of obtaining defense facilities with the provision of economic assistance. Mr. McGhee thought it was dangerous to establish a precedent of making an outright grant (apart from usual land rentals) for the base rights and it seemed to him that the matter of providing Libya with whatever economic aid it required could be kept separate from the defense arrangements. Mr. Allen explained the conviction of Mr. Pelt, the UN Commissioner in Libya, that the Libyans would require some direct payment for defense facilities. Mr. Allen said that the UK had proposed to make up the budgetary and balance payments deficit for the whole of Libya, but, in view of Mr. Pelt's insistence that there must be some fixed guarantee of payment in return for base privileges, the Foreign Office, which could see no overriding objection to this arrangement, was now considering that UK aid to Libya might fall into three parts: one, probably a very substantial proportion, would be earmarked for direct payment for defense rights; one would be a contribution to an economic development fund; the third amount would be a variable sum used to make up the Libyan deficit. Mr. Allen explained that the UK proposed to make up the deficit after US and other outside aid had been absorbed.

Neutralism

Mr. McGhee commented on the special attention he had given to the tendency throughout the Near East and Asia towards taking a neutral stand on issues in the struggle between the free world and Communism. The conversations he had had on his tour, however, had convinced him that government leaders in none of the 12 Near Eastern and South Asian countries he had visited had any real respect or philosophical attachment for the neutralistic policy expounded by Nehru, but to the contrary had a realistic appreciation of the significance of the East-West struggle. The fact that these countries did not take a more forthright stand with the West was due primarily to their sense of insecurity and their preoccupation with problems of immediate self-interest. It was important to try to restore confidence and to alleviate internal stresses throughout the area in order to obtain more open cooperation in the larger world conflict.

641.74/4–1451 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET
No. 2474

CAIRO, April 14, 1951.

Ref: Embtels 1045 April 12, 1040 April 11, 1039 April 9, 1034 April 9, London tel 155 April 6; Embdespatches 2447 April 11, 1942 February 13 [2]

Subject: Current Status of Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations.

Stevenson's return and the resumption of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations have again brought this problem to the forefront of the Egyptian political scene. Interest has been heightened by the uncertainty as to whether Stevenson had received his final instructions and by the atmosphere of secrecy which Salaheddin, with his love of the dramatic, has thrown around the negotiations.

As reported in the reference telegram, the first stage of the negotiations took place in an old palace on Rhoda Island (located in the Nile river near the center of Cairo). This meeting lasted approximately half an hour. Stevenson presented Salaheddin with an outline of the British proposals (along lines indicated in London tel 155 April 6).[3] He also gave Salaheddin a "bit of paper" on the Sudan which emphasized that the British government regarded the question of the Sudan as being entirely separate from the question of evacuation, and that in any event, no final decision on the Sudan could be taken without consulting the people themselves.

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[1] Drafted by Gordon H. Mattison, Counselor of Embassy in Cairo; copy to London.

[2] None of the references is printed except despatch 1942, p. 344.

[3] The proposals which Ambassador Stevenson presented to the Egyptian Government at this time were communicated to the Department of State by the First Secretary of the British Embassy at Washington, D. A. Greenhill, on April 27. See memorandum by Wells Stabler, *infra*.

Salaheddin read through the outline carefully and then stated that, while he would of course have to refer the matter to the Cabinet (meaning in this case the "Little Cabinet" designated for the negotiations: Nahas Pasha, Mohamed Fuad Seraggedin, Salaheddin, and Ibrahim Farag, see EmbDespatch 2447 April 11 and Embtel 1034 April 9), it was his, Salaheddin's personal opinion that the proposals were not acceptable. Shortly after this meeting, Salaheddin telephoned Stevenson personally and again emphasized the desire for secrecy in regard to the meeting—at least until Saturday (April 14). Although a number of Egyptian reporters were aware of the meeting, the government's directives to the press were so strict that not one word appeared in the local press.

In the meantime, the local BBC correspondent had cleared through the British Embassy a story regarding the meeting. (The meeting was so secret that even the Press Section of the British Embassy had been kept in the dark.) The story was broadcast by the BBC at least once before the Embassy was able to get a message in to play down and camouflage the item.

Since Stevenson had been informed that the King had issued instructions that the Cabinet group charged with the negotiations was not to make any decisions without consulting him, Stevenson arranged for copies of the documents which he had given Salaheddin to be sent to the King secretly through Hassan Youssef Pasha, Acting Chief of the Royal Cabinet. To date there has been no reaction from the palace to this move.

As reported in the reference telegram, the British Embassy had just received instructions as to how the question of the Sudan was to be handled. The British proposals with regard to the Sudan are essentially those outlined in the EmbDespatch 1942 of February 13, with the exception that the proposed Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Supervisory Council would be a Tripartite Commission which would formulate proposals for the constitutional future of the Sudan.

It is evident that the British still feel that they will be able to maneuver the Egyptians into an uncomfortable position on the Sudan by putting up proposals which, if refused, would place Egypt on record as being opposed to the principle of self-determination.

If we analyze the current status of the negotiations, we find the following situation exists as of the time of writing this despatch:

1. Stevenson has returned with proposals which are not nearly as mild or acceptable as Bevin's "preliminary thinking" which was outlined to Salaheddin before he left London early in the year.

2. Stevenson has been given some of the leeway in handling the negotiations which he desired (Embtel 1039 April 9). However, he has been given the almost incredibly difficult job of selling the Egyptians something that they have repeatedly and publicly announced that they would not accept.

3. Stevenson is also faced with the fact that even if the Egyptians should unexpectedly turn tractable, and agree to the new proposals, there is a distinct possibility that the Labor Government would wish to stall still further because of its fear that *no* agreement with Egypt could muster sufficient votes to get through Parliament (against a combination of Conservatives and Labor back-benchers). The Labor Government, according to Stevenson is trying desperately to stall off an election until the fall when it believes it will have a better chance.

4. The British Embassy believes that there is a possibility that the stalling tactics may prove successful because of the fact that the present Wafdist government is afraid to stir up local disturbances as it fears that it could not control these disturbances once they were started and that they might turn against the government itself. For this reason it is possible that the Wafdists would prefer "no agreement" to a "bad agreement", which in itself might cause disturbances which the government would be unable to control.

5. Insofar as current threats of "boycott" of the British forces in the Canal Zone and withdrawal of some 40,000 Egyptian workers there, the British Embassy is not overly concerned. It feels that the British forces have a commanding position in that they could retaliate effectively without use of force. For instance, they control the pipeline which supplies Cairo with gasoline and important communication facilities with the outside world. The British Embassy believes that the present government is conscious of the fact that two can play the boycott game, and that it will attempt to control extremist demands for this type of action.

6. In any event, most observers feel that the Egyptian government will go along with the British stalling tactics at least until after the King's wedding on May 6. The King obviously would not wish for untoward disturbances to take place just before his wedding, and he has sufficient influence with the present government to prevent it from taking any precipitate action.

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468 : "Egypt"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1951.

Participants: Mr. D. A. Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy
NE—Mr. Lewis Jones
NE—Mr. Stabler

Summary:

Mr. Greenhill called at his request and said that he had been instructed by the Foreign Office to communicate to the Department recent developments in connection with the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. He said that the Foreign Office had particularly requested that we be apprised of its gratitude for the support which had been given to the UK by the Department and Ambassador Caffery. The Foreign Office believes that this support has been invaluable.

Mr. Greenhill then gave the following details on the British defense proposals:

1. All Army personnel, except anti-aircraft gunners, to be withdrawn from Egypt within the next five years. Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, and the majority of combat troops to be evacuated from Egypt by the end of three years.
2. The Middle East base would remain under UK ownership with a long-term lease for the land. Control of the base would be through an Anglo-Egyptian Control Board jointly responsible to the British and Egyptian Governments. Approximately 3,500 British civilian technicians would remain on the base.
3. A joint Anglo-Egyptian air defense organization would be established which would remain active after 1956.
4. Egypt would guarantee the re-entry of British and allied forces in the event of war or the imminence of war.
5. Egyptian armed forces would be equipped immediately on a training scale. Thereafter they would be treated on equal priority with nations with which the UK has working defense arrangements.

The British Ambassador in Cairo was instructed to point out to the Egyptian Government that the above were minimum requirements for defense purposes and that it is inconceivable in the present threat of world war and the state of opinion in the UK that the British Government should purchase Egyptian cooperation by acceding to Egyptian demands for immediate evacuation. With respect to the Sudan, the British Government considers this question a separate issue and the British Ambassador had the authority to say that the UK was willing in due course to discuss this issue on the basis that the aim of the British Government is that the Sudanese should obtain self-Government at the earliest possible opportunity. The Ambassador was to emphasize that no arrangement could be reached which would interfere with this aim.

Finally, the British Ambassador was to raise with the Egyptian Government the question of the Suez Canal restrictions. He was instructed to make clear that failure by Egypt to remove these restrictions would make it most difficult for the British Government to obtain public support for a revision of the 1936 Treaty.

Mr. Greenhill added that the Foreign Office was concerned by the impression it had received from Mr. McGhee in London[1] that the United States valued Egyptian cooperation more highly than it did the retention of strategic facilities for the deployment of allied forces in the defense of the Near Eastern area. Mr. Stabler informed Mr. Greenhill that such an impression was not correct, but that we were considerably concerned by the lack of progress in these negotiations. Mr. Jones informed Mr. Greenhill that the Department would probably wish to make certain comments regarding the information which he had communicated on the defense proposals.

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[1] See memorandum of informal United States–United Kingdom discussions, April 10, p. 356.

774.00/5-251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, May 2, 1951—1 p. m.

1123. Egyptian Chamber Deputies "got even" last night with Brit Parl for anti-Egyptian statements. In strongest language yet used during Anglo-Egyptian negots Wafd as well as opposition speakers attacked Churchill and Conservative in particular Brit in gen, demanded abrogation 1936 Treaty, boycott to Brit, and treatment to "Brit dogs" in canal zone as "enemies". One speaker went so far as to call for non-aggression treaty with Russia, another melodramatically tore up copy 1936 Treaty to tumultuous applause from house. US attacked as ally Brit ME policy.

In reply FonMin Salaheddin demonstrated maximum self-restraint possible under circumstances, promised any new treaty wld be submitted Parl before signature and that he wld never sign an agreement that did not realize Egypt's national demands to the full. "Either Brit concedes our demands or the result will be what you have suggested".

FonMin made three points in particular: (1) Defending restrictions Suez Canal tankers; [2] (2) Condemning Brit failure permit supply arms including threat to "buy them from the devil if necessary"; and (3) Reiterating usual Sudan stand. Overall effect his speech calming in that no new definite Egyptian action any kind announced.

Altho mtg probably inevitable "escape valve" for pent-up Egyptian feelings, any definite dragging our negots certain become progressively more difficult.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London, Beirut for Blandford, and all other Arab capitals.

[2] Reference is to Egyptian restrictions against tankers using the Suez Canal s a passageway to Israel ports. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 59 ff.

Conference Files : Lot 59 D 95 : "US–UK Talks, Wash, 9/51, Briefing Book Egypt"

The Department of State to the British Embassy

SECRET

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. We greatly appreciate British courtesy in keeping us informed regarding developments in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, in particular the details of United Kingdom defense proposals to Egypt, and are grateful for references to support given by the Department and Ambassador Caffery.

2. We have now been informed that the Government of Egypt has replied to the United Kingdom defense proposals, and that the reply in effect rejects these proposals and restates Egyptian demands in unaltered form.

3. While we are disappointed by the Egyptian response, we understand that the Government of Egypt considers the door still open for further negotiations and that it now awaits further communication from the United Kingdom.

4. Basic attitude of the United States regarding Anglo-Egyptian issue is that we sincerely hope that the United Kingdom and Egypt as parties to this question will be able to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement which takes into account not only Egyptian national aspirations but also the vital question of security of the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East area. It is on the basis of the latter consideration that we have endeavored to leave no doubt with the Government of Egypt regarding our strong support for maintenance by the United Kingdom of important strategic facilities in Egypt.

5. Beginning with politico-military talks between the United Kingdom and the United States in Washington in 1947, and more recently in similar talks held here last October we have sought and, we continue to seek, ways and means to assist the United Kingdom in this situation within the framework of our basic position.

6. Following on these recent talks, the United States has studied the entire Near East situation and has formulated a new and more positive approach to the Near East which we wish to carry out in close correlation with the United Kingdom. It is our hope that this approach while not specifically directed at any one Near East problem, will contribute to a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian problem.

7. While the United Kingdom may be sure that we shall continue to give every possible support to its position in Egypt, we are apprehensive that a further decline in Anglo-Egyptian relations, with probable attendant disorders and a depreciation of the United Kingdom–United States position, might prejudice the successful execution of the new United States approach and go far to negate it.

8. Although recent reports from Cairo indicate a less intransigent attitude on the part of the Government of Egypt regarding the necessity for action within the next few weeks, we are nonetheless concerned by a general restlessness among the Egyptian people and politicians over what they regard as an unsatisfactory state of affairs and by the analogy which is inevitably drawn between nationalization of oil in Iran and "nationalization" of bases in Egypt.

9. The United States desires, in common with the United Kingdom, to seek to avoid the development of a situation which might add to the tension already existing in the Near and Middle East, and we therefore trust that the following suggestions will be studied by the United Kingdom in the same friendly spirit which has motivated their formulation.

10. We believe that it is essential that the United Kingdom reply should, like the Egyptian communication, leave the door open for a continuance of negotiations. We also suggest that the reply, which it is hoped will be made at an early date, will express the importance and utility of a visit by the Egyptian Foreign Minister to London this summer. Such a visit would, in our opinion, confirm in a public manner that the negotiations have by no means been deadlocked. We feel that this would relieve popular pressure for unilateral abrogation of the treaty.

11. We would also suggest that consideration might be given to positive steps which might be taken to create a more favorable atmosphere for the renewal of the negotiations. In this connection it might be possible for the United Kingdom to resume shipments of a token quantity of arms to Egypt at about the same time as the new United States approach to the Near East becomes public knowledge.

12. In view of the urgency of this problem and its implication regarding the deployment of allied forces for the defense of the area, as well as its intimate relationship to the new United States approach to the Near East, the United States would be willing to consult with the United Kingdom at an early date on an informal and top secret basis in order to discuss any ways and means which in the opinion of the United Kingdom might be helpful in achieving a solution.

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1951.

Secretary's Letters : Lot 56 D 459 : "Defense"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Dennis Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy
NE—Mr. Stabler

Summary:

Mr. Greenhill called at his request this afternoon and handed me an *aide-mémoire* from his Government [1] replying to US *aide-mémoire* of May 21 [2] on the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.

In delivering the *aide-mémoire* Mr. Greenhill said he would like to make a few comments. He said that the Foreign Office was quite concerned by what they felt was an underlying skepticism on the part of the United States regarding the necessity for retaining a base at all in Egypt in peacetime. The Foreign Office believed that if the US did feel this way, there was a fundamental divergence of views between us and it would be difficult to reach a satisfactory understanding.

The Foreign Office hoped that the United States would fully understand the complexity of the Parliamentary situation in the UK at this time. There is a current of feeling in Parliament against any action on the part of the Government which might be called appeasement to Egypt. In this connection, the Government has had difficulties over the Egyptian restrictions on the Suez Canal and the sterling balance question.[3]

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[1] Attached to source text, not printed. It first expressed appreciation for past U.S. support for the British position with respect to current negotiations with Egypt; it expressed full agreement on the necessity for coordinating United States–United Kingdom policy toward Egypt and to correlating the new U.S. approach to the Near East with Britain's efforts to secure Anglo-Egyptian agreements on Suez and the Sudan; it expressed the desire of the United Kingdom to keep the door open for negotiations with Egypt as long as possible; it defended the British negotiating position vis-à-vis Egypt with regard to Suez and the Sudan and informed the Department of State that instructions had been recently sent to Ambassador Stevenson to propose opening Anglo-Egyptian discussions with respect to the Sudan; it rejected the U.S. suggestion that the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs be invited to London on the grounds that such an invitation would inevitably lead the Egyptian Government and people to expect an early and favorable resolution of outstanding differences; in conclusion, it expressed general agreement with the U.S. position that the entire problem of Anglo-Egyptian relations had major implications in relation to the Western ability to defend the Near East.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] In despatch 63 from Cairo, July 13, Ambassador Caffery reported the official signing on July 1 of the Sterling Releases Agreement and the Sterling Payment Agreement by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt in conformity with the letter of understanding of March 11 discussed in despatch 2190 of March 16, p. 348. Caffery enclosed copies of these agreements with his despatch. (874.10/7–1351)

The attitude of Egypt toward the UK and the consequent hardening of the UK position have had as their immediate result the reluctance of the UK to provide arms, etc. to Egypt. However, the general effect has been to rule out even those concessions which in themselves would not have prejudiced the basic position of the UK in Egypt and its responsibility for the defense of the area. Consequently it was generally felt that the lack of mutual confidence made a bilateral solution of the problem nigh impossible.

The Foreign Office wished to emphasize that it was fully aware of the dangers of an open dispute with Egypt. It realized that such a dispute would increase the tension in the area and would probably lead to a discussion of the question in the UN. The UK desired to keep negotiations going and realized that it would be easier if concessions could be made. Since such concessions were out of the question, it was therefore necessary to spin out the negotiations. An attempt was being made to do this with the introduction of the Sudan question.

The Foreign Office was, however, considering a new approach to the defense problem. This approach might be the inclusion of Egypt in an "International Defense Organization for the Middle East." The Foreign Office was not in a position to say at this time whether this would be useful and they were therefore not making any formal approach to us as yet. However, the Foreign Office wished us to know in general terms of their thinking.

I thanked Mr. Greenhill for the *aide-mémoire* and his comments. I said I was concerned by the Foreign Office belief that we were skeptical about the necessity of a base in peacetime. I said that quite on the contrary we regarded the base as most important. Our fear was that if the UK maintained an inflexible line, the reaction of the Egyptians would be so hostile that the base might become a liability rather than an asset. Certainly grave difficulties would ensue if the UK had to "dig in" in the Canal Zone. Mr. Greenhill said that he appreciated this point and would try to clarify the situation with the Foreign Office. I asked Mr. Greenhill whether he could tell me anything more about the "International Defense Organization for the Middle East." Mr. Greenhill replied that the Foreign Office had not given any further details.

However, he assumed that the new approach would be the subject of the informal and top secret consultations which it was proposed would take place between us.[4] He said that Commonwealth discussions on Middle East defense would take place probably shortly and that following these discussions the UK would be in a better position to formulate the exact nature of the new approach to Egypt. I gathered that the UK would hope to have consultations with us the latter part of the summer.

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[4] See editorial note, p. 383.

Finally, I mentioned to Mr. Greenhill the apparent disappointment of the Egyptian Foreign Minister that he was not being asked to visit London this summer. I said that while we realized the UK might not be in a position to do very much for the Foreign Minister, we, nevertheless, thought that such an invitation might help the Foreign Minister in his dealings with the Egyptian public.

641.74/7-751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, July 7, 1951—9 p. m.

16. Brit Amb told me last night he recd Egyptian reply yesterday (one day later than promised) and I read it this morning. It recites again at some length the Egyptian case for early evacuation. For the Sudan it emphasizes the omission in the Brit note of mention of "unity under the Egyptian Crown", recites again at some length the Egyptian case and finally says that Egyptian Govt will accept suggestion for setting up proposed commission on condition the Egyptian Crown be not in question and an election be held within 2 years after the evacuation Brit military and civilian officials.

The really interesting point is the statement that the Egyptian Govt sees no object in further prolongation of convs with no end in sight and therefore insists in effect that unless Egyptian point of view is met in the near future Egyptian Govt will be compelled to do something about it. Stevenson asked MinFonAff what he meant by that. He replied, "it is imperative that before this Parliament adjourns in about 6 weeks we see tangible evidence of real results or we shall break off negotiations." Stevenson doubts that Cabinet authorized him to (go that far) and said so to Kerim Tabet this morning. Kerim Tabet said that as the Grand Chamberlain will be Acting Chief of Cabinet after departure of Hassan Youssef Pasha this afternoon Stevenson shld ask him to request MinFonAff for a record of the minutes of the conv to send to His Majesty in the hope that if the records contain this statement the King will have something to say about it.

I read also Ambs telegram to London transmitting Egyptian note in which he observes that he wld try to keep the ball rolling all summer on the Sudan. It is his present intention to see Min around end of next week and attempt to get him to talk about setting up the Sudan commission.[2]

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[1] Repeated to London.

CAFFERY

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[2] In telegram 43 from Cairo, July 14, Caffery reported that the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him "that Brit negots are 'getting nowhere' and unless something unexpected happens he proposes before the end of the present Parliament session (around middle Aug) to announce the end of the talks and to publish the minutes of conversations with Brit Amb, and finally to renounce the 1936 treaty. I told him I wld deprecate this etc., etc." (641.74/7-1451). In telegram 114 from Cairo, July 27, Caffery reported on further conversations between Ambassador Stevenson and Egyptian Foreign Minister Salaheddin in which Salaheddin contended that unless "Great Britain agreed as basis for discussion that unity of the Sudan and Egypt under the Egyptian Crown would not be in question it was useless to continue conversations." Stevenson "gave him any number of sound reasons why it is not possible at this juncture to make such a commitment but to no avail." Salaheddin then repeated that before the end of the current parliamentary session he would make a statement to the Egyptian Parliament as to whether or not it was worthwhile continuing negotiations. (641.74/7-2751)

Editorial Note

Concurrent with the developing Anglo-Egyptian disputes over Suez and the future of the Sudan, United States and United Kingdom military and diplomatic officials had begun laying plans for the creation of a Middle East Command that would include the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab States, including Egypt. In part, the emergence of the Middle East Command concept was in response to the practical problems involved in integrating Greece, and especially Turkey, into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization command structure. But by August of 1951, the United Kingdom and United States had also perceived that a Middle East Command might also be the instrument by which the British and Egyptians could resolve their differences over the future of Suez. In telegram 841 from London of August 13, Minister Julius Holmes reported "Further UK proposals on Egypt defense problem are apparently awaiting decisions on ME Command, on which FonOff now seems to be depending almost entirely for exit from present impasse." Holmes concluded that although "FonOff does not anticipate further developments in Egypt before Egyptian Parliament recesses, it does consider explosive nature Egypt issue vital reason for settling ME Command structure without delay." (774.5/8-1351) Thereafter, the connection between Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over Suez and the Sudan and the planning for a Middle East Command became intimate. For documentation on the Middle East Command as it related to the Commonwealth nations and those of the Near East, including Egypt, see pages 1 ff.

780.5/8–1551

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, 15 August 1951.

MY DEAR ACHESON: As you know, the question of Anglo-Egyptian relations has been looming large in our minds here recently, and I am disturbed at indications which I have seen that there is some divergence of view between you and us as to what our attitude towards these problems should be. Since I feel that any divergence between us on this issue must surely be avoided, it may be useful if I write now and tell you my own thinking on the whole question. I know you will not mind if I put my ideas quite bluntly in this personal communication, since it is after all between friends that plain speaking can and must take place.

May I say at the outset that, when I speak of divergencies, these are in no sense due to lack of co-operation between your Embassy here and ourselves, our own Embassy in Washington and the State Department, or our two Embassies in Cairo. On the contrary I should like to record that the co-operation between all of us has been constant and cordial, the interchange of ideas entirely free. Indeed, I hope that, in response to a suggestion of the State Department, our Embassies in Cairo will now be able to work out together a joint intelligence appreciation of the Egyptian situation including perhaps the Sudan. But it seems to me that the divergencies between us, if divergencies there are may derive from something deeper than the normal exchange of views on current affairs can put right. It is for this reason that I am writing to you now.

May I first re-state our position? We are in Egypt by virtue of a Treaty freely negotiated with the Egyptian Government in 1936. That Treaty has five years to run before the mechanism provided in it for revision at the request of either party comes into play; there is no provision in it for unilateral denunciation. That is the legal basis for our position although it is true that we have not found it possible to keep quite strictly within the exact terms of the treaty; but even more imporant that the legal basis, perhaps is the underlying reality to which the Treaty gives expression. That reality is that Egypt is not, and never will be able to defend herself against aggression by a major Power. We saw that in the last war, and no doubt we shall see it again if—contrary to all our hopes and efforts—there should be another war. But Egypt is important not only for herself but as the key to defence of the whole of the Middle East. I do not wish to recite again the importance of the Middle East to the defence of the free world: on that I think we are perfectly agreed. But we are advised that we cannot hope to defend the Middle East with the forces now at our disposal, or likely to be at our disposal in the foreseeable future, without the existence of a main base in Egypt. That base must be already there in time of peace, if we are to have a chance of holding the Middle East on the outbreak of war; and it must be there not merely as a dump, but as a live, going concern. We cannot move it out of Egypt, because not only would the expense be prohibitive, but also there is nowhere else where it can conveniently go. This was agreed between our Chiefs of Staff and yours, together with our political representatives, during the discussions last October.[1] Since then we have again considered the matter exhaustively and have come to the conclusion that strategically and logistically the base must be located in Egypt. We must have troops to guard the base, and to be ready for use in an emergency in the Middle East. We are prepared to agree that the Egyptians should in due course take over some of the guard duties, but we should still have to find some alternative location for our troops and this would take time. What the Egyptians cannot do, and of this we are convinced by our many years' experience of dealing with them, is to maintain the base itself as a live organisation. Furthermore, it is useless to have a base and headquarters in Egypt unless there is some air defence organisation to protect them from air attack, and this equally the Egyptians cannot provide in the foreseeable future.

I do not wish to dilate further on this point, because I can hardly believe that, at this time of day, there can be any serious difference between us regarding the general need for bases in advance of the outbreak of any war. After all we are very glad to have United States bomber bases in this country and we do not see why the Egyptians should object to our presence for similar reasons in their country. I should just like to repeat that we do not regard ourselves as being in Egypt simply for the maintenance of our own interests, or those of the Egyptians for that matter, but because we feel that we must bear this responsibility on behalf of all freedom-loving nations. No question of imperialism exists.

We appreciate that the Egyptians may resent this fact, and that their resentment has its roots in the past. But how deep does that resentment go? We know, from many conversations we have had with leading Egyptians and even with members of the present Egyptian Government, that they are to a great extent the prisoners of their own propaganda. Such people realize in their hearts that we have to stay in Egypt, even though some of them may regret it. Others of them say frankly that so long as we are there they will be able to divert on to our heads the wrath that should fall upon them for their corrupt and inefficient form of oligarchial government. Our task, therefore, it seems to me, is to provide if possible some means whereby at any rate those Egyptians who have goodwill towards us can accept the continued presence of British troops in Egypt, and thus avoid a direct clash.

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[1] For documentation on the United States-United Kingdom military talks of October 26, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 217 ff.

As you know, we have already made an offer to the Egyptians which goes as far as, or even farther than we can safely afford. On the 11th April last, His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo proposed to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the 1936 Treaty of Alliance should be revised so as to provide for:—

(*a*) the phased withdrawal of British troops from Egypt beginning within one year of the conclusion of an agreement on the revision of the Treaty and ending in 1956 (it should be noted that the rate of the withdrawal of the combatant troops and of General Headquarters depends largely on the rate at which accommodation can be provided for them elsewhere);

(*b*) the progressive civilianisation of the base, which should be concluded by 1956, essential British civilian personnel being introduced as military personnel are withdrawn. The base would thereafter be entrusted to the Egyptian armed forces for security purposes but operated in accordance with British military policy under the overall administrative control of an Anglo-Egyptian Control Board;

(*c*) the creation of a long-term Anglo-Egyptian coordinated air defence system in which there should be both Egyptian and British components;

(*d*) the provision at an early date of arms and equipment on training scale for the Egyptian forces and thereafter the provision of whatever further arms and equipment may be necessary in equal priority with other nations with whom we have working defence agreements;

(*e*) in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency, Egypt would agree to the return of British forces for the period of the emergency and would grant to them and to our allies all necessary facilities and assistance.

These proposals were flatly rejected by the Egyptians on 24th April, without even any discussion. The Egyptians merely repeated their own demands for total evacuation within a year.

I may add here in parenthesis that we have also been discussing the question of the future of the Sudan with the Egyptians and have tried to formulate certain principles to which both we and they could subscribe, but again we have reached deadlock over the Egyptian insistence on the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, whatever the wishes of the Sudanese may be. It is our view that these wishes must be the decisive factor on this aspect.

On the 6th August the Egyptian Foreign Minister in a speech in the Senate declared that he considered that negotiations between us were now closed. He chose as the pretext for this my own speech in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 30th July, in which I had been at particular pains to express our desire for co-operation with Egypt on the basis of equality and partnership.[2] In these circumstances, we must reckon on the possibility that, despite the efforts we have made, the next step by the Egyptians may be the unilateral denunciation of the 1936 Treaty.

Meanwhile, we are trying to work out, with your Government's agreement, the organisation of an Allied Middle East Command. Apart altogether from the general desirability of such an organisation, on which I think we are agreed, I personally am most anxious that the setting up of this Command should afford us an opportunity of a new approach to the Egyptians. If we had to leave Egypt, not only would the establishment of the proposed Allied Command be of little practical value but the effect on the Turks might be most unsettling; apart from this, it is surely in all our interests to see if we cannot offer to Egypt a settlement of the political problems which any reasonable person could hardly reject. The details of the proposed Command, and of the manner in which Egypt should be associated with it, are at present under study. What, however, I have in mind is that the headquarters of the Command should be located in Egypt, provided the latter agrees, and that Egypt should be offered a special position within the Command itself. We are also considering whether the proposals which we have already made to the Egyptian Government could be modified in any way in order to fit in with this conception.

So far I have said little about the divergencies between us. Indeed, I hope that on reading this statement of our views, you will think that they do not amount to much. But if there is anything that you disagree with here, or any suggestion which you have to make, I do hope that you will not hesitate to say so.

The plain fact is that we cannot afford to leave Egypt entirely, and I can assure you that no British Government, of whatever complexion, could offer to do so and hope to remain in office. We cannot afford to leave Egypt, because we need her, and we need her not only for ourselves, but for all of us who are determined to resist any attack upon our way of life. If the Egyptians will recognise the fact, so much the better; but if not, we and they will have to take the consequences of our remaining nonetheless. It is difficult to foresee exactly what those consequences may be, but whatever they are, they can hardly be worse than the abandonment of our essential requirements in Egypt and loss of control of the land bridge to Africa. Moreover, there is at least a chance, in my view, that if we show a firm and united front, while demonstrating our willingness to meet the reasonable wishes of

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[2] Extracts of Morrison's July 30 remarks in the House of Commons and of oreign Minister Salaheddin's speech to the Egyptian Senate of August 6, to-ether with a subsequent exchange of notes between Morrison and Egyptian rime Minister Nahas Pasha, dated August 17 and 26, respectively, are printed *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1951, pp. 455–462.

Egypt, the consequences of a refusal to withdraw may not be so very terrible after all.

In any case, in facing these facts I should like to feel able to count upon American support, both as regards working out now one more line of approach to the Egyptians, and if that fails, in resisting all attempts to dislodge us, whether they be made in the Security Council of the United Nations or elsewhere.

I should, however, be much worried if the Egyptians got the impression (as did the Persians in the earlier days of the present oil discussions)[3] that the United States was against us and could be relied upon, therefore, to side with them against the British. Such an impression would give us all the maximum of trouble.

Perhaps we may talk about all this in Washington,[4] but I wanted you to know of my views meantime. I hope also that between now and then it may be possible for these thoughts to be considered in the course of further politico-military talks between our representatives in Washington.[5]

Yours sincerely, HERBERT MORRISON

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[3] Regarding the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, see p. 544.

[4] Reference is to the forthcoming meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, at Washington, September 10–14; for documentation, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1163 ff.

[5] In telegram 956 from London, August 21, marked "Eyes only Secretary," Minister Julius Holmes reported "Strength of Brit feeling on Egyptian defense question, which is revealed in Morrison's note to you, was stressed to me at luncheon yesterday by Slessor, Chief Air Staff, who emphasized firm Brit decision, fully concurred in Brit C[hiefs of] S[taff] and Min Def, to remain in Egypt under 1936 Treaty if no other solution to problem cld be worked out." Holmes added that Slessor had informed him that Morrison's letter was in response to a telegram from Ambassador Franks "reporting a conversation with a Dept official in which latter was quoted as saying that if trouble comes over Egypt UK cannot count on US support." (774.5/8–2151)

641.74/8–2151

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 21, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department is deeply concerned by the recent trend of events in Egypt arising from the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for the revision of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance. In recent weeks Anglo-Egyptian relations have deteriorated considerably and the negotiations have reached an impasse with dangerous potentialities. Both sides appear to be in entrenched positions. Unless one of the parties breaks the deadlock by shifting positions, it is the Department's opinion that the intensity of public feeling and opinion in Egypt may soon force the Egyptian Government to adopt certain measures, possibly including the unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty, which will make further negotiations with the UK difficult, if not impossible.[3]

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[1] Drafted by Wells Stabler; cleared in draft with Bonbright of EUR, BNA, Cabot of S/ISA, S/P, and S/S.

The Department is fully aware of the great importance which is attached by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the present British position in Egypt. The Department will continue to make every effort to assist the UK in maintaining this position. However, the question poses itself whether insistence by the UK on the maintenance of its present position beyond that period to which Egypt is willing to acquiesce (estimated to be about 18 months) would render the strategic facilities in Egypt more of a liability than an asset in peacetime and raise serious problems in connection with their employment in wartime.

In view of the situation which now exists between Egypt and the UK, the Department believes that a reassessment should be made of the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the importance to the US of the maintenance of the present British troop strength and bases in Egypt, both under present conditions and conditions of war.

In this connection the following questions would appear to arise on which the views of the Department of Defense are of the highest importance:

(1) What is the relative strategic importance attached to the maintenance of present British troop strength in Egypt and the maintenance of base facilities?

(2) Does the Department of Defense believe that:

(*a*) All of the combat troops could be withdrawn during peacetime if some arrangement could be worked out for the retention of at least a nucleus of the base facilities? Or:

(*b*) If not all, how many combat troops could be withdrawn?

(3) Does the Department of Defense attach great importance to the British proposal for Joint Anglo-Egyptian Air Defense?

(4) Could General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, be moved from Fayid to some location outside of Egypt without prejudicing strategic planning or its operational efficiency in peace?

(5) Bearing in mind 1) the possibility that, irrespective of what plan may be devised, at least some British combat troops may have to leave Egypt and 2) the US position regarding the admission of Turkey to NATO prior to decisive action on the ME Command Structure, could the US at the proper time support a British approach to Egypt along the lines of UK-French-US-Turkish cooperation with Egypt on defense problem?

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[3] In telegram 216 from Cairo, August 18, Caffery had reported that the Egyptian Government had determined to abrogate the 1936 Treaty before the next speech from the throne by King Farouk. In telegram 249, August 25, from Cairo, Caffery added that "actual abrogation declaration will probably be made late October." (641.74/8-1851 and 8-2551)

(6) What would the attitude of the Defense Department be towards British military action against Egyptians to retain British troops and base rights in Egypt in peacetime?

(7) Having in mind the rejected British proposals of April 1951, suggesting UK-Egyptian defense cooperation, can the Department of Defense make concrete suggestions regarding feasible British concessions with regard to troops and bases which might satisfy the Egyptian demand for evacuation in 18 months and yet make possible the maintenance of essential base facilities in a state of readiness for immediate use on outbreak of hostilities?

I shall appreciate it if you would have urgent attention directed to this matter in order that I may have the views of the Defense Department prior to my discussions with Mr. Morrison on September 10.[3]

Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State:
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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[3] Reference is to the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, at Washington, September 10–14; for documentation, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1163 ff.

641.74/9–451

Memorandum by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley), to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 29 August 1951.

Subject: Importance of the British Military Position in Egypt

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 23 August 1951,[2] the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following views on the matters raised in the letter from the Secretary of State to you dated 21 August 1951.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it to be of extreme importance to the preservation of peace and security in the Middle East as well as the preservation of world peace that the Western Powers have access to certain strategic facilities in Egypt. Because of United States commitments in other areas, it is in the United States interest that the United Kingdom continue to have primary military responsibility in Egypt.

3. In regard to maintaining the present British position in Egypt, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a continuation of this position is of very great importance to the United States. Accordingly, if

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[1] Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Acting Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett on September 4 with a covering note indicating that the source text was in response to the letter of August 21 from Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews (*supra*) and that Lovett concurred in the views herein expressed.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

acceptable to the United Kingdom, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States support politically the United Kingdom in the enjoyment of:

a. The right to maintain strategic facilities in Egypt during peacetime in such condition that they could be effectively and speedily used in the event of immediate threat to the security of the Middle East; and

b. The right of re-entry in order to make full use of these facilities.

4. Current intelligence estimates indicate the following British force deployments in Egypt:

[Here follows a detailed list of British force deployments in Egypt.]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it would be both unsound and inappropriate for them to attempt an estimate relative to British requirements for specific numbers of armed forces for facilities in Egypt. It should be pointed out, however, that in peacetime the numbers of armed forces at any important facility seldom are adequate for emergency or war purposes. Under the terms of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance between Egypt and the United Kingdom, the British are limited to land forces not to exceed 10,000 and air forces not to exceed 400 pilots, together with the necessary ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that this number of combat personnel is obviously insufficient for emergency or war purposes.

6. In consonance with the foregoing, the responses of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the first three questions raised in the letter from the Under Secretary of State are:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff attach very great importance to the British maintaining their base facilities in Egypt;

b. The British must maintain troops at most of their facilities in Egypt if Egyptian bases are to be available immediately and in condition for possible use by the United States and the United Kingdom in the event of war or emergency. From the military point of view, this constitutes an over-riding consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, could not agree to the stripping of Egyptian bases of their operating personnel to the point where the bases would be militarily reduced to caretaker status;

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the British proposals of 5 April 1951 which were rejected by the Egyptian Government. At that time the British offered to phase out their combat troops over a five-year period beginning late in 1951, provided the base at Fayid remained under leasehold with some 3,500 British civilians retained as maintenance personnel and with Egyptian troops to guard it. It can be inferred from this offer that the British might still find it possible to reduce their armed forces in Egypt if appropriate arrangements for maintaining their base facilities there could be assured. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that any decision on this matter must rest with the British who undoubtedly will relate it to the circumstances existing at the time; and

d. From the strictly military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not attach importance to any air defense arrangement in Egypt which includes the utilization of Egyptian troops except as such an arrangement may be of assistance in making the retention of British troops in Egypt acceptable to the Government of Egypt.

7. Removal of General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, from Fayid to some location outside of Egypt would not necessarily prejudice strategic planning, but it might be prejudicial to operational efficiency in peace. In any event, Egypt is within the area of primary military responsibility of the British and decision on this matter should properly rest with them.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to United States political support of a British approach to Egypt along the lines of U.K.-French-U.S.-Turkish cooperation. They believe it possible that the Egyptians might be more amenable to such a combined approach. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, would have serious objection to such an approach if it involved any commitment of United States forces or interference in any manner with the military command of Middle East forces, either in or outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

9. Unless world opinion were first marshalled against the Egyptians, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it would be highly detrimental to United States military interests in the Middle East for the British to take military action against the Egyptians in peacetime in order to retain British base rights there. This view is not to be construed as denying British armed forces their inherent right of self-defense against local attacks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United Nations is the proper organ to undertake in the first instance such a marshalling of opinion, particularly in view of the provisions of Articles 8 and 16 of the Treaty of Alliance of 1936 between Egypt and the United Kingdom. Once world opinion has been marshalled, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that if no suitable arrangement can be achieved with the Egyptians, the United States might support politically the British in such defensive action in Egypt as may be required as a result of Egyptian unilateral abrogation of this treaty.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the British should not be offered gratuitously concrete suggestions regarding feasible British military concessions. However, if requested by the British, the following suggestions as a basis for discussion might be used:

a. The British might consider some reduction in the ancillary military personnel for administration and technical duties (or, possibly, in the light of their April proposal to the Egyptians, some reduction of their combat forces). If this action were accompanied by extensive publicity at the time of the departure of the British troops it might have a beneficial effect on the Egyptian-British relations. If it becomes necessary, it might be possible, at a later date, to replace certain of this ancillary personnel with personnel not in uniform;

b. As an inducement the British might offer to assist Egypt in the event of general hostilities in the air defense of certain areas important to the Egyptian Government; and

c. Consideration might be given to garrisoning the Egyptian bases with combined forces to include reduced British and increased Egyptian forces, together with forces of other Mediterranean nations. In this connection it should be made clear that the United States will not commit any United States forces to Egypt in time of peace.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY

Conference Files : Lot 59 D 95 : "US–UK Talks, Wash 9/51, Background Book Egypt"

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison)[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1951.

Thank you for ur ltr of Aug 15, 1951,[2] on the subj of Anglo-Egypt relations, which I have studied with care. We share your concern over the possible repercussions of the present impasse and the dangers of some precipitate action by the Egypt Govt such as the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Egypt. I shall be prepared to discuss this problem with you in our forthcoming talks.

I want to tell you at this time, however, that I was especially struck by the remarks in ur ltr concerning the ME command. It seems to me that the most likely way of solving the difficulties with Egypt wld be, as you suggest, through some form of internationalization f the Suez Canal bases under ME command arrangements which night draw Egypt into the picture in a special position. Such a position might give the Egypt Govt and people a considerable measure f satisfaction of their sensibilities and at the same time bring them realize that they must bear their share of responsibility for protectg the ME against potential Sov aggression. Additionally, if Egypt ld embrace this concept, it wld go far towards creating a healthier mosphere in both of our relations with other NE States.

In anticipation of our talks, it will be valuable for us to have the ults of the exchange of views on this subj between our reps now

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Drafted by Coe of BNA, cleared with Berry and Jones of NEA and with nd EUR. Transmitted to London in telegram 1263 of August 30 with the inction that it be conveyed to Morrison.

nte, p. 372.

tentatively scheduled for Sept 4–8 in Wash.[3] Perhaps ur reps can make clearer to us what you have in mind in the way of making the new command arrangement the vehicle for the retention of base rights in Egypt.

I may add that I am looking forward very much to ur visit and to an exchange of views with you on this and the many other problems facing the world.

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[3] See editorial note, p. 383.

641.74/9–151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 1, 1951—1 p. m.

313. During call on McGhee Aug 30 Egypt Amb discussed Anglo-Egypt problem and referring recent exchanges between Morrison and Nahas expressed hope acceptable proposals wld soon be made by UK. Amb said he ready fly Cairo shld anything concrete result from Secy–Morrison mtgs.[2]

McGhee reiterated our view this problem principally Anglo-Egypt and stressed need for continuation negots. He made clear US wld view with disfavor unilateral act by Egypt abrogate 1936 Treaty. McGhee then in most general way indicated consideration being given to possibility some multilateral arrangement to replace bilateral framework Anglo-Egypt defense. Nothing definite yet worked out and US not in position this time be more precise. In response to query re Amer participation such arrangement McGhee said "US giving serious thought." He emphasized US support admission Turk, Greece to NATO[3] and MSP[4] as tangible evidences US concern defense NE area. Amb expressed interest and recalled he had originally suggested such approach as solution Anglo-Egypt problem. He assumed that such multilateral arrangement wld mean evacuation Brit troops. McGhee replied it wld seem mistake to weaken defense arrangements by such evacuation since Egypt forces not present in position assume responsibility. Amb inquired re possible Israel participation in broader arrangement and McGhee expressed hope Israel in due course cld be brought into ME defense arrangement. Amb expressed view this extremely difficult if not impossible at present.

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[1] Drafted and transmitted by Stabler. Cleared by Moore of GTI and by S/S. Repeated to London.

[2] Reference is to the forthcoming meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, at Washington, September 10–14; for documentation, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1163 ff.

[3] For documentation on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, see *ibid.*, pp. 460 ff.

[4] For documentation on the formulation of the Mutual Security Program, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff. For documentation on proposed aid to the Arab states and Israel under the Mutual Security Program, see pp. 1 ff.

McGhee again stressed that no decisions had been taken re such developments, but possibility existed re broadening framework present defense arrangements.

FYI only. Turk Amb was also informed in gen terms re possibility multilateral arrangement and he discussed question later on own initiative with Egypt Amb. He reported latter receptive but determined that Brit troops shld be replaced by others.

Unless FonMin queries you re Amb conversation with McGhee, you shld not discuss above with him at this time.

WEBB

Editorial Note

British civil and military officials, led by Under Secretary of State Sir Reginald Bowker and Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot, came to Washington September 5–8 for talks on the Anglo-Egyptian problem with members of the Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Three papers were agreed upon as a basis for the forthcoming bipartite talks between Acheson and Morrison and the tripartite meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, at Washington, September 10–14. They were: Proposals to Egypt on its Participation in the Middle East Command; Proposed Timetable for Approach to Egypt and Turkey on the Middle East Command; The Sudan. (telegram 338 to Cairo, September 8, 641.74/9–851) No record of these meetings has been found in Department of State files. The text of the paper entitled "Proposals to Egypt on its Participation in ME Command" was sent to the Embassy in Turkey in telegram 182 of September 8 (same as telegram 339, page 181), the text of the paper entitled "Proposed Timetable for Approach to Turkey and Egypt" was sent to the Embassy in Turkey in telegram 183 of September 8 (page 182). The agreed paper on the Sudan is printed *infra*. For subsequent discussions on the Middle East Command and Egypt at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, at Washington, September 10–14, see volume III, part 1, pages 1163 ff.

Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: "Wash For Min Mtg—Position Papers"

Agreed United States–United Kingdom Paper[1]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1951.

THE SUDAN

In discussing the defence problem the Conference took particular account of Conclusion (H) of the Joint Appreciation prepared by the United Kingdom and the United States Ambassadors at Alexandria[2] to the effect

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[1] See editorial note, *supra*.

> "no Egyptian Government would be ready to enter into a defence agreement without a simultaneous settlement of the Sudan question".

The Conference also took account of the consequential recommendations No. IV, V and VI of the Joint Appreciation as follows:

> IV. Renewed consideration should be given to the possibility of according public recognition to the legal and constitutional status of the Egyptian Crown in regard to the Sudan.
>
> V. An early date should be fixed for the attainment of self-government by the Sudan and the principle of self-determination for the Sudanese should be maintained.
>
> VI. Further thought should be given to the possibility of an international guarantee of an Egypto-Sudanese Nile Waters agreement.

The United Kingdom representative pointed out that it was the considered view of the Governor General of the Sudan that the Sudanese make no distinction between the public recognition of the legal and constitutional status of the Egyptian Crown in regard to the Sudan and recognition of Egyptian sovereignty implying the establishment of Egyptian rule. Mr. Bowker went on to say that for this reason he thought it must be accepted as a fact that to attempt now to make some public recognition of the legal and constitutional status of the Egyptian Crown in regard to the Sudan would cause grave disturbances in the Sudan and was impracticable.

The Conference took note of this view but felt that some move with regard to the Sudan is an essential element in the success of proposals about the Command.[3] They therefore considered what other steps could be taken to try to meet Egyptian aspirations over the Sudan. It was pointed out that apart from Egypt's wish for purposes of prestige to establish a constitutional link between Egypt and the Sudan her main preoccupation was the fear that the British were trying to use their position in the Sudan to insure that the Sudan should ultimately be separated from Egypt and to exercise their influence with the Sudanese to that effect. It was agreed that the line which might be best presented as offering satisfactory safeguards to Egypt in this respect was to suggest the appointment of a United Nations or other international commission, on which Egypt would be represented, whose functions would be to keep a watch on constitutional developments in the Sudan and make recommendations on the manner in which the Sudanese should ultimately choose their international status. The commission would be charged specifically with the task of watching the interests both of the Sudanese and Egyptians. It was thought that such a suggestion would at the same time provide the Egyptians with the means of ensuring that their own essential interests were not prejudiced during the final stages of the Sudan's constitutional development and also provide Egypt with an acceptable way of relaxing her present insistence on immediate public recognition of the constitutional position of the Egyptian Crown in regard to the Sudan.

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[2] Reference is to an undated 19-page Joint Intelligence Estimate agreed to by the American and British Embassies in Cairo, not printed. Two copies of this document were transmitted to the Department of State by Ambassador Caffery in despatch 505 from Cairo, August 28, and are in Department file 641.74/8-2851.

[3] Reference is to the Middle East Command.

It was recommended that this suggestion should be accompanied by a reiteration of the United Kingdom's readiness to consider a statement of agreed principles in regard to the Sudan on the lines already put forward in the United Kingdom Ambassador's recent talks with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and to consider some form of international guarantee of an Egypto-Sudanese Nile Waters Agreement on the lines of Recommendation VI of the Joint Appreciation. This might possibly be associated with the formulation of a Nile Valley development authority for which the International Bank might if necessary be asked to provide some financial assistance.

The Conference thought that there would be a considerable advantage in aiming at the possibility of fixing an early date for the attainment of self-government by the Sudan.

The Conference thought that the Egyptians would put themselves in a weak position in regard to international opinion if they were to refuse proposals of this kind and, that provided the new approach on the defence issue were presented in a sufficiently attractive form, there was reason to hope that the Egyptians would hesitate to risk a complete deadlock owing to their attitude over the Sudan.

It was agreed that consideration would be given to any possible further steps which might go some way towards meeting the Egyptian position on the Sudan with the objective of eliminating it as an obstacle to agreement on the defence issue e.g. perhaps the appointment of a "neutral" Governor General.

1.74/9–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

OP SECRET CAIRO, September 18, 1951—8 p. m.

338. Gallad came to see me last night to talk about situation facing ing on his recent return. King is not pleased with way govt has

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Repeated to London. A handwritten note on the margin reads: "S: repeating Ottawa. Rptd Ankara 9/19."

handled Brit negots nor is he satisfied with their handling of internal situation, charges of corruption in govt circles, etc. For that reason has not yet recd Prime Minister but will probably receive him today or tomorrow. All Egypt know and applaud govt's decision to abrogate treaty and they knew that if this is not done it will be King who prevents it. Therefore, His Majesty says that much as he dislikes it, unless Brit can come up soon with some new acceptable proposal, he will be forced to let govt go ahead with abrogation. To do otherwise wld involve dismissing govt, dissolving Parliament and ruling by military force.

Gallad asked my opinion as to what he shld advise King. I counseled him to advise King to insist with Prime Minister that nothing be done about abrogating treaty until Morrison has time to come forward with something new.

"How long will that be?" asked Gallad. "I do not know", said I, "but say couple of weeks". Gallad said he wld counsel His Majesty to that effect.

Gallad observed that Prime Minister himself is not particularly pleased with situation into which he has been led by his Min FonAff but he can do nothing about it. Min FonAff is only really popular man in govt and furthermore, has practically entire nation behind him. Min FonAff wld be far more dangerous out govt than in govt.

Gallad added, "I must warn you that if Morrison's proposals are not acceptable His Majesty will be unable prevent abrogation of treaty although in any event, he will do his best." [2]

CAFFERY

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[2] In telegram 1477 from London, September 21, Minister Holmes reported that Ambassador Stevenson in Cairo was about "to deliver personal msg from Morrison to Nahas Pasha which says little new but again tries to encourage Egypt patience." Holmes added that Morrison "will make special point, since King has evidenced interest, of necessary consultation with Turkey prior presentation [Middle East Command] proposals to Egypt." (641.74/9-2151) In telegram 355 from Cairo, September 22, Caffery reported that Stevenson had delivered the Morrison message to Nahas who had replied that he must have something before the month's end. Stevenson then suggested that Nahas simply tell the Egyptian Parliament "that new and interesting proposals forthcoming requiring careful study and that govt wld discuss at next session Parliament in Nov." Nahas had replied that this was impossible "as he wld be 'shouted down.'" (641.74/9-2251) Caffery further informed the Secretary of State in telegram 364 from Cairo, September 25, that in a conference with Stevenson the previous day, King Farouk had made it clear "that he is 'on the spot': public opinion solidly backs the Cabinet and demands early abrogation of the treaty and if there is any change in the Egyptian attitude it will be quite clear that it is the King who has brought it about." Farouk expressed interest in the forthcoming Command proposals, "but said, 'whatever you do it is essential to do it quickly. I can not continue to hold them on the leash for two or three weeks more.'" (641.74/9-2551)

641.74/9–2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 24, 1951—5 p. m.

424. Deptel 338 Sept 8 [*18*].[2] Re Sudan paper Sept 8[3] agreed during Dept–FonOff talks and discussed Sept 10 by Secy and Morrison.[4]

Brit Emb rep gave Dept Sept 20 fol FonOff comments on points in ref paper:

1. FonOff believed it undesirable establish UN comm. Internatl comm, not operating under UN aegis, preferable as wld provide greater latitude choice membership which might include UK, Egypt, Sudan, US, and possibly "neutral" member. FonOff viewed comm as extension Tripartite Comm proposed by UK to Egypt in June. Some question whether comm shld begin work in near future or be established only at time self-govt elections.
2. FonOff agreeable renewal offer to Egypt of statement of principles.
3. Internatl guarantee Nile Waters Agreement and estab Nile Valley Development Authority desirable, but no thought yet given their formulation or relationship.
4. While UK wld not stand in way self-govt Sudan, fixing definite date most difficult. UK wld contemplate statement soon indicating attainment self-govt Sudan early date Brit aim. Self-govt wld be subject certain safeguards, i.e., advisors and guarantees to South Sudan against possible exploitation by north.
5. Neutral Governor Gen impossible as wld be breach UK pledge not change status Sudan without consulting Sudanese. Sudan civil servants, Brit and Sudanese, wld object serving under neutral Governor.

On Sept 22 Dept informed Brit Emb as fols:

1. US has no objection UK putting Sudan proposals to Egypt as matter concern only UK, Egypt, and Sudan.
2. US does not believe UK proposals re Sudan go far enough to be of any help in securing Egypt cooperation in MEC.
3. In view (2) US must revert to previous position that it does not have substantive position on Sudan. US will, therefore, be unable associate itself with UK on Sudan question as we had originally hoped, although we wld be willing support with Egypt Govt separability base question and Sudan.
4. If present UK proposals shld prove unacceptable to Egypt and appear as stumbling block for estab MEC, we hope UK will have ready second and more liberal set of proposals which might be put forward.

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[1] Drafted by Stabler, transmitted by G. Lewis Jones, cleared with S/S. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Paris.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] *Ante*, p. 383.

[4] For information concerning the bilateral conversations between Acheson and Morrison, see the editorial note, *ibid.*

5. Notwithstanding above and subject consideration detailed proposals US favorably disposed in principle render assistance re internatl guarantee Nile Waters Agreement and estab Nile Valley Development Authority on condition parties concerned desire US participation.

In response to query whether Dept wished to make further suggestions, Dept said UK in better position determine extent proposals and pointed to last para Sudan paper which stressed necessity eliminating Sudan as obstacle to agreement on defense issue.

ACHESON

641.74/9–2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, September 27, 1951—8 p. m.

375. Deptel 423, Sept 24.[2] Minister Foreign Affairs after recounting at some length reasons why Egyptian Govt must go ahead at once with abrogation 1936 treaty and referring to local press attacks on alleged Anglo-American plans for East Mediterranean finally agreed that he wld endeavor to hold off for say ten days.

Minister Foreign Affairs observed he cordially welcomed our hospitable interest in this question. He said he wld at once inform Prime Minister of this. If I had taken this matter up with Prime Minister rather than Foreign Minister I wld have recd from Prime Minister various declarations of good will but nothing else. He wld have taken no decision on this without consulting his Minister Foreign Affairs.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Not printed; it requested Caffery to seek an early opportunity to speak to Prime Minister Nahas Pasha and/or Foreign Minister Salaheddin in order to express the hope that no precipitate action would be taken by the Egyptian Government "which wld make difficult calm and considered deliberation new proposals" regarding the MEC (641.74/9–2351).

641.74/9–3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, September 30, 1951—midnight.

387. I saw the King this afternoon. He began conversation by complaining somewhat bitterly about continued attacks against him in American press. He said he was "fed up" and although he understood the reasons for the replies made by officials to his Ambassador in

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[1] Repeated to London and Ankara.

Washington the replies made him feel no better about the campaign which he felt was being waged against him.

Then we talked about Brit negots. I told him merely that we were sincerely and earnestly trying to find way out; that he must give us a little time and that we hope to come up with something soon. I mentioned briefly French and Turks. He said that he warmly welcome our entrance into the ring; without us nothing wld or cld be done.

"You are the only ones who can put it over", he remarked.

I asked if he cld hold off abrogation until we come up with something. He said, "I can hold it off for a brief space more but not for long; and you know why. Also you know my situation and the situation of my govt. I cannot set myself in opposition to the whole country and in this instance the whole country is of the same mind as the govt; although Nahas is old and his mind does not work as well as it did. MinFonAff is young and impulsive and also has other drawbacks, and when I returned he thought I was going to ask for his resignation. I told him I wld ask for nothing of the kind that I did not want him to resign. He is partly responsible for existing situation and he must see it through. If I broke with him I wld stir up a veritable hornets nest, and I do not like hornets.

"If you come up with something that I conscientiously believe my fatherland can accept the govt will accept it too. There is no worry on that score. But it must be something I can conscientiously accept and it must come soon. I am above all a patriotic Egyptian and rest assured that I am not going to accept anything which I consider to be against my country's interest. In any event you must step on it and come out with it soon, and I mean soon.

"I will tell you indiscreetly that I have told the govt that they can go ahead to prepare papers which will be required for abrogating treaty and for taking care of ensuing situation if your proposals are not good enough, but I hope it will never be necessary to use them".

I asked him if we shld bring proposals to him before we communicated them to the govt. He said "it is a question in my own mind. You might let me know quietly when you have something definite and I shall tell you what to do.

"You know because I have told you already that I am wholeheartedly on side of the west and in case of war you can count on me. Having that in mind do not do anything to weaken my position. If I am strong enough I can help you, but if I am weak, I won't be able to help you at all".

In closing he remarked that he did not want any major changes in the govt at this juncture and for that reason he had sanctioned only the two now well known shifts and the two new minor appointments.

CAFFERY

641.74/10-851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, October 8, 1951—7:14 p. m.

521. Brit Emb Oct 7 informed Dept Brit Cab has approved fol "new proposals" to Egypt Govt re Sudan:

[Here follow the "new proposals", which included an International Commission resident in but not governing over the Sudan, a Joint Anglo-Egyptian statement of common principles, an international guarantee of the Nile Waters Agreement, establishment of a Development Authority for the Nile, and an agreed date for attainment of self-government by the Sudan.]

Although Stevenson has been instructed hold line re separability Sudan and MEC ques, he has been authorized produce above proposals at time he considers appropriate.

Brit Emb stated FonOff "greatly hopes US will actively support UK in keeping Sudan and Defense issues separate and will support (above) positive proposals to Egypt."

While we believe UK has made effort to move further toward Egypt position, particularly in relation to internatl comm (Deptel 424, Sept 24),[2] we still consider it wld be inadvisable for US to associate itself with UK in presentation substantive proposals re Sudan to Egypt Govt. At same time we wld not wish our silence re substance Sudan ques to cause difficulty vis-à-vis MEC approach. Consequently, you shld from outset strongly support with Egypt Govt separability Sudan and MEC issues and our belief these two ques shld be decided separately on own merits. Time factor different between MEC and Sudan: first is urgent for defense NE and free world; second is evolutionary problem in which solid results best achieved by patient and unhurried deliberation. In addition you authorized make fol points:

1. US has been informed by UK of its proposal to Egypt re Sudan and we are confident Egypt Govt will wish to give them same serious and earnest consideration which we are sure were given to their formulation. We feel that with mutual goodwill and understanding solution adequately guaranteeing interests of all parties concerned can be developed. Fact we are unable comment substantively is because we are not in position, as are UK and Egypt, form independent judgment on complex factors involved.

2. If asked re US participation in internatl comm, you shld say that at request parties US wld give matter consideration.

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[1] Drafted by Stabler, transmitted and initialed by Jones. Repeated operation priority to Ankara, London, and Paris.

[2] *Ante*, p. 387.

You shld concert with UK colleague re timing ur approach to Egypt Govt on Sudan.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

At its Seventh Session at Ottawa in September 1951 the North Atlantic Council recommended the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. President Truman promptly cabled Turkish President Bayar proposing preliminary conversations between Turkish and United States officials regarding the possible establishment of a Middle East Command. In transmitting this message, Ambassador Wadsworth asked President Bayar if Turkey would be willing to join the United States and United Kingdom in urging on Egypt acceptance of an invitation to participate as a founding member of the MEC. On September 25, Wadsworth reported that President Bayar would welcome the visit of an informal group to study the possible establishment of the MEC and warmly accepted the invitation to join the United States and United Kingdom in approaching Egypt at an early date regarding membership in the Middle East Command. However, the proposed tripartite invitation to Egypt waited upon the despatch to Ankara of a three-man military mission headed by General Bradley and including British Field Marshal Slim and French General Lecheres which was to discuss the proposed MEC with Turkish officials. This mission did not reach Turkey until October 13, by which date the Egyptian Government had formally abrogated the 1899 and 1936 Treaties with the United Kingdom regarding the Sudan and Suez. (See despatch 921 from Cairo, October 9, *infra.*) British, American, and Turkish officials, joined by the French, determined to press the MEC invitation upon Egypt, and it was formally tendered on October 13. The Egyptian Government formally rejected the invitation on October 15. For documentation regarding the formulation of the MEC invitation to Egypt and Egypt's rejection of the invitation, see pages 1 ff.

641.74/10-951 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

CAIRO, October 9, 1951.

SECRET

No. 921

Ref: Embassy despatch 911 of October 9, 1951[2]

Subject: First twenty-four hours in Egypt after Prime Minister's abrogation speech

The address of Prime Minister Mustapha El Nahas Pasha in Parliament announcing the introduction of four laws in Parliament annulling the Egyptian acceptances of the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936[3] began just twenty-four hours ago at 6 p. m. on October 8, 1951. It lasted one hour and twenty minutes and was heard by an at first surprised and then almost hysterically delighted personal and radio audience of Senators, Deputies, newspapermen, and, incidentally, the people of Egypt.

When the speech had reached its close: "For the sake of Egypt I signed the 1936 Treaty and for the sake of Egypt I call on you today to abrogate it"; bedlam broke out in the Parliament. Representatives of each of the Opposition parties called for and received the floor to shout wholehearted support of the Government's action. The emotions of the moment were as irrational as the actions which the Prime Minister recommended, but there was no doubt then, and there has not been since, that regardless of the consequences and with no heed to the future, articulate Egypt was behind the Prime Minister to a man.

Throughout the evening of October 8, 1951, correspondents and political analysts were fully occupied, rejoicing, hailing, and prognosticating. Unlike the United States where this process would have occurred in full public view and hearing over television and radio hook-ups, in Egypt it was a front parlour experience—and almost any front parlour would do. Lights were burning most of the night in Political Clubs where in the midst of their enthusiasm Opposition leaders may well have been asking themselves if they had not been a little hasty in embracing a full scale unity behind the Wafd. More than one experienced politician pointed out privately the smoothness with which Nahas Pasha had silenced any possible Opposition criticism by including representatives of every party in the Parliamentary Committee established to study the proposed laws. Participating in that Committee they could certainly not withstand the emotionalism of the moment to do other than vote for the laws. At the same time, once they had voted for them the Opposition Parties stood with the Wafd, jointly responsible for whatever might next develop.

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[1] Copies to London, Paris, Moscow, Ankara, Tehran, Tripoli, and the Arab capitals.

[2] Not printed.

[3] The complete translated text of the statement in Parliament by Prime Minister Nahas Pasha, Monday, October 8, along with the translated text of the four draft decree laws annuling Egyptian acceptance of the 1899 Condominium Agreement and the 1936 Defense Treaty are in the Green Book issued by Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled *Records of Conversations, Notes and Papers Exchanged Between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom Government (March 1950–November 1951)*, Cairo, 1951, pp. 167–179.

A representative group of reasonably objective observers happened to be dining on the night of October 8 at the home of the Public Affairs Officer, Mr. Robert Payne. This group included Dr. Abbas Ammar of the Ministry of Social Affairs; Sami Simaika Bey, Director of the Press Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mohamed Heykal, of the Opposition Akhbar Al Yom; Sami Suki of the United Press; Dr. Salah Al 'Abd, of the Fuad University School of Social Work; prominent engineer, Niaza Mustafa Bey; journalist, Dr. Fuad Sarruf, and others. The majority of the group came directly to Mr. Payne's house from the Parliament meeting.

The immediate consensus of the group was the finality of the Prime Minister's address and in particular the irrevocable nature of the assumption by the Government for the King of the title "King of Egypt and the Sudan". From this consensus divergence arose at once as to the real meaning of the address. The most "Westernized" of the group maintained that this was in fact a "beginning of real Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and relations" while those inclined to be a little more independent in their thinking argued heatedly that to all intent and purposes negotiations between Egypt and Great Britain were now at a complete end and that all that remained was to implement with courage the decisions which had been taken. The group which maintained that the "door is now open" and that the Egyptian people would now feel free to negotiate from strength rather than weakness with anyone whom they chose, including the British, was led by Sami Simaika Bey, Sami Suki and Dr. Abbas Ammar. On the other side were the articulate Mohamed Heykal, Dr. Salah Al 'Abd and Niaza Mustafa Bey.

Interestingly enough, when the conversation swung to the Sudan there was a noticeable realignment of the groups. Sami Suki was of the opinion that the Sudanese would be very pleased by the speech and would rally to Egypt's side. Mohamed Heykal, however, maintained that they would do no such thing. He argued that the Sudan has a better government with less corruption today than Egypt has and that it has "nothing to gain and everything to lose" from a closer association with Egypt. He said that Egypt only takes from the Sudan and gives nothing.

Demonstrations

Immediately following the demonstration within Parliament there was a comparative lull in Cairo while the above "inventory taking" was going on. Early in the morning of October 9, 1951, however, sporadic demonstrations began. They continued throughout the morning to a climax around noon in large crowds at the railroad station to cheer the Prime Minister on his departure for Alexandria.

Demonstrators carried Egyptian flags and banners with slogans such as: "Long Live King of Egypt and the Sudan!" "Long Live Nahas, Hero of Independence!"; and, more ominously: "Get Out of Our Country!" Among slogans shouted was heard: "Long Live Mussadeq[4] and Nahas!"

After touring the main streets demonstrators went to the Abdin Palace Square where they gathered to shout: "Long Live the King of Egypt and the Sudan!" From the Palace they proceeded to the Prime Minister's house where they cheered the Prime Minister "Hero of Independence!" They then moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cheer Mohamed Salaheddin Pasha. To pay tribute to the late Saad Zaghloul Pasha, demonstrators visited his mausoleum and laid wreaths of flowers and recited the opening chapter of the Koran. Press sources estimated that demonstrators in Cairo during the day totalled in the neighborhood of 60,000. This is undoubtedly an exaggerated figure and reflects more onlookers than demonstrators.

The police forces were alerted throughout the day, concentrated particularly on the protection of the approaches to the British and American Embassies. On the whole the demonstrations were reasonably well handled and appeared motivated more by jubilant feelings of demonstrators than by destructive instincts. How long this might continue to be the case could only be a matter of conjecture of dubious value. The temptation to "settle a few scores" in the burst of nationalistic pride might well carry the demonstrations into an entirely different phase.

The only two acts of particular violence which occurred on October 9 were the smashing of a window and a neon sign in the Trans World Airlines office and the rather rough beating received by the driver of a British Embassy car who was so unfortunate as to get the car caught in a crowded street.

On order of the Ministry of Education all government schools in Egypt were closed throughout the day. Despite this fact—or perhaps because of it—students were in little evidence among the demonstrators, most of whom appeared ragged, unorganized and poorly led.

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[4] Mohammad Mosadeq, Prime Minister of Iran.

Editorial Reaction

The unanimously enthusiastic editorial reaction to the speech calling for the abrogation of the Treaty is being reported separately. Additional comment will be submitted from time to time.

Jefferson Caffery

641.74/10-951: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT London, October 9, 1951—3 p. m.

1734. We have just talked to Bowker who has been with Morrison all morning re Egyptian situation. Bowker says Foreign Office regards Nahas' action in presenting legislation to Parliament re defense and Sudan questions to be obvious maneuver calculated to enhance his bargaining position in connection new proposals which Egyptian Government knew would be forthcoming. While Foreign Office recognizes this development constitutes something of set-back re our new approach, it nevertheless does not feel it is fatal nor that we should be deterred from presenting our new proposal. It has noted that decrees have been tabled in form of requests for legislation which reinforces their belief that Egyptians regard this as bargaining gambit. Furthermore, they derive some hope from press reports that Nahas' stated action did not preclude consideration new proposals which UK might advance in near future.

Foreign Office is preparing telegrams to Washington, Paris and Ankara along foregoing lines and expressing hope other parties concerned in quadripartite approach will agree that we should carry on with our present plans. It is also drafting instructions to Stevenson to proceed, provided other powers willing, with approach to King and, almost immediately thereafter, to Egyptian Government, putting proposals in writing with view to publication in event their rejection by Egyptian Government. Bowker indicated Foreign Office attaches importance publication under these circumstances so that their reasonable nature will be apparent to world at large in event UK finds it necessary stand on 1936 treaty.

Foreign Office is also drafting press statement deploring Egyptian Government's taking this action at time when it knew new proposals were about to be put to it. Statement will mention in this connection, recent letter Stevenson addressed to Salah El Din informing him proposals would be put by tenth. Statement will conclude by making plain that UK maintains its position with respect 1936 treaty and

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris for MacArthur, to Ankara, and niact to Cairo.

1899 condominium agreement. (Foreign Office, when we left, still uncertain whether it would say "maintains", "stands by" or "reserves" its position with respect to these agreements.)

Bowker asked for our opinion as to how Department would feel re proceeding with approach. We said we had no way of knowing, but recalled that we have always been worried about weakness of UK proposals on Sudan. We said we felt Nahas' action last night made it more doubtful than ever that proposals which UK prepared to put forward would be adequate to meet situation and therefore underline necessity finding something more positive say on this score. Bowker seemed inclined to agree, adding that Robertson, Chief Secretary Sudan, will be in London within next few days and that although Foreign Office has not yet received text of decrees introduced by Nahas re Sudan, examination of these while Robertson is here might result in UK being able find some common ground which would permit formulation proposals which would still be acceptable to Sudanese. He emphasized, however, that proposed decree to amend Farouk's title to make him King of Sudan would be unacceptable to Sudanese, implying he did not see how UK could make any concession on this basic question. Bowker suggested that since any re-examination of Sudan proposals would require time, it might be possible tell Egyptians when approach made on MEC that UK has formulated some proposals on Sudan but that it wished re-examine these in light decrees put forward by Nahas.

At end of conversation we asked Bowker what UK would do in event complete stalemate reached with Egypt on defense question. Bowker replied that he could not say with certainty at this time. UK was again looking urgently into question of alternative locations for headquarters and base. If alternative sites found feasible, it would require time to re-locate facilities and it is HMG's intention to stand firm, resting on treaty rights in meantime. If alternative sites not feasible UK would simply stay put.[2]

GIFFORD

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[2] Following a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Attlee, then on an electioneering tour, Morrison issued a statement on the Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 and 1899 treaties late on the afternoon of October 9 which Ambassador Gifford characterized in telegram 1746, niact, from London, as "markedly stronger than that outlined by Bowker earlier today." Gifford added: "Foreign Office tells us Morrison made these changes personally before release 'to season to taste'." (641.74/10-951)

641.74/10-951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, October 9, 1951—8 p. m.

431. In consideration later events we decided Stevenson shld ask see King which he did and was recd today at noon. King said he had signed necessary papers yesterday at noon "with a heavy heart", but that he had no alternative as he cld not stand against whole country. Stevenson asked him why govt had acted as it did. King said: Primarily for domestic political reasons govt action yesterday has recd unanimous applause and govt has gained new life thereby. Secondly to divert nation's mind from corruption in govt and failure of govt to carry out electoral promises, etc. "However" the King added, "you waited too long. I have been warning you constantly that I cld not hold them off indefinitely".

King then referred with some bitterness to incident 32 years ago when Brit prohibited Egypt King to use title of King of Sudan. "That rankled".

Stevenson assured King that Brit wld do nothing provocative and expressed ardent hope that Egyptians wld show restraint. The King assured him that he had given orders to prevent unseemly demonstrations and "incidents". Stevenson said he hoped Egypt Govt wld not attempt, for instance, to cut off food supplies from Brit troops and King said he wld look into that too. Stevenson asked if King had any further opinion or advice to give and he said absolutely none, that he was up in the air as it was.

My own interpretation is that govt all along has wanted to abrogate treaty and had decided in principle some weeks ago to do so, but in view of MinFonAff's promise to me to wait ten days, they waited until the ten days expired, on Sunday last, and then decided to go ahead immed for fear proposals to be presented on Wednesday might be acceptable to King.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris for MacArthur and to London and Ankara. A typed notation on the source text reads: "Read by Mr. Stabler (NE) 11 p.m., 10/9/51."

Editorial Note

On October 10, Secretary Acheson released a statement to the press n which he confirmed the action of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) abrogating the 1899 and 1936 Anglo-Egyptian agreenents regarding the Sudan and Suez, adding:

"None of the agreements in question provides for abrogation. The .S. Government believes that proper respect for international obligations requires that they be altered by mutual agreement rather than by unilateral action of one of the parties. Furthermore, it should be noted that procedures wholly in accord with such respect for international commitments have already been set in motion."

Acheson closed his statement with the observation that new proposals to the Egyptian Government had been formulated over the past several months and "were to be presented to it within the next few days. It is the belief of the United States that a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian question can be found through these proposals." The complete text of Acheson's statement, from which the above excerpts have been taken, is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 22, 1951, page 647.

641.74/10-1251

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [LONDON, October 12, 1951.]

May I say how deeply we in this country appreciated your timely declaration [2] on the situation created by the Egyptian Government's move to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Condominium Agreements of 1899 regarding the Sudan? It is a great comfort to know that the United States are at one with us in appraising a situation which is of critical significance to the whole of the free world.

2. As you know we were determined that the Egyptian Government's action should not be allowed to deflect us from our intention to present to the Egyptian Government the proposals which we had worked out in the fullest consultation with our Allies not only for the settlement of Anglo-Egyptian differences, but for broadening and strengthening the foundations of the defence of the whole of the Middle East region. The support of the United States with that of France and Turkey in presenting these proposals will do more than anything else at the present time to convince Egypt of their value to her and to bring her as we hope she will be brought to play her part with us all in this great task.

3. It may be too much to hope for an early conclusion of a settlement with Egypt on the basis of our proposals. If the atmosphere improves and united firmness by us all is the best means to that end it may be as well that as has already been suggested General Bradley,

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[1] A notation on the source text reads: "Recd from Mr. Greenhill 10/12/51 10:30 p.m. Wells Stabler."

[2] See editorial note, *supra*.

Field Marshal Slim and General Lecheres with a Turkish General should go on from Ankara to Cairo.[3] Given an initial measure of willingness on the Egyptian side they would be able to explain in military terms the full practical implications of our proposals and to answer questions. There would of course be no question of their conducting negotiations.

4. Urgent as it is to complete the arrangements for setting up the Allied Middle East Command it is not our intention that the negotiations with Egypt should be rushed. We are prepared to talk patiently but I ought to make it clear that we have reached in the agreed proposals the limit of concessions we could make regarding the position of British troops and the base. It is also out of the question as I am sure you will agree for us to depart from our undertakings to the peoples of the Sudan. These we publicly re-affirmed on the 11th October.

5. You will have seen that the statement by His Majesty's Government on the 9th October[4] in which they announced that they maintained their full rights under the Treaty and the Condominium Agreements pending a satisfactory agreement with Egypt on the new proposals carried the implication that until such an agreement were reached our troops would stay in the Canal Zone. This is indeed our intention. You will remember that I informed you to this effect in my personal message of the 15th August[5] and again on the 10th September in the course of our conversations in Washington[6] prior to the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa.

6. We have naturally considered the implications of this decision. Our Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East have the necessary plans ready. These foresee action by the Egyptian Government together with the appropriate British counter-measures under various stages.

7. Stage I can be said to have begun with Nahas Pasha's action on the 8th October. At this stage the Commanders-in-Chief contemplate and have been authorised to institute at their discretion what may be called passive security measures. These involve a formal request to Egyptian local authorities to maintain order, the stopping of leave to Caior [*Cairo*] and Alexandria (which has already been enforced), the posting of additional security guards and the like.

8. Stage II arises if the Egyptian Government resorts to administrative non-cooperation. At this stage the Government might obstruct and delay customs posts, civil aviation, quarantine clearances and the

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[3] Regarding the visit of Generals Bradley and Lecheres and Field Marshal Slim to Ankara, October 13–14, see the editorial note, p. 211.

[4] See footnote 2, p. 396.

[5] *Ante*, p. 372.

[6] For documentation on the September 10 Acheson-Morrison talks, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1163 ff.

clearance of ships through the Suez Canal and interfere with our labour supply. There might be increased rudeness official and individual to the British personnel. Hostile demonstrations and minor violence might take place. In such a situation our passive security measures would be continued but intensified. Military protective patrols might have to be instituted and families of all ranks in the Canal Zone concentrated into more secure areas. Here again the Commanders-in-Chief have been given authority to take the appropriate counter-measures.

9. Stage III would amount to an Egyptian blockade of our forces. The Egyptian Government would no doubt pretend that our position in Egypt was illegal and would attempt to persuade us by such measures as the withdrawal of labour supplies and port facilities and restriction of movement in and out of the Canal Zone to withdraw. They might refuse the passage of ships through the Canal. We naturally hope that this stage will be averted but if it is forced upon us we should have to take counter-blockade measures. The nature of these would naturally depend on the particular steps which the Egyptian Government took on their side. It would almost certainly be necessary to reinforce our troops in the Canal Zone and might eventually be necessary to take complete control there. In the worst case Egyptian troops might have to be removed by force if necessary. We might also have to take certain additional measures to ensure the passage of shipping through the Canal.

10. As I have said we trust that we shall not be faced with Stage III. If it should however be forced on us we shall face it and see it through and I hope not alone. Our Military Advisers are completely confident of our ability to hold and maintain ourselves in the Canal Zone. Much as we should regret the necessity of using force we would not shrink from our responsibilities if the situation demanded it. I am confident that in this course we should have the full moral support of the United States and the other countries to whom as well as to us the freedom of the Middle East region is a vital interest. The consequences of a withdrawal which to us is unthinkable whether from the military, political or moral point of view would be so disastrous not only for this country but for the Western Allies as a whole as to leave us all no alternative but to stand firm together. Indeed if we were to withdraw the whole world would say that Britain had lost not to Egypt but to her Allies.

11. None of the counter measures envisaged under Stage III has yet been authorised. It may be some time before the need for this arises. On the other hand it might arise at any moment and without

warning. In giving such authority His Majesty's Government would naturally do their utmost to consult the other Governments principally concerned in organising Middle East Defence.

12. Should matters come to this pass there would of course be no hope of organising the Middle East Command on the lines agreed and in our view we should be obliged to proceed without Egypt. Indeed that hope would be shattered much sooner if the Egyptian Government definitely reject the agreed proposals. But in either case it would seem all the more urgent to press on with the Command arrangements and we would be strongly in favour of agreeing at least upon the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander and we would place British forces in the Canal Zone under his command as contemplated in the agreed proposals. In view of Egypt's non-cooperation the Allied Headquarters would no doubt have to be set up outside Egypt, His Majesty's Government for their part would agree to the establishment of the headquarters in Cyprus.

13. It might be contended that the existence of a base in Egypt is a cardinal feature of the Allied Middle East Command organization and that if Egypt will not participate there can be no Allied base there. I hope that there will be no thought of listening to such an argument. The plain fact will be that the British as I have said intend to hold the Egyptian base. If the Egyptians agree to participate in the Middle East Command well and good and the base would become an Allied base. But if there is no agreement with Egypt we still intend to hold the base so that it may be available for use by the Allies. And it is in this sense that I think we may regard ourselves as agents acting on behalf of the free world when we say that we intend to stay in Egypt at whatever cost and ask for the support and encouragement of the United States Government in our stand.

14. There is one more point. The Turkish attitude I am sure will be profoundly affected by British and American intentions regarding Egypt. The first thing the Turks will want to know is what we are going to do in Egypt and by our answer they will judge whether it is safe for them to come into a Middle East Command. In fact in response to the most urgent representations from Field Marshal Slim who is in Ankara with General Bradley and General Lecheres we have authorized him to assure the Turks that our policy is to stand our ground in Egypt. We shall be explaining our policy to the French and Turkish Governments and appropriate Commonwealth Governments but I wanted to have your reaction first and hope to hear from you urgently.

Editorial Note

Morrison's message was the subject of a brief Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on October 15 which revolved around determining the proper response by the United States Government to the Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 and 1899 treaties. No firm agreements were reached because it was realized that Secretary Acheson and the President would first have to discuss a proper reply to Morrison. However, the possibly harmful repercussions in the Near East to a firm United States condemnation of Egypt were discussed with particular stress on the possible danger to United States relations with Saudi Arabia which was considered a firm friend of Egypt. Nitze closed the meeting "by saying that backing up the British in Egypt may not be the best course of action, but in the absence of anyone else willing to expend their resources and assume responsibility there, he felt that backing the British was the inevitable answer". Egypt was the subject of further brief discussion with respect to a possible Middle East Command at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on October 26. (State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)

641.74/10–1551

Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1951.

Following the meeting held in my office Saturday morning, October 13, with Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Burrows, Mr. McGhee, Mr. Perkins and myself, I telephoned the Secretary in the country concerning Mr. Morrison's personal message to him on the Egyptian situation. The Secretary had read Mr. Morrison's message and I outlined to him our thinking concerning an interim reply. The Secretary felt we should take a rather "stout-hearted" attitude. He said the situation in Egypt, involving the unilateral abrogation of treaty rights, and with British forces actually on the ground, was quite a different one from that in Iran. He asked me to telephone Sir Oliver Franks, and referring to our recognition of this difference between the two situations to say that we are in full accord with the British with regard to stages 1 and 2 and these would present us with no problem. Stage 3 might involve far-reaching consequences and therefore would require rather full consultation within our Government, including the Secretary of Defense and the President. However, Mr. Acheson's first impression was not unfavorable.

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[1] Copies to S/S, EUR, NEA, S/P.

I reached Sir Oliver by telephone at 3 o'clock and conveyed the foregoing to him. He said he thought this interim reply would meet his requirements for the weekend and expressed his appreciation.

I said our military would probably want more details from the British military as to just what specific steps the British had in mind.

I also asked Sir Oliver if he could ascertain any plans the British Government might have for the protection of British and other foreign lives in Cairo or elsewhere in Egypt if rioting broke out following parliamentary action on the treaty today.[2]

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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[2] The gist of the Matthews-Franks conversation recounted in the source text was sent to Ankara in telegram 336, October 13, repeated niact to Cairo and to London and Paris (641.74/10-1351).

641.74/10-1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, October 16, 1951—6 p. m.

1857. Bowker has just informed us 16th Paratroop Brigade and 2nd Infantry Brigade being ordered from Cyprus to Canal Zone. Move will probably not be announced until tomorrow, but FonOff anxious let us know.

Reason for foregoing is concern at developing sitn as result of incidents, some by Egyptian Govt (such as interference telephone and railway traffic) and some by mobs and individuals (such as several incidents against Brit soldiers, interference with labor force, stoning school bus with Brit children in Canal Zone, riots Ismailia, etc.). Bowker said that move not intended be in any way provocative and that every attempt will be made emphasize its defensive and protective character.

Brit mil auths are also being auth take certain "negative" actions in present emergency. Bowker listed these as:

1. Removal any road blocks erected by Egyptians in Zone.
2. Putting emergency labor sched into effective (Bowker, while uncertain, thought this meant organization of troops and volunteers into labor force rather than any attempt conscription).
3. Setting up of check points to prevent undesirables from entering zone.
4. Prohibiting aircraft from flying over area except with prior permission. (Bowker said this measure has, of course, internatl aspects which are being urgently looked into.)

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

Fr and Turks will be informed of troop movements, but not of the further measures outlined above.[2]

GIFFORD

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[2] In telegram 1862 from London, October 16, Gifford reported that the movement of the two brigades would be by air "beginning tomorrow or possibly tonight" (641.74/10-1651). In telegram 502 from Cairo, October 17, Caffery stated that the U.S. Naval Attaché had reported the arrival of a British light cruiser at Port Said, the concentration of British families in Port Said, and Egyptian interference with British vessels carrying military supplies (641.74/10-1751). In telegram 519 from Cairo, October 18, Caffery reported that an "Unevaluated new source" had stated confidentially that the Muslim Brotherhood had gathered arms and ammunition and was leaving the following morning for Suez "to avenge Egyptians killed by British whose corpses prominently displayed today's Arabic press." The same source had reported that the Brotherhood had taken a resolution to go ahead with its 11-point program of violence, war, and terrorism regardless of subsequent government policy. (641.74/10-1851) In telegram 1990 from London of October 23, Gifford reported that the Foreign Office had informed him that another brigade was being ordered to Suez, from Tripoli, and this report was subsequently confirmed by Consul General Andrew G. Lynch at Tripoli in telegrams 159 of October 25 and 163 of October 26. (641.74/10-2351, 10-2551, 10-2651)

641.74/10-1251

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison)[1]

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. ACHESON TO MR. MORRISON

I have received your message of October 12[2] regarding recent developments in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the three stages of action by the Egyptian Government and British counter-measures which you believe may be required in certain eventualities.

As you know, we share your deep concern over the deterioration of the situation in Egypt and deplore the action of the Egyptian Government on October 8 for the unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Condominium Agreements of 1899 regarding the Sudan. We have no doubt that the Egyptian action is contrary to these agreements, which do not provide for unilateral abrogation.

You also know that we deeply regret that the Egyptian Government rejected the Four Power proposals[3] in such summary fashion. It had been our earnest hope that these proposals would make possible closer and more cooperative relations with Egypt and that a new era of international responsibility would develop in the Middle East area, fully compatible with Egypt's position as a sovereign and independent nation.

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[1] A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Handed by Sec. to Burrows British Embassy Counselor at 6:00 p. m. 10/17. Transmitted to London by telegram #2069." A copy of this telegram is in file 641.74/10-1751.

[2] *Ante*, p. 398.

[3] Reference is to the proposals for a Middle East Command presented to the Egyptian Government on October 13 and formally rejected on October 15. See editorial note, p. 391.

I have already sent word to you through Ambassador Franks[4] that we are in full accord with your thinking relating to stages 1 and 2 and we are prepared to render to the United Kingdom full moral support relative thereto. These stages involve Egyptian initiative and we recognize the inherent right of British forces to defend themselves against attacks. The same is true in connection with the protection of British nationals whose lives are placed in jeopardy by Egyptian action.

As you recognize, stage 3 raises more serious problems, including that of world public opinion. The United States believes that the British Government is fully justified in retaining its forces in the Canal Zone under the 1936 Treaty until some substitute is available for this arrangement such as that proposed under MEC. We share your view of the grave consequences to the West of a British withdrawal now from the Suez Base. We also believe that actions which may become necessary to keep open the Suez Canal are justified. We are therefore prepared to give our full political and diplomatic support to measures necessary (but which do not go beyond what is necessary) for the purposes of protecting the Suez Base and keeping the Canal open.

In this connection, I have every confidence that your forces will continue to conduct themselves, even in the face of unreasonable Egyptian actions, with that restraint which is so necessary to retain the support of world opinion. I mention this because of the importance I attach to avoiding the increased difficulties which would face us both if steps should be taken or events occur which would create violent adverse reaction from such opinion.

DEAN ACHESON

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1951.

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[4] See memorandum for the files by Matthews, October 15, p. 402.

641.74/10–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, October 17, 1951—10 p. m.

507. The Brit Amb showed me this morning reports from Suez about disturbances there yesterday and the consequent measures taken by the Brit mil auths. The mil were forced to fire on mob at Ismailia attacking Brit dependents and killed five persons. At Port Said the

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, and Ankara.

Egypt police coop successfully in restoring order. (The Egypt Govt seems desirous of playing down this action because in communiqué they issued last night they mentioned that five persons were killed but did not state that the Brit had done it.) There were cases of looting Brit houses, burning Brit autos, etc. As the situation seemed to be getting out of hand the Brit established roadblocks at all entrances and exits of the canal zone. Brit Amb asked London for auth in case of extreme necessity to cut the Cairo oil pipeline. Suez mil were asking for reinforcements.

The Brit Amb sent a note this morning inviting the attn of the Egyptian Govt to this situation.

There were also cases of difficulties with Egyptian laborers employed at the base and deliveries of food supplies have been interrupted.

The Brit Amb sent report on all this to London and requested it be passed to State Dept.

The Brit Amb showed me a tel from Wash inquiring as to measures contemplated in case of danger to Brit and Amer lives. In conjunction with Brit mil Brit Amb has almost completed a comprehensive report on this which if approved at London will be transmitted to the State Dept. There are 27,000 Brit subjects in Egypt.

Brit Amb sent this morning another note to Egypt MinFonAff protesting against anti-Brit articles appearing in extremist press and against sermons preached in a number of mosques last Friday that it was no crime to kill a Brit subj.

As Dept is aware the hostility to the US prevailing two years ago had diminished very considerably. Of course, recent events have made us again a full target for Egypt popular and press animosity. The govt however up to now has been playing sharply down attempts to bespatter US and officials, and the King especially have gone out of their way in the past few days to show public sympathy with this Emb. Of course we will avoid any attempt to drive wedge between us.

The French and Turk Ambs returned to Cairo yesterday, I return today and Brit tomorrow.

The 16th Parachute Brigade is arriving this evening in Suez.[2]

CAFFERY

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[2] In telegram 510 from Cairo, October 18, Caffery stated that while he believed the British "went beyond what was strictly necessary" in putting down disturbances in the canal zone, "their action has had a very salutary effect. If they had shown any disposition to give ground current situation throughout Egypt might well have become critical." Caffery added that he would, however, "take occasion to tell Stevenson that I hope he will keep a close eye on his military and see that they do nothing which might worsen situation, as animosity against Brit has been considerably increased by happenings on the 16th October." (641.74/10–1851) In telegram 516 from Cairo, October 18, Caffery repeated that British actions had "had very salutary effect in Egypt" and added that American business representatives at Suez confirmed that British forces had taken "practical charge of canal zone" including the Sinai bridge thus cutting Egyptian communications with military forces in Gaza (641.74/10–1851).

641.74/10-1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 19, 1951—8 p. m.

1941. FonOff reaction to events of last few days in Egypt is one of cautious optimism. It feels that on whole measures which UK mil has found necessary take in canal area have had salutary effect. but considers it is too early to judge whether Egyptians will be deterred from taking further provocative steps. FonOff stresses that steps which it has taken thus far have been purely precautionary in intent and that any salutary effect which has flowed from them has been purely coincidental (but no less welcome).

FonOff seems acutely aware necessity proceeding with caution altho equally convinced of need for strength. It places particular importance on necessity avoiding any action which wld result deterioration relationships between UK and Egypt mil which, throughout crisis and despite incidents, have remained surprisingly good.

We understand FonOff is keeping mil plans under close observation and that no major mil decisions will be made without FonOff concurrence. As example, we have been told FonOff has asked mil review question of necessity prohibiting flights over canal area. (Embtel 1857, Oct 16).[2] Also, decision re cutting off flow oil to Cairo (Cairo's 207 Oct 17[3]) has been held in abeyance until it has been seen how sitn develops.

GIFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

[2] *Ante*, p. 403.

[3] Same as telegram 507 from Cairo, October 17, *supra*.

641.74/10-2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, October 23, 1951—3 p. m.

555. Ref Embtels 553 and 554, October 23.[2] I repeat, in my opinion it is important on our side not to do anything to worsen the situation here. It is essential for Brit mil auths in Canal Zone to do everything needful and even go a little beyond that at times to protect their

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara. A typed notation on the source text reads: "Mr. Stabler's office (NE) notified 5: 15 p.m. 10/31/51."

[2] Neither printed; telegram 553 reported the British decision to cut off all fuel oil supplies from Suez to Cairo in retaliation for Egyptian interference with British military trains in the canal zone. Telegram 554 reported on civil disturbances in Cairo and stern police countermeasures including firing into crowds of demonstrators. (641.74/10-2351)

position there, and up to now they have done just that. This morning, however, I felt compelled to tell my Brit colleague that in my opinion Brit Zone Commander who this morning cut off fuel oil supplies from Egypt was going a bit too far. Fuel oil is used for electric power, telephones, telegrams, railroads, bakeries, mills, factories and industrial establishments, in general.

When this becomes known reaction of population will be violent. Difficult control and large fon population here will suffer.

Cutting off fuel oil wld be perfectly justifiable in a real emergency.

The CG told the Gov of Suez at 6 last night that unless trains in zone were running again this morning at 6 he wld take this action. I told Stevenson that I agree that it is necessary to keep trains running and that the gen wld be perfectly justified in taking measures to force Egypt to do this, and there are plenty of other measures he cld take. But this particular one directed against the whole population simply does not show a sense of proportion.

Stevenson is extremely unhappy about this and said obviously he has no control over the mil; he thanked me and said he wld telegraph urgently on this subj to London.

In meantime, our oil reps, who tell me with careful handling there are stocks for ten days of fuel oil in Egypt, are urgently asking for advice. I told them take it easy for a day or two.

It is plain that if this order is allowed to stand all hell will break loose in Egypt in a very few days. However, I am not suggesting that Dept take this up with London at this juncture. I shld prefer to await the reply from London to Stevenson.

Incidentally I asked Stevenson why since Erskine has taken over the trains he does not run them with Brit personnel. Stevenson did not know the answer.[3]

CAFFERY

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[3] Caffery informed the Secretary in telegram 563 of October 24 from Cairo that Ambassador Stevenson "tells me this morning that after our conversation he took up fuel oil embargo with Gen Robertson [Commander in Chief, British Middle East Land Forces] and that Robertson sent him word this morning that he had 'turned on the tap' again this morning at 6, but on day-to-day basis. However, he promised not turn off tap again without consulting Brit Amb who will consult with me." Caffery added that Robertson's action had averted a serious crisis and that the General acted "in view what I said to Stevenson." (641.74/10–2451). In telegram 2024 from London of October 24, Ambassador Gifford informed the Secretary, *inter alia*, that the Foreign Office "gathers prevention Suez–Cairo oil shipments carried out without realization probable serious econ consequences and has taken view that prohibition shld be withdrawn, especially since it has already served purpose showing Egypts that Brit authorities Canal Zone have available effective countermeasure." (641.74/10–2451)

641.74/10-2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, October 24, 1951—9 p. m.

565. Mytel 557, October 24.[2] The King said he desired to talk first about cutting off of fuel oil by Brit commanding general. He narrated in great detail all the dire consequences, including eventually revolution, that would entail. I was able to tell him that shipments had recommenced this morning. He went on to criticize with some vehemence the activities in general of Brit military in Canal Zone. I apprehend that he has lost most of his friendly feeling for Brit. He said that they were making it impossible for him or any Egypt Govt ever to accept a satisfactory solution of either defense problem or Sudan question. He again lamented fact that proposals were put forward at so inopportune a moment. He indicated that we and only we would ever be in a position to help find reasonable solutions. He urged us not to do anything on our side to worsen the situation. He then said, "I shall tell you and you only a few secrets that even my govt do not know. First, they think that the Min FonAff will head the delegation at Paris[3] but I have decided that he would do no good there and I shall send Fawzi Bey. Second, if Brit attempt remove my troops out of the Canal Zone I shall order them to resist to the last man. Third, I had a spy a night or two ago at an Ikwan mtg when oaths were taken to kill 13 men; I was first on the list and Nahas second.

He went on to say that he is extremely pessimistic about the way things are going: "It looks like we are headed for real trouble from which only the Commies would profit."

I told him he should understand that Brit military authorities in Canal Zone are having a tough time and that they are justified in going even beyond the strictly necessary in order to defend their position; but I agreed they should do nothing provocative or uselessly irritating.

I reminded him how frivolously his govt handled our proposals and that their only endeavor was to have a domestic political triumph. He agreed.

I believe it is clear he would still like Egypt to take part in an Eastern Medit set-up but in face of inflamed and inflammatory sentiment and passions here he is not optimistic about near future.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London, to Paris for MacArthur, and to Ankara.

[2] Not printed; it read: "King has sent me word he desires to see me urgently day. I am flying to Alexandria." (641.74/10-2451)

[3] Reference was to the forthcoming Sixth Session of the United Nations Genal Assembly which met at Paris between November 6, 1951, and February 5, 52.

641.74/10-2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, October 25, 1951—3 p. m.

568. Stevenson was in despair last night. Notwithstanding Gen Robertson's promise to him in the morning he was threatening last night to turn off tap again because he was not sure "Egypts had learned their lesson". I took high exception to this and Stevenson promised to do his best with Brit mil. "Remember, however," he remarked, "We in England are without a govt now".[2] In addition to formidable list consequence set out in mytel 55 [*555*] [3] I should add important irrigation pumps and domestic cooking. Furthermore, bakeries have fuel oil on hand for about three days. What wld mobs do in dark streets?

Brit Shell manager says cessation fuel oil traffic out of Suez wld force refinery to close within two or three days owing lack storage facilities. This wld immed force shut-down producing fields and deny white refinery products for pipeline transport. Supplies thus lost wld be irremedial inasmuch as transport capacity normally worked at maximum.

Brit mil significantly have informed Stevenson that their position in Canal Zone is untenable unless they receive minimum coop from Egypts. I retorted, "That is not the way to get it".[4]

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, and Ankara.

[2] General elections were being held throughout the United Kingdom on this day which led to a change of governments, the Conservative Party led by Winston Churchill replacing the Labour Party of Clement Attlee.

[3] Dated October 23, p. 407.

[4] In telegram 569 from Cairo, October 25, Caffery reported that Stevenson was able to persuade the British military not to turn off the oil taps again "and he is proceeding to Suez tomorrow to talk to Robertson and endeavor to persuade him that decision of that category shld be on cabinet level." Caffery added that Stevenson was cabling London "to put whatever govt comes in as result of elections on notice that very grave decisions must be taken soon at London." (641.74/10-2551)

641.74/10-2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, October 26, 1951—3 p. m.

575. Mytel 560 Oct 24.[2] Serageddin Pasha, Abboud Pasha, and I explored last night practically all angles of Anglo-Egypt sitn. I counselled him to take it easy in his efforts to harass Brit in Canal

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, and Ankara.

[2] Not printed; it reported that at the request of Abboud Pasha and Seraggedin, Caffery would dine with them on the evening of October 25 (641.74/10-2451).

Zone. I chided him for frivolous way they had handled our proposals etc., etc.

He exposed at some length Egypt point of view re Brit in gen and recent activities of Brit in Canal Zone in particular, emphasizing the inherent explosive potentialities of stopping fuel oil shipments, that Brit have still not turned tap all the way on as they promised, etc.

We reviewed the def proposals and in the end Serageddin said he wld like to continue these conversations with end in view of finding a reasonable agmt on them, but solely on the condition that something be done about the Sudan.

He insisted on Egypt side that only he and Abboud know about the conversation and he hoped I wld keep them to myself on our side.

Stevenson proceeds tomorrow to Suez (mytel 569 Oct 25)[3] in endeavor to persuade Robertson to turn tap all the way (it is now running three-fourths way).

CAFFERY

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[3] Not printed.

641.74/10-2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, October 27, 1951—7 p. m.

589. Now that dust beginning to settle I believe it desirable briefly recapitulate what has happened in Egypt recently and assess, reevaluate our policy.

1. Egyptians have been pursuing blindly fatalistic policy re Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Their do or die attitude has now passed the "do" stage and they are faced with a possible "die" stage.

2. The effective and firm British action in Suez zone has brought this fact most unpleasantly to attention of the Egyptians. Despite all bluster about "British aggression" closest reflection we have of true Egyptian reaction is plaintive newspaper headline "but they evacuated Abadan".[2]

3. Egyptians are surprised, hurt and deeply resentful. Their frustration and hatred is primarily focussed on British, but in the thrashings around, US French and Turk and West all came in for their share of abuse.

4. Frustration and hatred do not arise so much from fact Egyptians' lives have been lost but more from fact that Egyptians have made such poor showing when put to test.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, and Ankara.

[2] Reference is to the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; see p. 544.

5. The army is not happy that politicians have placed it in unevitable position of having its only effective division "trapped" in Gaza with Israelis on one side and a potentially hostile British force sitting on its supply lines.

6. The supply line is virtually exhausted and the hangover stage is not far away. The politicians have a few last weapons, among which is a rumored "declaration of war" against British. However, there is realization that this could only result in quick British occupation of whole country.

7. This has resulted in a surprising rash of exhortations to keep calm, typified by the pro-Wafdist Al Misri "Every attack on a foreigner will lead to the loss of the friendship of another nation and provide the enemy with a mortal weapon". Egypt suddenly realizes that she needs friends, and has very few.

8. This is accompanied by vengeful note of "Let's make friends with Russia". This is so far not serious threat, and it is believed that on this issue the King could successfully hold line as such a move would not have the irresistable appeal that characterized abrogation.

9. There is increasing evidence that King would like to seize the first opportunity to effect a change of government. He cannot easily forget spot which Nahas has put him in nor Nahas's defiance in persisting with abrogation proposals. King will not, however, take positive line until very sure of his ground.

10. It is unfortunate that circumstances did not permit our delaying proposals until the change envisaged in (9) took place. Even the most pliable of new governments could not accept the proposals without their being dressed up a bit. We can never get by with less than legal recognition of title "King of the Sudan".

11. Our firm support of British has been of great help to them at time they needed help. It has also made our moderating voice more effective with them. It has not yet irreparably damaged us with the Egyptians who still have hope that the US can do something to save them from the mess which they are in. This, plus other pertinent factors mentioned above produce the "crack in the door" mentioned in previous telegrams.

In another telegram I shall recommend how, in my opinion, we can best exploit the situation.

CAFFERY

641.74/10-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, October 30, 1951—2 p. m.

609. General recommendations re my telegram 589 October 27[2] on shape of things to come in Egypt:

1. We must above all pursue moderation theme (rather than mediation). While this may well come to point where it has to be broached on Washington–London level, we have so far avoided resentments which such approaches are apt to produce. Stevenson has been more than cooperative and I believe that this channel should be exploited to utmost.

2. In contrast with moderation we must never give impression that we are deserting our British friends. This would be fatal to us and to them. However, we must at the same time keep path to the crack in the door. Large part of this process will have to be played locally by ear.

3. We still have "position" in Egypt, and our prestige is not at too low level. While we must be firm in support of principles we must be careful to avoid punitive measures against Egypt, such as shutting off of present economic (Point Four) aid, etc. This tightrope is not going to be easy to walk. Our British friends will be seeking our support for their actions and the Egyptians will be seeking our good will and intervention against such actions.

4. We must seek to restrain British military "trigger happiness" until such time as drastic action is justified. (Such action can be most effective.) We must also seek to restrain Egyptian trigger happiness (not so much on actual military measures, but rather on measures destined to provoke British into abrupt action).

5. Our USIE output should stress inherent dangers of those who seek to play ball with the Soviets, and give picture of what has happened in countries which have tried this dangerous game. We should also intensify USIE activities immediately aiming particularly at lower level mass approach as most effective weapon against growing extremist movements.

6. We must not only be guided by the factors in the local situation mentioned in the reference telegram but also seek to exploit every hesitation that exists in Arab States re Egypt's actions. This should not, however, at this juncture be directed towards breaking up the Arab League.

7. We should proceed set up Middle East Command without Egypt, but continue emphasize regret non-Egyptian participation and leave

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[1] Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for MacArthur.
[2] *Supra.*

door open for eventual Egyptian membership on full partnership basis.

8. Do a little prettying up of Four-Nation proposal but refrain from re-presenting proposals until auspicious moment.

9. It is necessary that we face up to fact proposals will not be accepted without something substantial on Sudan and begin laying groundwork with British to convince them of this. We should be prepared to associate US with Sudan offers if British make them sufficiently substantial.

10. Avoid attempts "push" Egyptians during this period during which such attempts can only boomerang our detriment. In particular avoid any appearance assisting in demise of Wafd power under circumstances which could result throwing Wafd in arms of Reds.

My more explicit where-do-we-go-from-here telegram will follow.[3]

CAFFERY

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[3] Telegram 616, p. 415.

641.74/10-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, October 30, 1951—7 p. m.

2094. Eden's[2] first action re Egypt will probably be considered policy statement which FonOff now drafting and which if approved will be sent as instruction to Stevenson. It wld be brief and main object wld be set general course from which future decisions wld flow. It will undoubtedly confirm Brit stand to date. FonOff intends inform Dept fully.

In discussing Dept's concern re fuel oil shipments and sending Haifa tankers thru canal, FonOff this afternoon said UK wld of course keep these points fully in mind. It doubted action on either was early prospect, but particularly re former said UK was understandably not in very charitable mood toward Egypt since Min Interior seemed to be doing nothing to make good his promises there wld be no intimidations [garble] or interference with essential supplies for Brit troops. Govt's practice seems to be just the opposite and furthermore terrorist grps are making way to canal zone with at least connivance of govt.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

[2] Anthony Eden had replaced Morrison as British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Churchill government as a result of the general elections of October 25.

FonOff hopes Sudan commission's appeal to UN will die on vine but recognizes that if internatl interest in Sudan is stirred up UK may have new problem to consider. FonOff definitely dislikes idea of UN comm sticking its nose into Sudan and thinks Sudanese wld be best advised to get on with present program leading to self-govt.[3]

GIFFORD

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[3] In telegram 614, niact, from Cairo of October 31, Caffery informed the Secretary, *inter alia*, that Stevenson had reported the situation in the canal zone was "deteriorating daily" because of an increasing exodus of Egyptian labor and the fact that "Brit mil have again virtually turned off tap" in order to force the Egyptian Government to do something about getting the workers back on the job. Caffery added that he was not encouraged by London's attitude as reported in the source text. "Brit have in mind number of drastic reprisals in zone and I will go along with them as I have gone always in past but I can not go along with an action which if carried out will end only in reoccupation and revolution." (641.74/10-3151)

641.74/10-3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

CAIRO, October 31, 1951—9 p. m.

616. These are my recommendations on where-do-we-go-from-here. In my opinion measures, reprisals, etc., taken by British up to now in Zone, with exception of fuel oil squeeze, have been justified although at times they have gone little far. For instance, on British side there have been no casualties, but on Egypt side allegedly 19 killed and 125 wounded.

There are three choices and only three choices open to us:

First, let matters drift in hands of British military as they are now and end soon in British re-occupation of Egypt followed by revolution. It is possible that some British military would welcome this.

Second, disassociate our responsibility from operations of British military in the Zone;

Third, agree that Britain shall continue reprisals etc as they have in the past with the exception of the fuel oil squeeze; but take out of the hands of British military in Zone the power of decision for re-occupation and measures like cutting off fuel oil, which would inevitably lead to re-occupation. Such decisions should be made by higher-ups. At the same time I continue conversations of the kind I have begun with Serageddin in due course bringing in the King in hope of eventual agreement on defense proposals on condition that Brit do something about Sudan. As Department is aware even now Egypt credentials are made out in name of Sovereign of the Sudan nd even British admit there is much to be said for the King's right to itle King of Sudan. However every day present British military fuel il tactics continue hope of eventual agreement grows dimmer and immer. One very tiny bright spot is that more and more thinking

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[1] Repeated to London, Ankara, Moscow, Paris for MacArthur, and Arab pitals.

Egyptians are asking themselves "where do we go from here?" and are willing at least to examine defense proposals.

Although eventually we may have to get rid of WAFD Government it would be folly to ask King to do it now, for variety of reasons, primarily because he could not find at this juncture government to take its place. Same holds for Salaheddin; as much as King and Prime Minister and others in Cabinet would like to get rid of him they dare not do it now because of possibility of setting at head of an exceedingly dangerous very leftist movement. We shall have to take it easy for while but not as long perhaps as we now think if only British Government will explain facts of life to British Generals at Fayid. There is no problem with British Embassy. I know Department has in mind situation which could arise when British troops in Fayid under MEC command could by intemperate and/or irresponsible action if not controlled from above lead us into dire difficulty.

I have not seen my French and Turk colleagues this evening but from conversations last night with them I believe safe to say they will go along with me on very word of this.

Department pass Moscow.

CAFFERY

641.74/11-251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 2, 1951—7:40 p. m.

2325. Dept again raised with Brit Emb Nov 1 stoppage overland transport fuel supplies (Cairo's 614 Oct 31, 617 and 624 Nov 1[2] and Deptel 2222 Oct 27[3]). McGhee told Brit Min Steel decision re such stoppage too important to be made by mil auths alone and said in our view stoppage having effect contrary that desired by Brit mil. McGhee also mentioned consequences which such stoppage directed against Egypt civil population might have (Cairo's 614 and 616 Oct 31[4]).

Steel promised report Dept concern to FonOff but said he was sure we did not intend deny to UK means of retaliating to protect its position. McGhee said that only measure Brit have taken so far which causes real concern is stoppage fuel. Steel also said that although London had not instructed Robertson to stop fuel shipments, he felt Robertson cld be counted on to do nothing rash.

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[1] Drafted by Stabler, approved for transmission and initialed by McGhee. Repeated to Cairo, Paris, and Ankara.

[2] None printed.

[3] Not printed; it reported that Department officials had called in representatives of the British Embassy and had told them of the Department's great concern over recent British measures to cut off the fuel supply between the canal zone and Cairo (641.74/10-2751).

[4] Neither printed.

Dept hopes Emb will fol closely situation Egypt as reported Cairo's tels and will keep before FonOff our view it is important nothing be permitted which wld cause further deterioration situation.

WEBB

641.74/11-451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 3, 1951—4 p. m.

689. 1. Department has carefully studied Embtels 589,[2] 609,[3] 616[4] which have been most helpful.

2. Department agrees that third alternative (Embtel 616) is only possible course of action and that exaggerated measures against Egyptians such as cutting off fuel supplies can only increase Egyptian frustration and hostility with possibility consequences which you foresee. It will be recommended to Secretary now in Paris that he impress upon Eden our view that if Egyptian situation is not to deteriorate further, military authorities must be kept on close rein. We recognize that certain measures are necessary in connection with maintenance by British their position canal zone and we are prepared to continue our support along lines Secretary's letter to Morrison October 17.[5] We feel that you have done splendid job with Stevenson re British military and Department appreciates his cooperation.

3. Department considers, and will so inform UK, that it would be inappropriate and undesirable under present conditions to regard British troops in Suez base as MEC troops. These troops are in Egypt by virtue 36 treaty and recognition continued validity treaty must extend to both rights and obligations. We strongly believe MEC should not become involved in Anglo-Egyptian controversy.

4. Department agrees that for time being we should pursue moderation and toleration theme and that present Egyptian emotions should run their course. We also agree that it would not be desirable to expect King or others take action now which would be counter to popular sentiments. While we realize certain Egyptian actions against British are inevitable, we hope that Serageddin and others in Egyptian

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman.

[2] Dated October 27, p. 411.

[3] Dated October 30, p. 413.

[4] Dated October 31, p. 415.

[5] *Ante*, p. 404.

Government will realize grave dangers to their present efforts maintain order if extremist and terrorist activities are permitted.

5. While we do not intend take punitive measures in sense paragraph 3 Embtel 609, we feel that it is necessary to suspend training re Deptel 683 November 2[6] (and export licenses for military equipment and supplies. Re this, "suspension" is operative word and we would hope that conditions would soon permit at least resumption training.

6. Department believes that we should continue to make clear to Egyptians that door is still open for them to join MEC and that this cooperative defense enterprise is fair, honorable and possibly only way out of present impasse. Obviously MEC will require painstaking explanation as Egyptian press and official comment indicate great lack of comprehension of what MEC means. We recognize that proposals will probably have to be reformulated in form calculated to respond more specifically to Egyptian aspirations and that further efforts may have to be made re Sudan. On latter point Department is considering possible legal and political implications acceptance by US of King's title as "King of Egypt and of Sudan". However, there will undoubtedly be considerable difficulty in moving British on Sudan question.

7. Department has in mind suggesting to UK Foreign Office that you and UK, French, and Turk colleagues make recommendations re reformulation defense proposals which might be acceptable to Egypt. Your advice re desirability this requested. We would also appreciate your comments on desirability similar exercises re Sudan.

8. Department considers that contacts which you have had with Serageddin are most useful and should be continued (Embtel 632 November 2)[6] with view gradually enlarging them to include King and possibly others who recognize that continuance present situation benefits nobody and only spells trouble for everyone. Department understands that Aeliasandraos may be proceeding Paris shortly. View his close association Palace would any useful purpose be served by its being suggested that his visit to US would be welcome?

9. Department hopes obtain early approval from UK, French, and Turkey for statement of principles underlying MEC in order Arab States including Egypt and Israel will have better understanding what MEC is intended to be. We hope that such principles made known to Arab States in near future will maintain and increase present tendency those states retain freedom of action of MEC vis-à-vis Egypt.

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[6] Not printed.

10. Re Embtel 629 November 3 [7] Department is recommending that Secretary talk re MEC with heads Arab delegations prior November 10.[8]

WEBB

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[7] Not printed.

[8] Caffery replied in telegram 651 from Cairo, November 5, that he appreciated the Department's "highly satis telegram" and especially that the Department was recommending to Secretary Acheson, then at Paris for the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, that he impress upon Eden that "Brit mil auths must be kept in hand." Caffery added that he was not convinced that British military officials in the canal zone "are taking their FonOff admonitions very seriously." Caffery admitted that the British were in a "most difficult position" in the canal zone and that the Egyptians were "doing everything in their power to be disagreeable." Caffery concluded by stating that the British must continue to be supported and that moderation should be continued to be urged on the Egyptians. No useful purpose would be served by suggesting a visit of Egyptian officials to Washington. (641.74/11-551)

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468 : "Syria and Lebanon 1948 Memoranda"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard E. Gnade of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 9, 1951.

Participants: Dr. Malik, Minister of Lebanon
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Kopper—NE
Mr. Gnade—NE

Dr. Malik came to call on Mr. McGhee at 3:00 p. m. November 9, 1951 for a final talk before departing on the following day for Paris where he will be a member of the Lebanese UNGA delegation.

Dr. Malik opened the conversation by asking what he might tell his Arab colleagues at Paris when they asked for the latest views of Mr. McGhee, of the Department, and of the American Government regarding Middle Eastern affairs. Did Mr. McGhee have a message for them or for Egyptian Foreign Minister Salahuddin?

Mr. McGhee answered that this was a time of crisis in the relations between the Arabs and the West and an opportunity to demonstrate whether enduring relations between the two areas can be built up or not. The Egyptian situation was disillusioning and disappointing. MEC was long planned and thought out. It was a fine opportunity for Egypt to reach a reasonable solution of the Suez problem, but instead, the Egyptians jumped the gun on the MEC proposals and refused to give them any consideration when they were presented. The United States position on Egypt was a fundamental position and not subject to change. Secretary Acheson's statement [1] supporting the view that the treaty cannot be abrogated unilaterally stands as basic American doctrine.

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[1] See editorial note, p. 397.

Dr. Malik asked whether there was any way out of the impasse.

Mr. McGhee replied that the multilateral approach envisaged in MEC was a good solution. He and his colleagues had spent months meeting Salahuddin's problems and working to find an adequate solution. Egypt was to be a full partner—but she gave the idea absolutely no consideration and rejected it out of hand. As the MEC concept was being elaborated, he had hoped that Egypt would join in the discussion and planning. The eleven MEC principles show what we have in mind. They offer a broad and flexible "solution with honor" for Egypt. It is the only solution, since the West cannot let Suez lie undefended. The United States will play a full role, and there will be no colonial-type regime such as the Egyptians seem to fear. Initially the British must supply the forces to garrison the Canal because they have them available and the other participating powers do not.

Dr. Malik asked "Where do we go from here? How can Egypt's face be saved?" The United States must face the possibility of talking over with the British a time limit for British withdrawal from Suez. This, in Dr. Malik's eyes, was the only possible ray of hope in the situation.

Mr. McGhee answered that MEC was the real ray of hope. Egypt should take an active role, free from the old British bond.

Dr. Malik questioned what the nationality of SACME would be. Where would the headquarters be?

Mr. McGhee said that the headquarters would be in Egypt.

Dr. Malik asserted that the Egyptian demand for immediate withdrawal should not be taken too seriously. He thought that they would negotiate a time for withdrawal. A compromise and middle ground must be found, and he felt this could be done by a definite termination of the date of British withdrawal.

Mr. McGhee stated that there was no intention of appeasement of Egypt. She had no other way than MEC out of this dilemma.

Dr. Malik admitted that the Egyptians had acted childishly and foolishly. He wondered whether the British would be interested if the Egyptians offered to negotiate a British withdrawal within the period of a year.

Mr. McGhee said that although the West was always receptive to discussion, it would make no commitments on proposals. It was basically interested in discussing only MEC.

Mr. Kopper pointed out the possibilities of a long-term arrangement on Suez within the frame of MEC.

Mr. McGhee reiterated that the Western Powers could not see Suez left undefended and asked where the Egyptian line leads. Dr. Malik replied that the Egyptian line of action meant a satisfaction of Egyptian public opinion that the British were out of the country after 80 years of domination.

Mr. McGhee requested that Dr. Malik tell Salahuddin of his keen personal disappointment at the manner in which Egypt had recently acted regarding MEC, which had been worked out with Salahuddin's ideas in mind. The Egyptians had discarded the proposal without even considering it and had brought Egypt into direct conflict with the West.

Dr. Malik asked what the role of the other Arab States should be. Mr. McGhee replied that we are not pressing the other Arab States to join now but eventually we would like them all to associate themselves with MEC as fully participating members in a cooperative effort at Middle East defense. He hopes that the other Arab States will not follow Egypt's example, and equally hopes that Egypt will change its attitude. The United States has taken the initiative in this vital matter of the Middle Eastern defense since last January, and it was also extensively discussed at the Chiefs of Mission conference at Istanbul. He felt that the principles should be acceptable to Lebanon.

[Here follows a discussion of United States-Lebanese relations quoted in the editorial note, page 1012.]

641.74/11-1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, November 12, 1951—noon.

689. I talked again yesterday evening with Serageddin Pasha, the all-powerful SecGen of the Govt Wafd Party. Having in mind all the discounts anyone wld like to make this is what he said after a lengthy preliminary conversation:

We can accept your four power proposals on condition that they do not go further than Stevenson's offer in his conversation with Salaheddin prior to end of last summer. Stevenson agreed that only Brit troops to remain actually in zone wld be "technicians" in Art VI of the MEC proposals you talk of "forces" and not "technicians". I realize of course that a "technician" cld cover various categories. I must be able to say to the Egyptian people that the Brit "forces" will begin immed to evacuate and evacuation of their "forces" will be completed at the end of say a year; and you must not leave behind too many "technicians". I explained was different re our proposals but he stuck to his point. (Salaheddin insisted then that even "technicians" shld evacuate in maximum 18 months. Serageddin yesterday did not mention time-limit.)

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[1] Source text was originally transmitted to the Secretary of State only. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Repeated info London 315 and Paris 173." Presumably this action was taken in the Department of State.

The second condition covers the airplanes in the zone. The Egyptians had suggested to Stevenson that the airplanes no matter how many wld be "Egyptian" airplanes even if flown by Brit pilots, and even though they realized there might be some camouflage in this.

He said that in any event they wld insist that some Amer "technicians" be included in those stationed at the base. He said that they have confidence in us but have no confidence in anyone else, much as they dislike our present stand.

He insisted and emphasized the importance of extreme secrecy in connection with these conversations, if anything shld leak he cld not proceed with them. Because of this I am not repeating this to other capitals.

CAFFERY

641.74/11-1551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 21, 1951—11:57 a. m.

784. Embtel 689 Nov 12.[2] Report ur conversation with Serageddin has been read with much interest and we hope this useful contact will be continued. King's reaction these conversations (Embtel 702 Nov 15)[3] also of interest, although we regret that to date King has shown no evidence of leadership in finding way out present situation. While it is clearly difficult to forecast at this stage how far Serageddin might be able and willing to go in moving from present contact to negots, fact that he is talking in these terms is significant. We recognize that since at present time Egypt are in no mood to negotiate, it wld not be possible or desirable to make specific suggestions to them re reformulation Four-Power proposals. However, we wonder whether Serageddin wld be willing in near future to put on paper for our eyes only (if he wishes) what he has in mind re possible modifications in def proposals. One of our principal difficulties in working with Egypts has been that while they are always ready to reject proposals made to them, they never produce concrete suggestions which they cld seri-

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[1] Drafted by Stabler, approved for transmission and initialed for the Acting Secretary by McGhee. Repeated to London eyes only for Ambassador Gifford, to Paris eyes only for Ambassador Bruce and the Secretary.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed; it reported that King Farouk knew of Caffery's conversations with Seraggedin "and highly approves." Caffery added that the Chief of the King's Cabinet had informed him that Farouk was "delighted" that Seraggedin had taken the initiative in the conversations and hoped that they would lead to final acceptance by Egypt of defense plans, "with the usual reservation that Brit do something 'satisfactory' on Sudan." (641.74/11-1551)

ously expect US, UK or all Four Powers to consider. Egypts must realize from Four-Power proposals that UK and other three Powers have gone quite far (and might possibly go further) to meet their point of view on def issue, but these negots cannot be a one-way street. If as you report in Embtel 694[4] Nov 12, Nahas is "extremely unhappy" over present state of Anglo-Egypt differences, way is open for him and Serageddin to make concrete comments on the Four-Power proposals. You might feel it desirable in further conversations with Serageddin to stress that while we are anxious to see early solution to the present problem, we will be unable to make any progress if Egypts do not offer constructive comments which can be seriously considered. In this connection, it might be pertinent to remind Serageddin that during entire PD leading up to presentation Four-Power proposals, we had reason to believe from talks with Egypt officials that multilateral approach to problem wld be acceptable to all concerned.

Re Sudan, Dept has requested FonOff to take another look at this problem to see what further might be offered. Here again value references by Egypts to 1946 Bevin–Sidky protocol[5] are not particularly helpful in trying to work out compromise arrangement. It difficult for Brit to do something "satisfactory" on Sudan without any specific idea what Egypts want, except for extreme view that Brit shld evacuate Sudan. Dept wld appreciate ur comments as to whether there is any evidence that Brit have discussed Sudan problem with leaders of Sudanese polit parties with object of determining how far UK cld go in direction Egypts and still retain Sudanese support. It is our impression that to date this has not been done. Ur comments wld also be appreciated re Salaheddin's plebiscite proposal made before UNGA Nov 16 and effect on Egypts of Brit announcement re Sudan self-government in 1952.

Re Embtel 703 Nov 15,[6] principal criterion which shld determine whether or not change of govt shld be manipulated is more than reasonable degree assurance that new govt will carry out desired program. Based on available info we are doubtful whether in immed future any polit leaders, except from extremist elements, wld be willing or able form Govt which wld have sufficient strength to restore *status quo ante*. While Brit FonOff looks hopefully to King and Army to provide such new govt, there appears to be no evidence so far that

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[4] Not printed.

[5] For documentation on the Bevin–Sidky protocol on the Sudan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 69 ff.

[6] Not printed; it outlined recommendations submitted by Ambassador Stevenson to London in a "think-piece" concerning Britain's "future course of action in Egypt" (641.74/11–1551).

King cld or wld take this step and some quest may also arise re Army's loyalty. Obviously extremist govt wld be disastrous.

We are also concerned by Stevenson's apparent assumption that ouster of Wafd Govt wld by itself lead to restoration *status quo ante*. We find it hard to believe sit is that simple.

View above Dept wonders whether better solution might not be offered by working with those elements in present govt, such as Serageddin, who appears anxious re actual and future state of affairs, while at same time fostering purge of rabble-rousers, such as Salaheddin. If approaches by Serageddin mean anything and if he has the power he appears to have, it might not only be unwise but dangerous to embark on "govt-changing" program, particularly when no other polit leadership seems to be in sight. Another factor which shld be borne in mind is diffic sit which wld be created if respons govt change cld be placed on Western powers.

Dept believes that you and Stevenson shld give this whole ques most careful consideration. Ur substantive comments on Stevenson's recommendations and views expressed above wld be welcome.

WEBB

641.74/11-2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, November 24, 1951—2 p. m.

754. I found Stevenson in black despair yesterday. Events, he said, in canal zone are headed straight for an explosion to be followed by reoccupation of Egypt which inevitably will be followed by the British being thrown out of Egypt forever. I told him that things were not yet quite that bad.

Stevenson who is basically an intelligent man with good sound judgment has been pushed hither and yon by the Generals and one of his advisors and has made various recommendations which he now knows to be unsound and unreal and he hates to face the facts. However, he is now prepared to face them and I believe we may come up with joint approach that will make sense (mytel 749, Nov 23).[2] An example of his difficulties is a new attempt of the military to shut off fuel oil. Stevenson knows that nothing could help the Communists more or hurt the British more than that particular manoeuver. Nevertheless, the military are pressing and are endeavoring to get it again before the London Cabinet.[3] As I have remarked before, if the military shut off fuel oil again, let's stop talking about finding a solution.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, Rome for Acheson. The Secretary was in Rome to attend the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, November 24–28; for documentation, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 693 ff.

[2] Not printed.

CAFFERY

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[3] In telegram 2488 from London, November 24, Ambassador Gifford reported that British military authorities at Suez had been authorized to reinstitute a partial ban on oil shipments to the extent of stopping rail traffic 1 day in 7 and road traffic for 6 hours 1 day in 7. The measure had been authorized by Prime Minister Churchill on the grounds that British personnel checking oil shipments needed a respite from Egyptian terrorism. Gifford added that the Foreign Office had stated that should oil stocks fall to a danger level, the ban would be re-examined. (641.74/11-2451) In telegram 756 from Cairo, November 24, Caffery reported Stevenson's reception of the Churchill decision with the words " 'they have defeated me'." Caffery concluded by repeating and emphasizing the last sentence of the source text. (641.74/11-2451)

745W.00/11-2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 24, 1951—8 p. m.

2489. Deptel 2629, Nov 21.[2] FonOff thinks Salaheddin's Sudan pleb proposal is a "nonstarter" and proposes to ignore it unless UN shows any interest, whereupon UK wld ask what it considered rhetorical questions of what, why and how. In present form and under present circumstances FonOff considers proposal meaningless and broached insincerely by Egypt FonMin purely for propaganda. To have any significance, Egypt wld first have withdraw its constitution for Sudan. Eden has reproved Lie for appearing support proposal and, according to FonOff, latter was apologetic, saying he had been misunderstood.

First of all, FonOff considers withdrawal Brit and Egypt personnel utterly impractical and wld lead only to breakdown govt admin. Second main objection is that trying to get any meaning out of "vote per head" in country like Sudan, or even trying to hold a vote, is ludicrous.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo, Paris, Ankara.

[2] On November 16, Salaheddin had delivered a strongly worded speech before the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly at Paris condemning British policies and actions with regard to Egypt and the Sudan. In the course of his remarks, he declared "as a challenge to the United Kingdom that for our part, we accept to withdraw our officials and our armed forces from the Sudan on condition that the United Kingdom do the same, so as to allow the Sudanese freely to express their will through a plebiscite" arranged and supervised with the cooperation of the United Nations. Salaheddin's speech was reprinted in its entirety by the Egyptian Government in its Green Book on the Anglo-Egyptian crisis of 1950–1951, pp. 180–192. In telegram 2629 to London of November 21, Acting Secretary Webb asked to receive "soonest" Foreign Office reaction to Salaheddin's proposal, adding "We believe that if idea has merit, it shld not be allowed die on vine." (745W.00/11-2151)

FonOff admits it is neither happy about present Sudan situation nor sees future clearly. It presently has no good news on subj, but wants Dept know its mind open and that it wld gladly welcome suggestions from US. It does not reject idea that at some time in some form referendum may be necessary.

Under present circumstances, however, FonOff inclined think that the more Sudanese are left alone to work out their own destiny on present lines the better it will be for all, particularly Sudanese. Brit feel UN or other outside intervention now could only heighten internal dissension already alarmingly aroused by Egypt provocation. UK thinks it can handle Egypt attempts penetrate Sudan but has frank doubts about ability maintain law and order shld interference on international scale further foment civil strife. It does not altogether discount possibility of revolt comparable to Mahdist uprising of last century.

FonOff emphasizes (and Emb confirms) strong emotional feeling Brit in general about Sudan. Public and Parliament proud Brit achievement in bringing good admin and element of prosperity to Sudan. To them it is unthinkable that UK shld abandon its responsibility towards Sudanese, and above all unthinkable for Sudan to become prey to Egypt.

While FonOff sees little or no possibility meeting minds with Egypt over attachment Sudan to Egypt monarchy, Emb thinks UK might eventually agree to some compromise on this score provided essential Sudanese freedom protected. FonOff says Egypt FonMin has never at any time given any hope of Egypt agreement simply on symbolic kingship. Egypt wants more than this; they want control over all that matters in Sudan. As for Bevin–Sidky formula, FonOff now finds difficult to say what language means, and in any event knows it wld mean one thing to Egypt and another to UK.

GIFFORD

641.74/11–2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, November 26, 1951—1 p. m.

767. Deptel 801 Nov 23.[2] "Necessity giving Brit troops rest" formula is not to be taken seriously.

I agree that immed shut-off effects will not be disastrous. Brit generals are having tough time and we shld be indulgent (Deptel 807

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, Rome for Acheson.

[2] Not printed.

Nov 25).[3] I suggest that we let them play their game for next 2 weeks altho it is bound to have adverse effect on my Serageddin convs and of course King will be particularly angry.

However, if this state of affairs is allowed to continue "as is" Egypt will eventually fall into lap of my Russian colleague like an overripe plum. Only thing that stands in way of this is our still considerable prestige. Therefore if Brit mil are still playing their game at end of fortnight I reluctantly suggest that there is only one way left for us to protect ourselves and that is the next time after the fortnight they turn off the tap Dept spokesman answer in reply to a planted press question that the US has no responsibility in case of the Brit mil shutting off fuel supplies from Egypt.[4]

CAFFERY

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[3] Not printed.

[4] In telegram 847 to Cairo of November 30, Webb informed Caffery that as a result of Acheson's intervention with Eden on the oil cutoff issue, as reported in telegram Secto 87 from Rome, *infra*, "it will not be necessary consider suggestion re press statement US non-responsibility re oil shutdown." (641.74/11-2951)

740.5/11-2651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

ROME, November 26, 1951—10 p. m.

Secto 87. Secretary lunched today with Eden, Butler and Lord De L'Isle and Dudley. Present from US were Lovett and Snyder. Secretary raised question of stoppage of oil in Egypt.[2] Eden showed Secretary cables received from Erskine which made two main points. First point is desire of Brit to keep Egyptian Govt anxious re troop situation. Second point was that troops were under strain and needed rest from inspection duties. Also mentioned were fact that bodies Brit soldiers being dragged from Sweet Water Canal and temper of troops rising. Cables made strong point that Brit cld not remain passive in situation. Oil shut-off results from desire not to remain passive. Secretary took strong position and said that it was clear from these telegrams that fundamental question was not military one. He said object was obviously to keep govt upset and plausible excuse found in diffi-ulty of troops there.

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[1] Repeated to London and Cairo.

[2] In telegram 2426, niact, to Acheson at Rome, November 25, Acting Secretary ebb stated in part that in light of telegram 754 from Cairo (p. 424), "it wld be elpful Secty mention Eden our gen concern re poss consequences Brit mil exert-g pressure against Egypt pop as thru cat and mouse game with oil supplies." A ritish display of restraint, Webb added, might possibly be "more devastating" Egyptian political leaders than provocative acts. (641.74/11-2551) In telegram 15, niact, from Rome of November 25, Ambassador Dunn informed Webb that heson was considering speaking to Eden "and stating our concern re Brit binet decision to shut off fuel oil." (641.74/11-2551)

Eden said he had had matter put to him and had agreed to action of Brit Govt. Secretary said Eden was clearly yielding on political matter because of mil pressure. US Govt and his own Amb in Egypt had considered course which Brit followed unproductive.

Secretary said US Govt wld stand firm with Brit on action to protect integrity of Canal Zone but that we cld not stand with them on this action. Secretary told Eden he was wholly wrong and was undermining solidarity of United States and Brit relations in regard this problem. Secretary said in long run Brit must have passive acceptance of Egyptian Govt. Eden asked what US expected of him. Secretary replied that we wanted reversal of Brit decision.

ACHESON

641.74/11-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, November 30, 1951—3 p. m.

788. Deptel 784 Nov 21.[2] Our two Embs have devoted great deal of time to preparation of joint evaluation of present situation and are reasonably near agreement on "background" and "conclusions" sections. Stevenson has had consultations with Brit mil but in view of their attitude and London's too, he seems to have trouble in fol through at least to commit himself on paper. Admittedly situation here is complex as well as perplexing and I have sympathy with his difficulties. (Stevenson and I still work in close coop and harmony.)

In view of delay I go ahead with my recommendations as fol:

Palace and Wafd are presently only forces in Egypt with sufficient power to govern.

Brit are prone to believe that somehow or other new govt can be formed with which they can deal. There may well come a time when this will be true and I hope it is soon; but time has not yet come. We shld therefore do our best to hold Brit back on this until time is ripe. We shld agree, however, that Salaheddin should go, preferably while still in Paris: Palace and Serageddin urge this; but they won't act until we agree with Serageddin.

While Serageddin is unwilling to put anything on paper he says that he stands on paras 2 and 3 of mytel 689, Nov 12,[3] in other words that Brit troops left in zone shld be called technicians and that number shld be subj to prior agreement. In regard to the airplanes he wants them to fly Egyptian flag. I asked if he cld get away with this, having in mind the super-inflamed anti-Brit atmosphere hanging over Egypt. He replied, "Yes, but on the condition Brit agree on something satisfactory on the Sudan". I am not convinced that he can get away with it but if anybody in Egypt can he can.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, Rome for Acheson.

[2] *Ante*, p. 422.

[3] *Ante*, p. 421.

Everything Dept says in connection with Egypts being always ready to reject proposals made to them but never producing any serious concrete suggestions is only too true and only too logical. However we must face reality, and they won't come up with anything beyond what Serageddin has already said and with which the King is in accord. The Egypts still believe that one way or another they will be able to worry Brit out of the zone and fortunately they don't realize how difficult the Brit position is: and Brit position may be described as "lamentable".

After considerable conversation with Stevenson on the subj he put forth the suggestion in mytel 785, Nov 29,[4] "to find some formula in regards to the Egyptian crown which cld be reconciled with the right of eventual self-determination of the Sudanese".

As law offices of the crown have apparently decided that juridically Egypt claim to title of King of Sudan is well-founded, we cld suggest to Egypts to recognize title subj to "referendum" under supervision of three mutually agreed-upon friendly powers. Brit Sudanese officials wld immed bring up multiple arguments why referendum is not practical but that is not pertinent. If we can get Egypts to agree to such a formula we will have progressed considerably and they might find it difficult to reject it. If it is true, as Brit say, that Egypt supporters in Sudan are in a small minority there is no reason for them to win such a referendum. Nor wld it be necessary to have the referendum take place immed. (I apprehend Brit believe Hague Court wld decide against them on title question.) These suggestions, of course, will need a lot of polishing.

With regard to Dept's specific inquiry whether Brit have consulted with Sudanese leaders on how far they cld go to meet Egypt demands, it is not my understanding that there have been any such consultations.

I realize that it will be difficult for the Brit to face facts on the Sudan, first of all for domestic polit reason, but if the Brit maintain their stand as recently set out in London and Paris we must resign ourselves to the fact that the canal zone may, unless something unforeseen turns up, explode with a loud bang at no distant date, an explosion with a potential chain reaction of occupation revolution eventual Commie domination. We must also face the fact that with nothing on the Sudan this govt or any other govt the King might set up cld not agree on any defense proposals we might put forth.

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[4] Not printed.

At same time we must do everything possible to encourage Egyptian Govt to take positive steps towards controlling terrorists as this should ease problems of Brit mil and help to avoid situation which might result in their taking drastic (and probably disastrous) reprisals.

CAFFERY

641.74/12–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 6, 1951—3 p. m.

828. Without ref to the varied causes which have brought Egypts to the white-heated animosity against the Brit mentioned mytel 825, Dec 5[2] it is important in any thinking re current sitn bear fully in mind the fact that this animosity is deeply genuine and permeates the entire society. There are no longer elements of the press, officialdom or the public to whom we can look for rationality on this question. Even the Pasha element shows signs of wavering in the Iron Curtain direction directly against their own vested interests.

Within the last few days over expression this animosity has taken the form of a widespread movement in demonstrations and hysterical edits, not against Brit but against Egypt Govt and Serageddin particular for holding Egypt people in leash. Early Extremist demands for giving free rein to liberation battalions, arming the people, severing all relations with the Brit, etc., have become the gen cry.

Serageddin is not yet beaten, but last evening in closing univs and schools, ordering police to use force in stopping demonstrations and appealing to public for support against "enemies of order and security" he was moving in direction of last resort measures. These measures may result temporary artificial appearance calm but pressure will continue increase toward explosion point unless fundamental change occurs soon including Brit Mil thinking from attitude retaliation to one of conciliation and genuine attempt find a solution; and price for solution is going daily higher.

On Egypt Govt side one important difficulty is that terrorist alleged commandos in zone with govt encouragement have become natl heroes and the vocal public are calling upon them daily for bigger and better outrages against Brit troops.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, Ankara.

[2] Not printed. It reported that because of military requirements arising out of acts of terrorism in the canal zone, British authorities had reimposed severe restrictions on road traffic between Suez and Cairo and a temporary stoppage of oil shipments; "We are therefore," Caffery reported, "for one reason or another back to where we started on the oil question." Caffery concluded: "While I question the [British] Generals good faith I do not recommend making an issue of this yet in view of the awful hole they are in at this juncture but we must face the fact that Egyptian animosity against them has risen to such white heat that a real explosion seems inevitable." (641.74/12–551)

CAFFERY

641.74/12-751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, December 7, 1951—6 p. m.

2661. We are concerned by possibility widening difference of opinion between US and UK on how deal with Egypt crisis and believe it wld be helpful set forth what we think is present Brit attitude.

1. Embtels 2489,[2] 2497[3] and 2609[3] show that UK is firmly opposed at this juncture to encouraging idea of plebiscite in Sudan, both to avoid feeding Salaheddin's propaganda and because UK considers any sort of referendum now on Sudan wld be impractical and meaningless. Referendum may come later but now Sudanese must concentrate on program self-govt. In any case, FonOff says UK has had no indication whatsoever from Egypt Govt of any serious intentions to allow Sudanese freely choose own place in internatl community and points to designation Farouk as King Sudan and promulgation constitution as evidence to contrary.

2. FonOff attitude towards Sudan problem influenced by Sudanese opinion, Brit public opinion and fears about Egypt intentions. UK will not bargain fate of Sudanese and they must be allowed determine own future. FonOff is unwilling in present circumstances for UK be party to formula having effect acknowledging Egypt's sovereignty over Sudan and it therefore appears doubtful Stevenson will get authority he has requested (last sentence first para Cairo's 785[4] to Dept). FonOff says in first place Sudanese won't have Egypt King as King Sudan. In second place only contractual basis for Egypt's rights in Sudan 1899 condominium agrmt, which, apart from fact Egypt has denounced it, raises complex legal questions on which opinion divided. Present FonOff view of Bevin-Sidky formula is that it is "incomprehensible" and that 1946 negots broke down precisely because of inability get any common interpretation of formula. UK might in last analysis be persuaded admit theoretical basis for

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[1] Repeated to Cairo, Paris, Baghdad, Moscow, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Amman, Damascus.

[2] Dated November 24, p. 425.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Not printed; dated November 29, it reported that on a trip to the Fayid Base at Suez, Stevenson had learned the British generals had prepared two telegrams to London, one suggested drastic military sanctions and the other economic sanctions of far-reaching extent. Stevenson obtained agreement from the generals to defer dispatch of the cables and then telegraphed London himself requesting permission to tell King Farouk that, unless terrorism in the canal zone ceased, British forces would be forced to take drastic countermeasures in self-defense and asking for specific authority to tell Farouk that an effort would be made to find some formula with regard to the Egyptian crown and Sudan. (641.74/11-2951)

recognizing titular sovereignty King Egypt in Sudan, but wld go on to insist that question can not be divorced from present-day realities, foremost of which is Sudanese opposition to any form of Egypt control. In Brit view, Sudanese have been brought too far along road to self-govt and self-determination for process of history to be reversed and if Sudanese fear Egypt domination Egypt has only itself to blame. Gov-Gen Sudan has within past few days warned of violent reaction there if any sort of exclusive Egypt sovereignty recognized.

3. Embtel 2489 stated Brit objections to UN or internatl commission.

4. On defense proposals FonOff appears to think some flexibility at right time possible. FonOff not yet prepared be specific, but "flexibility" cld mean some combination UK's earlier proposal for progressive civilianization of base and MEC offer.

5. However, Brit concern about any new offer to Egypt is almost as much one of timing as of substance. Eden believes no dramatic move possible now and Brit policy for present must be one of patience and firmness. We think Brit consider present test of strength has on whole so far proved fairly successful politically and shld be allowed produce its effects little while longer, at least in absence responsible govt leadership in Egypt with which UK can effectively deal. Primary objective is holding on to base and this so far being accomplished Brit tempted think Egypt govt may be having even tougher time than they and that it cld be fatal show any sign of weakness now.

6. FonOff has great doubts govt headed by Nahas can ever agree to satisfactory settlement (whatever Serageddin thinks he can do about Salaheddin, etc). In any event, Egypt Govt must first come to grips with terrorism. Until govt faces this threat squarely (which FonOff has hopes it will in due time), it is unlikely—feel able negotiate with Brit and in fact will probably feel compelled make greater outward show intransigence towards Brit as terrorism increases. FonOff thinks "liberation battalions" in order gain public sympathy for independent existence may well stimulate further violence in canal zone and elsewhere. But Brit likely view this as further justification for taking safety their troops more and more into their own hands and added reason for putting no trust into govt which shows itself so unable or so unwilling to fulfill its responsibilities. As indicated above, Brits are far from despairing about what may on surface appear be indications imminent disaster and have hope that present Egypt authorities are waking up and will eventually take situation in hand. In any event, Brit probably do not at moment consider that it wld necessarily be unmitigated disaster if Nahas swept from office as result public disturbances. Brit also have in mind that there is still one last means of salvation which has not yet been brought to bear on internal situation, the Egypt army.

7. As counterweight to impression foregoing may give, it can be said that UK all feel unsatisfactory and explosive nature present situation and wld be only too glad to find anything that they feel wld work without sacrificing fundamental objectives and principles. On-the-spot reporting and recommendations of Amb Stevenson will undoubtedly carry weight. But on balance it appears likely Brit

Cabinet wld feel that any new approach to Egypt at this particular time wld do more harm than good.

This is Brit position as it appears to us as of today. It may of course change with events and we will watch closely for any such change.

GIFFORD

641.74/12-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT CAIRO, December 11, 1951—midnight.

858. On instrs FonOff Brit Amb called on acting Egypt FonMin tonight to tell him "don't get upset over Suez developments. The real purpose of them was to cut down points of friction. HMG takes full responsibility and will pay compensation immed. We have got to start talking and get to grips as excitement does not reach any sensible conclusion."[2] P. H. Amr[3] came to Eden upset with way things were going and wanted to know what Brit were going to do about it. He agreed with the text of the message which FonOff was sending Stevenson.[4]

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, Rome, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Tehran, and Arab capitals.

[2] See footnote 4, *supra*.

[3] Egyptian Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

[4] Caffery informed the Secretary in telegram 859 from Cairo, December 12, that the British Embassy at Cairo was "thoroughly aroused" over the implications of a possible break in Anglo-Egyptian relations "and is anxious for me to check again on subj with Egyptians. I will do so." (641.74/12-1251)

641.74/12-1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT CAIRO, December 12, 1951—2 p. m.

861. I again counseled Acting Min Fon Aff not to break relations with Brit. He said that govt to save its face with Egypt people must do something. He said, "As a friend tell us what to do". I skipped that one. He then said, "The very least we can do is to recall Amr as a protest. Can we do that?" I said, "Do not dare tell anyone that I told you but if you can have your cabinet buy that one I say go ahead; but promise me not to do anything against Stevenson or Embassy here". He replied, "All right".

He then again made his unusual heated appeal for us to do something to hold down Brit mil in zone. I told him that most effective things Egypts cld do in that connection was to call off their own terrorists.[2]

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda.

CAFFERY

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[2] In telegram 873, niact, from Cairo, December 13, Caffery reported that the Egyptian Government had just dispatched a note to the British Embassy protesting British "'atrocities'" and ending with the announcement that, in order to publicly show its indignation, Egypt was immediately recalling its Ambassador (Amr) to the United Kingdom. The Egyptian note was accompanied by a public communiqué announcing (1) preparation of legislation establishing sanctions against anyone who collaborated or had transactions with British military forces in the country; (2) modification of existing legislation to permit anyone to carry firearms on condition that the Minister of Interior was notified and did not object within a stated time; and (3) transfer of the Egyptian technical bureau, then in London, to Central Europe, with offices in Switzerland. (641.74/12–1351) In telegram 875 from Cairo, December 13, Caffery added that the actions announced by the Egyptian Cabinet "probably minimum Wafd thought it cld get away with and remain in power." After assessing the impact of these measures, Caffery added that considering the fact the Egyptian Government had considered a complete break in Anglo-Egyptian relations and/or the recall of Stevenson, "we have not come off too badly with tonight's actions." Caffery admitted that he was not certain why Farouk "has gone along with this" but guessed the King was unwilling to throw the Wafd into opposition "at this juncture." (641.74/12–1351)

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, December 12, 1951[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 12, 1951.

PRESENT

General Bradley
General Collins
General Vandenberg
Admiral Duncan
General Bolte
General Lee
Admiral Fife
Admiral Wooldridge
General Cabell
Admiral Lalor
Colonel Carnes

Mr. Matthews
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Bonbright
Mr. Berry
Mr. Ferguson
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Tufts
Mr. Gleason

General Ruffner

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[1] A note on the source text reads: "State draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." There is no indication from the source text of the identity of the drafting officer. The section on Egypt comprises pages 10–13 of the source text. The first two sections dealt with the questions of Korea and the prisoners of war and the results of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome. For a brief summary of the discussions on Korea and the prisoners-of-war issue by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, December 12, see vol. VII, p. 1307.

EGYPT

Mr. Berry: I have just returned from a visit to Egypt where I found a terrible situation. The British are detested. The hatred against them is general and intense. It is shared by everyone in the country. The result is that the position we desire in Egypt, the area we want for bases, and the influence of Egypt in the Arab world in support of our interests are denied to us. A solution is urgently needed to this exceedingly complex problem. The problem is not simply a problem of British position and influence in Egypt. It has many other deep-seated reasons as well. These include the fact that the population of Egypt has increased by one quarter in ten years. This increase has not been accompanied by any measurable increase in the amount of land under cultivation or in yields. It also includes the unequal distribution of wealth. One half of the cultivable land is owned by one-half of one percent of the land owners. In the cities there is an even more unequal distribution of wealth. It also includes the problem of education. Most of the population is illiterate and its ignorance is unimaginable.

I might give you one example to illustrate the importance of this last factor. During my stay in Egypt there was a riot at Ismailia. The riot started because a British patrol started to pick up a man who was lying in the street. The patrol thought that he was dead. However, he was not dead and when the patrol members picked him up he ran off. An Egyptian policeman saw this and jumped to the conclusion that evil spirits were abroad. He ran through the streets shooting off his revolver and crying out that evil spirits were abroad. He alarmed the 60 policemen in his headquarters and touched off a full-scale riot. It was four hours before the British and Egyptian authorities could restore order.

Another factor is that the Wafd party is the most corrupt party that has ever been in power in recent Egyptian history. A close associate of the Prime Minister arranged to have some valuable land declared as wasteland and then proceeded to arrange for the irrigation of this land at government expense. In this way he gained great wealth. That is just one example of the corruption which spreads throughout the government. No one has any confidence in the honesty of the government. It is also inept. It has not fulfilled any of the promises it made to the Egyptian people. It is also a disunited party except on the one question of the abrogation of the treaty with the U.K. As a matter of fact the Wafd party is happy to have the British troops as a focus of the Egyptian discontent. The party has now developed a campaign which really challenges the U.K. position in Egypt. Eighty-five percent of the labor force working for the British in the Canal Zone has left. When I visited a high British official in the Zone for lunch we ate canned food which he opened at his desk. His servant had gone out to obtain fresh food and had been beaten up and warned that unless he ceased to serve the official he would be tied hand and foot and thrown into the Canal. This kind of terrorism is increasing.

The British are trying to meet the labor problem by flying in labor from outside. However, this does not help—in fact, it introduces an element of confusion. The bases can no longer be regarded as operational bases. This puts us in a precarious position in the Middle East.

The British Ambassador is very depressed. He sees the future as a rapid downward spiral which will probably be set off by incidents in the Canal Zone. There are increasing accounts of violence against British soldiers and they are not a pretty kind. They are sand-bagged in the streets and then cut up. There were eleven such murders during my visit. The British soldiers are highly resentful of British inactivity. The officers believe that they will not be able to control the soldiers very long unless they take active measures to counter these acts of violence. However, if the British strike back the Egyptians will retaliate by cleaning the British out of Cairo and Alexandria. The British will occupy Cairo and Alexandria and that will lead to the eventual loss of Egypt by the British.

I am not quite as depressed as the British Ambassador. There are a number of elements with whom and with which we can work. (1) Our Ambassador is greatly respected. He speaks with a ring of authority. There is no doubt that he is the outstanding foreigner in Egypt. (2) The British Ambassador sees eye to eye with our Ambassador. We can get, and have gotten a joint view of the problem. I regard that as a matter of great importance. (3) Despite the U.S. position on Palestine, the U.S. still has great prestige in Egypt. This prestige can be exploited to our advantage. (4) The King clearly understands the position. He realizes that his position as king depends on our own—in fact, even his life depends on a solution of this problem. (5) There are certain Egyptian groups which are also on our side. For example, the Pashas clearly recognize that their position and wealth will be lost if Western influence is removed from Egypt. Some time this group will have to come out into the open if the terror is to be brought under control.

I think we may have to revamp our concept of the MEC in order to give more flattery to Egyptian vanity. I think we will also have to do something about recognizing the King of Egypt as the King of the Sudan. That should not be difficult as even the British law court recognizes his right to this title.

In conclusion, I would only say that Egypt is rapidly going down the drain and that it will soon be lost unless the trend is soon reversed.

If this happens we will have to revise our policy toward the whole Arab world. One of the difficulties in finding a solution is that the present government is the only organized political group.

General Bradley: What do you have in mind as regards the revamping of the MEC? We offered them already a very large position.

Mr. Berry: I must admit that we have not thought this one through. The Egyptians desire that the Arab states should all be charter members. It may be necessary to find some role for King Farouk. It may be necessary and possible for the British to withdraw some of their forces. In this connection I might point out that the Egyptians are ready to accept air force personnel on the ground that they are technicians. It is the ground forces which they are unwilling to permit to stay in Egypt. We have no definite and concrete proposal to make but we think something along these lines will have to be explored.

Mr. Ferguson: Did you feel that the Egyptians had understood our MEC proposals? When I was there a short time before your visit I had the feeling that the Egyptians had never read the proposals and had no understanding of them.

Mr. Berry: That is correct. They never saw the proposals. The Foreign Minister was the only cabinet member who had read them prior to their rejection by the cabinet.

Mr. Matthews: Is there any awareness in Egypt of the Communist threat?

Mr. Berry: That is something we can work on of course. Egypt is far from Russia and does not fear Russia; however, there are many Egyptians who fear the coming to power of extremist groups within Egypt. Such groups would be a challenge to the power and position of the wealthy Egyptians. They greatly fear the Moslem brotherhood and its policy of political assassination.

Mr. Bohlen: Did you get any impression about the development of the Communist party strength in Egypt?

Mr. Berry: No specific information. The Soviet Embassy has been conducting itself very circumspectly. The local Communist party is exploiting the discontent with local conditions but it had not been trying to spread the gospel of Marxism.

Mr. Bohlen: Is the Communist party trying the develop a fanatic nationalism which it could then exploit?

Mr. Berry: Yes, it is.

General Bradley: This has been a most interesting report.

641.74/12-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—6 p. m.

2923. 1. Embassy's thoughtful analysis present UK attitude on Egypt and Sudan (Embtel 2661 December 7)[2] most helpful and timely since Department reviewing our position on these questions.

2. We are concerned by tendency UK allow matters drift for time being, in hope that "something" may turn up which will make settlement possible. Since we are apprehensive consequences prolongation this line, we consider important that you discuss Anglo-Egyptian question with Eden soonest making clear our analysis situation and views following paragraphs. If possible, discussion should take place before Eden goes to Paris.

3. As we understand it, UK believes continuation present policy firmness and patience without further move from our side to end impasse may result in Egypt eventually being prepared negotiate settlement along desired lines. UK assumption is that if situation is permitted drift, in time either (A) Wafd Government (with or without Nahas), realizing folly of its ways, will take matters in hand and be prepared negotiate reasonably; or (B) public dissatisfaction and frustration will sweep Nahas and his party out of office and new government will come to power willing suppress disorder, back down on intransigeant Wafd stand and negotiate reasonable settlement.

4. Our analysis situation somewhat different. We consider Egyptian nationalism, which has grown steadily since 1919 is deeply-rooted movement which will neither subside nor alter its course by mere passage of time. Although present high pitch national fervor and emotion, of which UK primary target, may be partially induced artificially, we are convinced that in general it represents substantially accurate expression of popular feeling against UK. We also believe this feeling likely grow as time passes and as incidents and Egyptian deaths affect various parts of country. Danger present state of drift is that while public dissatisfaction and frustration may sweep Nahas and party out of office, Wafd may not be replaced by more reasonable politicians; on the contrary there is good chance it will be replaced by extremist elements which may lead Egypt down road to chaos and anarchy. If this should happen, and it becomes necessary for parts of Egypt to be reoccupied by UK to preserve law and order, we believe that will add such fuel to flames of Egyptian nationalism that West will have in Egypt no long range position and can maintain

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[1] Drafted by G. Lewis Jones and Stabler, cleared by BNA, EUR, S/P, and S. Approved for transmission by Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews. Repeated to Paris, Cairo, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Damascus.

[2] *Ante*, p. 431.

itself short-range only by force. What we could do in 1882 would not be acceptable to world opinion in 1952. In essence we hope British analysis is right; we doubt that it is and we fear consequences of UK maintaining its present policy too long.

5. UK and US share same basic objective in Egypt and although UK bears greater responsibility, US has stood close to UK regarding Egypt since our association with Four-Power defense proposals. We believe that to achieve our objective, namely maintenance strategic facilities in such manner they can be speedily and effectively used in wartime, we must have reasonable degree Egyptian cooperation. Regarding this we are impressed by conclusion reached by US and UK Embassies Cairo and concurred in by British Generals Fayid, that as of now lack Egyptian cooperation has resulted in Canal base being "no longer operative". (Cairo's 799 December 1 and Despatch 1279 December 2).[3]

6. Regarding Sudan we recognize UK more directly involved than US and that UK takes pride in its achievements there. However, we feel unpalatable fact must be faced, that defense issue and Sudan question are linked. Our two Ambassadors Cairo are convinced that we shall make no progress regarding Egyptian cooperation on defense issue if some face-saving move cannot be made regarding Sudan. We also believe that as each day goes by without moves by either side to settle situation, solution becomes increasingly more difficult.

7. Department particularly welcomes Eden's statement to Egyptian Ambassador December 11 that UK willing resume talks either Cairo or London.[4] We feel resumption talks (which was one of reasons we suggested UK respond to Salaheddin's Sudan plebiscite proposal) would give Egyptian Government excuse hold tight reign on disturbances. Talks would only be of use if they get down to substance quickly. Department's thinking this connection is along lines of "package deal" in which UK in conjunction US, France, and Turkey recognize title "King of Sudan" on condition (A) that Egyptians at same time agree to some form plebiscite or referendum to guarantee to Sudanese their right to eventual self-determination; and (B) that Egypt agree to substance Four Power defense proposals which might be recast without altering basic concept to make them more saleable Egyptian public.

8. Regarding above proposal we make following comments (A) Proposal seems wholly consistent with today's press reports views Eden will expound to Salaheddin in Paris; (B) It is consistent with Cairo joint appreciation that solution defense issue requires some move regarding Sudan; (C) It safeguards UK and Sudanese interests and also gives Egypt face-saving concession; (D) Any agreement

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[3] Neither printed.

[4] See footnote 4, *infra*.

by Egypt on substance Four Power proposals must not only be in form which binds Egypt but must contain provisions for presence in Egypt of allied troops in sufficient strength to assure maintenance MEC rights there since under present conditions new agreement with Egypt without such provisions would inspire no more confidence than 36 treaty.[5]

ACHESON

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[5] In telegram 893 from Cairo, niact, December 16, Caffery stated that he agreed with the ideas expressed in the source text, but that the important questions were timing and channels. "This is the time but I question Salaheddin a channel." Caffery added that if the British accepted the package proposals outlined in paragraph 7, Farouk should be approached, and, if he approved, Serageddin should then be contacted in confidence for suggestions regarding the course to be followed. (641.74/12-1651) In telegram 908 from Cairo, December 19, Caffery reported that Stevenson was delighted with the views expressed in the source text and was "as convinced as I am that Dept's suggestions signify only way out." (641.74/12-1951)

641.74/12-1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, December 17, 1951—7 p. m.

2769. Deptel 2923 December 14.[2] I saw Eden just before he left for Paris. Strang was also present. Eden agrees that something shld be done and done without delay about Egyptian question. As to our "packaged deal" proposal he particularly likes (B) and as to our comments, he particularly agrees with (D). However, he seemed adamantly opposed to making any concession on Sudan for two reasons: One, that as I stated in Embtel 2609 December 5,[3] he was unwilling to disturb Sudan situation, and second, that he personally did not think it would buy anything from Egypt.

Eden is to see Salah El-Din in Paris[4] although he thinks there is practically no chance of anything constructive coming out of mtg. He felt obligated to agree to see him because Amb asked if he wld and he felt he wld be criticized in UK and especially in US if he refused to do so. He said when he sees Salah El-Din he will certainly do nothing "to build the little man up".[5]

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Cairo, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Damascus.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed.

[4] In telegram 865 from Cairo, December 12, Caffery had reported that Egyptian Ambassador Amr at London had said that Salaheddin had complained that Eden had seen all the Arab foreign ministers at Paris during the Sixth Session of the General Assembly except Salaheddin. Eden subsequently said he would see Salaheddin if he requested it to talk about defense proposals "but not if he wanted to talk the same old lines." (641.74/12-1251) In telegram 922 to Cairo, repeated to London, Acheson reported that the Department of State had been informed by the British Embassy at Washington that if Eden saw Salaheddin in Paris he would talk in the most general terms and would not suggest any " 'deal'." (641.74/12-1651)

GIFFORD

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[5] In telegram 2770 from London, December 17, Gifford reported having just been shown instructions to Stevenson drafted by the Foreign Office at Eden's behest which stated that, subject to Stevenson's comments and anything that might come of the Eden–Salaheddin talks, Stevenson was to approach Farouk and "suggest he throw out govt and install one which will at least talk about MEC proposals." Stevenson was to emphasize to the King that the MEC proposals offered a possibility of Egypt obtaining everything it wished in the canal zone. (641.74/12–1751) At the close of telegram 908, summarized in part in footnote 5, *supra*, Caffery stated: "I again repeat and emphasize that if FonOff continues to adhere to policies set out in London tel 2769 and 2770, Dec 17 to Dept, we are headed for real trouble."

641.74/12–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 18, 1951— 3 p. m.

904. King has become progressively more angry with Wafd and particularly with way in which it has consistently out-maneuvered him ever since abrogation of the treaty. Determined to break the present govt, he is in need of two things:

(1) An occasion on which he can do so without putting himself in the wrong with people and
(2) An indication from the Brit that they wld be prepared to settle with a successor govt along lines sufficiently acceptable to Egypt people to render successor govts position tenable.

Gallad Pasha tells me that the right occasion arose on the night Dec 8 when the Wafd had failed so miserably in its announced "resist with all available force" move to stop the Brit demolition at Kafr Abdu but that King was unfortunately taken unawares and did not seize his advantage.

King was opposed to any break in relations with Brit and was not prepared accept even Amr recall. Cabinet, realizing this, announced recall in *Al Misri* before obtaining King's approval. This placed King in impossible position in public eye and he resentfully signed the order.

King is furious over what he terms "blundering tactics" of Brit in arranging Eden–Salaheddin meeting. In his opinion mere fact a mtg is taking place is a victory for Wafd and makes his job of breaking govt more difficult. He believes Salaheddin only anxious for mtg in order to be able publicize "I told Eden so and so". King is of the opinion Salaheddin will reject any proposals made by Brit and that his rejection of them will make it impossible for a successor govt to consider them.[2]

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, Ankara, Arab capitals, Tripoli, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Rome, and Moscow.

CAFFERY

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[2] In telegram 909 of December 19 from Cairo, Caffery reported that he had spoken with Sirry Pasha, "who made it clear he cld not undertake to head a new govt here at this juncture unless Brit FonOff changed its present attitude." Sirry, Caffery added, "is probably the outstanding polit leader here who is basically friendly to Western world." (641.74/12-1951)

641.74/12-1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, December 19, 1951—8 p. m.

2815. Eden launched hour's discussion with Salaheddin evening 18th by speaking out strongly against attacks two Egypt members Brit Emb, attacks in canal zone by Egypt police and terrorists, anti-Brit propaganda in Brit press and recall Amr deplored present state Anglo-Egypt relations and said business two FonMins set them right. In first place essential that incidents shld cease and present tension be relaxed. He urged most strongly that when this had been brought about Egypt Govt shld study 4-power proposals which UK sincerely believed held basis fair settlement. Salaheddin seemed agree incidents regrettable. He spoke on usual lines about impossibility accepting Brit or any other foreign occupation and said Egypt Govt had rejected 4-power proposals after close study showed little difference from offer Egypt had rejected in April. Eden disagreed. Enumerated specific advantages. Was confident differences cld be ironed out if proposals only discussed. Made it plain UK cld not meet Egypt demand for evacuation and that it was not God Salaheddin expecting it.

Salaheddin said he wld report conv to his govt, putting to it suggestion that efforts shld now be made bring incidents to end (Eden said UK had already done its part by withdrawing troops from Said, Suez and Ismailia) and that thereafter both sides shld consider 4-power proposals without commitment. Eden said he was ready contemplate talks either London or Cairo. No mention of Sudan was made during conv.

Commenting on conv in his report to London, Eden said he cld not tell whether anything wld come of it, that he gave nothing away and that Salaheddin seemed in more reasonable mood than anticipated.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

Eden was asked for Stevenson's comments in connection instruction reported Embtel 2770, rptd Cairo 112.[2]

FonOff also at loss know what to make of Salaheddin's rather surprising moderation, but thinks he may be shrewd enough realize Farouk's state of mind about Wafd Govt and also subdued by lack success Paris. If there is any serious indication from Cairo that suggestion third para might lead to something FonOff likely be willing hold up action on instruction reported Embtel 2770 for at least several days.[3]

GIFFORD

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[2] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 441; in telegram 903 from Cairo, December 18, Caffery reported that Stevenson had received his instructions from London which included "lecture King in Miles Lampson way." Stevenson had told Caffery "(most confidentially) this wld have been all right in 1888 or even in 1920 but now it wld only make the King very angry indeed as it wld bring to mind the tanks of 1942." Caffery reported that Stevenson was "thinking up best approach to let FonOff know tactfully how completely unrealistic all this is." (641.74/12–1851)

[3] Caffery reported in telegram 921 from Cairo, December 21, that the Acting Chief of the King's Cabinet had said the previous evening that Farouk "is not thinking presently about any change of government. As matters now stand he considers it more prudent to keep Wafd in power." (641.74/12–2151)

641.74/12–2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, December 22, 1951—2 p. m.

2856. Because of strong evidence "something on the Sudan" might break Anglo-Egyptian impasse, we wld perhaps recapitulate why Eden is so dead set against using this avenue. In this connection it is worth remembering that his judgment is probably backed up by considerable confidence in his own knowledge and understanding of Sudan and Anglo-Egyptian affairs. (It must be remembered in this connection that Eden once resigned from Brit Govt on moral issue.) Here are his reasons.

1. If all other reasons discounted, recognizing title Egyptian King wld still be impossible because Sudanese wld not have it and wld probably revolt against it with violence. (This feeling is strongly fortified by recent reports from Governor General Sudan that he cannot be responsible for maintenance law and order if this concession made.)

2. Constitutional and polit obligations which British have undertaken to Sudanese make it morally impossible to recognize Farouk's title without Sudanese consent. Brit, no more than Sudanese, public opinion wld allow it.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

3. Egyptians wld not be satisfied with recognition mere titular sovereignty and Sudanese know it. Recent proclamations re Farouk's title to Sudan and Sudan Constitution illustrated Egypt's real intentions.

4. At best, Egypt's claim to exclusive sovereignty over Sudan hangs by very slender thread.

1899 condominium agreement is only contractual basis for any Egypt rights there.

5. Plebiscite now wld be mechanically impractical and if it revealed anything at all, wld only confirm factional splits of which we are already well aware. When Sudanese developed institutions of self-govt to point where referendum cld have some meaning they can choose whatever future they please but UK cannot agree to recognizing in advance King's title even "subject to referendum," for reasons stated above.

This combination of practical, polit and moral reasons held by Brit against any compromise affecting the Sudan makes it difficult to see how Eden cld be argued out of his convictions.

If discussions on MEC can be initiated and it becomes evident that settlement of zone problem can be achieved if Sudan question solved, Eden might be willing at least to talk Sudan. Even in these circumstances Brit concessions wld be limited to what they felt they cld do without betraying their obligations to Sudanese. Only other possibility that suggests itself to us at moment is that if Sudan question kept to one side for present and real advance towards self-govt is made during coming year as UK contemplates, this might create new situation allowing for try at some arrangement that wld satisfy Egyptians.

FonOff says that is not fair to say UK is unwilling to try meet Egypt point view on Sudan but rather that it is unable to see now any way in which this can be done.

We believe above background shld be kept in mind in developing US position for coming Washington talks.[2]

GIFFORD

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[2] Prime Minister Churchill was due to visit Washington in January 1952 for talks with President Truman.

GREECE[1]

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH GREECE[2]

A. Political and Economic Relations

781.00/1–451 : Despatch

The Minister in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 1008

ATHENS, January 4, 1951.

Subject: Current Status of the "Papagos Solution"

Enclosed is the record of a recent conversation[3] between officer of this Embassy and Spyros Markezinis, leader of the New Party and friend and counselor of Marshal Papagos.

Much of Markezinis' conversation upon this occasion consisted merely of a reiteration of his views on the Papagos solution, along the lines reported in previous telegrams and despatches from this Embassy. It appears from this account and from certain remarks of Papagos himself that the Marshal continues to be averse to becoming Prime Minister except as the result of elections in which he would head a ticket composed of candidates of his own choosing. Some consideration is apparently being given to bringing Papagos and Plastiras together in the political field, and preliminary overtures to this end have been made by some members of EPEK and other left-center elements. The Court is reported to continue to look with disfavor upon the Markezinis version of the Papagos solution and is said to hope that election results satisfactory to the Palace can be achieved in six months time through the assistance of Ellinkon Phos, an organization formed to promote the spiritual and moral uplift of the nation but rapidly, and perhaps inevitably, becoming involved in politics.

The difficult economic situation, the danger from abroad and the uncertainty of the parliamentary majority of the present Government have brought again to the fore talk of the necessity for a strong government with the inevitable concomittant of renewed speculation concerning the possible elevation to political power of Marshal Papagos.

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[1] Documentation on problems involving the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is presented in vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff. For documentation on a dispute between Greece and Belgium concerning attachment of U.S. Marshall Plan funds for Greece by a Belgian private firm, Socobel (Société Commerciale Belge), see volume IV.

[2] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. V, pp. 335 ff.

[3] Not printed.

As previously reported, the Markezinis version of the Papagos solution has the support of some strong Liberal elements and is not based entirely upon rightists and life-long Royalists. Backing from both these politically diverse forces, however, comes preponderantly from the vested interests, the leaders in industry, finance and business. Markezinis would no doubt assert that the force of this criticism would be largely invalidated by the program of social justice and equality of sacrifice that Papagos would proclaim and follow, by the efforts being made to secure the support of some of the Socialists, and that individual candidates for the Papagos ticket would be drawn from all groups and classes. It is also possible that the tentative overtures for a Papagos–Plastiras combine might result in some agreement that would broaden the economic base of the Papagos front as envisaged by Markezinis, although certainly some of the leading lights of EPEK, such as Tsouderos and Merkouris, are no less representatives of the over privileged Athenians than are many politicians belonging to parties much further to the Right on political matters.

The Embassy is continuing to follow the situation closely with regard to political moves concerning Marshal Papagos and will attempt to keep the Department fully informed on this potentially very important matter.[4]

CHARLES W. YOST

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[4] In despatch 1075 from Athens, January 11, Ambassador Peurifoy enclosed a memorandum of conversation between Yost and Papagos on January 10 in which Papagos, under "discreet" probing, remarked, *inter alia*, that the current government did not enjoy the confidence of the Greek people and that Greece needed a government which enjoyed a solid parliamentary majority and would have the strength and courage to adopt socially progressive measures "which could be described as 'socialist'." (781.00/1–1151)

781.5/1–2051

Memorandum by the Minister in Greece (Yost) to the Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy)[1]

TOP SECRET ATHENS, January 20, 1951.

Subject: The Place of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey in Military Planning for the Year 1951

The Problem

The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest a reconsideration of military planning for Greece and Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Turkey, in so far as concerns the calendar year 1951 *only*.

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[1] Peurifoy transmitted the source text to the Department of State in despatch 1129, January 20. In a covering note, Peurifoy stated, *inter alia*, "At least from

Alternative Military Situations in Europe in 1951

Any one of three possible military situations may confront the West in Europe in 1951. First, open hostilities may be confined to the Far East and 1951 can be devoted in Europe to building up strength generally in accordance with overall strategic plans. Second, the Soviets, if they achieve a considerable success with indirect satellite aggression in the Far East, may attempt in Europe in 1951 a similar aggression in which they are not overtly involved, with a view both to strengthening their strategic position and to undermining the Western system of alliances before it becomes too strong. Finally, general war involving Europe may break out in 1951.

It is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty which of these alternatives will occur. The state of Soviet atomic and air defense capabilities is probably such that they would prefer to delay general hostilities until after 1951. On the other hand, they may not feel that they can permit the NATO to develop throughout the year without a counterblow which, if successful, could, without general war, shake the confidence and resolution of its European members. Such a blow might be a satellite attack on European states not members of the NAT.

Obviously, the best possible preparations should be made for each of these alternatives mentioned above, but equally obviously, satisfactory preparations cannot be made for all of them in 1951. If general war breaks out this summer, the manpower of Western Europe will still be largely unorganized and unequipped. Indeed, most of the equipment which had been supplied Western Europe would, under these circumstances, probably be lost. On the other hand, if general war does not break out in 1951, arms despatched to Western Europe during that period will be useful only for training and morale. These purposes are, of course, of great importance, but, in setting up priorities for deliveries of military equipment, they should be balanced against other related purposes.

The Position of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey

If the estimate set forth above is correct, there is at least a serious possibility that a satellite attack against a European country may be launched in 1951. If this should occur, Greece or Yugoslavia or both would be the most likely targets.

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the point of view of the strategic position of Greece, I believe this memo deserves the Department's careful attention." (781.5/1-2051) On February 2, Philip H. Watts of the Policy Planning Staff circulated the Yost memorandum to Bonbright of EUR, Byington of WE, Reinhardt and Campbell of EE, and Martin and MacArthur of RA. In a covering memorandum, Watts mentioned, *inter alia*, that Yost had also sent a copy of his memorandum to Policy Planning Staff Director Paul Nitze. (781.5/2-251)

Only a country adjacent to one of the satellites is exposed to such an attack. Of the countries adjacent, West Germany and Austria are occupied by Western troops so that even a satellite attack would raise the immediate question of general war. Yugoslavia and Greece are both physically and politically exposed, the latter because, while it has been the subject of deep US and UK concern, it is not presently protected by binding commitments as are the NAT members. The Korean experience demonstrated that the Soviets will not necessarily respect an area in which the US has taken a primary interest, as long as there are no US troops in occupation and no clear commitments to defend it. Indeed, the Kremlin may well be aware that the US has no present plans to send troops to Greece in case of war, either general or local.

The strategic and political advantages to the USSR of overrunning Yugoslavia and Greece are so clear as to need no elaboration. There is also in each case an emotional factor which might influence the Kremlin's calculations, in the case of Yugoslavia, a desire to punish and exterminate Tito; in the case of Greece, a desire to recoup the humiliating failure of the civil war.

The extensive rearmament of Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, which has taken place during the last year, is not an idle gesture. Perhaps it is intended only to prepare for general war. There can be no question, however, that these countries now substantially outclass Yugoslavia and Greece in matériel, particularly tanks and artillery. If these preponderances should be supplemented by adequate Soviet air power (Russian planes could easily be given satellite markings), they might prove decisive in spite of the toughness and spirit of the Greek and Yugoslav armies.

It should also be noted that the organs of Cominform propaganda are at present laying great stress on the theme that the Athens-Belgrade axis, linked to Ankara and Rome and directed by the US, is preparing an early aggression against the peoples' democracies. Such allegations have in the past frequently provided the excuse for totalitarian aggression. Similarly, Bulgarian papers are playing up the ' oppression" to which their compatriots are allegedly being subjected in Greek Macedonia and Thrace, and are demanding that these areas be liberated. The current ejection of Bulgaria's Turkish minority is another ominous sign. Both the material force and the political case are therefore being zealously prepared.

The Greek, Yugoslav and Turkish Armies

It has been frequently pointed out that, at the moment when we are desperately endeavoring to organize an army for the defense of Western Europe and are confronted by the inescapable fact that this army cannot attain substantial proportions during 1951, there already exist in Southeastern Europe three large armies of tough fighting quality and high morale, the Yugoslav of over 20 divisions, the Greek of 9, and the Turkish of 19, with a large increment of trained reserves mobilizable within a matter of hours.

It it not within the scope of this memo to discuss the role which these armies could play in case of general war. At the least, they would constitute a threat on the Soviet flank which would immobilize a considerable number of Soviet and satellite divisions. It is conceivable that, if properly equipped, they could even temporarily take the offensive in order to relieve the pressure on Western Europe at a critical time.

While this fact constitutes an important reason for hastening the modernization of their equipment, even more pressing perhaps is the necessity of enabling them to do so in order to meet a satellite attack, the serious possibility of which has been discussed above. This is especially important since the extent and speed with which aid could be rendered them after an attack begins is open to serious question.

What is in fact the present state of their armament? The Yugoslavs have a hodgepodge of obsolete equipment, for much of which ammunition and spare parts are in short supply, lacking any substantial anti-tank or anti-aircraft defense or any effective air power. The Greeks have an army excellently prepared to fight a guerrilla war but very heavily outclassed, by even the Bulgars alone, in artillery, tanks, anti-tank guns and aviation, and having on hand only a small fraction of the TNT required for the demolitions and mines which play a vital part in their play of battle. Material to fill most of these deficiences, except aviation, is included in the approved 1950 and 1951 MDAP programs, but almost none has in fact arrived in Greece. Both the Yugoslav and Greek armies might therefore, in case of a satellite attack under present condition, either be knocked out by superior power or at least lose rapidly a very substantial proportion of their forces and territory.

This Embassy is not acquainted in detail with the state of equipment of the Turkish army. Turkey would, moreover, be less likely to be subject to a purely satellite attack than would Greece or Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the deterrent value of a strong Turkish army, in conjunction with those of Greece and Yugoslavia, not to mention its role in case of general war, would seem to warrant a high priority for the supply to it of modern equipment.

Aid to Greece and Yugoslavia After a Satellite Attack

The very serious strategic and political effects of a successful satellite attack on Greece and/or Yugoslavia have been referred to above. It is very possible that, with adequate equipment, these two armies could alone defend themselves successfully against a satellite attack.

Even in this case, however, at least token forces from outside acting in the name of the UN would be necessary for morale purposes in order to demonstrate concretely to the armed forces and civilian population that the free world stands behind them and that they are not isolated in the face of superior power. It seems highly improbable, moreover, that, even if every practicable effort were made to do so, sufficient equipment to overcome all the indicated deficiencies could be despatched to Yugoslavia and Greece in time to meet an attack this spring. It is believed, therefore, that definite plans should be drawn up and agreed among the Western Powers to supply to Greece and Yugoslavia, in case of satellite attack, at least token ground forces from outside, as well as effective air support.

Conclusions

1. Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey represent the most effective force in being in 1951 on the Soviet periphery in Europe. They serve as a deterrent to aggression at the present time and could play at least an important diversive role in case of general war.

2. On the other hand, they are more vulnerable to purely *satellite* aggression than are other nations along the periphery in Europe. Substantial military and political preparations, possibly designed for such aggression, are well under way. A successful satellite attack upon Greece and/or Yugoslavia would have most serious strategic consequences and might deal a fatal blow to the morale of Western European countries.

3. A rapid increase, during the next six months, in certain key lines of military equipment of Greece, Yugoslavia, and perhaps Turkey, would multiply their usefulness as deterrents in case of general war, and would enable them to meet a satellite attack with a minimum of direct outside assistance after the attack took place. It is very doubtful whether the same quantity of equipment supplied to other European countries would return equivalent dividends *in 1951*.

4. Particularly in view of the inadequacy of their present equipment, Greece and Yugoslavia would, in case of satellite attack, need some direct assistance from UN air and, to at least a token extent, ground forces.

5. Consequently, it is recommended that (1) immediate attention be given to according a higher priority to the delivery of key military equipment to Greece, Yugoslavia, and perhaps Turkey, during the first 6–8 months of 1951, and (2) full agreement be reached among the Western Powers as to what direct assistance in the form of air

and ground forces could be supplied Greece and Yugoslavia in case of satellite attack during 1951.[2]

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[2] In telegram 3244 to Athens, March 16, Acheson stated that the proposals advanced in the source text had received careful study by the Departments of State and Defense and that at the ISAC meeting of March 9, Defense Department representatives had presented a report urging that there be no change in priorities for delivery of military equipment during the remainder of 1951. According to Defense Department analysis, the global demands for military equipment were of such magnitude that expedited treatment for one country was possible only at the expense of other countries or of U.S. forces. "Greece, Turkey better position now than other countries because recipients mil equip since '47. To improve that position further during '51 wld involve revised priorities with major impact on NATO which remains area of desired maximum build-up." (781.5/1-2051)

S/S–NSC Files : Lot 63 D 351 : NSC 103 Series

Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 6, 1951.

NSC 103

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GREECE

DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON GREECE

1. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination.

a. Greece occupies an important strategic position which, in the hands of an enemy, would be a threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez, Turkey and the Turkish Straits. Communist domination of Greece would serve as a springboard for communist penetration, political and military, into the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East area.

b. Communist domination of Greece would damage U.S. prestige and weaken the will to resist in other countries threatened with communist domination.

c. Communist domination of Greece could only be viewed as the first in a series of military and political consequences which would gravely threaten the security of the United States.

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[1] A covering note, not printed, by S. Everett Gleason, Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, to the National Security Council, dated February 6, 1951, stated that NSC 103 was comprised of two parts: The draft statement of policy was prepared by the NSC Staff on the basis of an initial draft by the Bureau of near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State. The NSC Staff Study on the Position of the United States With Respect to Greece printed *infra* was prepared for the information of the Council in connection with the draft policy statement. Gleason invited attention to the fact that not all members of the Senior NSC Staff had concurred in paragraph 3 of the draft statement of policy, and he concluded with the recommendation that if the Council adopted the draft statement of policy, it be forwarded to the President for his approval. (S/S–NSC Files : Lot 63 D 351 : NSC 103 Series)

2. Accordingly, the United States should:

a. Manifest publicly its active interest in the maintenance of the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and its continued support of the Truman doctrine as applied to Greece.

b. Provide appropriate international political support to Greece.

c. Promote the development of a stable democratic Greek government oriented to the West.

d. Provide economic assistance and advice in order to develop a viable Greek economy.

e. Lend appropriate support to the Greek military establishment to assist it in:

(1) Maintaining internal security.

(2) Resisting effectively an attack by satellite forces augmented by guerrillas.

(3) Causing maximum practicable delay to an attack involving direct Soviet participation.

(4) . . .

f. Provide Greece, within the limits of existing priorities and availabilites, military matériel, supplies, and guidance necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives listed in *e* above.

3. A Soviet or satellite attack against Greece would threaten the security interests of the United States and so increase the danger of global war that the United States in common prudence should assist in opposition to the attack in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of circumstances then existing, including the following general courses of action:

a. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.

b. Seek, by political measures, to stop the aggression, localize the action, and restore the *status quo.*

c. Provide such military matériel and deploy such forces to the general area as can be made available without jeopardizing the security of the United States or areas of greater strategic importance to the United States.

d. Urge other nations to take similar action, including appropriate measures in the United Nations and NATO.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series

Staff Study by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, February 6, 1951.]

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GREECE

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the position of the United States with respect to Greece.

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[1] See footnote 1, *supra.*

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ANALYSIS

he threat to the political independence and territorial integrity
ece derives from the USSR, acting mainly through its various
s: The Greek Communist Party, the Soviet satellite nations on
s northern border, and the international communist move-
The security of the Near East, and as a result the security
s of the United States, would be endangered if the USSR,
y or through any of its agents, obtained control of Greece.
l of Greece would provide access to the Mediterranean Sea as
a strategic position with respect to the eastern Mediterranean,
ar East, the Suez, Turkey and the Turkish Straits. Western
o the oil of the area would be threatened, as well as U.S. com-
tions and transportation facilities, and U.S. air and naval
n the area. The control of continental Greece and the Greek
s would present to the USSR important military and political
ages. Without foreign assistance, Greece is incapable of meeting
eat to its political independence and territorial integrity. It
erefore, been the policy of the United States to lend political,
ic, and military assistance and advice to Greece.

nited States political support to Greece has been both internal
ternational. Internally, the United States has advocated the
entation of wholesome political and social concepts as a deter-
communist subversion and has encouraged the observance of
atic, constitutional political practices as well as the protection
l liberties to the extent compatible with the security of the
Efforts of the United States to promote enactment and imple-
ion of legislation designed to distribute equitably the incidence
tion, to improve the efficiency of Greek fiscal and administra-
ocedures, and to free the Greek economy from monopolistic and
ing practices have been only partially successful.

the international sphere, United States political support to
has been extended mainly through the United Nations, which
en seized of the Greek Case since 1946. The United Nations
l Committee on the Balkans is being retained in Greece in order
r aggression and to authenticate to world opinion the true
of an aggression should it occur. The United States has en-
ed through its information media and diplomatic missions to
inate the facts of the Greek situation and in so doing to over-
he continuous vicious communist propaganda against Greece.
nited States has not hesitated to take direct diplomatic action
alf of Greece on appropriate occasion. In September 1950, as
festation of continuing interest in the independence and in-
of Greece, the United States initiated and strongly supported
which enabled Greece as well as Turkey to become associated

with the appropriate phases of the planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean area.

5. The object of United States economic aid to Greece is to assist Greece to restore its economy to a viable position and to assist Greece to develop and maintain a standard of living which will enable the Greek people to offer greater resistance to the blandishments of communist ideology. Although this objective is probably attainable, the economic recovery of Greece from the effects of World War II has nevertheless been seriously retarded because of subsequent guerrilla hostilities, political instability, inflation, and changes in world trade patterns. Moreover, so long as present conditions of international tension continue, Greece will be required to make military expenditures which are in excess of those which could be supported by the Greek economy. In FY 1950 Marshall Plan funds were required to finance 63.5% of the civilian imports into Greece. On the whole there have been substantial gains in reconstruction, production, and public administration, although because of the increase in population, per capita production is still less than prewar. Nevertheless, the United States has not succeeded in evoking the degree of self-help in Greece which is essential for the ultimate solution of Greece's critical economic problems. For this reason, acceptance of maximum responsibility for the rehabilitation and development of Greece by Greek leaders themselves continues to be a basic objective of U.S. policy in Greece. It is now evident Greece will not have achieved economic viability by 1952 and that American aid to Greece cannot be stopped in 1952 without jeopardizing the gains that have been made. Current estimates tend to indicate that Greece might be self-supporting by 1954, providing reduced trade barriers and higher standards of living in other Marshall Plan countries significantly expand the market for Greek products and providing Greek political leaders act courageously and unselfishly. Extension of American economic aid to Greece beyond 1952 does not imply a substantially larger total aid to Greece than has heretofore been considered necessary to make the Greek economy viable. It would involve spreading the contemplated aid over a longer period of time in order to assure that United States assistance will be merely a support for Greek effort rather than a substitute for it. In order to induce the Greek Government to prepare itself for the ultimate termination of American economic aid, American representatives in Greece have continued to encourage the creation of a stable and efficient government based on the freely elected representatives of the Greek people, and have urged that this government should be more responsive to the needs of the poor, that it should pursue a sound fiscal policy, establish an equitable tax system, improve public administration, revitalize local government, encourage

individual initiative, foster more competition in industry and trade, press aggressively for larger earnings from exports, tourism and shipping, husband national resources more carefully, frame and execute a realistic plan of economic development, and cultivate cordial relations with those of its neighbors who are not under the Soviet thumb.

6. The original objective of the military assistance program for Greece, initiated in 1947, was to provide the Greek armed forces with supplies, equipment and technical advice required to eliminate the communist guerrilla menace and to restore internal security. This objective was achieved in September 1949. After that date the objective of military assistance to Greece was to provide support to a Greek military establishment which would be capable of maintaining internal security and affording Greece, through certain limited accessories, a modicum of prestige and confidence, and which, in the event of a global war, would be capable of causing some delay to Soviet and/or satellite forces and of assisting in the over-all war effort. After the attack on Korea the scheduled reduction of the Greek armed forces was halted. The Greek armed forces, strengthened by American advice and equipment, are physically tough, well trained and have the will to resist. Minimum essential equipment to resist an armored attack is being provided to Greece as a matter of priority. With the exception of the Greek Air Force, all major items of equipment required by the Greek armed forces are expected to be provided through the FY 1951 and supplementary FY 1951 military assistance program for Greece. Assuming the present approved level of the Greek forces, future military assistance will be devoted principally to the maintenance and training of the Greek armed forces and the replacement of equipment as it becomes obsolete.

7. The inherent weakness of the economic and social structure of Greece, the position of Greece on the European and Asian defense perimeters, and the political significance which Greece has acquired as a symbol of the ability of the United States effectively to assist nations threatened with communist domination, all tend to indicate that Greece will continue to be a target of Soviet ambition. Within Greece the outlawed Communist Party is concentrating on repairing the damage suffered by its organization as a result of its complicity in the unsuccessful guerrilla war. It is estimated that the Greek Communist Party and its sympathizers represent probably less than 15% of the Greek people. Nevertheless, with its ruthless conspiratorial methods, its rigid discipline, and the direction which it receives from the powers of international communism, the Greek Communist Party constitutes a dangerous force ready to exploit unsatisfactory internal conditions in Greece and to assist a communist aggressor from without. The Greek guerrilla leaders have not abandoned their aims and

have at their disposal for combat purposes at least 20,000 guerrillas presently dispersed in Eastern Europe.

8. Greece is an area in which the Kremlin might consider that an aggression on the Korean pattern (an attack involving only satellite troops) would be successful. Since June 30, 1950, Cominform propaganda agencies have repeatedly charged that the "Athens–Belgrade Axis", under American and British direction, is preparing for aggressive action against Albania and Bulgaria and is menacing the peace of the Balkans. This Cominform propaganda line, coupled with the steady increase in the military potential of the Balkan satellite states, particularly Bulgaria, and the probability that the USSR is willing to risk a general war, has contributed to a disturbing situation.

9. On the one hand, the alleged threat to Bulgaria and Albania resulting from the "Athens–Belgrade Axis" may serve as a pretext for the USSR to send combat troops into Bulgaria at the request of the Bulgarian Government. The presence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria would serve to stabilize conditions within the country and would constitute an immediate threat to Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

10. On the other hand, it is possible that the USSR might instigate a Bulgarian (or joint Bulgarian-Albanian) attack against Greece coupled with or in support of a renewal of guerrilla activity. Bulgarian forces are estimated to be the best trained, best equipped and most reliable among the satellite forces in Eastern Europe. The Soviets have for some months been stockpiling war materials in the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria, in excess of the normal needs of the indigenous forces. The Bulgarian forces are known to possess considerable armored equipment, including between 450 and 700 T–34 tanks, and are believed to be capable of invading and overrunning Greece east of the Struma River in a few days time. In a sustained war Bulgarian forces are probably capable of extending their conquest to include all Greek territory east of the mountain line which runs through Edessa to Mount Olympus. It is believed, however, that the Bulgarian forces are not capable of destroying the Greek Army.

11. Bulgarian occupation limited only to Greek Thrace and Greek Macedonia would constitute a substantial success for the Cominform. Bulgarian irredentist aspirations would be satisfied, Salonika and the line of communications into Yugoslavia would be in the hands of the Cominform, and Greece would be deprived of its richest agricultural area. This would lead to the establishment of an "autonomous" Macedonian state in accordance with the aims of the Kremlin. Yugoslavia would be virtually surrounded, even though the Greek Army itself had not been eliminated nor had the existence of Greece as an independent state been extinguished.

12. Albania might attempt to remain neutral in the event of a Bulgarian attack against Greece because of its inability to contribute

a substantial military force and because Albanian participation might invite some form of hostile effort from Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, activity by Albanian forces might divert a number of badly needed Greek troops, and it is reasonable to suppose Albania would be prepared at least to support large-scale guerrilla activity against Greece in the event of an attack against Greece by Bulgaria.

13. Participation in a satellite attack against Greece would probably be limited to Bulgarian forces, possibly augmented by Albanian troops and Greek guerrilla forces. The promptest augmentation of Greek defensive strength might involve the utilization of British land, sea and air forces in the Near East, and American air and naval units in the Mediterranean area, as well as the military resources of Turkey and Yugoslavia. . . . The U.S. would assist in the most feasible manner. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with which Greece and Turkey are associated in the appropriate phases of the planning in connection with the defense of the Mediterranean area, provides a possible arrangement for future collective planning for the event of an attack against Greece.

14. The international conduct of the USSR in connection with Korea clearly demonstrates a willingness to risk a general war. The USSR must be aware of the deep interest and heavy moral commitment of the United States in Greece. An attack against Greece involving satellite and/or Soviet forces would indicate that a general war is probably imminent. In the event of a general Soviet attack against the West, Greece would probably be indefensible and the requirements of Greece would be subordinated to the global strategic plans of the United States.

15. From the liberation of Greece in 1944 until the end of FY 1951 total American aid to Greece will have reached almost $2 billion. Although the material cost has been high, resolute United States policy in Greece has encouraged the resistance to communism in other parts of the world and has avoided the consequences of communist domination of Greece. The Greek people remain essentially anti-communist and are prepared to fight again to maintain their freedom.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

16. In view of the vulnerability of Greece to communist subversion or aggression, the far-reaching consequences of communist domination of Greece, and the extent to which United States prestige has been committed to the maintenance of a free and independent Greece, continued United States assistance to Greece in the political, economic, and military fields is imperative. Within these fields certain basic alternative courses of action present themselves.

17. . . .

18. *Economic.* The Greek economy cannot survive at this time without continued United States assistance. It will not be self-supporting by the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952. Consequently, the principal alternatives confronting the United States lie in the determination of whether further economic assistance should be limited to a program of essential items designed to prevent disease and unrest or whether the United States should persist in the objective of developing a viable Greek economy. Although the obstacles to the creation of a self-supporting Greek economy are formidable, this objective is probably attainable. It holds not only the greatest promise for creating a healthy social structure in Greece, but also the best hope of ultimately divesting the United States of its obligations with regard to the Greek economy. Recent analysis suggests that future economic assistance to Greece must be provided in smaller annual increments in keeping with the limited capacity of Greece to provide sufficient internal investment capital, public or private, to permit a substantial increase in its productive capacity. This assistance must be extended for a number of years, possibly until 1954.

19. *Military Assistance.* Greece cannot afford to equip or maintain a military establishment of the size which the security requirements of the present international situation demand. The basic alternatives confronting the United States are whether the present Greek military establishment should be maintained primarily to insure internal security, or whether the United States should provide additional assistance which would, in addition, permit the Greek armed forces to resist effectively in the event of an attack by Soviet satellite forces. Particularly in view of the growing military capabilities of Bulgaria, progressive relative inferiority on the part of the Greek armed forces would seem to invite attack. Such an attack would cause serious embarrassment to the United States and might result in the communist domination of Greece. For these reasons, and in recognition of the increased potential of Greece to contribute to the general military strength of the non-communist world resulting from the already substantial United States investment, the United States will provide additional military training and equipment to Greece.

20. *In the event of an attack against Greece.* By instigating an attack against Greece by satellite forces the USSR would, without involving Soviet troops, place an immediate additional burden on the military resources of the United States. One alternative would be to limit United States action to political measures calculated to stop the aggression and localize the action. Inasmuch as there is little in the conduct of the USSR to indicate that the USSR would accept a political settlement which is not capable of prompt military enforcement, such measures would probably be futile. Moreover, failure of the United States to provide support to prevent Greece from falling

into the Soviet orbit would produce political and military consequences of critical importance to the security interests of the United States. The USSR would acquire the strategic advantages to be derived from the possession of Greece. Under these circumstances the USSR might expect that the United States would not respond to subsequent direct Soviet action against Turkey and/or Iran and that those governments and the governments of Western Europe would in time be forced to seek accommodations with the USSR. In light of the vital interest of the United States in Greece and the deep commitment of United States prestige in Greece, the more valid alternative open to the United States in the event of an attack by Soviet and/or satellite forces would be to provide matériel and deploy United States forces to the extent necessary and available without jeopardizing the security of the United States or of areas of the world of greater strategic importance to the United States, and to urge all other nations to take similar action.

CONCLUSIONS

21. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination.

22. The actions taken by the United States with respect to Greece, together with related factors, have been successful in preventing Greece from falling under communist domination.

23. In view of the far-reaching consequences of a communist domination of Greece, the investment of the United States in assistance to Greece has been justified although the cost has been high.

24. Greece continues to be a target of Soviet ambition although the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece has altered in form.

25. Greece is one of the areas in which the USSR might consider that an attack involving only satellite troops would be successful.

26. The present threat to the security of Greece derives immediately from the growing military potential of Greece's Cominform neighbors (particularly Bulgaria), from the presence of approximately 20,000 hostile Greek guerrillas in Eastern Europe, and from the activities of the Greek Communist Party as an agent of Soviet imperialism.

27. The preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece depends upon continued political, economic, and military assistance from the United States.

28. The United States should continue publicly to manifest deep interest in the independence and integrity of Greece in order to deter the USSR and/or its satellites from initiating aggressive action against Greece and, in any case, to prevent them from acting on the

assumption that the United States would not provide determined support to Greece in the event of an aggression.

29. The United States should assist in every appropriate manner to strengthen Greek society against communist subversion, including the encouragement of democratic political procedures, the acceptance of wholesome social objectives, and the elimination of unimportant differences among Greek political leaders.

30. The United States should continue to provide economic assistance and advice with the objective of making Greece economically viable at the earliest possible moment. This will require continued American dollar assistance, possibly until 1954.

31. Acceptance of maximum responsibility for the rehabilitation and development of Greece by Greek leaders themselves must continue to be a basic objective of U.S. policy in Greece.

32. The United States should lend appropriate support to the Greek military establishment to assist it in:

a. Maintaining internal security.
b. Discouraging and, if necessary, resisting effectively an attack by satellite forces augmented by guerrilla forces.
c. Causing maximum practicable delay to an attack involving direct Soviet participation.
d. . . .

33. Within the limits of existing priorities and availabilities of matériel, the United States should provide Greece with such military equipment and supplies as will make possible the accomplishment of the objectives outlined in paragraph 32 above.

34. The United States should develop plans to assist Greece in the event of an attack by satellite forces. In this connection the United States should:

a. . . .
b. Urge at the appropriate time, military planning by the NATO to cover such a contingency and in the meantime encourage Greece and Turkey to explore the possibilities for mutual military cooperation.
c. Consider at an appropriate time, the possibility and desirability of military cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia.

35. In the event of an attack against Greece by satellite forces, the United States should:

a. Make every effort to stop the aggression, localize the action and restore the *status quo* by political measures, through the UN, jointly with the UK, and unilaterally.
b. Accelerate and increase military assistance to Greece to the extent appropriate and feasible.
c. If necessary, and to the extent consistent with other security requirements, mobilize available military support to Greece through United Nations action, through implementation of North Atlantic

Treaty plans, through joint United States–United Kingdom arrangements, and through unilateral United States support, as appropriate.

d. In participating in any military support action for Greece as envisaged in *c* above, deploy, to the extent necessary, such forces as can be made available without jeopardizing the security of the United States . . . .

e. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.

36. In the event of direct Soviet participation in an attack against Greece the United States should take the measures set forth in paragraph 35 above. Such action, however, should be taken in the full knowledge that a general war may nevertheless be unavoidable.

S/S–NSC Files : Lot 63 D 351 : NSC 103 Series

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1951.

Subject: NSC 103—"The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Greece"

You will note from the second paragraph of the covering memorandum from the Acting Executive Secretary[2] that "not all the members of the Senior NSC Staff have concurred in paragraph 3 of the enclosed Statement of Policy". Mr. McGhee will, of course, send you a briefing memorandum on this paper but I thought it might be helpful to highlight briefly for you the differences of view, as we interpret them, which developed in the Senior Staff. This paper was drafted in the Department of State and processed through the NSC Staff Assistants. It reached the Senior Staff in agreed form. Mr. Finletter during the Senior Staff discussions raised questions particularly in regard to the third paragraph which covers the contingency of a Soviet or Satellite attack against Greece. His main argument seemed to be that we should at almost any cost avoid engaging in limited hostilities in connection with such contingency. Mr. Finletter raised the question whether we should decide that an attack on Greece would be a *casus belli* and argued against any such decision. In the last Senior Staff meeting, Mr. Finletter seemed willing to give some military assistance to Greece if it were attacked thus narrowing the apparent difference of opinion to one of degree. It is our view that the United States should give the maximum practicable assistance to Greece in the event of an attack, recognizing of course that the actual type and scope of military assistance can only be determined in the light of circumstances then existing.

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[1] Drafted by Max W. Bishop, NSC Staff Member assigned to the Ambassador at Large.

[2] See footnote 1, p. 451.

The JCS representative consistently supported our view and the NSRB representative supported Mr. Finletter. The NSRB representative also supported the view that we should make unequivocally clear that any local aggression will be met by denunciation of Soviet Russia as the true aggressor, presumably with "appropriate action to follow".

The issue around which the debate revolves is essentially the question whether we should to the best of our ability and in the most feasible manner meet with military resistance further acts of local aggression.[3]

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[3] On February 12, the Senior NSC Staff sent a memorandum to the National Security Council through NSC Executive Secretary James S. Lay recommending for its consideration that the draft statement of policy "be amended as follows in the interest of greater clarity:

"Par. 1–c, line 2: Strike out 'the first' and substitute 'one'.

"Par. 2–e–(2), line 1: Strike out 'Resisting effectively' and substitute 'Repelling'.

"Par. 2–e–(3), line 2: After the word 'direct' add the words 'or indirect'.

"Par. 3–c: Amend the paragraph to read as follows (words to be added underscored):

"c. Provide such military matériel and deploy such forces to the general area as can appropriately be made available without jeopardizing the security of the United States or areas of greater strategic importance to the United States, in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time."

A copy of this memorandum is in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series. On February 13, Berry sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State reviewing and analyzing the salient features of NSC 103 and urging its approval. A copy of this memorandum is in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 12 February 1951.

Subject: The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, recommend that the following substantive changes be made in the statement of policy contained in NSC 103 "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece":

a. Change the numbered subparagraphs (2) and (3) under subparagraph 2*e* to read as follows:

> "(2) Repelling an attack by satellite forces augmented by guerrillas;

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[1] On February 14, Lay, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, circulated this document to the National Security Council for its information in connection with the proposed consideration of NSC 103 at its meeting on February 14 (memorandum for the National Security Council, February 14, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series).

> "(3) Causing maximum practicable delay to an attack by satellite forces with indirect Soviet assistance or to an attack involving direct Soviet participation;"

These changes would bring the paper into consonance with the current estimate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to Greek capabilities.

b. Change the general course of action in subparagraph 3*c* to read as follows:

> "Provide such military matériel and deploy such forces to the general area as may be recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the light of the situation existing at the time."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it would be militarily unsound to base the provision of military matériel and deployment of United States forces to the general area of Greece only on the criteria that such deployment would not jeopardize the security of the United States or areas of greater strategic importance to us.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 103/1

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1951.

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GREECE

1. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination.

a. Greece occupies an important strategic position which, in the hands of an enemy, would be a threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez, Turkey and the Turkish Straits. Communist domination of Greece would serve as a springboard for communist penetration, political and military, into the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East area.

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[1] A covering note by Executive Secretary James S. Lay states that NSC 103 was considered at the 83d meeting of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 437) on February 14, with the President presiding and the Acting Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense Mobilization in attendance. The statement of policy contained in NSC 103 was adopted subject to the amendment of paragraphs 2–*e*–(2) and (3) proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 12 (*supra*) and of paragraphs 1–*c* and 3–*c* proposed by the Senior NSC Staff on February 12 (see footnote 3, p. 462). Accordingly, the National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization forwarded the source text, which was the amended version of the draft policy statement contained in NSC 103, to the President as NSC 103/1 for his consideration. The note is in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series. In a memorandum to the National Security Council of February 15, the Executive

Footnote continued on following page.

b. Communist domination of Greece would damage U.S. prestige and weaken the will to resist in other countries threatened with communist domination.

c. Communist domination of Greece could only be viewed as one in a series of military and political consequences which would gravely threaten the security of the United States.

2. Accordingly, the United States should:

a. Manifest publicly its active interest in the maintenance of the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and its continued support of the Truman doctrine as applied to Greece.

b. Provide appropriate international political support to Greece.

c. Promote the development of a stable democratic Greek government oriented to the West.

d. Provide economic assistance and advice in order to develop a viable Greek economy.

e. Lend appropriate support to the Greek military establishment to assist it in:

(1) Maintaining internal security.

(2) Repelling an attack by satellite forces augmented by guerrillas.

(3) Causing maximum practicable delay to an attack by satellite forces with indirect Soviet assistance or to an attack involving direct Soviet participation.

(4) . . .

f. Provide Greece, within the limits of existing priorities and availabilities, military matériel, supplies and guidance necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives listed in *e* above.

3. . . . the United States should: [2]

a. Press now for the inclusion of Greece as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement.[3]

Footnote continued from preceding page.

Secretary reported that the President had approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 103/1 and directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 103 Series).

The Executive Secretary of the NSC, in a covering note dated May 11, 1951 to NSC 109 (a draft policy statement on Turkey printed on p. 1148), informed the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that the NSC Staff, in preparing the draft statement, had recommended that revisions be made to NSC 103/1 along the lines of paragraph 3 of the draft statement of policy on Turkey. On May 24, 1951, the Executive Secretary informed the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that the President had that day approved the revisions to NSC 103/1 as proposed in NSC 109 and had directed their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under coordination of the Secretary of State. The revisions are indicated in subsequent footnotes.

[2] This paragraph did not appear in the text of NSC 103/1 as approved by the President on February 15, 1951; it was drafted by the Department of State and recommended by the NSC Staff in NSC 109 for incorporation in NSC 103/1. Paragraph 3, approved by the President on May 24, 1951, was added by substitution of

b. If full membership of Greece in NATO would be unacceptably delayed, conclude alternative security arrangements which would include Greece and would not prejudice Greek membership in NATO at the earliest practicable date.[4]

4. A Soviet or satellite attack against Greece would threaten the security interests of the United States and so increase the danger of global war that the United States in common prudence pending the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements, including the United States and Greece, should assist in opposition to the attack in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of circumstances then existing, including the following general courses of action:[5]

a. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.
b. Seek, by political measures, to stop the aggression, localize the action, and restore the *status quo*.
c. Provide such military matériel and deploy such forces to the general area as can appropriately be made available without jeopardizing the security of the United States . . . in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.
d. Urge other nations to take similar action, including appropriate measures in the United Nations and NATO.

5. After conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements, including the United States and Greece, the United States should respond to a Soviet or satellite attack against Greece in a manner and scope to

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a revised page to NSC 103/1 circulated to the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization by the Executive Secretary, NSC, under a covering memorandum dated May 24, 1951.

[3] In May of 1951, the Department of State formally broached the subject of Greek and Turkish membership in NATO to its NATO allies as a solution to the various strategic and command problems involved in protecting and possibly expanding the southern flank of the Western defense system. There followed 4 months of extensive debate and diplomacy within NATO and between the United States and various NATO governments until, at its Seventh Session at Ottawa in September 1951, the North Atlantic Council formally extended an invitation to both Greece and Turkey to adhere to the North Atlantic Pact. There followed months of negotiation between the Turkish Government and the United States, United Kingdom, and France concerning the precise command relationship to be established between the original NATO powers and the proposed new members, and this carried question of formal Greek and Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization beyond the end of the year. For documentation on the question of Greek and Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.

[4] For the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the statement in paragraph 3*b* expressed to the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum dated May 22, 1951, and circulated to the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that day, see footnote 1, p. 1148.

[5] This paragraph was numbered 3 in the text of NSC 103/1 approved by the President on February 15. The phrases "pending the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements, including the United States and Greece" in lines three to five of the paragraph were added as proposed in NSC 109 in the revised page circulated by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, under cover of his memorandum of May 24, 1951. See footnote 2, p. 464.

be determined in the light of the recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the circumstances then existing, and within the framework of the obligations of the United States under those arrangements.[4]

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[4] The text of NSC 103/1 as approved by the President on February 15 did not contain this paragraph 5. Approved by the President on May 24, 1951, as a revision to NSC 103/1 as recommended by the NSC Staff in NSC 109, the paragraph was added in a new page to NSC 103/1 circulated to the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization under cover of a memorandum by the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated May 24, 1951.

781.00/3-851 : Despatch

The First Secretary of Embassy in Greece (Memminger) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ATHENS, March 8, 1951.

No. 1402

Ref: Embtel 2761 Feb 24, 1951[1]

Subject: The Greek governmental crisis of February 1951

The vote of confidence of 133 to 91 accorded the Venizelos Government on February 22 terminated a crisis which in the eyes of most participants and observers was no crisis at all, and emphasized more than anything else the current negative and regressive factors in Greek political life. No real issues were settled, or even raised, and the governmental solution which emerged was in effect a throwback to that of a year ago, the tri-partite Center coalition which, however, lacked the virtue of the original combination in that it contained no hope of being a productive one.

Origin of Crisis:

Perhaps the most striking feature of the crisis is that it was precipitated by LEK (Populist-Unionist Party), the off-shoot of the Populist Party headed by Stephanopoulos and Kanellopoulos, and which since its inception had been regarded as an almost certain participant in the Government.

At the first major political rally of LEK held in Salonika February 18, both leaders surprised the political world by the viciousness of their attacks on the Government because of its lack of stability and minority character. Kanellopoulos went a step farther than his partner with a controversial statement, later variously interpreted, which was taken by some to mean that LEK favored an extra-parliamentary solution and by others as a warning that the country might be forced to this unless the Government took steps to strengthen its position.

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[1] Not printed; it reported on the Greek political situation in light of the governmental crisis.

The latter interpretation is the one given by Kanellopoulos himself, and may be taken as the correct one since he was its author.

The remark nevertheless caused a storm in Athens and many indignant protests from leaders of other political parties. Two days later Kanellopoulos interrupted his tour of Northern Greece to return to Athens and announce in the Chamber that LEK was withdrawing its support from the Government, at the same time raising the question of a vote of confidence. In the absence of Prime Minister Venizelos then touring at Yannina, the challenge was taken up by Vice Premier Papandreou who condemned the attitude of LEK as an affront to Parliament and the parliamentary system.

The Solution:

The debate on the confidence question touched on no national issues since none had been raised. For a moment there was some doubt as to whether a debate and vote would take place at all, owing to a disposition of some circles to dismiss the incident as never having aken place. What resulted therefore was merely maneuvering for support to forestall a collapse of the Government. Regardless of what disagreements existed in the Parliament there was general agreement among the Right that the Government must be upheld in order to prevent elections, which would have disastrous results for many deputies and possibly some of the parties.

As the principal supposed support of the Government, LEK, had suddenly been transmuted into the principal opposition, most speculaors concluded that Tsaldaris would come to the rescue of Venizelos nd Papandreou, since his opposition to them had never been complete and the crisis afforded an opportunity for him to return to power, he one goal of every Greek politician. The Embassy has little doubt hat he would have done so if necessary even if the Government refused to accept his solution of a broad coalition embracing Maniadakis' nd Sofianopoulos' groups as well as his own. However, EPEK displayed a surprising amenity to our suggestion that it would be iresponsible to overthrow the Government without some concrete lternative to offer and an equally surprising political ingenuity in getting credit for saving the Government while at the same time ecuring its own ends. Greece had thus returned to the Center coaliion created by the March 12, 1950 protocol, but under conditions eally providing for its own dissolution.

EPEK did not agree to participate in the Government but only to upport it on certain conditions. These were, first, that municipal lections be held on April 15, second, that a national electoral law e prepared as soon as possible, and third, that shortly thereafter eneral elections should be held if the international situation did not urther deteriorate. A fourth, unpublished, item called for the municial elections to be held on the basis of the electoral register as it was prior to the recent purge which disenfranchised a considerable number of supposedly leftist voters. It is not known whether the Government will adhere to this particular point.

The expedient accepted by Venizelos took nearly everyone by surprise and evoked practically no enthusiasm. The rightist press denounced the Government leaders for bowing to terms which in effect placed the country at the mercy of EPEK, in its opinion nothing more than a society of fellow-travellers. Only a limited number of Center partisans thought the solution the best one under the circumstances, the balance feeling that the present Parliament was sick beyond any possible cure and should be dissolved at once. This situation might have descended into a genuine crisis had it not been for the Katramatos–Metaxas affair [2] a few days later which was much more spectacular by nature and effectively diverted public attention from the real problems the Government faces.

Conclusions:

1. The February crisis provided one further piece of evidence confirming the essential instability of the Venizelos–Papandreou coalition and their inability to create any viable arrangement from the present Parliament. General realization that their Cabinet may be the last step before national elections, and genuine reluctance of all rightist politicians to face the electorate, are again shown to be two dominant factors of the present Greek political world.

2. LEK has emerged from this foray with considerable loss of prestige and as a party with an indecisive leadership and vague program. Kanellopoulos and Stephanopoulos demonstrated distressing irresponsibility and superficiality by provoking a crisis without having any really concrete alternative to offer. A general belief has grown up in political circles that in any genuine test, such as elections, LEK might well collapse and disappear from the political scene.

3. The country has moved closer to national elections. No one believes that EPEK will continue its support for any length of time, even if national elections were postponed indefinitely because of "a deterioration in the international situation" as mentioned in its pledge to support the Cabinet. The Government is apparently going forward with municipal elections in mid-April and many anticipate that the results will provoke a reshuffle or a downfall of the present Government even if the latter should in the meanwhile have adjourned Parliament, a procedure favored by Papandreou. Greek politicians and political memories being what they are, renewal of many of the old

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[2] In telegram 2785 from Athens, February 26, Peurifoy had reported that elements of the extreme right wing press in Athens had charged Col. Aristides Metaxas, Chief of the King's Political Bureau, of using his official position to secure clemency for industrialist John Katramatos convicted in late 1949 of rendering financial assistance to Greek guerrilla forces (781.00/2–2651).

combinations may be attempted with temporary success but it is unlikely that any coalition from the present Parliament could long endure.

4. If any one party got some advantage out of the crisis it was EPEK. It was EPEK which cleverly exploited a confused situation and succeeded in forcing the Government to go on record against its will for early elections, which Plastiras has been calling for since the Government fell last August. For the other parties the most that can be concluded is that they emerged from the fray with their armor a little more tarnished.

The Embassy is closely following the current situation in the light of this crisis and the conclusions outlined above, and will soon prepare for the Department's consideration recommendations on what the Embassy believes to be the best course it should follow in promoting joint Greek and American interests.

ROBERT B. MEMMINGER

781.00/3-951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, March 9, 1951—noon.

2942. After thorough canvass political scene following recent crisis, Embassy has reached following tentative conclusions regarding advisable US attitude:

1. Strong probability Left achieve considerable success municipal elections particularly in urban centers largely because of unsatisfactory economic situation and apparent inability Government arrest deterioration. Whether EPEK or extreme Left will reap major profit open to question, but might be latter. Nevertheless, we do not consider Embassy should urge Government again postpone elections unless startling internal or international developments occur prior April 15. Municipal elections not only desirable in principle in line general program democratization and decentralization, but also should give excellent indication whether national elections should be hazarded. Also another postponement after last month's clear commitment might further weaken Government and drive EPEK leftwards.

We do propose, however, (1) urge Government and other nationalist parties adopt common slates in doubtful urban centers in order prevent fragmentation rightist vote to profit of Left and (2) urge EPEK not pick fellow-travelling candidates in hope winning extreme Left support. Some cooperation with these proposals anticipated.

2. Venizelos and Papandreou believe no Government under present chamber could be stable and are working toward national elections

August or September when they hope economic conditions will have improved. Their conclusion based on conviction LEK unreliable partner. Populists under moral cloud EPEK would not enter Government prior elections and municipal Government unstable and ineffective. Other Rightist parties consider elections would produce chamber worse or at best approximately same as present and favor further efforts create new combination without elections. Palace inclines toward latter view. EPEK, of course, intent on elections. We propose urge Government adjourn definitive decision on national elections until outcome municipal elections known. In meantime, explorations currently in progress re broadening present Government can continue. Most feasible project is inclusion LEK, but we agree any combination based on present chamber unstable unless Rightist internecine quarrels should be submerged by strong Leftists wing in municipal elections.

3. Since majority voting system now considered by all parties to favor Papagos' solution national elections would probably be held under proportional system. Papagos' solution has experienced setback as result inept behavior his supporters during recent crisis and current coolness between Marshall and palace which undoubtedly exists despite King's assertion to contrary. Embassy sees no reason encourage Papagos' solution unless international situation worsens or all other means achieve stabler Government fail.

4. Should national elections become necessary, we believe they should be held by present Government perhaps somewhat broadened in order minimize interruption economic program. After election situation, seems probable either Center or Right coalition, preferably former, could be reconstituted and Government based on substantial Parliamentary majority setup.

5. As Department will note, no startling improvement in Greek political scene can be forecast. Prospects are either for: (1) Rightist coalition of three or four parties based on present chamber held together by fear of Leftist gains in elections, or (2) Center coalition based on new chamber not differing essentially from that created by 1950 elections. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize that though such Government would represent neither competence nor stability we would desire it would nevertheless be best that can be realistically expected in Greece at this time and would be generally responsive to US advice and fully committed to US objectives.

6. In view this fact and of serious danger growth Leftist sentiment in Greece as result deteriorating economic situation Embassy believes Greek Government of character indicated above, despite obvious shortcomings, should receive US support in order bolster its standing with mass Greek public opinion particularly in view upcoming municipal and perhaps national elections. Such support should

be manifested in two ways: (1) Sufficient economic aid to check growing political unrest even if this means slight increase in dollar allocations to compensate for rising world prices and to build up small reserves of essential foodstuffs and (2) avoidance public criticism Greek Government and occasional measured praise concrete accomplishments of Government. Latter form of support will not in any way reduce necessary unpublicized pressure on Greeks to exercise fullest possible degree self-help and to implement whatever military or austerity measures required by international developments.

7. I would appreciate receiving Department's reaction to general political approach outlined above.[1]

PEURIFOY

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[1] In telegram 3334 to Athens, March 21, Acheson informed Peurifoy that the Department concurred in the general views set forth in the source text: National elections should be deferred pending the outcome of municipal elections, a reexamination of internal Greek economic and political conditions, and the general international situation. Acheson added that the Department endorsed the view that the Papagos solution should not be encouraged except in the event that all other means to achieve a more stable Greek government had failed, and then such a solution should if possible follow constitutional practices. Acheson also reported a growing concern in the Department for the tendency of Greek political leaders to abandon support for a majority system in the event that national elections were held and stated "Dept recognizes Emb may be obliged actively encourage polit solution which we believe best calculated provide stability." In conclusion, Acheson endorsed Peurifoy's views concerning the necessity for economic aid to check growing political unrest. (781.00/3-951)

781.00/3-2151: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 29, 1951—7 p. m.

3488. Re Embtel 3098 March 21.[2] Dept keenly interested Venizelos statement Liberal-EPEK merger may become real possibility.

This development may present opportunity effect basic improvement in Grk polit sitn by promoting polarization "nationalist" parties in traditional pattern comprising principally Venizelist groups on one hand and parties Populist derivation on other. Indications of at least temporary abandonment Papagos solution by Palace seems wholesome development this direction. Nevertheless, irrespective merits reconstituting Populist Party, involvement Palace in movement mend Populist Party might be interpreted as partisan effort restore power and influence traditional source royalist strength and might therefore have dangerous implications (re last sentence penultimate para Embtel 3098).

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[1] Drafted by Norbert L. Anschuetz, officer in charge of Greek Affairs. Cleared with William Rountree, Director of GTI.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sophocles Venizelos had informed Ambassador Peurifoy that he was exploring the possibility of bringing about "in very near future" a merger of the Liberal and EPEK Parties and a consequent new government based upon this union. According to Venizelos' plan general elections would be held in August. The telegram also recalled for the Department's information that such a union had been envisaged ever since the March 1950 general elections, and that "Many of most influential deputies in both parties have long favored this move." A number of speeches advancing the idea had recently been made by leading figures in both parties, and the Embassy intended to seek out General Plastiras and other EPEK leaders shortly to determine how serious was this "long-mooted scheme." (781.00/3-2151)

EPEK–Liberal merger might be advantageous in

(1) accelerating latent tendencies toward consolidation "nationalist" parties into two camps. This wld avoid split in Grk polit life along Right–Left lines.

(2) providing govt with absolute Parliamentary majority (assuming Papandreou induced adhere to govt), thus eliminating necessity natl elections near future. Notwithstanding Venizelos' difficulties with Papandreou Dept has noted reports which tend indicate Papandreou might eventually participate in efforts bring together all former Venizelist factions.

(3) Enhancing prospects Parliamentary adoption majority system in event natl elections required.

Dept recognizes merger EPEK and Liberals wld require solution various difficult personality problems and perhaps frequent sympathetic advice from Emb. Nevertheless moment may have arrived when US shld actively but discreetly encourage consolidation present polit parties and acceptance majority election system. Dept recognizes such course involves serious problems such as possible reaction left wing of EPEK, position of presumably non-communist Left such as Sophianopoulos and Svolos, as well as an examination in light Grk and US interests of consequences revitalization Populist party and possibility Populist dominated govt in event new elections. . . .

Emb's views requested.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] Telegram 3766 from Athens, May 5, reported that it was now expected that the Greek Parliament would be prorogued until August at which time it would be called back into session briefly to proclaim elections unless the international situation was such as to preclude such a move. It also reported that a Parliamentary commission was currently studying an alternative electoral system but that final decision on this matter might well be postponed until August and that Venizelos had stated that endeavors to merge EPEK and Liberal Parties had foundered on the insistence by General Plastiras that he assume the office of Prime Minister and the King's refusal to accept him in that capacity. (781.00/5–551)

781.00/5-1251 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ATHENS, May 12, 1951—2 p. m.

3884. PriMin has issued statement effect there is no reason hold new elections unless agreement can be reached on some modification electoral system which will bring about stable govt with substantial majority.[1] Meeting party leaders being held next week attempt reach agreement on system.

Venizelos and EPEK leader inform us they favor variant of proportional system which wld grant to three parties receiving largest popular vote all parliamentary seats not alloted in first distribution. These three parties wld presumably be Liberal, EPEK and Populists and Venizelos is confident support these parties will ensure adoption this system. Papandreou in own interest supports straight proportional system or modification thereof favoring four rather than three main parties. Others oppose latter suggestion, and we believe rightly, on grounds fourth party might be extreme left. In order reconcile Papandreou, Venizelos has proposed their two parties merge. This wld be in line our objective reducing number parties and we are informing two leaders proposal seems sensible to us, but there is serious doubt Papandreou will consent to play second fiddle to Venizelos unless convinced his own electoral chances are very poor.

Venizelos has stated publicly he has no objection holding elections in July if other parties desire shorten electoral period. Present plans remain however recall Parliament late in June pass on budget and electoral system and hold elections late Aug or early Sept. There is still some talk service govt to hold elections, but King informs us he favors keeping present govt in order avoid unnecessary changes and we expressed hearty agreement.

There continues be fair prospect Liberals and EPEK might merge after elections with leader of party receiving larger vote becoming PriMin. In any case two parties plan if they win election to form govt with or without Papandreou. Palace continues adamant opposition Plastiras as PriMin though EPEK leaders including Gen were invited to Palace reception yesterday and talked at length with King. Palace still endeavoring detach Tsouderos from EPEK but he informs us he believes he can be more useful remaining with party fortifying its orientation to center and guiding it toward merger or coalition with libs. . . .

Efforts of Populists absorb smaller rightist parties also continuing but no significant progress as yet.

YOST

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[1] See footnote 3, *supra.*

781.00/5-1251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 17, 1951—1 p. m.

4367. Re Embtels 3766 and 3884.[2] Dept approves views expressed by you to Grk leaders concerning polit situation.

We believe we shld continue advocate adoption majority system. We perceive no justification new elections unless system employed subsequently provides basis for more stable govt. In event spectre Papagos responsible any real degree for current reluctance accept majority system, Palace might be willing suggest to Papagos that he issue statement disclaiming any intention participate forthcoming elections. We have noted lip service which Populists pay to majority system. To what extent does Emb consider this reflects actual Populist views?

If, however, opposition majority system cannot be overcome at this time without creating serious resentment, any proportional system which wld sharply reduce number parties wld represent improvement. System in which second distribution seats limited to three parties receiving largest popular vote wld seem present one effective method reducing fractionalism in Grk parties (Embtel 3884).

We believe Emb shld continue encourage Liberal–EPEK merger. We recognize nevertheless, initiative must come principally from Grks themselves and that Emb cannot place itself in position where it must accept responsibility for consequences such development. Palace cld exercise wholesome influence this situation and we approve your intention point out to King that premiership for Plastiras might well be price worth paying for merger Liberal and EPEK parties. Under circumstances contemplated (Venizelos as party pres and vice premier), we consider Plastiras wld be adequately insulated from undesirable influences.

Any merger which occurs after elections wld seem be little more than coalition, and therefore wld represent only slight progress toward internal polit stability. We are concerned that if nothing accomplished toward reconstitution of Liberal Party in light various favorable factors existing at this time, long period may elapse before conditions will again present opportunity consolidate polit parties in Greece. Liberal–EPEK merger wld probably make possible adoption majority system which, in turn, wld force polarization all other polit parties into traditional Liberal–Populist pattern.

We are pleased learn Parliament will reconvene in June discharge its obligations connection approval of budget. . . .

Peurifoy concurs.[3] ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Anschuetz, cleared by Rountree.

[2] Telegram 3884, *supra;* telegram 3766 is summarized in footnote 3, p. 472.

[3] Peurifoy was in Washington for consultations with Department of State officials.

Editorial Note

In telegram 4192 from Athens, May 31, Minister Yost reported that at 5 a. m. that morning several companies of the Greek Army had surrounded the Parliament building and the Athens radio station. Venizelos had called Papagos who arrived on the scene at 6 a. m. and ordered the troops returned to their barracks which they did. Yost further reported that an investigation was currently underway to determine who was responsible for this action and whether it was merely an isolated incident. (781.00/5–3151)

Yost reported in telegram 4215 from Athens, May 31, that to all outward appearances the situation was calm with no reports of any public or army disturbances in any part of the country. He added that the morning's incident appeared to be an isolated affair in reaction to the recent resignation of Papagos as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. (781.00/5–3151) King Paul described to Peurifoy the events and reasons leading to Papagos' resignation in an interview on June 4, the substance of which was transmitted by Peurifoy to the Secretary in telegram 4272, from Athens, June 4, not printed. (781.00/6–451)

781.00/6–151 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, June 1, 1951—6 p. m.

4232. Amb Peurifoy's expedited return[1] will have excellent effect. It is reported in morning press and clearly connected with Papagos' resignation. We have informed Venizelos and he will see Amb immed upon arrival.

Situation continues calm though there was certain amount of ferment among armed forces throughout country yesterday. We anticipate no further manifestations of any importance if govt and gen staff continue to handle situation carefully. Confirmation positions Grigoropoulos, Tsakalotos and Kitrilakis, all Papagos' men, resulting from their new designations has had definitely reassuring effect on armed forces. Gen public of course is deeply distressed and uneasy at loss of Marshal and particularly at fact, now openly discussed in all press, that it resulted from friction with King.

PriMin informs us manifestation yesterday was engineered by two brigadiers and two colonels who are now confined to quarters but not arrest. They belong to secret organization within armed forces called Idea, with which Dept is familiar, which according to Venizelos, has 1500–2000 officers in key positions. He says gradual removal most important these officers from key positions being considered. Also, although Marshal opposed sanctions against those involved in yesterday's manifestation, King feels some action against men who had been false to their oath must be taken. I told PriMin I considered it of utmost importance no sanctions or purges be conducted in armed forces without agreement of Marshal as consequences might be most serious. I believe Amb will wish to emphasize same point to King.

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[1] Telegram 4637 to Athens, May 31 reported that Peurifoy was arriving in Rome from Washington at 6:30 p. m., June 1, and instructed that an AMAG aircraft meet him there for his immediate return to Athens. It added that Peurifoy had expressed his desire to speak to Venizelos immediately upon his return. (123 Peurifoy)

Decree issued last night amends decree establishing position of C-in-C to permit King to assume functions, though relieving him of many of its lesser responsibilities. PriMin continues to assure us King will fill position only briefly, though adding King seems to like job. As previously reported, we consider this arrangement open to abuse and believe it shld be terminated quickly.

Another announcement today states King has abolished his civil bureau and created in its place Secretariat General. This presumably means elimination Metaxas. Papagos had two comments to make. First reported to us through Markezinis was that this proved there was plot against him since if action taken 3 days ago he need not have resigned. (This is hardly fair since King presumably felt he cld take action freely which he wld not take under "ultimatum.") Second comment was that Metaxas wld probably be taken back as private Secty in any case. Marshal also exercised that Potamianos might be named SecGen. Venizelos informed us no decision yet on occupant this position.

Papagos, having learned of Ambs return, sent Canellopoulos to inform us his decision continued to be irrevocable. He repeated assurances he will not enter politics. Canellopoulos nevertheless believes it not impossible restoration Marshal might be arranged. I agree and consider that in any case every effort shld be made. Venizelos has idea which he has discussed with King who agrees, that, if Greece admitted to NAT, important place might be found for Marshal in command structure which wld involve his return to control of Grk armed forces.

Yos

781.00/6-551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (*Peurifoy*) *to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY ATHENS, June 5, 1951—2 p. m

4293. I opened my two hour conversation with Papagos yesterday by telling him that I had not come to exert any pressure but to tel him as a friend how much my govt and I personally were concerne at the possible effect his resignation might have outside of Greece. I said that abroad in gen only the names of three Grks were known: The King because he was the King, Venizelos as son of his father, and Papagos because of reputation he had won for himself. I referred to high regard that Gen. Marshall, Gen. Eisenhower and Adm. Carney had for Papagos' abilities. It seemed to me that the Marshal's resignation was a great blow to Greece at time when some formal security arrangement for his country was being discussed. I sincerely hoped that some formula cld be found whereby his services cld continue to be utilized.

Papagos then related course his disagreement with King starting from some time back and citing many instances that the Emb had reported on at time such as Adm. Toumbas incident, Katramatos affair, appointment Potamianos and culminating in anti-Papagos activities reported by Gen. Ketseas from Washington. He stressed that as a private citizen Metaxas cld of course say anything he wished about Papagos without arousing the latter's concern but as close adviser to Count Metaxas' words and deeds cld not fail to affect Papagos. The Marshal said that King chose to disagree with him about appointments to the military household. Papagos had no intention of dictating these appointments to King and if asked wld gladly have furnished him long list of suitable candidates. When however the King picked people for military household posts whose honesty and integrity were doubted by Marshal the latter felt it his duty so to inform King. Contemplated appointment of Gen. Ventiris was opposed because it was entirely against regulations to appoint an officer on the inactive list to such a position and because he was convinced that this choice was dictated solely by the Palace's close connections with Ventiris brother and Pipinelis. He then returned to lengthy exposé his objections to Metaxas making clear that none of other sources of disagreement was as important as this. He added significantly that if King had told him at their mtg his intention to abolish political bureau of palace his resignation need never have occurred.

His version of his conversation with King differed considerably from the latter's. He stated that King had not attempted to persuade him to stay on but instead had queried him angrily as to why he had submitted his resignation to govt and not directly and in first instance to King. In other words, Marshal seemed to feel that King had provided no opportunity for arriving at mutual understanding. Truth is probably that two stubborn proud men met head on and neither wld retreat.

Marshal said he saw no way he cld come back to resume his duties as C-in-C. He thought it was best to leave situation as it existed except that he considered it mistake for King to assume post of

C-in-C. In his opinion post shld be abolished and Grigoropoulos shld hold top job as Chief of Staff Natl Def. In reply my question, he stated that he considered Grigoropoulos, Tsakalotas and Kitriiakis as able and capable officers but felt latter shld not be subordinate to Tsakalotas and might be made Dep Chief of Staff Natl Def. I told him that Grigoropoulos had recently informed me all three officers anxious that Papagos return and willing step down to facilitate this. He was obviously pleased this manifestation their regard but it did not alter his fundamental position.

In concluding visit I stated that I was extremely sorry that he felt no way cld be found to reconcile him and the King and thus make his return to C-in-C post possible. We discussed briefly necessity my issuing some statement and agreed on gen lines of looking to future and expressing confidence in capable officers now at head of Grk armed forces.

Door seemed to be closed to any other developments until last night's announcement resignation Palace entourage.[1] I now feel that some possibility of renewed effort exists. I have seen PriMin this morning who tells me King will assent to calling Papagos and discussing again question with PriMin and me present. King has also told Venizelos he intends announce today appointment Michael Pesmazoglou as head Palace Secretariat. Venizelos says this appointment shld be helpful in persuading Papagos return as latter has high regard for projected appointee.

PEURIFOY

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[1] Peurifoy had informed the Secretary of State in telegram 4288, priority from Athens, June 5, that "For what appears to have been a dramatic gesture, and perhaps little else, palace announced shortly after midnight that entire court from Grand Marshal Levides to palace veterinarian Alexiou had placed their resignations at disposal of King in view 'rumors' Papagos' resignation due hostile attitude court circles and in order 'second King in his great patriotic work'." Peurifoy added that the initial reaction of most Greek observers was not to take the the matter very seriously "believing King may merely refuse resignations and thus in effect confirm court entourage their positions. Some, however feel these *pro forma* resignations might conceivably provide basis for reconciliation Papagos and court." (781.00/6–551)

781.00/6–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, June 6, 1951—3 p. m.

4317. Shortly after despatch Embtel 4293, June 5,[1] King called me to palace and he said he felt necessary consult polit leaders before agreeing to take Papagos back. I remarked pointedly that different procedure had been fol in accepting Marshal's resignation. King asked my opinion of possibility Papagos resuming direction Army but not

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[1] *Supra.*

Navy or Air Force. I emphasized my conviction that there was absolutely no use in considering Papagos return if prior conditions were set up by either party and that only useful efforts were those devoted to restoring full confidence between King and Marshal. The King remarked that he did not believe Papagos return possible but that he wld talk to Venizelos on subject. . . .

Venizelos came to see me in evening to say that the King had decided he would not attempt to bring Papagos back because he wld thereby lose face. PriMin added that he believed the King was right. I disagreed, stating that it seemed to me that rather than losing prestige the King wld gain stature by showing himself willing and able to effect reconciliation with the Marshal. However, as this was the King's and the govt's decision, I felt it necessary to accept it as final. I told Venizelos this resolution of matter was most discouraging. I did not intend any threat but I wished him and the King to know that they cld not expect me to continue sympathetic to their personal problems as in past. I wld feel it most necessary to keep the strictest watch on all local developments in order to insure that Grk-Amer cooperation cld continue to be possible.

Conclusion which I have reached and on basis which I issued press statement this morning is fol. Marshal regrets his hasty resignation and wld probably be willing to return if requested by King with assurance his continued confidence and if restored to full powers. King, however, whose mind has been thoroughly poisoned against Marshal by his entourage, including Queen, continues to regard resignation as unfriendly act, to state Marshal has lost his confidence and to refuse to contemplate his recall except under unacceptable conditions. Venizelos believes it useless to contest this attitude and is making no further efforts.

It wld probably be possible to obtain restoration of Marshal by ultimatum to palace but in total absence atmosphere of confidence friction wld immed recur and new crisis probably arise. I have, therefore, thought it best to drop matter for the present rather than prolonging ferment in public opinion.

It is barely possible confidence between King and Marshal may be gradually restored over period of time and without being sanguine we shall work to this end. . . .

. . . .

PEURIFOY

781.00/7-651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 8, 1951—7 p. m.

4812. Embtel 4317.[2] We share Emb's disappointment at failure Grks evolve satis solution Papagos affair, although do not pretend fully understand internal implications this matter. Dept will watch for intimation Papagos proposes move into polit arena with earnest hope he will not do so.

We have noted (Embtel 4234)[3] Venizelos seriously considering possibility avoiding elections. Await your own view re desirability conducting elections near future in light recent developments. Our initial reaction is that in light polit ferment resulting from Papagos affair it becomes all more desirable clarify sitn through new elections. View with apprehension prospects new coalition from present Parl, possibly including LEK or Populists, which wld provide very little promise for further constructive effort by Grk Govt in its basic tasks of rehabilitating Grk economy and society, and improving Grk security measures.

Dept fears as result our conspicuous, unsuccessful effort influence outcome Papagos affair, US ability constructively direct course polit events may be diminished. Grk leaders have undoubtedly noted that US committed substantial portion its influence to proposition restoring Papagos. Measure our effort may be rather accurately gauged through press. In course this operation (objective of which US considered valid) we may have created resentments which will not immed disappear. Your dramatic return Greece and your efforts which followed (both which Dept approved) may have hardened parties in their positions thereby reducing possibility of solution satis to US. In light these facts we shld consider course we shld adopt to recoup our position.

It seems us in light real contribution which monarchy shld make as symbol natl unity and apparent inability Palace exercise this role in most effective manner, it becomes increasingly important fully develop relationship between Emb and Palace which wld enhance our faculty constructively influence Palace, and through it, Grk affairs in gen. We feel as result our strenuous effort in Papagos affair and unambiguous manner in which our position stated that wounds may have been inflicted on most vulnerable area of royal anatomy—its pride.

Dept concurs, as you suggested Embtel 4317, that US shld attempt frustrate any efforts by Palace to purge Grk Armed Forces and discourage renewal polit intervention in Grk Armed Forces from any quarter. This will be delicate task demanding not only US vigilance, ut cautious, unobtrusive action when necessary. Your appraisal post Papagos sitn requested.[4]

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[1] Drafted by Anschuetz, cleared by Rountree.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed.

ACHESON

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[4] See telegram 4396 from Athens, June 11, *infra*.

11.81/6-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

ECRET ATHENS, June 11, 1951—4 p. m.

4396. Ref Deptel 4812 June 8.[1] We are at loss to understand Dept's pparent belief US prestige and influence in Greece weakened by . . Papagos affair. . . . Having returned in this manner, had I not ade vigorous effort to find satis solution, US prestige wld indeed ave suffered in view gen expectation that our influence wld be exerted interests of reconciliation universally felt to be in best interests reece as well as US.

Far from being resented, exercise our influence . . . was earnestly licited by mil leaders, most polit leaders and most of press. Even ose hostile to Marshal were unwilling to see him go under circumances which weakened morale of armed forces and reflected on King. ur efforts were generally recognized as friendly and helpful and their ilure was received with deep regret and little or no blame. Only rentment engendered was perhaps in palace and even that mitigated our refraining from pressing matter when King proved unyielding. is precisely in Palace, moreover, that we consider our action most lutary and necessary since it demonstrated to King extreme seriousss with which we regard tampering with army. . . .

We are sure Dept shares our concern that Grk Army not suffer in orale and efficiency and this is principal danger raised by Papagos fair. Marshal had done excellent job of eliminating polit and Palace fluences and creating tightly-knit organization under staff of agessive and not wholly harmonious leaders. It is questionable whether y other man or group of men can resist these historic influences so ccessfully and it is realization this fact which has caused wideread apprehension in officer corps. Further purges under inspiration tamianos and Gen Ventiris are feared and, if carried out, might use armed forces to revert to unhappy condition of 1948.

Dept may wish to consult Gen Jenkins on this point. . . .

Marshal has repeatedly stated during last two weeks that he will t enter politics and we believe he is wholly sincere. We consider only velopment which might cause him to change his mind wld be pre-

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Supra.

cisely gutting of army by external influences. We understand he is at present considering withdrawal to Switz and believe this might be wisest course, allowing time for tempers to cool and permitting friends to pave way for eventual reconciliation with King.

Venizelos has been seriously considering desirability postponing elections until next year and wld probably do so if he cld persuade Plastiras to enter govt now. We consider it very unlikely he can do so. Papandreou and Kanellopoulos are working actively for formation broad natl govt but Tsaldaris Friday issued statement that Populists wld not participate in govt which had not been sanctioned by verdict of people. Fact is that most politicians wld prefer to avoid elections and that mass of population is indifferent and apathetic, [but] momentum toward elections will probably prevail.

We are not inclined to feel at this time that elections wld be dangerous, though there is possibility that Papagos affair and behavior of Palace might become electoral issue and whip up rather than abate ferment. On other hand, we believe we shld be under no illusion that elections at this time wld clarify situation to any appreciable extent. Very little chance exists adoption majority system since apprehensions redoubled it wld be considered invitation to Papagos. Moreover, in present fragmented state polit parties, majority system unlikely to do more than produce unstable electoral alliances. Reconstitution two traditional parties . . . is gradual process which cannot be accomplished overnight by adoption any electoral system.

While we agree and have consistently held that any coalition based on present parliament (except in case of critical natl emergency) wld be unstable and unwieldly, we shld not expect that elections under present conditions wld necessary produce marked improvement. Modified proportional system most likely to be adopted will favor three parties, Liberals, Populists and EPEK and probably produce govt formed from combination of two of them. Populist EPEK combination seems implausible. Pop–Lib combination is possible, but wld not provide coherent team and, with EPEK in opposition, wld work against reconstitution enlarged Liberal party. Govt dominated by Plastiras not too attractive since he wld probably attempt reduce size of army and to purge civil service in favor his partisans. Most hopeful prospect is therefore Liberal–EPEK combination dominated by former but there is some question whether even this wld be, except in having parliamentary majority, substantial improvement over present govt. We are inclined to feel therefore that pros and cons re elections this year are sufficiently evenly balanced so that US shld, unless conditions change, continue to maintain that question is one for decision by Greek people and leaders.

In summary, we believe that Papagos affair . . . involved morale and efficiency of armed forces and hence security of Greece and of

West. On other hand, we do not believe question of elections or party alignment is proper cause for vigorous US intervention under present circumstances since we consider advantages to be expected from elections highly problematical and US security interests much less directly involved. . . . We shall also work energetically, in cooperation with mission, for least possible interruption, attendant upon elections, in basic tasks of rehabilitating Grk economy and society.

I shld appreciate being informed whether Dept agrees with above analysis and with general course of action proposed.[2]

PEURIFOY

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[2] The same day (June 11) Minister Yost sent a "personal and secret" letter to GTI Director Rountree in which he reaffirmed that telegram 4812 "really did set us back on our heels and I think if you will reread it you will agree some of its comments were rather snide or at least excessively bland." Yost reassured Rountree that "the reservoir is *not* drained, that we are still as much loved as any Sugar Daddy ever is, and that we have rarely taken an action which had such general public support. On the other hand, we have to intervene every week on specific instructions from the Department on matters, ranging from yachts to tobacco, which really do create ill-feeling." After dwelling at some length on current difficulties in dealing with the volatile Greek political situation and on the great patience and competence shown by Ambassador Peurifoy, Yost concluded: "We stand ready to die for dear old Foggy Bottom but we must have our signals straight." (781.00/6–1151)

781.00/6-2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 25, 1951—7 p. m.

5141. Dept concurs in gen with analysis and course action outlined Embtel 4396.[2] Dept has at all times recognized importance vigorous US effort find solution Papagos affair and necessity protecting GAF from traditional Grk polit manipulation. Dept has never had any reservation whatever on this point. It was at all times Dept's intent and desire Emb shld make forceful presentation US views. On basis Emb reports and survey Grk press reaction Dept has concluded serious damage US prestige, of which Dept apprehensive, has not in fact occurred. Dept's apprehensions doubtless influenced by prominent manner events featured by US press and recollection reaction Grk public and press to other past US actions taken in Grk interest.

Dept concurs vigorous US action has undoubtedly given pause any who may contemplate seeking control Grk Armed Forces for their own ends. Dept tends believe Papagos affair transcends question personalities and probably reflects contest for control GAF which have traditionally been major and sometimes controlling factor in balance polit power in Greece. Papagos incident may well disclose basic feeling insecurity on part Palace as well as Palace conviction acceptable measure control GAF indispensable maintenance its position. Fact Papagos obviously not adequately responsive Palace direction and evidence efforts strengthen Ventiris clique (Embtel 4566)[3] seem lend support this thesis. Moreover, Papagos, as Comdr-in-Chief, was probably one most powerful polit factors in Greece. We have impression that for this reason neither Palace, Venizelos, nor any other important polit leader ardently desired restore Papagos. Inasmuch as full details forces at play will, by their nature, probably be only slowly revealed, we doubt foregoing analysis this para can be tested or implications Papagos affair fully understood at this moment.

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[1] Drafted by Anschuetz, cleared by Rountree.

[2] *Supra.*

Dept accepts Emb view US shld maintain position timing new elections question for decision by Grks. However, Dept tends consider question of type election system employed as one basic issues governing polit, social, econ progress in Greece and consequently cardinal factor determining ultimate success US aid program. Greece cannot long bear burden proportional representation in addition other handicaps. Improvement govt stability must of course be regarded as evolutionary process involving, among other things, education Grk public and leaders. However, we find it difficult anticipate situation in which Grk Parl elected under proportional system wld advert to majority system without strong encouragement. . . .

Dept notes Grk leaders have reached virtual agreement re type proportional system to be utilized (Embtel 4525).[3] System, if adopted, will represent considerable progress. Nevertheless, if any possibility exists majority system cld be made acceptable to Grk leaders we wld be inclined think Emb wld be justified in giving strongest encouragement such tendencies in line policy Emb has fol in this field. Some convincing public gesture by Papagos establishing beyond doubt his intention not participate forthcoming elections might contribute materially this regard. Moreover, if majority system cld be made more attractive by necessary action make next Parl revisionary, we wld find much merit in such idea both from legis as well polit point view. Dept recognizes consolidated parties created by majority system wld be subject initially various internal contradictions. We wld tend regard this as evolutionary and more than compensated for by establishment majority system pattern. Dept does not nourish high hopes such situation will materialize.

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[3] Not printed.

On basis excellent Emb reports this subj Dept under impression substantial agreement exists between Emb and Dept re foregoing.

Emb comments invited.[4]

ACHESON

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[4] In telegram 4673 from Athens, June 28, Peurifoy expressed his great appreciation for the comments in the source text. He expressed concurrence with the Department's analysis of the Papagos affair and current Greek political situation and expressed the belief that the immediate repercussions of the Papagos affair "are safely over." The Ambassador also promised to continue advocacy of a majority system "and shall certainly take advantage of any shift in party strategies which might make its immed adoption feasible." (781.00/6–2851)

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 6, 1951.

Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 103/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece."[1]

NSC 103/1 was approved as governmental policy on February 15, 1951. It is requested that this report, as of June 22, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

I *Policy Implementation*

The United States has continued to manifest publicly its continued support of the Truman doctrine as applied to Greece. The President and other high United States officials have cited Greece as an example of what can be accomplished with United States assistance in the struggle against international communism where the country threatened possesses the will to resist. The Secretary of State has publicly acknowledged that the United States is sympathetic to the desire of Greece (and Turkey) to frame some form of collective security arrangement which would include the United States and that, in the examination of this problem, consideration is being given to the inclusion of Greece (and Turkey) as full members of NATO.

On May 24, 1951 the President approved a revision of the Statement of Policy of NSC 103/1[2] which provides:

(1) that the United States should press now for the inclusion of Greece as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement, and

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[1] Dated February 14, p. 463.

[2] In a memorandum for the National Security Council, dated May 24, not printed, Lay reported that the President had approved revision of NSC 103/1 on the basis of proposals advanced in NSC 109, The Position of the United States With Respect to Turkey (*post*, p. 1148), looking to an early adherence of both Greece and Turkey to NATO. The May 24 memorandum from Lay to the NSC is in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series.

(2) that if full membership in NATO would be unacceptably delayed the United States should conclude alternative security arrangements which would include Greece and would not prejudice Greek membership in NATO at the earliest practicable date.

Accordingly, the United States has proposed that Greece (and Turkey) be accepted in NATO as full members. The matter is now under consideration by the Council of Deputies.[3]

The United States has actively encouraged closer cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia[4] in recognition of the fact that the security of each country is vitally affected by the security of the other. In response to a Yugoslav inquiry the Greek Government advised Yugoslavia that:

(1) in the event of an attack against Yugoslavia, Greece is prepared to honor her obligations as a member of the United Nations,
(2) Greece presumes that Yugoslavia would do likewise in the event of an attack against Greece,
(3) Greece is prepared to enter into military staff talks with Yugoslavia at the convenience of the Yugoslav Government.

Yugoslavia has not yet made any move to initiate military staff talks with Greece.

Greek-Turkish staff talks have continued at intervals. Although a more cordial atmosphere may be detected, no substantive results are anticipated pending the conclusion of some type of formal security arrangements between Greece and Turkey, on the one hand, and the United States on the other.

The Greek Government has demonstrated an improved willingness to take measures and to enact legislation calculated to improve basic economic and social conditions. In international affairs Greek policy has been unswervingly anti-communist and has accorded unreserved support to the United Nations and particularly to the United States. In some respects the relations between the Government and United States representatives in Athens have been more satisfactory than in any other period since the inception of the aid program. However, the political situation has not attained a desirable degree of stability. The United States has at every opportunity urged Greek leaders to merge political parties and to make changes in the electoral system which would tend to produce a more stable government. Municipal elections were held April 15 for the first time since 1936. These elections, which were the first in which Greek women have participated, failed to disclose any increase in communist political strength. It may be necessary for the United States to take measures to discourage an increase of political intervention in the affairs of the Greek Armed

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[3] See footnote 3, p. 465.

[4] For documentation on the question of Greek-Yugoslav cooperation, see the compilation on Yugoslavia in volume IV.

Forces as a result of the resignation of Field Marshal Papagos on May 30, 1951.[5]

The economic program in Greece is, in general, moving from the reconstruction phase into the development phase. The objective of the development phase is to increase Greece's ability to produce to a level at which foreign assistance will no longer be required. Progress has been made in re-orienting and implementing the economic program to meet changed international and domestic conditions. Emphasis is being placed on an increase in production, particularly foodstuffs, and items of personal equipment required by the Greek Armed Forces. The dangerous inflationary situation generated by menacing international developments has abated somewhat as a result of a drastic restriction of credits, more effective collection of existing taxes and the imposition of new taxes, and a ration program which is now in the process of development. This program is designed to support the standard of living of the population through the supply and rationing of basic essentials at fixed prices.

Cominform propaganda alleging that Greece, along with Yugoslavia and Turkey, is an instrument of aggressive US–UK imperialism in the Balkans has been increasingly virulent. The principal motives for this propaganda appear to be:

(*a*) to attempt to prepare a moral justification for any eventual aggression by the satellites themselves, and

(*b*) to divert attention of the Bulgarian and particularly the Albanian people from their increasing hostility to their own Moscow-dominated regimes.

The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), which has been active in Greece since late 1947 and on which the United States has consistently played a leading role, has recently issued statements indicating that charges that Greece is making aggressive preparations are without foundation in fact.

Evidence of a continuing increase in the military potential of Bulgaria is a cause of growing concern. United States military estimates concluded that as of April 1951 Bulgarian forces, equipped with between 500–600 T34 tanks, possessed the capability of occupying a substantial portion of north-central and north-eastern Greece and that unless the Greek forces received major logistical support as well as air and possibly naval support the Bulgarian forces could probably eventually occupy the mainland of Greece. Subsequent unconfirmed reports indicate Bulgarian armored strength may now possibly include more than 900 tanks of the T34 type or heavier. In addition to thousands of Russians strategically placed throughout the Bulgarian Government and armed forces, there are continuing unconfirmed reports of the existence of regular Soviet troop units in the Dobrujda area of northeastern Bulgaria.

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[5] See editorial note, p. 475.

There has been no significant increase in the military potential of Albania where internal conditions are deteriorating at a rate which must be genuinely alarming to the communist regime and to the Kremlin.

Nevertheless, the Albanian frontier continues to divert substantial Greek forces not only for defensive purposes, but also in anticipation of an opportunity to move into southern Albania in satisfaction of the longstanding Greek claim to the area of Northern Epirus should international developments permit. Recent open Yugoslav support of an Albanian refugee organization constitutes evidence of Yugoslav intent to bring Albania under Yugoslav hegemony if possible. The United States has, since World War II, consistently and strongly advised the Greek Government to employ a moderate and pacific policy regarding Albania. Nevertheless, Greek determination to realize their own territorial claims in Albania will tend to increase as Yugoslav designs in Albania become more apparent. Accordingly, the United States is presently attempting to evolve a clear policy with regard to Albania because of the close connection between such policy and United States policies toward both Greece and Yugoslavia, and particularly in order to make plans for dealing with any aggression in the Balkan area.

As of April 30, 1951 approximately 167 million dollars worth of military equipment approved under the FY 1950 and FY 1951 MDAP programs remains to be delivered. In light of the increasing military capability of the Soviet satellites, particularly Bulgaria, continuing re-examination of the adequacy of the United States military assistance programs for Greece is required.

II *Policy Evaluation*

United States policy with respect to Greece has continued slowly to increase military, economic, political, and social stability in Greece.

The Greek Government, while it falls far short of the necessary level of stability and efficiency, has nevertheless demonstrated a greater sense of responsibility than any Greek Government since the inception of the United States aid program. Industrial and agricultural production have continued to rise. Conditions exist under which Greece may be able, in the foreseeable future, to realize the most effective advance in economic development since World War II, provided international tensions do not increase.

Nevertheless, the position of Greece is precarious and will remain so until the struggle between the communist and non-communist worlds is resolved. Evidence points incontrovertibly to the fact that Greece remains a target of primary importance to international communism. The success of United States efforts in Greece has undoubtedly added to the difficulties of maintaining Cominform control in Albania and Bulgaria and provided reassurance to the Titoist defection of Yugoslavia.

United States policy with respect to Greece must continue to make provision for the fact that Greece is, and will remain, acutely sensitive to international developments. While there are no conclusive indications of an intention on the part of the Kremlin to bring about hostilies in the Balkans this year, there is also no assurance that such intentions do not exist, particularly in light of the significant increasing capability of the Soviet satellites to engage in offensive operations. Until some security arrangement is concluded with the participation of the United States, Greek morale will suffer and Greek participation in an effective defense of the Balkan area will not be fully assured or adequately planned. Some of the members of NATO have demonstrated reluctance to include Greece (and Turkey) in NATO. Nevertheless, although final NATO action cannot yet be predicted, vigorous U.S. sponsorship will, we hope, result in the admission of Greece. Consequently, there is no reason to seek an alternative form of security arrangement for Greece at this time, particularly in view of the major advantages inherent in NATO membership.

The provisions of the policy of the United States with respect to Greece set forth in NSC 103/1, as amended, continue to be adequate and timely.

H. Freeman Matthews

781.00/7-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL Athens, July 28, 1951—4 p. m.

501. Following passage rationing law last night on heels final adoption electoral law night before Venizelos pushed by Tsaldaris and Plastiras has taken plunge for elections in near future. Late last night PriMin announced he wld resign shortly, perhaps tonight, and that as chief of Lib Party he had proposed to King dissolution of Parl and elections under political govt. In audience yesterday with King Venizelos declared he agreed with Tsaldaris and Plastiras on impossibility declaring next Chamber revisionary under procedure specified Art 108 of Constitution which wld entail at least one months prolongation life present Parl and consequent extension period political uncertainty. Meeting of political party leaders with King scheduled for 6 p. m. tonight to discuss possible alternative procedures and if no agreement ensues Libs, Populists and EPEK favor dropping plan

for next Parl to revise constitution. According his announcement, Venizelos resignation will take place at conclusion this meeting.

Possibility always exists of some last minute attempt to avert or postpone elections by formulation another coalition govt from present Parl but this does not appear very likely. Papandreou early this week told us that palace considered elections inevitable and saw no other practicable solution while Venizelos, keyman in any maneuvers based on existing Parl, now appears determined go ahead with elections. Latter point made this morning to us by MinFin Mavros. He said Libs hope King will give mandate to Venizelos to dissolve Chamber and conduct elections. Lib plan is install service personnel in key electoral posts of Justice and Interior (and perhaps Defense as well) but Libs wld hold all other Cabinet posts. Tsouderos, Mavros stated, has definitely joined Lib Party with his followers and wld be given Cabinet post perhaps as dep PriMin, which might become important if Venizelos carried out his desire to take short holiday abroad.

Other possibility is strictly service govt with Mantzavinos being mentioned as most likely PriMin. Party leaders divided on this question. Plastiras supports plan for Lib Govt to conduct elections but Tsaldaris as well as Papandreou and LEK publicly at least demand service govt.

Emb is inclined welcome latest developments. Prolongation of pol uncertainty most undesirable and for some time it has appeared there was little hope of any stable and effective govt being formed from this Parl. Revision of Constitution may be desirable but is not vital and does not appear of sufficient importance to warrant another month or more of the pol jockeying that has been going on for many months. When asked for Amer views on govt to conduct elections, I have emphasized our interests are that this govt provide necessary continuity in econ policy and in its composition and conduct future holding of free and fair elections results of which will be unchallengeable in Greece or abroad.

PEURIFOY

781.00/7-3151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, July 31, 1951—4 p. m.

561. Papagos candidature has provoked varying polit reactions. Tsaldaris issued vehemently bitter statement, obviously anticipates serious polit damage to his party and can be expected use all means fight back including perhaps kind of press campaign he used to smear Markezinis in 1949. LEK which is mtg this morning fully expected

dissolve as party and unite under Papagos banner. Plastiras unperturbed, Moatsis assured us and his statement to be published in afternoon press welcomes Papagos candidacy as clearing up doubt on subj and as endorsing EPEK view for necessity of change. Moatsis states new developments have not altered in any way Plastiras refusal to cooperate with extreme left and feels EPEK will run alone and not fuse with Liberals prior to elections. Venizelos says Liberals will stand pat, expects few if any defections, and has some hope Plastiras might, after all unite with Liberals in common electoral campaign. According Venizelos, King, whom he saw this morning, was extremely angry and urged Venizelos make strong statement against Papagos, order immediately full scale investigation alleged Papagos plot in army and to move to divest marshal of his mil title. Venizelos said he had demurred and had urged King to follow moderate course. We strongly endorsed this stand. We put across similar idea to palace SYG Pesmazoglou and to George Ventiris this morning.

Markezinis states Papagos decision came as great surprise to his friends as well as his enemies and electoral plans only in formative stage. Much depends on attitude Lambrakis, powerful backstage Liberal, who is returning hastily from Rome this evening. As Dept aware Lambrakis had been advocate of Papagos solution but recently despairing of marshal's candidacy switched to support of Venizelos. Markezinis hopeful that despite lack advance knowledge Papagos plan Lambrakis will swing his influential papers and his followers in Liberal circles to marshal. According Markezinis, Papagos as reported Embtel 470, July 26[1] wld endeavor attract candidates from center as well as right tradition and insist on necessity bringing many new men into politics. He wishes put emphasis on constructive program and avoid attacks on other parties and personalities.

Marshal's candidacy introduces entirely new element into political situation and upcoming electoral campaign. Even initial results not yet clear. Emb convinced only practical course for us to fol is one of strict impartiality and nonintervention except in certain possible contingencies which we will discuss in subsequent tel.

Peurifoy

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[1] Not printed.

781.00/8–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, August 1, 1951—3 p. m.

574. As stated Embtel 561, Jul 31,[1] we consider Emb shld refrain from intervention or public comment on Papagos entry into politics except as we may wish informally to deny rumors that Amers inspired or encouraged his action. Privately and discreetly however we intend if it seems necessary to attempt to minimize 2 possible effects of marshal's steps.

One wld be unconstitutional maneuvers by palace to eliminate marshal from campaign or call off elections or so to act as to drive marshal into open hostility to monarchy. While we trust wiser counsels will prevail, anger and bitterness of King and Queen might impel them to such action. Ominous symptom was instruction of King to Venizelos to deal henceforth with Potamianos rather than Pesmazoglou. We suspect this is because latter as he indicated mins had advised King to accept sitn calmly and to seek reconciliation with marshal. Ventiris is apparently giving similar advice but others of palace entourage can be counted on to add fuel to flames.

Second untoward development might be polarization polit forces into extreme right-left camps, one behind Papagos and other behind Plastiras. We consider this danger less serious particularly if Papagos continues present effort to develop center rather than rightist constellation and if Plastiras sticks to assurances he will refuse any alliance with Commies. Immed fusion of Libs and EPEK might incline both generals to moderation but we doubt Plastiras will accept unless optimism regarding his prospects severely shaken.

While bulk of Papagos support will probably come from Populists which accts for virulence of Tsaldaris attack we incline to belief marshal will draw strength from all elements of non-Commie electorate. Many of those disgruntled with old polit leadership, who wld previously have gone with Plastiras may now vote for Papagos. Markezinis even with such leading Libs as Mavros, Averoff and Glavanis will switch to marshal and this while unlikely is possible. At all event Papagos practically certain to be one of three largest parties and cld conceivably have or approach absolute majority of Parl seats. Emb will endeavor earliest obtain and report country wide reaction and prospects.

Shld Papagos gain control of govt, admin wld probably become more firm, consistent non-defective and ECA prog wld benefit. Extent to which this wld be true wld however depend on character of principal collaborators marshal chooses. . . .

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[1] *Supra.*

Real disadvantage Papagos entry into politics is long term one which has hitherto persuaded Dept and Emb to consider him last card for use only in great emergency. Artificial and probably temporary crystallization of polit forces around marshal will interrupt gradual normalization of Greek polit life and reconstitution 2 traditional parties as predominant powers. Even if he shld succeed in his immed task this most fundamental work will have to be recommenced when he retires, probably after further period of splintering and confusion. This eventuality must conceivably be avoided if Papagos in effect inherited Populist party while Venizelos and Plastiras reconstituted strong Liberal counterweight. It seems unlikely at this writing however that any thing so clean cut will emerge.[2]

PEURIFOY

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[2] The Department concurred "in general in excellent analysis" of this telegram (telegram 565, August 2, to Athens, 781.00/8–151).

U.N. Doc. A/1857

Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans[1]

[Extract]

. . . .

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

205. The dual function of conciliation and observation with which the Special Committee was charged by the General Assembly, and which the latter confirmed by resolution 382 (V) adopted on 1 December 1950, has always remained the Special Committee's constant concern. It has continued to observe the compliance or non-compliance by the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece with the recommendations of the Assembly.*

206. Full diplomatic representation between Greece and Yugoslavia was restored by an exchange of ministers on 28 November 1950. The two Governments have continued their efforts through diplomatic channels to solve their common problems, and progress is being made in the establishment of normal relations between the two Governments. A series of trade and communications agreements have been signed, and the repatriation of Greek children and other Greek nationals from Yugoslavia to Greece is proceeding. Yugoslavia has co-

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[1] Report signed in Geneva, August 15, covering the period August 1, 1950, to August 1, 1951, and submitted to the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A copy of this report was forwarded to the Department of State on August 15 by Jefferson Patterson and may be found, along with a number of despatches detailing the ongoing work of drafting the report, in file 357.AE.

*See chapter II, paragraphs 25 to 30. [Footnote in the source text.]

operated with the international Red Cross organisations and the Swedish Red Cross in making possible the progress thus far achieved. The children so far repatriated have been reunited promptly with their parents. In the light of this improvement in the situation the following paragraphs do not concern themselves with Greek-Yugoslav relations.†

207. Diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations do not exist between Albania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Greece on the other. Whereas the Government of Greece has continued to co-operate with the Special Committee in the latter's efforts to promote the establishment of such relations, the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria have presisted in their refusal to recognize it as a legally constituted body of the United Nations.‡

208. In complete disregard of repeated General Assembly recommendations, those States at present accommodating the large number of Greek guerrillas known to have retreated into Albania and Bulgaria in 1949 have failed to permit any international verification of their disarming and disposition, thereby continuing a situation which constitutes a potential threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. Similarly, those States detaining Greek military personnel and other Greek nationals taken into the territories of the countries to the north of Greece as a result of the guerrilla warfare, in continued violation of accepted international practice, have made no effort to comply with the General Assembly recommendations concerning the repatriation either of such Greek military personnel, or of those other Greek nationals who desire to return to Greece and live in accordance with the law of the land.§

209. In disregard of fundamental humanitarian principles, and despite the recommendations of the General Assembly in 1948, 1949 and 1950, which sought a solution of the problem on a purely humanitarian basis divorced entirely from political considerations, the States detaining the Greek children, with the exception noted above of Yugoslavia, have made no effort to permit the return to their homes in Greece of the children whose repatriation has been requested.‖

210. The problem of international refugees in Greece has undergone further development during the course of the past year. In view of the continued movement of political and other refugees across the northern frontiers into Greece, the Special Committee remains of the opinion that it would be desirable that these refugees should be resettled outside Greece.¶

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† See chapter II, paragraph 30; chapter IV, paragraphs 175–183. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡ See chapter II, paragraphs 25–30. [Footnote in the source text.]

§ See chapter III, paragraphs 142–147; chapter IV, paragraphs 165–174. [Footnote in the source text.]

‖ See chapter IV, paragraphs 175–183. [Footnote in the source text.]

¶ See chapter IV, paragraphs 155–164. [Footnote in the source text.]

211. Although the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria have consistently disregarded the recommendations made by the General Assembly wih regard to co-operation by them with the Special Committee, those two Governments have continued to submit to the Secretary-General complaints alleging frontier violations. As the submission of these complaints implies recognition of the jurisdiction of the United Nations in the matter, it is the opinion of the Special Committee that action should be taken to draw the attention of the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria to the fact that an appropriate United Nations body, established by the General Assembly, already exists precisely for the examination and investigation of such complaints, and that this investigation can only be carried out if those States will co-operate with the Special Committee.

212. The "Free Greece" radio station of the Greek guerrilla movement has continued to operate from Romanian territory, transmitting instructions to the so-called "fighters" of this movement. The similarity between, on the one hand, the instructions given to guerrilla groups introduced clandestinely into Greece, as revealed by interrogation of members of these groups and, on the other hand, the instructions broadcast by the "Free Greece" station, affords a significant illustration of the fact that the leadership of the guerrilla movement comes from outside Greece.**

213. Furthermore, "Free Greece" broadcasts, accusing Greece of aggressive intentions towards Albania and Bulgaria, have been echoed by the Government-controlled propaganda emanating from certain East and Central European States. The presence of the Special Committee in Greece and the facts which it was able to establish on the spot made it possible for the Committee to affirm the groundlessness of these alarmist allegations and to ensure that they were assessed by world opinion at their true value.††

214. Since the forced retreat of the guerrilla formations across the northern frontiers of Greece in 1949, the Greek guerrilla movement has changed its tactics and has not attempted to resume large-scale guerrilla warfare. In openly avowed pursuance of the same ultimate aim—the forcible overthrow of the Greek Government—the Greek guerrilla leaders have resorted to subversive agitation carried on in the frontier areas of northern Greece by small armed groups of specially selected and trained guerrillas which are under instructions to effect the underground re-organization of the Greek Communist and "Agrarian" parties, collect intelligence regarding the Greek armed

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**See chapter V, paragraphs 184-203. [Footnote in the source text.]

†† *Ibid.* [Footnote in the source text.]

forces, foment discontent, incite to insurrection and generally prepare for a future attempt to overthrow the Greek Government by force.‡‡

215. The Special Committee has obtained a considerable amount of evidence showing not only that aid to the Greek guerrilla movement has continued to come from Albania and Bulgaria, but also that it is now afforded in varying forms by other Central and East European States, in defiance of the General Assembly's injunction to Albania and Bulgaria to cease rendering any support to the Greek guerrillas, and its recommendation to all States to refrain from any action designed to assist any armed group fighting against Greece.§§

216. There has been ample evidence to show that such guerrilla groups have been trained along parallel lines at special schools for Greek guerrillas in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for their subversive work in Greece. By means of a widespread and highly organized network extending from these three countries through Romania to Bulgaria, they are infiltrated secretly into Greece. The groups are instructed, equipped, and frequently also armed, in Bulgaria and then aided by the Bulgarian authorities to cross, and in some cases later to re-cross, the Greek-Bulgarian frontier. There has also been at least one characteristic instance of a similar group from Eastern Europe returning to Greece through Albania with the assistance of the Albanian authorities. Without such assistance from abroad the guerrilla groups now operating in the northern frontier areas of Greece could neither initiate their work nor continue to carry it out.§§

217. The threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece has thus changed in character since the retreat from Greece of the guerrilla forces in 1949. During the past year, this change has resulted in tension in the Balkans, by reason of the actively hostile attitude of certain East and Central European States towards Greece. Thus, the Special Committee has deemed it inadvisable to recommend its own dissolution.

218. It is the considered opinion of the Special Committee, based on its experience since 1947, that the constant vigilance of the United Nations with respect to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece has been an important element in the maintenance of the peace in the Balkans. However, the situation depicted in the foregoing paragraphs constitutes a continuing threat to Greece and to peace in the Balkans, which can only be removed if the States concerned will act in their relations with Greece in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter and the recommendations of the General Assembly.

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‡‡ See chapter III, paragraphs 71–152. [Footnote in the source text.]

§§ *Ibid.* [Footnote in the source text.]

CHAPTER VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

219. In the light of the evidence before it, and of the conclusions it has drawn therefrom, and reserving its right to submit either supplementary or revised recommendations prior to the convening of the sixth session of the General Assembly it deemed advisable or necessary:

The Special Committee recommends:

1. That the General Assembly re-assert the importance of maintaining peace in the Balkans, continue its efforts to eliminate the threat to Greece by considering ways and means of achieving peaceful co-operation between Greece and the States from which this threat comes, and to that end re-affirm its recommendations to the appropriate States as to

—the cessation of all assistance or support to the Greek guerrilla movement in its activities against Greece;
—the renewal of diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations;
—the renewal, revision or establishment of frontier conventions;
—the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas;
—the provision of no arms and materials of war either directly or indirectly to Albania and Bulgaria until it has been determined that the unlawful assistance of these States to the Greek guerrillas has ceased;
—the repatriation of Greek military personnel, Greek children and other Greek nationals;
—the co-operation of the States concerned with the appropriate United Nations body, particularly as regards the prompt and impartial investigation of their complaints and allegations.

2. That the General Assembly take note of the evidence concerning the existence in Eastern and Central Europe of a network for the training and clandestine re-introduction into Greece of Greek guerrilla agents for the purpose of conducting subversive activities, espionage, sabotage, propaganda and underground reorganization of the Greek guerrilla movement in Greece in preparation for an attempt to overthrow the Greek Government by force.

3. That the General Assembly take into account the changed but continuing threat to Greece within the context of the hostile attitude towards Greece of a number of Eastern and Central European States, particularly Bulgaria, and the consequent tension in the Balkans.

4. That the General Assembly consider the advisability of maintaining United Nations vigilance over the Balkans in the light of the present nature of the threat to peace in that area.

Done at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, in the English and French languages, this fifteenth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-one.

Representative of:

Australia	JOHN RYAN
Brazil	GALBA SANTOS
China	WEN YUAN-NING
France	EMILE CHARVERIAT
Mexico	OMAR JOSEFE
Netherlands	P. C. VISSER
Pakistan	ALI HAIDER ABBASI
Poland	
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	W. L. C. KNIGHT
United States of America	JEFFERSON PATTERSON
Principal Secretariat	RAOUL AGLION

781.00/8-2251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, August 22, 1951—5 p. m.

890. I expressed our concern over the recent polit developments to PriMin yesterday, assured him we took decidely dim view of apparent attempts to deprive army from voting . . . .

I told Venizelos frankly that we were much disturbed by Gen Tsakalotos memo (remytel 870, Aug 21)[1] because:

(1) I had learned from Gen Frederick that the special training exercises or maneuvers referred to by Tsakalotos had not been previously scheduled;

(2) Tsakalotos statement that under electoral law, "the soldiers, especially those of the infantry, would not be technically able to vote" seemed incomprehensible in view clear provision for soldiers voting in electoral law;

(3) publication of a secret mil document in local press tended to foster belief that Greek mil security had diminished considerably since Papagos' resignation.

Venizelos answered that he too found Tsakalotos memo somewhat obtuse, but that he understood General referred to insignificant number of men along Bulgarian frontier. In any case we cld rest assured that there wld be no skulduggery and that soldiers wld vote as originally planned. He then declared that he wld have method of document's publication fully investigated.

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[1] Not printed; it reported that the daily newspaper *Athinaiki*, controlled by General Zervas, leader of the Greek National Party, had published on August 21 the full text of a memorandum dated August 4 from General Tsakalotos to the King recommending that the Greek armed forces not vote in the forthcoming national elections (981.61/8-2151).

Here I interjected that I wld save him trouble and expense of investigation by telling him without further ado that his close associate Napoleon Zervas had sought to peddle secret memo to *Vima* and perhaps other papers and failing had published it in his own sheet *Athinaiki*. His response to this was a rather shamefaced "I am afraid you are right." I then said pointedly that I understood Zervas' friend Boulis Metaxas had returned.

Venizelos said that he had opposed Sedgwick interview and considered its publication untimely although he fully agreed with its content (re Embtel 839, Aug 18).[2] I mentioned fact that he had assumed full responsibility for this as he had several other controversial moves by Palace. This he ruefully admitted, but added categorically that King's polit activities wld cease immed.

Venizelos said he understood there was good chance of cut in ECA aid to Greece. If this were true he pled that no announcement be made until after elections since voters might hold him personally responsible. I told him that matter now under discussion in Congress but that I doubted very much any definite action wld be taken prior to Sept 9.

Although our conversation was friendly I made our concern with current trends eminently clear to Venizelos. In view of apparent determination in Palace circles to beat Papagos at all costs and Venizelos extreme reluctance to resist these forces it might be desirable for Dept to express our concern at turn of events here to some reliable Amer newspapermen. Here I might add that for some inexplicable reason Greek polits seem to fear criticism in US press more than anything else in world.

PEURIFOY

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[2] Not printed.

781.00/8–2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, August 24, 1951—1 p. m.

919. King received me yesterday. I told him that speaking both as Amb and personal friend, I was gravely concerned by recent partisan polit activities of Palace which boded ill, particularly if Papagos wins election. His Majesty assured me that he wld "engage no more in such activities."

King, who apparently had been thoroughly briefed on our views by Venizelos (Embtel 890, August 22),[1] was nevertheless obviously perturbed when I told him that if *Eleftheria* serial story "Papagos Affair" did not cease involving American officials and reporting twisted versions of their activities here during earlier polit crises, I might be forced to issue a statement to set record straight. His Majesty said that he sincerely hoped this wld not be necessary.

King then brought up subj of Queen's request to Eleni Vlachos that *Kathimerini* switch its pro-Papagos line (Embtel 859, Aug 20).[2] He explained that Queen and Miss Vlachos were old friends, that they met to discuss village relief, and that Queen had merely asked how so close a friend could support an enemy of court. (This inquiry according to Miss Vlachos took four hours.)

I told King that since Papagos was favorite in pre-election betting he shld take into account that he might well have to work with Marshal. He answered that if Marshal led field he wld not hesitate to offer him mandate although he fully realized that there might be certain difficulties between them. He said, for example, that Papagos might insist on certain change in army of which he as Commander-in-Chief wld disapprove. If Papagos controlled Parliament he could, of course, effect these changes by legislation and this wld be embarrassing to throne.

I thereupon suggested that King spare himself all possibility of embarrassment in this matter by ridding himself of this title of C-in-C before elections. His Majesty said that as matter of fact he had intended for some time to make someone else supreme commander of armed forces but had simply neglected to do so.

In this connection I said that we had been upset by Tsakalotos memo (Embtel 870, August 21)[3] which was embarrassing not only to King but also to various high army officers. We were even more concerned by current rumors that Grigoropoulos and several others who had openly favored soldier voting were to be eased out of army. This I made clear wld have ill effect both at home and abroad, as wld any measures such as staged maneuvers, to prevent soldiers from exercising right to vote.

King replied that no such moves were contemplated.

I then told His Majesty that I was sure his interest like ours was to give Greece a stable and able govt and consequently if Greek Rally was first party, but did not secure working majority, we hoped he wld use his great influence to persuade other polit groups to cooperate with Papagos and make stable govt possible.

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[1] *Supra.*
[2] Not printed.
[3] Summarized in footnote 1, *supra.*

I closed audience by telling King that I not only admired really wonderful work which had made his Queen and himself best loved monarchs in Grk history, but that personally I was deeply grateful to them for their kindness to my family. We parted as we met in a spirit of friendship.

While it cannot be expected that extracurricular Palace activities will wholly cease, I believe that this interview and that with Venizelos will have moderating effect and perhaps forestall even more dangerous steps which might otherwise have been taken. It is worth noting that [George Vendiris], who was yesterday named secretary general to King replacing Pesmazoglou, has requested us earnestly to exercise our influence on King in favor of nonintervention and moderation. For contrary influences at work see my conversation with Levides (Embtel 918, August 24).[4]

PEURIFOY

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[4] Not printed; it reported on a conversation between Peurifoy and Grand Marshal of the Court Colonel Levides following the Ambassador's interview with the King discussed in the source text. Levides expressed profound concern "with way things were going at Palace and possible disastrous results to throne and country which might occur therefrom." (781.11/8-2451)

Athens Embassy Files : Lot 59 F 48 : "Top Secret 49–57"

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Chief of the United States Joint Military Air Group in Greece (Frederick)[1]

TOP SECRET [ATHENS,] August 24, 1951.

I should appreciate it if, in order to assist in supporting the American objective of maintaining political stability in Greece during and immediately after the forthcoming elections, you could take the following steps in relation to the Greek armed forces:

1. Take an early opportunity to point out to General Grigoropoulos and General Tsakalotos, particularly the latter, as I have pointed out to the King and the Prime Minister,[2] the concern with which we regard measures calculated to influence the attitude of the armed forces and their leaders in the elections. You should emphasize the very unfortunate impression which would be created in the United States and elsewhere by any attempt to prevent the soldiers from voting by holding maneuvers or training on or about election day or by any other device of this kind. In this connection you might refer to the unfortunate effect created by General Tsakalotos' memorandum published in *Athenaiki*, which gave the misleading impression that he and other generals opposed voting by the Army in the present election, whereas it is your understanding that their recommendation

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[1] Drafted by Yost.

[2] See telegram 890 from Athens, August 22, p. 498, and telegram 919, August 24, from Athens, *supra*.

referred only to future elections. In view of the misunderstanding created by General Tsakalotos' memorandum, it would be desirable that a circular be sent by the General Staff to all corps and division commanders instructing them to see to it that the soldiers are in no way prevented from voting.

2. You may also wish to point out to General Grigoropoulos and Tsakalotos that, while the ostensible purpose of the measures taken by General Tsakalotos during recent weeks has been to remove or neutralize political influences in the Army, the actual effect has been to create the widespread impression that the High Command has been using its position to oppose and defeat one of the political parties. Such activities cannot help but jeopardize the morale and unity of the armed forces at a time when it is of the utmost importance that they be maintained at their highest pitch.

3. Having made these points to Generals Grigoropoulos and Tsakalotos, I believe you should take every possible precaution to see to it that these recommendations are not ignored. Specifically, you and your staff should be alert to observe and, if possible, forestall any sanctions against any of the officers whose views on soldier voting and related matters differed from those of General Tsakalotos. Most important of all, I hope that your officers in the field will watch for and report immediately to you any indications that substantial units of the Army are, through one device or another, about to be deprived of the possibility of voting, and that they will, insofar as possible, observe the actual situation on election day.

781.00/8-2251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 24, 1951—8 p. m.

956. Dept shares Emb's concern recent polit developments reported urtel 859 Aug 21[2] and hopes your remarks Venizelos urtel 890 Aug 22[3] will have salutatory effect. While not too hopeful Venizelos will influence Palace, perhaps he can be persuaded not lend himself to latter's machinations.

Agree you shld seek earliest opportunity discreetly and tactfully reiterate informally to King dangers not only to institution of monarchy, but also stability of country with subsequent possibility nullifying effect of Amer program in Greece, all of which inherent Palace intervention current electoral campaign. While Emb best able determine approach King, might be propitious have talk on grounds that monarchy post-war period has been stabilizing influence and any action taken jeopardizing this position wld have serious consequence to Grk nation. Re urdesp 197 Aug 7[4] as concomitant might be useful Emb take up this subj again with Pipinelis.

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[1] Drafted by Ben F. Dixon of GTI, cleared by Edmund J. Dorsz, Deputy Director, GTI.

[2] Not printed.

[3] *Ante*, p. 498.

Dept believes most important fact US seriously concerned this matter shld not become known publicly. Wish not lend any color frequent commie charge US intervention and domination Greece or arouse Grk animosity undue intervention internal affairs. Latter particularly important in view Emb's estimate Papagos prospects as result coming elections and his oft-announced position necessity Grks conduct own affairs. Dept's view any representation made this matter for present shld be informal and anything resembling *démarche* or formal statement should be avoided.

Since Palace intervention increasingly common knowledge Greece, public knowledge US disapproval Palace participation politics might contribute undermining prestige monarch and might be considered US tacit approval for Grks raise "issue of regime." Similarly, because present Palace polit activities almost entirely anti-Papagos public knowledge US anxious Palace eschew politics this time most probably be construed US support Papagos. Any talks King or Venizelos this matter shld make abundantly clear US impartiality as to consideration but Palace intervention politics inadvisable regardless direction that activity.

View foregoing considerations, Dept considers preferable not discuss this matter Amb Politis or prompt any press comment at this time. Such action might be reserved and employed only if sitn becomes much worse.

Your comments foregoing wld be appreciated.

ACHESON

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[4] Not printed; it reported on a conversation between Memminger and Panayotis Pipinelis, former Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs and occasional counselor to the King, during the course of which Memminger sought to win Pipinelis' support for a policy of Palace neutrality during the election campaign. Memminger told Pipinelis, *inter alia*, "in as nice a way as I could that we in the Embassy had long had great respect for his ability, intelligence and candor, and that we felt confident he would counsel caution in what might well develop into a very hot political campaign. He got the idea on the first bounce and assured me that he would." (781.00/8-751)

781.00/8-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, August 28, 1951—4 p. m.

981. I met privately with Papagos and Kanellopoulos yesterday at their request. Marshal seemed serenely confident and in excellent condition both physically and mentally.

Papagos said that he was disturbed by King's continued failure to relinquish position of C-in-C as he feared that if this were not done prior to elections there wld be considerable embarrassment for all concerned.

Once he controls new Parl, as Papagos said, he can of course strip monarch of all mil auth, but to do this Marshal feels wld be generally regarded as anti-monarchical move and it is certainly one he wld be most reluctant to make. However, Papagos is determined to punish Gen Tsakalotos for what he considers his intensive partisan pol activities, particularly for his "fabricated memo" which misrepresented situation completely (Embtel 870 August 21).[1] Papagos said that he had not decided whether to have Tsakalotos court martialed or simply retired without fanfare.

I mentioned fact that it was Papagos himself, after consultation with Gen Jenkins and me, who switched Tsakalotos from A Corps to Athens. He answered quickly that this was true in a sense, but that he had made Tsakalotos Inspector Gen and not chief of army staff. Tsakalotos, he added, was an able fighting man, but he had proved himself to be without character. Further he was not intelligent and it was obvious that his recent pol antics had been planned for him by palace circles which had no doubt promised him eventual promotion to chief of National Defense Gen Staff.

Papagos then asked that I seek to persuade Venizelos to use his influence to have King abandon his title as C-in-C. As I was noncomittal here, he added that he had been much pleased with our attitude of strict neutrality in local campaign and with our efforts to stop any faction from resorting to extreme tactics.

Papagos made it clear that when elected (it is never if elected with him) he will not as is popularly rumored seek to disturb King's household. In fact he maintains that he has never done so, but merely as life long friend told King that several of palace coterie were dangerous men to have about.

Marshal said that Queen had told Eleni Vlachos that if Papagos was elected he wld soon close *Kathimerini* since as dictator he wld not tolerate press criticism. Papagos asserted he had assured Miss Vlachos as he was now assuring me that he did not approve of and wld never seek to impose dictatorial govt on Greece. He had, he admitted, served under Metaxas but only as soldier of crown, and had never approved of strong arm methods in govt.

To my specific query as to what wld happen to his bitterest critic *Eleftheria* Papagos answered that he wld cause prompt investigation as to status of funds used for that daily's support. Personally he has good reason to believe money used to keep *Eleftheria* functioning through campaign has come from persons close to palace. If these funds were loans, Marshal will see that paper is either forced to pay up or closed with latter alternative strong probability.

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[1] Summarized in footnote 1, p. 498.

When new govt is formed Papagos stated he will be Defense Min as well as PriMin so that he can clear up deteriorated mil situation. He maintains hordes of new civilian employees have been placed in Defense Min in past few weeks and these parasites will have to be cleared out. Once Defense situation is again secure he will turn Defense Min over to some one else. Here Marshal made it crystal clear to Kanellopoulos and to me that no inefficient ministers will be long tolerated in his cabinet.

I told Papagos that while we fully appreciated his ability, integrity and understanding, we had a long standing interest in govt stability in Greece, and we hoped that in his anxiety for improvement he wld not upset applecart. He answered that we cld count on him to collaborate with us on closest possible basis.

I told Marshal we had received reports to effect that if rally [3] did not secure absolute majority that he wld resign. He replied that while he wld of course, get majority, these reports were "sheer enemy propaganda".

In this connection Marshal added that the calumnies of his foes created a terrific temptation for him to set record straight. However, wld not answer the slanders of his enemies. To do so, he declared, might well terminate careers of King and Queen in Greece.

In conclusion, Marshal expressed hope that I wld soon see King again and that if I did so he very much hoped Her Majesty wld be present. The Queen, it was tacitly apparent, he considers his most dangerous opponent.

While I said nothing on this point to Papagos I do not propose to seek another audience, since to do so now might be misconstrued.

PEURIFOY

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[3] In telegram 652 from Athens, August 6, Peurifoy had reported, *inter alia*, that the Papagos political movement had officially announced its name as the "Greek Rally." (781.00/8-651)

781.00/8-2851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 7, 1951—8 p. m.

1177. Embtel 981 Aug 28.[2] Re ur conv Aug 27 with Papagos in which he stated that if elected he will court martial or retire Gen Tsakalotos at once. Dept Army, including Asst Chief of Staff, G-3, Gen Jenkins, believes that unless Grk mil and civilian opinion universally agree Tsakalotos' actions deserve drastic punishment, precipitate severe action will have serious effects on efficiency and morale Grk Armed Forces and cld even result in internal strife.

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[1] Drafted by Anschuetz and cleared with General Jenkins, Department of the Army, and Rountree.

[2] *Supra.*

Dept recognizes in event Papagos heads new govt series delicate polit problems will arise in which Emb undoubtedly hopes be able exercise moderating influence. In this connection Dept concurs in Army apprehensions set forth above and suggests that, if elected, Papagos be urged, in interest Grk mil forces, to heal breach with Tsakalotos or if that not possible to move slowly against Tsakalotos after achieving backing of mil and public opinion.

Webb

781.00/9–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, September 12, 1951—4 p. m.

1219. Altho electoral campaign has wholly preoccupied govt and polit parties, Grk press and articulate elements of public are increasingly concerned by anticipated drastic cut in Amer aid. As soon as new govt constituted, formal and urgent representations to US may be expected.

Emb, mission and JUSMAG are also deeply concerned at probable repercussions of cut if it shld prove to be as extensive as feared. Obviously some few items cld be stricken from import program without grave loss. Most rigid austerity in use of some essentials such as petroleum products cld effect further savings. Some elements of reconstruction program cld be dropped without too much injury to economy. Sum total of these reductions cld not however approach overall percentage cut reflected in Congressional authorization without doing what might prove irreparable damage to Grk recovery so far achieved at such heavy expense and directly undermining mil effort.

Any further reductions over and above those suggested in preceding para wld have to come either from (1) food and other strictly essential consumer goods required for maintenance health and morale of population, (2) raw materials, fuels, fertilizers and equipment required to maintain Grk production employment and transport even at present inadequate level; or (3) very modest reconstruction program designed to permit gradual development in direction of self supporting economy. As to first, it is clear health and morale of population must be maintained in Greece, which lies at such strategic spot and whose standard of living is already so marginal. As to second necessity for even greater import level can be avoided only by keeping Grk production for both civilian and mil needs up at least to current levels. As to one and two, greater scarcity of consumer goods will contribute heavily to inflationary pressures which are already very serious problem. As to third, reconstruction program offers chief hope of lifting

Greece ultimately off back of Amer taxpayer. Moreover as Dept is aware, reconstruction in Greece, having got fully under way only at end of civil war, is three to four years behind reconstruction in other ECA countries and for this and other reasons its abandonment or drastic curtailment wld have most grave effect on Grk morale.

In view small size and potentialities her industry Greece cannot be expected to make substantial contribution to mil production though all possibilities are of course being thoroughly explored. Principal Grk contribution to West mil strength lies in army of eleven divs with large readily mobilizable reserve of trained men, with excellent spirit and with constantly improving equipment. Greece is spending approx 45 percent of her budget for maintenance these disproportionately large force and US is spending more than 150 mil annually for their equipment. It will however be absolutely impossible for Grk Govt to continue to spend this proportion of its budget for mil if US econ aid is substantially cut. Moreover important elements of econ program such as transport communications, maintenance of food and fuel reserves, etc., make direct contribution to mil. Finally it wld be rash to expect morale and effectiveness of armed forces to remain at present pitch if there shld be drastic decline in gen econ welfare affecting, among others, families of soldiers. In short mil contribution of Greece to West def is to unusual degree, because of marginal standard of living and retarded postwar recovery, dependent on maintenance and at least some improvement in econ sitn. To neglect Grk economy while attempting to develop its mil strength wld be self defeating and wld jeopardize gravely US mil objectives in this part of world.

We know Dept is aware of all these factors but believed it might find useful up to minute report by reps all US agencies here. ECA/G is making careful review of entire import program to determine what reductions cld be made without grave econ, polit and mil repercussions but our tentative view is that total reduction cld not safely be over 15 percent. Even such reduction might well require some compensatory assistance to Grks on mil side to relieve large and growing burden on their budget resulting from contd maintenance under arms of 160,000 men. Lapham and Gen Frederick concur.[1]

Peurifoy

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[1] In telegram 1338 to Athens of September 17, Acting Secretary of State Webb informed Peurifoy that the Department of State shared his concern at the repercussions of an aid cut as foreshadowed by recent Congressional action. "Importance adequate aid will be stressed connection House Senate conference and with appropriations bill. Dept hopes enough aid will finally be allocated to Greece for pursuit objectives but expects reduction. Doubly important Greeks make best use of aid and own resources." (781.00/9-1251)

781.00/9-1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, September 15, 1951—1 p.m.

1266. Post-electoral polit sitn may be summarized as fols:

It seems almost certain Papagos cannot have absolute majority though faint possibility exists he might wean sufficient Deps away from other parties.[1] It is still possible that Venizelos and Plastiras together may have bare majority. However EPEK–Lib Govt wld be highly unstable due to slimness majority, distrust between two leaders and violent attacks to be anticipated from Gr Rally which wld feel, as overwhelmingly largest party, it was being cheated of office. Probability is that neither Papagos alone nor EPEK–Lib combination will have enough strength to form stable govt.

Papagos states categorically that he will not collaborate with any other party (since such party wld hamstring implementation his program) and that only solution is immed new elections under majority system. In discussing question with Marshal, Canelloupoulos and Markezinis, we have cited three disadvantages to immed election:

(1) Additional two months neglect of pressing econ problems arising from growing inflation, cut in US aid, etc.;

(2) Prolongation and increased embitterment polit campaign deepening fissure between right and left and perhaps stimulating further unhealthy polit activities in army.

(3) Uncertainty that results of elections wld be improvement over present chamber in which workable conservative majority though split, does exist. While Rally leaders convinced they wld obtain clear majority in new elections, we pointed out that on assumption Lib Party wld break up and Papagos receive one-third its recent vote, Plastiras might receive two-thirds as well as significant proportion EDA vote, resulting perhaps in approx even balance between right and left with cooperation between two rendered impossible by character of campaign. Papagos, however, deaf to these arguments claims election six months from now after he had taken unpopular econ measures but before they had had time to produce beneficial effect will be less favorable to him and demands elections now. He wld

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[1] Telegram 1194 from Athens, September 11, reported that "With almost all civilian votes in there is rather widespread feeling that elections have resulted in impasse." The telegram then reported the election results to that date (781.00/9–1151). The final election returns, as announced by the Greek Ministry of the Interior on September 24 were as follows:

	Votes	*Seats*
Greek Rally (Papagos)	623,297	114
National Progressive Union (Plastiras)	399,529	74
Liberals (Venizelos)	324,482	57
National Democratic Left	178,325	10
Populist (Tsaldaris)	113,580	2
Democratic Socialist (Papandreou)	37,033	—
Agrarians	23,186	1
Others	7,469	—

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950–1952, p. 11836.

prefer to conduct them himself but might consent to service govt if its composition had his approval.

King and Venizelos strongly oppose immed elections, latter presumably because he foresees further weakening or dissolution his party, former because he wld thereafter be confronted with choice of Papagos or Plastiras. Palace favors three-party govt but this seems out of question. Venizelos cld perhaps be persuaded to accept coalition with Papagos but latter absolutely refuses. Unless, therefore, EPEK and Libs shld be able to form govt which wld be precarious at best we may be confronted next week with no practicable alternative to new elections.

I lay problem at this stage before Dept in order that if it shld feel effect in US or internationally of immed new elections wld be so unfortunate as to warrant further stronger representations on our party, it may immed instruct me to take such action in case need arises. I am far from sure that even very strong representations wld alter stand of Papagos who is deeply embittered by recent campaign against him, wholly distrustful of Palace and Venizelos and obsessed with somewhat Messianic belief that only if free and untrammeled can he save Greece. Further representations might well be, therefore, futile expenditure our credit. I doubt that any public statement on my part such as that recommended by Venizelos or Vendiris wld affect outcome and wld probably serve only to damage relations with Papagos. On the whole, I am inclined unless Dept feels disposed to put our whole weight behind prevention new elections, to let nature take its course reserving our influence to minimize insofar as possible disadvantages and dangers which we foresee that course will entail.[2]

PEURIFOY

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[2] Telegram 1379 to Athens, September 19, stated that the Department generally concurred with the Embassy's analysis of the Greek political situation and likewise doubted if any public statement by the Embassy could substantially advance U.S. interests. "Dept believes dexterous management Emb's position during difficult circumstances past weeks has well protected if not actually enhanced US prestige during this period." The Department added that it was in no way reluctant to commit U.S. influence to any course of action which seemed clearly in the national interests. "However, at this moment in light present delicate, complicated situation and until opportunity presents itself in which US might beneficially and decisively effect developments in Greece, Dept concurs Emb's recommendation let nature take its course while reserving our influence to minimize dangers which apparent to Emb and Dept." (781.00/9–1551)

781.5 MAP/9-2051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 20, 1951—2 p. m.

1395. Toisa. Supplementing Deptel 1338,[2] FY 52 MSP legis in conference comite this week. Appropriations hearings being conducted concurrently. Under circumstances difficult at moment forecast amts available Greece but safe assume econ figure will be substantially lower than 250 originally presented. Shld be remembered, however, that country aid figures used in Cong presentations are illustrative and do not necessarily represent aid level which is still to be determined. Important that Grks understand this procedure.

However, even if illustrative figure for Greece approximates level of econ aid as eventually determined by ECA, mechanisms may exist which will permit supplemental assistance in case of necessity. These involve trans between titles, trans from mil to econ within Title I, off-shore procurement by US, use of mil funds for some common use items.

While above methods may exist their use will be governed on basis strict and substantiated necessity. Cong comites have taken very hard look at econ programs especially those not directly related to mil effort. For this reason and also because 250 million figure conceived from beginning as subj substantial revision after realistic and detailed import program drawn up, wld urge that Grks undertake immed strenuous "hard core" approach to reappraisal present tentative and inadequately justified import program.

Substance above can be used as you see fit in countering possible adverse comment resulting from publicity aid level.

WEBB

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[1] Drafted by George H. Emery of S/ISA. Cleared by Rountree, Anschuetz, and Lincoln of GTI; Colonel Waddell of Defense; Mahon of ECA. Signed for the Acting Secretary by Jonathan B. Bingham of the Technical Cooperation Administration.

[2] Summarized in footnote 1, p. 507.

781.00/9-2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, September 24, 1951—4 p. m.

1391. Yesterday deputy PriMin handed me a note formally concurred in by three major pol parties appealing against cut in level of aid.

Note outlines as follows effect of any marked reduction in aid:

1. Because of very strong inflationary forces, announcement of cu

might easily create panic in gold market and spread to other sectors of economy.

2. Investment program already reduced and necessary for food and raw materials. Further cuts wld result in increased unemployment and undermine hope for future and morale of people latter indispensable for social cohesiveness and fighting spirit of armed force.

3. Reduction of ECA counterpart availabilities wld have shattering effect on govt expenditures, first among civil pensioners, veterans and guerrilla-stricken areas northern Greece. These sectors most vulnerable Commie infiltration. But even drastic economies here cld not prevent substantial reduction mil expenditures and armed forces.

Elaborating last point, note shows 43 percent of budgeted govt expenditures 1951/52 is for natl defense, 14 percent civil pay roll. Even if govt cld resist tremendous pressure for adjustment civil service pay, cut welfare and relief, local governments, a cut in defense expenditure wld be necessary at $250 million level. At lower level, govt revenue wld be reduced by lowered customs revenues and other taxes, and substantial reductions in size of armed forces wld be unavoidable.

Note concludes "it can only assert with all the seriousness at its command that a reduced level of aid will make it impossible to maintain the main lines of its present policy. Retreat wld be rapidly followed by dramatic developments leading to crisis and chaos. For, under those conditions the forces working against peace and social order wld have full opportunity to renew their activities which aim at paralysis of the social structure and the destruction of the defense establishment of Greece." Text and despatch follow.[1]

Emb and USA substantially in accord with arguments presented.

Peurifoy

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[1] The text of the note was transmitted to the Department in despatch 466 from Athens, September 25, a copy of which is in file 881.10/9-2551.

781.00/10-1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, October 16, 1951—8 a. m.

1735. Essential elements of current political situation are fol:

1. EPEK leaders apparently satisfied with outcome negots with Liberals and eager to set up two-party govt at earliest possible moment.[1] Plastiras has publicly denied he favors elections under majority

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[1] In telegram 1305 from Athens, September 18, Peurifoy had informed the Secretary of State that Plastiras had called that day "to tell me of his long discussion with Venizelos yesterday in which they agreed to form new govt. According to Plastiras it was not yet decided as to whether new govt shld be pure EPEK with Lib support in Parliament or whether Libs wld actively participate." (781.00/9-1851)

system but denial appears designed to check pressure for early elections rather than to scuttle majority system which Plastiras privately prefers in spite of contrary view some members his party. Rumors of EPEK flirtation with Rally persist but, even if accurate, seem most unlikely to lead to any alliance.

2. Rally continues adamant opposition to coalition with any other party in present Chamber although Venizelos though intermediary has recently renewed proposal for tripartite govt under neutral PM. Markezinis, however, continues to favor electoral alliance with Liberals and presumably will endeavor [convince Papagos & Ven] desirability this solution.

3. Liberals are in most unhappy frame of mind since, while negots with EPEK proceeding smoothly on surface, Venizelos and other leaders are increasingly disturbed at (1) probability serious friction with EPEK over concrete implementation clemency and econ policies and (2) effect on Liberal fortunes of sharing responsibility for unpopular econ-measures which are now unavoidable. Liberals therefore probing possibility supporting but not participating in EPEK govt, though a withdrawal from public commitments at this late stage may prove impossible. While delay in determination final election returns due in part to complications of system and errors of courts, it is probable Venizelos is deliberating prolonging process in hopes escaping from his predicament. On other hand he obviously does not want new elections which wld strengthen one or both larger parties at his expense.

Emb views are fol:

1. In spite Plastiras vagaries we wld not object to EPEK–Liberal govt with latter exercising restraining influence on former. Frictions between two are, however, such that we doubt govt with majority only three or four can endure more than 60–90 days. Even during this tenure it will be thinking primarily of forthcoming elections and most reluctant to take firm decisions. We inclined to view therefore that new elections are necessary and that sooner they are held the better. It may, however, require experiment with EPEK–Liberal govt to convince two leaders and palace that elections unavoidable.

2. In case of new elections Liberals must enter electoral alliance or risk total annihilation. Majority sentiment within party now favors alliance with EPEK but doubts appearing which will be strengthened if govt coalition with EPEK proves disillusioning. We are inclined to prefer that Liberals enter electoral alliance with Rally for fol reasons: (*a*) EPEK plus Liberals vs Rally wld be likely, since population very evenly divided between left and right, produce another stalemate with neither party having strong or [stable majority whereas Rally and Libs] wld almost certainly have large majority offering prospect stable govt for one or two years, (*b*) in spite of outmoded Royalist–Venizelos antagonism. Liberal leadership is closer in spirit and program to Rally than to EPEK and hence less likely to disrupt coalition in early stages. We recognize this solution has disadvantage of leaving EPEK without moderating balance afforded by close association with Liberals, but believe this consideration outweighed by importance providing Greece with strong govt in immed future. It is presumed in any case that some Liberals wld go with EPEK even if bulk of party went with Rally.

3. . . . We of course do not propose to take open position pro or con and will be careful to preserve our present cordial relations with EPEK. Nevertheless, in light our present judgment and in spite unfortunate effects immediate impasse, we do not propose to push Venizelos into EPEK embrace nor discourage his efforts to find other solution. However, balance of probability still is that Liberal-EPEK govt will have to be tried, even though briefly, before another solution becomes feasible.

Peurifoy

357.AE/10-1951

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] October 19, 1951.

Subject: Continuation of UN Vigilance in the Balkans

Beginning in the spring of 1950 the Department began consultation with other interested powers looking toward the abolition of UNSCOB and removal of the item of the threat to the peace of Greece from the General Assembly Agenda. Korean events clearly set forth the fact that the Soviet Union was still willing to resort, through its satellites, to aggression against the free world. Furthermore, Korea demonstrated the effectiveness of prompt and impartial reporting in arousing world opinion and in initiating an incontestable basis for UN action. Consequently, the United States joined with Greece and other nations at the Fifth Assembly to continue UNSCOB for an additional year with the power to recommend its own dissolution before the Sixth Assembly if conditions warranted it. Based on evidence collected throughout the year, UNSCOB in its recent report recommended that United Nations vigilance in the Balkans be maintained. This position was adopted unanimously by UNSCOB and had full support of the Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom. In supporting this position the interested areas of the Department had three considerations in mind:

1. The threat to Yugoslavia is very real and continuing. The security of Yugoslavia is of direct strategic interest to the United States. This threat has been comprehensively set forth in the Yugoslav White Book, published in February 1951. On September 11 it also circulated to United Nations Members a series of complaints against the Albanian Government. The Yugoslav Government has advised that they intend to propose the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia as an agenda item in the coming General Assembly. For the past six months the Department has been discussing with the Yugoslavs and other interested countries possible means of addressing UN action to the threat to Yugoslavia.

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[1] Drafted by Dixon (GTI).

The Yugoslavs believe that the establishment of a UN body to be concerned solely or directly with the threat to Yugoslavia would be provocative to the USSR. For political reasons the Yugoslavs would not accept UNSCOB but might accept some other body not having UNSCOB's history. They may be willing, however, to consider establishment of a UN body principally concerned with the Greek frontier but which could quickly spread its operation to Yugoslavia should aggressive action be initiated against Yugoslavia.

2. The location of a United Nations Commission or its observers in the sensitive Balkan area has given the West a tactical advantage in the context of the overall strategic relation between the West and the Soviet Bloc; it seems essential to maintain those moral and political deterrents to Soviet expansion. UN vigilance in the Balkans has constituted such an impediment in the international field to Soviet expansion to the Mediterranean. Were this impediment to be removed, the Soviets would gain a very real advantage. While the removal of UN vigilance in this area would probably not be a signal for a Soviet aggressive move toward the Mediterranean, it would, however, relieve the pressure upon them in this area and give them greater freedom of action. The fact that similar tactical advantages are not enjoyed by the West in many other sensitive areas makes it seem essential to retain that advantage in the Balkan area.

3. The threat to Greece, while altered, is nonetheless real. The Department's judgment in reversing its position with regard to the abolition of UNSCOB appears to have been vindicated in view of events since that time. Prior to the summer of 1950 there had been a noticeable increase in the military potential of the satellites. This military buildup increased steadily during the fall of 1950 and became very much accelerated particularly in Bulgaria during the spring and summer of 1950. Along with this, propaganda efforts against Greece increased in almost direct proportion, taking two lines: first, that a Belgrade–Athens–Ankara axis was being formed directed against Albania and Bulgaria; second, US and UK were mounting a Greek offensive against Albania and Bulgaria. The propaganda program went to the lengths of broadcasting the contents of alleged combat operation orders, imputing a purpose to the movements of prominent Greek and American civil and military personalities (including yourself), indicating Greek troop dispositions, in order to give the idea that an attack was imminent. By twisting actual events and adding false statements a very artful picture was presented which confused even some Greeks. Whatever else may have been the effect of this propaganda it undoubtedly has served to heighten the tension in the Balkans and to whip up public feeling in Bulgaria and Albania, which feeling could be exploited if it were decided to make an attack against Greece. It follows that the threat inherent in the satellite military buildup would seem to be directed toward Greece by this propaganda. On two occasions in January and July of 1951 the intensity of such propaganda compelled UNSCOB to report the untruthfulness of these charges to the members of the UN after having conducted an investigation in Greece.

On quite another score it is notable that the satellite governments have been training Greek guerrillas in infiltration, underground, reorganization, and subversive tactics. Groups of these people have constantly been entering Greece clandestinely to collect intelligence of the Greek armed forces, to foment discontent, and to lay a basis for a future attempt to overthrow the Greek Government. While no substantial headway has been made in this direction, it is not impossible for a resurgence of guerrilla activity in Greece to occur. Removal of UN vigilance from Greece would encourage the renewal of guerrilla penetration across the frontiers as is now daily occurring along the Yugoslav satellite frontier. Such a movement could be materially assisted by trained guerrillas now in the satellites amounting to possibly as much as 20,000.

The recent national elections have resulted in a stalemate. While it is possible for an EPEK–Liberal Government to be formed, it would probably be no more effective or durable a government than those of the recent past. The prospect of improvement in political stability is not good. Inflationary pressures are making for considerable latent discontent. In such a situation when a reduction in American assistance is imminent, withdrawal of UN vigilance from Greece might be interpreted as a lessening of American interest in Greece and result in a weakening of Greek morale. While Greece has been invited to join NATO, the effect of this move cannot be fully felt in Greece for quite some time. Furthermore, the NATO guarantee is not adopted to meet the threat to Greek security which could result from a revived guerrilla threat.

UNSCOB, while it has performed a valuable task in the past, is a cumbersome body not well adapted to meet the threat in the Balkans today. UN machinery in this area is in need of freshening up, which could only be accomplished by a new body and a new mechanism better suited to the needs of the situation. While Britain and France, as well as many other governments, are inclined to favor the retention of UNSCOB in a revised form, the Department has, for the past month, been in consultation with other interested nations, in an attempt to convince them of the need of more compact and efficient machinery in the Balkans. The Department proposes the establishment of a subcommission of the POC which would sit in New York and be composed of members of standing delegations there. Its membership would be reliable, since a majority of the POC can be relied upon to make such a selection. A small observer group of 10 to 15 persons would be located in Greece to keep a watch on the Greek borders with Albania and Bulgaria but ready to operate any place in the Balkans. The subcommittee would be empowered to provide for observation in other areas of international tension in the Balkans at the request of any government concerned, and could itself go to the scene of trouble. Perhaps from one-half to two-thirds of the present costs of UNSCOB would be saved through the operation of this new body. This subcommittee, from the point of view of the Greek probem, would be a disengaging process which, if events warranted it, could be removed from the Greek scene. On the other hand, it could be ready to act immediately in case of an emergency anywhere in the Balkans.[2]

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[2] On November 20, John Politis, head of the Greek Delegation to the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly at Paris, informed the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee that the Greek Government considered that the situation in Greece had been restored to a point where the UNSCOB was no longer necessary and therefore should be dissolved. In view of the opinion given in the last report of the Special Committee that potential Communist danger still existed and that continued vigilance in the Balkans remained necessary, a resolution sponsored by Greece, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States was presented which, after expressing deep appreciation of the work of the UNSCOB, recommended its dissolution within 60 days and its supersession by a Balkan subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission (POC). The resolution was adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on November 23 by a vote of 50 to 5, with 3 abstentions after rejection of a Soviet amendment which called on the United Nations to condemn the United States for "interference" in Greek affairs and called also on the Greek Government to declare a general political amnesty and to reestablish "normal diplomatic relations" with her neighbors. The plenary session of the General Assembly upheld the resolution on December 7, by a vote of 48 to 5 to 1. In telegram 3058 from Athens, January 8, 1952, Ambassador Peurifoy informed the Department that a special meeting of the UNSCOB on January 7 had voted to dissolve the organization by formal meeting on February 5 (357.AE/1-852). Documentation on the work of UNSCOB during 1951 and on the negotiations leading to its dissolution may be found in file 357.AE.

781.13/10-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ATHENS, October 30, 1951—8 p. m.

1972. After considerable last minute bargaining and reshuffling new EPEK-Liberal Cabinet finally formed in time to be sworn in Oct 27. Apparently against his better judgment Venizelos accepted post Deputy PriMin and Min Fon Affairs but obviously withheld some of his best men from Cabinet posts, possibly to use them in future maneuvers. In any event, attitude Liberal leader will probably largely determine length of tenure of office of new govt.

Cabinet as formed appears no worse than expected. EPEK portion is combination of brilliant individualists and party hacks. Rendis shld make good Interior Min while prospects of intelligent but erratic Kartalis as Coordination Min more uncertain due his known incapacity work in harness. Allamanis in Agric is reputedly able and energetic young lawyer with wide knowledge farm problems. Papaspyrou of Justice has good reputation but little is known of him or of Bourdaras of Communications. Zigdis, another bright young man, will be without portfolio for present. He also has reputation of being difficult to work with. Papapolitis, formerly regarded as a Leftist, is reportedly unhappy at being given Commerce Min; however, this appointment was an honor for freshman Deputy, indicating his personal friendship with Plastiras. Evelpides in Fin is well known journalist, professor, author, poet and jack of all trades but generally expressed opinion is that he lacks force and will not succeed as Min.

Cabinets surprise package is, of course, King's "non-polit" man, ex-Admiral Sakellariou, whose post as Defense Min was "recommended" by His Majesty on afternoon Oct 27. Dept will recall Sakellariou was Navy Min in 1947–48 and that he is one of Palace inner social circle. His most recent exploit was to desert Papagos ticket early in election campaign at King's request and to issue strong public statement against Marshal's candidacy. However, Canellopoulos confides that Sakellariou has privately made his peace with Papagos and his appointment is by no means unwelcome to Greek rally.

Full reports on all new Cabinet Mins being pouched.

Peurifoy

781.00/11-351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 3, 1951—1:55 p. m.

2187. Emb's contd fine reporting apprising Dept difficult post-electoral polit situation appreciated. Although we do not wish prejudge newly installed govt, your reports indicate its lack cohesion and unity in purpose, coupled with polit maneuvers going on between Libs and Rally, gives rise serious doubts that it has real prospect effectiveness and durability. Dept views with grave concern possible repetition polit doldrums as occurred first half 1950 in what is now even more crucial period. Wld appear that most likely indigenous factor which might strengthen present govt wld be vehement Papagos opposition, which might conceivably result in closer EPEK–Lib bond. Two serious hazards seem inherent in this forced union: At best EPEK–Lib Parl Majority extremely weak, which condition wld inevitably be reflected in its adm. As Emb points out, such union although not permanent might lead to impasse in new elections or result in vesting balance of power in extreme left.

. . . .

In connection possible new coalition under present Parl, Lib–Rally combination wld have advantage real Parl strength. Moreover as Emb has pointed out a combination of these two elements wld be desirable objective even if new election on majority system were to be held. Dept presumes that in any event, there is little possibility for either EPEK–Lib–Rally or EPEK–Rally coalition in present Parl.

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[1] Drafted by Dixon, approved for transmission by Rountree.

Dept thus concurs, that if obvious difficulties cld be overcome and if they cld be brought together, Papagos–Venizelos coalition wld afford best possibility stable govt under present circumstances. . . .

. . . .

Webb

881.00/11–1051 : Despatch

The Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Greece (Turkel) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ATHENS, November 10, 1951.

No. 662

Subject: Statement on Greek Government Economic Policy in Relation to Military Defense Effort by George Kartalis, Minister of Coordination.

On October 30, 1951 the Chief of the ECA Mission to Greece sent a letter to the Greek Prime Minister advocating that a number of specific matters be dealt with promptly. A copy of this letter is attached as Enclosure No. 1.[1]

Mr. Kartalis, who was Minister of Finance in the short-lived EPEK Government during the spring of 1950 and who has recently been named Minister of Coordination, replied at a meeting of the Steering Committee on November 3rd. Five copies of a transcript of Mr. Kartalis' statement are attached as Enclosure No. 2.[1]

Briefly, he indicates that the Government will try vigorously to enforce price control and wage stabilization policies. At the same time efforts will be made to increase tax revenues while cutting budgetary expenses; it may be feasible to reduce the deficit by a couple of hundred billion from the previously estimated 1,200 billion drachmas. Mr. Kartalis indicates that it will be almost impossible to make further savings with military expenses accounting for 43% of the budget and almost 10% of the national income, including aid. Under these circumstances the problem of maintaining financial stability and a minimum level of investment would have been difficult even at the assumed aid level of $250 million. The Government is taking steps to restrict credit but crop concentration for rationing is expected to increase the currency circulation. The Government believes that essential reconstruction projects must be continued, as these are the only permanent solution to Greece's economic problems, and also because of the shattering effect upon the morale of the Greek people if they are faced with the fact that no improvement of their present low standard of living is likely.

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[1] Not printed.

Mr. Kartalis suggests that the ordinary budgetary expenses should be provided from Greek resources. *Extraordinary and non-recurrent expenses, including basic investment and the cost of maintaining an army strength in excess of 80,000 men should be covered by aid.* Therefore the present Government endorses the representations against an aid cut which were made by previous Governments.

Mr. Kartalis' statement that it will be very difficult to make a sizeable budget reduction is probably correct. With one-third of the fiscal year past it will not be feasible to make the savings which might have been possible by an earlier and rigorous survey of the Mavros budget with its estimated 1,200 deficit.

Mr. Kartalis correctly anticipates that the poor state of the Greek civil service will limit some governmental plans. He does not mention the equally weak condition of the present Government, which may not be able to institute strong measures without bringing about its own downfall. For example, even if it should be considered desirable to set maximum as well as minimum wages, it is most improbable that this or any other non-dictatorial Greek Government could enforce such a measure. This limitation may also apply to the badly needed anti-inflationary program which Mr. Kartalis proposes to put into effect.

Mr. Kartalis states that 43% of the budget (presumably the Mavros budget) and 10% of the national income will be spent for defense during the present fiscal year and that this is beyond the ability of the economy. These percentages would be more nearly 36% and 8% if the public security expenditures were not lumped with national defense; public security forces include 23,400 gendarmerie in paramilitary formations but also include large numbers of town police with a tenuous relationship to the national defense establishment.

The most important theme developed in the statement was summed up as follows: "Military expenditure designed to serve wider international defense requirements and objectives should be treated separately and covered by contributions out of the wider resources of the community of nations which it serves." Local newspapers are already hammering this point and it is an argument which will probably commend itself to all Greek political figures during the immediate future.

HARRY R. TURKEL

Editorial Note

In telegram Torep 8737 to Paris, November 19, Acting ECA Administrator Richard Bissell informed Paul Porter, the Acting United States Special Representative in Europe, and W. Averell Harriman, rman of the NATO Temporary Council Committee (see volume II, part 1, pages 1 ff.) that the United States was now prepared to extend a firm commitment of economic aid totaling $486.5 million to six NATO countries and that present plans also called for the opening of "rather similar discussions promptly with non-NATO countries, extent and time at which we would make firm commitment varying with tactical situation." Included in this latter group of countries was Greece, with a projected aid figure of $170 million. Bissell added that existing commitments plus strongly predictable aid requirements for France and the United Kingdom "closely approach and may even exceed total sum that can legally be made available as economic aid. Therefore unless and until it is possible to see where one or more of these requirements can be reduced, it is essential no commitment be made to any one country in excess of the figure shown." (ECA Telegram Files: FRC Acc. No. 53A278: Paris Torep)

881.00 R/11-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ATHENS, November 20, 1951—8 p. m.

2388. For Rountree. Ref Toeca 1432, Nov 19.[2] I wish to urge acceptance ECA/G recommendation that Grk level of aid this year be fixed at not less than $200 million and that decision be announced at earliest possible moment.

As Dept knows various spokesmen of present govt, including Venizelos and Kartalis, have announced publicly Grk Army cannot be maintained at present level unless part of burden is borne by NATO or US. While stating govt's formal *démarche* in this sense has been submitted to Wash. we have inquired what concrete form additional mil aid could take, considering that MDAP equipment and common use supplies already account for the foreign exchange cost (about 50 percent of total expenditures) for Grk armed forces and that, insofar as drachma problem is concerned, ECA is already sterilizing entire budget deficit. Govt replies make clear kind of relief they envisage is import additional consumer or capital goods, thus permitting release additional counterpart for mil or non-mil purposes. Objective of request for further mil assistance is therefore in fact to increase economic aid, or failing that, to provide polit justification for failure govt parties to solve urgent econ problems. Longer govt is left in doubt as to level of econ aid stronger will be momentum behind plea for further mil help and greater disillusionment and recrimination when no further benefits are forthcoming.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Riddleberger.

[2] Not found in Department of State or ECA telegram files.

Although plea for further mil aid appears in this sense specious, need for at least $200 million econ aid is very real indeed. As Dept knows, margin in Greece between econ and polit stability and instability is extremely narrow and we feel cut of 20 percent from originally proposed program (73 percent of last year) is crowding that margin very closely. Thanks to civil war [Greece has] army already in being comparable, on basis population and resources, to 1953 goal for western Eur armies but maintenance that army in state of effectiveness depends on delicate complex of polit, econ and psychological factors. While further specifically mil aid is not required, sufficient econ help to underpin present abnormal mil establishment is essential if Greece is to play contemplated role in NATO. We feel cut of aid to $170 million likely to break through margin of stability and morale and doubt that saving $30 million warrants running that risk at this critical time. Increased austerity is being and will be demanded of Grk Govt and people, despite their already low standard of living, but we shld not expect to maintain necessary stability and enthusiasm for our cause if aid cuts are too drastic or too sudden.

For these reasons I hope Dept will exert its influence to obtain prompt allocation of at least $200 million to Greece. Projects which all agree are essential are already coming to a standstill throughout Greece and further delay will merely multiply difficulty and waste in getting them underway once more.

Announcement at this time of aid program of less than $200 million, even though ECA/W might be prepared to make additional allocation at later time, wld in our judgment, create a serious psychological reaction which might well set in train a sequence of events seriously aggravating current inflationary situation. Cost of remedying such situation at later date might be more expensive than announcement of more reasonable figure at this time.

PEURIFOY

781.13/11-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, November 21, 1951—9 p. m.

2412. Averoff tells me that Plastiras last Monday before second heart attack[1] directed him officially to inform NATO powers that

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[1] Peurifoy had informed the Secretary of State in telegram 2402 from Athens, November 21, that Plastiras had suffered a second heart attack the previous day and that, while his physicians expected him to recover, he "will however be out of action for at least one month" (781.13/11-2151). In telegram 2551 to Athens, November 27, Acting Secretary Webb replied that the Army had two excellent heart specialists in Germany and had ordered one of them to Greece (781.13/11-2451). In telegram 2528 from Athens, November 30, Peurifoy reported that a Col. William S. George had arrived in Athens, examined Plastiras, and concluded that his condition was as his Greek physicians had described (781.13/11-3051).

Greece wld have to reduce armed forces unless further assistance forthcoming. Upon Averoff protesting unwisdom this step, PriMin agreed only US and UK need be informed. He first proposed forces be reduced about one-third (to 100,000) by Jan 1, but, upon Averoff again demonstrating, agreed reduction to 125,000 sufficient until Jan 1. In view PriMin's illness, Averoff again proposes for present to take no further official action on this matter.

I shall discuss this question again with Plastiras if and when his health permits. While there is considerable degree of bluff and blackmail in this attitude and real objective is to obtain more econ aid (ref Embtel 2388, Nov 20) Plastiras has long felt armed forces cld and shld be reduced and there is no assurance he might not carry out some reduction. In speaking with him on subj, I shld point out that reduction of Grk forces at this time, over and above stimulating effect on neighboring Sov satellites, might jeopardize Senate approval of Grk admission to NATO and in view present Congressional preoccupation with building military strength, wld be more likely to reduce than increase US aid.

I believe such attitude on our part wld probably block reduction but consider position shld be made clear to Plastiras promptly before his campaign acquires further momentum and he gets farther out on limb. I shld therefore appreciate urgent confirmation that it remain firm policy of Dept and JCS that Grk armed forces shld remain at present level. It will also be most helpful in talking with Plastiras if I am able to state definitely what level of US econ and military aid to Greece for current year will be and if I am able to assure him of regular counterpart releases for essential projects provided his govt is taking necessary anti-inflationary measures.

PEURIFOY

781.5/11-2351: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY ATHENS, November 23, 1951—6 p. m.

2432. In spite of Averoff's statement to us reported Embtel 2412 November 21[2] that he intended for moment to take no further official action re reduction armed forces, he sent me this morning just before taking off for Rome NATO mtg,[3] draft of note stating *inter alia* that (1) the Grk Govt came to the decision to reduce expenses for its armed forces, which constitute largest item in budget and which comparatively are the highest mil expenditures in the world and (2) in view of the above the Grk Govt is studying a sharp cut in mil expenses which shall entail a partial discharge of enlisted men as of January 1, 1952.

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[1] Repeated to Rome for Anschuetz.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For documentation on the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome, November 24–28, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 693 ff.

Fon Office states it is intention of govt to present note after receipt our comment to US and UK but timing of presentations still uncertain. We think it wld be most desirable forestall presentation formal note along these lines and wld like discuss question informally with govt leaders early next week setting forth fully and vigorously why we think govt proposal to reduce armed forces at this time is unwise and unacceptable. Before doing so, however, we wld wish to be sure as indicated Embtel 2412 that Dept and JCS continue firmly of opinion that present level shld be maintained.

Meanwhile, I am requesting JUSMAG and ECA to join Emb in careful resurvey of Grk mil budget to determine whether substantial economies can not be made without reduction of forces. Basic objective of Grk Govt is of course to prevent serious cuts in US econ aid and definite decision in this field shld go far to check agitation.

Papagos and other Rally leaders have expressed to us indignation at blackmailing tactics of govt on reduction of armed forces and wld probably be prepared to launch offensive on this score in Parl . . . .[4]

Peurifoy

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[4] In telegram 2534 to Athens, November 26, Acting Secretary Webb endorsed the Embassy position with respect to maintenance of the current Greek military level and requested Peurifoy to emphasize to Greek officials that the ECA in considering its economic aid program was postulating maintenance of the current level of the Greek armed forces. Webb concluded that until the current ECA detailed economic review was received by the Department and discussions with ECA officials were completed, little else could be said regarding economic aid for Greece. (781.5/11-2351)

781.00/11-2951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 29, 1951—7:12 p. m.

2597. Venizelos called at Dept Nov 28 to pay courtesy visit. During conv Venizelos espoused essentiality continuing econ aid Greece at FY 51 level. Dept pointed out total amt substantially reduced from last year, which wld inevitably be reflected in aid levels to individual countries including Greece. However best possible wld be done for Greece under circumstances. Upon Venizelos' allusion possibility reduction armed forces if econ aid lower, we pointed out most unwise for Greece reduce her armed forces level.

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[1] Drafted by Dixon, cleared by S/S, approved for transmission by Dorsz, and signed for the Acting Secretary by Assistant Secretary of State McGhee.

Venizelos said King had requested his return because Plastiras' illness and that he wld return next week. We gained impression from Venizelos discussion of possible polit developments resulting from Plastiras' "retirement" that he believes Plastiras now out of picture. He envisages as logical development that govt will be formed of Libs and Rally. In his view Lib–Rally Govt based on present Parl preferable to electoral union of two parties followed by new elections. Questioned as to workability this cooperation he replied programs of two parties greatly similar and Papagos' attitude greatly changed from orig stand of no collaboration. He also commented that reconciliation had begun between Palace and Papagos. During conv Dept confined its remarks to emphasis need of effective and durable govt without indicating preferences any particular solution. We also stressed necessity putting into effect program outlined by Amb in Propellor Club speech.

Venizelos also raised question of Cyprus. In referring attempts of gun-running into Cyprus stated he wld not like see civil disturbances break out there. Grk and Cypriot emotions at high pitch but wld be calmed if Brit gave indication at this time they wld consider union under more settled internatl conditions. Dept answered generally along lines position previously communicated to Emb. Present time inopportune raise question. Brit statement of willingness consider union in future might be construed as weakness by Cypriot Commies and as such might stimulate them increase agitation. Short-range stability badly needed until West superior to Sovs and raising Enosis issue wld adversely affect stability by disturbing relations between now friendly parties to this issue.

Last para sent info Nicosia and London.

WEBB

881.00 R/11–2951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 5, 1951—5:12 p. m.

2691. Comments in Embtel 2515 Nov 29[2] and earlier tels will be utilized by Dept in emphasizing forthcoming ECA discussions here importance of furnishing adequate amount of econ aid to Greece.

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[1] Drafted by William J. Porter of GTI, cleared by S/S, approved for transmission by Rountree.

[2] Telegram 2515 sent by Yost from Athens on November 29, read in part as follows: "We question why, if it is considered that only 10 million cut is justified in each of two succeeding years, it is considered safe to make cut of over 100 million (from 275 actually spent to 170) in current year. We emphasize that this is really nub of our concern which centers in anxiety that ECA/W, preoccupied with Grk aspect of worldwide inflationary problem and with frailty Grk political leadership (also as Porter notes not an exclusively Grk phenomenon), may attempt to effect overnight cure by drastic surgical operation which could kill patient. Dispute is not actually about objectives but about speed and timing." (881.00 R/11–2951)

We assume Jenkins and Paige will submit fullest possible econ data in their attempt justify on econ grounds earlier recommendations re lowest level aid needed carry out US objectives, and also which specific projects and programs wld have to be cut back if aid lowered. Without such data, Dept has experienced considerable difficulty in attempt give maximum possible support to Emb and ECA/G recommendations, especially in light current heavy demands from other participants of US econ aid programs.

If info can be readily assembled, Dept wld like know which particular projects and programs wld have to be cut or eliminated if ECA decides extended $170 mil econ aid this FY.

WEBB

881.00 R/12-851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET

ATHENS, December 8, 1951—1 p. m.

2665. Ref Deptel 2691, Dec 5.[1] Believe Paige has very detailed data on cuts which wld be required if level aid fixed at $170 [million?]. These include practical elimination substantial industry and mining programs as well as Ptolemais thermoelectric project. Our particular concern however is with drastic cuts, which wld also be required, in agricultural rehabilitation and land reclamation and perhaps also in power projects already under way. Such severe cut in these fields wld involve serious social and polit repercussions, cld hardly be without effect on milit posture, and wld certainly prolong period during which US wld have to supply large food and other consumption imports. We are also concerned, in view Greece's vulnerable position, in proposed drastic reduction in pipelines.

We fully recognize problem created by heavy new demands from UK and others but nevertheless feel that 35 percent cut in aid this year wld be too sudden shock to Greek economy and to stabilization program on which we are now engaged. Additional $30 million required to taper off more slowly in fields mentioned above wld seem to be, in light existing level Greek milit forces, fully as necessary protection to western defense effort as heavy contributions we are proposing to make to meet new econ difficulties in western Europe.

PEURIFOY

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[1] *Supra.*

781.5 MSP/12-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, December 21, 1951—5 p. m.

2869. Grk Govt is being officially informed today that level of aid for current year is $182 million. I am issuing to press tomorrow statement explaining how substantial is level US milit and econ aid still being granted and that we are confident this amount if properly used will be sufficient to meet Greece's essential needs.

In spite these assurances designed cushion shock of announcement aid figure below lowest level Grk people had anticipated I am by no means confident $182 million will prove adequate assure basic US objectives. I have in series of tels over past two months pointed out why I considered $200 million to be absolute minimum we cld safely contemplate. Unlike West Eur countries with large resources and developed economies there is extremely little margin for error in Greece and difference between success and failure may depend on sums which seem ridiculously small in comparison with over-all US defense expenditures. Yet in Greece as we have repeatedly pointed out and as Congressional groups visiting Athens have repeatedly noted with satisfaction, we already have armed forces of magnitude which we are spending vast sums in hope of creating in Western Eur.

We understand it is firm US policy (1) that size and efficiency of these forces not be reduced; (2) that drastic anti-inflationary measures be taken in Greece to provide safe econ base for these forces; and (3) that preparation be made for important financial measures intended for the same purpose. While all US representatives in Greece will devote every effort to achieve these objectives I do not feel able assure Dept they will be achieved with aid limited to $182 million.

We shall do everything within our power to make $182 million suffice and earnestly hope it may do so. I intend however to scrutinize effects of aid cut most closely during coming months and will inform Dept promptly if in fact it shld prove that this amount is not adequate to maintain econ base on which abnormal Grk defense effort rests.

PEURIFOY

781.00/12-2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET ATHENS, December 26, 1951—3 p. m.

2901. Polit situation is particularly fluid at this moment due to (1) possible repercussions of US aid cut, (2) usual uncertainty as to which way Venizelos will jump, and (3) apparent shift in attitude of rally.

As to last, Markezinis informs us that he personally has become convinced that collaboration with Libs without new elections might be desirable. He emphasises Papagos still believes election essential but we presume he wld not have mentioned matter to us unless he thought Marshal cld be converted. Markezinis did not explain this radical shift in his position but we believe it attributable to conviction that, in view attitude of Palace, reenforced by approval new constitution, it may be impossible for considerable period to bring about elections.

As to Venizelos, he informed me immed after his return he intended to urge Plastiras, in view state of health, to retire from active polit life. If Plastiras shld agree Venizelos wld support immed EPEK–Lib merger with Plastiras as President combined party and Venizelos as PriMin. If this arrangement not possible Venizelos wld seek collaboration with rally to form new govt without elections.

These remarks were made before Venizelos had had much opportunity to bring himself up to date on polit situation. Increasing activity of Plastiras suggests he wld be willing to retire to honorary post unless he has another heart attack. Whether he wld favor merger on other terms, in face opposition most leading members his party, is open question.

It is still too early to assess polit effects of cut in aid but for moment govt, while protesting vigorously against magnitude of cut, is showing no signs of resigning over this issue.

PEURIFOY

781.5 MSP/1–352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

SECRET

ATHENS, January 3, 1952—11 a. m.

3001. Min of Coordination yesterday handed Emb memo dated Dec 29[1] indicating great surprise and deep disappointment at cut in aid level. Alleges this will make it impossible attain three major Greek policy objectives, maintenance (*a*) present size and strength defense establishment; (*b*) financial and economic stability; (*c*) minimum essential investment programs for creation viable economy.

Points to sharp increase in gold sales as result of blow to confidence; reviews familiar arguments of lowest per capita income, highest defense burden in West Europe, and inability to benefit by off-shore procurement. Complains of lack of consultation on setting aid level and pre-emption German market by Virginia tobacco financed in part by ECA.

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[1] A copy of the note is in the Athens Embassy Files: Lot 58 F 7: 500 ECA (conf).

Concludes with statement that supplementary aid, while minor percentage of total US aid to Europe, of crucial importance to stability and defense effort of Greece. Greek Govt unable to consider $182 million as final and formally requests opportunity detailed restatement for additional assistance this year.

Pursuant to my directions, Emb representative told Min twice in clearest possible terms that, in the light of worldwide US commitments, the allotment must be regarded as final and that no useful purpose wld be served by an attempt to reopen the matter. My view was transmitted that our common task now is to plan the wisest and most difficult use of the $182 million we have.

There was optimism from the Greeks my equally firm conviction that if it proves impossible to live within this level of aid, the question must be reopened.

Despatch with text of note follows.

Peurifoy

B. Interest of the United States in the Agitation for Union of Cyprus With Greece (*Enosis*)

781.00/2-2051 : Telegram

The Minister in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL — Athens, February 20, 1951—11 a.m.

2701. Re Embtel 2674 February 17.[2] British Embassy understandably irritated by Prime Minister's unexpected demand for Cyprus. Ambassador Norton and his principal assistants have lost no opportunity to express their displeasure in informal talks with Greek Foreign Office officials and politicians but have avoided contact with Prime Minister or other leading Cabinet Ministers.

British seem particularly annoyed with Kanellopoulos who introduced pre-arranged question in Parliament and thus gave Prime Minister opportunity to shift public attention from economic ills to generally popular political matter. British feel introduction Cyprus question at present most unwise and ungracious especially as only few days before Greek representatives at Paris sought English assistance in their attempt to procure equivalent 80 million dollar assistance through EPU.

Foreign Minister Under Secretary Politis maintained to British that popular demand for Cyprus simply could not be held longer in check and now that government has committed itself to introduce matter at next UNGA session British must make some concession to save Greece from having to side with Communist states who are sure to agitate for "Enosis" as embarrassment to West. Norton agrees that great popular pressure on Greek Government being exerted particularly by Orthodox Church.

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Not printed; it summarized favorable comments in Greek press to Prime Minister Venizelos' demand in the Greek Parliament for a union of Greece and Cyprus (*Enosis*) (981.61/2-1751).

British have made clear to Politis that further discussion of Cyprus question absolutely useless as certainly British and probably American defense staffs would not tolerate present change in status of strategic Cyprus. However, Norton feels his government must face up to question more realistically than has so far been case. He is inclined believe best policy open to British is to promise Greeks willingness discuss question as soon as international situation permits.

Over weekend, Venizelos and Kanellopoulos have told me they consider indefinite continuation present situation re Cyprus intolerable and British attitude unacceptable. Prime Minister has indicated, however, that he is not inclined take any further steps at this moment and has publicly stated that next move up to British.

Strategic argument characterized by Kanellopoulos as entirely unconvincing since he asserts Greeks have repeatly emphasized that they, if masters of Cyprus, would accord US and UK whatever facilities and bases required.

Without question movement for acquisition of Cyprus has solid popular base in Greece as irredentism deeply ingrained feature Greek nationalism. However, restraint by politicians, press and church could certainly prevent situation from becoming acute. Upon event appropriate occasion, Embassy will continue to counsel leaders these groups to follow course of moderation and patience emphasizing present period international tension most inappropriate for any change in Cyprus status. Nevertheless, we must anticipate continuing and perhaps increasing agitation on this subject.

YOST

647C.81/3-2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL ATHENS, March 22, 1951—1:08 p. m.

3125. I saw Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus this morning[2] at his request. Deptel 3258, Mar 16.[3] He was accompanied by Loizides, Greek subject member of last year's Cypriot delegation visiting UN and professional propagandist of Cypriot cause.

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[1] Repeated to London and Nicosia.

[2] Peurifoy had reported Makarios' arrival in Athens on March 13 "to see leaders all political parties on Cyprus question." Peurifoy added that the Government press bulletin reported mass demonstrations of university and other students scheduled for March 23 to demonstrate for Cyprus union "and approve resolution that will then be delivered to Government and to US and British Embassies." (647C.81/3-1451)

Archbishop explained ardent desire Cypriots for union with Greece, dismissed as relatively unimportant Turk Govt opposition and expressed opinion Cyprus would be safer military base for western powers if union occurred as this would obviate dangers inherent in disaffected and hostile population. He also stressed that continuation present situation provided most favorable opportunity for Commies propaganda in Cyprus against "imperialist" US as well as UK. In response my question Archbishop replied that Orthodox clergy in Cyprus taking strong line against communism, Loizides adding that Cypriot Communists had been ex-communicated. Markarios stressed his warm friendship for the US and pleasure at friendly reception accorded him there during his last year's visit. Loizides said in his opinion US most favorable to Cypriot cause and referred to conversations with Congressmen and others.

I emphasized our concern that current Cyprus agitation might lead to development another trouble spot at this time of great international crisis. In common struggle which US is leading it is most important for all non-Commie elements to present united front and church should, I felt, be one of the most useful and cooperative elements in this movement.

In reply my question Loizides stated that if no other action taken in meantime, Cypriots intended raise question next GA meeting and would be constrained request assistance some other govts perhaps even eastern European one if Greek Govt would not serve as sponsor. I asked him if he realized what an unpleasant and difficult question this would be in GA and if he were aware that US Govt might well not support Cypriot claim before UN especially if international situation remained tense. Loizides then asked for US mediation between Cypriots and British. I recalled to him answer he had recd on this subject from McFall last autumn (Depairgram 388, Dec 6 1950[4]) and stated that I had no reason to believe US position had changed subsequently. I promised, however, to report our conversation to Dept and to inform Archbishop of any additional views Dept might have.

In concluding Makarios strongly deprecated British refusal even to discuss question and stated that agitation for *Enosis* could be quelled if British stated that although international situation precluded any alteration island's status at present they would be willing to discuss question at some specific time in future, perhaps within one or two years. Dept will note that this latter point of Makarios is similar to that made by Venizelos and also by British Ambassador Norton and might be worth exploring.

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[3] Not printed; it stated that if Peurifoy perceived no objections, "believe it desirable for Amb seize this opportunity discuss *Enosis* problem with PriMin and Makarios separately, emphasizing US continues believe agitation *Enosis* at this time inopportune." It also informed Peurifoy that Greek-American societies were attempting to bring pressure on the United States Senate to adopt a resolution favoring *Enosis*. (747C.00/3-1451) Peurifoy's report on his meeting with Prime Minister Venizelos on March 19, during the course of which Venizelos "confided his anxiety with growing pressure for Cyprus union with Greece" is in telegram 3074 from Athens, March 19 (747C.00/3-1951).

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

Makarios and Loizides are fully aware I believe that US Govt will not support them in any way. However, they obviously feel that their cause has strong popular appeal in US and hope to bring pressure on Dept through Greek-Amer societies and Congress. I have no confidence that my expression and explanation US views at this first meeting will deter either ethnarchy or Loizides from further agitation for *Enosis* in Greece, Cyprus, US or elsewhere. It is possible that before leaving Makarios will ask to see me again to inquire whether Dept has any further views on subject. If I can arrange to see him alone on this occasion I have some hope that I may be able to make him see more clearly the harmfulness of Cyprus agitation at present and persuade him to take more helpful attitude.

Peurifoy

647C.81/5–251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 2, 1951—7 p. m.

4111. Officer Brit Emb informed Dept [2] that Brit Fon Off understands Grk Govt will shortly make proposal to UK Govt re union Cyprus with Greece. If Brit reply considered unfavorable by Grks, Greece will consider raising question at Sixth UNGA. Before doing so, however, Grk Rep UN Kyrou will informally sound out US reaction this move. Brit believe if US reply short of positive rejection, Grks wld accept as tacit approval.

Dept replied Amer Emb Athens has expressed view to Grk Govt on several occasions that present time most inopportune raise this question at UN. Also assured US reply to Kyrou wld indicate strong disapproval of such a Grk move.

Dept believes this type maneuver by Grks will only serve exacerbate present situation particularly if exchange of views made public. It may not be too late anticipate this move by Grks and Emb shld, if no objection perceived, seek suitable means discourage it.

Acheson

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[1] Drafted by Dixon, cleared by UNP and BNA, approved for transmission and signed for the Secretary by Rountree.

[2] Reference is to a conversation between Earl Jellicoe, the First Secretary of the British Embassy, and Ben F. Dixon and Joseph J. Wagner of GTI on May 1. A memorandum of this conversation is in file 747C.00/5–151.

747C.00/5-451 : Telegram

The Minister in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET ATHENS, May 4, 1951—6 p.m.

3759. Subj Deptel 4111 May 2[2] discussed today with Venizelos and Politis. They stated *démarche* soliciting Brit declaration re future of Cyprus had been made to Morrison within last few days and read to me full text of report on conversation from Greek Amb London. Melas said Morrison had categorically refused to make any declaration, had been unwilling even to admit that question disposition of Cyprus might be discussed between Brit and Grks sometime in future, had repeated well-known arguments concerning inadvisability cause unrest among Cypriots at this time and finally had stressed Turkish interest in question.

Venizelos and Politis expressed considerable indignation at completely negative attitude of Brit. They said they intended to keep Brit reply secret if possible since its publication wld further inflame Cypriot public opinion and, further, that they had no intention of raising question in UN GA. Politis, however, declared Cypriots might endeavor persuade some Arab states to raise question which wld, of course, deeply embarrass Grk Govt. They declared they were doing everything possible to prevent issue from troubling Anglo-Grk relations and were endeavoring to quiet Cypriots but doubted ability to do so indefinitely if no satisfaction whatsoever is forthcoming. They doubted whether, in view present state Cypriot public opinion completely negative attitude is best means of keeping population calm and assuring loyalty in case of emergency.They were both convinced recent statement on subj by Turkish FonMin had been inspired by Brit.[3]

I detailed at some length reasons why Dept and US mil authorities consider present time most inappropriate for any change in status of Cyprus or any public controversy over issue. Venizelos and Politis expressed understanding and agreement but emphasized embarrassment of govt which is under heavy pressure from public opinion and all pol parties, which is likely to increase as electoral campaign gets underway this summer. Venizelos insisted that sitn wld be eased if Brit could be persuaded to make even most vague and general sort of statement which wld indicate their willingness discuss question at some indefinite time in future. He asked that this view be brought to Dept's attention and its good offices solicited. I promised to report report his views but said could give no assurance of any assistance in view of Dept's strong feeling that issue shld not be further raised at this time.

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[1] Repeated to London, pouched to Nicosia.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] In telegram 3595 from Athens, April 24, Peurifoy reported that nearly all the Athens newspapers had devoted leading comments to the April 23 statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü to an Istanbul newspaper "to effect Turkey vitally concerned in ultimate fate Cyprus in view island's geographical position and Turk minority and therefore Turkey prefers maintenance *status quo*." (981.61/4-2451)

While Emb is unaware exact state of public opinion Cyprus, there can be no question repeated visits Cypriot metropolitan to Greece have stirred up feeling here to point where agitation can hardly be dampened down even with best efforts of govt. We are inclined to believe, as previously reported, that some vague, non-committal statement by Brit wld be useful and that in absence action along these lines issue is likely to become increasingly troublesome and perhaps eventually dangerous.

Yost

647C.81/5-451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 9, 1951—11 a. m.

4224. Re Embtel 3759.[2] You may report to Venizelos that, as you anticipated, in view Dept's conviction *Enosis* question shld not be raised at this time Dept considers it inappropriate to approach UK to make gen statement indicating willingness discuss *Enosis* at some future time. Moreover, Dept not prepared discount sincerity Turkish apprehensions re change in status Cyprus.

In further elucidation Dept's gen attitude concerning *Enosis*, you might in your discretion, point out that in face current world anxieties a serious question arises whether US press and public likely look with sympathy at appearance new internatl issue which wld add present tensions and cause dissension among allies. *Enosis* question not one which widely understood or capable arousing deep emotion among great majority US population with exception Grk-Amer community. Consequently, unwillingness defer this issue in face common danger now confronting free world might create highly unfavorable impression in minds US Cong and public. For this reason and since Dept cannot provide any encouragement Grk Govt this time, Dept considers Grks wld be prudent exercise every precaution prevent Grk public from becoming unduly excited by this issue, thereby providing acute embarrassment Grk Govt. You might reiterate Dept's strong objection raising issue this time in no way alters Dept's opinion there is no reason believe solution mutually satis all parties cannot ultimately be achieved.

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[1] Drafted by Anschuetz; cleared by BNA, UNP, UND, S/S; approved for ransmission by McGhee. Repeated to London and Nicosia.

[2] *Supra.*

FYI question Cyprus has been proposed for agenda Colonial talks which US–UK hope hold in near future. Dept has been informed Brit may be prepared during these talks consider renewal offer of self-govt and possibility dual nationality. However, there is no present indication Brit prepared go beyond point discussion. Brit reluctance express willingness discuss *Enosis* at some indefinite future date derives from belief such declaration wld in fact encourage proponents of *Enosis* redouble their efforts rather than tranquilize sitn. Likewise Brit believe impossible realistically determine now some specific future date by which internatl sitn wld permit discussion this topic.

View US interest in maintenance *status quo* in Cyprus and many current areas friction between US and UK, Dept not prepared press Brit on this issue at this time. For this reason Dept considers it dangerous give any encouragement whatever to Grk Govt re quick solution pending indication Brit willingness make concession this matter.

Peurifoy concurs.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] Peurifoy was in the United States for consultations at the Department of State. Yost informed the Secretary of State in telegram 3897 from Athens, May 14, that the views conveyed in the source text had been passed on to Venizelos who expressed disappointment but "assures us Govt will continue do what it can dampen agitation for *Enosis*." Venizelos added that he would discourage further visits of the Cypriot delegation to Athens but continued to maintain that opposition parties would make much of the issue during the forthcoming electoral campaign. Yost added that Venizelos had told the British that he could not accept their rejection of the recent call for Greek-Cypriot union as final. (647C.81/5–1451) In telegram 6394 from London, June 6, Ambassador Gifford informed the Secretary of State that the British Foreign Office had asked him to express to the Department and to Yost its great appreciation "for 'words of wisdom' given by Yost to Greeks re Cyprus in recent weeks, particularly for his efforts to disabuse Venizelos of idea UK shld make statement at this time re plebiscite." (647C.81/6–651)

747C.00/7–2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1951.

Participants: NEA—Mr. Burton Y. Berry
Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, Turkish Ambassador

Ambassador Erkin of Turkey called this morning at his own request on what he described over the telephone as a "confidential matter". After the usual preliminaries he said that he wished to discuss Cyprus. On June 29 the *Messager d'Athenes* is reported to have contained a declaration of a U.S. diplomat, in the course of which, the diplomat

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said that the U.S. agreed with the British to find a solution for the Cyprus question by which the British would administer Cyprus for twenty years and after which Britain and Greece would determine between themselves the future status of Cyprus. The Ambassador asked if I would please look into this report and let him know for the information of his government whether there was any basis for the statements attributed to a U.S. diplomat. He then said that he wished to express his views upon the subject. First, the creation of such a formula in the present state of world tension is a very dangerous action. Second, the Cyprus question is an artificial one as the island currently has a status within the framework of the British commonwealth. Third, the Turkish Government sees no need for a change in the present status of Cyprus but if a change is provoked the Turkish Government wants to be one of the parties that considers any suggested change. Fourth, the attitude of some Greek politicians urging self determination for Cyprus really does not provide a solution as the people of Cyprus called Greeks are not really Greeks but an island people of the Mediterranean who adhere to the Greek orthodox religion. Moreover, should the Greek Government officially sponsor a self determination movement for Cyprus the Greeks would be opening the door to Albania and Yugoslavia to sponsor similar movements to liberate sections of their populations now within the Greek frontiers.

[Here follows a brief discussion of the effects of the French elections on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.]

747C.00/8-1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (Gerig)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1951.

Participants: Mr. C. E. Steel, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. K. D. Jamieson, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Assistant Secretary Hickerson, UNA
Mr. Benjamin Gerig, UND

Mr. Steel came to Mr. Hickerson's office today to discuss various matters concerning the projected colonial talks in London.[1] In the course of the conversation Mr. Steel referred to the question of Cyprus

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[1] Colonial policy talks were held in London and Paris during October 1951 in preparation for the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly at Paris, November 1951–February 1952. For documentation on these talks, see vol. II, pp. 623 ff.

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and presented the attached *aide-mémoire*.[3] He pointed out that the U.K. Government is of the opinion that strategic considerations require the maintenance of complete sovereignty by His Majesty's Government over Cyprus and that no end can at present be seen to this requirement. He said his government considers that every effort must be made to avoid attention being drawn to the question of Cyprus, and particularly to prevent the question from being raised in the General Assembly this year. Further, that if it should be raised, it should be dealt with along the foregoing lines, having special regard to the long-term strategic requirements involved. He concluded by saying that his government hoped that full agreement could be reached between our two governments on these lines before the discussions on other colonial questions took place.

Mr. Hickerson said that we would, of course, give most careful consideration to the views expressed. He understood that the question was not being actively pushed by either public or official opinion in Greece. He also thought the Cyprus question would be considerably eased if Greece and Turkey were brought into NATO. He concluded by saying that he would bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate officers of the Department and that we would try to formulate our views as soon as possible.

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[3] Not printed (747C.00/8-1351).

747C.00/8-3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET ATHENS, August 31, 1951—4 p.m.

1034. Brit Emb informs us that in forthcoming colonial talks in Washington preparatory for UNGA [2] Brit del will urge no change in current policy re Cyprus. While realizing difficulty of wholly negative response to Grk pretensions Brit Govt sees no possible alternative in light current internatl and strategic situation. It believes proposal for public statement re ultimate attachment Cyprus to Greece wld merely stimulate agitation and that proposal for granting Cypriots dual nationality is impracticable for number of reasons. Offer of more extensive self-govt under Brit Crown remains of course open.

Only positive suggestion which emanated from Brit Emb Athens and which HMG might take up in Wash, was that Greece might be asked in conjunction with its adherence to NAT, to refrain from stirring up issues which might cause difficulties to fellow-members

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[1] Repeated to London, pouched to Nicosia.

[2] Presumably a reference to the colonial talks held at London and Paris in October 1951. See footnote 1, *supra*.

We pointed out Dept's reluctance appear to attach conditions of any kind to Greco-Turk adherence to NATO and presumed this wld apply to any formal change of Grk policy re Cyprus, though we also believed Dept wld continue as in past to urge Grks not to upset *status quo* at this time.

Peurifoy

747C.00/8-1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ben F. Dixon of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] October 1, 1951.

Participants: Mr. K. D. Jamieson, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. J. Jefferson Jones III—UND
Mr. Burton Kitain—BNA
Mr. Ben F. Dixon—GTI

Mr. Jamieson called on October 1 at 4 p. m., at the request of the Department, to receive an *Aide-Mémoire* [1] in answer to the *Aide-Mémoire* of the British Embassy dated August 13, 1951,[2] relating to Cyprus. A copy of the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* is attached.

Mr. Jamieson, after reading the *Aide-Mémoire*, remarked that US views seemed closely to parallel those of the United Kingdom. He requested some elaboration on the position set forth in the second paragraph of the *Aide-Mémoire*. Mr. Dixon then gave an oral exposition of this matter based on Section V beginning on page 4 of the position paper for the use of the US Representative to the Anglo-American Colonial Policy Discussion to be held in London on October 9, 1951 (copy attached).[3] The exposition given by Mr. Dixon generally covered the two categories: measures which might be taken to isolate certain issues from the *Enosis* problem in order to strengthen the position of the United States and the United Kingdom at the General Assembly; and, possible steps which might be taken eventually leading towards abatement of the *Enosis* agitation. Mr. Jamieson expressed interest in this discussion and the suggestions made. He said that these would be related to his Government. He made specific comment with regard to three of the points made.

Reiterating the Offer of Self-Government

Mr. Jamieson said that the Governor of Cyprus believed that making a formal offer of self-government would probably be inadvisable. To world opinion it would seem to occur so close to the meeting of the General Assembly as to be an obvious move to anticipate possible discussions on this score. Internally such a statement might lead to violent response on the part of the Cypriots, which would be contrary to the result to be hoped for. Furthermore, it might cast some doubt upon the sincerity of the original offer. Mr. Jamieson agreed, however, that discreet and timely public announcements or attempts to point up the fact that the offer is open, would be advisable.

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[1] Annex, below.
[2] Not printed, but see memorandum of conversation by Gerig, August 14, p. 535.
[3] Not printed (747C.00/8-1351).

Mr. Dixon referred to the fact that the Cypriots constantly maintain that they will not accept self-government because they will only accept *Enosis*. The Department is of the opinion that this is a fallacious argument, since *Enosis* is equally precluded under the present form of government as it would be under self-government; therefore, the attainment of self-government actually would have no altered bearing on the *Enosis* issue.

Anti-Sedition Laws

Mr. Jamieson said that he had only one observation to make with regard to the Department's suggestion of repealing the anti-sedition laws and replacing them with measures having stricter penalties more stringently enforced but devoid of the element of deprivation of civil liberties. Specifically, such a change in the laws would rule out the possibility of being able to anticipate any nationalist or communist moves. Mr. Dixon replied that from the information available to the Department it did not seem that there were any activities of such a serious nature that anticipation would seem to be a necessary element to maintaining peace. In many cases the process of placing persons under bond not to break the peace could easily be replaced by the use of suspended sentences especially where habitual transgressors of the law were concerned. Mr. Jamieson observed that it is sometimes hard to write a water-tight law. The communists are usually good in finding loopholes and circumventing the purposes of the law. In connection with the anti-sedition laws, Mr. Jamieson remarked that the Cyprus Government was particularly interested in using the anti-sedition laws to try to drive a wedge between the nationalists and the communists and insofar as possible remove the communists as active proponents of *Enosis*, thus removing the pressure on the Ethnarchy. The rivalry between the two in advocating this issue had in good measure accounted for the present heightened stage of agitation.

Dual Nationality

Mr. Jamieson said this posed two practical difficulties; first, would it be necessary to give the Turkish population in Cyprus the same advantages with regard to Turkish citizenship? second, would Cypriots be liable to Greek conscription? He said such a step would in no way pacify the Greeks unless they would be given some authority in Cyprus, which would be unacceptable to the British Government. Furthermore, Mr. Jamieson said that while his Government was prepared to accept divided sentiment, they could not accept a situation leading to divided allegiance. Such a move, he felt, would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and would simply invite more trouble on the *Enosis* issue. Mr. Dixon replied that the Department had had no opportunity to explore this question in detail with the British. We realized, however, that the Foreign Office had made an extensive study of this matter. The Department's view was simply that moves of this nature were helpful and constructive. In thinking of dual-nationality the Department did not have in mind that any far-reaching privileges should be granted to the Cypriots. Rather, the Department's thinking had been in terms of the psychological effect of purely nominal Greek citizenship for those Cypriots who desired it. In answer to the points made by Mr. Jamieson, he said that Cypriots in Cyprus would owe their allegiance to the Government of Cyprus and would be fully subject to Cypriot laws. Although in Greece the allegiance of such Cypriots would be to the Greek Government and they would be constrained to follow Greek law, this would not affect their responsibilities or status at home. Mr. Dixon said he believed that the sentiment of Greek-ethnic Cypriots in Cyprus could know much greater bounds in their desire for union with Greece. Therefore, simple bestowal of Greek citizenship on those Greeks who desired, would be unlikely further to exacerbate the situation.

[Annex 1]

The Department of State to the British Embassy [4]

Aide-Mémoire

Reference is made to the *Aide-Mémoire* of the British Embassy dated August 13, 1951, relating to Cyprus. The Department of State believes that surrender of British sovereignty over Cyprus would have a most serious effect on the Allied strategic position in the Middle East. The Department of State believes further that agitation for a union between Cyprus and Greece as well as attempts to raise this problem in an international forum are unwise and inopportune at this time. It agrees that every effort should be made to prevent the question from being raised at the United Nations.[5] The Representative of the Department of State who will participate in the Anglo-

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[4] Drafted by Dixon of GTI; cleared by BNA, UND, and UNP.

[5] The Cyprus question was not formally raised at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

American discussions on colonial questions to be held at London on October 9, 1951, has been authorized to consider with the British Representative possible tactics to be employed in the event that the question is brought to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Department agrees that there is no step which can be taken and no statement that can be made which would appease, in substantial measure for the immediate future, the Greeks or those who agitate for *Enosis* in Cyprus. However, the Department believes that this does not necessarily preclude the possibility of making certain helpful adjustments which might strengthen the position of the United Kingdom and of the United States in any possible General Assembly discussion. It would be desirable, if possible, to isolate from the union problem certain issues which might provide material for uses inimical to our common objective as set forth above. Furthermore, it might be possible for certain measures to be taken which, while not immediately appeasing the proponents of union, would in due course lead in the direction of an abatement of the agitation for union.

The Department of State believes it would be inadvisable for this Government to join the United Kingdom in making a statement concerning the retention of British sovereignty over Cyprus. It is believed that the United States can be more helpful by refraining from becoming directly and publicly identified with this issue. On balance the Department is inclined to question whether the issuance of such a statement by the United Kingdom at this time would have a beneficial or salutary effect. It is quite possible that such a statement might cause the advocates of *Enosis* to feel constrained to challenge this statement and renew their agitation.

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1951.

747C.00/11-2951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Nicosia[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 29, 1951—7 : 14 p.m.

99. During courtesy call at Dept Nov 28 Venizelos raised question of Cyprus. In referring attempts gun-running into Cyprus[2] stated he wld not like see civil disturbances break out there. Grk and Cypriot emotions at high pitch but wld be calmed if Brit gave indication at

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[1] Drafted by Dixon, cleared by S/S, approved for transmission and signed for the Secretary by Dorsz. Repeated to London.

[2] During the course of a call at the Department of State on November 15 Ambassa[illegible] Politis had informed McGhee and Dixon that Communist forces had atte[illegible]d to move 1.500 rifles from Greece into Cyprus for the purpose of creati[illegible]vil disturbances. Politis emphasized that the Greek Government "would n[illegible]pport any venture of this nature and had taken steps to prevent this even[illegible] Memorandum of conversation, by Dixon, November 15, 1951, 747C.00/11[illegible]1)

this time they wld consider union under more settled internatl conditions. Dept answered generally along lines position previously communicated to you. Present time inopportune raise question. Brit statement of willingness consider union in future might be construed as weakness by Cypriot Commies and as such might stimulate them increase agitation. Short-range stability badly needed until West superior to Sovs and raising *Enosis* issue wld adversely affect stability by disturbing relations between now friendly parties to this issue.

Above info transmitted Athens.

WEBB

747C.00/12-751 : Despatch

The Consul at Nicosia (Wagner) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NICOSIA, December 7, 1951.

No. 172

Subject: The Present State of *Enosis*

The Department was informed in recent despatches of the situation which surrounded the formation both of the Ethnarchy (Nationalist) and AKEL (Communist) *Enosis* delegations to Paris, and in particular of the disunity which dominated the Nationalist activity in that regard. The Department also was informed, in the Consulate's telegram No. 116 of December 1, 1951,[2] of the Consulate's observation that feelings over *Enosis* were then much more pronounced in Athens than in Cyprus. It is intended, through this brief report, to inform the Department of the additional information which has reached us since the submission of the foregoing communications.

First, there has been a decided lessening, in the local press, of discussion and speculation pertaining to *Enosis*. In fact, to one on the scene that development seemed to follow upon the heels of the sudden Greek aggressiveness over the question. The arch-conservative *Nea*, as reported in this week's press summary, even went so far as to lash at those "so-called" Nationalist leaders who suddenly became "tongue-tied" once the *Enosis* agitation reached a "dangerous" level. In that same connection I again wish to emphasize that the popular emotions over *Enosis* were not, during the recent past, at the high pitch indicated by Mr. Venizelos.

Yesterday, at a luncheon, I had the opportunity of discussing the present state of the *Enosis* movement with Mr. Zeno Pierides. Besides being the Honorary Consul for Sweden in Larnaca and a very substantial business-man, Mr. Pierides is also quite an ardent Nationalist and close to Ethnarchy circles. He indicated to me that the *Enosis* drive, as far as the Cypriot Nationalists are concerned, is "finished" for the time being. He went on to say that the last weeks had been confused and hectic ones in Ethnarchy and Nationalist circles, with the level-headed leaders pleading that this is not the time, given the international situation, to raise strongly the *Enosis* issue. He expressed the belief that those who espoused moderation and the suspension of increased activity for some time, had won their point. He did not mean to imply, of course, that the usual run of *Enosis* propaganda would not continue, but simply that measures would return to a normal basis in that regard.

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[1] Copies to Athens and London.

[2] Not printed.

I commented to my friend that I had even noticed a diminution in the number of reports and amount of speculation appearing in the local Nationalist press concerning the subject of union with Greece. He agreed that that was so, and said that it was due to "pressure". I inquired as to what he meant and he replied "diplomatic pressure—upon Greece". I gathered from the tone in which the foregoing was told to me that the local Nationalists may have received word from Greece that this year's show is over.

We are still of the opinion that the key to the present *Enosi* situation, at least as far as the Ethnarchy and Nationalists are concerned, is to be found in Athens and that the movement will from the point of view of those political elements, return to normal once the Greeks definitely desist from stirring up the matter. Perhaps we should also explain that by normal we mean a state of affairs under which the subject will continue to be an important topic of press and discussion, but not one requiring immediate solution.

One element which we are still studying, however, is the renewed interest of the AKEL (Communists) in the union movement. During the recent Seventh Annual AKEL Congress the Secretary Genera of the Party, Papaioannou, clearly stated the Communist policy a being in favor of *Enosis*, and explaining at length that he was setting forth the correct policy in the endeavor to dissipate any lingering effects of the Party's former and mistaken espousal of self-government. Until recently the Communists had been inclined to relegate *Enosi* to a subordinate position in their propaganda. Perhaps, believing that the objective is without reach under the present world conditions and thus cannot become a source of trouble to them, their renewed attentions are designed to capitalize upon the emotional responses which the words "*Enosis*" and "Greece" seem to evoke in so man hearts here while at the same time embarrassing the Right-Wing.

The Consulate is, incidentally now in the process of accumulating information bearing upon the [illegible] AKEL Congress, and hopes to be able to submit a comprehens[illegible]rt in that regard shortly.

JOSEPH J. WAGNE

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE AMENDING THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT OF JULY 2, 1948, AS AMENDED

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Athens March 6 and 30, 1951, entered into force March 30, 1951, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 2 (part 1), page 843.]

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE

[For text of Treaty signed at Athens August 1, 1951, entered into force October 13, 1954, and exchange of notes dated at Athens August 3 and December 26, 1951, see 5 UST (pt. 2) 1829.]

IRAN

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN; THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAN; INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DISPUTE[1]

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[1] Documentation concerning Iran for the year 1951 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume x.

IRAQ

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ'S POLICY CONCERNING COOPERATION WITH THE WEST; THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES TECHNICAL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ[1]

787.00/1–2451 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State[2]

SECRET — BAGHDAD, January 24, 1951.

No. 744

During course of my first call on Acting Foreign Minister Shakr al-Wadi I was struck by change in atmosphere which had taken place since my departure in late September.

Shakr Pasha made it abundantly clear that Iraqi Government thinking had crystallized to the point where, instead of the fatalistic acceptance of the futility of Soviet aggression in the Middle East, it has been decided that every means will be exerted to meet the issue with such resources, both moral and material, as they may be able to summon from within themselves and their country and from Britain, the United States and any other sources including the Arab States.

There was an atmosphere of grave concern at the rapid deterioration of the international situation following upon the developments in Korea as a result of Moscow-supported Chinese Communist military intervention. This led logically to a re-examination by the Iraq Government of its position and the emergence of a conviction that Iraq must participate actively and positively in whatever defense against Soviet aggression might be forthcoming. He made it clear that there was no acceptance of the "neutralism" such as was reflected in certain circles in Egypt, for instance, and, in fact, that the Prime Minister, Nuri Said, was proceeding to the Arab League meeting at Cairo[3] with the intention of attempting to promote what would amount to a military alliance among the Arab States, thus liquidating any thoughts of "neutralism" in the area. *Comment:* It is of course highly doubtful that Nuri really expects to accomplish such an alliance. His purpose is probably to try to condition the Arab States to an acceptance of a pro-Western policy and an abandonment of any thoughts of neutralism.

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[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 636 ff.

[2] Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and Moscow.

[3] A special session of the Arab League Political Committee, January 20–February 3.

Most significant, perhaps, was the implication that the problem of Israel must be put into a more realistic perspective which the serious circumstances demanded. In fact, in my succeeding conversation with Ahmad al Rawi, Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, he came right out and said, in effect, that Israel as a danger must no longer be considered at all in the face of the deadly threat of Soviet imperialism.

EDWARD S. CROCKER

787.00/2–1951 : Despatch

The Chargé in Iraq (Tenney) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 843

BAGHDAD, February 19, 1951.

[Here follows section IV which is a continuation of the review of Iraqi political development and political attitudes (sections I, II, and III) presented in despatches 821 and 822 of February 12 (787.00/2–1251). Despatch 821 reported on Nuri al-Sa'id's efforts at the Arab League Meeting, January 23, to secure the alignment of the Arab States and the Arab League with the West. Despatch 822 reported on Sa'id's efforts since early November 1950 to impress on the Iraqi public the necessity of arranging for "joint defense" of the Arab states. The despatch also presented a review, as seen from Iraq, of the principal points of interest in the Arab League meeting of January 20–February 3.]

V. THE GOVERNMENT STRESSES IRAQ'S DEFENSELESSNESS AND NEED OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The general international tension and threat of global war following Chinese Communist military successes in Korea in December and January, and especially the unpleasant necessity for Iraq to come out openly in support of—or opposition to—the United States resolution condemning Chinese Communist aggression, revived in Iraq an acute awareness of the country's defenselessness and a keen desire on the part of Iraqi political and military leaders to get military assistance from the Western powers (compare the Embassy's despatch No. 424, October 23, 1950, p. 5).[2]

The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense (Shakir al-Wadi and Ahmed Rawi) explained at length to the Embassy that the Government was afraid that if Iraq provoked the Soviet Union by following the U.S. line against the Chinese Communists, the Soviets might retaliate through stepped up subversive action in Iraq especially in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Government stressed that the Iraqi Army must have additional arms and equipment in order to deal with the situation on the Iraqi border if a Soviet inspired insurrection should occur in Iranian Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan (or if Mulla Mustafa should return to Iraq backed by Russian arms) and in order to maintain internal security if the U.S.S.R. should take active steps to increase subversive activity in Iraq (compare the Embassy's despatch No. 829, February 17, 1951,[2] which transmits a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office, with the help of the Ministries of Interior and Defense, regarding the factors which make it necessary that Iraq's armed forces be strengthened).

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[1] Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Not printed.

Foreign Office Undersecretary (before the final vote on the U.S. resolution on Chinese aggression) summarized the Government's viewpoint as follows:

> *a*) The Government believes that the vote on the Chinese aggression resolution is a turning point in the sense that a vote for the U.S. resolution will be (and will be so considered by the Iraqi public) a definite alignment of Iraq against the Soviet sphere, and that it will "align Iraq with the Western powers" in the event of a third World War.
>
> *b*) Iraq is afraid that the Russians will regard an Iraqi vote for the resolution as a hostile act and that if Iraq so votes the U.S.S.R. will take action against Iraq probably in the form of greatly expanded subversive activities here.
>
> *c*) Therefore the Government feels that if Iraq is to take the risk of acting in such a way as to anger the Russians and thus run the danger of a greatly stepped up subversive campaign, Iraq must have some assurance of military and economic aid from the United States (since Britain cannot supply it).

The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense have both taken the line in discussions with Embassy representatives that Britain, which has treaty responsibility for the defense of Iraq, is unable to defend the area or even to supply sufficient arms to enable the Iraq Government to build up the army and the police force sufficiently to maintain internal security should war break out, or should disturbances occur in Northwest Iran. Therefore, they say, the Government must turn to the United States as the only power in a position to supply the needed equipment.

The reasons underlying the Government's desire to increase the strength of its armed forces may be summarized as follows:

It is a principle of Iraqi political life that the Government can maintain order and security in the outlying Kurdish mountain regions and in the southern Arab tribal districts only when it is "strong". The Government's strength depends in the last analysis on its armed forces,—the army and the police—and their ability to take quick effective action when disturbances break out. Growing realization that Iraq is in fact defenseless should war break out between the Soviet Union and the Western powers is one of the causes for the widespread feeling in unthinking (or anti-Western) nationalist and leftist circles that Iraq should remain neutral in the event of war and should make public declaration of such a policy. The weakness of Iraq's armed forces and the feeling that the country and its government do not have the strong military backing of a first class military power able to cope with a Russian attack (such as Britain used to be but is not now under the present alignment of world forces) also has the effect of reducing the Government's ability to keep the respect of and maintain order among unruly tribesmen or discontented urban elements. Why should the Kurdish mountain chieftain or the Euphrates tribal sheikh, who has, or thinks he has, grievances against the Government remain respectful and submissive if he believes the Government is likely to be swept away?

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[2] Not printed.

For these reasons the Government is most anxious to build up the strength of its armed forces and to seek United States participation, with Britain, in some form of multilateral military arrangement for the defense of the area.[4]

VI. Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Jordanian Relations

1. *Iraqi-Syrian Relations.*

The only development of importance in Iraqi-Syrian relations during the period under review was Prime Minister Qudsi's visit to Baghdad (November 18 to 23). During his five day visit, the principal political matters discussed by Qudsi and Prime Minister Nuri Said were (*a*) the question of military cooperation with the West; (*b*) the Arab League's Collective Security Pact; (*c*) the relations between Syrian and Egypt and (*d*) Iraqi-Syrian relations and the question of Saudi Arabian interference in Syrian affairs.

The Iraqis seem to have been pleased with results of Qudsi's visit, believing that Nuri Pasha was successful in explaining Iraqi viewpoints on inter-Arab and international affairs,—and to a certain extent winning Qudsi's approval of them.

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[4] Despatch 1061, April 10, from Baghdad transmitted a list of military equipment recently released to Iraq by the British Government and commented that although these items would undoubtedly make the Iraqi Army a more effective internal police force, they would not satisfy the needs of the Iraqi Government if it were to be encouraged to play its part in any defense of the area. The despatch closed with the words: "It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the time is here when material military assistance must be rendered to Iraq if the will to resist is to be encouraged." (787.5/4–1051)

a) *The Defense of the Middle East and Military Cooperation with the West.*

Nuri Pasha expounded his thesis that Iraq especially, but Syria and Saudi Arabia as well, are dangerously exposed to Soviet invasion in the event of global war, and that therefore the Arab States should seek the military cooperation of Britain and the West in the defense of the Middle East.

b) *The Collective Security Pact.*

Nuri Pasha asked Qudsi to inform the Egyptian Prime Minister (on his forthcoming visit to Cairo) that Iraq could not sign the Egyptian version of the Collective Security Pact; that Iraq insisted that the Pact be made more practical by providing for a Chiefs of Staff committee and that the Commander in Chief of the combined Arab armies should be either chosen on merit, or [be] a national of the state or the territory on which war occurs.

c) *Egyptian-Syrian Relations.*

Qudsi (according to Iraqi sources) assured Nuri Pasha that at future Arab League meetings Syria would not follow the Egyptian lead, but would take an independent line, considering each question on its merits.

d) *Iraqi-Syrian Relations and the Question of Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian Interference in Syrian Affairs.*

According to Iraqi sources, Qudsi did not raise the question of interference in Syrian affairs with the Iraqis (because, the Iraqis maintain, the Syrians are quite aware Iraq has not interfered since Hennawi's downfall),[5] but he did inform Nuri Pasha that he had urged the Saudi Arabians to "stop subsidizing intrigues in Syria".

2. *The Iraq–Syria Union Question*[6]

As regards the question of Syro-Iraqi union, the Iraq Government's attitude remained the same, during the period under review, as it has been for the past year. The Iraqis take the line that the question as to whether or not Iraq and Syria should unite is now up to the Syrians; Iraq has made its position in favor of union clear—it can do nothing more until the Syrians come to a decision as to whether they desire union with Iraq.

At the time of Qudsi's visit, the Undersecretary of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the reporting officer that Qudsi was certain that both Saudi Arabia and Egypt were engaging in intrigues in Syria, hoping eventually to arrange for the return of

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[5] Col. Sami al-Hinnawi, who led a successful military coup in Syria in August 1949, was in turn removed from power by a military coup on December 14, 1949.

[6] For documentation concerning U.S. policy toward the possibility of a Syro-Iraqi union in 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1201 ff.

Shukri Quwwatli,[7] since they believe Quwwatli would take a stronger stand against the union of Syria and Iraq than the present Syrian regime.

3. *Iraqi-Jordanian Relations*

a) *King Abdullah Visits Baghdad.*

In the period under review there have been no noteworthy developments in relations between Iraq and Jordan. King Abdullah came to Baghdad twice (in October and November) to visit his ailing niece Queen Aliya, and a third time, in December, for her funeral.

During his October visit King Abdullah, in a press interview, stressed the need for the "unity of Iraq, Jordan and Syria", and in November (at the time of Prime Minister Nuri Said's address of November 14 pointing out the impossibility of neutrality for Iraq) he expressed his approval of Nuri's stand against neutrality, telling newspapermen that "neutrality, whether armed or not, is of no avail".

b) *Nuri Said Visits Amman.*

In January, on his way to the Cairo Arab League meeting, Nuri Said visited Amman to discuss with King Abdullah the forthcoming League meeting, and also to ask the King if he would permit denationalized Iraqi Jews to move by road from Iraq across Jordan to Israel. Nuri had hoped to be able to arrange for the transport of large numbers of Jews by bus to Israel (in an effort to speed up the emigration operation), but King Abdullah wisely refused, realizing that the movement of large numbers of Jews across Jordan would probably cause serious incidents endangering internal security.

E. PAUL TENNEY

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[7] The regime of Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli was overthrown in a *coup d'état* of March 30, 1949, by Col. Husni Za'im.

887.00 TA/7-751 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Iraq (*Crocker*) *to the Department of State*[1]

SECRET

BAGHDAD, July 7, 1951.

No. 23

From the referenced Despatch, it will be recalled that Iraqis generally applaud the Point IV Technical Assistance Program. The General Agreement passed the Chamber of Deputies with only seven adverse votes. (It became effective by publication in the official *Gazette* on June 2, 1951.)[2]

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[1] Repeated to Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo.

[2] A summary of the negotiation of the Point Four Agreement, a comment on its status, a review of the Embassy's experience with the program to date, and enclosed copies of several Embassy and Foreign Office notes exchanged on the agreement, are in despatch 2256, June 25, from Baghdad, in Department of State file 887.00 TA/6-2551. For the text of the Agreement for Technical Cooperation signed at Baghdad on April 10 and entered into force on June 2, see 3 UST (pt. 1) 541.

READEX FICHE best copy a

Considerable preparatory work was done prior to the conclusion of the General Agreement so that a number of Point IV projects were in advanced stages of discussion. However, most of these projects (especially leader grants and trainees projects) proved difficult to conclude with official sanction of the Iraqi Government. Thus, full advantage was not taken of the available 1951 fiscal year funds.

In reviewing the course of the discussions with the Iraqis concerning Point IV projects, it seems clear that much more should have been done on the Iraqi side to finalize these projects earlier. It is the feeling of the Embassy that the procrastination of the Iraqis can not be explained merely by inefficiency, but that some delaying tactics were employed.

. . . .

EDWARD S. CROCKER

787.5 MAP/8-2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 29, 1951.

Subject: 1) Iraq Acceptance of Military and Economic Assistance Under the Mutual Security Program.
2) Iraq Views on Japanese Peace Treaty

Participants: Mr. Abdullah Bakr, Minister of Iraq, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA
Mr. John R. Barrow—NE

Discussion:

1) *Iraq acceptance of the Mutual Security Program*

Pursuant to instructions from his Government, Mr. Bakr stated that the Iraqi Government was ready to "accept" United States military and economic assistance under the Mutual Security Program. He said the Government had emphasized military assistance. (Obviously military and economic assistance would be provided only on the basis of an Iraqi request.)

I congratulated the Government of Iraq for this early and forthright action. I said I thought the emphasis on military assistance was quite correct in the light of the sound economic position which Iraq would attain if all went well with the new IPC Agreement.[1] Economic aid could largely be confined to technical assistance.

I said that I hoped this approach was an indication that Iraq stood ready to cooperate with the West in strengthening the defense of the

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[1] For documentation on the Iraq Petroleum Company agreement, see pp. 268 ff.

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area since this would naturally make us more interested in sending military aid to Iraq.

Mr. Bakr said this point was not specifically included in his instructions but he would mention it to his Government.

[Here follows the remainder of this memorandum which concerns Bakr's imminent departure for San Francisco to attend the Japanese Treaty Conference, and Iraq's views on the stationing of United States troops in Japan. McGhee closed with the information that he and Bakr had discussed in general terms such questions as the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) Agreement and Iraq-Jordan union without developing any new thoughts on the questions.]

G[EORGE] C. M[CGHEE]

887.2553/10–1151 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET
No. 349

BAGHDAD, October 11, 1951.

1. *Summary and Introductory Comment.*

This Despatch will briefly examine the effects on the Iraqi national economy which may be expected to result from the proposed oil concessions agreement between Iraq and the oil-producing companies (Iraq Petroleum Co., Mosul Petroleum Co., and Basra Petroleum Co.) and to assign approximate magnitudes to the resultant impacts. No attempt is made here to indulge in close economic analysis; time limitations preclude this and the purposes of the Despatch do not require it. Approximations are sufficient to highlight the far-reaching implications of the benefits to be derived by Iraq under the new agreement. Moreover, the Despatch is intended to suggest the general direction and nature of the effects of the new agreement rather than to precisely measure them.

The terms of the agreement, when ratified by Iraq's Parliament, will be retroactive to January 1, 1951. Under the agreement, there will occur a substantial increase in oil production and in oil revenues to the Iraq Government. Both increases will exert attenuated subsidiary effects in addition to the direct impact on the Iraqi economy caused by their own sizeable contributions.

The oil revenues will place Iraq for the foreseeable future in a comfortable net creditor position on balance of international payments account. While means of financing developmental projects will no longer be a problem, the inflationary impact of the greatly increased governmental revenue will create a series of complex financial difficul-

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[1] Repeated to London, Tehran, Amman, Basra, Beirut, Benghazi, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

with which Iraq is not well prepared to cope. Considerable eco-
ic, social and political readjustments are anticipated over the long-
, an obviously painful process fraught with dangers for stability
e area.

Here follow two sections covering the direct and indirect impacts of
increases in oil production and revenue rate on the Iraqi national
omy.]

et Effect.

rom the foregoing, several broad conclusions having policy im-
ations may be drawn. Some of these have already been discussed
previous despatches; others will be developed further in future
patches.

) Oil is predominantly the mainstay of Iraqi economy and the
e of future development to make the economy viable before the
esource is depleted.

) Contrary to the usual bankruptcy of backward areas, Iraq has
e revenue in sight than projects upon which to spend it.

Iraq sorely needs technical assistance, both in personnel and
ds.

) Iraq is faced with a monumental developmental task with only
odicum of helpful institutional aids; thus truly staggering socio-
omic problems (such as inflation and shifts in emphasis on eco-
ic groups) arising out of the coming tremendous expansion of
omic activity are complicated by the scarcity of executive per-
nel and the out-moded social-political-economic traditions and
oms.

Here follows a listing of recent despatches concerning the oil
ement, the Technical Assistance and Development Board (see
patch 466, November 10, page 554), and the economic life of Jews
others in Iraq.]

EDWARD S. CROCKER

0/11-551

norandum by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs
Gnade) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern
ffairs (Kopper)

ET [WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1951.

ject: Weekly Summary

Here follow the sections on Syria and Lebanon.]

he Palace Master of ceremonies, an intimate of the Regent,[1]
orted to a US Embassy official that he was extremely worried about

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rown Prince Abdul Ilah.

the consequences of the present tense situation brought about by extreme nationalist sentiment.[2] He was apparently afraid of a mob uprising. He remarked: "We can depend on the tribes, but are not certain of the Army". This is the first hint the Embassy has received that the Army was not completely reliable. He spoke as if the Regent were convinced that Nuri must go, but he saw no suitable leader in sight to replace Nuri.

In an unprecedented private interview with Mr. Crocker the Regent let it be known that he was much impressed with the opportunity offered in the form of association with the MEC;[3] that he was unhappy about Egypt's unilateral action with respect thereto; that he was not satisfied that Nuri Said's present one-man government was representative enough to deal with a matter of such importance, and that he wanted to work out in his own mind the best way to prepare Iraq to deal with the MEC in view of Egypt's rejection, the reluctance of any Arab state to take the first step, and the possible opposition of extremist elements. He felt that since Egypt had not consulted the other Arab states in her action they were free to follow their own best interests in this instance. He suggested that the United States should mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.[4]

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[2] The political atmosphere in Iraq was tense as leftist, nationalist, and anti-Western elements continued to mount pressure for abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and adoption of a policy of "neutrality" for the Middle East. The situation was described in despatches 394, October 24, and 432, November 3, from Baghdad: 787.00/10-2451 and /11-351, respectively.

[3] For documentation on the proposed Middle East Command, see pp. 1 ff.

[4] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 343 ff.

887.00 TA/11-1051: Despatch

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State

SECRET — BAGHDAD, November 10, 1951.

No. 466

Subject: Basic Policy on Technical Assistance for Iraq.

The Embassy has been engaged in discussions with the recently arrived TCA field party which is reviewing and evaluating technical assistance projects in Iraq. It appears opportune to set forth the Embassy's views concerning the most appropriate policy relative to such projects, based, of course, upon experience to date with Point IV in Iraq.

The foremost consideration is that Iraq does not lend itself to being fitted to an over-all pattern of technical aid. Iraq has had the benefit of numerous surveys of her developmental needs (largely British performed) and has already launched on a program of economic development. A special government agency (the Development Board) has been established with high-level personnel and substantial revenues with the specific purposes of determining the nature of the developmental projects to be undertaken and assuring that such projects go forward. The Iraqis would not welcome the arrival of a foreign group which might attempt to present them with plans for the development of their country. It is essential to the acceptability of Point IV aid in Iraq that any central TCA group here avoid even the appearance of such a purpose. Moreover, it is definitely to our interest and that of Iraq to support completely the Development Board and not to detract in any way from its prestige and its functions.

In this connection it must be borne in mind that, while a General Point IV Agreement has been signed with Iraq, this by no means indicates that the course of the various projects as requested finally by the Government has been smooth. The Embassy has found it necessary to exercise much tact and forebearance in dealing with the various concerned Iraqi officials, many of whom have private interests in connection with specific technical aid projects which do not always coincide with the objectives of the Point IV program and which, furthermore, sometimes occasion internal conflicts among the Iraqis themselves.

Understanding the Iraqi character is important in actually implementing the technical aid program. To begin with, the Iraqis generally are suspicious of getting something for nothing and this suspicion is not limited to the top-level people; in fact, it is probably least true of the western-educated Iraqis. Nevertheless, there is political danger for Iraqis to appear to be too closely associated with occidental countries and so few Iraqis care to support Point IV with unbounded enthusiasm. Also the Iraqis are a proud people and their leaders are often super-sensitive of their own prerogatives, so that aid projects must be carefully presented. These characteristics make the position of a Point IV project negotiator a delicate one, which is further complicated by the ineptness and administrative inefficiency of the Iraqi authorities.

The Embassy's experience shows that often individual Iraqi officials will grandiosely endorse a project and indicate that the endorsement constitutes practical adoption of the project by the Iraqi Government. However, final approval of a project generally requires slow and devious processes in which even Iraqi personalities who do not appear to have any direct relation to the project under consideration occasionally inject themselves. The Point IV project negotiator must also be leery of the pleasing and deceptively efficient phrases used by the western-educated Iraqis, since Iraqis usually like to be congenial. Use of the same technical language that we employ does not always mean that the Iraqi has our attitudes of mind nor our customary drive to accomplish objectives.

It is also essential to bear in mind that Iraq, unlike many other backward countries, has now and will have for the foreseeable future more funds (from her oil resources) than she needs for any reasonable developmental program. Thus she does not need financial aid for her economic development. She does need desperately foreign technical assistance. However, she can afford to pay for it. This fact has definite advantages since she can readily finance developmental projects; and thus maximize the benefit to be derived from technical advice; but it also makes the Iraqis feel more independent in accepting technical aid.

To summarize the effect of these considerations on the technical aid program, it is not believed that the most progress can be made in Iraq by attempting too extensive and ambitious Point IV projects too rapidly. Caution seems indicated so as not to lose the ground gained thus far. Furthermore, the projects must be geared to the Iraqi concept of where aid is needed and to Iraqi methods even though those methods are much slower, devious, and inefficient than ours. One of the objectives of our aid here should be precisely to improve gradually those methods.

To pass now to considering the nature of projects feasible in Iraq, it is the Embassy's considered judgment that the Development Board constitutes the principal key to the future of Iraq's development of her resources. This Board has allotted to it all the Iraqi oil revenues (which represent by far the largest source of national income) and is specifically charged with responsibility for measures for economic development.

A golden opportunity for influencing and guiding Iraq's economic future exists in the provision for an American member of this Board. Unfortunately, Gen. Donald Adams who served for a short time as Point IV appointee to the Board, left Iraq in July and a replacement has not yet arrived. This has created a somewhat delicate problem since the Iraqis (and foreign diplomatic circles also) are most anxious to have an American member. In the Embassy's view, this is by far the most important technical aid appointment to be made in Iraq. The American member will sit with the innermost council of the Iraqis in charting Iraq's economic future and in implementing developmental plans by appropriate measures. No other American in Iraq can be in a position to learn so intimately the Iraqi problems and plans for development nor to contribute so largely by counsel to the solution of those problems and the formulation of sound plans.

The position of the American member of the Development Board is so influential and important that the Embassy believes it should be the focal point around which other Point IV activities in Iraq should center. While the American member should have no administrative functions with reference to the rest of the Point IV program in Iraq (essential because he can only maintain the confidence of the Iraqis by concentrating on his duties on the Board), he would be in a unique position to advise the Embassy's Technical Cooperation Officer regarding various technical aid projects. It is believed that in this way a better integrated and practical program for Iraq may be evolved.

It is understood that the Department proposes to establish a central TCA group within the Embassy to coordinate the aid program for Iraq. This is a sound proposal; however, the existence of an American member on the Iraqi Development Board will necessitate some difference in the type of operation carried on by the central TCA group from operation of similar groups in other countries. Moreover, the nature of the situation in Iraq is such that no strong central supervision of technical assistance projects in Iraq appears feasible. The fact of a Development Board means that plans must initiate with that Board in order that Iraqi cooperation may be assured. Thus, the central TCA group cannot inject itself into the economic planning activities of the Iraq Government as may be practicable and desirable in some other countries. The American member of the Development Board will do this as a function of his position. Furthermore, the Iraqis would be quick to resent any apparent interference with the Point IV technicians whom they will consider as special advisors and members of the staffs of the Ministries to which assigned. Thus, the central TCA group should not attempt close supervision of the American technicians assigned to Iraq.

The Department will also appreciate that many Iraqis feel that not much aid has been forthcoming under Point IV. Gen. Adams came as American member of the Development Board, but has resigned and his vacancy has not been filled. Dr. Walter C. Price is now here as maternal and child health expert. The Iraqis have had a naive belief that many American technicians would have arrived before now and the Embassy's explanations have not completely reassured them. It is therefore important that at least six or seven of the 21 technicians which the Iraqis have requested be sent to Iraq immediately. Until they arrive, the Embassy considers the time inopportune to discuss any further technical aid projects.

Of less importance than the furnishing of American technicians in the eyes of the Iraqis generally, is the program for training Iraqis abroad. Some progress is being made in this field which seems to be reasonably satisfying to the Iraqis. Of least importance from the Iraqi point-of-view are the various special training projects, such as leader grant projects.

For convenient reference, Enclosure 1 to this Despatch lists the Embassy's major communications to the Department concerning the technical assistance program in Iraq which may be consulted to gain a fuller appreciation of the needs and problems peculiar to Iraq.

The views expressed in this Despatch have been thoroughly discussed with the Point IV field party now at this Embassy.[1]

EDWARD S. CROCKER

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[1] Enclosed in this despatch was a list of despatches of major import on the subject of technical assistance programs in Iraq.

AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ

[For text of Agreement signed at Baghdad April 10, 1951, entered into force June 2, 1951, see 3 UST (pt. 1) 541.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ CONCERNING CONSULAR OFFICERS

[For text of Agreement effected by exchanges of notes dated at Washington March 14, May 15, June 19, and August 8, 1951, entered into force August 8, 1951, see 5 UST (pt. 1) 657.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ CONCERNING AN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION

[For text of Agreement signed at Baghdad August 16, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1908.]

ISRAEL

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH ISRAEL; INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PALESTINE QUESTION[1]

684A.86/1–351

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1951.

Subject: Possible Moves to Improve Relations Between Israel and the Arab States.[2]

We have noted the current Israeli preoccupation over the possibility that in the event of a major war involving the Near East, Israel would be completely cut off from its Western sources of supply for food and fuel. This preoccupation has resulted in the recent Israeli approach to advocate the desirability that the United States stock-pile food and fuel in Israel.

If food and fuel sources of supply in the Arab states were open to Israel, the position of the latter would not be so precarious if its present foreign supply lines were cut. This will not be possible, however, until an improvement takes place in the relations between Israel and the Arab states.

There are submitted hereunder some ideas on moves which Israel might make in an effort to induce the Arab states to adopt a different attitude. These ideas are based on the assumption that Israel needs peace more than do the Arab states, and that it would be Israel, not the Arabs, who would have to make concessions in order to obtain this peace, given the present Arab determination not to come to a settlement with Israel.

1. Israel might publicly accept the UN recommendation that those refugees desiring to return to their homes and to live at peace with their neighbors would be permitted to do so. Israel might then make a genuine effort to take back as many refugees as it possibly could.

2. Israel might make an offer to give adequate compensation for abandoned refugee property and to begin payment of such compensa-

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[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 658 ff.

[2] The following handwritten note appears in the margin of the source text next to the first paragraph: "Dreamy! G[eorge] C. M[cGhee]". Another handwritten note reads: "Let's make George eat his word! [G.] L[ewis] J[ones]".

tion, without making this action dependent upon a general peace settlement.

3. Israel might offer to return some of the Arab quarters of Jerusalem. This would have an important effect on the possibility of peace with Jordan.

4. Israel might offer to cede to Egypt and Jordan part of the Southern Negev in order to establish the land bridge between the Arab states so much desired by the Arabs. If this were not possible, Israel might offer the Arabs a corridor across the Southern Negev. Transit rights for Israel across this corridor to Elath could doubtless be arranged.

5. Israel might offer to return to Jordan the areas in the "Triangle" region taken over as part of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan.[3]

6. Israel might offer to make Haifa a free port and Lydda a free air-port.

7. Israel might offer to the Arab states facilities for rail transit of Israel in sealed cars.

8. Israel might offer to make available to the Arab states scientific and medical advice and equipment.

9. Israel might return to Jordan the disputed territory in the Rutenberg area.

On the reverse side of the medal the Arabs should be expected to take the following steps:

1. To sign non-aggression pacts with Israel if outright peace settlements were out of the question.

2. To begin commercial relations with Israel.

3. To permit free passage of persons and goods between Israel and the Arab states.

4. To permit the flow of oil through the Haifa pipeline.

5. To cease boycotts and blockade practices.

6. To arrange for full Israeli access to the cultural institutions on Mt. Scopus, and to the Wailing Wall.

In the opinion of NE, peace with Jordan might be achieved if the Israelis could see fit to make some of the moves suggested above. Given the serious international situation, Lebanon might follow Jordan once the ice were broken. However, Israel has always strongly rejected any suggestion that she make concessions of the above nature, on the grounds that this would indicate weakness and would only serve to whet the appetite of the Arabs for more concessions. Conversely, we have no *assurance* that the steps, if taken would result in countersteps by the Arabs in the direction of better relations with Israel.

Recommendations:[4]

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[3] Of April 3, 1949; U.N. Doc. S/1302/Rev. 1.

[4] The remainder of this memorandum has not been found in Department of State files.

790.5/1–551 : Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TEL AVIV, January 5, 1951—9 a. m.

392. Following is Embassy's preliminary response to problems raised by Israel offer have its armament plants produce arms for use of West. Deptel 270, December 29.[1]

Military: Service attachés unable comment pending implementation Herzog's suggestion they be invited inspect Israel munitions factories. If Israel extends facilities, comprehensive report will be submitted soonest.

Political: Reference proposal reflects degree to which Israel leadership now prepared to translate its Western orientation into tangible foreign political commitments. Offer is culmination of gradual change in foreign political thinking of Israel leaders during last six months. Shift in emphasis during that period from official policy of "neutrality" to "nonidentification" to what is now sometimes described as "independent" has prepared ground for shift to more overt ties to West. Recent developments Korea and growing fear that Third World War may be imminent have helped awaken public to danger that as price for neutrality Israel may, in event major hostilities, find itself cut off from West upon whom it is dependent. As result bulk of population now probably ready support complete break with neutrality if such break linked to political and military alliance with West.

Government motivation for reference proposal probably twofold. For one, concern Arabs may take advantage of western preoccupation with USSR to launch second round. Although no fresh evidence here of such Arab intentions, mere logical possibility has kept Israel on guard, and this factor is constantly stressed domestically to keep population alert and psychologically prepared for sacrifice. Probably more basic, however, is genuine conviction of top leaders and informed public that Israel cannot hope emerge from Third World War as independent national state unless firmly allied as active participant with Western powers.

Israel Government undoubtedly views its offer as critical decision at critical time, regardless of whether US accepts or rejects, offer will likely have widespread political consequences. If plan accepted, activities of small Communist party will undoubtedly be intensified. Communists can be expected extend their present efforts propagandize and infiltrate to direct sabotage. Reaction of Mapam members more difficult to predict because of absence any dependable estimate of strength various Mapam factions. Outlook at present is that small Extreme Leftist faction will cooperate with Communists, but that large numbers of rank and file will be bewildered and confused into inaction in early stages. Ultimate response of Mapam membership will probably depend on whether Government skillful enough to split party by convincing rank and file they are making choice for or against national survival. But regardless exact outcome here, Israel Government not likely to have much difficulty controlling Extreme Leftist elements. Mapam's control Histadrut and certainty latter will support government policy would provide effective instrument for maintaining labor discipline.

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[1] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1086.

Negative response would be psychological blow to Israel. First reaction likely to be overtures along similar lines to Britain with whom relations conspicuously cordial within last few weeks. Top political circles Israel are known to have speculated that at Truman–Attlee talks[2] Great Britain may have been assigned primary responsibility for Middle East in event of war. Further consequences difficult to forsee, but safe guess is that outright rejection by both US and Britain would weaken position of pro-Western spokesmen in Israel political life and encourage those who advocate salvation through increasingly uneasy neutrality.

In summary, Embassy's preliminary appraisal reference proposal is that it is little short of revolutionary in Israeli thinking, that the very fact Government leaders have made it is vivid proof of their determination to take whatever steps are necessary to insure their survival as national state, and that it is sufficiently significant to our Near Eastern policy to warrant careful top level attention.[3]

FORD

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[2] For documentation on the talks held between Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman in Washington, December 4–8, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1698 ff. and *ibid.*, vol. VII, pp. 1237 ff.

[3] For additional documentation on the attitude of the United States toward Israeli participation in Middle East defense, see pp. 1 ff.

357.AC/1-2351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 23, 1951—6 p. m.

497. For Palmer and Blandford. Reur respective jurisdictions Dept believes only possible areas uncertainty between PCC and UNRWA problems of (1) assessment and payment of compensation; (2) arrangements for repatriation of Arab refugees or (3) their resettle-

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[1] Telegram drafted by James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs and William L. Sands of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on January 22. Telegram cleared by NE, NEA, UNE, and UNA.

ment. By UNGA resolutions 1948 [2] and 1950 [3] PCC has gen polit responsibility handling these problems. By UNGA res 1950 [4] UNRWA has sole responsibility reintegration program.

Compensation: Unless otherwise agreed by Israel Arabs in negots with PCC, PCC's role assessment and payment of compensation understood limited to effecting polit agreement, and essential preliminary arrangements therefor. UNRWA may or may not be agency for settlement compensation claims depending on agreement negotiated by PCC. Dept deems it quite possible UNRWA as result negots may be agency handling large portion compensation claims but largest claims undoubtedly will come from wealthy Arab refugees not dependent on UNRWA in position to obtain governmental support and legal assistance hence may be uninterested or oppose use UNRWA admin compensation settlement.

Repatriation: Polit negots responsibility PCC. Since repatriation best negotiating point vis-à-vis settlement compensation UNRWA shld avoid ref thereto during PCC negots.

Resettlement: While there will no doubt arise at some time in future polit problems in connection with resettlement which are the primary responsibility of PCC, Dept strongly of opinion since reintegration is current topic of negotiation between UNRWA and Arab states and is at a delicate stage with Syria, that new negotiating element injected into this framework at present wld be unfortunate and therefore believes PCC shld not press negots affecting resettlement with Arab states at this time. UNRWA shld keep PCC closely informed on progress of negots and US members shld in particular keep close contact on this phase of problem.

Re gen instrs, McGhee–Blandford ltr April 5, 1950 [5] reaffirmed. Jan 2 suggestions to Palmer re desirability possibilities increasing areas Arab-Israeli agreement shld be pressed all appropriate occasions. This connection Dept suggests closer personal relations with Riley wld be helpful. Dept shld be kept advised all possibilities areas and means increasing Arab-Israeli agreement.

ACHESON

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[2] Reference is to Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. Text is in U.N. Doc. A/810. For part of the text, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, pt. 2, p. 1661.

[3] Resolution 394 (V) of December 14, 1950. For text, see U.N. Doc. A/1775.

[4] Resolution 393 (V) of December 2, 1950, is *ibid.*

[5] Not printed.

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum by the Ambassador-Designate to Israel (Davis)[1] *to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1951.

Subject: Call on the President

The President expressed great interest in our relations with Israel, stating that we wished of course to be as helpful as possible. He referred to the Arab refugee problem as the "crux of the matter," saying that the question might tend to resolve itself if a program of aid to the countries where these refugees now find themselves could be worked out on a satisfactory basis. He added, however, that little progress seems to have been possible thus far in this direction.

He stated further that while we take a friendly interest in Israel we have to recognize that the aggressiveness of the Israelis occasionally needs to be restrained. He remarked at this juncture that our principal policy objective was of course to prevent any renewal of hostilities in the Near East, and that anything which I could do to keep the eastern end of the Mediterranean peaceful would be very welcome.

M[ONNETT] B. D[AVIS]

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[1] President Truman formally appointed Mr. Davis Ambassador to Israel on February 1. He presented his credentials on February 26.

357.AC/1-2751: Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BEIRUT, January 27, 1951—noon.

408. Palun 370. Joint PCC–UNRWA meeting 25 ended on note of cooperation and understanding. Prior to meeting with UNRWA, USDel had presented to PCC our views on future relations with UNRWA and respective concentration of efforts. PCC accepted readily US views in complete accordance Deptel 497, January 23.[1] These views were communicated to UNRWA in joint meeting in remarks by French Turk and US representatives. While British and French members UNRWA advisory commission expressed concern over possible overlapping with UNRWA reintegration program, PCC statement of understanding its role under GA resolution[2] and intentions as outlined Deptel 497 met no opposition. It was agreed that PCC and UNRWA should communicate regularly and exchange full informa-

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[1] *Ante*, p. 562.

[2] Presumably that cited in footnote 3, p. 563.

tion on progress respective tasks. Second joint meeting, at which UNRWA will discuss with PCC details of reintegration program, is scheduled for first week following close Istanbul conference.[3]

PCC and UNRWA considered Israel conditional offer to UNRWA reintegration fund.[4] After joint meeting, PCC telegraphed to secretary negotiation committee as follows: "Dear Mr. White: Further to my letter of 10 January,[5] I would like to inform you that the conciliation commission has considered the conditional offer of the government of Israel to the relief and reintegration program for Palestine refugees, both at its meeting of 26 January and at joint meeting of the commission and UNRWA held on the same day.

The commission has asked me to thank the negotiation committee for having brought this matter to its attention. I would like to request the committee to urge upon the government of Israel the importance of making an offer without conditions as to compensation. The Commission believes that such an unconditional offer by Israel would be a demonstration of goodwill that would greatly accelerate the work of the conciliation commission in final settlement of the refugee problem and all other questions outstanding between Israel and Arab states." PCC informed UNRWA its intention forward above telegram and received copy UNRWA's communication to negotiation committee.[6]

[Palmer]

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[3] For documentation on the Middle East Chiefs of Mission meeting held in Istanbul February 14–21, see pp. 49 ff.

[4] On December 13, 1950, the Government of Israel had indicated its readiness to contribute approximately $2,800,000 to a reintegration program for Palestine refugees if it were in return given assurance that the contribution would release it from all individual claims for compensation for abandoned Arab lands. (Information based on part of telegram 78 from Marseilles, January 15; 357.AC/1–1551) The offer had been made to a negotiating committee whose terms of reference are set forth in Resolution 393 (V) of the United Nations General Assembly.

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

[6] In telegram 93 to Jerusalem (Unpal 262), February 19, drafted by Mr. Ludlow of UNP and marked "For Palmer," the Department stated in part: "While Dept holds present Israeli compensation proposals to negotiating comite wholly unacceptable Dept believes area for negotiating relationship reintegration fund and Israeli obligation compensate does exist and shld be basis for prompt discussions by PCC with Israeli reps. Dept views as likely basis agreement procedure whereby individual Arab claims wld be cancelled as Israeli ear-marked funds were used to resettle individual, PRA being agency handling such procedure." The Department urged Mr. Palmer to persuade his PCC colleagues to negotiate with Israel "conditions linking compensation and resettlement which might induce Israeli contribution reintegration fund no less than equivalent 5 million dollars first installment." This telegram was cleared by NE, NEA, UNE, and UNA. (357.AC/2–1951) For background to this policy instruction, see Mr. Ludlow's memorandum of March 14 to John D. Hickerson, p. 592.

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Eban.

The Ambassador of Israel is calling on you today, at 2:30 p. m., to review certain aspects of Israel's problems before your departure for Istanbul. He has requested one hour of your time for this purpose. The subjects he will discuss fall into three main categories: (1) Defense, (2) Supply, and (3) Peace.

1. *Defense*

Background: The Israelis have indicated to the Department and the Defense Department on a number of occasions that Israel wished to contribute as effectively as possible to the security of the Near East and that Israel was prepared to participate in possible US–UK defense plans for the area in return for certain considerations.

On December 18, Israel Minister Kollek informed Mr. Rockwell and General Burns that the Israel Government was convinced that the only hope for its salvation lay with the West and it was accordingly prepared to offer the West full cooperation in one form or another in plans for defense of the Near East. Mr. Kollek said that if the UK were considered to have primary responsibility for the defense of the Near East, Israel was perfectly willing to consult with that country in this regard. Although we have not informed the Israeli that the UK has this primary responsibility, it is understood very confidentially from the British Embassy here that the British Foreign Office has so informed the Israel Minister in London, Eliahu Elath. Sir Brian Robertson, Commander in Chief of British Middle East Forces, will visit Israel on February 19 to hold exploratory talks with the Israel Government on the possibilities of UN-Israel military cooperation.

On December 23, Israel Foreign Minister Sharett submitted to Secretary of Defense Marshall a comprehensive memorandum[2] of Israel's military requirements suggesting, among other things, that the US (*a*) should turn over 150,000 American rifles to the Israel Army for the Czech and other rifles Israel presently possesses, thereby standardizing Israel Army equipment with that of the US, and (*b*) the US should utilize Israel's excess production capacity in light arms and ammunition for the MDAP program.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by John A. Waldo of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.
[2] Not found in Department of State files.

You may recall that Ambassador Eban first made the latter proposal to you on November 22. It is understood, however, that the Defense Department has decided against this Israel suggestion.

Recommendations: We are glad to note Israel's increasing tendency to cooperate with the West. The Department and the Defense Department will, of course, consider any proposals Israel has to make along these lines. The Israel Government must remember, however, that there are many prior demands on US military assistance these days.

We understand that Sir Brian Robertson is going out to the area shortly to talk with the Israel Government. As far as Israel's proposals to the Defense Department are concerned, we understand that they are under consideration at the present time.

2. *Supply*

Background: In December Israel Minister Sharett discussed with the Secretary, Mr. Averell Harriman, Secretary of Defense Marshall, and Secretary of Agriculture Brannan the possibility that the US might stockpile wheat and oil in Israel for use by the US in the Near East area in the event world hostilities should interrupt shipping to the Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Israel would be permitted to purchase the wheat or oil as required for internal consumption. It is understood that the Israel Government has now discarded this proposal as impracticable. Mr. Lavon, Israel Minister of Agriculture, presently in this country, has recently discussed with Mr. Brannan of Agriculture the possibility that the US might ship to Israel a two-year supply of wheat to be held for the account of the US Government and to be purchased by Israel as required. According to the Embassy here, Israel could not pay for a two-year supply of wheat at the present time but would be able to do so on the installment plan. The Embassy reported that the Secretary of Agriculture "viewed the suggestion with favor." It is believed, however, that the Commodity Credit Corporation might be unwilling to approve a deal of this sort, since it would open the door to similar requests from a great number of other countries.

Recommendation: If the Ambassador should raise this matter, it is recommended that you inform him that the Department is aware of and sympathetic to Israel's supply problems. The Department is glad to consider any proposal which the Israelis may make in this regard and discuss it with other interested Government agencies.

3. *Peace*

Recommendations: When the Ambassador broaches this subject you might bear the following points in mind in replying to him:

(*a*) The PCC has had preliminary discussions in Beirut and will shortly take up its residence in Jerusalem where it will be urgently concerned with the question of compensation in addition to that of facilitating a peace settlement. We hope that the Israelis will cooperate fully with the PCC. We feel that the PCC is the UN organization primarily concerned with achieving a peace settlement in the Near East and can usefully continue its work in this regard. Even though no substantial progress has yet been made, the organization represents the continuing interest of the UN in exploring all possible means of reaching such a settlement.

(*b*) We are glad to see that as a result of the Security Council Resolution of November 17, 1950[3] the Mixed Armistice Commissions are actively dealing with a variety of problems, some of them political. We hope it will be possible for the Commissions to assist in bringing about expanded areas of agreement between Israel and the Arab states. In that connection, we note with interest that the international boundary has finally been demarcated between Israel and Lebanon, that Egypt and Israel are in the process of discussing Egyptian restrictions on the Suez Canal and that Jordan and Israel have agreed to make every effort to carry out all the provisions of the Jordan–Israel Armistice Agreement. We hope in this regard that Israel will not adopt a too intransigent attitude toward the Arab states. The Commissions are almost the only direct official contact between Israel and the neighboring Arab states and they are valuable to both sides in that regard. We believe, however, that such incidents as the occupation by Israel of the Jisr Majami area and the somewhat aggressive and stubborn attitude of Israel on the issue of the road block between Beersheba and Elath are detrimental to the improvement of Israel-Arab relations. It would appear that Israel is unwilling to make concessions to the Arabs even on matters of no great importance to the Israelis and on which the Arabs may have at least a moral argument in their favor. We believe Israel should reconsider its attitude in this regard.

(*c*) The Department welcomes Israel's proposed contribution to the reintegration fund of the UNRWA. We hope, however, that Israel will see fit to make this contribution without insisting on any conditions or identifying it as a charge against compensation. While in the end this might turn out to be the case, it is believed that no such conditions should be made initially until the subcommittee of the PCC has had an opportunity to investigate the entire compensation situation.

(*d*) *Jerusalem:* If the Ambassador raises this question, you might inform him that we are opposed to moving our Embassy to Jerusalem until the GA has had another opportunity to consider the question. We believe that the December 9, 1949 resolution,[4] while impracticable, still remains on the books. We are not unaware of the practical difficulties of the present situation but hope that Israel will not be precipitate in changing the location of the Foreign Office.[5]

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[3] For text, see U.N. Doc. S/1907.

[4] Reference is to Resolution 303 (IV) of the United Nations General Assembly.

[5] No memorandum has been found in Department of State files of Mr. McGhee's conversation with Mr. Eban held January 29. A telegraphic summary is *infra*.

974.731/1–2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 31, 1951—1 p. m.

306. Israel Amb Eban Jan 29 had hour-long talk with McGhee. Kollek and Keren also present. Eban reviewed Israel situation re defense, supplies, and peace. Israel position these matters already known to you.

In addition Eban discussed Egypt "blockade" Suez Canal and expressed hope Dept wld support Israel view that Egypt–Israel MAC competent handle Israel complaint against Suez Canal restrictions. McGhee replied we agreed Israel view and informally would so advise UN secretariat. (urtel 429 Jan 24).[2]

McGhee then referred question Israel seizure Nov 23, 1950, of $6,500 worth US aircraft parts destined Syria and pointed out seeming inconsistency Israel position re "blockade" and fact of seizure aircraft parts. Israelis appeared embarrassed and promised tel immed FonOff recommending release aircraft parts to Syria.

Emb may wish inform Bendor Dept's position re "blockade" and take similar position re aircraft parts.[3]

ACHESON

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Waldo. Repeated telegraphically to Cairo, Damascus, and Jerusalem, and by air pouch to London.

[2] Not printed. In telegram 1101 from New York, February 1, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in part indicated that the British Delegation to the United Nations was also preparing to inform the United Nations Secretariat of its view that the Egypt–Israel MAC was competent to handle this question. (974.5301/2–151)

[3] Documents in file 483.118 for 1951 indicate that at least partly as a result of American representations the Israeli authorities by April 15 released the parts in question for shipment back to the United States after having refused to allow their shipment to a nearby non-Arab port (for transshipment to Beirut).

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357 AC/2–551 : Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, February 5, 1951—6 p. m.

452. I visited Riley in Jerusalem February 4 to ascertain condition his health and took occasion discuss Suez issue which he says continues plague him because of "conflicting opinions being expressed from all sides." He referred to Deptels 306 and 310 to Tel Aviv [1] (83 and 84 to Jerusalem) and declared vehemently that however much he and others might wish for MAC to be found competent to handle Canal restrictions issue, he still believed armistice terms sufficiently obscure and possibly even inapplicable to warrant careful consideration by UN

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[1] Neither printed.

legal authorities and even refer entire question to SC or other high level if necessary. Riley made point that Egyptians are insistent on MAC noncompetence and that as neutral arbiter he cannot appear be taking sides unless he is securely supported by concrete legal phraseology which he believes is lacking in only terms reference available to him namely Israel–Egypt armistice agreement.

Comment: Embassy believes Riley's position vis-à-vis Egyptians well taken. This is not so much quibble over words as careful concession to Egyptian sensibilities in interests NE peace generally and Riley's meticulously maintained balance in particular. *End comment.*

New subject: Riley's health not good and while he not in pain, he is bed-ridden and his doctor insists he must have operation for removal kidneystone within few days. Riley was yesterday undecided whether fly to US for operation or remain here.

Fos

611.84A/2–651

Department of State Policy Statement [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1951

ISRAEL

A. OBJECTIVES

United States policies regarding Israel derive from the following objectives:

1. The achievement and maintenance of peace, general stability and economic progress of the Near East as factors essential to world peace;
2. Acquisition for the United States in particular and the West in general of the friendship and support of people and governments of the area.

B. POLICIES

US objectives toward Israel must be considered in terms of objectives toward the Near East as a whole, because: 1) under present circumstances, the strategic nature of the area as a whole determines to a large extent the policies toward its component parts; and 2) primarily as a result of the Palestine problem, actions taken with regard to Israel are likely to have strong repercussions throughout the area.

Within Israel itself the United States is confronted with two major policy problems: first, Israel's economic viability and hence its political stability; and second, Israel's support of the West as against the Soviet bloc.

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[1] Department of State Policy Statements were summaries of policy toward a country or region. They were prepared in the responsible geographic offices of the Department. The Policy Statements, which were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad, were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions for comment and criticism. The statements were revised periodically.

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The combined circumstances of large-scale immigration and the Arab economic blockade have produced serious economic conditions within Israel. To date the political stability of Israel has not been threatened to any significant degree, but economic pressures are growing inexorably. It is in our interest that Israel's stability be maintained and consequently US policies must be directed to this end. The most obvious means to meet the economic problem in Israel is the extension of financial assistance to Israel by means of loans and other assistance within the framework of economic assistance to the area as a whole. Point IV funds are available and the Israelis should be encouraged to make use of them.[2]

The United States must support United Nations efforts to persuade Israel and the Arab states to settle their differences, since this would obviate the economic blockade. Consideration should be given to fostering limited agreements of a commercial nature between Israel and the Arab states, although the prospects of such agreement being concluded in the immediate future are not bright.

Meanwhile the economic blockade of Israel prevents that country from obtaining from the neighboring states relatively plentiful and inexpensive supplies of oil and foodstuffs. Oil is essential to Israel's growing economy. If the Iraqi Government would permit oil to flow to Haifa through the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline or the Egyptian Government would allow goods destined for Israel to move freely through the Suez Canal, significant progress would be made toward alleviating Israel's most serious shortages and improving its precarious economic position. The Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission is presently considering an Israel complaint against Egypt's "blockade" of the Suez Canal. We believe the Mixed Armistice Commission is competent to deal with this Israel complaint and hope that the Mixed Armistice Commission will be able to persuade the Egyptians to cease their restrictive practices against trade through the Canal.

With respect to immigration, it has been and should continue to be the Department's policy to counsel Israel that the inflow of population should be coordinated with the economic capacity of the state. Consideration should be given to the extent which the United States by loans or other economic assistance is prepared to underwrite the Israel Government's policy of encouraging continuing large-scale immigration into Israel when the absorptive capacity of the country is approaching exhaustion.

There are indications that Israel is departing from its previous policy of strict neutrality and committing itself more openly to sup-

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[2] For text of the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, which was signed at Tel Aviv, February 26, 1951, and which entered into force that same day, see 3 UST (pt. 1) 379.

The Department's press release issued on the date of signature is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1951, p. 500.

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port of the West. Statements by government officials, the Prime Minister in particular, and confidential offers of support made to this country, point in this direction. Another indication is the recent withdrawal of Histadruth, Israel's all-encompassing labor union, from the WFTU. This trend should be encouraged, but care should be taken that the United States is not unduly committed in return to the economic, military or political support of Israel. It would be desirable that Histadruth join the ICFTU, but there should be no overt pressure to this end which might embarrass the pro-West elements in Israel with respect to their opposition.

The presence of five million American Jews in the United States, the majority of whom in varying degrees favor active US economic and political support of Israel, is a factor in our relations with Israel and the Arab states. Political pressure which organized Jewish groups are able to bring to bear upon the United States Government, while not necessarily productive of significant modifications of US policy, nonetheless convinces the Arab states that the United States is primarily interested in Israel's problems to the disadvantage of the Arabs. Unguarded public statements by prominent Americans made at the behest of these groups are cited by the Arabs as evidence of the correctness of their charges. We should attempt to discourage public comparisons between Israel and the Arab states prejudicial to the latter and at the same time work to achieve a balance between statements concerning Israel and statements concerning the Arab states. As the occasion arises, we should demonstrate to the American public, Israel and the Arab states that the policy of the United States Government is one of equal friendship and impartiality as between Israel and the Arab states.

A further US objective with respect to Israel is winning an increasing measure of firm popular support for the American point of view over the significant minority of Israelis who are pro-Soviet in their outlook. Strong left-wing socialist beliefs brought with them from Europe incline this minority toward Soviet propaganda and techniques. USIE by expanding its activities can make available more information about this country to all sections of the Israel population. A special USIE target should be the socialist communal settlements. Personal visits of Americans, both official and unofficial, to these settlements and elsewhere throughout the country should help the informational program.

As measures for the economic improvement of Israel and for encouraging its alignment with the West, Israel should be urged to consider adhering to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [3] and joining the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. A treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation will shortly be signed between Israel and the United States which should facilitate the investment of private US capital in Israel and generally stimulate trade between the two countries.[4]

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[3] Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. For text, see 61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6).

Fundamental to the achievement of US objectives in Israel is the resolution of the many problems arising from the recent hostilities in Palestine. Although the hostilities themselves were brought to an end during the first half of 1949, with the signing of armistice agreements between Israel and the four neighboring Arab states, the following major problems remain:

1) 800,000 Arab refugees from Palestine still live under intolerable conditions in nearby Arab countries or in parts of Palestine remaining under Arab control. Israel has been willing to permit the return of only very few of these refugees to their homes, and is, in reality, in no position to permit any large degree of repatriation. Israel has only recently given indications of being willing to consider payment of compensation outside the framework of negotiations with the Arab states looking toward a general settlement of all outstanding questions.

2) The Arab governments maintain an economic and political blockade of Israel which not only is having serious effects upon the economy of that country but also prevents the progressive improvement of Arab–Israel relations which more normal intercourse would tend to bring about.

3) Unsettled border conditions lead to frequent incidents which are a continuous cause of ill-feeling and which could develop into more extended conflict.

4) The question of establishing an international authority in the Jerusalem area to provide protection for and free access to the Holy Places is a problem which has been of continuing concern to the United Nations and to the United States as a member of the United Nations. The principal difficulty lies in creating an international regime which will be acceptable to Israel and Jordan by not interfering appreciably in their alleged sovereignty over their respective sections of the City, and which at the same time will satisfy a majority of the international community.

Of these problems, the most serious is that of the refugees. The existence of this large body of homeless and jobless people is not only a continuing cause of Arab bitterness toward Israel and a drain on the local economies, but is a source of unrest and an invitation to Communist infiltration. The United Nations is providing direct relief for the refugees, but the reintegration of these people into the Near East economy has been prevented by Israel's refusal, based on its inability, to permit their return to their former homes and by its refusal until recently to consider the payment of compensation to the refugees outside the context of an over-all peace settlement and the reluctance of all Arab governments, excepting Jordan, to agree to their resettlement elsewhere. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency, set up by the General Assembly in 1949 to administer relief and to undertake development projects for the employment of the refugees, has concluded that the only hope of reintegration for any substantial number of these people lies in resettlement in the Arab countries. The recommendation that the United Nations establish a fund to be used for this purpose and for whatever repatriation proves to be practicable was approved by the General Assembly on December 2, 1950.[5] We should continue to support this approach by contributing to the fund, by emphasizing to the Arab states that resettlement is the only realistic solution and by urging Israel to accept some repatriation, and to compensate, in one way or another and without waiting for a general settlement, those Arabs who do not choose to return to their homes.

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[4] File 611.84A4 for 1951 contains documentation on the negotiations for the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the two countries, which was signed in Washington, August 23, and which entered into force April 3, 1954. For text, see 5 UST (pt. 1) 550.

For the Department's press statement released the date of signature, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 3, 1951, p. 382.

With regard to this and other problems related to the Palestine dispute, the United Nations has attempted to bring the parties into negotiations looking toward a general settlement. Neither side, however, has evidenced a willingness to make the compromises necessary to achieve such a comprehensive agreement. Therefore, while the United States should collaborate in United Nations efforts to urge this course upon Israel and the Arab states, emphasis should be given in our direct relations with these countries and in the United Nations to the gradual extension of areas of cooperation on specific problems as they arise and to the general easing of tensions in the Near East. To this end, every effort should be made to strengthen the machinery which has been established for the purpose of settling disputes of a local character. Of particular importance are the Mixed Armistice Commissions and the Special Committees, established by the Armistice Agreements.

Another aspect of this problem of tension and distrust has been that of the shipment of arms to the countries in the Near East. It was recognized at the time the Security Council lifted the embargo on such arms shipments, on August 11, 1949, that conditions existed which might bring about an arms race in the area, and the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stated the opposition of their governments to competition of this sort. This country subsequently decided to permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states, with the condition that these shipments should be limited to such equipment as we might consider necessary for the maintenance of internal security and for legitimate defense.

Early in 1950, it was determined that further and more positive measures should be taken to reduce tensions in the Near East. As a result, on May 25, 1950, the governments of the United States, the

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[5] Reference is to a provision of Resolution 393 (V).

United Kingdom, and France issued a tripartite declaration [6] wherein they redefined their arms policy, and gave certain guarantees and assurances regarding the security of the area. The three governments stated that applications for arms or war material for any of the Arab states or Israel would be considered in the light of the recognized need of these countries to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purpose of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. In particular they declared that should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines they would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violations. This declaration appears to have done much to stabilize the situation.

Unless a major revision of the general policy set forth in this declaration should be indicated by military considerations, the policy should be continued in an effort to increase the feeling of security and confidence in the future on the part of the states recently party to the Palestine hostilities. Further consideration might well be given to circumstances in which the tripartite declaration should be invoked and to the means of carrying out the guarantees contained therein.

Another problem which has resulted from the establishment of the State of Israel, but which has been dealt with separately, is that of Jerusalem. In recognition of the unique religious character of the city, the United Nations has attempted to provide an international regime for Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum*, but it has been unsuccessful, due largely to the unwillingness of either Jordan or Israel, the states presently controlling the city, to accept such a plan. In view of the evident impracticability of complete internationalization, the United States has and should continue to support the establishment of a less comprehensive arrangement for an international regime which would still provide for the protection of the legitimate rights of the world community in Jerusalem. While the United States would support any arrangement in Jerusalem which was agreed to by Israel and Jordan and a majority of the international community, it is assumed that such an arrangement would generally conform to one which the United States would consider desirable for the area.

A special policy problem has developed as a result of the United Nations concern with Jerusalem. The Israel Government has proclaimed Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel, an act which, while not specifically prohibited by the United Nations, is in clear violation of the spirit of the special status recommended for the city by the General Assembly. The Department advised the Israel Government against moving its capital to Jerusalem, but without effect. There is thus created the problem of whether the establishment of the capital in this city should be recognized by moving the United States Embassy, which has remained in Tel Aviv, to Jerusalem. Since the UN General Assembly has reach no definite decision on Jerusalem, consideration should be given to moving the Embassy to Jerusalem after consultation with other appropriate nations.

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[6] For text of the Tripartite Declaration regarding security in the Middle East, issued May 25, 1950 by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886. For documentation regarding its formulation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 975–990 and 1027–1031; and *ibid.*, vol. V, pp. 131–168.

A difficult factor in the Palestine dispute is that the Arab states regard anything favorable to Israel as being unfavorable to themselves. The Department is endeavoring to convince the Arabs of US impartiality as between them and Israel, and care should be taken in dealing with Israel to avoid giving an impression of favoritism which would be resented by the Arabs. It is, of course, equally important for Israel to realize that the United States intends to treat it with neither more nor less favor than it does the Arabs.

Relations with States other than the Arab Countries:

USSR—Until recently, Israel's policy regarding the USSR on the one hand and the United States on the other has been one of strict neutrality. The Israeli Government's natural sympathies lay in general with the West, but the presence of more than two million prospective Jewish immigrants in the USSR and its satellites, together with well organized pro-Soviet elements in Israel, made neutrality seem the wisest policy. Continued refusal by the Soviet Union to permit Jewish emigration has weakened enthusiasm for the Eastern bloc, however, and while Israel-Russian diplomatic relations are correct, Israel leaders have not hesitated to attack Communism violently on occasion or to indicate general sympathy with Western policies in such instances as the Korean war.

Great Britain—During the past year British relations with Israel have greatly improved, due largely to a substantial change in British policy toward Israel. As a result, Great Britain is in a position to exert its influence usefully upon Israel and has done so on a number of occasions.

Middle Eastern States—Israel has been at considerable pains to develop its relations with the non-Arab states of the Middle East, and has been recognized by Turkey, Greece, Iran and India. Only with Turkey does it enjoy full diplomatic relations, however, although Greece and India are believed to be favorably disposed on this question. Iran, on the other hand, recognized Israel primarily because of the presence of Iranian refugees in the latter country, and is not generally on friendly terms with it.

If Israel is successful in developing its relations with these and other non-Arab states in the area, the economic and political results could be important, though it is doubtful whether such relations could substitute for normal intercourse with Israel's immediate neighbors.

Policy Evaluation:

US policy toward the Palestine dispute has been one, primarily, of urging the parties, through the United Nations, to negotiate in order to reach an agreed solution of all the issues which exist between them. That this policy has been almost completely unsuccessful is due to: 1) the profundity of Arab-Israel disagreement; 2) Israel has so far refused to make any substantial concessions to the Arabs; and 3) the Arab states neither desired nor found it politically expedient to negotiate without at least a promise of such concessions. The United States should take appropriate opportunities to point out to Israel and the Arab states that our policy is one of equal friendship and impartiality toward all of the states in the area; that it is our view that Israel exists and will continue to exist, and that the Arab states should recognize this fact in order that more normal conditions may return to the Near East.

The present emphasis upon gradual improvement of working relations between the countries, coupled with high level negotiations on separate aspects of the Palestine problem, is probably a fruitful one, but certain elements of danger exist as well. As an example, increasing numbers of incidents along the armistice lines and frontiers have brought about a deterioration in Israel-Arab relations recently, particularly between Israel and Jordan. It is thus proposed that the mechanism set up for the handling of such local disputes be strengthened so that the period of armistice may be one of increasing cooperation and trust looking toward the time when all major problems can be resolved. Further consideration must be given to means of providing this mechanism with increased strength and prestige.

A more successful aspect of US policy with respect to Palestine has been that regarding arms and security. A serious arms race has apparently been averted, and fears on the part of Israelis and Arabs that the other side was planning large-scale aggression have greatly diminished over the past few months. Further problems may arise, however, if the decision is made to increase supplies of arms to the Near East for purposes of area defense, and great care should be exercised to insure that instability is not increased by such an operation.

On the economic side, continuing consideration should be given to measures looking to the maintenance of economic stability in Israel and the other states of the Near East.

786.00/2-2751 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

[Extracts]

SECRET CAIRO, February 7, 1951.[2]
No. 1875

Subject: Meetings of the Arab League Political Committee and Council January 20 through February 3, 1951

. . . .

XVI. *Thirteenth and Final Meeting of the Political Committee February 3, 1951*

The final meeting of the Arab League Political Committee was held for the purpose of finishing in quick succession the remaining matters still on the original agenda.

A. *Decisions Reached* (Reference Embtel 836 February 4)[3]

. . . .

2. *Palestine Refugees.* The Committee finally decided that the League Secretariat should prepare a note which would be studied and approved by the member states[4] and would then be sent to the PCC, the UNRWA, and all of the member states thereof. The stated purpose of this note was to place the Arab States on record once again as to their insistence on the rights of the Palestine refugees to be returned to their original homes or to receive adequate compensation if they elected not to return. In addition, however, the real emphasis was to be put on the need for interim programs prior to the implementation of the refugees "rights" and the fact that funds presently available are grossly inadequate to the task at hand.

It is apparent from a number of conversations which representatives of the Embassy have had with Foreign Office, League Officials and others that many hope that the note when completed will be received and interpreted as meaning a good deal more than it actually said. They are, of course, certain in their own minds that the refugees are not ever going to get back and that resettlement work must be started in the countries in which they are now located. Politically they do not dare to admit such a possibility and the very word "resettlement" would be ruinous to their careers. These officials feel that the answer is largely financial and that if adequate sums can be raised a major step will have been taken toward the eventual solution of the problem.

. . . .

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

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[1] Despatch drafted by Joseph S. Sparks, First Secretary of Embassy.

[2] This despatch was not mailed until March 23. It was received in the Department April 2.

[3] Not printed. (786.00/2-451)

[4] Notes similar in substance were prepared by some of the member states; see p. 639.

784A.13/2-751 : Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, February 7, 1951—1 p. m.

466. Re Deptel 312, February 1.[1] At roundtable discussion February 6 my home with UK, French, Turk and Australian Ministers,[2] consensus on Jerusalem was substantially that indicated first paragraph reference telegram to effect each mission favors confining official contact with Israeli Government in Jerusalem to strictly *ad hoc* basis limiting all such contacts to business of urgent or special technical nature. It was agreed that no statement, formal or otherwise, would be volunteered to Israeli Government in above sense. (Previous informal talks on separate occasion with Ministers Belgium, Italy, Yugoslavia and Swiss Consul General had[3] revealed agreement in principle with foregoing).

In this connection, British Minister said arrangements already made official visit Prime Minister his office Jerusalem and attendance Prime Minister's official dinner Jerusalem by himself and Sir Brian Robertson during latter's forthcoming visit Israel.

Re second and third paragraphs reference telegram Sharett told me during luncheon discussion February 3 that as long as he was Foreign Minister he would neither ask nor expect hundred or more families comprising his Ministry to move to Jerusalem until adequate housing was ready for them. Thus while reiterating that move to Jerusalem had ceased be matter principle and was solely matter physical convenience, (Embdes 398, February 1)[4] he said that since virtually no housing was ready at present and since it would take at least one year prepare such housing, figure of 12 months could be taken as basis for calculations on how soon foreign diplomatic corps might expect be asked set up shop in Jerusalem.

Embassy's opinion is that in normal course events Israeli Foreign Office and hence Diplomatic Corps will not leave Tel Aviv for at least another year to 18 months. Meanwhile, Embassy accepts and will be guided by Department's decision permit occasional official contact government officials Jerusalem at discretion chief of Mission and without prejudice any subsequent UN action on issue.

FORD

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Mr. Waldo of NE and cleared also by UNP, reads in part: "Re Jerusalem Dept opposed moving Emb Tel Aviv Jerusalem until GA has considered question at next session. Dept prepared authorize Emb reps go Jerusalem as necessary carry on official business with Israel Govt officials." (784A.5/1-2351)

[2] Sir Knox Helm, Edouard-Felix Guyon, Seyfullah Esin, and O. C. W. Fuhrman, respectively.

[3] Jean E. S. Dubois, Raimondo Giustiniani, Nokola Milicevic, and Dr. Paul Ritter, respectively.

[4] Not printed.

784A.5/2-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 14, 1951—3 p. m.

340. Re Embtel 466, Feb. 7.[2] Emb Tel Aviv and ConGen Jerusalem shld be guided by fol:

1. US does not recognize sovereignty of Israel or Jordan in Jerusalem. UN is still seized of Jerusalem problem, and US attitude toward status of City will continue to be framed in light UN situation.
2. US continues support principle internationalization Jerusalem along lines modified internatl regime since full internationalization impracticable.
3. Without prejudice final UN decision on status Jerusalem, Amb and Emb personnel auth proceed Jerusalem as necessary carry on official business with Israel Govt officials.
4. In discretion Amb, personnel Emb may visit Jerusalem for unofficial purposes often as desired.
5. Officers ConGen Jerusalem may deal with Israel Ministries in Jerusalem on dipl business as well as routine Consular affairs, but shld be guided in this by wishes of Amb.

Inform friendly colleagues foregoing position.[3]

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo and cleared in NE, L/NEA, and UNP. Repeated for action to Jerusalem and for information to Amman, Haifa, and London.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] In telegram 200 from Jerusalem, April 23, the Consulate General in Jerusalem raised the question of whether the Embassy in Tel Aviv had administrative jurisdiction over the Consulate General such as would enable Ambassador Davis on his own initiative to transfer personnel between it and the Embassy. (784A.5/4-2351)

The Department in telegram 114 to Jerusalem, April 26, answered this question in the affirmative and added: "Does not conflict Deptel 91 Feb 14, setting forth polit relation Israel, Jordan, Jerusalem. Until status Jerusalem resolved, no administrative jurisdiction Amman over any part of Jerusalem being authorized at this time." (784A.5/4-2351)

780.00/2-1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director for International Security Affairs (Ohly)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Abba Eban—Ambassador of Israel
Dr. Moshe Keren, Counselor of Embassy
Mr. John H. Ohly—S/ISA

I met with the above named individuals at their request, and the Ambassador stated that the purpose of his call was to acquaint me, as he was endeavoring to acquaint the officials of all agencies of the U.S. government, concerning Israel's belief as to the importance which the great powers should attach to the Near East and, more particularly, to the potentialities of Israel as a factor in the security situation in that area. History has indicated that this part of the world was almost always involved in any great war, and he was sure that the same would be true in the future. He hoped, therefore, that the United States would attach a higher priority to its security than was apparently presently the case, at least so far as one could tell from the relative emphasis on other parts of the world in statements of American officials and in the public press.

Assuming the correctness of the foregoing hypothesis concerning the essentiality of the Middle East, he said he wished to stress certain factors about Israel which in his opinion indicated that Israel might contribute importantly to international security. He then went through in some detail the various points which were made in the memorandum submitted by Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett to the Secretary of Defense on December 23, 1950. In particular he emphasized the following:

(1) that during the war with the Arab States in 1948, Israel had mobilized 90,000 men out of a total population of 650,000, a degree of mobilization that he did not believe had ever been equalled elsewhere. Since the population had increased to 1,250,000 and would further increase within 3 years to around 2,000,000, it would thus be possible for Israel if necessary to mobilize some 200,000 men. These men would be well prepared, since although the standing army was small, the country had a system of compulsory military service running from 18 months to 2 years.

(2) Israel had industrial potential of two types which should be valuable in the efforts of the free world to build up large stocks of military equipment. In the first place there were facilities engaged in or capable of production of various types of light military equipment up to 6-inch mortars. These facilities had a capacity far in excess of requirements of the Israeli forces and this excess could be made available for MDAP purposes. In the second place, there were certain facilities presently engaged in civilian production which were capable of conversion to military purposes. For example, a factory now manufacturing milk cans could be readily converted for purposes of manufacturing shell cases.

(3) Israel had various services such as ports, installations and airfields which if improved could be of considerable assistance in the event of a conflict which affected the Middle East.

The value of the foregoing manpower, industrial potential and services was dependent in some degree upon outside help. In his opinion, the strengthening of Israel in these respects by a small amount of outside assistance would be of considerable importance in terms of increasing the ability of Israel not only to defend her own territory but in terms of her ability to participate in defense of the Near East as a whole. While feeling that the possibilities of cooperation among the states in the form of a collective security arrangement of any kind were nonexistent at the moment, this did not appear to be a reason for holding back in strengthening those portions of the area which had the vigor, manpower, facilities and will to make a contribution to Middle Eastern defense. In response to a question as to what other portions of the Middle East might in his judgment fall in the same category as Israel, he stated, after some hesitation, that apart from Turkey and Iran he would include Jordan, since British interest in Jordan gave a base of strength on which to build, as was not present in other Arab countries.

The Ambassador then alluded to General Robertson's projected trip to Israel.[1] He said he understood that there must be an allocation of responsibility as among the great powers for the defense of particular areas of the world. It was his opinion, however, that if a decision had been reached that the British should have the responsibility in the Middle East, that this was not wholly realistic because the British could not undertake the task alone. It would be preferable to have a joint Anglo-American scheme for the defense of the area. Psychologically also, because of the past problems of Britain with the Israeli, it would be easier for the latter to cooperate in a defense scheme if the United States was also associated, although he did not wish to give too much emphasis to this point, since the bitterness of several years ago toward the British had to a large extent disappeared. From another psychological standpoint however, United States association would be of considerable importance because, as he put it, a country which feels that it is holding the hand of a giant has a much greater will to resist aggression and to take steps in preparation therefor.

The Ambassador then turned to the general supply situation of his country. This he said was affected by two factors. In the first place, the land isolation of Israel due to the attitude of the bordering Arab States made the country almost wholly dependent for essential materials on continued operation of the sea lanes. In the second place, the vast immigration that had been taking place and would continue to take place for the next few years had made it impossible to build up stocks of material or to increase indigenous agricultural and industrial production at the same rate as the population growth. The country had no substantial stockpiles of crucial materials and would be in a desperate situation if some aggravation in the international situation should cut off its commerce. In the latter event, the effects would be felt in certain segments of the country in a very few weeks and before long serious paralysis of the country's life would commence. In addition, the same results would flow in a less aggravated form whenever the sources upon which Israel depended cease to be open and free. Thus the establishment of control and priority systems by the United States and other countries in connection with the current defense effort was already affecting Israel's ability to obtain several crucial items. In this latter connection he cited the importance of sulphur to the Israeli fertilizer industry and the fact that they were now having difficulty in obtaining the amounts of sulphur required. His government was therefore seeking ways and means for stockpiling a year's supply of certain critical materials such as food (wheat and cattle feed grains), fuel oil, cotton (for its textile industry), etc. In addition his government was seeking some form of assistance in obtaining the priorities and allocations necessary to obtain those particular controlled commodities which were necessary for the life of his country's economy.

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[1] General Robertson arrived in Israel February 19.

Summing up his presentation, he argued that the potentially major asset which Israel presented could be realized by a relatively minor effort and that it was thoroughly in the interest of the United States to make a real effort to help Israel help itself.

I reverted to his statements concerning the industrial potential of Israel for arms manufacture and stated that our attachés in Israel who had been asked to learn more about this capacity had some difficulty in obtaining requested information. They could not, without invitation from the proper Israeli officials, visit and inspect the plants which the Israeli government had stated might be available. The Ambassador replied that he felt that Colonel Hertzog, the Military Attaché here, and who is now in Israel in connection with General Robertson's visit, will have some information on this matter when he returns. The Ambassador went on to say that Colonel Hertzog was also bringing back with him an up-to-date list of the specific requirements of the Israeli forces.

In response to a question, the Ambassador said that there was no longer the same degree of danger or the same degree of fear of danger as a year ago that hostilities would be resumed by the Arab States. He stated, moreover, that the flow of arms to these States from other countries had appreciably lessened and that these Arab countries were now receiving virtually no heavy equipment. He felt that the political attitude of the West, coupled with the disunity among the Arab States themselves were the factors which prevented further hostilities, but emphasized that any grave international situation or the outbreak of war would recreate a local danger as opportunists sought to capitalize on the situation.

In the course of the conversation he made several other significant remarks. In the first place he stated that his government had been able to obtain substantial amounts of light equipment but it had been unable to obtain heavy equipment such as artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, jets, tanks or recoilless rifles. In the second place, speaking about the British in Egypt, he expressed the view that it would not be possible at any time over the next few years for the British to work out satisfactory arrangements for the maintenance of military facilities and military forces in Egypt. He considered it remarkable that the British had succeeded in working out the present *modus vivendi.*

884A.00 TA/2-2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Investment and Economic Development Staff (Malenbaum)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1951.[1]

Subject: Foreign Assistance for Israel.

Participants: Mr. Hyman—Embassy of Israel
Wilfred Malenbaum—ED

In the course of a chance meeting with Mr. Hyman on Saturday evening, I was given the following information on Israeli activities re foreign assistance:

1. *Grant aid for $150 million in fiscal 1952.*

Apparently this will be initiated by the Congress rather than in the Executive Branch. It will be introduced in the Senate by Senators Taft and Douglas.[2] I was told that Senator Taft was the main supporter of the program and welcomed the idea of bipartisan action, indicating only that his Democratic co-sponsor should be an adequately senior Senator. Taft seemed satisfied with the Douglas alignment. I was told that organized efforts are being made by people in appropriate states to enlist Congressional support. It is anticipated that a significant amount of the money is to be used for food imports, that offshore purchases will be necessary, and that explicit mention will be made of the use of these grant funds "to permit Israel to make its proper contribution to the Arab Refugee Resettlement Program".

While I was given no specific time indication, I gathered that this matter was being pushed aggressively. There was no desire on Mr. Hyman's part that his remarks be kept confidential.

2. *The Prospective Bond Issue.*

Mr. Hyman remarked that he had just come from a meeting called by Ambassador Eban of some 200 leading Jewish businessmen. He indicated that these men were optimistic about the prospects for selling the bonds and that 3 of the businessmen had pledged personal takings of at least one-half million dollars each. I was told that the selling program will begin about May 1, after the hump on the appeal drive. No effort would be made to soft-peddle the oncoming request for bond sales but there was confidence that the issue would not appreciably affect the level of contributions to the appeal.

Prime Minister Ben Gurion is expected to visit this country early in May to spark the opening of the bond drive. I gathered this information was not public.

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[1] Memorandum drafted February 26.

[2] Senator Douglas introduced the bill to this end, S. 1247, in the Senate on April 2 on behalf of himself, Mr. Taft, and 34 other Senators.

674.84A/3-151

Memorandum by the Special Adviser on Geography (Boggs)[1] *to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1951.

Subject: Access to the Ports in the Gulf of Aqaba

This memorandum is in fulfillment of an assurance given at a conference on problems relating to the Gulf of Aqaba held February 21, 1951, in Room 3022 NS. The meeting was attended by Mr. Robert Thayer (NE), Mr. S. N. Crowe (L/NEA), Mr. Victor Wallace (L/E), and Mr. S. W. Boggs and Mrs. Saucerman (OIR/GE). Mr. Wells Stabler (NE) has discussed the matter by telephone with this office.

The Problem of the Gulf of Aqaba

The Gulf of Aqaba lies at the north end of the Red Sea, and is bordered by Egypt (Sinai peninsula), Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is nearly 100 nautical miles long in a NNE–SSW direction, with widths of seven to 14 nautical miles toward the middle and lower parts of the gulf. Its relatively steep shores owe their characteristics to its rift valley structure, as the Gulf of Aqaba lies in the extensive fault system that produced the great rift valley to the south through the Red Sea and east Africa, including Lake Tanganyika, and its continuation to the north through the Wadi el Araba, the Dead Sea, and the Jordan River valley.

At the mouth of the Gulf the distance between the Sinai peninsula and the Arabian mainland is approximately eight nautical miles. Tiran Island, in the middle of the entrance to the Gulf, is a little more than three miles from the mainland on either side. The main channel into the Gulf of Aqaba is "Enterprise Passage", close to the Egyptian coast. This Passage lies between the Sinai peninsula and Gordon reef, which are only about ⅔ naut. mi. apart. Tiran Island (even without its neighboring islets and reefs) with the territorial sea of Tiran and the mainland shores (assuming a 3-mile limit), thus appears to provide a legal basis for closing the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. (Egypt and Saudi Arabia claim a 6-mi. limit, which is of course not recognized by the United States.)

The sovereignty of Tiran and Senafir Islands seems to be in question. A recent London telegram states: "Claimant to islands since Turks not clear. Foreign Office understood they passed to Saudi Arabia" (No. 4455, Feb. 15, 1951).[2] Certain foreign atlases indicate the islands as belonging to Saudi Arabia. Egypt, however, occupied them in March 1950 and is reported to have mounted guns at Ras Nuzerani on the mainland peninsula, near the entrance to Enterprise Passage. The islands had been reported to be uninhabited.

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[1] In the Office of Intelligence Research.

[2] Not printed. (674.84A/2-1551)

The head of the Gulf of Aqaba presents a problem distinctly different. Israel and Jordan possess short coasts, between that of Egypt, on the west, and that of Saudi Arabia on the east, both of which extend the full length of the Gulf and beyond into the Red Sea. The exact lengths of the coasts of Israel and Jordan are uncertain, as their boundary termini on the coast have not been clearly defined. But apparently, by ordinary principles and techniques of delimitation, and assuming a 3-mile limit, the territorial waters belonging to Israel and to Jordan would be "pinched off" by the territorial waters of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which would probably meet just to the south of those of Israel and Jordan.

In an article entitled "Delimitation of Seaward Areas under National Jurisdiction", which will appear in the April issue of *The American Journal of International Law*,[3] I have dealt systematically with all geographical and geometrical types of delimitation problems which can arise the world over, and have appended the following footnote which specifically refers to the Gulf of Aqaba.

> "An additional category was originally planned: Zones of access to the high seas, by surface and air, for states apparently denied access from relatively short coasts on bays or gulfs, because the usual delimitation techniques would pinch them off from the high seas. Problems would have been considered such as those of the Gulf of Aqaba (underscore added), where both Israel and Jordan have very short coasts, between those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and where there are differences of navigability by surface ships and maneuverability of airplanes within zones of access that might be delimited by special techniques that should be taken into account. But each case is almost unique; general principles could be stated, but perhaps no techniques of wide applicability could be evolved."

The problems of access through the Gulf of Aqaba are, therefore, apparently unique. They are of interest from both the legal and geographical points of view.

Israel is developing a new port called Elath (Ailat). Jordan has a seaport at the village of Aqaba (sometimes said itself to be the site of biblical Elath). It might be helpful to have fresh, first-hand information regarding the precise location of these two ports, their traffic, and present development and facilities.

Analogous situations

I have considered various possible geographical analogies to passageway to the ports within the Gulf of Aqaba, and have concluded that the most relevant is the passageway to the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland through the waters of the Sound and the Belts between Denmark and Sweden. Here are States bordering the Baltic, whose only access to the high seas is through navigable channels, all less than six miles minimum width, which pass between the mainland of Denmark, islands of Denmark, and the mainland of Sweden. The problems of access through those territorial waters have already been resolved, over a period of many decades. The early initiative of the United States in declaring these channels free passageways by public right is particularly relevant. The history of the Sound and the Belts, as well as the geographical factors involved, are significant in the current problems of the Gulf of Aqaba.

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[3] Vol. 45, p. 240.

The Sound and the Belts. The principal channels are the Sound (minimum width 2 miles), the Little Belt (least width 600 yards), and the Great Belt (minimum width about 3.5 miles). For more than four centuries Denmark collected dues on traffic passing through these waters, in later decades from "privileged" (treaty) nations. The United States paid such dues under the U.S.-Danish Convention of 1826 (Miller, *Treaties*[4] . . . Vol. 3, pp. 239–43).

The United States became critical of this "tribute", known as "the Sound dues", as early as 1837, and on October 14, 1848, Secretary of State Buchanan took the position that

> "Under that law [public law of nations] the navigation of the two seas connected by this Strait [actually the Sound and the Belts] is free to all nations; and therefore the navigation of the channel by which they are connected ought, also, to be free." (Miller, *Treaties* . . . Vol. 7, p. 530.)

In 1856 the convention of 1826 was abrogated by the United States.

The instructions to Mr. Bedinger, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires to Denmark, dated July 18, 1853, are pertinent in recalling that "the principle upon which those dues are collected, cannot be defended" . . . "a 'principle' so flagrantly at variance with the established right of each of the nations of the earth to the *liberum mare.*" (Miller, *Treaties* . . . Vol. 7, p. 534.)

A general treaty for the reduction of the Sound dues was signed by Denmark and 13 other States, including Great Britain and France, March 14, 1857 (English text in Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, Vol. 2, pp. 1201–09.)[5]

The United States was not a party to this treaty, since negotiations had long been under way for a separate treaty with Denmark. Ratification of the general treaty of March 14, 1857, had been exchanged on the following March 31, and therefore prior to the separate U.S.-Danish treaty of April 11, 1857.[6]

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[4] Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*. 8 volumes (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1931–1948). All ellipses in this document appear in the source text.

[5] Sir Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, 4 volumes (London, Butterworths (etc.), 1875–1891).

[6] The convention for the discontinuance of the Sound dues, signed at Washington. For text, see 11 Stat. 719.

By the U.S.-Danish treaty concluded April 11, 1857, the United States agreed to pay to Denmark "once and for all" the sum of $393,011 (Art. 3). That sum with interest was paid in London in March 1858. Torben Bille, Danish Chargé d'Affaires, who signed the U.S.-Danish convention for Denmark, wrote that "navigation of the Sound and Belts has thus been rendered as free and open to the shipping of the world as the ocean itself" (D.S., 2 Notes from the Danish Legation, July 4, 1857. See Miller, *Treaties* . . . Vol. 7, p. 585).

Suggestions

It is respectfully suggested that the United States adopt the viewpoint that access to the ports within the Gulf of Aqaba should be free to all nations—as free as the access to the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland is through the territorial waters of Denmark and Sweden. Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be presented with such an interpretation of the geographical and legal situation. Admittedly, the Gulf of Aqaba is small, and traffic to ports on its shores is extremely small in comparison with that of the Baltic Sea. But the concern of Israel and Jordan, in possessing sea coasts at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, is clearly that they may have access to the high seas through the Red Sea. Israel and Jordan might well be parties to a settlement relating to all questions of access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

It is further suggested that an effort be made to find a principle for the delimitation of the territorial sea of all four countries in the waters at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, so as to give both Israel and Jordan direct access to the high seas portion of the Gulf, if possible. I should be glad to work on that unusual problem, and to show the application of such a principle on a map, if requested to do so.

683.84A/3-551 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Tyler) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET JERUSALEM, March 5, 1951—2 p.m.

162. Reference Deptel 94, February 27,[2] General Riley furnished Consulate General following:

"Complaint submitted to MAC by Syria on February 21 alleging that Israelis not inhabitants demilitarized zone as authorized by general armistice agreement[3] commenced important works on or about February 14 along western bank Jordan River [garble] belonging to Arabs in Mansoura sector south Lake Hula.[4] This Israeli project

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[1] Repeated to Damascus for information.

[2] Not printed.

[3] For text, see U.N. Doc. S/1353/Rev. 1.

[4] For background on the Huleh (Hula) dispute, see the memorandum of April 6 from Mr. Waldo to Mr. Kopper, p. 620.

(Hula concession) is in accordance with original agreement signed in June 1914 between Turkish Minister of Finance and two Beirut businessmen which authorizes individuals to drain marshes in Hula area. Concession agreed to give boundaries of lands on which Society holding concession had right to change, destroy or modify channels, dam up waterways, expropriate lands, buildings, et cetera owned by private individuals in accordance with expropriation law, occupy lands temporarily, indemnities to be paid to owners by Society through Imperial Government.

UN observer Captain Bouteille Belgian army in command with member of Israeli delegation contacted superintendent Palestine Land Development Company in charge of work project who produced photographs copy of certificate given on November 28, 1934 by Syrian-Ottoman Agricultural Company which read as follows:

> 'Palestine Land Development Company took possession of Hula concession with all rights pertaining thereof'.

Superintendent then stated that up to now (February 22, 1951) works have been started on ten to twelve dunams of Arab land in Mansoura sector. He also stated that Arab owners can get in touch with Mr. Horowitz (Israel) at Rumishmar Hayarieh police station to discuss and claim compensation for damages to their land thus incurred.

Some five or six months ago Israeli delegate requested and received approval of Syrian delegate to send a water survey team into demilitarized zone. In November Israelis repaired dam at southern end of Lake Hula which has raised slightly level of lake which has caused flooding of small amount of Arab land in northeast sector of lake. At present works project in demilitarized zone is straightening west bank of Jordan for distance about 4 kilos below Lake Hula. Israelis have requested permission from Syrian delegate to cross to east bank of Jordan still in demilitarized zone for purpose of performing similar type on that bank. Syrians refuse to grant permission. I fear Israelis will attempt to force issue which may result in difficult situation. Chairman of MAC has requested on numerous occasions that Israelis cease work now being performed in demilitarized zone until discussions in MAC are completed but Israelis refuse to abide by this request. Not only Colonel Ramati but Major Shoham as well have stated to chairman and one observer that entire matter has been discussed with State Department and that green light was given them to proceed with work. Therefore 'they are not worried about what Syrian Government thinks as US controls UN'.

To my mind there are two problems involved:

(1) Drainage of swamp area north of Lake Hula and drainage of Lake Hula itself which is outside demilitarized zone and

(2) Preliminary work along River Jordan in demilitarized zone which must be accomplished before above project can commence.

These two projects, in my mind, when completed will cause changes in area not visualized at time Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement was signed. However, as this swamp area and Lake Hula are in Israeli controlled territory, I do not believe that Syria has any right to dictate what Israelis do in way of such drainage. When this project is completed Israelis will have reclaimed about 57,000 dunams of excellent farmland and there is no question that Israelis will establish in this reclaimed area many additional settlements.

Syrians maintain that these additional settlements will be inhabited by many ex-Israeli soldiers disguised as farmers and thus will give not only a political but a military advantage to Israelis. Due to the topographical features i.e. extremely high ground on Syrian side of border I am of opinion that Syrian guns will dominate this area to such an extent as to give Syria as much of a military advantage as will be accorded Israel when these settlements are established.

However in view of changed situation I cannot by any stretch of imagination see how Israelis can authorize Palestine Land Development Company to proceed with work in demilitarized zone under agreement given on November 28, 1934, by Syrian-Ottoman Agricultural Company which results in a destruction or expropriation of land, buildings, et cetera owned by private Arab individuals or which justifies them to occupy lands temporarily on understanding that indemnities will be paid to owners through Israeli Government.

Under terms of armistice agreement Israelis maintain that work being performed within demilitarized zone is in accordance with normal restoration of life within demilitarized zone. I agree with Qudsi, Prime Minister Syria that if this work along Jordan River is continued without a mutual agreement being reached between parties concerned, trouble may result.

Prime Minister Qudsi is perfectly correct in his statement that this affair brought out the danger of continuing neutral status of this area. For a number of months Israelis have continued to interfere materially with activities of refugee Arabs in demilitarized zone. In southern part of demilitarized zone Israelis have ploughed some 2,000 dunams of land that belong to Arab refugees. In northern sector of demilitarized zone Israelis in recent months have prevented Syrians who own land in demilitarized zone from crossing boundary and working their land. In central sector Israeli military police have interfered with Arab villagers in that area.

It must be realized only way we were able to complete negotiation of general armistice agreement between Syria and Israel was to propose a compromise plan which involved complete withdrawal of Syrian troops from area west of old international boundary which separated Syria from Palestine. Therefore Qudsi's suggested plan for *modus vivendi* whereby Syria would administer part of demilitarized zone inhabited by Arabs and Israelis would administer remainder, will not be accepted by Israelis.

If Armistice agreement is carefully examined it will be found that although Syria signed armistice agreement it signed in name of refugee Arabs who under terms of armistice agreement would be returned to demilitarized zone. Under paragraph 5(*e*) of Article 5, chairman assumed authority that ordinarily would have been vested in hands of Syrian Government. However in view of lack of power chairman has no way of enforcing directive than is contained in that paragraph unless Israelis are willing to abide by his decision. Furthermore within demilitarized zone Arabs and Israelis are in settlements contiguous to each other and any possibility of drawing a line separating Arabs from Israelis within that area is not feasible. As for Qudsi's statement that the Israeli plant to drain Hula will result in raising of level of

Lake Tiberias thus flooding land farmed by Arabs is questionable. If this were to occur then Israeli settlement of Ein Gev on eastern bank of Lake Tiberias might also be flooded. I am quite sure that Israelis have checked this possibility.

I plan on discussing problem with Shiloah tomorrow March 5 and will attempt to get Israeli Government to stop work on the straightening of Jordan River until such time as the MAC has completed its discussion and possibly reach mutual agreement between parties themselves".[5]

TYLER

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[5] At the meeting of the Israel–Syria MAC held March 7 General Riley submitted a memorandum in which he stated that under the Syro-Israeli Armistice Agreement neither party enjoyed rights of sovereignty within the demilitarized zone. Hence concessionaires had no right to expropriate property or to force its owners to accept compensation. "There is no law of expropriation within demilitarized zone."

General Riley concluded:

"In opinion of Chief of Staff Palestine Land Development Co. Ltd. should be instructed forthwith to cease all operations within demilitarized zone until such time as a mutual agreement is arranged through chairman between Syria and Israel for continuing this project."

U.N. Doc. S/2049 includes full text of this memorandum as well as details of the activities of the Israel–Syria MAC in the first months of 1951.

Additional information regarding the Huleh dispute is in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1951, pp. 286–293.

683.84A/3–251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 8, 1951—7 p. m.

313. ReLegtels 404[2] Feb 20, 434 Mar 2,[3] and Jerusalem Contel 162 Mar 5[4] suggest you reply to Qudsi along fol lines: "Dept has studied with interest proposal PriMin re demilitarized zone on Syrian-Israel border and appreciates spirit which prompted his suggestion. Study situation reveals that administration in demilitarized zone regulated by terms Syrian-Israel Armistice Agreement. Alteration along lines PriMin's suggestions wld require modification this Agreement. According to art 8 para 3 of agreement, any suggestion for modification Armistice may be introduced by either of parties concerned. Dept con-

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Waldo and cleared within NE. Repeated to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

[2] In this telegram the Legation had informed the Department of Prime Minister Qudsi's proposal to divide the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria along ethnic lines as a means of eliminating friction in that area. "Both states would agree to continuance demilitarized nature border areas and arrangement would not prejudice final settlement." (683.84A/2–2051)

[3] In this telegram Minister Cannon had endorsed the Syrian proposal summarized in footnote 2 above, and had commented in part: "Legation believes that aside from any easing of friction that might result agreement with Israel in MAC would associate present government more closely with armistice. More important any form voluntary negotiation between Arab States and Israel desirable if only to accustom them to idea." (683.84A/3–251)

[4] *Supra.*

siders, therefore, wld be inappropriate for Chairman MAC introduce proposal suggested by PriMin. Perfectly proper, however, Syrian Rep MAC take up question possible modification Armistice Agreement in MAC.

Dept appreciates interest PriMin in peaceful solution in MAC problems arising between Syria and Israel. Fully agrees with him every effort must be made avoid incidents Syria-Israel border and work out peacefully all problems that arise. Dept assures PriMin it will keep close watch over situation and has full confidence in ability MAC work out satisfactory solution present problem. We are certain Syrian Govt will continue extend close cooperation to MAC since principally through that body difficulties arising between Syria and Israel can be solved".

FYI Dept never gave "green light" to Israelis regarding project for construction in demilitarized zone. Several weeks ago the Israelis informed Dept of project in Huleh area they planned undertake and said Syrian soldiers bordering area were adopting hostile attitude. Dept informed Israelis it would request leg Damascus raise matter informally with Syrian Govt (Deptel 272, Feb 8).[5]

Dept will consider discussing matter with Israel reps after Gen Riley has had opportunity attempt work out solution in Syrian-Israel MAC. Dept strongly of opinion that Arab residents demilitarized zone shld be protected in property rights in event Israel project permitted continue. Dept prepared make subsequent representations this regard.[6]

WEBB

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[5] Not printed. (683.84A/2-651)

[6] In telegram 458 from Damascus, March 14, Mr. Cannon in part reported that he had informed the Foreign Ministry of the Department's position as conveyed in telegram 318. (683.84A/3-1451)

UNP Files : Lot 59 D 237

Memorandum by James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 14, 1951.

STATUS OF PALESTINE SITUATION

At Harding Bancroft's suggestion I am submitting herewith for your information a brief summary of the problems in the Palestine situation with which UNA is concerned.

1. *Activities of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.* The PCC has reassembled in Jerusalem and its Secretariat has undertaken cer-

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[1] Memorandum addressed also to Mr. Popper.

tain studies on the assessment of compensation due Arab refugees and possible procedures for repatriation of refugees to Israel. Holger Andersen of Denmark has accepted the position of Director of the new office to be established under the PCC pursuant to the General Assembly's resolution of December 14, 1950 to handle problems relating to compensation and repatriation. He will assume his duties about May 1 since he is currently engaged in another assignment for the United Nations.

The PCC and the UNRWA have held two meetings in Beirut to delineate their respective responsibilities concerning the handling of the Arab refugee problem. The major issue between them presently is the role which the PCC should have with regard to the resettlement of Arab refugees. The PCC believes that political negotiations with the Arab States and Israel may, of necessity, have to deal with certain aspects of resettlement while UNRWA believes that anything related to resettlement is entirely within their jurisdiction. While I share the PCC viewpoint, I believe that any differences on this subject can be satisfactorily ironed out between Ambassador Palmer and Ambassador Blandford.

Another matter of concern affecting the two Commissions is a proposal made by Israel to the United Nations Negotiating Committee on Palestine and Korean relief. The Israelis have made an offer of 1,000,000 Israeli pounds to the Negotiating Committee for Palestine refugee relief on the condition that Israel shall be relieved of individual claims of compensation. This is a distortion of the suggestion made by certain Departmental officers to the Israelis last fall but the unfortunate effect of the proposal has been that if a contribution of any size is now to be expected serious consideration must be given to relating any such contribution to a procedure for satisfying claims of compensation against Israel. Ambassador Palmer quite strongly opposes any such linking of the two, but he has been requested to reconsider the problem, in view of the fact that NEA and UNE are seriously concerned over possible Congressional opposition to any substantial United States contribution if Israel does not make a relatively substantial contribution. I have acceded to NEA's and UNE's wishes on this representation to Ambassador Palmer in view of their greater knowledge of the Congressional problem. Personally I share Palmer's concern and feel that the size of the Israeli offer will have little if any effect on Congressional action on our contribution.[2]

[Here follow sections concerning the health and responsibilities of General Riley.]

4. *Jordan-Israeli Relations.* Serious border incidents have occurred in recent months involving Jordan and Israel. One major incident occurred in the Negev where the Israelis were stopped by Jordanian road blocks from using the road which the Israelis built to short cut a road already existent to the extreme south. The short cut as surveyed appeared in part to run through Jordan. A solution agreeable to both sides has been reached in the Mixed Armistice Commission. The tension for some time was quite high between the countries. Another seri-

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[2] In telegram 207 from Jerusalem (Palun 402), May 9, Ambassador Palmer in substance reiterated his views as outlined by Mr. Ludlow above. (357.AC/5-951)

ous incident occurred when Israeli troops raided the small village of Sharafat, clearly within Jordan territory on the road between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. This, too, has been settled although not without acrimony. Some encouraging efforts at private negotiation have been made by secret meetings between King Abdullah and Samir Pasha of Jordan and Reuven Shiloah of Israel. Samir Pasha has been acting both as Jordanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister but has recently given up the latter post to Admar Tuquan Bey, one of Jordan's observers at the Fifth General Assembly. Samir Pasha is reputed to be generally disposed to assist King Abdullah in reaching some sort of peaceful settlement with Israel but recent border incidents have so embittered him that chances of real progress have been considerably lessened. In an effort apparently to improve the working of the Jordan-Israeli Armistice Commission King Abdullah has replaced the senior Jordan representative, Nashashibi with Akmar Khalil and has in turn made Nashashibi under secretary in the Foreign Ministry. The result of these moves has been to increase the possible resistance at the top level in the Jordan Foreign Office to any further extensive negotiations.

5. *Jerusalem.* King Abdullah of Jordan has appointed a curator for the protection of Holy Places in Arab-held Jerusalem. This may be considered to be Jordan's answer to any further United Nations efforts to internationalize the city or protect the Holy Places. We may anticipate therefore that acceptance of any United Nations proposals on Jerusalem by Israel and Jordan in the future will be highly unlikely.

884A.00/3-1551

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1951.

Subject: Grant Aid to Israel

Discussion:

The Department understands that the Israel Government, through its Embassy in Washington, will shortly make a formal request to this Government for a grant-in-aid in the amount of $150,000,000 to assist Israel in its balance of payments problems over a one-year period. In addition, the Department has learned informally from the Israel Embassy here that Senators Taft and Douglas may have agreed to sponsor a Foreign Affairs bill authorizing this grant. It is not known when this bill may be introduced.

These funds would presumably form a part of a $1,500,000,000 Israel three-year program for economic development to consolidate the economy of the State and facilitate the immigration into Israel of the Jews of the Middle East and Eastern Europe, numbering an estimated

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Mr. Waldo and Mr. Stabler. It was cleared in NE, GTI, NEA, RA, EUR, H, E, and S/P. Routed through G and initialed by Mr. Matthews. Placed in Mr. Acheson's White House Briefing Book on March 22.

500,000. Of this billion and a half, it is proposed to raise $500,000,000 in Israel. It is planned that the remaining billion will be raised in the US through such means as promotion of a $500,000,000 bond issue, increased fund-raising through the United Jewish Appeal, and obtaining grants-in-aid from the United States Government. In the latter connection, fifteen prominent American Jewish leaders visited the White House on November 15, 1950 to present a memorandum [2] to the President which stated that Israel has a special claim for financial support from the US and requested the US to grant Israel loans and other forms of financial support. It is probable that the present request for grant aid, if successful, will be the first in a series of applications by the Israel Government to cover the requirements of its three-year program.

The Department has formulated a balanced program of grant aid for the Arab states and Israel. This program, in the amount of $25,000,000, for the states involved, is being submitted for the approval of the Bureau of the Budget and is designed to accelerate the economic development of the Near Eastern states in spheres in which the local governments are unable either to supply the necessary finances themselves or to obtain loans from other countries. (Tab A)

It should also be noted that, in addition to the $25,000,000 proposed under the Department's grant aid program, the Department is seeking legislative authority to contribute $30,000,000 to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Moreover, the policy toward the Arab States and Israel defined in NSC 47/4 [3] contemplates a military aid program of approximately $45,000,000 to that area. These sums total $100,000,000 of proposed grant aid to the Near Eastern area for the coming fiscal year, from which Israel will receive both direct and indirect benefits.

The anticipated request for grant aid to Israel raises most serious political and strategic questions which may have a profound effect on our relations with the other states of the Near and Middle East.

The United States has endeavored to follow a policy of strict impartiality toward the Arab states and Israel. While US relations with the Arab states have been strained since the end of 1947, a year ago the Department became so concerned at the growing anti-American sentiment in the Arab states that it undertook a specific program to convince them of the sincerity and genuineness of this policy. While the latter approach has had some success, the Arab states still view actions of the US with suspicion and regard any action by the US favorable to Israel as proof that the US follows an anti-Arab policy. In this connection, the Arab states point to the numerous statements of high US Government officials tending to contrast them unfavorably with Israel, to the two Eximbank loans to Israel totalling $135,000,000[4] and to the fact that Israel has not been obliged to repatriate the Palestine refugees.

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[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] NSC 47/4 of March 7 is not printed.

Other factors as well have now entered the picture which have produced a sharp loss of confidence in the US and a resultant tendency toward neutralism in the Arab states. For example, the outbreak of war in Korea and the change in the power position of the US have engendered a growing feeling of neglect and isolation in these states, intensified their awareness of their own military weakness and vulnerability, and resulted in a marked deterioration of morale. This situation has manifested itself in the reluctance of the Arab states to support the UN position on Korea, in anti-West and pro-neutral campaigns in the press, and in the unwillingness of any Arab leader publicly to counter this trend.

We consider, however, that these countries are basically pro-Western and anti-Soviet and are prepared to play their part, in co-operation with the US and the UK, in the defense of the area. Taking into consideration the view expressed in NSC 47/2, dated October 17, 1949,[5] that "The political and economic stability of Israel and the Arab states is of critical importance to the security of the US", the Department, in collaboration with the Defense Department, formulated a revised program toward the Arab states and Israel, contained in NSC 47/4, designed to counteract the growing tendency toward neutralism and to maximize the will of the states to cooperate with the West in resistance to the USSR both now and in the event of war. NSC 47/4 was approved by the NSC on March 14[6] and is now before the President for his approval.

Since the dominant consideration in US relations with the Near East is that of US security, the subject of grant aid to Israel must be considered in that light. We believe that for Israel to receive priority or exceptional treatment in the matter of grant aid would contravene our established policy of impartiality as set forth in NSC 47/2 and would produce a most violent and hostile reaction in the Arab states. In addition it might negate the policy set forth in NSC 47/4 and result in the complete alienation of the Arab states from the West. These developments could also have the most serious consequences on our strategic interests in Greece and Turkey, and could further prejudice the present critical situation in Iran.

Recommendations:

1. It is recommended that you discuss this question with the President at the earliest possible moment and seek his approval for the

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[4] For documentation on the Export-Import Bank's loans to Israel, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 594 ff., and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. V, pp. 658 ff.

[5] For text, see *ibid.*, 1949, vol. VI, p. 1430.

[6] The paper which was approved by NSC March 14 and by President Truman March 17 is NSC 47/5. For text, see p. 95.

ition that exceptional grant aid or other special financial assistance srael outside of the grant aid program which has already been pro-ed would contravene our policy toward Israel and the Arab states et forth in NSC 47/2 and NSC 47/4.

. In the event the President is unable to approve the foregoing ommendation, it is recommended that you seek his approval for the ition that any program of increased grant aid for Israel should be lertaken only as a part of an integrated and balanced program of nt aid for the area as a whole, on the basis of the impartial grant program already formulated by the Department (Tab A).

[Tab A]

nt Aid

he purpose of grant aid is to accelerate the economic development he Near Eastern states in spheres which the local governments are ble either to supply the necessary finances themselves or to obtain as from other countries. The total contemplated for the Near East-countries would amount to $25,879,000 in the fiscal year beginning y 1, 1951 on the basis of the following illustrative country break-n:

strative Program	*Thousand Dollars*
Syria	10, 201
Lebanon	3, 208
Israel	968
Jordan	4, 855
Egypt	870
Saudi Arabia	384
Iraq	5, 000
Yemen	393
Total	25, 879

hese illustrative allocations for each country take account of the ity of Saudi Arabia and Iraq to finance their own economic de-pment from oil royalties, of the sources of finance available to el from public and private funds in the United States, of Egypt's ively favorable financial position resulting from the good world ket for cotton. Thus, most of the grant aid would be concentrated yria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (the latter a large country with undeveloped resources).

hese countries have not been officially consulted with respect to a osed grant aid program. However, all of the governments of these tries have expressed a strong need for additional financing in r to carry ahead their development programs at a more rapid

The type of project contemplated here would involve measures to improve public health, engineering surveys of public works (which might become bankable), the establishment of technical laboratories and technical schools, the equipping and improving of existing agricultural experimental and demonstration farms, assistance to land resettlement projects which are designed to help solve the land tenure problem, technical experts on roads, laboratories and hospitals, and local trainees to be sent to the United States. These projects include what we now call Point IV Technical Assistance (which would amount to $1 million to the Near East countries in the current fiscal year) and more extensive grant aid projects involving both equipment and experts.

It is assumed in the grant aid program that strict economic development projects which are bankable would be financed either by the country's own banks or by the IBRD or possible by the EximBank. The grant aid projects are over and above the bankable projects.

784A.00/3-1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, March 16, 1951—1 p. m.

567. During stay of Lewis Jones in Israel[2] we called on PriMin Ben Gurion at Tiberias. He stressed the vital importance to his country of re-establishment of normal relations between Israel and Arab states. He was convinced that key to situation was Egypt because of its position or relative power prestige and leadership in ME. He stated that US and possibly UK cld be of extremely valuable assistance to Israel in this connection.

In developing this point, PriMin stated obviously great powers wld have to depend on persuasion but he felt there was such a good case for making peace with Israel in interests of regional and world peace that there shld be a good chance of getting Egypt to take lead in re-establishing normal relations with Israel. He was confident Jordan and Leb wld be glad follow suit but wld not venture in either case to take lead. He thought Syria and Iraq might be slower but wld eventually follow Egypt's lead.

Discussion then turned to various things Israel might do to improve chances of reaching agreements with neighbors. Mention was made of release of blocked balances, dividing of no-man's land in Jerusalem coupled with immed compensation of owners whose property remains on Israel side of line.

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[1] Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Lond

[2] Information on dates of Mr. Jones' stay in Israel has not been found in Department of State files.

PriMin said he recognized importance of world peace to his country since any major conflict might mean complete destruction of the state.

He confirmed Israel's orientation toward West by saying that Israel and Turkey are 2 countries that can be counted upon to resist any aggression and that it might be a very real advantage to Allies to have his country's trained army in strategic position. He stressed that none of us know how much time we have and urged prompt action to effect peace in ME, pointing out that Israeli force wld not be utilized outside Israel unless this country is at peace with its neighbors.

DAVIS

784A.5 MSA/3-1751

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO ISRAEL REQUEST FOR GRANT AID

1. Our established policy of impartiality as between the Arab states and Israel, as set forth in NSC 47/5, dated March 17, 1951,[2] should be carried out. NSC 47/5 sets forth in part: "The political and economic stability of the Arab states and Israel continues to be of critical importance to the security of the US . . . The US should without partiality as between Israel and the several Arab states:

a) Seek legislative action which will permit the development of appropriate arms supply programs, and
b) Undertake and accelerate planned technical and economic assistance."

2. The Department has in preparation a carefully integrated program of economic and military assistance for Israel and the Arab states designed to strengthen the capabilities of all countries in the Near Eastern area on an impartial basis.

3. Any special treatment for Israel in the matter of grant aid would produce a violent and hostile reaction in the Arab states, which would regard such a grant as proof that the US is following a pro-Israel and an anti-Arab policy. Strenuous objections have already been received from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

4. Such a grant would have a particularly adverse effect on Egypt and Syria, which are presently on balance in the East-West question, and would probably drive them further into a policy of neutralism.

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[1] This unsigned memorandum is the attachment to another document (which summarizes it) titled "Outline Analysis of Factors Concerning Israel: Grant Aid Request". The latter paper, not printed, bears the handwritten date of March 17.

[2] NSC 47/5 is dated March 14 and was approved by the President March 17. For text, see p. 95.

5. This reaction in the Arab states would have serious consequences on our special strategic interests in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and upon the strategic interests the US shares with the UK in the other Arab states and Israel. The defection of the Arab states would jeopardize any possibility of defense and stability in depth.

6. The anticipated reaction in the Arab states might lead to a situation similar to that presently existing in Iran.

7. Israel's need for financial aid is unquestionable. However, this request is an open-end liability, both as to amount and duration: it envisages the continued financing by the US of Israel's immigration and internal development program without regard to the economic capabilities of the country. Because of Israel's unlimited immigration policy, no opportunity is afforded for stabilizing Israel economy at any given level.

8. This request is for fiscal 1952, and is only a part of Israel's three-year billion and a half dollar program. It is likely that private support will be adversely affected by direct US Government grant assistance, which would further increase the ultimate US vulnerability to requests.

9. A positive approach, however, to the Congress, outlining the balanced military and economic aid program which the Department has under consideration and stressing the difficulties involved in unilateral aid to Israel might result in a shifting of present support for the requested grant to support of a policy providing for reasonable grant aid for Israel and the Arab states on an impartial basis; maintenance of our even-handed approach to the area; improved prospects for peace between Israel and the Arabs, which should be a matter of as great importance to Israel and Israel supporters as direct grant-aid to Israel.

683.84A/3-1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 17, 1951—4 p. m.

386. In informal discussion with Israel Emb Rep Mar 16 Dept gave substance Jlem Contels 162 Mar 5,[2] 165 Mar 7, 169 Mar 15,[3] and expressed fol views:

(1) Syrian Govt under Armistice Agreement cld not concern itself with Israel civil operations Huleh area outside demilitarized zones.

(2) Situation demilitarized zones responsibility UN Chairman MAC.

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Waldo and cleared in NE and UNP. Repeated to Jerusalem, Damascus, and USUN in New York.

[2] *Ante*, p. 588.

[3] Neither printed.

pages tightly

(3) Syrian Govt through membership in MAC entitled make representations to MAC re situation demilitarized zones.

(4) Israel construction demilitarized zone shld cease pending agreement this matter in MAC.

(5) Armistice Agreement provides that Chairman Israel-Syrian MAC has special duties re admin demilitarized zone including preservation rights Arab and Israel inhabitants. Believe Arabs demilitarized zone shld be fully compensated for any loss of land due civil operations this area preferably by appropriate land compensation elsewhere in demilitarized zone. Arrangements this compensation shld be worked out through Israel-Syrian MAC prior Israel undertaking engineering operations demilitarized zone. Moreover, Dept has doubts re validity in demilitarized zone semi-private arrangements made during Mandate.

(6) Dept hoped Israel wld attend Mar 19 meeting MAC and wld avoid any provocative action.

ACHESON

684A.85/3-1951: Despatch

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Department of State

SECRET AMMAN, March 19, 1951.

No. 223

Subject: Meeting of March 16, 1951 Between Jordan Prime Minister and Shiloah.[1]

The Department will recall that on February 23, 1951, Samir Pasha Rifa'i met Shiloah at Shuneh in order to explore various means of further implementing the Rhodes Armistice Agreement.[2] (Attention is invited in this connection to Legation's telegram 145 of February 27, 1951).[3] The discussion centered chiefly around implementation of Paragraph 6 of Article VI and of Article VIII, such implementation being conditioned upon Israeli evacuation of the Naharayim area. At that meeting, on the basis of a request made by Shiloah, both parties agreed to adjourn and draw up within the framework of the subjects discussed certain proposals representing the position of the party in question for further discussion on or about March 9. This meeting was later postponed and took place one week later than originally planned.

During the meeting between Mr. G. Lewis Jones and myself and Sir Alec Kirkbride (see Legation's despatch 219, March 15, 1951),[3] the British Minister agreed to make available to me the purport of proposals which might be made by Samir Pasha Rifa'i at his next meeting with Shiloah. I met Kirkbride on March 17 and he showed me a copy of Samir's document[4] and gave me the following account of the proceedings of the meeting between the two. I should point out in this connection that the meeting between Samir and Shiloah and the proceedings which transpired were discussed between Samir and Kirkbride in the greatest secrecy and confidence. It is most unlikely that Samir has shared his information with more than one or two of his Cabinet colleagues and it is imperative that the following information not be disclosed to any Israeli authorities or to Jordanian representatives as having been received from Kirkbride.

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[1] Documentation concerning those of the Rifai–Shiloah conversations which were held previously in 1951 is not printed. It is in file 684A.85. For general background, see Mr. Ludlow's memorandum of March 14 to Mr. Hickerson, p. 592.

[2] Reference is the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement of April 3, 1949.

[3] Not printed.

Although Samir came to the meeting prepared with a document outlining Jordan's position, he found that his Israeli counterpart was equipped with no such paper. Samir's document outlined a broadening of the present degree of agreement between the two parties along the following lines:

(1) Israelis would evacuate the Naharayim area and the boundary at this point would follow the old international line. Whatever crops had been planted by the Israelis in this region would be harvested by them.

(2) Following evacuation of the Naharayim area and after the elapse of two months, but in any case not less than one month, the two parties would proceed to implement Article VI and Article VIII of the Rhodes Agreement.

(3) The Special Committee provided for in Article VIII of the Rhodes Agreement would deal with the following questions in the order indicated:

a. Article VI:

(1) Paragraph 6 of this Article, which states, "Wherever villages may be affected by the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Line . . . , the inhabitants of such villages shall be entitled to maintain, and shall be protected in their full rights of residence, property and freedom", would be implemented in order to alleviate the distressed condition of the inhabitants of the border-line villages who are separated by the line from their lands and means of livelihood. In particular, such inhabitants would have access to their lands and reap the produce therefrom, although such lands would be considered an integral part of Israeli territory.

b. Article VIII:

(1) Free movement of traffic on the Latrun–Jerusalem road. Resumption of traffic on this road would be agreed to in conjunction with division of no-man's-land in its vicinity. The road itself in the Latrun area and no-man's-land south of the road would go to Israel. That portion of no-man's-land north of the road would go to Jordan.

(2) Resumption of the normal functions of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto. United Nations control over the Mount Scopus area would be termi-

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[4] Complete text of a purported copy of this document, dated March 15, furnished the Embassy in Israel by the Israeli Foreign Office, is in despatch 581 from Tel Aviv, March 23, not printed. (684A.85/3–2351)

nated. Free access, under Jordan control, would be assured in order to permit the normal functioning of the University and Hospital on Mount Scopus.

(3) Free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives. Free access to these areas would be agreed to as a matter of principle and it would be the task of the Special Committee to agree upon a practical method of carrying out this principle. The measure of freedom of access would depend largely upon security considerations.

(4) Resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station. This would take place in conjunction with opening the Latrun–Jerusalem road.

(5) Resumption of the operation of the railroad to Jerusalem. This has already been done.

(6) Jordan's advantages under Article VIII of the Agreement, opening of the Bethlehem-Jerusalem road and provision of electricity for the Old City, would be renounced.

c. Division of No-Man's-Land:

(1) Division of no-man's-land would be accomplished on the basis of property ownership. Absurdities in the configuration of the land which might result would be worked out on the basis of practical adjustments.

d. Compensation for Arab Property in Israeli-Held Jerusalem:

(1) The Israeli Government would provide financial compensation for Arab property in Israeli-held Jerusalem and the Jordan Government would provide financial compensation for Israeli property in Jordan-held Jerusalem.

e. Release of Frozen Balances:

(1) The Israeli Government would release all Arab balances blocked in Israeli banks.

Shiloah's reactions to this document are stated to have been as follows:

1. He agreed to the provisions of the first point of Samir's statement.
2. He considered that under (2) the elapsed time should be one month instead of two. Samir agreed to this modification.
3. As regards (3)*a*(1), he did not agree with Samir's interpretation that villages on the Jordan side of the line should benefit from Paragraph 6 of Article VI. However, he recognized the hardships suffered by these villagers and thought some form of compensation or other special arrangement might alleviate the situation. The matter would be studied.
4. He agreed to (3)*b*(1).
5. As to (3)*b*(2), he astounded Samir by stating that Israel had always considered the Mount Scopus area to be Israeli territory and that no form of Jordan control could be recognized. Without referring to the official map attached to the Armistice Agreement which clearly shows the Mount Scopus area to be on the Jordan side of the line, Samir said that he would be glad to learn from Shiloah the basis of this claim. Shiloah said he would study the matter further.

6. Shiloah agreed to (3)*b*(3).

7. As regards (3)*b*(6), he said that although Jordan might renounce these advantages, the Israelis were still prepared to grant them.

8. The questions raised under (3)*c* and (3)*d* would be studied further by Shiloah and his associates. He stated that he did not believe Israel was now in a position to be able to pay compensation for Arab properties in Israeli-held Jerusalem.

9. Shiloah would recommend favorable action on the release of Arab blocked balances mentioned under (3)*e*.

The Legation believes that the proposals made by Samir represent a constructive step forward and that they should help dispell doubts concerning his intention to implement the Armistice Agreement. It would seem that, as a result of these discussions, the responsibility for making the next move is placed upon the Israelis. For the first time since he assumed office and began discussions with the Israelis, Samir is now in the happy position of being able to relax and allow the other side to take the next step.

It was apparently agreed at the meeting that after further consultation with his superiors, Shiloah would indicate a date on which he was prepared to continue discussions with Samir.

A. David Fritzlan

262.84A41/3–1951

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of German Economic Affairs (Margolies)

[Washington,] March 19, 1951.

Subject: Israeli Note Concerning Reparation Claims Against Germany

Participants: Mr. Waldo—NE
Mr. Margolies—GEA

Mr. Waldo inquired as to the status of the reply to the Israeli note[1] on the subject of reparation claims against Germany. He said that a representative of the Israeli Embassy was expected in his office that afternoon and he anticipated an inquiry as to when a reply might be expected.

I told Mr. Waldo that GER had sent out a memorandum to the Bureaus of the Department soliciting their views as to how the note might be answered, insofar as it affected their interests. I said that after the Department's position had been worked out, GER would forward a proposed reply to the Intergovernmental Study Group at London to be coordinated there in substance with replies being pre-

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[1] Of March 12, not printed. In it Israel had requested support of the United States for its claim of $1,500,000,000 in reparations from the German Federal Republic. (262.84A41/3–1251)

ared by the French and British, as is being done in connection with
he first Israeli note concerning restitution and looted property.

Mr. Waldo asked whether I had any views as to the possibility of the
sraeli Government obtaining satisfaction of its claims against
Germany.

I said that my personal reaction was that it was extremely unlikely
hat the three Powers would agree to support the Israeli claim for
eparation. I said that to do so would open up the possibility of the
evival of all sorts of other claims against Germany for reparation
rom other sources. I also said that it seemed to me that since the U.S.
ould have to finance the payment of the claims in any event, it would
e preferable to make payments directly to the beneficiary countries
nstead of indirectly through Germany, if we felt such claims should
e made.

On the second point, Mr. Waldo said that in the case of Israel this
as not the case. There would be a definite political advantage to mak-
ng a contribution to the Israeli economy indirectly through Germany
ather than directly. Direct contributions gave rise to requests from
eighboring Arab states. Mr. Waldo said his views, of course, were also
reliminary, and did not necessarily reflect the position of his bureau.

Mr. Waldo said that they had before them a request from Israel for
conomic aid and that before they could answer that request they
eeded to figure out what might happen in regard to reparations. He
aid he would like to have a meeting with GER on this point. I sug-
ested that he call Mr. Kiefer and discuss it with him, and said that I
hought that such a meeting might perhaps be chaired by Mr. Lewis
ho had been closely following the Israeli problem.[2]

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[2] Record of such a meeting has not been found in Department of State files.

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cretary's Memoranda : Lot 53 D 444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State[1]

NFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1951.

ubject:
1. Israel request for a grant-in-aid of $150 million from the US.
2. Israel claim to reparations from Germany of $1,500,000,000.
3. Request that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion be extended official invitation to visit the US.

articipants:
S—The Secretary
H.E. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
The Honorable David Horowitz, Director General, Israel Ministry of Finance
NE—Mr. Waldo

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

1. The Ambassador of Israel called on me, accompanied by Mr. Horowitz, to present and discuss a note[2] requesting a $150 million grant-in-aid from the US for the period July 1, 1951 through June 1, 1952.

The Ambassador reviewed the three points on which the Israel Government based its request for special assistance from the US:

(1) An increase of 510,000 in Israel's population from the proclamation of the State to the present, and an expected increase of 600,000 in the next three years;

(2) The heavy defense expenditures which were required by Israel as a result of the refusal of the Arab states to make peace in the Near East; and

(3) The financial commitments which arose from Israel's declared willingness to contribute generously to the reintegration fund of the UNRWA in payment of compensation to the Arabs.

The Ambassador reviewed the substance of the note in full and said that he believed that US assistance to Israel was consistent with the objectives of the US aid programs which had already been undertaken. There was some reason to believe that there might be certain unwillingness to assist Israel because of the attitude of Israel's neighbors. The Israel Government felt that this was a negative approach to the problem and thought that, instead, a positive policy of extending aid to both Israel and Israel's neighbors should be followed rather than one of withholding aid from Israel.

Mr. Horowitz said that Israel was tapping every possible source of aid and doing everything feasible to assist itself. He mentioned the $500 million bond issue, the increased activities of the United Jewish Appeal, et cetera.

I asked the Ambassador whether the grant was supposed to assist Israel over the three-year period or was merely a request for one year. He replied that the $150 million covered the estimated additional needs of Israel for this period; he did not know what might be necessary after the year had elapsed.

I informed the Ambassador that I would study the note most carefully.[3]

2. The Ambassador then said he wished to bring to my attention a note which had been delivered by the Embassy to the Bureau of German Affairs on March 12 requesting US assistance in obtaining

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[2] Department of State files contain an Israeli note on this subject dated March 15, not printed. (884A.00 TA/3-1550) No other Israeli note on the aid request has been found in Department of State files.

[3] In a memorandum of a conversation with President Truman on March 23, Mr. Acheson made the following reference to the Israeli aid request:

"I informed the President of the request made by the Israeli Ambassador of me yesterday and of the proposed bill which some Senators were going to introduce.

"I explained that no decision was asked of the President at this time." (884A.00/3-1551) reparations from Germany of $1,500,000,000. The Ambassador outlined the various reasons why he felt that Israel was entitled to this sum of money from Germany, and requested the Department's sympathetic assistance. I said that I would study the matter.

3. The Ambassador inquired whether it would be possible for the President to extend an invitation to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to pay an official visit to the US in the near future. The Ambassador said that the Prime Minister was most anxious to come and that such a visit could be most useful. I told the Ambassador that I was pretty sure of the President's thinking in this regard. I was certain, therefore, that it would be impossible to extend such an invitation to the Israel Prime Minister; the President was very busy and had already too many state visits on his calendar for this year. The Ambassador then inquired, if the Prime Minister visited this country in an informal capacity, whether the President and I would be willing to see him. I said that I could not say at this time but would have to consider the matter very carefully.

Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary McGhee arrived in Israel at Jerusalem the morning of March 27 and left the country from the same place the evening of the following day. On March 29 he left Jordan for Cairo.

In Joint Weeka 65 from Tel Aviv, March 30, the Embassy reported that Mr. McGhee had paid courtesy calls on President Weizmann and Foreign Minister Sharett and had dined with Foreign Office officials. (784A.00(W)/3-3051) No other record of his conversations while in Israel has been found in Department of State files.

The Assistant Secretary's visit to Israel was part of his general tour of the Near East and South Asia. For further information on this trip, see the editorial note, page 49.

683.84A/3-2851

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs (Waldo)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1951.

Subject: Syria–Israel Border Situation.

Participants: Major General Wm. E. Riley, USMC, Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine.
NE—Mr. Waldo

I telephoned General Riley at the US Naval Hospital in St. Albans, Long Island, New York, concerning the serious situation which has arisen between Israel and Syria in the demilitarized zone of the Hule swamp area. I gave him the substance of Damascus telegram no. 492, March 28.[1] I told him that we had previously discussed this matter with the Israelis on an informal basis, but now felt that the situation had become so serious that a more formal representation should be made by the Department. I asked the General what his views were.

He told me that he agreed that the only way these matters could be handled effectively was for the Department to take an active interest in the workings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. He approved our making representations to the Israelis on the matter, and said that he thought we should also discuss it with the Syrians.

The General considered the Israelis were responsible for the tense military situation on the Syria–Israel border. He said that the Israelis had apparently refused to abide by his memorandum of March 7 in which he had stated: "Until such time as a mutual agreement is reached between the governments of Israel and Syria with respect to work now being conducted in demilitarized zone in connection with drainage of Lake Hule marshes, the Palestine Land Development Company or any successors are, in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, not justified in continuing such work." The General said that he had called into the Hospital Rafiq Asha, Syrian Consul General in New York, and discussed the matter with him and expected to see Gideon Rafael, Israel Counselor and Deputy Representative to the UN, tomorrow.

The General also thought it might be a good idea to inform the French and Belgians of any steps we might take since the Acting Chief of Staff of the UN TSO, Col. de Ridder, is a Belgian.

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[1] Not printed. In it the Legation had in part indicated a rising level of tension in Syria as a result of the Huleh conflict. (683.84A/3-2851)

884A.00/3-1551

Memorandum by Charles B. Marshall of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Nitze) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1951.

Subject: Grant to Israel.

Since being called in last week to a short meeting in your office relating to the prospective legislative proposals for a $150,000,000 grant to Israel, I have looked further into the subject. What I have learned prompts me to this initiative.

I do not wish to labor the analysis of the proposal. It has been ably dealt with in a March 15 memorandum from NEA to the Secretary.[2] A few points, however, are worth emphasizing.

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[1] This memorandum bears the typed notation "Cleared with NEA."

[2] Memorandum by Mr. Berry, p. 594.

The proposed grant would increase by 15,380 per cent Israel's portion of economic aid as contemplated in the foreign assistance program put forth by the Executive.

An increase of contemplated aid for neighboring countries on a proportional scale would entail a grant of more than $40,000,000,000 to the Near East.

The Israeli proposal is based upon an obvious claim for favoritism. The Israeli ambassador's note of March 15 putting the touch on Uncle Sam makes no attempt to conceal this. The plea is based on "special ties" between the two countries and "the maintenance and extension of a traditional relationship firmly established in the hearts of both peoples".

Despite many allusions in the note attempting to pass off the proposed aid as being just the same sort of thing the United States has been doing for a lot of nations, the undertakings envisaged by Israel are quite different. They involve plans for resettlement for undefined numbers of Jews from other countries in years to come. The note attempts to put the United States in the position of being obligated to underwrite these undertakings. The development is envisaged in the note as sharpening the contrast between Israel and neighboring countries. The numbers, the superiority in economic power, and the greater degree of prosperity developed in Israel is envisaged as having a great impact in neighboring states. This impact of contrast is presented as contributing to "the stability of the entire Near East". How it would do so is not clear.

The logical sequel of great expansion of the Israeli population in an enclave of advancement amid an area of lag would be further expansion of the dimensions of Israel. This is made quite articulate in various Zionist pronouncements, though not expressed in the Israeli note.

Obviously the United States could not underwrite the Israeli undertaking without being involved in all its implications. All of our economic assistance must be related to the ends sought. In giving such assistance in such extraordinary degree the United States would become fully associated with Israeli's ambitions. It would become associated with Israeli as an object of Arab fears of attempts to expand the present Israeli holdings to include the entire Fertile Crescent.

This would be virtually fatal to all efforts to enhance support of the United States in the Moslem world. The impact would not be confined to the Arab states. It would probably run all the way to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

In that sense, the proposal is in sharp contrast to all preceding economic assistance. It would not conduce to—it would militate against—the security and other interests of the United States not in a slight but in a drastic degree.

The potential impact of this proposal in hurting our position in the Near East is illustrated by the circumstance that four Arab states, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, have already articulated their protests against it officially, while Italy has made known its fears about the proposal in relation to upsetting the delicate situation bearing on the Mediterranean.

My friends at the Capitol tell me that the points against the plan are not understood up there. They tell me that most of the supporters lined up for the Israeli proposal are under the impression that the Executive branch looks with favor on this plan. I am advised that it is highly advisable to get the word around as rapidly as possible that this proposal involves implications quite counter to our security interests. I am advised that it would be particularly important to get this word right away to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee lest a number of them be committed to the plan in ignorance of its broad implications. If several of them should be committed as sponsors of the bill it would be virtually impossible to block favorable action in the Committee. My friends at the Capitol tell me that the two leading sponsors of the measure in the Senate are cagey legislators most adept at quietly lining up support in advance of introducing a bill and that it would therefore be well to make the opposing views known without delay.

My recommendations, which underscore and go beyond those in the NEA paper, are that you should urge upon the Secretary and support all action to the following ends:

a. That the President be fully informed about the implicit dangers.

b. That the Department seek Presidential clearance, if it is necessary, for actively opposing the proposal.

c. That the known congressional sponsors be fully and emphatically advised of the basis of opposition.

d. That the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in particular be apprised of the basis of opposition.

e. That every legitimate effort be made to ensure defeat of the legislation in the Congress.

f. That the President be urged to veto it if it should be passed as a separate item.

g. That, in event of enactment, the President be advised to reserve the right to use the funds only in the ways and to the extent compatible with the foreign policy objectives and the security interests of the United States and to make public this position and the underlying reasons.

683.84A/3-3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1951.

Subject: Border tension between Israel and Syria.

Participants: Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
Miss Esther Herlitz, First Secretary, Embassy of Israel
NEA—Mr. Berry
NE—Mr. Waldo

Dr. Keren, Counselor of the Embassy of Israel, and Miss Esther Herlitz, First Secretary, called on me this morning, at my request, in connection with recent incidents in the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel. Mr. Waldo gave an account of the background of the case and listed the events that had occurred.

I told the Counselor that we had discussed the present problem with General Riley, who is in a hospital in New York, and were in effect backing up his position. I understood that General Riley was discussing the matter with the Israelis and the Syrians in New York.

I told the Counselor and Miss Herlitz that the Department was generally sympathetic to the Israel program for draining and developing the Hule area. We thought such a program would be helpful to the Israelis and also to the Syrians, since it would eliminate malaria from the area. I said we felt that the Syrians had no reason to object to Israel's activities there.

I told the Counselor, further, that we were aware that the drainage of the Hule area was dependent upon certain engineering operations by the Israelis in the demilitarized zone south of Lake Hule. It seemed logical to us that these operations would have to be undertaken. At the same time, we felt that the Israelis could afford to use patience in negotiating with the Syrians, through the Mixed Armistice Commission, a solution of the problem raised by the engineering activities. We understood that these operations resulted in the dispossession of certain Arab landowners and that the Syrians were protesting on their behalf. It also appeared that the Israelis had taken actions in the area which were not fully in accord with the Armistice Agreement and which contributed to instability in the area.

I informed the Israel representatives that we had been much concerned over the increasing number of incidents occurring recently along the Israel frontiers. We hoped that the situation would improve. Otherwise, the continuance of such incidents could have a most deleterious effect on the Department's attitude, and I could not predict what turn this might take. We therefore hoped that the Israelis would use patience and work out this problem in the demilitarized zone through cooperation with the Mixed Armistice Commission. Like the Israelis, the Department was hopeful regarding a settlement of the outstanding problems between Israel and the Arab states. A repetition of incidents like that now occurring in the Hule area could only prejudice possibilities for a peaceful settlement.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

The Israel representatives said it was their understanding that Colonel Ramati and Colonel Bossavy of the Mixed Armistice Commission had reached some agreement in an exchange of letters,[2] but did not pursue this point. They promised to report our views to the Israel Foreign Office.[3]

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[2] Information on activities of the Israel-Syria MAC at the end of March is in U.N. Docs. S/2067 and S/2084.

[3] In telegram 407 to Tel Aviv (353 to Damascus), March 31, the Department summarized the representations made to the Israeli representatives the previous day and continued:

"Syrian Min also was requested call same day. We expressed appreciation for moderation shown in Huleh area by Syrian Govt and hoped this moderate attitude would continue. We thought Israel project Huleh area useful . . . and hoped Syrians wld work out peaceful solution problem in cooperation MAC. We also hoped Syrians wld not take up matter in SC at this time." (684A.85/2-1251)

788.00/4-1051

Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, in Connection With the Visit to London of The Honorable George C. McGhee, April 2–3, 1951[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, April 2, 1951.

Topic for Discussion: Arab Refugees

Participants: *Foreign Office*
R. J. Bowker, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
Trefor Evans, Middle East Secretariat
Sir Henry Knight, British Representative on the UNRWA
U.S.A.
George C. McGhee, Department of State
James K. Penfield, American Embassy, London
John Frick Root, American Embassy, London

Mr. Evans presented a paper (attached herewith) setting forth the problem of the Arab refugees as the British see it. To them there seemed to be, as explained in the paper, three alternatives and they were interested in learning Mr. McGhee's views on the problem. Mr. McGhee said he thought the first of the possibilities suggested was by far the best and he believed that it could be accomplished. He noted that it was the US intention to provide $30 million for Arab refugees as part of its Foreign Aid Program for next year. Mr. Evans said that the UK contribution might vary from $8 to $10 million depending on the contributions from other sources. Mr. McGhee said that he did not at all favor the proposal that Israel should be given a loan with which to provide compensation for the refugees. He thought it was far more desirable to contribute directly to the resettlement of the refugees and perhaps to obtain from them as they were settled a sort of "quit claim" for the compensation to which they had felt entitled. In most cases they would be obtaining in resettlement more than they had left behind. As for the problem of immediate finance raised by Mr. Evans, Mr. McGhee said that Congressional authorization of the proposed contribution for next year would probably make it possible for us to advance some of the funds as early as July 1st.

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[1] Drafted by Root. This memorandum and its attachment, not printed, were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch 4832 from London, April 10. For information concerning Mr. McGhee's visit to London and his other conversations there with British officials, see footnote 1, p. 104.

Mr. McGhee said that it was extremely disappointing that we were no further ahead in resolving the refugee problem than two years ago and that it seemed to him more should have been accomplished by now in making headway with projects which would provide for the resettlement of refugees. He said the inability of UNRWA to get ahead with the real job at hand had been very discouraging and raised the question of whether any UN organization was competent to do the job. In answer to a question from Mr. McGhee, Sir Henry Knight said that administrative expenses of the agency amounted to about 12% and salaries to another 3%.

Mr. McGhee said that he wondered whether it might not be advisable to give to our Point Four officers sent to the area to supervise U.S. bilateral grant aid the additional responsibility of insuring the proper use of our contribution to the refugee program. Mr. McGhee and Sir Henry Knight agreed on the desirability of pressing for the decentralization of the refugee program and enlisting the cooperation of the individual Arab countries, whose initiative in the matter should be stimulated. Mr. McGhee and Sir Henry recognized that the Arab countries were looking for a guarantee of continued outside interest and financial assistance in the resettlement programs and thought that, while our governments could not commit themselves to a guarantee of funds, it would be possible for the UN on the one hand through the director of the UNRWA, and on the other hand for the British and American representatives on UNRWA on behalf of their respective governments, to give assurances, particularly to Syria where the main resettlement should be carried out, of a desire and intention to see the resettlement problem carried to its completion.

Mr. McGhee thought that it should be possible to carry out an appreciable number of resettlement projects in Jordan, but both Sir Henry and Mr. Evans were much more sceptical and believed that the physical resources there severely limited the development which could be undertaken.

With regard to the actual expenditure of funds, Mr. Evans noted that the Jordan Government had so far been able to spend only a part of the £1 million loan from the U.K. It was recognized that putting money for development into actual use was a fairly slow process.

884A.00/3-1551

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1951.

Subject: Grant Aid to Israel

The following regarding Israel's request for grant aid is for your information and discussion with the President at your meeting with him today, should you consider such desirable.

On March 22 the Israeli Ambassador submitted a request to you for grant aid in the amount of $150,000,000. Friends of Israel had prepared for immediate Congressional action upon this request, but this was forestalled as a result of the Department's suggestion to Congressional leaders that such action on the very day of the submission of Israel's request would have undesirable consequences. You informed the President of Israel's request and proposed Congressional action on March 23 (Tab A).[2]

It now appears that a Bill will be introduced into the Congress today or tomorrow authorizing grant aid to Israel in the amount of $150,000,000. In discussing the proposed Bill with Congressional leaders we plan to say that action in favor of the Israel request at this time would be contrary to the security interests of the United States as it will confirm the Arab states in their belief that the United States is not interested in Arab welfare and development, but is solely concerned with the welfare of Israel. The Department has already received protests in this connection from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq.

The Department is in the process of preparing a balanced grant aid program for the area as a whole, which will take into consideration

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[1] This document bears a notation in an unidentified hand: "This memo was placed in the Secretary's W[hite] H[ouse] Book for 4/2/51."

[2] See footnote 3, p. 606.

Israel's needs, although it will not include the full amount of the request the Israel Government has made. This program will be submitted to the Congress within the next several weeks. Hence, special Congressional action for the benefit of Israel would conflict with and jeopardize the Department's over-all program. Moreover, the bill for the benefit of Israel, planned for introduction this week, would contravene our established policy of objective impartiality toward the States of the Near East as set forth in NSC 47/2 dated October 17, 1949, recently confirmed in NSC 47/5 which received the approval of the President on March 17, 1951. A discussion of this position is contained in my memorandum dated March 15,[3] addressed to you (Tab B).

The policy of scrupulous impartiality between Arabs and Jews offers the best hope of bringing about peace and stability in the Near East—to disturb this balance by partial action of the Congress at this time would have serious adverse consequences to the United States, Israel and Arab security.

It is believed that explanation of the foregoing considerations and established policies should now be made to all important officials of the Executive Branch of the Government. NEA believes that it would be helpful if the President would discuss the subject at an early Cabinet meeting and inform the members thereof that aid to Israel must be a part of the balanced program for the Near East as a whole.[4]

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[3] *Ante*, p. 594.

[4] On April 2 Secretary Acheson discussed a number of foreign policy issues with President Truman. Mr. Acheson's memorandum of the part of the conversation devoted to Israel follows:

"I went over this matter fully with the President. He is fully aware of the danger to American interests in the Middle East which this proposal poses. He agrees that, subject to further discussion between him and me, the matter should be taken up at the Cabinet and that we should begin careful talks on the Hill, pointing out the full implications of what is proposed.

"He suggested also the possibility of having discussions with some leading Jewish groups. He would be glad to do this if it seems wise to us.

"I think that this matter requires further thought and discussion in the Department. I suggest that Mr. Webb get together a small group to go over the matter with me." (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 238)

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

US/S/1720 [New York,] April 2, 1951.

Subject:
1) Egypt Blockade at the Suez Canal
2) Huleh Crisis
3) Projected Supplementary Report
4) Possibility of General Riley's Replacement as Chief of Staff

Participants: General William E. Riley—USMC, Chief of Staff, UN
Truce Supervision Organization
Mr. James Ludlow—UNP

1) *Egyptian Blockade at the Suez Canal*—General Riley briefly outlined to me what he considered must be the nature of the opinion which he will give as Chairman of the Special Committee provided for under Article 10 of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement.[1] While this decision is subject to possible revision after consultation with Ralph Bunche and Abe Feller, he contemplates holding that the action by the Egyptian Government in obstructing shipment through the Suez Canal destined for Israel must of necessity be considered as a hostile act, but not necessarily against the General Armistice Agreement because of the limitations imposed on the term "hostile act" in the text of Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement. This paragraph reads "No element of the land, sea or air, military or para-military forces of either party, including non-regular forces shall commit any war-like or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other party or against civilians in territory under the control of that party". He will add that the imposition of blockade controls through the Suez Canal is an aggressive action, but again not necessarily against Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the General Armistice Agreement, in view of the limitation in the text to "armed forces, land, sea or air of either party".

The effect of his decision will be that the MAC does not have the right to demand from the Egyptian Government that it not interfere with the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal while at the same time accusing them of violating the spirit of the Agreement. He believes that it is essential that the decision be so constructed as to insure the possibility of continued cooperation of the two parties to the General Armistice Agreement. We discussed the likelihood of the problem being brought before the Security Council and he indicated that he was cognizant of this likelihood, but felt that any decision he rendered would be challenged by one or both of the parties. I told him that it was our understanding that the British were somewhat concerned by the delay in the decision and that they, of their own accord, might raise the matter of the obstruction of the Canal, possibly in the Security Council.

General Riley stated that he had been somewhat embarrassed by the fact that the Israelis knew that he had asked for comments from the legal department of UN, since he felt that the Israelis would ask that the information, which they understood to state that the MAC did have competence in handling the particular issue, should be made a public record. He stated that he understood from the Israelis that the

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[1] Of February 24, 1949. Text is in U.N. Doc. S/1264/ Corr.1 and Add.1.

Department of State had indicated to the Israelis that we believe that the MAC had competence. I told him in reply that his use of UN's legal information was entirely up to him. So far as the Department was concerned, it was our belief that under the November 17, 1950 resolution, the Security Council required a decision from him and that it was implicit in the resolution and in the statements made by the Members of the Council in discussing the resolution, that the MAC had competence to handle the case. However, he should not be concerned with the possibility that his decision would differ with what he understood from the Israelis was the position of this Government with regard to the MAC's competence. He was an agent of the UN and not of the US and was therefore to make a decision as required by the resolution. The important thing to the US was only that the machinery of the Armistice Agreements continue to function as satisfactorily as possible and receive the backing and support of the Security Council.

I asked General Riley about the timing of his decision and he stated that he had no specific date in mind, but that it would be necessary to call together a special committee before a decision could be rendered and he was not sure when this would be done either by himself or by his Deputy. I told him that we would appreciate any indication he might give concerning the time of such decision.

[Here follow discussions of the Huleh conflict, TSO administrative matters, and a replacement for General Riley.]

S/ISA Files: Lot 52-26: "Israel"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Gardiner)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 4, 1951.

Subject: Israeli Request for Grant Aid Fiscal 1952

Participants:
Mr. Linder—E
Mr. Stinebower—E
Mr. Johnson—White House [1]
Mr. Meloy[?]—S/S
Mr. Gardiner—NEA
Mr. Lawton—Budget Bureau

Mr. Lawton had requested the meeting to discuss what plans the Department might have to modify its presentation for economic assistance to the Near East in the light of the introduction of a bill in the House and the Senate to provide $150 million grant aid to Israel. The Department officials made it clear that no position had yet been taken by the Department, and that the matter was having the consideration of the Secretary. It was, however, the belief of the Department representatives present that the Department might wish to amend its presentation to the Budget Bureau to include larger increments of aid for Israel and the Arab states in a balanced program that would accord with a policy of impartiality toward the various countries concerned. Mr. Johnson requested that the matter be further reviewed at the staff level, but it was stated that such further consultation was probably not feasible until a position had been adopted by the Department.[3]

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[1] Presumably Richard N. Johnson of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President.

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[3] In a memorandum of a conversation held April 4 with Mr. Johnson, just subsequent to that above, Mr. Linder stated that ". . . Mr. Johnson again emphasized the desirability of keeping his office informed as our point of view developed, the purpose being to try to avoid the risk that the Department and the White House points of view would not run completely parallel." (784A.5 MAP/4-451)

884A.00 TA/4-451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, April 4, 1951—5 p.m.

610. Depcirtel 562 Mar 22[1] and Embtel 585 March 27 re Israel request grant in aid.[2]

While Emb lacks statistical data necessary to make adequate analysis relationship amount requested to actual econ needs, the fol observations are submitted as of possible interest:

1. Immigration policy is basic in official and public thinking here and there is no doubt govt is committed to maintain present high rate of immigration at least until Iraqi and Rumanian situations liquidated.
2. In absence marked change for better in its relations with Arab countries, Israel will not be inclined lessen present rate expenditures for defense purposes.
3. Although amount requested large for country this size, it is not believed sufficient enable Israel achieve econ equilibrium, but on contrary wld be in nature of stop-gap specifically for next fiscal year. Further requests are accordingly to be expected.
4. Emb believes drains on economy for immigration and mil expenditures together with limited prospective income will make some aid essential if Israel is to maintain roughly present living standards. In other words, decline in such standards is probable if aid not forthcoming despite loans and remittances expected from abroad and anticipated increases in natl income.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] In this telegram the Ambassador had in part reported that the Embassy had received a copy of the Israeli note requesting aid (see footnote 2, p. 606) and that the Embassy would comment on the request following discussion of the matter with Mr. McGhee (in Israel). (884A.00 TA/3-2751)

5. Emb believes further that decrease in living standards wld be exploited by extremist opposition elements.

6. Note frankly appeals for help in financing ambitious immigration program, and manner of making request for grant clearly shows that govt believes fate of request depends on public and congressional support which Amer friends of Israel can muster. Subject has not been mentioned since notice given personally by FonMin (Embtel 585 Mar 27) and no further query is anticipated.

Davis

884A.00 R/4-551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1951.

Subject: Grant-aid to Israel

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Abraham Feinberg
NE—Mr. Waldo

Mr. Feinberg called in accord with a suggestion from the President that he see me so that I could explain to him some of the problems faced by the Department in connection with the Congressional bills of April 2 to authorize grant-in-aid of $150 million for Israel.

I told Mr. Feinberg that the principal problem facing us in the Near East was one of security. Our first line of defense in that area was the states of Greece, Turkey, and Iran; behind these countries the Arab states and Israel provided the only defense in depth. The Arab states, however, were not very secure. At the present time they could not defend themselves against the Soviet Union. A year ago these states had expressed the conviction that Israel was preparing for aggressive action against them. Israel had held similar views with respect to the Arab states. As a result of the uneasiness in the NE the US, the UK, and France had issued a declaration, May 25, 1950, which assured all of the states of the Near East that these three countries would be prepared to supply them with arms adequate for internal security and for necessary self-defense on receiving assurances from the individual states that these arms would not be used against one another. The declaration also indicated that we wished to strengthen these countries and permit them to play their part in the defense of the area. As a further implementation of the policy set forth in the declaration, the Department had been studying means whereby individual states of the Near East could be strengthened in order that they might be in a position to defend themselves against aggression from the Soviet Union. At present none of the states in the Near East, with the possible exception of Israel was in such a position.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

The bill which had been introduced into Congress authorizing $150 million for Israel came at a very inopportune time; Congress was in a difficult mood, and the Department's aid programs would probably encounter considerable resistance. It was probable, moreover, that if 150 million dollars were made available for Israel it would be taken out of the Department's program already contemplated for the area, which included the Near Eastern states and Iran. There was no question but that, if Iran and the Arab states were to fall to the Soviet Union, Israel's position in the Near East would be untenable.

Mr. Feinberg said that the President had talked to him and that he relied on the President's and my views in this matter. He assured me, therefore, that no pressure would be brought to bear in connection with the bills in the House and Senate. He was leaving for Israel in a few days to bring back Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion; and would explain our position to the Prime Minister. Mr. Feinberg appeared certain the Prime Minister would understand the US position. I told Mr. Feinberg that none of the arguments I had made to him would be likely to carry much weight with the Ambassador of Israel, who would feel that he had arguments equally as valid as mine. On the other hand, we could hardly expect Israel's thinking regarding grant aid to be similar to ours or that Israel would propose a program of assistance for the area as a whole in asking for a grant from the United States.[2]

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[2] On April 5, during a discussion with President Truman of several foreign policy issues, the Secretary raised the subject of aid to Israel. Mr. Acheson's account of that part of the conversation follows:

"I reported to the President our analysis of the problems created by the Taft-Douglas bill. He has these very much in mind and will talk with me about the matter again early next week.

"In the meantime, we should proceed with our thinking on various courses which might be pursued, but no one in the Department should express views of any sort outside the Department without further direction from me." (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 238)

Arrangement of documentation in this lot file indicates that the Secretary's talk with the President occurred after his conversation with Mr. Feinberg.

683.84A/4-651

Memorandum by the Acting Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs (Waldo) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)[1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

Subject: Summary of Events Relating to the Huleh Lake Controversy.

Background

Huleh Lake lies in the northeastern corner of Israel, hard against part of the border with Syria; it empties into the Jordan at its southern end. Its northern shore is bordered by extensive malarial marshes and a program to drain these has been in mind since before World War I. The Israel Government, in its desire to gain more agricultural land and improve the public health of the area, began in recent months to initiate a project which would straighten the Jordan River bed, lower the water level of Huleh Lake, and thereby drain the marshes.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Worcester.

However, drainage activities must perforce take place within the demilitarized zone below the southern shore of the lake, and political complications between Israel and Syria have become paramount therefore during the last two months. The Israelis claimed rights of construction, alteration and expropriation, stating that compensation would be granted to those Arab landowners whose property was involved. When requested by the MAC chairman to cease work until completion of discussions, the Israeli delegate refused to comply and stated that (1) "entire matter had been discussed with State Department, who gave the green light to proceed, (2) therefore they were not worried about what the Syrian Government thought since the US controls the UN." [2]

February 14:

The Syrian delegation to the MAC complained that the Israeli project was (1) giving the Israelis a military advantage by removing a natural obstacle, (2) preventing many Arabs of the demilitarized zone from resumption of normal civilian life. The Israel delegation did not object to submission of the complaint, and General Riley submitted a memorandum in reply on

March 7:

At this meeting the memorandum was read and in substance opined:

1) Drainage of Lake Huleh would not give Israel any military advantage not equally applicable to Syria, and therefore was not a violation of Article II of the Armistice Agreement.

2) The work was of civilian nature in territory under Israel control, where no Syrian objections could be offered.

3) Flooding of Arab lands at the south shore because of dam construction was an obstacle to normal civilian life, and a violation of Article V of the Armistice Agreement.

4) Neither party had sovereign rights within the demilitarized area, no Mandate or Ottoman concessions could apply. Therefore, construction work and expropriation without full consent of landowners were non-exercisable and detrimental to the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area, and constituted a violation of Article V.

General Riley found that all land operations should cease until a mutual agreement was reached by Israel and Syria. The Israel delegation charged General Riley could only deal with Article II, the Syrians replied that he must consider all sides of the problem and that he had not gone beyond his prerogatives. It was agreed to postpone a vote until

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[2] The quotation is adapted from telegram 162 from Jerusalem, March 5, p. 588.

March 8:

The Israel delegation did not appear, but sent word that its Government must give the question further and careful consideration. The Syrians protested the delay, asked that the TSO intervene to stop the construction work immediately, and the Chairman of the MAC so requested the Israel delegation on March 10.

March 15:

Jerusalem Tel 169 March 15[3] reported that Israel delegate Ramati flatly refused a request by UN headquarters to stop Huleh operations immediately. He said problem was outside scope of MAC.

An Israeli patrol crossed to the east bank of the Jordan, and Arabs on the Syrian side opened fire. MAC Chairman Bossavy stopped the gunfire and the Syrian delegate assured him there would not be military intervention except under provocation or orders from higher authorities. Israelis refused to remove the tractor and Bossavy immobilized it.

March 17:

Deptel 386 of March 17[4] gave the Department's views, which in substance followed General Riley's recommendations, and expressed the hope that Israel would attend the March 19 MAC meeting and avoid provocative acts.

Damascus Tel 470 of March 17[5] gave the Syrian Government's views, which also paralleled General Riley's; the Syrians contended they had not interfered with force, although Huleh Arab landowners had resisted Israeli operations.

March 18:

The Syrian Minister of Defense stated to Colonel de Ridder that if Israel continued operations, the Syrian army was prepared to take punitive action.

March 19:

Israeli delegate Ramati proposed at the MAC meeting that the question be removed from the MAC and placed in Chairman Bossavy's hand. Bossavy agreed and added the provision that all work should also stop immediately; Syria concurred, but Israel withdrew.

Apparently at some point during this period the operations had ceased, for the Israeli delegate warned that after March 23 work would recommence regardless of whether Bossavy had come to a decision or not.

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[3] Not printed. (683.84A/3-1551)

[4] *Ante*, p. 600.

[5] Not printed. (683.84A/3-1751)

March 21:

The MAC Chairman reported Huleh Arab landowners were unwilling to accept compensation.

Col. Bossavy was notified by the Palestine Land Development Co. that work would be resumed on March 23.

March 26:

A meeting between Makleff and Shishakli was fruitless. Makleff claimed the MAC Chairman had no power to order work cessation, that he could only so order for a limited period of time and solely to discuss compensation. Syria maintained the operations should be unconditionally stopped to find an overall solution.

March 27:

Israeli tractors resumed work. Israeli army opened fire with mortars and machine guns; the Syrian army did not take action, but the Syrian delegate lodged a strong complaint against the Israeli army for firing small arms and mortars from the demilitarized zone.

The Acting Chief of Staff TSO requested the Israeli defense forces Chief of Staff to: (1) withdraw a paramilitary force that had emplaced mortars in the demilitarized zone, (2) withdraw a military patrol and additional military personnel. Israeli forces were repeatedly firing bursts from automatic weapons.

March 28:

Reports continued of Israeli mortar and automatic fire in demilitarized zone and close to Syrian border. UN observers stated that the Syrian army had apparently not fired a single shot throughout the dispute, although Col. Shishakli had warned that he could not for long restrain his men in the face of repeated provocation. All Arab fire was by Huleh landowners in the demilitarized zone, or by the same Arabs who had retreated over the Syrian border.

The Syrian Air Force and two infantry brigades were alerted for action.

March 30:

The U.S. position was explained to Israel Embassy officials by the Department. Mr. Keren was told that apparently the Israelis had taken action contrary to the armistice agreement, and that continuance of incidents by Israel could have a most deleterious effect upon the Department's attitude.

To the Syrian Minister the Department expressed appreciation for Syria's moderate attitude, and the hope that Syria would continue to exercise restraint and not take any untoward action.

April 1:

Jerusalem Tel 179 of April 1 [6] reported that UN observers had been fired upon by Israelis and sugar put in their gas tanks over recent days. Col. de Ridder of the MAC stated an amicable arrangement of the drainage question could have been made, if the Israelis had not been so insolent and aggressive. He placed much of the blame on the attitude of Israeli delegate Ramati.

April 2:

The tension relaxed somewhat at this point after being at explosive heights for the past few weeks. The Israel Chief of Staff assured Col. Metz of the TSO that: (1) No Israel troops or mortars would be allowed in the demilitarized zone, (2) UN observers would have freedom of movement, (3) The Israeli delegation would attend MAC meetings.

April 3:

The Secretary General of the Syrian Foreign Ministry stated to a Legation officer (Damascus Tel 505 April 3) [7] that the Syrian Government's attitude would continue to be one of restraint and moderation, but he failed to comprehend why the MAC was unable to enforce its decisions.

He added that Syria hoped to find a settlement through the MAC, but that meanwhile the Arab landowners had no course of appeal and the Israelis were forcibly making changes unilaterally. The whole question of UN authority seemed at stake; he hoped the MAC would be able to enforce its rulings so that Security Council action would not be necessary.

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[6] Not printed. (683.84A/4-151)
[7] Not printed. (683.84A/4-351)

683.84A/4-651: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 6, 1951—7 p. m.
NIACT

595. While Dept does not have complete and accurate factual acct of shooting of seven Israelies by Syrians, subsequent bombing Syrian installations by Israeli Air Force in El Hamma area April 4 and 5, you shld nevertheless make known fol US views to Syrian and Israeli govts at earliest opportunity:

I. US takes serious view trend recent developments between Syria and Israel. Stake which Syria, Israel and UN have in border peace is such that allocation blame and analysis validity of accusations and counter accusations are dwarfed in larger context of peace in area. Use of mil measures to settle differences can only lead to tragic consequences in countries concerned, area as a whole and world at large. US believes UN machinery adequate to settle questions in dispute and that this machinery shld be utilized to maximum. Under circumstances no mil measures can possibly be justified.

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Jones and Mr. Kopper. Cleared with UNP, WE, and BNA. Transmission approved by Mr. McGhee personally. Sent niact to Damascus and Tel Aviv, and repeated for information to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, and Paris.

II. US believes that Demilitarized Zone shld be immed evacuated by mil forces both sides and Israel civil police within area shld remain close to Israel settlements. Mbrs shld comply with letter and spirit recommendations UN Chairman MAC has made or may make and with terms of armistice agreements.

III. US is consulting with UK and Fr. Unless there is cessation activity, we plan discuss with them what action may be necessary.

Dept today making known above to Syrian and Israeli Chiefs of Mission here.

For Embs Paris and London, Dept informing Brit and Fr Embs here substance above. Dept believes it wld be helpful if UK and Fr govts took similar action vis-à-vis Israel and Syrian govts.[2]

For USUN: If asked you may inform interested dels US position as set forth above. Dept believes it highly desirable that report be recd from UN observers in field quickly as possible.

ACHESON

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[2] In telegram 6022 from Paris, April 8, the Embassy in part indicated that the British and French Governments both were taking action in the matter similar to that of the United States. (683.84A/4-851)

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Israel Ambassador

Participants: H. E. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NEA—Mr. Berry
NE—Mr. Lewis Jones
NE—Mr. Waldo

The Israel Ambassador called to discuss the following subjects with me:

1. The Syrian-Israel dispute: The Israel Ambassador outlined the Israel position on the Demilitarized Zone. He said that Israel claimed

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

full sovereignty over the Zone and that a letter from Ralph Bunche to Israel military representatives fully confirmed the Israel view. If the Syrians persisted in their attitude of obstruction in the Zone, the Israel Government would be forced to release the letter to the public.

The Israel Ambassador claimed that Syria had violated the Armistice Agreement in attempting to prevent Israel engineering operations in the Demilitarized Zone. The Armistice Agreement specifically provided for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area. The Hule project had been under consideration for a long time and the draining of the swamps could only be considered as providing for the restoration of ordinary civil life in the zone. The Israel Government could not permit either Syria or the UN to hold up progress in the Demilitarized Zone indefinitely. After a certain length of time one could consider that the Armistice Agreements became obsolete. He was firmly convinced, therefore, that the Arab states should negotiate final peace settlements instead of obstructing legitimate Israel operations in Israel territory. The Israel government took a very serious view of the shooting of the seven Israel policemen in the Demilitarized Zone. He regretted that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the French Colonel Bossavy had not seen fit to go to the scene of the shooting. In the Israel view, Colonel Bossavy was no longer acceptable as Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The policemen had been killed on Israel soil while on a routine patrol mission. The Israel government had thereupon undertaken punitive action and bombed Syrian border fortifications.

Mr. Waldo said that a cable from Jerusalem [2] reported that the Israel press release on the killing of the policemen was substantially correct, except that initial reports from UN observers in the area to the Deputy Chief of Staff in Jerusalem appeared to indicate that the Israel policemen might have been shot on Syrian soil.

I informed the Ambassador that since we did not have all the facts on the situation in the Demilitarized Zone we were not in a position to adjudicate the case. We did feel, however, that Israel could not unilaterally interpret the Armistice Agreement. With regard to the shooting of the policemen, however, and the subsequent bombing by Israel of Syrian soil, I informed the Ambassador that, while we deeply regretted the shooting of the policemen, that incident in no way justified the deliberate retaliatory bombing of Syrian positions. It was one thing for incidents to occur on the spot where it was frequently impossible to determine who was at fault, since there might be an exchange of rifle shots from both sides; it was another matter entirely for the government of Israel to undertake reprisals by bombing. We could not over-estimate the gravity of the situation and were taking up the matter of the Syrian-Israel border incidents with the French and with the British.[3]

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[2] Reference is to telegram 184 from Jerusalem, April 5, not printed. (683.84A/4-551)

[3] Notes which in part embodied the position taken here by Mr. McGhee regarding the Huleh dispute and the incident at El Hamma were delivered to the Embassy of Israel and the Legation of Syria on April 7.

In the note to Israel, the Department also stated in part that the United States "assumed" that Israel would ". . . cease forthwith military action in the area and [would] act in accord with the findings of the United Nations

2. The Ambassador then took up the question of the grant-aid bill. He admitted that Israel was a part of the Near East region, but believed there should be no discrimination as between Israel and the Arab states; if the Arabs should appeal to the US for economic assistance, Israel considered such a move a progressive step on their part; if the Arab states did not consider they were justified in asking the US for economic assistance, Israel did not believe that this should deter the US from extending aid to Israel. He thought that the US made somewhat of a fetish of regionalism; Arab needs were less than those of Israel, since Israel had special problems which had to be considered outside of the general framework of plans for the Near East as a whole. The Ambassador considered that the US would be strengthened by assisting Israel and it would improve the special relationship that existed between the US and Israel. He said that Israel representatives were ready to discuss the matter with the Department at any time.

I informed the Ambassador that the US would not expect Israel to submit an overall program for the Near East, since that was a matter which lay within our determination. I told him that the request for grant-aid was being given careful consideration.

3. The Israel Ambassador informed me that Israel has submitted its request for one and a half billion dollars of reparations from Germany, with great seriousness. He said that he doubted that the Germans who supported Hitler would now help defend the democracies and that those Germans must expatiate their sins. Israel opinion on the question of German reparations was very agitated, and Mr. Horowitz planned to meet with officers of the German Affairs Bureau and discuss this problem. I told the Ambassador that this matter was one primarily for consideration by another Bureau of the Department.

"In the long run, the position of Israel in the Near East is dependent upon the development of friendly relations with the Arab States." (Text is contained in telegram 421 to Tel Aviv, April 7; 683.84A/4–751.)

In the note to Syria, the Department recounted the representations made to Israel and also stated in part: "The United States likewise urges the Syrian Government to take immediate steps to assure that there will be no further recourse to violence on the part of Syrian forces." (Text is contained in telegram 366 to Damascus, April 7, repeated to Tel Aviv as number 420; 683.84A/4–751.)

At the Department's press and radio news conference held April 9, at 12:35 p. m., Mr. McDermott verbally made public the substance of the two notes. The transcript of his remarks is included in Department of State "Daily News Conferences", vi, 1951, under date of April 9, pp. 2–5.

774.5/4-1151

The Egyptian Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

Translation

CONFIDENTIAL

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Israeli advance towards the Gulf of Akaba in violation of the truce[2] imposed by the Security Council and the General Armistice Agreement[3] is a cause of serious concern for Egypt owing to the prevailing tension in the Middle East and the state of war between the Arabs and Jews.

2. Measures of safeguard and security have been necessary. One of these measures has been, as is well-known, the occupation of the islets of Tiran and Sinafir to affirm the sovereign rights of the Kingdom of Egypt over these Egyptian islets situated not far from the ingress to the Gulf of Akaba.[4]

3. The appropriate Egyptian authorities have recently had recourse to another measure of security by declaring as a zone forbidden for navigation the maritime surface west of an imaginary line extending straight from Ras Nusrani to Ras Muhammad in the South Eastern part of the Sinai Peninsula and at the ingress to the Gulf of Akaba. By its geographical position this zone is away from the maritime route usually followed by boats wishing to penetrate into the Gulf of Akaba from the Red Sea or vice versa.

4. Although sovereign of the Akaba Strait, also called the Tiran Strait and situated entirely within the boundaries of her territorial waters, Egypt does not intend to prohibit the innocent passage of warships or commercial boats of friendly countries, in their capacity as bordering states, without prejudice to Egypt's legitimate rights of control or to the exercise of her exceptional rights of inspection and of seizing contraband articles, by virtue of the provisions of the Decree of February 6, 1950, as long as these provisions remain in force.

5. As to enemy boats, a distinction must be made between warships, and commercial boats. The former are forbidden from entering and traversing the territorial waters of the Kingdom of Egypt up to a distance of three nautical miles from the Egyptian coast, and this

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[1] Transmitted to Washington as enclosure 1 to despatch 2446 from Cairo, April 11, p. 633.

A copy of the original French text, not printed, forms enclosure 2 to the despatch.

[2] The Security Council had issued its final cease-fire order on July 15, 1948. For text, see U.N. Doc. S/902 or *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, pt. 2, p. 1224.

[3] Between Israel and Egypt, signed February 24, 1949. For text, see U.N. Doc. S/1264/Corr. 1 and Add. 1.

[4] For information on this incident, see telegram 102, January 30, in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 711.

by virtue of Article 2, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes on February 24, 1949. As to enemy commercial boats, they can only enter any section of the Egyptian territorial waters at their own risk. The least that can be said, without prejudice to the future attitude of the Egyptian Court of Prizes, is that they expose themselves to seizure and detention until their fate is decided by the above Court of Prizes which has always endeavored that its jurisprudence should be in conformity with the international law on this matter.

APRIL 9, 1951.

683.84A/4–1051 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 10, 1951—7 p. m.

612. Syria's Min[2] asked Dept Rep today whether USG action on Syro-Israeli frontier dispute taken under tripartite declaration.[3] Dept Rep replied US considered tripartite declaration shld be used only in circumstances more serious than the present. Believed recent dispute cld be resolved in existing UN machinery. Although consulting with UK and Fr because of mutual interest in problem US does not contemplate action under tripartite declaration at this time. Action taken by US thus far prompted by friendship for both Syria and Israel and obligation as member UN do all possible promote peace and stability. Inform FonOff of foregoing and report views re applicability tripartite declaration to frontier incidents.

ACHESON

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Barrow and cleared with UNP. Sent to London and Paris and repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Faiz El-Khouri.

[3] During discussion of the Israel–Syria border dispute at the press conference cited in footnote 3, p. 626, the following exchange had taken place:

"Q. Can you explain it just a little, on what aspect we are taking up with the British and French on this?

"A. The discussion of the agreement which was made May 25, 1950. It was provided in it that we should consult should there be any violation or threat to the other nations, arrangements that had been made with reference to fringe and disputed areas between Israel and her neighbors, for the purpose of seeing what should be done immediately if there was trouble, or head off trouble that had not broken out."

262.84A41/4-1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Alexander F. Kiefer of the Office of German Economic Affairs

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1951.

Subject: Israeli Reparation Claim Against Germany.

Participants: Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
Mr. Horowitz, Israeli Minister of Finance
GER—Henry A. Byroade
GEA—Alexander F. Kiefer

The Ambassador and Mr. Horowitz stated that they had come to discuss in greater detail with Mr. Byroade the Israeli reparation claim against Germany, which had been the subject of a note from the Israeli Ambassador on March 12, 1951. Mr. Horowitz stated that the German balance of payments was now greatly improved, and while it was realized that it was still short of equilibrium, it seemed to him that it was sound enough to bear the burden of the Israeli claim. He compared the German balance of payments with that of Israel, having exports of 13 million pounds sterling and imports of 103 million pounds sterling, the latter much larger figure being due entirely to the costs of resettlement which, it was recalled, had entered into the Israeli reparation claim. Mr. Horowitz noted that many restrictions on German production had been removed and that Germany had many exportable commodities in a seller's market; the Israeli Government realized that payment of the reparation claim by Germany would have to take several years and that it probably would have to be in unrequited exports, rather than foreign exchange. This was no problem for Israel because Germany was producing precisely the things which Israel needed most urgently.

The Israelis felt that Germany was actually ready to do something along the lines which the Israeli Government had in mind and Mr. Eban added that the influence of the Occupying Powers under the circumstances might make the difference between readiness to do something and action itself. Mr. Horowitz expressed his conviction that the Israeli claim was entirely feasible from the economic point of view. What was needed was Allied pressure on the Germans to perform. The Israeli claim was not a purely legal one, and possibly there were certain legalistic gaps in it. The circumstances, however, were such that political and moral bridges over these gaps were completely justified. One had to reckon in this connection with the very strong public opinion on this matter in Israel.

Mr. Byroade asked what Mr. Horowitz had meant by a German readiness to do something. Mr. Horowitz replied that there seemed to be a realization in the higher circles in Germany that a measure of dditional retribution was called for, but that it was quite possible hat this feeling did not prevail among the people.

Mr. Byroade suggested that what the Israelis wanted was really eparation out of current production. It also seemed to him that the sraelis saw the German picture in brighter terms than we did; ctually we expected a German trade deficit next year, additional ECA assistance, and a mounting burden on the Germans in connection vith the defense effort. Mr. Horowitz admitted the point about repara- ion out of German production, but stated that he preferred to con- sider it a measure of necessary retribution. It was realized that the erman Government would be faced with certain other obligations vhich would have to be satisfied out of limited resources. The matter eally boiled down to a question of priorities and in considering these, ne would have to bear in mind such matters as the comparative tandard of living as between Germany and Israel. For the Israelis, he question was whether the Israeli people should be kept on a level f starvation so that the Germans might be permitted to contribute o Allied security while maintaining their present relatively high tandard of living. The amount of the Israeli reparation claim was ctually relatively insignificant in the total German economic picture. urthermore, since the matter of the defense of the Western world ad come up, it might be well to bear in mind that a strong and well eveloped Israel was also a very considerable asset to that defense.

Mr. Byroade stated that he agreed that there was a question of pri- rities here and that he had really wanted to indicate that there would e a German deficit for sometime to come, and that the priority for the upport of Allied Forces would place heavy demands on the German conomy. He inquired what time period the Israeli Government had n mind for the payment of the Israeli claim. Mr. Horowitz replied hat this might be five to seven years, depending on the development f German exports. Mr. Byroade commented that he wished the prob- m were as easy as the Israeli representatives had made it out. Mr. ban commented that the impact on the Israeli economy of rehabilitat- g 500,000 persons was greater than the impact of the necessary assist- nce on the German economy.

Mr. Horowitz remarked that there were strong psychological con- derations. Something had to be done soon by the Germans and racefully, if this question was not to poison the atmosphere for years o come.

Mr. Byroade stated that the Israeli claim was really an Allied roblem. He was sympathetic to the logic of the Israeli position, but e was also acutely conscious of the practical difficulties arising out f the nature of the world in which we live today.

[Here follows discussion of procedural matters.]

683.84A/4-1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 10, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Israel Ambassador

Participants: H.E. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
NEA—Mr. Berry
NE—Mr. Lewis Jones
NE—Mr. Waldo

The Ambassador called at his own request to make some further remarks on the Israel–Syria border situation.

The Ambassador said that he had recently been in touch with General Riley in New York on the Israel–Syria situation. The General had agreed that it was unfortunate that the dispute should come before the Security Council. The General considered that this problem could be worked out in the Mixed Armistice Commission. Israel was quite willing to negotiate the problem in the MAC providing that Col. Bossavy was replaced as Chairman. Israel had had at least the right to expect a "show of gallantry" from Col. Bossavy at the time of the shooting of the seven policemen.

The Ambassador said that he considered uncalled for the release to the press of Mr. McGhee's remarks as summarized in the *aide-mémoire* given Mr. Keren on Saturday.[2] When Israel had submitted notes to the Department, Israel representatives made a practice of consulting with the Department before releasing them to the press. He would have hoped that Israel would have merited reciprocal treatment on this occasion. With regard to the press account itself, it had interpreted Mr. McGhee's remarks as a rebuke to Israel in according Israel the largest measure of responsibility for the border situation. He denied that the onus lay with Israel and claimed that continuous Syrian violence along Israel's borders which had culminated in the shooting of the seven policemen, had compelled Israel to take punitive action.

I told the Ambassador that we could only repeat our position as it had been expressed in the *aide-mémoire*. It had been decided to release our views to the press because of the depth of our concern over the dangerous potentialities of the border situation and because of repeated inquiries from the press. In considering that the shooting of the policemen had not warranted the deliberate retaliatory bombing of Syrian soil, we had not attempted to pass judgment on the question of the dispute over the Demilitarized Zone. It was hoped that a proper discussion of this matter could take place in the SC.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

[2] April 7. See footnote 3, p. 626.

The Ambassador then informed me that there had been another border clash in which Arabs in the village of Nuqueib had shot at Israel civil police while the latter were performing their routine duties.

Mr. Jones said that we would inquire of our missions concerning this incident.

774.5/4–1151 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 2446

CAIRO, April 11, 1951.

Subject: Transmission of Egyptian Foreign Office *Aide-Mémoire* re Gulf of Aqaba[1]

As stated in the reference despatch[2] this Embassy has kept all inquiries of the Government of Egypt concerning an Egyptian naval blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba on a highly informal and personal basis with officials of the Egyptian Foreign Office. It was, therefore, somewhat of a surprise recently when the Counselor of the Embassy was handed an *Aide-Mémoire* on the subject during the course of one of his regular visits to Abdul Rahman Hakki Pasha, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That Hakki Pasha may have been slightly confused was evidenced by the fact that he apologized to the Counselor for having misplaced the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* on the subject. There had, of course, been no such *Aide-Mémoire.*

The Embassy is certain that the appropriate legal section of the Department will wish to give the most careful consideration to the ontents of the enclosed *Aide-Mémoire* and would appreciate instrucions as to the type of acknowledgment, if any, which should be made f its receipt. That the Government of Egypt is not certain of its own position may be indicated by the facts uncovered by the Office of he Naval Attaché that the "Circular to Shipping" put out by the Egyptian Government in implementation of the reasoning contained n the *Aide-Mémoire* was dated December 25, 1950, was in Arabic but ot in French, was received by only one shipping agent in Alexandria ontrary to the normal custom of full circulation, and only two weeks go was denied by one agency of the Egyptian Government as even eing in existence.

Although rejection of the points made in the *Aide-Mémoire* may resent a complicated and even questionable legal problem, if the *Aide-Mémoire* is received only in silence such silence will be interreted by the Government of Egypt as acquiescence of the United tates Government in the position assumed.

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

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[1] Dated April 9, p. 628.

[2] Despatch 2090 of March 5, not printed.

784A.5/4-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

TEL AVIV, April 11, 1951—6 p. m.

645. Having heard that this govt was planning an official celebration in Jerusalem on May 11, I took occasion recently to review briefly the policy set forth in Deptel 340, February 14[2] when on a routine visit to the FonOff to make arrangements for the entertainment of official visitors. This was done to forestall if possible receiving an official invitation to celebration or at least prepare a basis for non-attendance shld one nevertheless be recd.

I have now been asked informally whether I wld consider it consistent with our policy to attend such a celebration in Jerusalem and have expressed the view that it wld not be consistent with such policy. I thanked the FonOff spokesman for taking matter up in this way and said I hoped no invitation wld be recd in circumstances. I understand my Brit, French and Belgian colleagues agree this view.

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated to Amman and Jerusalem.

[2] *Ante*, p. 580.

683.84A/4-1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, April 12, 1951—7 p. m.

5410. Re Deptcirtel 612, April 10, 7 p. m.[1]

Asst head eastern San [*Eastern Department?*][2] expressed FonOff view that Israel Borderment apparently on Syrian side border as well as in demilitarized zone seemed lift recent Syro-Israeli disputes out of category mere frontier incident, or at least threatened do so. FonOff considered that in expressing UK views and concern to both parties (along lines similar Dept's) and in consulting with US and French it was in fact acting consistently with its obligations under tripartite declaration and so gave to understand Syrian and Israeli dipl reps here. FonOff agrees that it preferable withhold any appearance of calling tripartite declaration into formal operation for more serious sitn but since action to be taken under declaration not defined, sees no reason why we cannot say we have already acted according its spirit.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 629.

[2] In 1951 the Assistant Head of the Eastern Department of the United Kingdom's Foreign Office for the region including Israel and Syria was J. C. Wardrop.

onOff also agrees present dispute shld be handled by existing UN chinery.[3]

GIFFORD

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[3] In telegram 6160 from Paris, April 12, the Embassy reported on its conver- tion with a Foreign Office official with regard to French representations made Israel and Syria concerning the Huleh conflict. The Embassy stated in part: "Luc pointed out that FonOff, while mentioning tripartite declaration as ex- anation of their *démarches*, had carefully avoided stating they were taking tion thereunder. He agrees that any action under tripartite declaration shld reserved for graver events than present frontier incidents, which shld be ndled by existing UN machinery." (683.84A/4-1251)

0/4-1351 : Telegram

he Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

ONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 13, 1951—3 p. m.

845. Re impending SC consideration Syrian-Israeli allegations rmistice violations, fol US position shld be transmitted in confidence KDel and FrDel only. Embassies London, Paris requested do same.

1. View need for establishing facts, parties and Riley shld be heard y SC, and latest field reports from MACs re status Israeli-Syrian isputes shld be required by SC.

2. US Rep's role during presentation in SC by Israel, Syria, Riley nd MAC during submission report will be one of attempting elicit ll facts and to be sure complaints have thorough airing. However, fforts enlarge scope grievances during course presentation cases to e discouraged by US Rep, privately if such efforts can be anticipated nd publicly if necessary in the Council. US will be prepared present s views in SC fol steps in para 1.

3. While facts elicited by SC might affect eventual draft res, on asis of facts now at hand, Dept's thinking on possible res which might e introduced in SC with joint sponsorship generally along fol lines:

a. Reminding parties past concern of SC in achieving final peace in area;

b. Reminding parties of obligations under Art 2, para 4 of UN Charter[2] and commitments under Armistice Agreement that there shall be no resort to mil action against each other and accordingly noting incidents and, if useful purpose will be served, condemning actions of party or parties demonstrated to be at fault[3] as inconsistent with obligations undertaken;

c. Calling upon parties to use available armistice machinery and abide by decisions thereof;

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Ludlow and cleared by UNA, NE, and NEA. Trans- nission approved by Mr. Hickerson personally. Repeated for information to)amascus, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] For text of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, une 26, 1945, see TS No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

[3] Between the words "fault" and "as" in the source text the following phrase s crossed out: ", e.g. retaliatory bombing,". The change was initialed by Ir. Hickerson.

d. Endorsing Riley's views that rights of parties are held in abeyance in demilitarized zone and accordingly directives of Chairman MAC pursuant his auth Art 5 Armistice Agreements shld be respected;

e. Declaring that it is SC view that parties cannot refuse participate in MAC mtgs;

f. Reminding parties obligations under Charter and Armistice Agreement to reach a permanent peace;

g. Calling on Chief of Staff UNTSO to report at end of 30 days on compliance given to res.[4]

ACHESON

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[4] In telegram 6228 from Paris, April 14, the Embassy reported in part that officials of the Foreign Office had "expressed entire approval" of the position of the United States outlined above. (683.84A/4-1451)

In telegram 5466 from London, April 17, the Embassy stated in part that the Foreign Office's instructions to the United Kingdom Delegation at the United Nations corresponded to numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 above, but that the United Kingdom had not yet taken a position regarding the substance of the resolution. According to the Embassy the Foreign Office was inclined to regard the question of sovereignty in the demilitarized zone as too complex for consideration in the present resolution. (683.84A/4-1751).

683.84A/4-1551 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, April 15, 1951—3 p. m.

536. UN official has discussed with me in strict confidence his views on how UN authority is to be restored in Syro-Israel dispute over demilitarized zone. Summary his remarks follows:

1. Can Israelis bring armed police into the zone? Syrians strongly affirm police may only be recruited from local population pointing to Bunche's reply dated June 26, 1949[2] to question raised at last meeting Syrian-Israeli armistice comm June 21,[3] heading in part as follows:

> "Such civilian administration (referred to in para 5 of armistice agreement) including policing will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of admin, jurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignty." Israeli place stress however on subsequent passage in same letter stating admin and police in zone wld be "Arab" and "Israeli" respectively. Syrians declare Bunche clearly meant local Jewish population in zone when referring to "Israelis". Only SC with perhaps Bunche as witness can clear this question up. Up to 250 Israeli police now in central zone and number shld be reduced to Mar 15 level. Arab villages shld be policed by Arabs.

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] For text, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.542, p. 31.

[3] 1949.

2. Does Israel have sovereignty over zone? Acting Chief Staff Truce Observation Comm, has already informed Israelis their claim to sovereignty is untenable under the Armistice Agreement and that Israeli territory ends where zone begins. However only SC can give ruling that will be respected by Israel. In letter to Sharett also dated June 26, 1949[4] Bunche stated "questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be dealt within ultimate peace settlement and not in Armistice Agreement". Israeli official documents before UN asserting zone within Israeli territory should not be allowed to stand in record.

3. Has chairman of MAC authority stopped work on drainage project as MAC asserts it has? Riley's memo on Lake Huleh project (Jerusalem Contel 165, Mar 7)[5] ordered work stoppage but Israel is not only refuse obey it but have resorted to subterfuge to offset memo. Thus, two hours after Riley departed for US Colonel Ramati declared Riley had orally agreed withdraw memo but his political adviser denied this. On Mar 14 Ramati succeeded in getting Bossavy to sign two letters drafted by Ramati in English at variance with directive in Riley's memo. On Apr 12 Shiloah said he had just recd tel from Washington saying Riley had orally concurred in plane set forth in Bossavy's letter. Political adviser refused accept this statement unless direct from Riley.

4. It is essential that Arabs forcibly removed by Israelis from zone be returned to their homes as MAC insists if its authority and terms of armistice agreement are to be upheld. Only 40 to 50 Arabs are left in central zone out of approx 1100 in mid-March. At least 650 now in Israeli custody and remainder fled to Syria. One killed by Israeli police when he resisted removal.

UN official also said urgent temporary need exists for six more trained observers not below the rank of Captain. He preferred these be American and doubted wisdom of recruiting observers of other nationality. In response my query he emphatically said he did not think armed UN escorts shld be assigned to observers.

In conclusion he said SC session wld be farce if it only resulted in "condemnatory resolution" without making clear cut decisions on above specific issues.[6]

CANNON

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[4] This message had also been sent to the Syrian Foreign Office. A longer portion is quoted in U.N. Doc. S/PV.542, p. 30.

[5] Not printed. (683.84A/3-751) It contains the document quoted in footnote 5, p. 591.

[6] In telegram 535 from Damascus, April 15, Minister Cannon had stated in part: "Now that Syrian-Israeli dispute is to be debated before SC it seems to us that for evaluating effectiveness MAC machinery henceforth and consequently for determining US policy it is essential that issue of sovereignty in the demilitarized zone be defined at outset. . . . Our concern is lest UN might prefer to seek settlement by handing problem back to MAC with some formula designed to strengthen MAC's prestige instead of grappling with this fundamental issue of sovereignty." (683.84A/4-1551)

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1951.

Subject: Syrian-Israeli situation.

Participants: Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Kopper
NE—Mr. Stabler

Mr. Eban called on me at his request. He said that Mr. Sharett had asked him to take up with the Department the question of jurisdiction in the demilitarized zone. The US delegation to the UN had also suggested that he discuss this question with the Department as it was the delegation's feeling that the Department might not be familiar with some of the points he was going to mention. Mr. Eban said it was unfortunate that this question had come to the SC, since the matter should have been dealt with by the Mixed Armistice Commission. He felt that Israel was the aggrieved party in this question, since the Syrians had invaded Israeli territory and had killed seven Israeli policemen. His government considered that the November 17 resolution of the SC was an injunction to the parties not to bring matters before the SC when they could be resolved in the Mixed Armistice Commission. However, the question was now before the SC. While his government had had no intention of raising the juridical position of the demilitarized zone, since it felt that Israel clearly had jurisdiction over the area, it now appeared that this matter was an issue. General Riley had raised the question by stating that in his opinion the laws and legislation of Israel were in abeyance. Originally, he had said that the laws were null and void, but had subsequently changed his mind. His government had admiration for General Riley, but they did not believe he was an expert on Palestine or Israel law. In the view of the Israel government the concession given to the Palestine Land Development Company was still entirely valid and Israel did not believe that either Riley or the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission had any right to assume they could cancel the validity of this concession. His government believed that this action was not in keeping either with the Armistice Agreement or with practice for the last two years. Israel considered that the only difference between the demilitarized zone and the rest of Israel territory was that troops could not be stationed in the former; otherwise, the demilitarized zone was exactly the same as other Israel territory, and Israel law was valid and applicable there. Israel considered that the basic concept of the Armistice Agreement was that there was a contractual arrangement between the two parties and the UN and that the Chairman had no superior rights to the other parties. Israel would like to see the UN and observers abide by the Armistice Agreement and only assume those powers expressly given them by that Agreement. Israel took strong exception to the unilateral action by the Chairman.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Stabler.

Mr. Eban also reviewed certain alleged facts concerning the situation.

I thanked Mr. Eban for these views, but said that the matter was now to be considered by the SC and it was for that body to decide the issues. We considered, however, that Israel had taken unilateral action in this situation and had not recognized the fact that the UN Chairman had requested the Israelis to cease engineering operations and that the Syrians had protested these operations. Since the question was being disputed by the two nations, it would appear that the UN had a supra-national authority and consequently it was not justifiable for Israel to take unilateral action. While we deplored the shooting of the Israeli policemen, we did not think that the Israeli retaliatory action could be justified under any circumstances. I said I was sure that Mr. Eban would understand that these incidents have a cause and effect relationship. With respect to the facts in the case, I wished to point out that the Department also possessed a considerable amount of information from neutral and reliable sources which I could say in all frankness did not bear out much of the information which the Israelis presented. Unfortunately, Israel had not seen fit to permit our Service Attachés to proceed into the area, so our information from the Israeli side did not come from American official observers. However, I emphasized that the US did not prejudge the issue and that we would await determination of the facts as the SC consideration of this case developed.

George C. McGhee

320.2 AA/4-1951

The Lebanese Foreign Office to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees[1]

[Translation]

Beirut, 16 April 1951.

The Lebanese Government has examined the refugee problem in the light of the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 2 and 14, 1950. It is pleased to note that both these resolutions give evidence of a sincere wish to help the refugees, to confirm their right to return to their homes and for the right to compensation for those who decide not to return. It hopes that the Office to be created by the Conciliation Commission will put into effect Paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948.

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[1] Translation of this note was transmitted to the Department as enclosure to despatch 549, April 19.

Telegram 716 to Beirut (Unrap 137), April 21, indicates in part that similar notes had been received by the Embassy in Egypt and the Legation in Syria from their host governments by that date. (844.411/4-2051)

However, the Lebanese Government cannot avoid expressing its reprobation of the unjust measures taken with regard to the refugees, the effect of which is to impede their repatriation. It is, in particular, against those of the measures which have made it possible for their goods and assets to be disposed of without their permission, whereas thousands of them are at present living under the most difficult conditions, have already passed three winters away from their homes and, in spite of their tragic situation, the Jewish authorities continue to encourage Jews from all over the world to emigrate to Palestine without at all taking into consideration the disastrous effects which may result from this in at one and the same time the political, social and economic fields, and from which the Middle East will not be able to escape.

Since the day when these dramatic happenings took place, the refugee problem has been incessantly brought up before the General Assembly of the United Nations. The General Assembly has continuously made appeals that the rights of the refugees should be respected. The Arab Governments have always had the hope that the United Nations would implement these resolutions and that the great democratic states would make use of the means available to them to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees and their re-installation in Palestine. But this hope has not been realised, the difficulties have continued to increase and the sufferings of the refugees have redoubled.

The Lebanese Government, taking into consideration the tension prevalent in the world today, has examined the attitude which the Arab Government should adopt at the present stage of international affairs. Starting with the fact that the refugee problem is a political, social and human problem of the greatest gravity, and that it calls for an urgent solution motivated by principles of law and justice, and whereas, on the other hand, the international situation requires that this problem should be examined with care and steadfastness, and in view of the fact that the Arab countries cannot devote themselves wholeheartedly to their share of the responsibilities devolving on them in the international scene so long as they have to face up to this serious problem, the Lebanese Government is persuaded of the fact that there should be a united effort to find an immediate solution to the refugee problem in conformity with the provisions of both Paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948, and those of the resolutions of December 2 and 14, 1950.

The Lebanese Government considers that the funds destined for the Refugee Relief Programme and the implementation of the works in which the refugees are to take part do not respond to all the existing needs, nor are they sufficient for improving their living conditions, or for assuring the food, clothing and housing which they so greatly need.

In particular, the Lebanese Government considers that the sum of $30,000,000 fixed by the resolution of the General Assembly of December 2, 1950, for the Reintegration Fund is insufficient to remove the numerous difficulties facing the refugees. Resettlement in or out of Palestine can only be carried out if greater funds are dedicated to this end, to assure to approximately 900,000 refugees the peace and security of which they are at present deprived.

The General Assembly recorded, with good reason, in Paragraph 4 of the resolution of December 2, 1950, that resettlement of the refugees in or out of Palestine without prejudging their right to repatriation and compensation would in a large measure contribute to the peace and stability of the Near East. But this resettlement can only succeed if large funds are voted for the realisation of the aims which the United Nations have set themselves.

In this connection, it would be interesting to recall that Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the General Assembly resolution of December 11. 1948, requested the Conciliation Commission to take the necessary steps with a view to resettling the refugees and facilitating their economic and social rehabilitation. Unfortunately, neither the Con iliation Commission nor the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was able to attain this goal due to the insufficiency of the funds given them.

The refugees certainly expect the United Nations to protect their ights, to help them, to provide relief for them and ensure their return o a normal way of life.

Count Bernadotte, UN Mediator, stressed, in addition to this, in is report submitted to the General Assembly on December 18, 1948, he responsibilities incumbent on the United Nations with regard to he refugees. Far more, the refugees consider that the greater part f these responsibilities is incumbent on the two great democracies, r reasons which there is no occasion to mention here.

The Lebanese Government makes a point of recording in this respect at at no time have the Arab Governments tried to shirk their re- onsibilities, but that they have made use of all the means at their sposal to help the refugees. These Governments cannot, however, tle the refugee problem as a whole with their means alone. It is undeniable fact that it is up to the international community to ume this task, in conformity with the aims of the Charter of the ited Nations.

The Arab Governments have collaborated with UNRWA and have accepted the implementation of certain works projects in their countries. But the funds available to the Agency have limited its field of activity, and have made it possible for only a very small number of refugees to be given employment.

At the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League on February 3, 1951, the Arab Governments gave all their attention to the situation in which the refugees now find themselves and the dangers which may result, particularly in the present state of international tension. They agreed that they should each present this joint note to the Governments concerned, inviting them to spare no effort to answer the appeals of the refugees and to see that their rights are respected in conformity with the above-mentioned General Assembly resolutions. At the same time they agreed that they should confirm that the refugees, being assured of the approval and support of the Arab Governments in this connection, cannot accept any project for resettlement in or out of Palestine before a general programme has been adopted through which it will be possible to assure, in the quickest possible time, the full and entire realisation of such projects, protecting at the same time all their rights as recognized by the General Assembly resolutions.

The Lebanese Government hopes that the other member states of the United Nations will hasten to find a solution to the refugee problem in the above-mentioned direction, so that the Arab States, having been relieved of their preoccupation with the refugee problem and having been assured that it has been settled on a basis of law and justice, may devote themselves to the study of the other problems they have to face, and collaborate effectively to the settlement of general international questions.[2]

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[2] In circular telegram 646 of April 24, routed to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus, drafted by Mr. Sands and cleared by NE and UNP, the Department stated in part: "Ack[nowledgment of] *Aide-Mémoire* shld note briefly US Govt considers this constructive forward step settlement refugee problem and US other interested govts currently examining ways and means financing reintegration." (320.2AA/4-251)

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468 : "Economic Assistance"

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1951.

Subject: Suggested action for presentation of a program of economic assistance to the Near East in the light of the Israeli request for a grant in Fiscal 1952 of $150 million.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Gardiner.

Discussion:

(1) We now have "markings" from the Bureau of the Budget on our program for grant aid to the Near East; out of a total of $50,000,000 approved by the Bureau of the Budget for the area, including a contribution which may be as high as $30,000,000 to the United Nations Arab refugee program, $1,000,000 is earmarked for Israel.

(2) Since the preparation of that program, the Israelis have requested a grant of $150,000,000. This request is intended to be the first installment of a three-year program amounting to $1½ billion which Israel will seek from United States grants and other sources. This program will involve the immigration into Israel of 500,000 Jewish people. It has not been demonstrated that it is in our national interest for the United States Government to assume even partial financial responsibility for such immigration.

(3) The items that go to make up the $150 million are set forth in the Note of March 22:

"APPROXIMATE LIST OF PURCHASES TO BE FINANCED WITH REQUESTED GRANT-IN-AID

A. Materials, fixtures, and equipment required to be imported for the construction of 70,000 housing units		$30, 000, 000
B. Supplies required to restrain the inflationary pressure of the investment and defense programs		
(*a*) Wheat	$25, 000, 000	
(*b*) Fodders	15, 000, 000	
(*c*) Oilseeds	10, 000, 000	
(*d*) Fertilizers and seeds	10, 000, 000	
(*e*) Cotton, other fibers, and textile materials	10, 000, 000	
(*f*) Leather, hides, chemicals, and minor materials	10, 000, 000	
(*g*) Petroleum	25, 000, 000	105, 000, 000
C. Shipping and insurance services		15, 000, 000
Total		$150, 000, 000"

The foregoing list, as regards certain items, is clearly excessive, and probably reflects the desire of the Israelis to stockpile basic items. Item A is based on the presumption that the United States will assist in the financing of the immigration policy discussed above. Item B(*a*), Wheat, represents roughly 50% more than the import requirements of Israel, based on 1950 actual imports and taking Israel's projected population growth into account. Item G, Petroleum, represents per capita requirements double those of the United Kingdom, approximately nine times those of Greece, and 18 times those of Turkey. Similar inflation occurs elsewhere in these figures.

(4) Balance of payments figures, however, suggest that Israel, even without a large immigration program, is likely to require grant aid in order to prevent a considerable reduction of the living standards of its present population. We cannot justify a figure with precision at this time, but a reasonable amount would appear to be at least $25 million. Such an amount could be justified on a project basis. Israel's requirements for grant aid are of course related to an unknown; the amount that may be subscribed privately for the country's needs.

(5) Our policy of impartiality requires an adjustment of proposed aid to the Arab states if Israel is to receive a substantial grant. Thus it might be opportune to combine legislative proposals providing for grants to Israel in a regional program which will include proposals looking to a final settlement of the Arab refugee problem.

The Israeli Note refers to Israel's obligations to the refugees. It is most unlikely that a direct settlement by Israel of the refugee claims for compensation can or will be made in any reasonable period of time. If in the long run the United States is to pay this bill, it will be preferable for the United States to provide funds promptly and directly for refugee resettlement and to administer these funds either directly or through United Nations mechanisms.

An indication of United States willingness to make adequate funds available for refugee resettlement could go far to ease local tensions and to make the Arab states themselves take resettlement seriously. This view has been expressed to us by Arab leaders in Syria and elsewhere. We cannot get far with a total reintegration budget of $30 million for 1952. It is therefore suggested that our legislation be written to provide authorization for a further $50 million to be available for refugee resettlement over and above our presently proposed contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. We recognize that the $50 million could not be disbursed in 1952; however, the availability of such a fund would enable us to move forward vigorously, as we could convince the Arab states that we mean to see the program of refugee resettlement through. Precedents exist for such a fund. The Arabs have demanded such an evidence of our intentions before they will agree to accept the influx of such large numbers of refugees for resettlement.

Such a proposal, presented in conjunction with the program already "marked up" by the Bureau of the Budget, would satisfy our essential criterion—impartiality.

We therefore submit the following recommendation:

Recommendation:

That we be authorized to present a revised program to the Bureau of the Budget for economic aid to the Near East increasing the present figure of $50 million for the Near East by $50 million, $25 million of which is to be earmarked for Israel and $25 million for Arab refugee resettlement, plus a further $25 million to be authorized for Arab refugee resettlement. Appropriations for this final $25 million will not be sought at this time.[2]

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[2] A notation on the source text indicates that this paper was concurred in by H, E, and UNA. "S/FA does not fully concur and is submitting separate comment." The S/FA paper is *infra.*

Attached to another copy of the memorandum above is a note of April 21 from Mr. Bonesteel to Mr. Bissell which indicates that by that date Mr. Acheson had approved the memorandum for interdepartmental clearance. (S/ISA Files: Lot 52-26: "Israel")

Information on clearance of the specific memorandum above has not been found in Department of State files, but in a memorandum of April 25, to Mr. Gordon, Mr. Bonesteel stated in part that by then an increase in economic aid to Israel and the Arab states had been "cleared" by the Defense and Treasury Departments. (S/ISA Files: Lot 52-26: "Israel")

/ISA Files: Lot 52-26: "Israel"

Iemorandum by the Executive Director, European Coordinating Committee, Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Bonesteel) to the Secretary of State

OP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1951.

ubject: NEA Memo to the Secretary[1] on additional economic assistance to Middle East in light of Israeli requests for $150 million (Mr. McGhee, 17 April, 1951)

1. I have seen and discussed the subject NEA memo.

2. The original FY '52 foreign aid program, Title II, included arly $1.0 million for Israel. This represented the considered estite of the Executive Branch on aid required for Israel and desirable the U.S. national interest under the concept of the total foreign aid l. This should be the position defended by the Administration, *less* an estimate of the U.S. internal political situation indicates separate Israeli request would be substantially approved by Conss, with the explosive effects of such partisanship on the Arab tes in the Mid-East.

. If this political estimate indicates that the better way out of a situation is to increase our proposed aid for Israel—and the same the Arab countries—then I agree that a program such as sugged by Mr. McGhee might be put forward.

In any event, it should informally be made plain to Members ongress who intend to oppose the Israeli request, that the Israeli est is an outright suggestion for an international WPA which it further involve the U.S. Government in a moral commitment pport the three-year $1.5 billion program of the Israeli Govern—a program contemplating further substantial immigration into

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pra.

a country which seems economically incapable of supporting even its present population.

5. A decision on the subject is needed *urgently*. The Bureau of the Budget "marked" Title II without prejudice to further action on the Israeli request. NEA cannot finalize its programs for Congress until it knows whether or not to increase the present program.

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Edward P. Maffitt of the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] April 19, 1951.

US/S/1742

Subject: The Syrian-Israeli Dispute

Participants: Major General William E. Riley, Chief of Staff, Truce Supervision Organization
Edward P. Maffitt, US Mission

Last Monday, the 16th, I visited General Riley in the St. Albans Naval Hospital. I took the occasion to inform him that the State Department had finally acceded to General Cates' insistent request that Riley be returned to active Marine Corps duty. We then discussed matters connected with the present Syrian-Israeli dispute.

Riley said Eban and Rafael had come to see him the afternoon of their visit to this office (April 13th) [1] and had appeared somewhat unsettled. Riley was inclined to attribute this to their talk with us and something Dr. Bunche had said to them, and thought that the combination of these incidents and the conversation that had ensued between Riley and themselves might have had something to do with the tone Foreign Minister Sharett took in his press conference on April 15. Bunche had said that he would not like to give testimony at the Council table, but if he did, would not support the Israelis' claim that the Demilitarized Zone is Israeli territory. Riley himself had told Eban that he disagreed with Israel's way of proceeding in the Huleh district and its claim that it had the right to police the Demilitarized Zone. He also had told Eban that he would not recommend the release of Colonel Bossavy because it was the Israeli Delegate Ramati who was requesting it. He had assured Eban that Ramati caused more trouble than the rest of the Israeli Delegates together and had added that for a year he, Riley, had been requesting Ramati's replacement.

At this point General Riley said it seemed to him that the Israelis were trying unilaterally to revise the Armistice Agreement.

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[1] The memorandum of this conversation held between Messrs. Eban, Rafael, Gross, and Maffitt is not printed. (IO Files: US/S/1742)

General Riley then mentioned an element that I think will be most important in the Security Council discussion of the case. He referred to an explanatory note [2] Dr. Bunche had sent the parties in transmitting them his draft of Article V of the Armistice Agreement. Among other things, this note said that "Civilian administration, including policing, will be on a local basis without raising the questions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship and sovereignty." I think it also affirms the competence of the Chairman of the MAC which would be created by the Armistice Agreement, in matters concerning the administration and policing of the Demilitarized Zone. Riley said that both parties to the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Conference had agreed that the explanatory note should be recorded in the Summary Records of the Conference's meetings and that, once it had been so recorded, it would be used as an authentic commentary should any difficulty arise in the interpretation of the Armistice Agreement. The Summary Records of all the Conference meetings were transmitted by Mr. Bigier to the Chief of Staff under covering letter of July 26th and Riley believed that both parties and Dr. Bunche as well as himself had complete sets.

I said I thought these Summary Records, including the explanatory note, should be at the disposal of the Council and General Riley thought that if he should be invited to the table to answer questions, he could bring them to the attention of the Council in reply to an appropriate question.

In reply to my inquiry whether the Chairman's jurisdiction in the Demilitarized Zone had been called into question prior to the present incidents, Riley said it had not. In fact he recalled that in August of 1949 he had caused the Israelis to remove a cluster of houses they had set up over-night near Ein Gev and that before the Israelis removed them to another place they had sought and obtained the Chairman's permission to place them in the new location.

General Riley also recalled that we might find several cases recorded in the Summary Records of the MAC where the Chairman, as agent for the Palestine Arabs, had received complaints against the actions of Israeli police in the Demilitarized Zone.

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[2] See telegram 536 from Damascus, April 15, p. 636.

684A.85/4-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

Tel Aviv, April 20, 1951—2 p. m.

667. Re Embtel 579, Mar 22 [2] and Embdesp 541, Mar 23.[3]

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[1] Repeated to Amman and Jerusalem for information.

[2] Not printed. (684A.85/3-2251) It contains a summary of the Jordanian proposals discussed in despatch 223 from Amman, March 19, p. 601.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 602.

copy available

Shiloah has now given me what purports to be copy Israel reply[4] to PriMin Jordan's communication suggesting possible basis implementation Jordan–Israel armistice agreement and settlement certain other outstanding problems. Israel reply (being air mailed today) includes fol:

(1) Best procedure is to implement gen armistice agreement as first step; hence discussion items outside scope armistice agreement shld be excluded from talks for present and may properly be taken up later by special comite mentioned Article VIII after implementation armistice agreement.
(2) Reaffirms Israel willingness hand over Naharayim area but on understanding all outstanding details implementation armistice agreement "will be agreed upon before this area is handed over".
(3) Rejects Jordan suggestion that Article VI be extended to villages east of demarcation line in ex-Iraqi sector but offers compensation to landowners on Israel side who have chosen move to Jordan. Rejects any claim on Israel Govt of landowners on Jordan side armistice line but states such claims may be placed on agenda Article VIII comite after implementation that article. Reaffirms Israel readiness pay for road mentioned Article VI (5) armistice agreement.
(4) Accepts in principle free movement Latrun–Jerusalem road and operation Latrun pumping station be achieved by division no-man's-land. Suggests details be worked out by mil.
(5) Expresses "amazement" suggestion Mt. Scopus be treated as Jordan territory since area held by Israel forces prior to mil agreement July 7, 1948. Entire Mt. Scopus area "is and must remain Israel territory". Only on this understanding can problem be discussed.
(6) Detailed plans for implementation free access to holy places shld be achieved during Pechrut [apparent garble] negots with effective date left to special agreement.
(7) Israel prepared implement Article VIII provisions to Bethlehem road and electricity for old city.

Shiloah reminded me that Jordan plan included four points outside armistice agreements, viz, cession Naharayim area, release of blocked accts, compensation of Arabs owning property in Israel-held Jerusalem, and division of no-man's-land in Jerusalem basis property ownership. He said that despite Israel policy of insistence on implementation armistice agreement before taking up other questions he was authorized agree to transfer Naharayim area; and while making no ref to matter of blocked accts in written communication he delivered oral message that Israel Govt will consider partial release in order to help Jordan officials make settlement more palatable in Arab circles. He indicates his govt not prepared to discuss other compensation outside terms of armistice agreement until that agreement fulfilled. Moreover, suggestion re divisions no-man's-land in Jerusalem regarded as entirely impractical and unacceptable as method of fixing boundary. As to uncompromising attitude re Mt. Scopus, he stated his govt wld not have made any pronouncement on this subj had Jordan not attempted prejudice Israel position.

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[4] The full text, dated April 16, of this document is enclosed with despatch 623 from Tel Aviv, April 20, not printed. (684A.85/4–2051)

Comment: Emb has impression both sides inclined to be defeatist about success of negots and doubts whether present exchange of correspondence will bring success much, if any, nearer. It believed real Israel position less rigid than text implies.

Davis

320.2 AA/4–2651 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BEIRUT, April 26, 1951—4 p. m.

603. Rapun 143.[2] Re Unrap 137.[3]

Lie arrived Beirut [4] depressed by over-all Arab attitude and confused as to Arab position on reintegration. Shortness of visit did not enable him penetrate repatriation smokescreen nor permit us to obtain adequate press statements despite considerable effort.

On last day of visit Fouad Ammoun agreed with me that Arab countries were defeating their own purpose by talking in language of recent note.[5] Said he wld attempt to give Lie simple statement of real Arab position in interest of obtaining generous and continuing UN support of reintegration.

As result incomplete impressions, Lie straining for new solutions.

On reintegration Lie talked of large loan program. We suggested he first find new director and 50 million grant money.

On over-all UN activity in area Lie considers situation too complicated. Proposes policy board at Lake Success representing all country and functional interests with one man in area to carry out all policies. We reminded him of sovereignty angle, realism of grass root contacts and occasional merit of separating our old issues from new as with PCC and PRA.

Finally we emphasized next reintegration move is UN not Arab and parted good friends.

Bruins

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[1] Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem (for Palmer), and Tel Aviv.

[2] Rapuns were apparently from Mr. Blandford in his capacity as United States Representative on the Advisory Committee to UNRWAPNE.

[3] Dated April 21, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 639.

[4] Department of State files do not indicate inclusive dates of Mr. Lie's visit to Beirut.

[5] In telegram 605 (Rapun 114) from Beirut, April 27, Mr. Blandford stated in part: "For casual reader aggressive language of *aide-mémoire* consciously conceals Arab intent to cooperate reintegration." (320.2 AA/4–2751)

683.84A/4–2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Bernhard G. Bechhoefer of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET [NEW YORK,] April 26, 1951.

Subject: Controversy between Israel and Syria

Participants: Mr. Gideon Raphael—Israeli Delegation
Mr. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer—Department of State

At the end of yesterday's Security Council meeting, Mr. Raphael approached me and asked my views on Ambassador Eban's speech.[1] I replied that I considered it a very eloquent and persuasive speech and was very anxious to study in detail the legal points which Ambassador Eban had made.

Mr. Raphael then asked me whether, in my opinion, the situation would be helped by Ambassador Eban's admission that Israel was at fault in engaging in the retaliatory bombings. I said that I thought it probably would help, that I could see no possible justification for the retaliatory bombings. Mr. Raphael indicated that, from the legal standpoint, he agreed that there was no justification.

Mr. Raphael then asked my views concerning the outcome of the Security Council proceedings. What were the plans of the United States concerning any action by the Security Council? I stated that the evidence was very complicated, and before coming to any conclusions, the United States wished to hear all the evidence. I pointed out that both Ambassador Eban's speech and General Riley's statement at the April 25th meeting had tended to clarify points which were previously somewhat obscure.

Mr. Raphael then asked whether it was true that the United States wished to stop the Huleh drainage project. I suggested that Mr. McGhee's statement to Ambassador Eban was entirely clear on that point.[2] He replied that in general Mr. McGhee's statement was constructive but that he wondered whether the United States had changed its position since then. I said I had no knowledge of any change.

Mr. Raphael then expressed the hope that General Riley could continue his work in Palestine.[3] He stated that regardless of the ability of any successor, it would take that successor at least a year to work out the cordial working relationships which General Riley had already established with Israel and the Arab States. Ambassador Eban at that moment spoke to me and reiterated Mr. Raphael's strong endorsement of General Riley. It should be noted that this conversation took place *after* General Riley's statement to the Security Council which was sharply critical of the Israeli position. Mr. Raphael specifically stated to me on a very confidential basis that he did not disagree very sharply with the main lines of General Riley's statement.

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[1] For text, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.542, pp. 3–27.

[2] Reference uncertain. For the attitude of the U.S. Government on the drainage project, see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Berry, March 30, p. 611.

[3] At this time the Department of the Navy wished to return General Riley to active duty with the Marine Corps while the United Nations and the Department of State were trying to obtain an extension of his tour with the Truce Supervisory Organization. The matter was finally resolved late in May when General Riley, after an extension of his tour had been approved by the Navy, accepted a permanent position with the United Nations and applied for retirement from the Corps. Documentation is in file 683.84A for 1951, and UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237.

UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1951.

Subject: Attached Draft Resolution.

The attached draft resolution was sent on by NE to Mr. Maffitt, USUN presumably last Thursday.[2] We first became aware of the existence of this draft this morning when Mr. Worcester of NE handed copies to Mr. Bechhoefer and Mr. Ludlow in anticipation of a 2 P M meeting in NE on it.

In a conversation which Mr. Ludlow had with Mr. Maffitt this morning, Mr. Ludlow learned that Mr. Maffitt had been talking to the British and French from this draft resolution. Mr. Ludlow told Mr. Maffitt that UNP had not seen this draft, nor did it know of its existence, and suggested to Mr. Maffitt that he not discuss this draft any further. Mr. Ludlow stated that the Department's position is and remains that which was contained in Deptel 845 to USUN, April 13.[3]

I telephoned Mr. Kopper and on learning that he was out, talked to Mr. Wells Stabler who told me that this draft was sent on to Mr. Maffitt because the latter was in need of something with which to talk to the British and French; that NE had sought to clear this draft with officers in UNP but was unable to reach those officers!

The draft in substance, you will note, is unacceptable to UNP and is in excess of the Department's position as set forth in Deptel 845.

I have requested Mr. Bechhoefer and Mr. Ludlow to concert with NE on a draft which would be mutually acceptable to both NE and UNA.

D[AVID] W. W[AINHOUSE]

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[1] Memorandum directed also to Mr. Sandifer.
[2] April 26.
[3] *Ante*, p. 635.

[Attachment]

Draft Resolution

[Extracts]

CONFIDENTIAL [undated.]

A.

1. The Security Council,

. . . .

2. Decides that the deterioration of the situation in the Demilitarized Zone provided for by Article 5 of the Israel–Syria Armistice Agreement of July 20, 1949, has resulted primarily from the refusal of the Israel Government to comply with the requests of the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization regarding the engineering operations of the Palestine Land Development Company in the Demilitarized Zone.

3. Considers that this attitude on the part of Israel has resulted in the inability of the Mixed Armistice Commission to deal appropriately with the situation in the Demilitarized Zone.

. . . .

B.

1. The Security Council deplores the series of incidents which have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone resulting in the loss of Israeli and Arab lives and the bombing of Syrian soil by Israel military forces for which, it is noted, apology has been made by the Israel representative on April 25, 1951.

. . . .

330/5–151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 1, 1951—7 p. m.

891. Fol Dept's draft res re Syrian and Israel complaints before SC.

"*The Security Council*

1. *Recalling* its past res of Aug 11, 1949[2] and Nov 17, 1950 relating to Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighboring Arab States and to provisions contained therein concerning methods for maintaining Armistice and resolving disputes through Mixed Armis-

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[1] Telegram drafted by Messrs. Bechhoefer, Ludlow, and Waldo, and cleared with NE and UNA. Sent also to Damascus and Tel Aviv, and repeated for information to London and Paris.

[2] For text, see U.N. Doc. S/1376, I.

ice Commissions participated in by parties to Armistice Agreement;

2. *Noting* the complaints of Syria and Israel to SC, statements in Council of reps of Syria and Israel, the reports to Secy Gen of UN by Chief of Staff and Act Chief of Staff of UN Truce Supervision Org for Palestine, and statements before Council of the Chief of Staff of UN Truce Supervision Org for Palestine;

3. *Declares* that in order to promote return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that govts of Israel and Syria observe faithfully Gen Armistice Agreement dated July 20, 1949;

4. *Notes* that Israel and Syria by Arts 4 and 5 of Armistice Agreenent estab a demilitarized zone between them in interest of ensuring naintenance of their Armistice and accordingly agreed upon certain provisions for return of normal civilian life in and internal security of zone;

5. *Notes* that under Armistice Agreement where interpretation of neaning of a particular provision of the Agreement, other than preamble and Arts I and II, is at issue the Mixed Armistice Commission's interpretation shall prevail;

6. *Calls upon* govts of Israel and Syria to bring before Mixed Armistice Commission for its consideration the complaints of which SC is presently seized, except that alluded to in para 9 of this res, and to abide by decisions of Mixed Armistice Com;

7. *Reminds* Govt of Israel that it is inconsistent with objectives and ntent of Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of chairman of Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under Art V and calls upon the parties to be represented at all mtgs called by chairman of Commission and to respect such requests.

8. *Considers* that that Chairman of MAC is entitled to consider disputes concerning extent to which either party to Armistice Agreement s free to undertake civilian activities in demilitarized zone, to determine, where appropriate, the conditions under which such activities shall take place, and to take action to ensure that demilitarized zone shall be respected in accordance with letter and spirit of Armistice Agreement.

9. *Brings* to atten of govts of Syria and Israel their obligations under Art 2, para 4 of Charter of UN and their commitments under Armistice Agreement not to resort to mil force and finds that aerial action taken by forces of govt of Israel Apr 5, 1951 is violation of erms of Armistice Agreement and inconsistent with obligations of Israel under Charter:

10. *Noting* complaint with regard to evacuation of Arab residents from demilitarized zone, (*a*) decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from demil zone without their consent by govt of Israel shld be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that Mixed Armistice Com shld supervise their return and rehabilitation in manner to be determined by Commission; and (*b*) holds that no action nvolving transfer of persons across internatl frontiers, armistice lines, or within demil zone shld be undertaken without the prior decision of he Mixed Armistice Commission;

11. *Reminds* parties of their obligations under Charter to settle their nternatl disputes by peaceful means in such manner that internatl peace and security are not endangered, and expresses its concern at failure of govts of Israel and Syria to achieve progress pursuant to

their commitments under Armistice Agreement to promote return of permanent peace to Palestine.

12. *Calls upon* Chief of Staff of UN Truce Supervision Com to report to SC at end of 30 days on compliance given to this res.

13. *Requests* the Secy Gen to furnish such additional personnel and assistance as Chief of Staff of Truce Supervision Org may request in carrying out this res and Council's res of Nov 17 1950."

Dept considers inclusion para 10 *a* desirable but suggests USUN obtain Gen Riley's approval thereto.

Dept wld appreciate comments Emb Tel Aviv and Leg Damascus.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] In telegram 894 to New York, May 2, drafted by Mr. Ludlow and cleared by UNP and NE, the Department transmitted a paragraph to be added to the resolution:

"Noting with concern the repeated refusal of Israeli authorities to permit UN observers to perform their legitimate functions, calls to the attention of Israel the view of the Council that the parties shld permit access at all times for observers and officials of TSO whenever such access is requested in the pursuance of their functions and to render every facility which may be requested by the Chairman of the MAC in the interests of assuring access to localities subject of a complaint." (357.AC/5-251)

Editorial Note

In a letter of May 2 to Mr. Lawton, Mr. Webb outlined the Department's revised proposals with regard to economic aid to the Arab States and Israel. It is printed on page 120.

For considerable subsequent documentation on aid programs which affected Israel, see pages 1 ff.

Editorial Note

On May 2 fighting broke out in the area of Shamalneh village, in the Syro-Israeli Demilitarized Zone, and the Tel al Mutillah, in Israeli territory to the west of the Zone. Files 683.84A and 330 for May 1951 indicate that the Legation in Damascus initially understood the fighting to involve Israeli police (or soldiers) and Arab civilians resident in the Zone, while the Embassy in Tel Aviv supported the Israeli contention that the combatants included from the beginning regular Syrian troops. As of May 6 the Department accepted the contention that the Arab combatants were civilian. However, by May 9 it was taking note of ". . . mounting evidence some degree Syrian Army participation in incidents near Tell al Mutilla as reported by Emb Tel Aviv . . .". (Telegram 429 to Damascus, May 9, 683.84A/5-351)

Additional pertinent information regarding the origin of this incident is in file 683.84A for August 1951, especially in telegram 183 from Tel Aviv, August 27; airgram 33 to Damascus, August 30; and telegram 115 from Damascus, August 31.

In a resolution of May 8 (U.N. Doc. S/2130), the Security Council called upon the parties to cease fighting. The fighting ended by May 10.

State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, May 2, 1951[1]

[Extract][2]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON.]

PRESENT

General Bradley
General Collins
General Vandenberg
Admiral Sherman
General Bolte
General White
Admiral[3]
Admiral Wooldridge
General[3]

Admiral Lalor
Colonel Carnes
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Ferguson
[Mr. McGhee]
Mr. Tufts
Mr. Gleason

. . . .

ISRAEL

GENERAL VANDENBERG: I would like to mention the request by Israel for $150,000,000. From the military point of view I am firmly pposed to any action on behalf of Israel which would jeopardize ur position in Saudi Arabia, particularly of course our use of the Dhahran air base. Our prestige in Saudi Arabia was once high and t is now at an all-time low. It will go completely out of sight if we ake this action to aid Israel. We have got to have good relations vith Saudi Arabia. The Israeli program scares me.

MR. MCGHEE: As you know, the Israeli request was made to us and vas coordinated with a campaign in the Senate and House by which he Israelis obtained a lot of signatures by the Senators and Congress-nen. We have made no response to the Israeli request except to indicate hat we are developing a balanced program for the Middle East. We ave told them that we would make a single request for the Middle

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[1] This memorandum bears the following unsigned notation: "State Draft. Not leared with any of the participants."
[2] Another extract from this memorandum is printed on p. 113.
[3] Surname not indicated in the source text.

Eastern area and that that request will be balanced from an area standpoint. The purpose of our program will be to ease tensions in the area. I have just returned, as you know, from a trip through the area. I am convinced that the Israeli program would be disastrous to our relations with the Arab States. We must provide assistance to the Arab States comparable to that which we provide Israel. I would take issue with you, however, General Vandenberg, on the state of our relations with Saudi Arabia. I think that they are now at the highest point at which they have been since the Palestine nadir.

Admiral Sherman: What will happen to our relations with Saudi Arabia if Iraq nationalizes its petroleum industry and the Iraqis in effect take over?

Mr. McGhee: There is no indication that that will happen. I think Iraq could and would make arrangements with the same companies which now hold concession rights.

General Vandenberg: Our treaty with Saudi Arabia depends on what we do in the area and our good behavior. The treaty will run for only a short time. This trouble in Iran, this Israeli business and all the other things going on in that part of the world are bound to have an effect on Saudi Arabia, but as long as you people in State agree about the dangers in this program, I feel reassured.

Mr. McGhee: I feel sure that the Israeli program would not pass the Congress without Administration support.

Mr. Nitze: However, 36 Senators have signed the petition.

Mr. McGhee: Some of them signed it on a misunderstanding.

. . . .

684A.85/5–251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET   Tel Aviv, May 2, 1951—5 p. m.

696. Shiloah told us he has had recent conference with King Abdullah at latter's request to discuss Israel reply to PriMin Samir Rifai's written proposal (see Embtel 667 Apr 20).[2] When Shiloah enquired whether the King wished to have Samir present, Abdullah replied he preferred speak to him alone since he was displeased with both Samir and Shiloah over exchange of correspondence. He deplored raising sovereignty issue and Israel's undiplomatic rejoinder saying he wondered whether both govts might not withdraw their respective communications. Shiloah replied that altho such withdrawal wld present some practical difficulties he believed it might nevertheless

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman and Jerusalem.

[2] *Ante*, p. 647.

be done. The King then suggested Israelis disregard any intemperance in Jordan's reply and consider possibility of withdrawing entire correspondence. Shiloah thereupon spoke of possibility that Israel might be prepared release some blocked balances in order to create more favorable atmosphere. He says King Abdullah showed lively interest in this prospect and seemed hopeful it might serve useful purpose. In this connection however Shiloah remarked that while he believes Abdullah means well and has good ideas, he has now become "wishful thinker" and is believed to lack real power to implement views which are his alone.

DAVIS

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation : Lot 65 D 238

Memorandum of Meeting With the President, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1951.

LUNCHEON FOR THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER [1]

I went over with the President the information contained in my briefing memorandum,* which the President has in mind.[2] He will not raise the matter and will not permit himself to be committed in any way.

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

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[1] Mr. Ben Gurion arrived in the United States at Washington, May 3. President Truman gave him a luncheon the following day. On May 4, the Prime Minister also had separate conversations with W. Averell Harriman and Secretary Marshall. The Prime Minister met with President Truman on May 8 at the White House. No primary record of any of these conversations has been found in Department of State files. For what is apparently a summary of the talk held with Mr. Marshall, see the excerpt from the Daily Top Secret Summary of May 17, p. 686.

For the memorandum of the Prime Minister's conversation held with Secretary Acheson, May 8, see p. 667.

During his stay in the United States, Mr. Ben Gurion visited a number of cities in connection with the Israeli bond drive. He left the country from New York on May 31.

* On what to say if Prime Minister raises question of $150,000,000 at luncheon today. [Handwritten, unsigned footnote interpolation in the source text.]

[2] A section devoted to Israel in Mr. McWilliams' briefing memorandum of May 3 to the Secretary follows:

"The President is giving a luncheon for the Israeli Prime Minister tomorrow. Mr. McGhee suggests you discuss with the President the line to be taken in event the question of grant aid comes up. For your information, the Omnibus Aid Bill includes $25 million economic grant aid for Israel, $22.5 million for the Arab States, and $75 million for the UN activities of aid to Arab refugees.

"Of the $75 million we propose to seek only $50 million appropriation at this time. This fund will be supplemented by other contributing nations and will enable relief operations costing about $25 million per annum to be continued and will make possible a substantial start on a program of integration of Arab refugees. This program is of direct benefit to Israel." (Lot 65 D 238)

684A.85/5–351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, May 3, 1951—9 a. m.

698. In view Ben Gurion visit, Dept may be interested fol re Embtel 696, May 2.[2] Shiloah requested my views exchange of correspondence, and was informed it was my impression ground had been lost rather than gained. I suggested more attention be paid to motivation Arab opposition as prelude to coordinated and sustained Israel effort effect change in Arab attitude; expressed belief his people with their intelligence and determination can accomplish more than heretofore if they consider matter important enough. Cited unnecessarily provocative language in correspondence, generally rough handling of border incidents, and apparent lack of any concerted effort to create better feeling as factors contributing to lack of progress. He agreed imagination needed to avoid phraseology unduly embarrassing other negotiators, and seemed take in good part expression of view he had invited. I stressed nothing wld please us more than see improvement in Israel relations with its neighbors but we are convinced such improvement will have to be achieved by parties directly concerned.

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman and Jerusalem.
[2] *Ante*, p. 656.

357.AC/5–351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, May 3, 1951—5 : 57 p. m.

1485. Re Syrian-Israeli dispute. Following are USUN observations regarding draft res contained in Deptel 891 of May 1.[1] These are based on conversation yesterday with British and French,[2] views of Gen Riley, and opinions developed within mission.

1) Immediately following para 3, a new para 4 might be inserted calling attention of parties to Art. VIII, para 3 of Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement (providing that "either of the parties may call upon the SYG of the UN to convoke a conference of reps of the two parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising or suspending any of the provisions of this agreement other than Articles I and III. Par-

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[1] *Ante*, p. 652.
[2] A memorandum, by Mr. Bechhoefer of the conversation held in New York March 2, between Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to the United Nations is in IO Files: US/S/1750. A further memorandum by Mr. Bechhoefer on the same subject, addressed to Mr. Wainhouse, is in UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237.

ticipation in such conferences shall be obligatory upon the parties"). Practice of parties in bringing complaints direct to SC, when agreement is not reached through MAC's, contravenes spirit of this para, since we understand Bunche's design in putting it into armistice agreement was to keep disputes away from SC until all means of settlement provided by armistice agreement were exhausted.

2) Drafting of para 6 raises two points:

> *a*) In calling upon parties to bring complaints before MAC, para would provide for MAC consideration of some matters which are primarily or solely concern of chairman in his capacity as agent for Arab residents. This would constitute violation of Art. V of armistice agreement. For instance, firing by Arab civilians in zone is matter for chairman and is no concern of Syria's unless MAC is called upon to make interpretation in connection with decision of Chairman.
>
> *b*) Some elements in situation created by the retaliatory bombing are fit subjects for MAC consideration and should not be excluded from the request to parties. Therefore mission suggests language of this sort, "requests Govts of Israel and Syria to bring before MAC or its chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under armistice agreement, the complaints of which the SC is presently seized and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom."

3) Begin para 7 with word "considers" and delete "reminds the Govt of Israel". We feel sure if shoe fits Israelis will put it on and we consider original language is not well calculated to induce reasonable attitude.

4) Regarding para 9, we suggest that the finding by SC entailed in use of word "violation" may be getting SC into MAC's terrain. Furthermore, the retaliatory bombing was violation of cease-fire of July 15, 1948 and was therefore of direct concern to SC under provision of August 11, 1949 res which reads "requests the Chief of Staff mentioned above to report to the SC on the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine in accordance with the terms of this resolution . . .". Council can therefore make finding that bombing violated cease-fire and the last part of the para might read "is a violation of the cease-fire provided in the Security Council resolution of July 15, 1948, and is inconsistent with the terms of the armistice agreement and the obligations of Israel under the Charter of the United Nations."

5) Substitute "considers" for "decides" under para 10A and "considers" for "holds" in 10B on grounds not well calculated to induce reasonable attitude.

6) Omit "at end of 30 days" in para 12. Chief of Staff is submitting periodic reports to Council on continuing authority granted by November 17, 1950 res. We question whether Chief of Staff should be tied down to hard and fast schedule and are inclined to believe he should be given discretion to report when he considers circumstances warrant.

7) With regard to new suggested para in Deptel 894 of May 2,[3] we wish to point out that on at least one occasion Arab villagers refused to give observers access to place where they wished to go.

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[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 654.

However, since this refusal may have been based on fact that observers were accompanied by Israeli police (possibly at request of MAC chairman), possible Israeli charge of bias based on their being singled out in para might be met on ground that Arab villagers had right to exclude Israeli police. Please advise your decision after consideration this point.

Riley suggests substituting "required" for "requested" after words "whatever such access is".

AUSTIN

684A.85/5–451 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET AMMAN, May 4, 1951—11 a. m.

191. Kirkbride today showed me text PriMin Samir Rifai's reply to recent Israeli communication on implementation Jordan-Israeli armistice agreement (see Tel Aviv tel 667 April 20 to Dept).[2]

Samir's reply made in last two days and in essence states:

(1) Jordan agrees with Israel that first step must be implementation armistice agrmt and then consideration might appropriately be given other matters.

(2) Jordan considers Arts 6 and 8 thus far unimplemented and steps shld be taken rectify this state of affairs.

(3) There appears to be basic difference of interpretation between Jordan and Israel on meaning these articles and especially meaning of Art 8 as regards Mt Scopus institutions.

(4) In view of fact that interpretation of agrmt is legal matter Jordan believes difference shld be submitted to an internatl tribunal for clarification.

(5) Jordan proposes matter be submitted by both parties to Internatl Court of Justice and hopes Israel will agree this procedure.

Samir's reply was dispatched after mtg between King Abdullah and Shiloah described in Tel Aviv tel 696 May 2.[3] I understand King sought dissuade Samir from sending reply at this juncture stating that Israelis had promised pay Jordan "A lot of money" (presumably he referred to release certain blocked balances). Samir took stand that thus far Israeli concessions had been limited to offer evacuate Naharayim and release some blocked accounts. These were both due Jordan as matter of right and justice and must not be considered Israeli favors.

Kirkbride tells me at recent mtg between King and Shiloah it was latter, not Abdullah, who deplored raising sovereignty issue. He thinks

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[1] Repeated for information to Jerusalem, London, and Tel Aviv.

[2] *Ante*, p. 647.

[3] *Ante*, p. 656.

pages tightl

this may indicate Israelis not very sure of legal basis for their contention.[4]

FRITZLAN

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[4] In telegram 196 from Amman, May 14, the Legation reported in part that it learned that the proposal to have the two sides withdraw previous correspondence was discussed without result at a meeting held May 11 between the King, Prime Minister Rifai, and Mr. Shiloah. (684A.85/5–1451)

674.84A/5–451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, May 4, 1951—2 p. m.

1130. With regard to proposal that note re Akaba shld be expanded to review and renew our protests on Suez Canal and transport restrictions generally (Deptel 1068 May 2[2] rptd London 4998, Tel Aviv 481, Jidda 365, Amman 152) I believe reasoning on page 9 *Current Fon Relations* April 25[3] outlining basis for Dept's rejection Brit suggestion for renewed protest on Haifa restrictions are also applicable in present instance. Our position is on record with GOE and renewal at this time wld not likely really to contribute to result we desire. In fact it might have opposite tendency since GOE, with considerable justification, I believe, does not consider that Amer commercial interests are being seriously affected by her restrictions. GOE wld probably interpret undue unilateral interest on our part as confirmation that restrictions are of some utility insofar as Israel is concerned and that our interest reflects pro-Israeli policy.

In gen, views on this question are same as outlined in mytel 502, Nov 20, 1950[4] commenting on similar proposal, namely, that only chance of effective solution lies through MAC and SC.

I wld suggest therefore that Akaba protests be confined to that particular problem.

[CAFFERY]

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv.

[2] In this telegram the Department had in part suggested:

"Dept agrees reply shld be made to Egypt *aide-mémoire* re Akaba (Embdes 2446 Apr 11 [p. 633] and Deptel 1020 Apr 18 [not printed]) lest silence be interpreted as US acquiescence in position adopted. . . . We believe reply shld 1) review restrictions which Egypt has adopted and their effect on US natl interests; 2) set forth arguments contained Deptel 432, Nov 14, 1950 [not printed]; 3) cite gen legal principles involved in Akaba situation, (this situation analogous to passageway to Baltic Sea and Gulf Finland through Sound and Belts between Denmark and Sweden); and 4) assert US inability recognize validity Egypt position." (674.84A/5–251)

[3] Not printed; reference is to Department of State's classified internal publication, *Current Foreign Relations*.

[4] Not printed.

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683.84A/5–451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, May 4, 1951—5 p.m.
NIACT

709. 1. Comment to Deptel 480, May 1[2] and intel 1 a.m. May 3[3] following Embtel 704, May 4.[3]

Emb believes that draft res is based on earlier situation which has now changed in important respects, and that if presented in present form wld now be definitely harmful. It does not take into account fundamental change which has taken place in Israel attitude and policy. Earlier subjective attitude and disposition to override UNTSO auth have given way to what appears to be genuine determination to be scrupulously correct in observance terms armistice agreement and coop with UN.

2. Developments evidencing change in policy include public expression of regret over retaliatory bombing, agreement FonMin and Col De Ridder (Embtel 706, May 4)[4] to confine work for time being to west bank of Jordan, apparent restraint now being practiced by Israel forces in face of present attacks (Embtel 705, May 4),[5] more coop attitude of Israel auths toward service attachés.

3. It ignores more recent breach of peace in Israel-Syrian border area and possible effect thereof on relative position of parties to dispute. Army Attaché, who has just returned from areas where firing now in progress, reports notable restraint on part Israel forces under what he terms extreme provocation, and firing from Syrian positions in volume suggesting mil formations.

4. In light of foregoing, singling out of Israel for public rebuke in latter part of Section 9 of draft res without any ref to use of force by Syria cld not but give this country and its sympathizers reason for complaint. If this action is to be mentioned specifically as violation of terms of armistice agreement, they certainly wld not understand failure to criticize Syria for resorting to mil action such as involved killing of Israel police near El Hamma and soldiers north of Sea of Galilee

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[1] Telegram repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Paris.

[2] Same as telegram 891 to New York, p. 652.

[3] Not printed.

[4] This telegram indicated in part that the agreement mentioned had gone into effect some time after April 27. (683.84A/5-451) In telegram 590 from Damascus, May 5, the Legation commented in part: "Confining work west bank of Jordan, even if practicable still fails justify continued disregard MAC chairman's decisions." (683.84A/5–551)

[5] This telegram reads in part: "Army attaché who returned late May 3 from reconnaissance in area recent Israel–Syria fighting reports present behavior Israel Army entirely correct and his impression Israel army determined avoid any action which cld subject them to criticism Israel Army apparently has instructions to confine all military action to 'nondemilitarization Israel territory.' . . . Service attachés have received full cooperation Israel auths re latest incidents." (683.84A/5–451)

ear Tall Al Matilla. There is some question whether one violation hld be mentioned unless all are specified. It may be desirable to riticize both parties for having resorted to any mil action whatsoever.

5. It is doubted also whether any useful purpose is served by men- ioning Israel by name in Section 7 of the proposed draft since it wld e just as effective and less offensive simply to state that it is incon- stent with objectives and intent of armistice agreement for parties to efuse to participate in meetings.

6. Emb inclined favor inclusion subsection (*b*) para 10 subject Gen iley's approval without alteration, but suggests amending subsection *ı*) to take into account that return of Arabs in some cases impossible, ecause of destruction of homes. Hence Dept may wish include provi- on for early compensation such cases. Emb believes moreover effort ld be made to avoid if possible stalement produced by few land- olders who cld not be persuaded accept compensation and permit evelopment project to proceed. Unreasonably obstructive tactics on rt of few persons cld still endanger internatl peace.

7. It is suggested also that position of extremely important point 1) be changed to final point in order that document end on note urg- g peaceful settlement. Emb hopes SC intervention may be so handled to induce parties to negot permanent peace settlement near future.[6]

DAVIS

In telegram 584 from Damascus May 4, the Legation commented on the draft curity Council resolution in part as follows:

"Dept's draft SC resolution Deptel 412 [891 to New York] appears to us meet requirements present situation. We feel moreover urgent need exists SC to clarify all of issues dealt with in draft plus requirement Israeli pro- le UN officials full access and facilities parts of zone at all times. Leg ieves para 10(A) shld not be deleted and in fact shld affirm obligation Israeli reconstruct destroyed homes." (683.84A/5–451)

P Files: Lot 58 D 224

emorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Barrow)

NFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1951.

bject: 1) The Iraqi Jews
2) The Huleh Controversy and a Final Settlement of the Palestine Problem
3) Grant Aid to the Near East

rticipants: Mr. Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Barrow

Discussion

1) *The Iraqi Jews.*

Mr. Blaustein had submitted a letter to Mr. McGhee, copy attached,[1] which, while not criticising the general principle of freezing of assets, took exception to a number of the aspects of Iraqi law and practice in this regard.[2] Mr. McGhee recalled the Department's previous efforts on behalf of the Iraqi Jews, and assured Mr. Blaustein that the Department had and would continue to go about as far as we reasonably could in endeavoring to secure better treatment for them. He had spoken to the Iraqis about it during his recent trip to Baghdad.[3] There were, however, as Mr. Blaustein could appreciate, certain limitations imposed upon any government in involving itself in the details of the internal legislation enacted by another country. Mr. McGhee said that the Indian Government was very much interested in the Negro problem in the United States, but if the Indian Embassy were to endeavor to tell us exactly how we should deal with the problem, we would no doubt resent it.

Moreover, an approach to Iraq on the subject of the frozen assets would invite Iraqi criticisms of the somewhat parallel situation existing in Israeli treatment of not only the assets of Arab refugees but also of Arab inhabitants in Israel.[4] We did not pretend that these parallels necessarily condone the Iraqi actions, but they were nevertheless a factor to be considered.

Mr. McGhee said that we would bring Mr. Blaustein's letter and memorandum to the attention of our Embassy at Baghdad and would request that the Embassy go as far as it felt it could in ameliorating the situation, but the limitations of the action we could take in this regard should be borne in mind. It was further agreed that the Department would authorize the Embassy at Baghdad to approach the Iraqi Government regarding an extension of the May 31 deadline of

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[1] Mr. Blaustein's letter of April 19 to Mr. McGhee is not printed.

[2] On March 10, the Iraqi Government had frozen the assets of those Iraqi Jews who had registered for emigration from Iraq to Israel. Previous Iraqi legislation had deprived those Jews who registered of their citizenship. Information on these subjects is in files 357.AC, 784A.00, 884A.1887, and 887.411 for 1951.

[3] Mr. McGhee had been in Baghdad during the third week in March. Record has not been found in Department of State files of any representations made to the Iraqi Government on this subject during his visit.

[4] On this ground the U.S. Government had refused an Israeli request of March 20 that it intercede with Iraq in the matter of frozen assets. (Despatch 534 from Tel Aviv, March 21, enclosing Israeli *aide-mémoire* of March 20, 884A.1887/3-2151; telegram 393 to Tel Aviv, March 23, 357.AC/3-2151; airgram 231 to Tel Aviv, April 17, 884A.1887/3-2151)

The formal reply dated May 1 of the United States to this and other requests of Israel on the subject of Jewish emigration from Iraq forms enclosure 1 to despatch 39, from Tel Aviv, July 12. (884A.1887/7-1251)

wish emigration from Iraq in order that the airlift program could
completed.[5]

Mr. Blaustein then asked Mr. McGhee if he had any objection to
publishing the information contained in his letter and memo-
ndum and mentioning his talk with Mr. McGhee without report-
Mr. McGhee's reaction or associating the Department with the
formation in any way. Mr. Blaustein said that members of his orga-
ation who were experts on the Near East believed that giving the
qi actions the full light of publicity and bringing public opinion
bear would be one of the best means of convincing Iraq to take a
re moderate attitude.

Mr. McGhee said that Mr. Blaustein was certainly entitled to pub-
the information if he wished to, but voiced doubts that publicity
this kind would seriously influence the Iraqi Government, and,
n if so, might influence it adversely. He urged Mr. Blaustein to
sider the reaction in Iraq very carefully.[6]

) *The Huleh Controversy and a Final Settlement of the Palestine
blem.*

Ir. Blaustein said he was greatly concerned over the Huleh con-
versy and asked if there was any message that Mr. McGhee would
him to relay to the Government of Israel. Mr. McGhee reviewed in
eral terms the facts of the controversy stating that it appeared
ave its origin in the efforts of the Israel Government to undertake
Huleh drainage scheme in spite of the request of the United Na-
s Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission that work be
ed pending negotiations with the Arab land owners whose prop-
was being expropriated under the scheme. Mr. McGhee said the
urity Council was meeting on May 8 to consider the question and
le no direct response to Mr. Blaustein's offer to speak with the
eli authorities.

Ir. Blaustein then said that the Huleh controversy and the situa-
of the Iraqi Jews were all just symptoms of one fundamental
ady, the lack of a final settlement of the Palestine problem. He
that he and his colleagues have been giving a great deal of

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n telegram 549 to Baghdad, May 9, approved for transmission by Kopper,
Department stated it believed on the basis of recently received information
Iraq might extend this time limit on its own initiative. "However, shld
s not act Emb is authorized discreetly pt out at optimum moment: (1) USG
ves Israel making max effort complete airlift; (2) *inter alia*, halt in
uation process wld impose severe burden upon Iraqi Govt in resolving prob-
of denationalized Jews left in Iraq." (884A.1887/5-951)
direct reply to this telegram has been found in Department of State
Telegram 765 from Baghdad, June 2, reads as follows: "NEAT rep states
t denationalized Jews to Israel will be completed by end of June. Opera-
continue monthly; no govt action taken re unofficially mentioned May 31
line nor announcement made of future deadline." (884A.1887/6-251)
oint Weeka 79 from Tel Aviv, July 6, reported in part that the movement
6,662 Jews from Iraq to Israel would be completed in the near future.
A.00(W)/7-651)

thought to the question, and it was the consensus that Egypt was the key country to bring to a settlement since all the others would probably fall in line if Egypt was the first to conclude peace. Mr. McGhee agreed that Egypt was logically the key country insofar as the Arab side of the problem was concerned, but he said that during his recent visit to Egypt he saw no signs that the Egyptians were ready to make peace unless substantial concessions were offered by Israel.

Mr. Blaustein said he wondered if there was anything he, as a non-Zionist American in no way associated with the Israel Government, could do to bring Egypt and Israel together. If he or someone like him could only talk with the Egyptians to ascertain their conditions for a peaceful settlement, it might be possible for him to persuade friends in Israel to make an offer along these lines.

Mr. McGhee said that he would try to arrange a meeting between Mr. Blaustein and the Egyptian Ambassador. He did not know how productive the meeting would be but thought that it was worth trying.

3) *Grant Aid to the Near East.*

Mr. Blaustein said that he had seen the President the previous day and had left with him a letter setting forth the views of his organization on the $150 million grant aid bill for Israel now pending in the Congress. In one part of his letter he implied that the State Department was blocking passage of this bill and that the President should overrule the State Department's objections.

Mr. Blaustein said that he was aware of our feeling that the question of grant aid should be approached on a regional basis and that impartiality had to be shown to the Arab States and Israel. He feared, however, that if this area approach to grant aid were adopted (*a*) the voting of the funds by the Congress would be long delayed, and (*b*) Israel would not receive an adequate sum to meet its urgent requirements.

Mr. McGhee said that the Department sincerely desired to help Israel out of its economic difficulties, but it would simply not be either fair to other countries or orderly from an administrative standpoint to make grant aid to Israel separate from the omnibus aid program which we had been working on for quite some time, indeed even before the Israel grant aid request had been submitted. In fact, as a matter of procedure, grant aid to the Near East had been made a part of the global omnibus aid bill, since Congress quite reasonably wanted to see just how much our foreign aid bill amounted to and whether it was being apportioned throughout the world on an intelligent basis.

Mr. Blaustein said that he did not object to the area approach in principle, but he was still concerned lest Israel not be given an adequate amount to meet its requirements. He said that if the sum being considered was in the vicinity of $20 or $25 million it would be completely inadequate. Mr. McGhee said that the grant to Israel as well s to other countries would have to be considered primarily in the ight of how much foreign aid the United States could afford, taking nto account the legitimate needs of all countries. Possibly no country vould receive all that it wanted or felt it needed; we would just have o do the best we could.

84A.13/5-851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

ECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Prime Minister of Israel

Participants: Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion
The Secretary
Ambassador of Israel, Abba Eban
NE—Mr. Lewis Jones
NE—Mr. Waldo

The Prime Minister expressed his thanks to me and the US Governnent for the extensive aid which the US had given to Israel since the ounding of that state. The Prime Minister said that this aid was symolic of the community of ideals which existed between Israel and the nited States.

The Prime Minister told me that he had discussed questions of peace nd the defense of the Middle East with General Marshall [2] and had nformed him of the close relationship which now exists between the K and Israel. He said this is now on the same basis as it had been "in he old days". On the subject of Middle East defense, there had been o differences of opinion between General Marshall and himself, alhough he clearly understood that foreign policy was decided in the tate Department.

Prime Minister said that Israel has the capacity to defend itself and o take part in the defense of the Middle East; Israel has the manower and the industrial capacity; the manpower is growing rapidly nd is now twice what it had been on the establishment of the State. As result of the steady inflow of immigrants there is now in Israel a arger proportion of people between the ages of fifteen and forty than n most countries; Israel has a small standing army but has taken neasures to train large reserves. The principal feature of this training onsists of two years of compulsory service for both men and women. his service includes nine months of agricultural training as well as nstruction in Hebrew, history, etc. Such an extensive program of training is a great burden for a little country with a yearly immigration of 200,000 people.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

[2] No memorandum of the conversation held May 4 between the Prime Minister nd General Marshall has been found in Department of State files. However, ee the extract from the Daily Top Secret Summary of May 17, p. 686.

Israel has followed, and will continue to follow, a policy of unlimited immigration. It is the ideal on which the State is based. The immigration program will have to be carried on as long as it is necessary to provide a haven for oppressed Jews, but such a policy constitutes a tremendous burden for Israel. Israel's prime need, therefore, is to build up its industrial establishment and its defensive capacity, and to do this it needs US assistance; it cannot do it alone. From the point of view of manpower, it is true Israel is not the only country in the Near East; Turkey is also willing and able to contribute to the defense of the area. Israel, however, can be considered the second people of the region, after the Turks. The other countries are not of much use in any plans for the defense of the area.

He knew the US and the UK considered the defense of the Middle East vital and that we would want to defend the Middle East. The Prime Minister hoped for peace, but no one could tell when calamity might come. With regard to the specific steps which might be taken by Israel, he mentioned that his country could produce guns and shells but the necessary raw materials would have to come from outside. He realized that raw materials had to be controlled in the present state of world crisis, but Israel should at least have priority with the other allies of the US for raw materials, machinery, and engineers; Israel had a great deal to learn, and had an urgent need for instructors.

On the basis of Israel's needs, his country had inaugurated a $1.5 billion program over the next three years to assist in the resettlement of immigrants and to enable Israel to play a defensive role in the area. Five hundred million dollars of the required sum would be raised in Israel; the other billion, it was hoped could come from the US, from the bond issue, gifts, and from other sources. It was in this connection that Israel had asked the US for grant aid.

The Prime Minister said he understood that an objection had been raised that a grant to Israel by the US would alienate the Arab states. He considered this an illogical position and said that the British had made the same mistake in the past. The Arab attitude toward the US was not determined by what the US did for the Jews. Persia was an example. Persia was relatively friendly toward Israel and yet he was convinced Persia would not fight for the West. The Arabs were very similar to the Persians; they had an historic inability to stand up in the face of situations like the one presently threatening world peace. He said that what the West did for Israel, therefore, would not change the basic attitude of the Arab states toward the West.

The US was in a position to help Israel greatly. For example, the Germans had taken away Jewish lives and Jewish property, and the

Germans should pay a part of the burden of resettling the Jewish emigrants from Europe who had suffered from their excesses. Mr. Adenauer had acknowledged Germany's guilt to certain Israel representatives, expressed the wish to make amends, and admitted the principle of the need for the payment of an indemnity. Adenauer said, however, that he could not pay such an indemnity against the wishes of the US. The US, therefore, could be of great assistance to Israel by permitting and encouraging Germany to pay its just debts.

The Prime Minister said that his talk with me constituted an outline of Israel's present needs and the means whereby they could be filled.

I told the Prime Minister that I knew that General Marshall's views were in accord with the Department's.

We had given a great deal of thought to what could be done in the Middle East. The first essential, however, was to get peace in the area, and we hoped Israel would cooperate with the Armistice machinery in working out the present dispute between Syria and Israel. The matter could be settled through the UN, if the Israelis were helpful and cooperative.

I realized two things were needed to build up local production in Israel: machine tools and raw materials. Mr. Wilson had just returned from a trip to Europe and was fully aware of the crisis throughout the world resulting from shortages of these items. The present problem, however, is to establish an international system for the distribution of raw materials which would stimulate production. During the Second World War the US and the UK controlled all raw material sources and were able to establish the necessary priorities throughout the world; now the cooperation of at least seven countries was required to establish similar controls. There was also the question of supplies to be exchanged for raw materials. During the last war prices of raw materials were over controlled and export controls were in effect on manufactured goods from the US to other countries. A problem had then arisen in connection with our neighbors in Latin America. As a result of the tight controls during the war they were unable to obtain their requirements in manufactured goods during the war. When the US took off all export controls and also removed price controls, they were unable to purchase the needed goods with the funds which had accumulated from the sale of raw materials at controlled prices during the war period. International agreement on allocations was therefore urgently necessary at the present time.

I told the Prime Minister that I did not fully understand what was meant by Mr. Adenauer's remarks. I pointed out that any German deficit would have to be made good by the US. We had had trouble with the Russians on this score. The Russians wanted a large indemnity from Germany, but all reparations from Western Germany ultimately came out of the US unless they took the form of a transfer of capital items which had now ceased. We were not in favor of reparations out of current production.

Ambassador Eban interposed the remark that Israel's policy would involve unrequited exports from Germany. He claimed that Germany had a higher standard of living than Israel and could afford to follow such a program.

The Prime Minister said that Israel was lowering its standard of living in order to bring in people from all over the world; it was inconceivable to him, therefore, that the Germans should get away with maintaining a higher standard of living than existed in Israel.

The Prime Minister said that Israel had a great interest in peace in the Near East. He could not say, however, when peace would come, because of the corruption of the Arab governments, competing political factions, etc. In the beginning, the Arabs had believed that they could defeat Israel on the field of battle; they were now aware that this was impossible, and maintained the Israel economy would collapse shortly resulting in Israel's disappearance from the Near East. The Prime Minister claimed that there were many people in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon who were friends of Israel and wanted peace. In Syria, however, they had all been liquidated.

The Prime Minister suggested that the best means whereby the US could facilitate peace in the Near East was by extending economic aid to the Israelis. This would constitute proof to the Arabs that their hope for Israel's economic collapse was untenable and would convince them that Israel could not be destroyed. The Arab states would then be prepared to make peace with Israel. The Prime Minister said that Egypt was the keystone for peace in the Near East and that a peace agreement with that country would go a long way to bring about peace agreements with the other neighboring Arab countries. He said there were no problems between Israel and Egypt, and only desert lay between the two countries.

The Prime Minister continued that Israel did not claim an inch of Syrian territory; They had no reason to attack Syria, but they had conclusive evidence that Syrian soldiers had entered the Demilitarized Zone and that the fighting was continuing in the area. He said there was no reason for aggression by Israel, and he could give me the fullest assurances that Israel would cooperate with the UN in bringing about peace in the area and keeping the Armistice Agreement.

The Prime Minister concluded by stating that the West might find that Israel's cooperation would be the decisive factor in the successful defense of the Middle East.

357.AC/5-951 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY JERUSALEM, May 9, 1951—noon.

208. Palun 403. This tel is in nature of situation report on activities of PCC since first mtg of current year on 25 Jan. It is motivated both by need for better understanding of Dept's present views on problems with which PCC is seized, but also by increasing sense of frustration and futility on part of PC as whole. During past three months there has been no progress made on compensation repatriation blocked accts or peace negots as envisaged in GA res of 14 Dec 1950. Meanwhile Israel-Syrian relations have reached alarming point of deterioration while PCC has been largely out of touch with situation. There now remain six months before opening of next GA session. This wld be sufficient time for carrying out an active program in connection with above problems provided a more vigorous leadership cld be undertaken by USDel. Under present circumstances, I do not feel in a position to assert such leadership in absence of clear understanding of Dept's objective with respect to above-mentioned problems.

On compensation USDel has proceeded in PCC in accordance with Dept's basic instrs contained in document SD/S/C. 1/261 of 6 Sept 1949, Dept memo of Jan 3, 1950 and Unpal 246 of 6 Feb 1950.[1] These documents assume that compensation shld be paid on basis of individual losses and distribution of compensation shld at least in part be made to individual claimants.[2] We have also assumed that a basis can be worked out for linking compensation and reintegration whereby individual refugees being compensated can use their compensation for resettlement as pointed out in Palun 400 of 6 Mar 1951.[3] On these assumptions USDel initiated a work program which was approved by PCC on 10 Mar 1951 (doc Comgen/17/Rev 1) for arriving at an estimate of total value of refugee lost property, consideration of means of linking compensation and reintegration, and study of means of obtaining funds with which compensation might be paid. This program was discussed with Wainhouse in Jerusalem prior to adoption by PCC and with Jones and McGhee thereafter. It was also discussed informally with Shiloah by Barco. While an estimate of total Arab losses can be undertaken by PCC's refugee office on arrival of Andersen who is expected end of this month fact remains that consideration of compensation claims is academic unless means can be found for financing compensation payment. Shiloah has expressed an interest to Barco in possibility of a long-term United Nations loan to Israel which wld enable Israel to assume obligation to pay compensation. I have not felt in a position to discuss this question with reps of Israel Govt in absence of a better understanding of Dept's position in this respect. It is fundamental question in my opinion in any consideration with Israel of her compensation obligations. Unless this matter can be negotiated with Israel, I see little for PCC to do on this question prior to its next report to GA.

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[1] None printed.

[2] In his immediately preceding telegram, 207 (Palun 402), also of May 9, (357.AC/5-951), Ambassador Palmer had in substance reiterated his views as outlined by Mr. Ludlow in his memorandum to Mr. Hickerson of March 14, p. 592.

[3] In this telegram Mr. Palmer had stated in part:

"US delegate does believe that a basis for linking compensation and reintegration can be worked out. He does not believe however that this can be done prior to an agreement with Israel as to sum of money to be paid for compensation. Once agreement has been reached as to this sum and as to means of obtaining necessary funds for payment of this sum, US delegate believes that methods can be devised in cooperation with UNRWA to enable individual refugees being compensated to use their compensation for their own resettlement." (357.AC/3-651)

Repatriation is a dead letter as far as PCC is concerned. Yet under 14 Dec res new refugee office is expected to work out arrangements for repatriation. USDel doubts Andersen will succeed where PCC has failed in this respect.

On blocked accts, Barco's discussion with FonOff in London indicated clearly UK no longer has any control over sterling balances due Israel which wld be required in event Israel was willing release Arab accts. Question of release or non-release of Arab accts thus remains entirely with Israel Govt. In view of negative attitude Israel Govt I have not felt in a position make any proposals in this connection.

On peace negots as envisaged in 14 Dec res there exists no grounds on which PCC cld at present time propose direct or indirect discussions in absence Dept's initiative. Basis for such discussions wld necessarily lie in Israel's willingness consider making concrete offers to Arab States.

Israel's deteriorating relations with Syria have produced a situation within PCC where members feel responsibility to UN and states concerned without having means make any contribution. Boisanger intends to raise problem at next PCC meeting and to propose report to SYG raising question PCC's dilemma. His principal concern is to protect PCC from charges of indifference in event of major Israeli Syrian conflict.

Foregoing indicates sense of futility with which PCC now regards its present task. Active consideration of these problems by members of comm are becoming increasingly infrequent. Boisanger has only last week returned from a month in Paris, is now touring Syria and will leave again for Paris probably early in June. Aras likewise is seldom in Jerusalem. SYG Lie's recent discussions at Govt House with PCC clearly indicated his realization that PCC activities had reached a stalemate and that only remaining function was to include in report to GA recommendations for consolidation of United Nations activities in this area and elimination unproductive organizations. My Fr and Turkish colleagues apparently are in agreement with his views and favor adjournment following Andersen's arrival until time for preparing GA report. USDel hopes for Dept's guidance and support for more positive achievement than this.

In view circumscribed position in which PCC finds itself, this can best be done by Dept's supporting (1) realistic plans for compensation and first and foremost for financing of a fund from which Israel can pay compensation. This in itself wld be important contribution toward political settlement in area. Failure to deal effectively with compensation will encourage new charges by Arab world of emptiness of promises of UN generally and US specifically. (2) Immed direct negots under UN auspices between Israel and Jordan and Israel and Syria on questions best suited to transform armistice arrangements into formal peace. (Shiloah recently admitted that in his opinion continued failure direct Israel–Jordan talks at Shuneh was due to absence of third party to talk as mediator). Under these two categories, new efforts by PCC can be productive, but such efforts required determined US leadership. In absence of such leadership, PCC is becoming symbol of UN failure, and, in minds of Arab world, a cover for US indifference. Time may come when responsible Israel leaders will feel likewise.[4]

[PALMER]

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[4] In telegram 220 from Jerusalem (Palun 405), May 28, Mr. Palmer indicated that no reply to Palun 403 had as yet been received and stated in part: "As was also indicated in Palun 403 my colleagues feel that PCC's early adjournment is necessary. . . . Criticism in press and among public of PCC as irresponsible body and demands for resignation are becoming more frequent." The Ambassador stated that the PCC planned to adjourn its Jerusalem sessions the following week and to reconvene in Geneva no later than August 15. (357.AC/5–2851)

330/5–1051 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, May 10, 1951—12 : 56 p. m.
PRIORITY

1516. Re Syrian-Israeli dispute: Following is result of US-UK-French consultation at adviser level yesterday afternoon on text of resolution as contained Deptel 891 of May 1[1] (agreement subject to dels' clearance, but in most cases UK adviser had cleared del position):

Agreement without change on paras 1 through 5, 8, 11, and 13.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 652.

Paragraph 6 to read: "Calls on Govts of Israel and Syria to bring before MAC or its chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under Armistice Agreement, the complaints of which SC presently seized and to abide by decisions resulting therefrom." UKFO has instructed it wishes words "except that alluded to in para 9 of this resolution" omitted since some details connected with retaliatory bombing may be fit subjects for MAC or chairman's action. French had no strong opinion but inclined toward omitting words.

Paragraph 7: UKFO has instructed del it concurs with our suggested replacement of words "reminds Govt of Israel" by "considers". French preferred original wording but would put our amendment and UK concurrence thereto to Quai d'Orsay.

Paragraph 9: French and British accepted our inclusion of reference to July 15, 1948 cease-fire resolution, but felt some allusion must be made to recent TSO reports of further Israel bombing of Syrian territory and indications Syrian Army may be participating in hostilities. British accordingly suggested following redraft of paragraph 9:

> "*Brings* to the attention of the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and their commitments under the Armistice Agreement not to resort to military force:
>
> "finds *that*
>
> "(*a*) Aerial action taken by forces of the Government of Israel on April 5, 1951, and
>
> (*b*) Any aggressive military actions by either of the parties in or around the demilitarized zone, which further investigation by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization into the reports and complaints recently submitted to the Council may establish, constitute a violation of the cease-fire provided in the Security Council Resolution of July 15, 1948 and are inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter."

Word "aggressive" suggested by French, as recognition of right of self-defense. When we pointed out language of redraft did not declare present of military or para-military forces in demilitarized zone, if proven, to be violation of Armistice Agreement, French replied numerous other violations, such as reported second aerial bombing of Syrian territory, not cited.

Paragraph 10: Changes suggested mytels 1485[2] (para 5) and 1486[3] (last para) accepted by British and French.

Paragraph 12: Omission of words "at end of thirty days" accepted by British and French.

Re possible new paragraph 4 suggested mytel 1485, neither British nor French liked. UK feared its inclusion might prejudice authority of MAC and French said it does not accord with Quai d'Orsay's desire to throw fullest emphasis possible on authority of MAC. We accordingly dropped it.

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[2] Dated May 3, p. 658.

[3] The last paragraph of this telegram, also of May 3, reads as follows: "Further to mytel 1485, Riley approves language para 10 of draft res with following additional modifications: omit 'without their consent' following 'from demilitarized zone' in sub-para A; and insert 'chairman of the' before 'Mixed Armistice Commission' in sub-para B." (357.AC/5-351)

Re new paragraph of urtel 894, May 2:[4] British and French accepted replacement of "calls to the attention of Israel the view of the Council" by "considers" and replacement of "requested" by "required" before "in the pursuance."

New paragraph suggested in beginning urtel 905:[5] British and French had had doubts over Riley's being authorized to make representations to parties while still here, but in view of his imminent departure and his declared liking for paragraph, hoped their governments would accept.

These new paragraphs would be numbered 11 and 13, respectively, and present 11, 12 and 13 would become 12, 14 and 15, respectively.

UK suggested paragraph, reported in revised form by mytel 1498,[6] May 7, was withdrawn by UKDel. French concurred in withdrawal.

French propose to submit to colleagues tomorrow two paragraphs embodying desire to "reinforce authority of MAC" and "avoid difficulties of interpretation of Armistice Agreement by parties". They apparently working on paragraph declaring sovereignty not being "exercised" in zone by either party.

Timetable: Results recorded above are subject to review and possible change by governments, but three co-sponsors seem in general to be thinking along same lines. In fact, UKFO has indicated general agreement our thinking, except for new para 9 drafting which, of course, it has not seen. French seem to be concentrating their attention on two points mentioned in immediately preceding para and appear not to feel deeply about rest, although del, at least, seems inclined make faces at Israelis. With luck we may have agreement on resolution by Friday evening or Saturday morning. Co-sponsors might then at once show it in confidence to other SC members seeking del comment (not, however, with view to modification unless sharp divergency arose) so that members would have earliest opportunity seek instructions. We would show resolution to parties Monday, and call for meeting 15th to table resolution, deliver our statements and probably hear from parties. If no important amendments submitted (parties will probably try to have their respective views written in as on May 8) and other members finish speaking, resolution might be voted May 16. If no, we should try to break into Comite 1 AMC deliberations for half-day to finish. Haste is indicated since Riley, who hopes to depart for Palestine 13th, holds that he will be unable to get parties' serious attention to complaints until SC has finished action on present agenda.

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[4] See footnote 3, p. 654.

[5] Dated May 5. The section mentioned reads as follows:

"Dept believes fol new para shld be added to draft res preferably to follow present para 11: 'Directs the Chief of Staff of TSO to take the necessary steps to effect the implementation of this resolution for the purpose of restoring peace in the Area, and authorizes him to make such representations to the govts of Israel and Syria as he may deem necessary'.

"Dept has in mind possibility such authorization will empower Riley to undertake negotiations with Syria and Israel reps here in this country and issue directives to de Ridder in Palestine until such time as Riley may be able return to his post." (330/5–551)

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 680.

Gross

683.84A/5-1051 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT Damascus, May 10, 1951—10 p. m.

616. ReDepcirtel 676, May 7[2] (recd this afternoon). Re Amb Eban's request for good offices US on behalf Israel and arguments he presented Legation has fol comment:

1. Since early Mar US counselled Syrian restraint and full cooperation with UN; French and Brit have done likewise; Syrian record of cooperation attested by UN reports. No evidence divergence from this policy despite Israel disregard MAC decisions and steady deterioration situation. See fol tel re Shishikli renewed assurances this regard to me today.

2. Eban's charge of "gross fallacy" is shocking example high pressure campaign apparently designed convince world conflict began May 4 whereas whole series of developments have taken course feared by Syrians as stated Legtels 404,[3] Feb 20, 458, Mar 14.[4] We suspect some assistance from Syria for Arabs fighting protect their homes and Legation military attaché's tel CL–177[5] like Tel Aviv tels listed material observed on spot and allegedly left behind when Arabs driven back. Important to note that observers report what they see but do not speculate or interpret one way or other. We have not seen TSO reports indicating Syrian army intervention.

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[1] Telegram repeated for information to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Paris.

[2] In this telegram the Department had summarized a conversation held May 7 between Mr. Eban, Mr. Berry, and other officials, in which the Ambassador had requested on behalf of Israel the good offices of the United States in restoring peace to the Demilitarized Zone. "He expressed feeling his Govt that big powers not make sufficiently strenuous representations Damascus this question. . . . Eban stated our analysis was based on 'gross fallacy' that Arabs involved were civilians." The Ambassador had also stated Israeli belief that France was ". . . endeavoring assist Syria obtain water sources. Israel wld display 'special tenacity' re this area as Israel existence wld be threatened without water sources." (683.84A/5–751)

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 591.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 592.

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

3. As for Eban's concern lest US objectivity be encouraging Syrians
n "deception" that only civilians involved, UN reports alone can be
onsidered authoritative. See fuller discussion below.

4. Question water rights opens highly complex problem involving
yria Jordan and Israel. Comments this subject in subsequent msg
ased on Legation's detailed study available data. Israel "special
enacity" does not alter fact armistice agreement and interpretative
ocumentation show that sovereignty over zone is in dispute and to
e decided in final peace settlement. We doubt any French involve-
ent question water rights and regard injection this new charge pos-
ble attempt confuse issues. French here have often talked about
ispute but never mentioned this aspect.

Gen contention that Syria has launched aggressive attack on Israel
wholly out of keeping with demonstrated Syrian policy of restraint
d is not in accord with UN observer reports. Moreover, intense
ropaganda campaign over Shamalneh incident has tended obscure
ct it is but one of series incidents which make pattern of organized
rael campaign to eliminate indigenous Arab inhabitants demili-
rized zone to bolster Israel claim to area. Perhaps clearest example
Israel action against Arabs of Samra (Legtel 530, Apr 13 [6] and TSO
ports) in which no question or charge Syrian involvement. UN re-
orts give clear picture as to Israeli acts at Ghannameh, Khuri Farm,
amra and Nuqeib and leave little doubt as to illegal nature original
rael incursion into Al Hammeh and subsequent bombing. In evaluat-
g available evidence we can not dismiss possibility Shamalneh in-
dent may have been contrived to counteract unfavorable publicity
ven Israel resistance to UN authority in area.

We believe that US has much at stake in this matter. While we
ecognize immed problems remain those of obtaining effective cease-
e and strengthening authority and prestige MAC, it seems essential
at US take stand reasserting UN responsibilities in zone and return
conditions of armistice (to which we morally committed by assur-
ces given Syrian Govt when we encouraged them to reach agree-
ent) or risk shaking to foundation already precarious US position
Syria and Arab world.

This public stand cld probably best be taken in speech by chairman
S del to UN but it shld not be long delayed. Ideally it shld come prior
Arab League Political Comite mtg here May 14, where all-impor-
nt decisions may be made amidst inflammatory public clamor. We
pe at least instructions may be sent our chiefs of mission in Arab
untries prior this mtg authorizing them give conference reassurances
rab govts in sense above recommendation.[7]

CANNON

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[6] Not printed. (683.84A/5–1151)

[7] In circular telegram 702, May 11, sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo,
amascus, and Jidda, and repeated for information to Jerusalem, London, Paris,
d Tel Aviv, the Department stated in part: "Damascus tel 616 May 10 most
lpful. Dept endeavoring finalize draft [SC] resolution. . . . Best we can hope
do re Arab League Political Comm mtg Damascus May 14 is to supply Arab
pitals with draft for confidential disclosure Arab governments." (683.84A/
1151)

680.84A/5-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, May 11, 1951—2 p.m.

1159. Re Deptel 1097 May 9.[2] I agree thoroughly Dept's estimate key position Egypt in relations between Arab states and Israel, but am not optimistic early Egypt moves towards peace settlement without considerably more incentive than they now believe exists.

As Dept aware, primary concentration Egypt political thinking currently on Anglo-Egypt relations. So far as Israel concerned, I am convinced leaders fed up with the whole question but lack desire or courage to hazard their personal political futures by attempting even initial steps in direction peace settlement. If they cld work for peace without loss of face, they wld probably do so, but none of them see way clear. Popular feeling is less thoughtful, but is roughly comparable to govt's. Any change last six months either people or govt has been toward greater tiredness with problem, but not toward support constructive course doing something about it.

Conviction on part Egypt that attitude Israel has really changed wld certainly be helpful, but the point has long passed at which more "tact" wld contribute anything. Deeply skeptical of "words," the only hope of building a background from which progress wld be possible is clear-cut, genuinely helpful, action.

Status refugees and lack confidence UN or West going to do anything materially relieve their situation form the core of the present Egypt discouragement with over-all problem. Accordingly, cooperation of interested major powers to effect a long-term solution of the refugee problem offers the best opportunity to remove the most important obstacle to Israel-Arab understanding. Such cooperation wld have to include large-scale financial assistance for reintegration. Israeli participation at least to extent making financial contribution and giving up part of Negeb (possibly to Jordan) is imperative to success. Egypt willing evacuate Gaza preferably to Jordan.

Lacking such an approach present situation, though onerous, apt to continue indefinitely. Large-scale US financial assistance to Israel in interim cannot fail mean serious deterioration present all-around relations and such assistance without at least commensurate aid to Arab states wld be disastrous blow to any hopes constructive solution.

CAFFERY

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[1] Telegram repeated for information to London, Tel Aviv, and Arab capitals.

[2] In this telegram the Department had in part requested the Embassy to report on the then-present Egyptian attitude towards Israel, to identify any changes in Egyptian popular feeling towards Israel over the preceding six months, and to estimate ". . . Egypt's price for settlement with Israel." (674.84A/5-951)

674.84A/5-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, May 11, 1951—5 p. m.

5894. For the Secretary. At reception given by Morrison to King and Queen of Denmark last night, in response to question by me as to how things where going with him, he stated with some feeling that Iran was giving him concern and he hoped for US support. I said I was sure he could count on it in any constructive program UK might have. It seemed significant to me that he held up receiving line to tell me this as I shook hands with him.

Today I had lunch alone with Anthony Eden at his request. He said he had talked with Morrison about Iran with Churchill present. Eden told Morrison he felt oil sit in other parts of Near East wld tend to degenerate if Iran won out which it might unless something constructive were done by UK. Eden suggested to Morrison that UK shld force Suez Canal issue by sending destroyers with tankers thru Suez Canal and insisting on oil being transported freely thru canal. He seemed to believe that UK wld get away with it with Egypt and that it wld convince NE area that UK meant business and wld have salutary effect on Iran. I am not sure that Eden knew all the facts about Suez Canal but what he was saying was that the use of big stick directly in Suez wld be better than directly in Iran which might bring Soviets in from North. I expressed no view on matter but he gave me to understand that he expected me to pass his remarks on to his friend, Dean Acheson.

GIFFORD

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1951.

Subject: Draft Security Council Resolution on the Syrian-Israeli Dispute.

The Security Council has for the past several weeks been seized with the Syrian-Israeli situation. We now propose that the US along with the UK, France and probably Turkey introduce the draft resolution contained in the attached telegram at the next meeting of the Security Council on Tuesday, May 15. All paragraphs but paragraph three have already been agreed upon by the UK and French delegations, and we expect the concurrence of the Turks. Paragraph three is new and has not been considered by the proposed co-sponsors.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Messrs. Kopper, Stabler, and Ludlow.

We are bringing the matter to your attention because paragraph three places the basic responsibility for the present Syrian-Israeli dispute on Israel, which we believe to be thoroughly justified by the facts in this case.

Recommendation:

That you approve the inclusion of paragraph three.[2]

Attachment:

Draft telegram.[3]

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[2] The Secretary discussed a number of foreign policy issues with the President on May 14. Mr. Acheson's memorandum of the part of the conversation devoted to Israel follows:

"I went over with the President the proposed resolution. Our conversation centered on paragraph 3. The President agreed with the view I expressed, which was that this paragraph, certainly in anything like its present form, is unwise.

"I shall discuss this matter at greater length with Mr. McGhee and Mr. Hickerson." (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 238) No record has been found in Department of State files of any conversation the Secretary may have held with Messrs. McGhee and Hickerson on this subject.

[3] In light of the conversation quoted in footnote 2 above, draft was not identical to the draft resolution transmitted to New York in telegram 926, May 14, p. 681. However, no copy of a draft resolution with a version of paragraph 3 differing from that in telegram 926 has been found in Department of State files.

330/5–1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 14, 1951—12:01 p.m.

1534. Re Syrian-Israeli dispute: Following are developments of May 12 re draft res: UK received London's comment re latest draft and was instructed to press for inclusion of para along lines reported mytel 1498 of May 7.[1] French del expressed desire for inclusion mention of Huleh project. Fowler (UK) drafted tentative para combining UK idea with the one Dept is considering which Fowler received from us Friday on tentative and informal basis and which at our request he has not given to other dels. His para is: "While recognizing general benefit which would result from drainage operations, both within and outside demilitarized zone, is of opinion that failure of Israel to need requests of Chief of Staff and Chairman of MAC re engineering operations of Palestine Land Development Company in demilitarized zone, has contributed in large measure to subsequent deterioration of security in area and recommends that such operations in demilitarized zone cease pending negotiations on this issue in accordance with terms of general armistice agreement."

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[1] The paragraph suggested by the United Kingdom and transmitted in telegram 1498 follows: " 'While recognizing the general benefit which could result from drainage operations both within and outside demilitarized zone, [SC] recommends that in accordance with memorandum of Chief of Staff to parties, dated March 7, 1951, operations of Palestine Land Development Co. in demilitarized zone should cease pending negotiation of this issue in MAC.' " (330/5–751)

Fowler thinks UKDel will not insist on inclusion language of para up to "is of opinion" if we feel such mention of Huleh project might cause complications.

Confirming Maffitt telecon with Ludlow and Waldo, following drafting changes have been agreed with UK and French dels:

Para 5 of urtel 891[2]—insert "article 7, para 8 of the" between "under" and "armistice" in first line.

Para 8 urtel 891, as amended—Replace "is entitled" by "has authority" between "civilian life" and "to consider."

Para 9 urtel 891—Replace "brings to attention of" by "recalls to" at beginning.

Riley departed for Palestine by air last night urging most expeditious adoption on res as possible to enable him act effectively in MAC chairmanship he will assume upon arrival. He reported Ben-Gurion had indicated to him Israel adamant on claim of sovereignty over Syrian-Israeli demilitarized zone.

Austin

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[2] Dated May 1, p. 652.

330/5-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, May 14, 1951—7 p. m.

926. Fol is text tentative draft res to be circulated to UNSC mbrs Tuesday May 15 concerning Syrian-Israeli question. It is anticipated US, UK, Fr and Turkey will co-sponsor res. All paras except 3 and 8 have been agreed to by those countries. Anticipate agreement paras 3 and 8 will be forthcoming prior tabling of res:

"*The Security Council:*

1. *Recalling* its past resolutions of July 15, 1948, Aug 11, 1949, Nov 17, 1950 and May 8, 1951 relating to the Armistice Agreements bet Israel and the neighboring Arab States and to the provisions

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Waldo and Mr. Kopper; transmission approved by Mr. Waldo on behalf of Mr. Jones. Date of drafting does not appear on this telegram.

contained therein concerning methods for maintaining the Armistice and resolving disputes through the Mixed Armistice Commissions participated in by the parties to the Armistice Agreement;

2. *Noting* the complaints of Syria and Israel to the SC, statements in the Council of the representatives of Syria and Israel, the reports to the SYG of the UN by the Chief of Staff and the Actg Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine, and statements before the Council by the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine;

3. *Noting* that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Org in a memo of Mar 7, 1951, and the Chairman of the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on a number of occasions have requested the Israel delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission to insure that the Palestine Land Development Co., Ltd, is instructed to cease all operations in the Demil Zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this project, and

Noting further that Article V of the General Armistice Agreement gives to the Chairman the responsibility for the general supervision of the Demil Zone,

Endorses the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and calls upon the Govt of Israel to comply with them.

4. *Declares* that in order to promote return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the Govts of Israel and Syria observe faithfully the General Armistice Agreement of July 20, 1949;

5. *Notes* that under Art 7, para 8, the Armistice Agreement where interpretation of meaning of a particular provision of the Agreement, other than the preamble and Arts I and II, is at issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission's interpretation shall prevail.

6. *Calls upon* the Govts of Israel and Syria to bring before the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their complaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom.

7. *Considers* that it is inconsistent with objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under Art V and calls upon the parties to be represented at all mtgs called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests.

8. *Takes note* that the fol excerpt cited by the Chief of Staff of TSO at 542 mtg of the SC on April 25, 1951, as being from the Summary Record of the Syria–Israel Armistice Conference of July 3, 1949 was agreed to by the parties as an authoritative comment on Art V of the Syria–Israel Armistice Agreement:[2]

> 'The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the Demil zone is provided for, within the framework of an armistice agreement, in sub-paras 5(*b*) and 5(*f*) of the draft Art.

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[2] In a memorandum for the files of May 15, Mr. Hickerson indicated that he had agreed during a telephone conversation that evening with Ambassador Gross to changes which brought the language of this sentence to its final form, in order to secure agreement among the cosponsors. Mr. Hickerson stated that the changes were subsequently approved by Mr. Waldo for NE. (UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237)

Such civil administration, including policing, will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignty.

'Where Israeli civilians return to or remain in an Israeli village or settlement, the civil administration and policing of that village or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab administration and police unit will be authorized.

'As civilian life is gradually restored, administration will take shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

'The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation and cooperation with the local communities, will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and protection of civilian life. He will not assume responsibility for direct administration of the zone.'

9. *Recalls* to the Government of Syria and Israel their obligations under Art II, para 4 of the Charter of the UN and their commitments under the Armistice Agreement not to resort to mil force and finds that: (*a*) aerial action taken by the forces of the Govt of Israel on Apr 5, 1951 and (*b*) any aggressive mil actions by either of the parties in or around the Demil zone, which further investigation by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Org into the reports and complaints recently submitted to the Council may establish, constitute a violation of the cease fire provision provided in the SC Res of Jul 15, 1948 and are inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter.

10. *Noting* the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents from the Demil zone: (*a*) considers that Arab civilians who have been removed from the Demil zone by the Govt of Israel shld be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice Commission shld supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be determined by the Commission; and (*b*) considers that no action involving the transfer of persons across intl frontiers, armistice lines or within the Demil zone shld be undertaken without the prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

11. *Noting* with concern the refusal on a number of occasions to permit observers and officials of the Truce Supervision Org to enter localities and areas which were subjects of complaints in order to perform their legitimate functions, considers that the parties shld permit such entry at all times whenever this is required, to enable the Truce Supervision Org to fulfill its functions, and shld render every facility which may be requested by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for this purpose.

12. *Reminds* the parties of their obligations under the Charter of the UN to settle their intl disputes by peaceful means in such manner that intl peace and security are not endangered and expresses its concern at the failure of the Govts of Israel and Syria to achieve progress pursuant to their commitments under the Armistice Agreement to promote the return to permanent peace in Palestine.

13. *Directs* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Org to take the necessary steps to give effect to this Res for the purpose of restor-

ing peace in the area and authorizes him to take such measures to restore peace in the area and to make such representations to the Govts of Israel and Syria as he may deem necessary.

14. *Calls upon* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Org to report to the SC on compliance given to this Res.

15. *Requests* the SYG to furnish such additional personnel and assistance as the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Org may request in carrying out this Res and the Council's Resolutions of May 8, 1951 and Nov 17, 1950."

While Damascus free use substance above with AL dels, text shld not be made available to them before Dept authorizes.

ACHESON

683.84A/5-1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1951.

Subject: Syrian-Israel Situation

Participants: Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel.
Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Waldo

Mr. Eban called on me at his request. He said the Prime Minister had directed him to inform the Department of a recent order which had been sent to the Director General of the Palestine Land Development Company in Jerusalem by the Chairman of the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. The Ambassador quoted the directive which was dated May 12, as follows:

> "In accordance with authority vested in the Chairman of the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission under Art. 5 of General Armistice Agreement, I hereby direct immediate cessation of all Lake Hula and Jordan River drainage works in Demilitarized Zone until such time as agreement on such works can be reached under supervision of Chairman or through directives or resolutions of higher authority."

The Ambassador said the Prime Minister had told him to state that the Israel Government considered the language of this directive highly inappropriate and was of the view the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission had no right to issue an order on this subject either to the Palestine Land Development Company or the Israel Government itself. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission did not have civil jurisdiction in the Demilitarized Zone nor was he in any way authorized to interfere with the purely civil authority in the Zone. The Israel Government itself could not call on the Palestine Land Development Company to cease its activities because the company and its operations were a purely private concern and Israel law did not empower the Israel Government to interfere in such matters. The Israel Government was not, therefore, in a position to cooperate with the Chairman on this particular subject.

The Ambassador expressed the hope that the Security Council would not attempt to interfere in the matter and that the US would not take a position which might have an unfortunate effect on US-Israel relations. Mr. Eban pointed out that both Syria and Israel had agreed to the SC cease fire of May 8 and he felt that there was no reason why the SC should be called upon to consider the situation further. The Armistice Agreement was a bilateral arrangement between the Israelis and the Syrians and no party outside of those two had a right to interfere with the workings of that agreement. The Ambassador stated that the Prime Minister had said the Israel Government could never order these engineering operations to cease in the Zone as it was something to which the Government was fully committed, and in the light of the recent incidents in the Zone, any Israel Government which attempted to hold up the operations would face great internal difficulties. The Ambassador implied that Israel would be in a difficult position if the SC should attempt to interfere with the Israel operations in the Zone. The Ambassador further said that in the early discussions with the Department Mr. Berry had informed him that the Department considered the drainage operations in the Huleh area a highly desirable activity which should not be stopped by the objections of a handful of Arabs.

I took issue with the Ambassador on this statement, and told him that Mr. Berry and the Department considered the drainage operations in the Huleh area desirable but engineering operations in the Zone should only be carried out after proper arrangements had been made through the Chairman of the MAC. We believed that there was a right way and a wrong way to proceed in the matter and that if the Israel Government proceeded in the right way we believed it would be possible to work out a means whereby drainage operations could be undertaken. Israel, however, had chosen to proceed with the activities in the Zone without the necessary permission of the Chairman of the MAC.

It was further pointed out to the Ambassador that the US hoped that Israel would not put itself in a position of refusing to comply with the SC resolution. It was within the competence of the SC to consider any dispute and in this particular case both of the parties had submitted complaints for SC consideration and were responsible for the fact that the SC was presently considering the problem. Not all of the complaints had been disposed of by the recent cease fire resolution.

I said that I could not anticipate the action which the SC might take since there were other governments concerned in the Council beside the US. We felt that Israel should abide by the findings of the Council and our position would be made clear when the time came.

Daily TS Summary : Lot 52–242

Daily Top Secret Summary

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1951.

Subject: Israel's Role in Middle Eastern Defense

The Israeli Prime Minister recently summarized to the Secretary of Defense [1] Israel's requirements from the United States as (1) assistance in building up industry for the production of military equipment and (2) provision of equipment to the Israeli army to bring it up to U.S. standards. He also wished to know UK and U.S. plans for the defense of the Middle East. He reported that the UK Commander of Middle East Land Forces recently informed him that the role he envisaged for Israel immediately was to utilize its port facilities and right of transit for troops and supplies. The Secretary of Defense expressed the view that the most important contribution that Israel could make to the stability and future defense of the area was to control and prevent the border incidents which continue to occur with its neighbors.

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[1] Probably during their conversation held May 4, of which no primary record has been found in Department of State files.

683.84A/5–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT TEL AVIV, May 17, 1951—1 p. m.

765. Re Deptel 513, May 14.[2] Due my temporary indisposition, Eytan, Dir Gen FonOff called in Keeler this morning and in presence Bendor conveyed on behalf FonMin Sharett, then presiding over Cabinet meeting Jerusalem, Israels reaction to SC res tabled last night. Requested these reactions be conveyed to Dept before vote tomorrow.

It wld be "less than truth", Eytan asserted, to fail to indicate that Israel "extremely upset" by terms of resolution, which he characterized as "not fair" and as one which Israel convinced "will not achieve purpose for which intended".

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Paris.

[2] Same as telegram 926 to New York, p. 681.

When both sides accepted SC cease-fire last week and normal activities in area were resumed, Israel assumed that SC had finished with matter, and that Gen Riley hastening back to settle outstanding issues. Israel suddenly discovered that SC, "under circumstances which to us mysterious", was unexpectedly convened again, with "certain amount of furtiveness" to discuss this resolution. Inasmuch as Israel del and other dels were confronted with document they never seen before, only natural that voting on resolution postponed.

After explaining that he wld not give a detailed analysis, but wld concentrate on 32 points to which Israel took greatest exception, he gave fol analysis of Israel attitude on these points, which set forth in numbered paras 3 and 10 of resolution in reftel. Particularly stress point (1) below.

> 1. Numbered para 3 reftel. Cessation Huleh work touches Israel population, which has mystic as well as practical approach to development and reconstruction, at most sensitive point.
>
> To date, US has shown sympathetic understanding and given consistent finan and moral support for such projects, for which Israel appreciative. Decision stop work wld come as shock to population and wld have serious internal consequences. Particularly, concerned that US sponsorship and "I fear US initiative in putting this before SC", will operate as gift to Mapamt just before elections, and consequences likely to be unfortunate for democratic cause.
>
> 2. Numbered para 10 reftel. Israel regards point calling for return Arabs to their homes as retrograde step from viewpoint peace in area. Recent fighting by Shamalna Arabs "armed, incited and assisted by Syrian Army personnel" is indication consequences returning Arabs to demil zone. Their presence represents danger not only to Israel security, but to peace in region.

In general, Eytan argued, resolution "unfortunate" in that it puts premium on aggression. Not only Syria, but other Arabs will deduce from resolution that they can halt development Israel by aggressive acts similar to most recent incidents and will be encouraged to try again at suitable opportunity.

After Eytan's statement, Bendor added that not only Mapamt, but entire Israel population wld be affected by resolution which in it "careful understatement" (para 9 *b* reftel),[3] failed to differentiate clearly between Syrian aggression and Israel's "holding back when attacked", for which, he added, Amb Davis had commended Israel. Resolution cld not have been much worse for Israel, he said, if in response last attack Israel Army had moved into demil zone, and hence raises questions about "rewards for virtue".

My comment will follow.[4]

DAVIS

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[3] Identical to the subparagraph in the final text which begins: "Any aggressive military action . . .". For text of May 18, see p. 693.

[4] See telegram 771 from Tel Aviv, May 18, p. 691.

683.84A/5–1751 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 17, 1951—5 p.m.
PRIORITY

713. While not disputing defensive character Iraqi action in transferring air units Syria, Dept considers it unfortunate action taken while Syria–Israel dispute *sub judice* in SC. Action, which hardly necessary in view acceptance by Syria and Israel of SC cease-fire resolution of May 9 [*8*], lends itself to propaganda claims of Arab "aggressive intent" and has already created adverse reaction in US.

Inform FonOff of foregoing emphasizing that it is to interests of Syria[2] and Arabs generally to refrain from precipitate action prejudicing dispassionate consideration of Syria-Israel dispute in SC. Missions in other Arab caps requested to speak to govts to which accredited similarly. London discuss with FonOff and report UK reaction.

ACHESON

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Barrow and approved for transmission by Mr. Jones. Clearance obtained from Mr. Ludlow for UNP and Mr. Ranney for BNA. Repeated priority to Damascus. Repeated also on routine basis to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, New York, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] In telegram 645 from Damascus, May 20, Minister Cannon in part indicated that he had discussed the matter with Prime Minister Qudsi. He concluded: "From US viewpoint I wonder if we have much to gain at this stage by pressing further representations. It seems to us what good will we may have accumulated might best be used to bring Arab states round to reasonable settlement of various problems connected with present dispute and requiring Arab concessions." (683.84A/5–2051)

330/5–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, May 17, 1951—7 p.m.

934. Re Syrian-Israeli dispute. In anticipation Netherlands formal request at next SC meeting for information sponsors views on whether Huleh project can be stopped until after all Arabs affected by engineering operation are satisfied by compensation and removal you may in your discretion point out the following:

1. US believes that any conflict of view over right of Chairman of MAC to authorize continuance of Huleh project in fact of possible solitary Arab opposition is up to MAC pursuant to Art 7, para 8.

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Ludlow; transmission approved by Mr. Wainhouse after clearance in NE and L/UNA.

However, we are of opinion that Chairman of MAC has this right under full implementation clause Art 5, para 5 (*c*) when taken in consonance with Art 5, para 2 relating to gradual restoration of normal civilian life in zone. Provision for gradual restoration of normal civilian life cld be understood as having same effect as "promotion of the general welfare."

2. We concur UK view that procedure outlined in Art 8 para 3 might be used by Israelis as means for negotiating resumption Huleh project through specific revision of Armistice Agreement. However, US believes that as result of enactment of pending SC res which directs Chief of Staff TSO "to take the necessary steps to give effect to this res for the purpose of restoring peace in the area and authorizes him to take such measures to restore peace in the area, etc". Chief of Staff in our opinion cld at any time direct resumption of Huleh project pursuant to this SC Res if in his opinion such step wld contribute to restoration of peace in area.

With regard to possible allegations from either party that SC cannot impose on either party to agreement acceptance of additional powers of MAC Chairman, USDel can point out that, although Chief of Staff of TSO as Chairman of MACs in various armistice agreements is to assist parties to carry out agreements, by Res Aug 11, 1949, he is also agent of SC. As such SC can give him such powers as are necessary to enable him to discharge his mandate even though such powers were not anticipated by the Armistice Agreements, if in opinion of SC they are consistent and necessary SC's carrying out requirements of UN Charter.

ACHESON

83.84A/5-1951 : Telegram

President Weizmann of Israel to President Truman[1]

REHOVOT, May 18, 1951.

Have learned with deep apprehension proposal by American representative in Security Council to stop drainage of Hule swamp in order to appease Arab League that waged aggressive war against Israel. Drainage of Hule is essential not only for reclamation of largest malarial swamp area in Israel but for agricultural development of arid zones throughout country particularly Negev. To hold up Hule project means perpetuation of desert conditions in vast areas capable of providing homes for tens of thousands of immigrant settlers. Cannot conceive America lending hand to adoption of such calamitous decision which affects very essence of our life. Pray you prevent grievous action. Warmest personal regards.

CHAIM WEIZMANN

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[1] Telegram sent through commercial channels to the White House and transmitted to the Secretary by President Truman under cover of the following memorandum of May 19: "Attached is copy of a telegram that I have just received from the President of Israel. I know nothing about this situation and I'll appreciate it if you will prepare a reply." For President Truman's reply of May 31, see p. 701.

683.84A/5-1851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 18, 1951—1 p. m.

936. Re Syrian-Israeli dispute. Dept considers unacceptable Israel proposals made to Dept and USUN May 17[2] amend draft Four-Power res with exception para noting Israel regret re bombing. Suggest para on these lines be included immediately after para 11 which starts "*Recalls* to . . .".[3]

ACHESON

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Ludlow and Mr. Waldo. Cleared in NEA with Messrs. Berry, Kopper, and Barrow. Transmission approved by Mr. Wainhouse.

[2] Apparent reference to proposals contained in the following document dated May 17, found attached to telegram 936:

"Replace paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 by the following:

"*Noting* that the operations of the PLDC for draining the Huleh Marshes in the Demilitarized Zone are reported by the Chief of Staff of the TSO to affect the interests of Arab owners on seven acres of land in the Demilitarized Zone; Requests the Chief of Staff of the TSO to formulate an arrangement for the protection of the interests of the landowners involved, either by fair compensation or by an exchange of land, or both;

"*Calls upon* the parties to comply with such arrangement that the Chief of Staff may propose.

"Paragraph 9:

"*Regarding* . . . not to resort to military force,

"(*a*) *Takes note* of the statement of the representative of Israel on April 25 expressing regret for the aerial action taken by Israel forces on April 5, 1951;

"(*b*) *Finds* that . . .

"Paragraph 10:

"*Noting* the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents from the Demilitarized Zone,

"(*a*) *Requests* the Chief of Staff of the TSO, as a matter of urgency, to investigate this complaint,

"(*b*) *Calls upon* the parties to comply with the findings of the Chief of Staff in this matter."

The source text of this attachment contains no explanatory information other than the date.

[3] Record of the Security Council meeting held May 18 (U.N. Doc. S/PV.547) indicates that a revised draft (U.N. Doc. S/2152/Rev. 1) incorporating the substance of the modification to paragraph 9 which had been suggested by Israel was introduced by the sponsoring powers.

There followed a summary by USUN of action taken on the revision: "In noting the insertion in the revised text, Eban had thought it was to have replaced the sub-para condemning the bombing action. As the entire para (11) gave the impression of guilt, Israel was profoundly resentful. After the sponsors stated the revision had been made along the lines they thought had been suggested to them by Israel, Louri (Israel) replied the insertion or omission of the sub-para noting the statement of regret was of no consequence because the condemnation sub-para remained. The sponsors then withdrew Rev. 2 and Rev. 1 [introduced May 16] was adopted 10-0-1 (USSR)." (Quoted from telegram 1549 from New York, May 18, 11 p. m.; 330/5-1851)

83.84A/5–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State [1]

ECRET NIACT TEL AVIV, May 18, 1951—2 p. m.

771. Comment on Embtel 765, May 17.[2]

1. I take extremely serious view Israel's statement ref tel and mood developing here because ultimate solution this area's problem at stake nd will be fundamentally affected by res. To understand Israel's sychological reaction to res important to recall:

(1) That Israelis were taken aback (with beneficial effect) by riginal Dept statements (Deptels 420, 421, April 7)[3] to Israel and yria re incidents in Huleh and Tiberias areas, and felt rebuke implicit n Dept's statement to Israel bore down more heavily on Israel than yria;

(2) That Dept and UN silence re Tel Al Mutilla incident, as well s nature UN reporting of incident, were blow to Israel confidence n receiving objective treatment.

Coming on heel these two reactions, SC res understandably confirms srael suspicion of powers which did not hesitate to criticize Israel harply in early stages of incident but were not willing render Israel ustice due her when she was attacked in her own terr by forces bviously militarily trained and equipped.

2. Problem is complicated by fact that Israel, smarting under conviction injustice has been done her, completely oblivious to how extremely irritating her initial handling of the Huleh incident has been. Moreover, as reported previously, Israelis feel their legal position in carrying on Huleh work was sound, especially since it went unchallenged for several months; and they seem completely incapable of realizing extent to which their gen attitude and actions have annoyed everyone concerned. If therefore SC res is based on assumption that Israelis have guilty conscience and that this firm follow-up will restore their perspective, such is far from case. Result more likely to be wave of cynicism concerning UN throughout country, with earlier sense of guilt felt by Israelis, over statement publicly attributed PriMin to effect that Israel wld not accept UN order to cease work, now likely to e replaced by feeling PriMin knew what he was doing. If res passes n form in which tabled, I wld not be surprised if Israel determinedly esists its implementation. Moreover, in event another attack like Tel l Mutilla, army voices urging mil reprisals to put end to problems of emilitarized zone will have been strengthened. We must therefore face the fact that we have definitely weakened our position in Israel

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, erusalem, Jidda, London, and Paris.

[2] *Ante*, p. 686.

[3] Neither printed, but see footnote 3, p. 626.

by failing to respond with sufficient flexibility to changes taking place in behavior Israel and Syria in recent border controversy, and by giving Israelis impression we are not willing give them their due even in conspicuous instance where they chanced to be in right.

3. I feel strongly that in dealing with these conflicting parties, each of which certain of its righteousness, we dare not underestimate importance of convincing both sides our absolute impartiality and our determination to get at the facts and act upon them. I had hoped therefore that final draft of SC res wld be at greater pains to "give devil his due" in each case. I still believe that it is desirable to make as clear as possible that we consider our disapproval of Israel disregard of request of Chief of Staff TSO in memo March 7, with respect to work on Huleh project, as distinct from and not at all inconsistent with our opinion that project is desirable and shld go forward after an equitable settlement has been reached. I confirm my recommendation that along with strong criticism of forcible removal Arab villagers and landowners from demilitarized zone, and in some cases the subsequent destruction of their homes, we propose a constructive and feasible alternative to simply return to villages, such as payment immed and adequate compensation. This admittedly makes concession to Israel *fait accompli*, but on other hand it might be one practical means of meeting understandable Israel fear that cessation work "until agreement arranged" will permit indefinite obstruction of project by small determined group of Arabs. This fear, we are convinced, is one of important factors at bottom of Israel's consistently high-handed treatment of Arabs in border region and is basic to Israel's obduracy with regard to stopping work in Huleh. Finally, in attempt regain some lost ground, it might serve useful purpose even belatedly to include in SC res statement censuring recent mil operations against Israel on Israel soil, making clear that UN is concern of an out aggression [apparent garble?] against either party from any source whatsoever.

4. Emb believes abortive res shld be avoided at all costs, and that prestige of UN requires that before res is voted in present form, powers involved decide if they are prepared to do what is necessary to implement it.

DAVIS

683.84A/5-1851: Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, May 18, 1951—6 p. m.

642. PriMin this morning asked me to call to hear his observations on draft SC res.

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

He said reaction Syrians and other Arab leaders attending AL con-
rence was gen favorable, above all because they felt they now saw
anslated into action the assurances of real impartiality and justice
f which they had hitherto had little evidence in any disputes involv-
g Israel. His three specific points re res were:

1. Gen uneasiness lest reference to suspension work prove ineffectual
light publicized determination Israeli not to be diverted from this
roject. He fears major attempt will be made to obtain endorsement
raeli program on grounds enlightened development project being
eld up by handful backward and recalcitrant Arabs. *Comment:* this
even acres" argument (Legtel 641, May 18).[2] I said it is up to
yrian del to prove his case. Whole world knows US policy favors and
romotes land development, malaria control, etc. and Syrians must
rove other factors are fundamental, and that it is not just legalistic
stinacy.

2. He hopes that powers given TSO will not be used too broadly. He
as full confidence in present personalities but with changes over
eriod of times some new chief of staff TSO might presume to order all
rts of things "to restore peace" outside framework of armistice
greement. *Comment:* I assume he refers to para 13. I said context
as clear and advised against trying to tinker with formal text.

3. He said some of his Arab colleagues deplore lack of provision
r sanctions for non-compliance. He himself was willing to take
ance. I said he was quite right; a lot can happen if using this par-
cular dispute Syria shld be induced to become stalking horse for gen
rab griefs against Israel.

CANNON

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[2] Not printed. (683.84A/5–1851) "'Seven acres' argument" refers to repeated
raeli emphasis on the alleged smallness of the real property under expropria-
on from Arab holders in the Demilitarized Zone by the Palestine Land
evelopment Company.

Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council on May 18, 1951[1]

he Security Council,

Recalling its past resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 17 No-
mber 1950 and 8 May 1951 relating to the General Armistice Agree-
ents between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States and to the
ovisions contained therein concerning methods for maintaining the
mistice and resolving disputes through the Mixed Armistice Com-
issions participated in by the parties to the General Armistice
greements;

Noting the complaints of Syria and Israel to the Security Council,
atement in the Council of the representatives of Syria and Israel,
e reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Chief

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[1] U.N. Doc. S/2157. Approved by a vote of 10 votes to none, with the USSR
staining.

of Staff and the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine and statements before the Council by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine,

Noting that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in a memorandum of 7 March 1951, and the Chairman of the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on a number of occasions have requested the Israel Delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission to ensure that the Palestine Land Development Company, Limited, is instructed to cease all operations in the demilitarized zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this project, and,

Noting further that Article V of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria gives to the Chairman the responsibility for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone,

Endorses the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and calls upon the Government of Israel to comply with them;

Declares that in order to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the Governments of Israel and Syria observe faithfully the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949;

Notes that under Article VII, paragraph 8, of the Armistice Agreement, where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of the agreement, other than the preamble and Articles I and II, is at issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission's interpretation shall prevail;

Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to bring before the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their complaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom;

Considers that it is inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under Article V and calls upon the parties to be represented at all meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests;

Calls upon the parties to give effect to the following excerpt cited by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization at the 542nd meeting of the Security Council on 25 April 1951,[2] as being from the summary record of the Syria-Israel Armistice Conference of 3 July 1949, which was agreed to by the parties as an authoritative

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[2] U.N. Doc. S/PV.542.

pages tightly

comment on Article V of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria:

> "The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an Armistice Agreement, in sub-paragraphs 5(*b*) and 5(*f*) of the draft article. Such civil administration, including policing, will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignty.
>
> "Where Israeli civilians return to or remain in Israeli village or settlement, the civil administration and policing of the village or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab administration and police unit will be authorized.
>
> "As civilian life is gradually restored, administration will take shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.
>
> "The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation and co-operation with the local communities, will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and protection of civilian life. He will not assume responsibility for direct administration of the zone.

Recalls to the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and their commitments under the Armistice Agreement not to resort to military force and finds that:

(*a*) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel on 5 April 1951, and

(*b*) Any aggressive military action by either of the parties in or around the demilitarized zone, which further investigation by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization into the reports and complaints recently submitted to the Council may establish,

constitute a violation of the cease-fire provision provided in the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter;

Noting the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents from the demilitarized zone;

(*a*) Decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the Government of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be determined by the Commission; and

(*b*) Holds that no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarized zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

Noting with concern the refusal on a number of occasions to permit observers and officials of the Truce Supervision Organization to enter localities and areas which were subjects of complaints in order to perform their legitimate functions,

Considers that the parties should permit such entry at all times whenever this is required, to enable the Truce Supervision Organization to fulfil its functions, and should render every facility which may be requested by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for this purpose;

Reminds the parties of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security are not endangered and expresses its concern at the failure of the Governments of Israel and Syria to achieve progress pursuant to their commitments under the Armistice Agreement to promote the return to permanent peace in Palestine;

Directs the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to take the necessary steps to give effect to this resolution for the purpose of restoring peace in the area and authorizes him to take such measures to restore peace in the area and to make such representations to the Governments of Israel and Syria as he may deem necessary;

Calls upon the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to report to the Security Council on compliance given to the present resolution;

Requests the Secretary-General to furnish such additional personnel and assistance as the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization may request in carrying out the present resolution and the Council's resolutions of 8 May 1951 and 17 November 1950.

683.84A/5–2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Barrow)

[Extract][1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1951.

Subject: 1. Syria–Israel Dispute
2. Military and Economic Aid to Syria

Participants: Faiz El-Khouri, Minister of Syria
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Barrow

Discussion:

1. The Syrian Minister expressed satisfaction at the United Nations Security Council resolution of May 18, 1951 regarding the Syria-Israel dispute, "even though it came a little late". He said that this

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[1] The material on military and economic aid to Syria is omitted.

move was regarded as concrete evidence that the United States was following its announced policy of impartiality.

When the Syrian Minister alluded to Israeli misbehavior, Mr. McGhee took occasion to mention that Syria had recently taken some actions which were of a minor character but which nevertheless did not help to advance the Syrian case in the eyes of the public. He referred to (*a*) the transfer of air units from Iraq, (*b*) the statement of the Syrian Prime Minister that Syria would never make peace with Israel, (*c*) the creation by the Arab League of an office to strengthen the economic boycott against Israel and (*d*) the visit of the controversial Grand Mufti to Damascus during the Arab League meetings. Mr. McGhee emphasized that whatever reasons or justification might lie behind these developments he believed they accomplished very little while at the same time evoking adverse reaction toward the Arabs in world public opinion. The Minister, while not admitting that the foregoing actions were unjustified, agreed that it was unwise to have made them public at this time.

The Syrian Minister said that Syria, while pleased with the resolution, was fearful that Israel would not comply and asked what the United States would do in the face of Israel's flouting the Security Council resolution. Mr. McGhee assured Faiz Bey that the United States would press strongly to see that the resolution was implemented.

. . . .

674.84A/5-2351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 23, 1951—7 p. m.

5424. For Ambassador. I believe it unwise in present Brit polit situation for me to reply to Eden's observations (urtel 5894 May 11).[2]

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Stabler and approved for transmission by Mr. Acheson personally.

[2] *Ante*, p. 679. In a memorandum of May 16 to the Secretary, routed through Mr. Matthews, Mr. McGhee had commented on telegram 5894 in part as follows:

"There has been considerable criticism by the Conservatives and the Labor back-benchers over the manner in which the British Government is conducting the negotiations with Egypt on the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The Conservatives believe that the Government is prepared to make too many concessions to Egypt and has demanded that the Government adopt a strong attitude with respect to the restrictions which the Egyptian Government has placed on tankers transitting the Suez Canal bound for Israel. We feel that it is unfortunate that the UK has felt obliged to complicate the already complicated treaty negotiations by the introduction of the Suez Canal issue. We are convinced that if the British should try any such method as suggested by Mr. Eden, it would be impossible to obtain a satisfactory settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian question. It must be admitted that up to the present time little or no progress has been made in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations but that the door is still open. There can be little doubt that that door would be closed if tactics of force were employed. It should also be emphasized that the consequences of such action on the US position in the Near and Middle East would be extremely serious." (974.531/5-1651)

For documentation regarding the attitude of the United States concerning the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for a revision of the Treaty of 1936, see pp. 343 f

Suggest you advise Eden of our gen thinking re Anglo-Egypt and Anglo-Iran relations since this will constitute answer and at same time pour cold water upon course he proposes.

We agree it is of utmost importance Iran situation be settled as soon as possible on amicable and reasonable basis and we have informed Morrison of basis on which we wld be prepared support such program as may be put forward. We recognize that great provocation has been presented but believe that situation requires infinite restraint. We feel that same criteria apply in Egypt situation. We consider that any display of force such as use of destroyers with tankers transitting Suez Canal wld have most disastrous repercussions not only in Egypt but throughout entire Near and Middle East and wld play directly into hands of those who have been hoping UK and its friends wld be driven to such measures. We also believe that tactics of force wld prejudice possibility of satis resolution of Egypt question.

FYI: It is hard for Dept to believe Eden seriously entertains these views. Do you consider they prevail widely in Conservative Party leadership?

ACHESON

330/5-2351: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, May 23, 1951—7:01 p.m.
PRIORITY

1575. Israeli-Syria dispute. Malania (UN) told us of confidential cable just received from Riley for informal use by and in discretion of SC president. Substance approximately as follows:

Sharett told Riley[1] it was his understanding that point at issue now is safeguarding of legitimate rights and interests of Arab landowners in that part of demilitarized zone effected by Huleh drainage operations. Immediate task was to explore possibility of agreement with these landowners on basis of compensation or the granting of alternate tracts of land. Israeli Govt had therefore requested Palestine Land Development Company to suspend its operations in affected area for "brief period" necessary to come to understanding with landowners. Suspension effective May 23. On May 24, engineering work would be shifted to other areas of demilitarized zone. Sharett emphasized this would be temporary and partial discontinuance to facilitate understanding with owners. He reasserted "inalienable right" of Israel to complete drainage project.

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[1] In a letter transmitted to the General the night of May 22–23, and published in the *Jerusalem Post* the following morning. Text is in telegram 788 from Tel Aviv, May 23, not printed. (683.84A/5-2351)

In Riley's opinion, Sharett's position raised "dangerous issue" which probably will cause trouble. Riley cannot now authorize commencement of engineering operations elsewhere in demilitarized zone. Investigation must first take place to determine if new sites are in fact in Israeli territory. Riley has therefore requested Israeli Govt to order that work be stopped altogether until continuation can be authorized in proper manner.

Earliest possible date for MAC meeting is Monday, May 28. Riley will be in chair.

Austin

974.531/5–2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET London, May 25, 1951—3 p. m.

6159. For the Secretary. In my opinion Eden really feels that UK shld follow tactics re Suez Canal outlined mytel 5894 May 11[1] (Deptel 5424 May 23).[2] He is not the sort of man to make a suggestion of this type without giving it full thought and particularly in a conversation with me. Evidence that he continues to entertain these views found in his Empire Day speech last night when, after referring to progressive deterioration of respect for international obligations, he stated "In Egypt in two years past, our tankers to Haifa have been denied right of passage thru Suez Canal, though under terms of convention, Canal shld be free from blockade in peace and war."

He contd that two months ago there had been debate "when Commons was virtually unanimous, in speech at least, against govt granting facilities to Egypt to acquire oil while Brit tankers were still being denied passage thru canal." Yet when it came to the division, govt had won by three votes, and he supposed that business was still going on and Brit tankers to Haifa were still being stopped. "Giving away just internatl rights does not win peace. That is appeasement at its worst. We have been pushed around a little too much of late. That is bad for us and bad for other countries and it is bad for peace. For sometime past I have thought that we should call halt to that process."

Fact that Churchill was present when Eden discussed his proposal with Morrison indicates that it had former's support. I shall endeavor discreetly to ascertain views other conservative leaders in matter, but I am inclined to feel that those who have given any thought to subj wld be reluctant to take issue with party leader and deputy leader even tho they personally might have some misgivings re wisdom of move this type.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 679.

[2] *Ante*, p. 697.

Will advise Eden when opportunity arises as you suggest.

GIFFORD

683.84A/5-2951 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 29, 1951—6 p. m.

743. On appropriate occasion your discretion you shld remind govts to which accredited fol position which Dept has indicated to Israel and Syria number previous occasions: It was not design of sponsors Res bring about permanent cessation of drainage operations in Huleh area which dependent on work in Demilit Zone. This made clear on May 18 in SC when spokesman for sponsors stated all sponsors agreed Huleh drainage project wld undoubtedly promote gen welfare of area. First objective Res, however, to bring about suspension of drainage operations in Demilit Zone enable Chief of Staff of TSO bring about negotiated settlement between owners of affected land and Palestine Land Development Co. Sponsors did not intend give veto power over drainage swamp to any party but believe that through appropriate UN machinery already established handle problem, rights Arabs in area cld be safeguarded and at same time useful project cld be carried out.

Dept believes Riley shld be given opportunity deal with problem in Demilit Zone (re Damascus Legtel 670, May 26)[2] and any action by states members SC to back up Res shld only be undertaken on basis report to UN from Riley that either party is refusing or has failed comply with Res.

You may assure govts to which accredited that US will continue watch situation Demilit Zone carefully and will consider serious matter failure either Syria or Israel comply with SC Res.

Potentially dangerous is idea "this time US siding with Arabs." US action SC was and is strictly impartial and statement to contrary only jeopardize strength US position. Both Arabs and Israelis shld understand this.

ACHESON

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Waldo, cleared for UNP by Mr. Ludlow, approved for transmission by Mr. Jones.

Telegram sent for action to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Haifa, Jerusalem, Jidda, and Tel Aviv, and sent for information to Ankara, Paris, and London.

[2] Not printed. (683.84A/5-2651)

683.84A/5–3151 : Telegram

President Truman to President Weizmann of Israel[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, May 31, 1951—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have recd your tel of May 18, 1951 concerning the four-power res regarding the situation in the Demilitarized Zone on the Israel-Syrian border. As you know, this res was adopted by the Security Council on May 18, 1951 by a unanimous vote. I want to assure you, Mr. President, that the United States reps in conjunction with their Brit, Fr, and Turk colleagues considered the matter most carefully before introducing this res in the Council.

As was pointed out in the sponsors' statements before the Security Council on May 16 and 18, the fundamental consideration in this res is the strengthening of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Comm and of the authority of the United Nations Chief of Staff in dealing with the points at issue regarding the Demilitarized Zone. I can assure you that it was not the design of the sponsors of this res to bring about a permanent cessation of drainage operations in the Huleh marsh area. At the same time, the Security Council has expressed the view that such activities in the Demilitarized Zone should only be carried on in accordance with the procedures established under the Armistice Agreement. The United States will continue to support the position of the United Nations on this matter, noting that if either side is dissatisfied with the terms of the present agreement, the necessary United Nations machinery is always available to permit modifications to be made.

I am very happy to have recd reports that fighting in the Demilitarized Zone has now ceased and both sides are abiding by the terms of the Security Council's cease-fire of May 8. We are also confident that both sides will similarly comply with the terms of the res of May 18.

It is my hope that in the near future the limited arrangements represented by the armistice agreements can be supplanted or expanded by additional agreements between Israel and the Arab states which will result in final peace settlements. Meanwhile, in the absence of more comprehensive settlements, the armistice agreements are the only, and therefore invaluable, instruments safeguarding peace in the area. As such, they must be carefully preserved. It is my belief that only through the scrupulous adherence of both sides to the armistice agreements and Security Council resolutions can a solid foundation be laid for an eventual permanent peace.

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[1] The text of this message is printed in the form in which it was transmitted in telegram 535 to Tel Aviv, May 31, which also includes delivery instructions.
Mr. Waldo drafted this message on May 25. In a memorandum of May 28, which covers part of his discussion of foreign policy that day with the President, Mr. Acheson stated: "I left the draft telegram with the President, who said that he would study it and let me hear from him." (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 238) No response from the President has been found in Department of State files. The message as transmitted is unchanged from Mr. Waldo's draft.

I send to you, Mr. President, my warm regards.

HARRY S. TRUMAN[3]

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[3] In telegram 833 to Washington, June 4, Ambassador Davis stated he had personally delivered this message to President Weizmann on June 1. He commented in part: "Also said I had impression matter was being permitted to assume more importance in Israel than it merits, and that public was being given idea that resolution indicated unfriendliness on part sponsors, which simply is not true." (683.84A/6–451) In a letter to the Ambassador of June 12, marked "Personal—Confidential", Mr. McGhee commended Mr. Davis for stressing this point. (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: File "D" Letters)

320.2 AA/6–451 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, June 4, 1951—11 a. m.

714. Rapun 163. From Bergus for Blandford.[1] Fol summarizes subcommittee report now under active consideration AdCom: *Begin summary:*

1. Indispensable preliminary is tripartite declaration to effect US, UK, Fr intend see reintegration job through and that reintegration will not compromise repatriation compensation rights.

2. Two subjects of relief transfer and reintegration must be linked and problem involves all Arab states.

3. Therefore after tripartite declaration Arab states would be invited joint conference with PRA. At conference PRA wld acquaint Arab leaders with full situation including movement problem. Question whether detailed joint negotiation wld be undertaken then or on bilateral basis later left open. Timing and method similar approach Israel left open.

4. PRA proposals wld include:

(*a*) Relief wld be handed over by paying cash to local govts in currencies of contributing countries. Usable contributions in kind wld be handed over at fixed rate as part of cash subsidy. Medical education and welfare should not be separated out.

(*b*) Payments wld be based on present figure of 850,000 refugees with escalator clause based internatl price wheat.

(*c*) Arab govts wld be encouraged present reintegration projects for PRA consideration. PRA wld offer technical and financial assistance. Relief transfer agreements wld contain provision for reducing relief payments as reintegration projects agreed on. Small subsidy to be paid to govts for stopping relief to refugees already self-reintegrated.

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[1] Ambassador Blandford had left Beirut for Washington on May 30.

Rapid diminishing availability relief funds wld be emphasized ong with major econ advantages accruing from reintegration. *End mmary.*

Wld appreciate your comments.[3]

Bruins

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[3] See footnote 1, p. 717.

3.84A/6-751 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

NFIDENTIAL Beirut, June 7, 1951—3 p. m.

731. Replying Deptel 859, June 6,[2] requesting state of drainage ork in demilitarized zone, Gen Riley, now in Beirut, reports that on me 5 he submitted second interim report[3] to Pres SecCo on steps ken to give effect to May 18, 1951 SecCo resolution.

[Part ?] 1 of this report covers Israel Govt agreement for stoppage all work in demilitarized zone until chairman has opportunity to eck on status of lands Israeli-owned, concession-owned and Arabwned, where work must be performed in connection with over-all roject. Chairman, as result of his investigation, expects to be in sition to authorize Palestine Land Development Co. to resume work Monday, June 12 on Israeli- or concession-owned lands. No work ill be resumed on any Arab-owned land until chairman reaches greement on payment of compensation and possible exchange of lands ithin demilitarized zone. If this is not possible (present indications no ncurrence possible), then within period two weeks Gen Riley will nd it necessary to report back to SecCo results of such endeavors. s Riley sees situation, chairman cannot stop work from proceeding lands other than Arab-owned for an indefinite period. However, yria is intent on interpreting SecCo res to mean that work on all nds will be suspended indefinitely. Riley invites attention to fact at at time Mar 7 memo was prepared, he had no knowledge that nds other than Arab-owned were involved. Therefore, he must stand point that Palestine Land Development Co. does have authority to ntinue work on land which belongs to Israelis and to concession.

Above is for info only and not for publication.

Gen Riley expects to be mainly in Beirut next two or three weeks. uggest routing communications for him accordingly.

Bruins

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[1] Repeated for information to Damascus, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Not printed.

[3] U.N. Doc. S/2185.

857.AC/6–751 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT JERUSALEM, June 7, 1951—6 p. m.

232. Palun 407. Fol Shiloah's invitation to dinner with Sharett 28 May (Palun 405)[1] which I had declined, Sharett himself invited Barco and me to dine on Wed June 6. I had meanwhile explained to Shiloah that I had nothing to say to Israel Govt on subject of compensation but that I wld of course be happy hear anything which they had to tell us. It was on this basis that we accepted Sharett's latest invitation and dined with him, Shiloah, Horowitz, and Comay at Sharett's house last night in Jerusalem. Immed after dinner Sharett said that he had been hoping for sometime discuss with USDel subject of Barco's and Shiloah's earlier talks (Palun 403).[2] He wanted to say at outset that he was very much interested in line of thinking which had been subject of those talks. He cld not however raise matter with his govt without pursuing it further with USDel. Meanwhile he had recd several requests from Aras, Boisanger, and Andersen for mtgs which he had put off until he had had an opportunity talk to us. He asked Shiloah outline points of his conversation with Barco in order we might all be clear as to exactly what had been said. Shiloah recalled Barco had put forward seven points for consideration:

1. That refugee problem remained greatest obstacle to peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors.
2. That it was unlikely practical means cld be found for refugee repatriation on any large scale.
3. That there remained question of compensation, which if settled satisfactorily might be expected remove refugee problem as grievance against Israel.
4. That settlement of compensation question might be expected pave way to peaceful relations between Israel and her Arab neighbors.
5. That by relating compensation to reintegration, it might be possible avoid waste of compensation funds and encourage resettlement.
6. Assuming Israel was not now in a position undertake large scale financial obligations to refugees, it might be possible obtain internatl assistance through UN for such financing.
7. Wld Israel therefore consider it politically advantageous to settle compensation question by assuming large scale financial obligation if such obligation cld be guaranteed or financed with internatl assistance without jeopardizing Israel's economic future, it being understood that settlement of compensation question wld be outside context of any overall peace settlement and without ref to Israel's claims for war damages?

Shiloah explained that the discussions Barco and he had had on these points had always been on basis of personal inquiry and explora-

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[1] Not printed; one section of Palun 405 is summarized in footnote 4, p. 673.
[2] Dated May 9, p. 671.

n, each party understanding that the other was not in a position
say what attitude his govt might take on matter.

Sharett then asked number of questions concerning manner in which
mpensation wld be carried out if Israel were to agree to assume
ligation referred to. His questions related to how compensation
nds might be used for reintegration; whether Israel wld be expected
pay to a trustee or to Arab govts; whether Israel having paid cld
regarded as acquitted of responsibility; whether if compensation
nd was insufficient to pay all claims in full, refugees wld expect
maintain a claim against Israel for balance; if compensation
nd was to be determined on basis of a global estimate but payment
s to be made to individual claimants, how and when were individ-
l claims to be examined; etc.

USDel replied to these questions that they had certainly not been
erlooked in our thinking but that until discussions of principle
d proceeded further, we had not thought it possible find answers
them. We felt however that procedures cld be worked out to
swer each question satisfactorily and we had hoped when time
me we cld work out answers in collaboration with them and refu-
e office. Sharett then pointed out that proposal under discussion
s distinct departure from orthodox view of compensation as Israel
d always understood it. Orthodox view had been that compensation
s an incentive to a peace settlement and that as such it had to be
yed as trump card in overall peace negots. On one hand Israel
t it was prospect of compensation that provided best encourage-
ent to govts of Arab states to talk peace and on other that if com-
nsation were paid without requiring anything in return peace talks
ght be postponed indefinitely. Proposal under discussion however
s based on an opposite theory, that with payment of compensation
incipal obstacle to peace wld be removed by depriving Arab states
their grievances, and he was personally somewhat sympathetic to
is view. At this point USDel added that up to present govts com-
ising PCC had little persuasive power with Arab states so long as
ey cld not point to any substantial efforts by Israel to discharge
obligation, but that with payment of compensation by Israel, our
vts wld be in much more persuasive position and might be expected
ve greater success in urging Arabs come to terms.

Sharett then raised problem of public opinion in Israel, pointing
t that it wld be difficult for Israelis to accept payment of compensa-
n to Arab refugees, many of whom had fought against them, if at
me time Israel's claims for reparations against Germany cld not be
tisfied. He felt moreover that question of financing wld prove much
s difficult if Israel cld expect repayment for losses Israel citizens
d suffered at hands of Germans. He thought this aspect of problem
ld be pursued further and intimated that Shiloah, who expected go

to Washington at end of month, might take up question again in Washington. Emphasizing however his interest in present line of thinking, he asked whether our intention was take up question officially and privately with Govt of Israel or whether it was our intention to raise question publicly at time of our report to Gen. Assembly. He hoped it wld be possible have discussions of more official nature in near future. In this connection, I told Sharett Barco wld be going back to Dept for consultations and that following his return I hoped such official discussions cld take place.

This morning Sharett saw Aras in Jerusalem, who reported to USDel that for first time he had found Sharett's attitude hopeful. Whereas in past discussions he had been evasive and indirect, in this morning's conv he seemed much more receptive to Aras's argument that with settlement of compensation question Israel wld be taking an important step toward peace with Arab states.

[Palmer]

683.84A/6-951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 9, 1951—5 p. m.

5771. Re Embtel 6451 June 8[2] and approach Brit Emb rep Dept has informed latter as fols:

> Dept understands FonOff concern re course of action which Riley intends pursue, but feels that if he were now dissuaded, his position with Israelis wld be undermined and Syrians wld take this as further evidence they can block drainage operations demilitarized zone indefinitely. While we agree that effect Israel compliance SC res May 18 wld have been better if it had been given more promptly and gracefully and if permission resume operations on Israel or concession-owned lands not granted so soon after compliance, facts remain: *a*) Israel has complied; *b*) Syria elects ignore sponsors' interpretation SC res; and *c*) Riley's position technically sound.
>
> In our view SC res designed primarily to strengthen authority chief of Staff TSO and Chairman MAC and nothing shld now be done which wld weaken their authority. We do not think that question of who owned lands cld have affected res one way or other since point at issue was compliance not ownership.

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Stabler, cleared for UNP by Mr. Ludlow, and approved for transmission by Mr. Jones. Repeated for information to Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.

[2] In this telegram the Embassy had described the reaction of the Foreign Office to General Riley's position on the resumption of work on the Huleh drainage project (see telegram 731 from Beirut, June 7, p. 703). Paragraph 3 of telegram 6451 reads as follows:

"FonOff thinks that correct procedure for Riley to have followed under circumstances wld have been to state that he was afraid SC action might have been based on his erroneous info re actual position but to have called Israel to stop all work until such time as SC cld again consider matter and reaffirm or alter its decision." (683.84A/6-851)

For above reasons we are disposed support Riley in his intended urse of action.

Re FonOff thinking correct procedure para three reftel we believe is wld be mistake since it wld have immed reopened entire question SC thereby vitiating one of the principal objectives SC res—let AC do the job. However we shld be disposed support further SC tion shld Riley so request.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

Some time after June 11, but before June 20, General Riley made ailable to the Legation in Beirut an analysis, originally prepared r United Nations use, of some of his actions in the Huleh matter llowing passage of the Security Council resolution of May 18. The st paragraph of this analysis follows:

> "When it was learned that Palestine Land Dev Co cld work on cerin Israeli lands without infringing on Arab land, Chief of Staff quested Palestine Land Development Co. to again stop all work on une 5, 1951 in demilitarized zone in accordance with S/2157 [the solution of May 18], until chairman had opportunity to check hether lands on which work resumed May 24 cld be considered as rab-owned. This investigation was completed and permission granted alestine Land Dev Co to proceed with work on June 11, 1951, since nds not considered to be Arab-owned. This action based on Art 5 interpreted by explanatory note." (Summary transmitted to the epartment in telegram 786, from Beirut, June 20; 330/6-2051)

4A.00/6-1151

emorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

ONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1951.

ubject: Visit of Mr. Jacob Blaustein, President, American Jewish Committee and the American Oil Company.

articipants: Mr. Blaustein
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Lewis Jones—NE
Mr. Waldo—NE
Mr. Stabler—NE

Mr. Blaustein called on me at his request to discuss his recent interiew with the Egyptian Ambassador to the US, as well as certain ther items.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

[Here follows a discussion of the situation in Morocco.]

2. *Israel:* Mr. Blaustein agreed that grant-aid for the Near East should be provided on a regional basis, provided that Israel received enough. He suggested it might be desirable for him to discuss the matter with the Bureau of the Budget and Mr. Foster of ECA with this in mind. I told Mr. Blaustein that under the President's program Israel was scheduled to receive $23.5 million, and that any greater sum under present budgeting would certainly be considered by the Arabs as proof of a complete lack of impartiality. Mr. Blaustein said that Israel could be counted upon as an ally and that, therefore, it should get the same aid as the European countries. I said that it was not possible to increase the amount; the President had already set forth the US position in his message to the Congress.[2] We also felt that $50 million for the refugees was equally of benefit to Israel.

Mr. Blaustein inquired whether the Arabs had agreed to resettlement. I said that these funds were not for the payment of compensation, but were to provide for feeding under the UN and for projects leading to resettlement. I told Mr. Blaustein that two years ago it was clear to me that the refugees would have to be resettled in the Arab states and, if these states agreed, resettlement should be forthcoming soon.

Mr. Blaustein then raised the question of the SC Resolution of May 18, and expressed disappointment in it. He said it might endanger Ben-Gurion's chances in the forthcoming elections in Israel and make the Arabs more difficult to deal with. He admitted, however, that Israel had gone along with the UN decision and that everything I had told him would occur had happened. I said that the resolution had reestablished respect for the UN in the area. We now believed that General Riley should be permitted to have a free hand under the resolution.

3. *Discussion with Egyptian Ambassador:*

Mr. Blaustein then turned to a discussion of his meeting with the Egyptian Ambassador. He had told the Egyptian Ambassador that he was a non-Zionist, but not an anti-Zionist. He was not a member of any Zionist organization nor a supporter of the more radical aspects of Zionism. He was eager for peace in the Near East area and hoped that the ECA aid could be extended to the area in order to fight Communism. Egypt was the only country south of Turkey which had the necessary industrial capacity to raise the standard of living for the masses.

Mr. Jones said that it was difficult to convince the workers of Egypt and Iraq of the miserable lot of Communist workers. Their own condition was bad enough. They could also claim that the West had given to the Arab world Israel and the refugees. Mr. Blaustein said he understood from the Ambassador that the Syrians had turned down Point IV.[3] Mr. Jones replied that that was indeed the case. There were several factors which had a bearing on the matter: (1) Israel slowness in complying with SC resolution of May 18 and (2) Syrian discouragement because we had allocated $23.5 million for Israel and only $23.5 million for all the Arab states. These facts, plus a weak Syrian government, had resulted in the rejection of Point IV. Mr. Blaustein said it was his view that the feudal landowners didn't want Point IV and the French business groups were also afraid of it. He had told the Egyptian Ambassador that nations were like individuals. There were times when you had to be realistic. Britain had made mistakes by moving too slowly in the area, and Egypt should profit by the example and do something to make peace. He told the Ambassador that if Israel were going to collapse, the Egyptian policy of watchful waiting was sufficient, but Israel was not going to collapse. The fact that certain American senators and representatives were getting behind a bill for grant-aid to Israel showed that Israel is supported by American public opinion—not only by American Jews. The Egyptian Ambassador said that Communism was a great menace, and inquired whether Israel would be willing to join an Arab bloc against Communism, Mr. Blaustein said he didn't know, but it was a good idea.

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[2] For information on President Truman's message to the Congress of May 24, which deals with a regional aid program to the Near East, see the editorial note, p. 150.

I said that I thought Israel would cooperate with the West, as well as with the Arabs. Mr. Blaustein inquired whether such cooperation would be within the framework of the Atlantic Pact. I said I didn't think so, but that we would be happy to encourage any regional grouping of this sort.

Mr. Blaustein said he had suggested that the Egyptian Ambassador meet Ambassador Eban at his (Blaustein's) home in Baltimore. The Egyptian Ambassador, however, had replied that he would have to get the approval of his government for such a meeting. Mr. Blaustein had also told the Egyptian Ambassador that there were basically no problems between Israel and Egypt. The Ambassador said that Egypt wanted peace, and Mr. Blaustein requested the Ambassador to talk to his government about the matter.

I said that if this would work it would be a good thing, but that we had had previous experience in this problem: In 1949, we had acted as intermediary between Egypt and Israel in connection with the Gaza Strip. We had thought it would be an extremely constructive step if Israel could have taken over the Gaza Strip and at the same time assume full responsibility for the inhabitants and refugees there. However, the Egyptians had refused to negotiate on the subject. While we are not trying to impose peace, we want it nonetheless.

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[3] For additional documentation on this subject, see pp. 1073 ff.

However, we do not think any Egyptian government would make peace at this time. The Arabs feel that they would not get anything from Israel, so they do not understand why they should make peace and give up their policy of noncooperation and no trade. Mr. Blaustein said that Ben-Gurion had told him that arrangements could be worked out with the Egyptians to save face all around. I said that a small offer at this juncture, but one outside the context of a final settlement, to give up territory, take back refugees, or release blocked Arab accounts might be helpful in bringing about the final objective. Mr. Blaustein wondered whether it really would be helpful, and referred to the Israel offer to take back 100,000 refugees. I said that when the offer was made we had urged the Arabs to consider it.

Mr. Blaustein said that the Egyptian Ambassador had told him to tell Eban to stop border incidents. I said that we didn't wish to say who was to blame, but the Israelis had refused to accept the rulings of the head UN man in Palestine and most of the incidents on the Syrian border had taken place after that. I said that Eban had taken the entire Huleh incident too hard and too personally, and had really made things more difficult by his insistence and subjectivity.

Mr. Blaustein said that he would ask the Egyptian Ambassador over to his house in a couple weeks, and suggested that I come along too. I told him that this would put the matter in an entirely different light so far as the Ambassador was concerned; that it would be better if Mr. Blaustein saw the Ambassador by himself.

Mr. Blaustein then mentioned the problem of the Iraqi Jews, particularly of Iraqi Jews who were abroad and who had property in Iraq. He felt that these men were treated unfairly if their assets were frozen or confiscated. I said I thought this was being cleared up. I mentioned, with regard to the immigration into Israel, that Mr. Kaplan, Minister of Finance, had mentioned the possibility of mass emigration from Iran. I said it was one thing to take Jews from all over the world who were in distress, but it was another matter entirely to attempt to create circumstances which would stimulate immigration of Jews from areas where they were living in peace. Mr. Blaustein agreed with me in this, and said that Ben-Gurion's reference to a 4,000,000 population in Israel was fantastically large.

George C. McGhee

784A.00/6-1251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL Tel Aviv, June 12, 1951—6 p.m.

865. Harold B. Hoskins arrived Tel Aviv Friday June 8 and left Sunday June 10. His visit was of great value to Emb because of

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[1] Repeated to Jerusalem for the information of Ambassador Palmer.

his knowledge of area and recent tour of whole ME. While here he had interviews with PriMin, FonMin and Shiloah. PriMin postponed trip to Tiberias in order see Hoskins Sunday morning.

Ben Gurion spoke with enthusiasm of his impressions US saying we are not making most of our opportunities acquaint world with achievements. Mentioned TVA and Ford plant as examples US accomplishments which made deep impression on him. As to policy objectives, he said maintenance of peace most important, and reiterated view expressed earlier to asst secy McGhee and Dir of NE Lewis Jones that Israel considers Egypt key to situation. He regards that country leader of Arab nations and one that wld dare change its policy toward Israel. Accordingly he declared it to be his intention to do everything possible persuade Egypt to lead way in making peace. Deplored reactionary nature Arab govts but recognized no time wait for change for better.

Mr. Hoskins stated frankly believed PriMin had exaggerated opinion of Egypt and might find he was leaning on broken reed; wld do better to look to Turkey for cooperation in improving relations with Arabs. Mentioned also Saudi Arabia. Made point Arab countries distrust intentions both Israel and US hence any idea that US in position persuade Arab countries change attitude is unrealistic. We must strive build confidence. PriMin while somewhat disappointed appeared accept the views as coming from a source he respects. He agreed Turkey best friend in ME. Said Abdullah means well but not in hands Pal Arabs and powerless. Although obviously displeased over SC action Huleh controversy, he avoided subject. His manner nevertheless was very cordial throughout interview.

FonMin Sharett expressed disappointment over SC res, but he also did not dwell on subject. Seemed interested some constructive means improve gen situation. Ref his last mtg with Amb Palmer when possibility move toward payment compensation was discussed, Sharett said there are two schools of thought: (1) that compensation powerful factor in inducing Arab countries to make peace and that Israel wld not therefore make any concessions this connection except as part of gen settlement; (2) other school of thought is that Israel shld take initiative in making some payment as evidence sincerity in recognizing obligations and in order create confidence its intentions. He intimated he is ready give latter point of view careful consideration. Seemed responsive to argument that former policy had not produced results and that something needs be done to counteract distrust (he expressed some misgivings lest concessions be interpreted as weakness and desperate move in effort make peace before collapse).

We urge view that such action wld be act of strength which wld improve Israel's moral position here and abroad, particularly in US and Europe. Hoskins suggested it wld be advisable ensure that initial payment is distributed to refugees themselves to have maximum psychological effect.

Justification wld be moral one, namely that Israel recognizes obligation and is discharging it because she regards it right thing to do. FonMin did not reject these ideas but on contrary seemed to be giving them very serious considerations. He did not dwell on difficulties of financing, but remarked that his govt wld have to have some assistance from the UN or other source in meeting such obligations.

Davis

974.531/6–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 12, 1951—7 p. m.

1288. Dept understands that Den, Nor, Swed and SoAfr have recently made representations re Canal restrictions similar to those of UK; that Ital has promised make representations and that Aust will probably take like action. Paris tel 7564, rptd Cairo 66, Jun 6,[2] indicates Fr also inclined this direction.

In view above and last sentence urdes 2810, May 26,[3] Dept believes US shld now also make representations. Since US made at least ten written or oral protests re Canal and other restrictions since May, 1948, and since these protests have virtually been ignored, we believe our representations this time shld go further than routine follow-up of Dec 11 note.[4] Dept emphasizes it continues to be seriously concerned by Egypt restrictions on air and surface transportation in gen and desires Emb give constant consideration ways of resolving this problem. We do not agree that Egypt Govt wld be justified in its belief that Canal and other restrictions do not adversely affect Amer interests, commercial and otherwise and Dept instr 107, Jun 5,[5] contains detailed analysis our views this point. While Emb may be correct this question can only be dealt with satis in SC, we feel Egypt Govt shld be left in no doubt our protests are motivated solely by our interest in protecting legitimate operations US vessels and aircraft in Eastern Medit area. However, if question does arise in SC, our attitude wld be one of disapproval Egypt restrictions. We wld prefer that Egypt lift restrictions voluntarily as result protests maritime powers rather than as result SC action which wld probably be interpreted in Arab states as pro-Israel. If it comes to SC action however we will be obliged to state fully views which have been made known to Egypt Govt over past three years.

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[1] Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Canberra, Copenhagen, Damascus, Jidda, London, New York, Oslo, Paris, Pretoria, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, and The Hague. Telegram drafted by Mr. Stabler in NE and cleared with UNP, BNA, and L/NEA.

[2] Not printed.

[3] On May 23, the British Embassy in Cairo had delivered to the Foreign Ministry a note of protest over Suez Canal restrictions. (Copy enclosed with despatch 2796 from Cairo, not printed; 674.84A/5–2551.) In despatch 2810, the Ambassador had stated in part: "If it should develop later that all the other Maritime powers have followed the British action we might want to consider at that time sending a routine followup on our previous note. . . ." (974.5301/5–2651) The note mentioned in the quotation is cited in footnote 6, below.

[4] No. 184. It forms enclosure 4 to despatch 1439 from Cairo, December 19, 1950, not printed. (974.5301/12–1950)

[5] Not printed. (974.5301/6–551)

Unless you perceive over-riding objection you shld deliver note along fol lines:

> "I have honor refer Embs note No. 184 Dec 11 1950, re restrictions imposed by Egypt Govt on ships transitting Suez Canal and to numerous previous communications which have been made to the Egypt Govt since May, 1948, on this subject and on restrictions imposed on air and surface transportation in gen.
>
> "It is matter of deep concern to US Govt that these restrictions are still maintained. My govt has therefore instructed me once again to invite Your Excellency's attn to serious view it takes of these restrictions and to state US Govt considers them to be unreasonable, impracticable and unjustified.
>
> "In addressing itself to this serious problem my govt is motivated solely by its desire to protect legitimate interests of US which have been and continue to be adversely affected by these restrictions and its views are held without prejudice to whatever may be decided by the Egypt-Israel MAC, the Special Committee or SC.
>
> "I have been further instructed to state my govt is confident that a review of this question will cause the Egypt Govt to take necessary steps to remove these restrictions."

In presenting above note to FonMin Dept hopes you will emphasize fact that we are acting only because important US interests involved and without re Israel situation.[6] In event FonMin inquires how restrictions have adversely affected US interests you are authorized to give him *aide-mémoire* based on Depts instr 107.

Re Embdes 2446 Apr 11 we agree that reply to Egypt *aide-mémoire* of Apr 9[7] shld be limited to Akaba situation only. You shld therefore at some appropriate time, either in connection with the above note or not as you see fit, address communication to FonOff in reply its *aide-mémoire* containing operative paragraph on fol lines:

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[6] Ambassador Caffery delivered this note on June 15. In despatch 2993 from Cairo, June 18, he commented as follows:

"I am personally convinced that the Egyptians were prepared to make modifications in these restrictions and there was evidence some two months ago in the press that the Government was preparing the public for such a move.

"However, the storm of protest in the British Parliament over the restrictions and the firm tone of the recent British note have now placed the Egyptian Government in a position whereby any modification of its stand would appear to be yielding to British pressure, a step which is politically impossible.

"For this and other reasons enumerated in my recent telegrams, I deemed it advisable to make entirely clear to the Foreign Minister that the United States protest was an independent action, based on the adverse effect that the restrictions were having on United States interests."

A handwritten, unsigned marginal note next to the final paragraph reads: "That's what we wanted." (974.531/6-1851)

[7] For the despatch and enclosed *aide-mémoire*, see pp. 633 and 628, respectively.

> "US Govt has considered *aide-mémoire* of Apr 9 and Emb has been instructed to state that considerable doubts are entertained by US re validity and legality of measures which Egypt Govt proposes to take at entrance to Gulf Akaba. US Govt, therefore, fully reserves its rights in connection with this situation." [8]

ACHESON

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[8] In telegram 59 from Cairo, July 17, the Embassy reported that this note had been delivered but did not specify the date. (974.531/7-1751)

357.AC/6-1251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Jerusalem [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 12, 1951—7 p. m.

137. Unpal 270. For Palmer.

I. Re Palun 403 [2] and 405 [3] Dept fully appreciates PCC's and your anxiety re apparent lack progress toward achievement PCC's assignments per GA Res 14 Dec 1950. However, Dept understood you and your colleagues had agreed on fol course of action and factors which necessarily meant slow progress: (A) Settlement refugee problem took priority over polit negots Pal peace; (B) Compensation and resettlement most important aspect refugee problem for which details shld be worked out promptly. (C) Details cld not be finalized until Anderson's delayed arrival May. (D) In meantime negots with Israel re possible linking compensation and resettlement undesirable pending estimate Israel's total compensation obligation. (E) Negots re this obligation considered impossible by PCC pending ascertainment likely source of funds whereby Israel cld pay compensation.

II. Interim action PCC pending Anderson's arrival included (A) drawing up and adopting Comgen/17/Rev. 1, which Dept deems satisfactory approach PCC problems and upon which Dept assumes PCC now operating and (B) meetings between Boissanger and various Arab leaders which indicated Arab appreciation necessity refugee reintegration together with continued opposition polit negots with Israel.

III. Dept believes recent developments indicate possibility PCC might proceed more actively and accordingly any opportunities shld be exploited. Passage firm and impartial SC res May 18 which has had appreciable impacts on Israel and Arab States; public announcement intention to ask Congress sizeable sum for Arab refugees and funds for mil and econ assistance for Arab States and Israel; relative restraint Arab League's May mtg and trend toward Arab willingness permit refugee resettlement; apparent effective resumption operations Syrian-Israeli MAC, all contribute Dept's belief PCC backed by dipl support shld have new try.

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Ludlow in UNP; cleared in UNA, NE, and NEA; initialed by Mr. McGhee. Telegram repeated to New York; message air pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Dated May 9, p. 671.

[3] Dated May 28; see footnote 4, p. 673.

Dept desires your views re fol possibilities or modifications thereof:

1. *Israel Treatment of Arab Residents*

Dept disturbed re conflicting accounts of condition and treatment Arab residents in Israel and believes basic and authoritative study this situation helpful. Dept believes this task within terms of reference PCC under its responsibilities re repatriation, compensation, econ and social rehabilitation and protection refugee rights and properties. Suggest you consult Emb, Tel Aviv re feasibility, desirability PCC undertaking such study. Comment requested re

(*a*) usefulness resulting data with reference to possible repatriation plans;
(*b*) time required for study;
(*c*) probable extent Israel cooperation;
(*d*) effect on refugees resulting from assembling and publication info;
(*e*) repercussion study within Israel.

2. *Repatriation*

Dept appreciates prospects dim for any substantial repatriation but believes Israel might be approached again re this subject. In such approach PCC cld advance to Israel as argument that public announcement agreement some repatriation wld reduce charges Israel has not made even token compliance with successive GA reses. Pls forward estimate if obtainable Arabs officially repatriated and nr infiltrees and expellees.

3. *Compensation*. Dept welcomes arrival Andersen[4] and believes his function will be useful. Dept assumes, per Part II PCC ref doc, PCC will seek agreement with Israel and Arab states on principle of compensation and total amt. Dept believes that ascertainment individual compensation claims shld proceed as evidence constructive activity behalf Arabs. While appreciating risk involved unfavorable refugee reaction if substantial or prompt payment not forthcoming, Dept believes risk worth taking and shld be undertaken without regard ability Israel to pay since info and estimates derived will be valuable for other reasons. Dept is of gen opinion that there is little likelihood Israel will be able to pay any substantial compensation. As PCC fully appreciates funds for such compensation probably can only come from sources outside Israel. Dept believes prospects very dim for internatl loan to Israel to pay compensation and recognizes Exim bank and IBRD credits not available for this purpose. Israel's future dol receipts un-

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[4] Under General Assembly Resolution 394 (V) of December 14, 1950, the PCC had established on May 15, 1951, a Refugee Office. On May 22, Mr. Holger Andersen of Denmark took up his duties as Director of the Office.

likely cover essential need Israel. Inescapable conclusion is that only practicable solution to meet compensation claims lies in possibility internatl contributions to compensation and/or reintegration fund. It is not considered likely that USG or Congress wld ever provide grant funds to pay Arab compensation claims over and above US contribution to reintegration. Dept believes when PRA resettles individual Arab claimants it shld require Arabs waive claims for compensation to extent full value benefits recd.

For claims other Arabs i.e., those not on relief or not awaiting resettlement Dept believes procedures contained in PCC ref document satisfactory. Dept believes possible aid to eventual peace settlement may derive from special negots compensation payment to influential Arab claimants. Dept also believes PCC might investigate and comment on possibility of Anderson's performing function "honest broker" re property or blocked accounts which Arab refugees might volunteer to settle with Israel if intermediary channels open.

4. *Possible Political Settlement*

Arab States and Israel shld be urged to consider possible unilateral or multilateral non-aggression declarations vis-à-vis each other. Parties to Armistice Agreement might consider fol:

> (*a*) According to MAC greater scope handle current *ad hoc* problems now hindering estab better day to day relations. Addition polit reps might assist; (*b*) elimination, partition, reduction, or redelimitation demilitarized zones in light experience which has revealed deficiency present zones as factors for peace; In connection proposals for changes demilitarized zones if Arabs found it politically difficult take initiative alone, PCC might endeavor bring Jordan and Syria simultaneously to negot with Israel on problems of mutual interest such as el-Hamma salient; (*c*) define armistice lines or segments thereof as de facto national boundaries pending final settlement.

Fol unilateral actions by Israel not connected with Arab *quid pro quo* might be urged as constituting valuable progress toward Israel Arab peace: (*a*) opening free zone for Arabs at Haifa; (*b*) opening corridor for Arab traffic between Jordan and Egypt subject security safeguards; (*c*) offering to subject output Haifa refinery to internatl control; (*d*) releasing blocked Arab balances in Israel; (*e*) offering sealed freight car transit facilities between Lebanon, Egypt and Haifa–Jordan subject security requirements.

Re Palun 406.[5] Dept believes that if PCC is to act upon any of suggestions outlined this tel, can do so best in Jerusalem. UN Secretariat has advised USUN Azcarate urges transfer PCC to Geneva in order to conduct certain polit negots. Nature of such negots not specified. In light previous experience Dept does not believe negots possible this distant venue.

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[5] In this telegram of June 1 Ambassador Palmer had stated in part that the PCC had adjourned that day to reconvene at Geneva not later than August 15 unless its Chairman (Ambassador Palmer) should call for an earlier meeting elsewhere. The Ambassador had stated he assumed the PCC would adhere to the decision to move to Geneva and asked the Department for travel orders. (357.AC/6–151)

Re Palun 407,[6] just recd, Dept's comments to follow.

Acheson

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[6] Dated June 7, p. 704.

320.2 AA/6-1451

Memorandum by the Adviser in the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (Tomlinson)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] June 13, 1951.

Minutes on Consultations With Ambassador Blandford Concerning the Palestine Refugee Problem

(Ambassador Blandford, Mr. Gardiner, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. Tomlinson)

Ambassador Blandford presented for discussion the following three papers:

(1) Reintegration Policy
(2) Problems in the Turnover of Relief Administration to Local Governments
(3) Relationship of Compensation to Reintegration

Reintegration Policy

The group agreed substantially with Ambassador Blandford's views on reintegration policy which, as modified, are set forth below:

1. Reintegration is a process and a program whereby refugees permanently leave a temporary shelter and ration lines and move into houses and become self supporting.

2. Reintegration facilities may be occupied by refugees under permanent or temporary arrangements. PRA will receive documentary evidence of the obligations for the value of the facilities turned over to the refugee. Discharge of this obligation will be determined only after the refugee's claim for compensation has been determined.

3. Reintegration facilities financed through international assistance shall remain continuously available for refugee use for the duration of the program.

4. Compensation payments due individual refugees shall be used to liquidate their outstanding obligations.

5. Reintegration operations may include:

(*a*) Purging ration rolls
(*b*) Transportation to reintegration opportunities
(*c*) Placement in jobs

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[1] This document forms the attachment to a memorandum of June 14 from Mr. Tomlinson to Mr. Gardiner. In it Mr. Tomlinson stated that Ambassador Blandford had agreed on the "minutes". He mentioned also that he believed the statement on reintegration policy needed no further clearance.

(*d*) Individual loans
(*e*) Loans to development or cooperative institutions
(*f*) Provision of land, shelter and community facilities
(*g*) Construction of minor works including access roads, irrigation and drainage ditches, wells and pumping

6. Reintegration operations insofar as possible shall be performed by local governments with Agency assistance along the following lines:

(*a*) Suitable audit, inspection and reporting services
(*b*) Technical assistance
(*c*) Contractual services
(*d*) Grant or loan of funds

7. Local governments shall be encouraged to establish central facilities for liaison with the Agency, and local reintegration authorities for field operations.

8. Reintegration facilities should not appear conspicuously superior to the prevailing or immediately prospective standard of living of non-refugees in the area. Within such limitation and economical use of funds, modern methods and equipment should be used to obtain a maximum of health and convenience.

9. Similarly, in the use and development of land for reintegration there should be reasonable progress toward better standards of occupancy and cultivation.

10. The reintegration process and program is heavily dependent upon large scale economic development programs by local governments financed out of their own funds, loans and grants. From one-half to two-thirds of the refugees will be dependent for employment and reintegration opportunities upon such large projects for water control, transportation and industrial development.

Problems in Turnover of Relief Administration to Local Governments

The group recognized that one of the most difficult problems to be faced is the turnover of relief administration to local governments. This policy was strongly advocated by Mr. Clapp and has been a policy for which the Department, as well as certain United States missions, have pressed for for many months. The Agency has also been searching for a suitable method to implement this policy. The following questions prepared by Ambassador Blandford are illustrative of many which have to be faced:

1. Should the Agency undertake formal agreements to finance refugee relief administration by local governments?

2. Should the turnover take place at one time or in stages—for example, education, health, relief administration?

3. Should the terms of financing be on the basis of:

(*a*) A supplement to the local government's capacity to contribute?
(*b*) A percentage distribution of total contributions received?
(*c*) A flat payment based on negotiations?
(*d*) A fluctuating payment based on refugee relief loan?

4. Should there be a census operation? Conducted by whom?

5. Should the Agency exercise any control over the ration rolls or ne distribution of its contribution whether in cash or kind?

6. Should the Agency finance on a declining schedule related to eintegration progress? How is this to be policed?

7. How is relief financing in one country to be related to reintegra- on progress in another?

8. Shall the Agency utilize the facilities of the Arab League for ter-government negotiations?

9. Should the Agency attempt overall programming and negotia- on for the entire refugee population over a period of possibly three ears?

A basic question which is implied above is whether or not local vernments can be persuaded to accept this responsibility without commitment on the part of the Agency or by the major contributing vernments to furnish continuing financial support until reintegra- on has been effected. The group recognized that even if the local vernments were to accept administrative responsibility for relief erations, the Agency would still be subject to criticism, possibly even ore than at present, because the refugees and the local governments uld be in a position to concentrate their fire on the Agency to a eater degree than is the case at present. There is a further basic ques- n of how the Agency can exercise control over reintegration, if it es control of the official register of refugees.

The group did not come up with any concrete recommendations for ndling this matter but recognized that the Agency would need to plore it further and come up with proposals for later consideration.

lationship of Compensation to Reintegration

The group concerned itself primarily with Ambassador Blandford's ggestion that a study be made of the means by which contributions the refugee program could be used for a multi-purpose political ect. Basically the contributions for the refugee program should be igned not only to assist in the reintegration of refugees but also in ectively contributing to a political settlement of lasting value. The ugees will not accept the proffer of reintegration facilities financed the Agency as a liquidation of their claims for compensation from ael. Israel itself cannot move forward in establishing normal rela- nships with its Arab neighbors unless it recognizes its obligation compensation and takes steps toward meeting that obligation.

Vould it not therefore be possible for the major contributors to refugee program to earmark parts of their contributions as loans Israel, but to be disbursed by the Agency as compensation pay- nts which would be supplemented where necessary by a reintegra- grant out of the remainder of the contributions to the Reintegra- Fund.[2]

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handwritten marginal note next to this paragraph in the source text reads: oubt [G.] L[ewis] J[ones]”.

The group agreed that a proposal along these lines should be fully studied and elaborated with a view to making early recommendations thereon.

Immediate Action

(*a*) Ambassador Blandford will seek the agreement of the Advisory Commission on the statement on Reintegration Policy. The statement will then be circulated to many areas for information.

(*b*) Ambassador Blandford will further explore the problem of turnover of relief administration with the Advisory Commission and develop proposals for further consideration by the respective governments.

(*c*) Intensive work should be done on the study of the relationship between reintegration and compensation with a view to coming up with definitive recommendations by June 22.[3]

(*d*) A draft statement should be prepared for the Advisory Commission to issue in response to the Arab League note on the refugee problem representing the views of the Department. If agreed to by other members of the Advisory Commission, they would clear it with their respective governments so that it would constitute an authoritative reply on behalf of the governments represented on that body.[4]

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[3] No such recommendations dating from around the time specified above have been found in Department of State files. For the Department's later position paper of October 12, see p. 903.

[4] In telegram 41 from Beirut (Rapun 187), July 16, the U.S. Delegation to UNRWA stated in part:

"At request Blandford AdCom has agreed postpone issuance joint statement for three to four weeks. This will permit director hold exploratory conversations during forthcoming round courtesy visits Near East capitals to ascertain whether NE states would respond declaration.

"Declaration could then be issued as response to Near East views and as opening gun later negotiations relief transfer and reintegration program." (320.2AA/7–1651)

(Mr. Blandford had become Director of the UNRWAPNE shortly after his resignation June 30 as American Member of the Advisory Commission to the UNRWAPNE.)

Department of State files do not reveal further discussion during 1951 of the proposed joint statement.

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1951.

Subject: Visit of the Israel Ambassador

Participants: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Waldo—NE

The Ambassador called on me at his request to discuss briefly certain subjects and to pay his first visit after a rest of three weeks. The Ambassador was in the best of humor throughout and appeared well rested and far less intense and nervous than on previous occasions.

The Ambassador stated, first, that the papers on military assistance which General Marshall had suggested should be prepared were almost ready. He said he wanted to present them to me sometime in the following week. While on the subject of arms, he wished to mention a matter of some concern to him. As I knew, the US had been permitting Israel to purchase certain types of armament on the open market. Since the beginning of April, however, Israel had been unable to obtain State Department approval for any licenses for military equipment. He thought it might be as a result of the incidents of April 5, but hoped those incidents would have no permanent effect on the Department's attitude. The Ambassador said that Israel was particularly interested in obtaining 250 light machineguns and certain spare parts for military aircraft.

I said that I was not familiar with this matter, and asked Mr. Waldo, who said that he was aware that action on certain of the licenses had been postponed, although so far as he knew no licenses had been rejected during this period. I said that we had never expected the Huleh incident would develop into open war and that we had no intention of cutting off military supplies to Israel.

The Ambassador stated that Israel was disappointed in General Riley's decision on the Suez Canal matter,[1] but fully understood his position. It now appeared that the problem would have to come before the SC, and Israel hoped that it would be possible for some member of the Council, possibly the British, to take the matter up, especially since much wider interests than those of Israel were involved.

I told the Ambassador that we had constantly reiterated our position to the Egyptian Government, protesting against interference with shipping through the Canal, and that when the matter came up in the Council we would make that position very clear. The Ambassador was informed that there might be some difficulty if the British took up the problem in the Council. In the first place, it would be difficult for anyone except the Israelis to claim that the Egyptian action in the Canal was a threat to the peace and that, therefore, it was probable that SC action based on a complaint of a member of the Council might only be in the nature of a recommendation. The Israelis, on the other hand, could claim that the blockade was a threat to the peace and the Council might then be in a position to take more effective action. An additional factor was that if the British raised the subject, the Egyptians might well insist on raising the entire Anglo-Egyptian question.

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[1] On June 12, General Riley had submitted a report (U.N. Doc. S/2194) to the Security Council. His conclusions have been summarized as follows:

"He stated his opinion that Egyptian interference with the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal was an aggressive and hostile act; it was contrary to the spirit of the Armistice Agreement and jeopardized its effective functioning. He pointed out, however, that the interference was not being committed by the Egyptian armed forces and, therefore, was not specifically covered by the Armistice Agreement. For that reason, he had felt bound to vote with Egypt in the Special Committee that the Mixed Armistice Commission did not have the right to demand that the Egyptian Government should not interfere with the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal. He considered, nevertheless, that either the Egyptian Government must relax the interference in the spirit of the Armistice Agreement, or that the question must be referred to some higher competent authority, such as the Security Council or the International Court of Justice." (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1951, p. 294)

The Ambassador said that so far as Israel was concerned, he would prefer to have some member of the Council take the matter up, but he did not care who that might be. It was agreed, however, that it would not be desirable to raise the issue in the Council during the Presidency of the Soviet Union.

With regard to the Huleh dispute, the Ambassador said that it appeared to him improbable that General Riley could obtain the agreement of the Arab landowners in the Demilitarized Zone and that, therefore, other steps would have to be taken. The Ambassador said he hoped these would not consist in a revision of the Armistice Agreement or the holding of a conference for that purpose as suggested by the British. He thought that would set a dangerous precedent. He preferred that the dispute be referred directly to the SC for its determination. I said that we would certainly consider the matter carefully.

The Ambassador then told me he had just seen Secretary Brannan of Agriculture and had been informed that the Israel application to the International Wheat Council for an increase in its quota had been approved and that Israel would receive a 200,000-ton increase in quota. This would save Israel about a million dollars a year. His government was very grateful for the increase.

I thanked the Ambassador for calling and told him we would study the questions he had raised with us.

683.84A/6-1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 15, 1951—5 p. m.

900. For Bruins from McGhee. Deep feeling in Syria (Damascus Legtels 723, 724 Jun 12)[2] plus nr of pts re which we need info make it desirable for you deliver orally msg along fol lines from me to Riley and to report his reactions. *Msg begins.*

Ur presence NE with authority strengthened by SC res of May 18 is source of confidence to us all. Pressures now seem to be building up in Syria but we confident ur sure hand will calm situation. Syrians have raised nr of questions with Leg Damascus and in letter to SC: Dept in position answer most of these but on some we lack necessary background info. These questions follow and wld appreciate ur guidance re replies via Leg Beirut.

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Jones and approved for transmission by Mr. McGhee. Telegram repeated for information to Damascus, London, New York, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Neither printed, but see footnote 2, *infra*.

a.) Syria implies you have devoted most of ur attn to Israel and have been to Damascus only once: sense neglect expressed.

b.) Syrians complain they got story from Israel radio re resumption operations on Israel-owned lands in Demilit Zone and not from you.

c.) Allege that one month after adoption SC res, Arabs still have not been allowed to return to their homes in Zone.

d.) Allege impossible determine Arab land holdings in the Zone since Arabs not there to indicate boundaries.

e.) Allege Israel mil emplacements remain in Zone.

f.) Great pt made by Syria re shortness of time between complete stoppage work in Zone and resumption on Israel property.

Assure you Dept fully supporting you in handling ur difficult job. We welcome reactivation the MAC. We hope ur guidance foregoing will help us to help you with parties—particularly with Syrians who appear to be in injured, stormy and unpredictable mood. Warm regards. *Msg ends.*

In ur discretion you may convey Riley info in recent Damascus Legtels. [McGhee.]

ACHESON

683.84A/6-1251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 15, 1951—7 p. m.

492. Re Legtels 723, 724, Jun 12[2] and London Embtel 6520 Jun 12,[3] Dept believes Riley's position technically sound for fol reasons:

Wording SC Res May 18 followed closely basic Armistice documents and official memos Chief of Staff UNTSO and Chairman MAC order, to avoid criticism SC attempting alter meaning these documents which, Dept believes, already adequately define and interpret auth Chairman MAC deal with any situation in Demil Zone under Art Five Armistice Agreement. Para 3 of SC Res combines wording from Para C Riley memo Mar 7 and from request Mar 10 by Chairman MAC to Israel del MAC "to insure that instructions are issued in order that Israel works on Arab owned lands in Demil Zone be stopped until action has been taken by the Syrian-Israel MAC." In using language Riley memo, words "mutual" and "between Syria and Israel" were specifically omitted order not to tie hands of Chief of Staff or MAC Chairman.

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Waldo and cleared for UNP by Mr. Wainhouse. Transmission approved by Mr. Jones and repeated for information to Beirut, London, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Neither printed. In the former, the Legation had stated in part: "We fully understand that Riley's position with Israelis shld not be undermined . . . but do not know how to deal with dilemma whereby if Riley's earlier position was based on misapprehension of facts . . . US may be maneuvered into safeguarding Riley–Israel relationship at expense US–Syrian relations. . . . We have often remarked Syrian fears extend beyond drainage problem to anxiety lest Israel is establishing its claim to whole demil zone. US position shld be designed to counteract this obsession." (683.84A/6-1251)

In telegram 724, the Legation had reported in part that the Foreign Office had protested ". . . vigorously against Riley's action in giving permission Israelis resume drainage operations on lands allegedly Jewish owned in demilitarized zone." (683.84A/6-1251)

[3] In this telegram the Embassy had in part reported that the Foreign Office, in commenting on the Department's views expressed in telegram 5771 to London, June 9 (p. 706) had inquired as to precisely why the Department held that Riley's position (on the resumption of work on Jewish-owned lands in the Zone by the Palestine Land Development Co.) was technically sound. (683.84A/6-1251)

Dept believes Syrians shld take into account this background re drafting of Res as well as Riley's memo of Mar 7 in its entirety. Para A subpara *d* that memo states that neither party to Armistice Agreement enjoys rights of sovereignty within the Demil Zone, and concludes that expropriation by Pal Land Development Company Arab land in the Demil Zone without the consent of the owners is a violation of the Armistice Agreement. Believe Paras B, and C, represent views of Chief of Staff on basis premises established in Para A.

In interpreting Paras 3, 4, and 5 of SC Res on behalf of sponsors, UK rep stated in SC on May 18 that "we are conscious of duties of TSO to safeguard legitimate rights and interests of Arab land owners. The first objective of draft res is therefore to bring about the suspension of the drainage opns in the Demil Zone to enable Chief of Staff of TSO to use his good offices in effort to bring about and negotiate settlement between the owners of the affected land and the Pal Land Development Co."

While agreeing that time between complete stoppage works in Zone and resumption work on Israel-owned land was extremely short, Dept believes on basis foregoing that Chairman Mac has auth authorize Pal Land Development Co. undertake opns on Israel-owned land within Demil Zone, provided he is satisfied land is in fact owned by Israelis and that such opns are resumed only with express permission Chairman of MAC.

You might point out to Syrian auths that principal purposes SC Res were to make clear Israel does not have unilateral right interpret Armistice Agreement and that Chairman and not Israel was responsible for supervision of administration of Demil Zone. Latter point considered of great importance by Syrians urdesp 457 Apr 23.[4]

Dept believes objectives of preceding para achieved and thus rights of UN have been upheld. Re other objectives of Res, Riley's Jun 5 report to UN states these in process being carried out.

Dept agrees that present developments emphasize fact Armistice Agreement does not give Syrians any rights in area previously occupied by Syrian troops. We believe only way alter this situation is through Armistice revision machinery established for that purpose.[5]

ACHESON

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[4] Not printed.

[5] In telegram 6692 from London, June 20, the Embassy stated that the Foreign Office was grateful for the Department's views as stated above. "Since conversation with Emb reported Embtel 6520 June 12, FonOff has given further study this question and has independently reached similar conclusions." (683.84A/6–2051)

357.AC/6-1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Jerusalem[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 19, 1951—7 p. m.

141. Unpal 271. Fol Dept's views re Palun 407:[2]

1. Dept concurs important element progress with Arabs towards peace is abandonment by Israel "orthodox view" re concessions thus giving PCC and friends both sides talking pts with Arabs. Israel has operated for three years on "orthodox view" without appreciable progress towards peace: alternative course has yet to be tried.

2. A policy of unilateral initiative towards settlement with Arabs is matter strictly for decision by Israel. Polit repercussions such a policy shift will be profound inside Israel and consequently its statesmen must themselves be convinced new policy in Israel's best interests. While agreeing unilateral concession by Israel wld be most helpful in facilitating final peace with Arabs, Dept believes it wld be unwise bribe or cajole Israel into so major a policy change which to be successful shld so command itself that Israel politicians wld be willing risk their reputations in its behalf.

3. Sharett's ref to Israel's reparations claims against Ger has some earmarks "deal". Secy made clear Ben Gurion May 8 (see memo conversation)[3] such reparations cld only come from pockets US taxpayers and US opposed for many vital reasons reparations from current Ger production.

4. Re internatl assistance financing large scale fin obligations undertaken by Israel towards refugees on understanding its own econ future not jeopardized (paras numbered 6 and 7 reftel) this again boils down to US taxpayer who in last analysis wld be asked pay Israel so Israel can pay Arabs. While hard facts situation still under study, Dept is not reconciled advocating solution along these lines. (Re numbered para 3 Unpal 270)[4] It wld be wrong for Sharett to entertain on basis ur interesting and helpful talks any misconceptions to contrary. In any case Israel must take initiative in developing proposals for internatl financing as a long-term obligation on Israel. Such proposals cld then be studied by UN members.

5. Sharett can obviously not be given answers to his questions by Dept because this wld imply advocacy if not some moral commitment by Dept. If Israel is seriously interested we presume PCC cld work out in conjunction with Israel for study by interested parties a comprehensive scheme covering these problems. Trends of thought in Dept re Sharett's questions are being aigamd FYI.

6. We believe at this stage ur talks shld remain on present informal personal level.

ACHESON

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[1] Telegram drafted by Mr. Jones in NE and cleared in UNP and NEA; approved for transmission by Mr. Jones.

[2] Dated June 7, p. 704.

[3] Dated May 8, p. 667.

[4] Dated June 12, p. 714.

683.84A/6-2051 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, June 20, 1951—9 a. m

785. For McGhee from Bruins. Your msg (Deptel 900)[2] give
orally to Riley, whose reaction was that he has made every effort t
be impartial and if he has spent more time with Israelis than wit
Syrians it is because Israelis needed more persuading.

His replies are as fols in accordance with lettered paras your msg

(*a*) Held conferences in Damascus May 17 and 22, June 13. Majo
Jdid visited Riley in Beirut June 2 to discuss problem. Riley main
tained hdqrs in Beirut to be in closer touch with Damascus by tel
phone. Held five conferences in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. If he was i
touch with Israelis and extra time spent it was to exert pressure fo
compliance.

(*b*) Riley regrets through error info was not passed to Defens
Min as planned prior to press release. If Syrian reps had listened t
BBC or Arab instead of Israeli radio, same msg cld have been hear

(*c*) Problem difficult due to destruction of villages. Time is nece
sary to get accord on free interviews by observers with Arabs
Shaab.[3] Due to unsatisfactory results from these interviews, Rile
attempting get Israelis to set date on which transport can be arrange
to take back to demilit zone those who wish to return.

(*d*) This is matter of opinion. Chairman bases his info on certifie
land titles. In this regard believe titles in this area much better tha
elsewhere as Palestine Land Development Co. officials have been wor
ing on project for years. For info, Palestine Land Development C
has about completed work on Jewish or concession lands on We
Bank. Now want to move to East Bank but fear little Jewish la
involved on that bank as to necessitate complete stoppage of wo
in zone unless it can be continued on Arab-owned lands. Report
failure of chairman to reach agreement with Arab landowners bei
submitted to SC this date.

(*e*) This is quite possible, and is difficult problem until we can g
Israeli police out of zone. Arabs have entrenchments established
approach to El Hamma. Riley prefers these remain until norm
relationships restored.

(*f*) This is matter of opinion. Since chairman had fairly accura
knowledge about these Jewish lands, the five-day stoppage certain
complied with resolutions and gave him sufficient time for his i
vestigations. In Riley's view these lands were never the subject
discussion.

Riley further states MAC meeting is scheduled for Rosh Pin
June 20, at which much discussion is expected on interpretation
planatory note and powers of chairman.

BRU

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[1] Telegram repeated to Damascus, London, New York, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Dated June 15, p. 722.

[3] A village in Israel to which Israeli authorities had removed a number
Arab residents of the Demilitarized Zone in the course of the dispute with Sy
regarding the Huleh drainage project.

683.84A/6-2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

SECRET Tel Aviv, June 22, 1951—5 p. m.

906. For Dept only. Comment on Embtel 905 June 22:[1] After consultation with Gen. Riley, Emb believes Huleh situation deteriorating and unless effective action taken promptly, serious consequences likely.

It is foregone conclusion no agreement with Arab landowners will be reached. They know they dare not expose themselves to Arab displeasure that wld result. This means also agreement cannot be reached with owners for continuation work Huleh Project on Arab-owned land. Development company is completing work on Jewish-owned land and within few days progress on project may have to be halted. It is believed govt here will appeal case to SC as first step but has no intention permitting Arabs halt work for long and may take direct action if decision delayed, in which case Arabs will no doubt repel hostilities in some form.

Significance exchange correspondence in reftel is that Arabs in Shaab also under pressure from two sides. Fon Min apparently encountered difficulty in form of political disagreement and lack of cooperation in making arrangements for interview of former residents demil zone, and after interviewing started number of Israeli police at Shaab was increased. While difficult to prove, UN reps concerned became convinced Arabs not reacting freely, fearing Israel pressure on one side and Arab displeasure on other.

Chief of Staff view that about 750 will desire return to former homes and request that Chairman MAC make necessary arrangements will precipitate practical problems involved in return to villages where homes of many have been destroyed. It is believed, moreover, Israel will resist by indirect means implementation SC Resolution May 18 in this and certain other respects to be discussed later.

As indicated last para Embtel 771 May 18,[2] it is believed prestige of UN requires that resolution be completely and effectively implemented. Issue may now be made by Israel over return of Arabs, but even more serious question is that UNTSO is now confronted with substanti failure to accept basic decision implicit in explanatory note of Ralp Bunche dated June 26, 1949, quoted in SC Resolution May 18 relatin to civil admin in demil zone. Israel police are now in control of are and while Emb has not discussed this matter with any official of thi govt, it doubts that Israel will carry out exact terms of resolution wit regard to policing demil zone. Matter is regarded as so serious tha Emb believes Chief of Staff shld be recalled for consultation and im portant decisions taken before parties to conflict have opportunity t exploit politically above points.

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[1] In order to implement a provision of the Security Council resolution of May 18, United Nations observers during the period June 3–12 had interviewed a number of the Arabs being held at Shaab to ascertain which of them wished to return to their homes. Telegram 905 consists of an exchange of correspondence of June 21 between Minister Sharett and General Riley on this subject. General Riley had stated in part that no useful purpose could result from further interviews, that it was anticipated that approximately 750 Arabs would desire to return to their homes in the Demilitarized Zone, and that he had asked Colonel Taxis to obtain from Israel transport to facilitate their early return. (683.84A/6-2251)

[2] *Ante*, p. 691.

Davi

884A.411/6-2351 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY JERUSALEM, June 23, 1951—11 a. m

236. Palun 409. Re Unpal 270.[1] Our understanding as to PCC im mediate and prospective course of action as agreed upon and as t actual and possible adverse factor is correct as outlined under section 1 and 2. But agreement that "compensation and resettlement mos important aspect refugee problem for which details should be worke out promptly" can hardly be effectively translated into action withou more inspiring and fundamentally honest approach to compensatio as repeatedly emphasized alternative to repatriation than is offere by Dept under section 3 para 3.

Accuracy of Dept belief as expressed under section 3 that oppor tunity now exists for new try by PCC backed by diplomatic suppor wld depend upon nature and weight of such support if opportunity really existed. But neither as regards impact of SC res May 18 o Israel or Arab states or public announcement of intention to ask congress for sizeable sum for Arab refugees and other indicated purposes, nor as regards resumption operations Syria-Israeli MAC, does Dept reasoning find responsive echo in US missions consulted by US del (Palun 408, June 20).[2] With Davis, Drew, Cannon and Bruins, I see no reason for optimism and question timeliness of new try by PCC in present atmosphere which Riley likewise at present finds far from promising.

As regards Israeli treatment of Arab residents, Davis and I agree that this wld be delicate matter for PCC unless restricted only to cases of repatriated refugees and carefully excluding consideratio of Arab citizens of Israel who obviously do not come within scope of PCC direction or authority. I believe Tel Aviv Emb and Consul Waller at Haifa can most effectively and without risk of unfortunate repercussions provide Dept with helpful, objective and complete study of this question, but I will keep in touch with them and jointly with Davis inform Dept if at any time it appears that PCC might in any way assist in such a study. We do not overlook probability that conclusions that might tend to encourage refugees to choose compensation and/or resettlement instead of insisting on repatriation might simultaneously adversely and possibly seriously affect PCC relations Israel, and vice-versa.

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[1] Dated June 12, p. 714.

[2] Not printed. (357.AC/6-2051)

As regards question of repatriation, USDel agrees that Israel might and shld be approached again and believes that refugee office shld as planned raise this question for possible reference to PCC for appropriate action at opportune moment. Endeavor will be made to provide Dept estimate requested.

Re section 3 para 4 "possible political settlement," neither USDel nor missions Tel Aviv Amman, Damascus, Beirut consider 4(*b*) or 4(*c*) cld now be taken up to any advantage or without danger or worsening present generally unsatisfactory situation. As regards 4(*a*) I assume Dept would expect due consideration to be given to Riley's views. USDel believes such consideration essential, particularly in view of Riley's lack of confidence in PCC and that any possibilities Dept might have in mind should be informally explored with Riley, possibly by USDel which now has excellent relations with him.

As regards possible unilateral actions by Israel suggested by Dept, which wld not involve any Arab *quid pro quo*, (*a*) and (*b*) are considered by USDel and missions consulted as out of question at present; (*c*) is not understood; (*e*) might be worked out if of sufficient interest to parties, which is doubtful. Releasing blocked Arab balances in Israel (*d*) has in my opinion long been question which shld be pursued in interest alike of Israel and individuals concerned; Amb Davis and I wld welcome strong Dept support at opportune moment which he and I both feel wld depend on outcome of further approach and exploration which I hope to be able to continue on informal personal basis.

Re Dept's views on Palun 406,[3] I believe usefulness of PCC Jerusalem can better be determined in course of Barco[4] Consultations in

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[3] See footnote 5, p. 710.

[4] Mr. Barco arrived in Washington June 25. According to a memorandum of June 22 from Mr. Ludlow to Messrs. Wainhouse and Bechhoefer, the purpose of his trip was to consult with the Department on the proposals contained in Unpal 270. (UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237)

Dept and in light of resultant Dept guidance for USDel and indications as to extent of Dept support.[5]

[PALMER]

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[5] The memorandum cited in footnote 4 above reads in part:

"3. I had a talk with Jack Blandford and Arthur Gardiner this afternoon on Jack's complaint that the PCC was jeopardizing the work of the PRA by its members commenting and writing papers on the reintegration program and by Holger Andersen's going about as head of the PCC "Refugee Office". Jack said that the PCC's every action in the field was confusing particularly to the Arabs. He specifically asks that Palmer be instructed to get the PCC to divorce itself completely from anything to do with reintegration. I suggested that Jack, now as UN Director of PRA, should take his complaints up with the PCC directly. He said that this would do no good unless Palmer received instructions. He went on to say that Andy Cordier and Hill in Lie's office are quite in accord with his, Jack's, views. I said that I thought that he and Jim Barco should talk the matter over on Monday if possible and dependent on what they agreed upon, instructions could be sent to Palmer. If it becomes necessary to send instructions to Palmer, I suggest that he be reminded of the instructions sent to Beirut in January on the respective jurisdictions of PCC and PRA. If Jack wishes to have his complaints enumerated for Palmer's comments and suggestion it might be done, but I would not be severe on Palmer for what is the fault of his colleagues and two General Assembly resolutions last fall which tended to obscure PRA's and PCC's jurisdiction. Furthermore, I think that Jack should be pressed further to take up his complaints directly with the PCC or the UN Secretariat."

357.AC/6–2551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Jordan Minister, Dr. Yusuf Haikal

Participants: Dr. Yusuf Haikal, Minister of Jordan
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Waldo—NE

Dr. Haikal called on me to discuss recent actions by the Israel Government to restrict the flow of the Jordan. He said that the Israelis had been shutting off the water at the southern end of Lake Tiberias, resulting in a great increase in salinity in the lower regions of the River and jeopardizing the economic life of the entire valley. His Government had cabled to the Secretary General of the UN requesting that the UN take action to halt Israel's interference with the flow of the River.

Dr. Haikal said that he had also discussed the question in New York with appropriate officials of the UN but had not received a very satisfactory reply to his questions. The UN Secretariat had told Dr. Haikal that it did not think the SC or UN could take any action on this question without a full investigation and that, therefore, the PCC or General Riley would be required to investigate. Dr. Haikal said that he had reported this to his government, suggesting that Riley might be asked to investigate and that his government had replied that the problem was outside the competence of General Riley.

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[1] Memorandum drafte[illegible]y Mr. Waldo.

I told the Minister that this situation pointed up the urgency of some form of agreement between Israel and Jordan, at least on this particular question. We had been faced with a somewhat similar problem in the use of the water of the Colorado River. California had wished to use the entire flow of that river before it entered Mexico. Without looking into the legal aspect involved, we had negotiated a treaty with Mexico which had satisfactorily settled the disposition of the Colorado River water.[2] I suggested that the Jordan government might look into this treaty, and I gave the Minister a copy of it.

The Minister said that, while we had worked out the problem with Mexico, he wanted to point out that, after all, the US had friendly relations with Mexico, and Jordan did not have friendly relations with Israel. There was no point of contact between the two governments. Dr. Haikal said that the UN had brought Israel into being and was responsible for all the problems which stemmed from Israel's creation and, therefore, the UN should be called upon to settle the question of water rights.

I told the Jordan Minister that it seemed to me that there were several points of possible contact between Israel and Jordan which might be usefully employed in handling this problem. In the first place, there was a Special Committee under the General Armistice Agreement whose terms of reference might permit the consideration of this problem. In addition to that, there was of course the PCC, which was specifically charged with negotiating political arrangements between Israel and Jordan. The Minister said that as far as the PCC was concerned they had been unsuccessful in solving any political questions over the last three years and he was afraid they would have no greater success with this one. The water of the Jordan was vital to the life of his country, and he hoped that some immediate step could be taken to instruct the Israelis to desist from cutting off the flow of the River. I said that it seemed to me the matter could be taken up with the PCC on an urgent basis; that we would be glad to study the matter and inform the Minister in a few days as to a possible means of solving this question.

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[2] Apparent reference to the treaty relating to the utilization of waters of the Colorado and Rio Grande (with Supplementary Protocol signed November 14, 1944), signed at Washington, February 3, 1944, and entered into force November 8, 1945. For text, see TS 994 or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1219.

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Eban

The Ambassador of Israel will submit to you at 4 p. m. today a note, with three separate annexes, on the following subjects:

1. Israel's industrial capacity and potentialities;
2. Productive capacity of the Israel armament industry;
3. Israel's repair and rehabilitation capacity for arms and equipment.

Over the past year, the Israelis have indicated to the Department, to the Defense Department, and to other officials of the US Government that Israel wished to contribute as effectively as possible to the security of the Near East and that Israel was prepared to participate in possible US–UK defense plans for the area in return for certain considerations.

The most important discussion on this matter from Israel's point of view took place last September between the Foreign Minister of Israel, Moshe Sharett, and the Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall. On December 23, 1950, the Foreign Minister submitted certain proposals to the Secretary of Defense in the form of a fairly comprehensive memorandum in two parts under covering letter:[1] Part One consisted of a description of Israel's supply position and the need for stockpiling in advance of a possible emergency, and Part Two concerned Israel's immediate military needs. The latter was broken down into a number of smaller items, each one of which was covered briefly by a paragraph of discussion. The proposals were not submitted to the Department, although a copy was subsequently made available to us by the Defense Department.

In accord with the Secretary of Defense's suggestion of January 11, 1951,[2] the Secretary of Defense informed Sharett that copies of the Israel memorandum had been sent to General Bradley, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and three Service Secretaries for preliminary study and appropriate action where possible. The Secretary's letter was most cordial and suggested that the Israel government forward these proposals, broken down into individual papers on separate subjects, through appropriate State Department diplomatic channels to "insure that all interested agencies of the Government are fully apprised of and can take appropriate action on your suggestions."

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[1] For the text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1077.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

ccord with the Secretary of Defense's suggestion of January 11, ore, the Israel Ambassador is submitting the present note to you. pril 9, 1951, the first in this series[3] was delivered to the Depart- requesting certain small arms and ammunition which, if granted, result in standardizing the Israel Army with American small No action on this latter request can be taken, of course, until becomes eligible under MDAP. To the Department's knowledge, se has taken no positive action for similar reasons on any of 's other requests.

s believed that the note, with annexes, should be transmitted lly to the Defense Department with a request that these papers en the most careful study and that a report be submitted to the tment concerning the possibility and feasibility of fulfilling any f Israel's requests in the light of US policy toward the Near East forth in the pertinent NSC papers.

el's relations with Defense have improved greatly over the past nd are now at the point where Israel officials in Washington given the impression on a few occasions that the Defense estab- ent was more ready to grant Israel requests for arms and military nce than the State Department. This view is based on the ex- cordiality of Secretary of Defense' letter of January 11 and srael officials consider to have been a very heartening discussion en the Secretary of Defense and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. ptimism received a slight setback recently when the Army De- ent refused to invite Brigadier General Chaim Laskov, Director ining, Israel Army, to visit military schools and installations country. Israel has expressed considerable concern about this, e have informed that government that, while we are generally thetic to permitting Laskov to come, it is not feasible to invite the present time.

mendations:

t you speak to the Israel Ambassador along the following lines: e sincerely grateful for this further evidence of Israel's willing- cooperate with the West. We realize that these papers represent hours of hard work by Israel government officials. The papers be most useful to the Department, the officials of the Defense tment, and other interested agencies in making a study of Israel's and potential contribution toward the defense of the Near East. will receive the most careful study and handling, noting care- the need for guarding the security classifications of each one. will probably be a number of questions which will come to us in urse of studying these documents, and we shall get in touch he Israel officials at that time. We would be interested, however,

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found in Department of State files.

to know whether Israel intends to make this information available to the British Government in view of the special responsibility which the British have in the defense of the Near East and the fact that the Israel Government has already had certain discussions with General Robertson.

780.5/6-2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Israel Ambassador.

Participants: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel.
Mr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel.
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Waldo

The Ambassador of Israel, accompanied by the Counselor, called at 4 p. m. on June 26 to leave a note[2] amplifying earlier Israel proposals on the possibilities of Israel cooperation in Western defense plans for the Near East. The Ambassador said that the note contained three annexes: one on Israel's industrial potentialities; the second, on the armament industry; and, the third, a logistic estimate on repair facilities for arms and equipment in Israel. The Ambassador said he was presenting these on behalf of his government as a basis for discussion; they represented a genuine and sincere attempt to assess the possibility of cooperation at this stage. The Ambassador admitted that the absolute industrial capacity of Israel was small by American standards, but should be considered in relation to the capacity of the area. An element of strength in Israel's industrial position was the great volume of technical skill available. The weak spots arose out of supply problems and the need for technical advice. Another shortage in Israel which resulted in a certain disadvantage was a lack of fuel.

I told the Ambassador that we appreciated Israel's efforts in making this information available. We would give it most careful consideration and would request the appropriate military people in our government to study it from the military point of view. We are very much interested in the security of the Near East. An indication of this is the forty millions which we have recommended for military assistance in the area.

The Ambassador said there were elements of potential strength in the Near East but at present it was too much of a vacuum. I agreed.

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[1] Memorandum drafted by Mr. Waldo.

[2] Note and annexes not found in Department of State files.

ut expressed the view that in the event of war logistics problems in
he area would be very great for both sides. The Russians would
robably not be able to send more than a few divisions into the entire
rea. The Ambassador appeared to concur, remarking that the Korean
ar had punctured the theory of Communist invincibility.

I inquired whether the information on Israel military potentialities
ad been given to General Robertson. In view of the British position
n the Middle East, I suggested that it might be helpful for Israel
o make the information available to the British. The Ambassador
aid he had asked his Government whether it would be made available
o the British. He personally thought it a desirable move. He would
t me know what was decided. A factor influencing Israel's decision
n the matter was that some members of the Israel military were still
uspicious that the British connections with the Arab Legion might
esult in the Arabs learning Israel military secrets.

In reply to a query from me on the fuel shortage in Israel, Mr. Keren
aid that the Haifa refinery was presently operating at 25 percent
apacity but production could probably be expanded if more crude
il were made available, possibly from the Near East. The Ambassa-
or said that the Western Powers were the principal losers in this
atter. If Haifa were brought into full production without Iraq's
ooperation the Iraqi Government might realize the futility of con-
nuing to blockade the pipeline. I said that in my view there was
o reason the refinery could not operate at capacity on Venezuelan
rude. A number of European refineries were presently so operating.
n terms of the final product, there was not a great difference in
rice per barrel between Caribbean crude and that from the Near
ast. If we lost the Abadan refinery, however, it was probable the
ntire capacity of the Haifa refinery would be utilized.

7.AC/6-2851 : Telegram

he United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

CRET PRIORITY JERUSALEM, June 28, 1951—1 p. m.

241. Palun 411. PCC Polit Off Fisher yesterday visited Abdullah
Amman Palace in response to King's invitation. After discussing
rtain specific aspects of Jordan-Israel relations of minor impor-
nce but which seemed to offer possibility of mutually advantageous
lution although not yet developed to point warranting report to
ept, King asked Fisher to stay and talk with him about what he
rmed "a most personal and confidential problem which is breaking
y heart". (Karmi Bey was acting as interpreter.)

This problem, King said, was that of peace with Israel. "I am an old man", he continued. "I know that my power is limited; I know that I am hated by my own son," and he also referred to certain Arab leaders. "I also know that my own people distrust me because of my peace efforts. But despite all that, I know that I cld get peace settled if I only had some encouragement and cld get any reasonable concession from Israel".

At this point Fisher reminded King of unsuccessful efforts year and half ago to facilitate talks with Israel and suggested that it was unlikely that any Israel Govt on eve of general elections wld be prepared to make concessions which it had refused eighteen months ago. King agreed but queried whether it wld not be possible to raise matter again after elections if these shld result in establishment of "stable and sane Jewish Govt." Fisher replied that he had no doubt but what PCC if and when approached by Jordan Govt, wld most earnestly consider ways and means of improving relations between these two countries.

Fisher then asked what in King's opinion wld be reaction of AL and his own Govt to such a move. King declared that he and his Govt were prepared to defy AL, but added "we cannot defy my own people". He said his own people distrusted him because they suspected him of wanting to make peace without any concessions by Israel. He emphasized that this is an obstacle which he cannot overcome. He said "please understand that despite the AL I would have support of my own people and the tacit support at least of the British if I cld justify a peace by pointing to concessions made by the Jews. But without any concessions from them I am defeated before I even start". Elaborating on concessions that might be required by Jordan, King spoke of territorial adjustments in triangle "or elsewhere" and of a corridor to the Gaza Strip "which then wld become Jordan territory".

Concerning refugees, he said he realized that wholesale repatriation or even complete compensation was impossible. But he expressed his conviction that such bitterness cld be alleviated if propertied refugees were permitted to go to Israel for limited period to settle their affairs and if such refugees cld get the income at least from their property if not the property itself. This and reasonable settlement of blocked accounts, King insisted, wld make it possible for many to reestablish themselves elsewhere and to forget their bitterness.

King ended interview by saying, "Please help me. I can do it if I get some help and encouragement. But I am an old man. I have not much time left and I don't want to die of a broken heart".

Dept will recall that Fisher during past few years has met King Abdullah often on informal basis and has had frequent opportunities for friendly discussion of Jordan–Israel problem. Fisher had not seen King for some time prior to mtg yesterday and was impressed by fact that he had aged greatly and that his appeal to Fisher both at beginning and end of his discussion of this "personal and confidential problem" was almost an imploring one.

Am taking to Drew tomorrow and to Davis July 1 copies of this tel.

[Palmer]

784A.00/6-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

SECRET Tel Aviv, June 28, 1951—7 p. m.

928. Chief US Division FonOff [1] advises Israel Govt received suggestion via Israel-Syrian MAC that FonOff reps of the two countries meet to discuss possible improvement in relations. He considers proposal motivated by desire Syria gain territorial advantages. Says spokesman replying suggested agenda be prepared from which it cld be determined whether meeting worth while, and that if purpose solely to raise boundary question there wld be "nothing to discuss".

In conversation with Secretary of Labor Tobin Monday, PriMin Ben-Gurion expressed once more his belief Egypt key to Israel-Arab relations. Recalling his conversation with Mr. Hoskins, however, Embtel 865 June 12,[2] he said he knew some officials of US Govt do not agree but he still believes Israel relations with its neighbors wld improve rapidly if Egypt cld be persuaded to take lead.

Comment: Emb understands from well-informed source that both Syria and Egypt have their price for making peace with Israel in form of territorial settlements. He believes that Syria wld make no further objection to Huleh project if Israel wld agree to divide demilit zone and establish frontier at Jordan River, and that Egypt likewise wld abandon blockade and make peace if Israel wld give up outlet on Akaba Gulf.

At present both proposals unthinkable from Israel point of view and no political leader wld dare make such concessions. In fact Emb sees little chance realistic approach to problems unless both sides come to feel it vitally important to their security and welfare to find early basis resumption normal relations. Even then public which has long been subjected to provocative propaganda wld have to be conditioned to accept realistic settlement.

Davis

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[1] Shmuel Bendor.

[2] *Ante*, p. 710.

London Embassy Files : Lot 59 F 59 : 500 Israel

Memorandum by the Chief of the British Commonwealth and Mi
East Division of the Office of International Finance (Polk
George M. Bennsky, Jr.[1]

[Washington,] June 29, 1

Progress of Israeli Bond Sales in the United States

For your information, here is the gist of my remarks on the al
subject at the N.E. staff meeting of June 27, 1951.

Restricted On June 21, Mr. Theodore Kollek, Israeli Mini
to the United States, informed the Treasury in a telephone conve
tion that the Israeli Government still expected to realize a tota
about $80 million in cash in 1951 from bond sales. As of that d
total commitments for purchases were $65 million, although in
mation on this figure ran a day or so late. As for cash, however,
had about $21 million at the last report. It might take two or
weeks, or even two or three months, for the outstanding pledge
be liquidated.

End restricted—Begin of confidential On June 22, in a teleph
conversation with Mr. Polk, Chief of the British Commonwe
and Middle East Division, Office of International Finance,
Treasury, an officer of the Chase National Bank, New York
which is the bank in which funds received from bond sales ultima
are deposited, stated that as of that date, about $19 million had
received in cash. He also stated that Israeli representatives had
dicated that about $50 to $60 million in pledges had been recei
(These figures are noticeably quite close to those given by Mr. Koll
The Chase officer indicated further that the bond sales had not
nearly as successful as the Israelis had hoped. Their hopes had
that $300 million in cash would be received in 1951 and $100 mil
in cash in each of the two succeeding years.

In a conversation between Mr. Delaney, of OIF, and Mr. Theo
Racoosin, a U.W. [*U.S.?*] Citizen active in New York City activ
of the United Jewish Appeal, Mr. Racoosin indicated that he, am
others, had opposed the bond issue from the beginning, thinkin
was a mistake. Among the considerations had been that it migh
difficult or impossible for Israel to repay the purchasers of the bo
in view of the country's outstanding $135 million debt to the Exp
Import Bank. One of the factors apparently motivating the b
issue was said to be the steady decline in private contribution
Israel between 1948 and 1950. The Israelis hoped to reverse this
clining trend in their exchange receipts through the mechanism

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[1] In the Treasury Department. The drafting line attributes authorshi
Mr. Bennsky.

the bond issue. Mr. Racoosin thought that his original feeling that the bond issue was a mistake had been borne out by the disappointing results of the issue, which had produced much less than had been anticipated.

As far as private contributions through the United Jewish Appeal are concerned, Mr. Racoosin said that they are running at a higher level in 1951 than as of the same date in 1950. Mr. Racoosin, who is an accountant, is leaving for Israel this week to study accounting practices there. *End confidential.*

357.AC/7–251 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 2, 1951—5 p. m.

2. Fol Dept's current views re Huleh problem: Dept believes there are certain steps which shld be taken by parties in cooperation with TSO on spot before SC shld be called on study problem special arrangements permit Israel complete engineering project Demilit Zone. Dept deeply disturbed recent report from Gen Riley dated Jun 26[2] to effect Israel not complying fully certain aspects SC Res May 18.

1. Displaced Arabs Shaab who wish return Demil Zone shld be permitted do so forthwith and transportation to area shld be facilitated by Israel Govt. Res does not authorize Israel arbitrarily attach any conditions their return. MAC shld arrange for rehabilitation those returning. Dept also believes Israel Govt has primary responsibility contribute thereto. Arab homes destroyed by Israel shld be replaced by Israel.

2. Administrative situation Zone shld be restored to *status quo ante* including reduction and deployment Israel police forces accord Riley's determination. Para 9 SC Res May 18 in conjunction with Art 5 wld appear define clearly status of Zone pending agreed revision Armistice Agreement. Any dispute this matter in MAC shld be capable settlement procedure Art 7 para 8. Do not believe Israel justified in claims that other Bunche letters have official bearing on case. Believe question of sovereignty not at issue while Armistice terms in force. Neither Israel nor Syria can justify unilateral action in Zone thru claim of sovereignty.

3. Dept notes with interest report that during MAC meeting Jun 20 the Syrians offered appoint special reps for discussion designed modify Armistice Agreement. Israel rejected this proposal and claimed wld stand by Armistice Agreement unless gen discussions cld be held cov-

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo (NE); cleared by Mr. Bechhoefer (UNP); approved for transmission and signed for the Secretary by Mr. G. L. Jones (NE). Sent to Tel Aviv, London, Paris, New York, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Jerusalem (for Ambassador Palmer); sent by pouch to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, The Hague, and Brussels.

[2] See U.N. Docs. S/2213 and S/2213/Add. 1.

ering all outstanding questions. While unaware reason why Israel shld not engage in limited discussion, Dept of view that Syria wld have much to gain and nothing lose by accepting Israel suggestion negotiate on all questions. Negotiations need not be called peace negots and arrangements reached thereunder need not be considered peace settlements but merely extension Armistice Agreement.

Dept understands Riley returning New York for consultation. Believe such consultation may be useful and shld be undertaken with members SC, particularly co-sponsors SC Res, as well as UN Secretariat. Dept continues support Riley handling situation between Syria and Israel and prepared act in accord his findings.

Dept believes rights of UN and Arabs in Zone must first be protected and assured before procedure can be explored to permit Israel engineering operations Arab-owned-land in Zone. Dept deplores apparent fact that both Israel and Syria use Arabs as pawns of national policy. Dept believes if Syrians guilty using pressure on Arabs in Zone to refuse compensation and thus endeavor hold up drainage works indefinitely, Syria wld be in as morally weak position as Israel if latter in fact bribing or coercing Shaab Arabs to prevent return to Zone. As stated by sponsors of SC Res it is believed SC wld be sympathetic to Israel plea for assistance carrying out drainage project but considers Israel shld first comply with findings UN SC and TSO. Possible that further efforts TSO bring about compliance with SC Res and thereafter consideration question SC may mean delay of month or six weeks in drainage operations. Dept does not consider this excessive and in light assurances SC re continuation project, Israel can well afford adopt patient attitude.

US expects consult co-sponsors re foregoing.

ACHESON

974.5301/7-251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 2, 1951—7:16 p.m.

3. Re Suez Canal dispute. Referring to info received this morning from UKDel (Usun 2, July 2),[2] to effect that London may have had in mind for some time bringing up Suez Canal matter in SC, we submit for Dept's consideration following objections to this course, at least for time being:

1. To put public pressure on Egyptians would tend to freeze their intransigence rather than increase possibility of getting alleviation of restrictions.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo and London.

[2] Not printed.

2. In turn our own interests and those of our close friends might be further damaged. In this connection Balluseck (Netherlands) indicated that because of Dutch shipping, aviation and other interests (he mentioned favorable balance of payments with Egypt) he thought his govt would be quite reluctant to press Egyptians unduly.

3. To air our dispute with Egyptians in SC would tend further to damage our general position with them as well as with their Arab neighbors. Arab states might well be expected to claim that once again USG was endeavoring to pull Israeli chestnuts out of fire.

4. To air this dispute in SC would inevitably bring once more to the fore all of the bitterness between Arab states and Israel over Palestine already sharpened by Huleh dispute.

5. Egyptians would undoubtedly air publicly and probably bitterly their differences with UK concerning revision of UK-Egyptian treaty involving not only Suez but also Sudan.

6. At present touchy stage of Iranian question it would not seem wise to precipitate in SC debate on Suez restrictions.

For these reasons we are strongly inclined to recommend that Dept ascertain whether in fact UK seriously considers bringing up Suez question and if so attempt to dissuade them.

It would seem to us that in present circumstances most effective means of securing alleviation sought would be continued diplomatic effort in close concert, if not jointly, with govts most closely affected. Presumably diplomatic effort would be strengthened at least over a period of time and economic hardship suffered by Israel alleviated by extent to which operations of Haifa refinery could be stepped up by imports from sources not dependent on canal. Lourie informed us on Friday that while at one time Haifa refinery had ceased operation entirely, it was now operating at about 20 percent of capacity on basis of oil imported from Venezuela.

AUSTIN

262.84A41/7-351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 3, 1951—1 p. m.

36. On Jun 29 Israeli Amb called on Dept re Israeli reparation note of Mar 12 1951 and left *aide-mémoire* [2] giving supplementary info on econ conditions in Ger and Israel.

Amb reported recent mtg between Horowitz Director Israeli Fin Min and Adenauer in which suggestion Israeli Govt was made to Adenauer that FedGovt might make voluntary gesture of assistance to Israel in recognition of burdens which Israeli Govt carried due

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Margolies (GEA); cleared with Mr. Reinstein (GER) and in substance with Mr. Waldo (NE); authorized for transmission by Mr. G. W. Lewis (GER). Repeated priority to London and Paris and for information to Frankfurt and Tel Aviv.

[2] The *aide-mémoire* of June 29, not printed, is in file 262.84A41/6-2951.

to Nazi persecutions. According to Amb Adenauer was sy
but said that he anticipated opposition from Schumacher
felt that the needed specific approval US. Amb stated that h
reported this to McCloy.

Amb requested therefore that if reply to Israeli note is not
reply shld not be so drafted as to preclude possibility of
contribution by Ger to assist Israel.

Dept assured Amb that reply wld not prejudice such deve

Dept proposes to tell Israeli Amb on Jul 5 at time tha
reparation note is delivered that contents of reply will not be
to FedRep or be made public, unless released to public by Isr
or unless subsequent developments make release necessary.
quests Emb London and Emb Paris to suggest to UK and
that their replies also be kept confidential. In our view p
note might create erroneous impression in Ger to effect t
Powers have decided not to favor voluntary action on part
Pls advise whether this suggestion concerning lack of pu
favorably received.

683.84A/7-351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department o

SECRET Tel Aviv, July 3, 195

2. FonMin told me July 1 that he sees no merit in propos
Govt that reps of Israel and Syria meet if sole purpose i
Syrian territorial ambitions; he feels conference wld only
deadlock which wld weaken present armistice agreement.
hand he wld not object to conference provided it is gen in
not confined to boundary question. He attacked attitude o
with vigor saying their interest negative and purpose pol
econ; they seek "stranglehold on Israel's water sources" and
which was never part of Syria. He pointed out Israel evacuat
area in Lebanon without demand for either territory or cr
militarized zone. FonMin stated with great positiveness Isra
agree to any "deal with Syria" which will sacrifice Israel's
demilitarized zone or compromise water sources. Emb un
Syria has now decided not to submit agenda for suggested t
Israel.

Comment: Sharett spoke out more emphatically than his su
as reported in Embtel 928, June 28.[1] He added nothing new
but merely confirmed view reported in earlier tels. His att
definitely more uncompromising than at any time during
months and conflict in views with respect to implementati

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[1] *Ante*, p. 737.

res of May 18 appears inevitable (Embtel 906, June 22).[2] Israel will expect SC or Chief of Staff TSO to take initiative in taking some action to prevent Arab landlords from holding up Huleh project and at same time will resist removal Israel police from demilitarized zone or any surrender actual Israel jurisdiction that area. Depcirtel 2, July 2[3] indicates similarity legal argument used to support Israel position.

DAVIS

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[2] *Ante*, p. 727.
[3] *Ante*, p. 739.

674.84A/7-351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 3, 1951—6:24 p. m.

17. Re Suez: In conversation this morning Israeli del told us Tel Aviv intends to have Israeli del submit complaint on Suez to council and ask President to call meeting, if no member willing to submit complaint. Rafael said his del expects instructions within few days and will consult us before taking action.

Maffitt said he personally felt it would be better if Egyptians could be persuaded privately to drop restrictions, but he made clear that US is in no way opposing matter being brought to council table. In this connection, if Dept feels there is no reasonable hope of favorable Egyptian reaction to US and other *démarches* on Suez, or prefers Suez matter be brought up now rather than possibly in future, we should appreciate Dept's instructions to that effect.

Fact that Israelis themselves contemplate bringing Suez matter into council strengthens our view that SC consideration this matter at this time would not be advisable (mytel 3, July 2),[1] since association with their initiative will thereby make US, UK, etc., doubly vulnerable to Arab suspicion.

AUSTIN

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[1] *Ante*, p. 740.

684A.85/7-351 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Tyler) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY JERUSALEM, July 3, 1951—7 p. m.

2. In view potential grave results to Jordan, future Jordan-Israeli relations and impossibility of resettling any refugees if water level

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[1] Repeated to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus; repeated for information to London.

and salt content river make Jordan unfit for irrigation (Deptel 145 June 28)[2] ConGen after consultation Fischer PCC puts forth following: Article 3 para 2 of both Egyptian and Jordan armistice agreements with Israel identical.

This paragraph prohibits land, sea or air mil or para mil forces of either side from taking any hostile or warlike act against other. It is understood that the banning of hostile acts only by mil or para mil forces was basis of reasoning of Gen Riley in agreeing that Egypt was not breaking letter of Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement by blockading Israel-bound ships through Suez Canal. Riley added that the blockade was not in the spirit of the agreement as it was an aggressive act.

But Jordan-Israeli armistice agreement has third para under article 3 which is not in Egyptian-Israeli agreement. This para 3 article 3 Jordan-Israeli agreement reads: "No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the parties to this agreement against the other party" and there is no ref to any mil or para-mil forces.

If Riley reasoned Egyptian blockade was aggressive act, cutting of water supply to Jordan River vital to very existence Jordan is certainly "act of hostility—conducted from territory controlled by one of the parties"—in this case Israel.

Suggest therefore Riley empowered under art 3 para 3 to halt all drainage work in Israel effecting flow of Jordan until accurate survey of its effects on Jordan has been made and agreement between Jordan and Israel reached.

ConGen agrees problem involves international water rights but if situation presently serious and growing more so daily by time World Court could render a decision Israel could present *fait accompli* dangerous to peace ME. Little likelihood seen here Israel willingly ceasing work while discussing matter with Jordan, and some outside pressure must be exerted.

TYLER

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[2] Telegram 145 to Jerusalem, June 28, not printed (684A.85/7–351), summarized the memorandum of conversation by Mr. McGhee with Dr. Haikal on June 25, p. 730.

357.AC/7–551 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, July 5, 1951—noon.

6. Over past fortnight we have been deeply impressed by info from Damascus diplomatic sources which seem to confirm Syrian charges

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[1] Repeated for information to Tel Aviv.

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to effect that Israeli have used intimidation and even physical abuse to prevent Arabs at Shaab from declaring TSO preference for return to Ghanameh and Baghara. Many Arab heads of families especially landowners have not been available for questioning and seem to have "disappeared"; as result intimidation others have withdrawn their request to return. They are wretched and hopeless.

We therefore wholly concur in point one Depcirtel July 2[2] and are convinced only way to enable TSO ascertain Arabs' true wishes is to return them all to demilitarized zone forthwith wholly removed from Israel jurisdiction and control. In this way something could be done to counteract Syrian disillusionment with SC resolution. We see definite danger in growing sentiment in Arab states this resolution only another manifestation venality of UN.

Other comments on reftel will fol.[3]

CANNON

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[2] *Ante*, p. 739.

[3] With respect to further comments by the Embassy in Syria on circular telegram 2 of July 2, see telegram 26 from Damascus, July 14, p. 770.

684A.85/7-551 : Telegram

The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN, July 5, 1951—2 p. m.

7. Re Deptel 187 June 29[*28*].[2] In conv with Jordan PriMin July 2, he expressed opinion that neither PCC nor TSO competent to take cognizance of alleged Israeli diversion of waters of Jordan River. If SC unwilling consider Jordan complaint he proposes have recourse to Internatl Court of Justice and is already in consultation with legal experts in London. While PriMin was restrained in conv, he left no doubt of grave view he takes of sit.

Regarding alternative courses suggested by Dept to Jordan Min, while conceivable PCC might take cognizance of complaint at request of both parties, it is hardly likely that Israel wld take such action.

Neither can I understand how terms of arms agreement wld give competence over Jordan complaint to either special comite or TSO. Terms of reference of special comite are specified in agreement and to classify an alleged violation of internatl riparian rights as a "warlike act or act of hostility" under Art 3 wld appear to require a considerable broadening of the apparent intent of the Jordan-Israeli arms [*armistice*] agreement.

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[1] Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] The same as telegram 145 to Jerusalem, June 28, not printed (684A.85/7-351), which summarized the memorandum of conversation by Mr. McGhee with Dr. Haikal on June 25, p. 730.

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If the foregoing conclusions are correct and Dept further holds that UN SC could not act, I see no other recourse than the Internatl Court. While I agree with Dept that problems of this nature point up importance of settlement between Jordan and Israel, it wld in my opinion be lamentable denial of efficacy of machinery established by UN charter to hold that Jordan's only recourse against flagrant violation of its internatl rights wld be to undertake peace negots while Israel is holding knife at her throat. On contrary, I believe that acceptance of jurisdiction of Internatl Court, by both parties and compliance with its decision wld constitute the proper and logical foundation on which to build hopes of a peace settlement between them.

Drew

IO Files

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL [New York,] July 5, 1951.
US/S/1787

Subject: Syrian-Israel Dispute
Jordan and the Huleh Project

Participants: Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Permanent Representative of Syria to the UN
Ambassador Ernest A. Gross—US Mission
John C. Ross, US Mission (later)
Edward P. Maffitt, US Mission

Ambassador Zeineddine called at his request on Ambassador Gross the afternoon of July 3rd. In addition to paying his respects on a colleague, he seemed to have in mind trying to convince the US Government that it should adopt a position which would show Tel Aviv that Israel was "no longer the *enfant gâté*" of the UN. In pursuing the latter purpose, Zeineddine revealed to us what may turn out to be Syria's strategy in the next phase of its conflict with Israel over the Demilitarized Zone between the two countries. This will be discussed below.

Ambassador Zeineddine urged the necessity of the US assuming a firm attitude against what it termed Israeli expansionism vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. He said that past support of Israel by the US had brought not only the US but the West in general and the UN to a low point in Arab opinion. Things have got so bad in that respect, he said, that neutralism or even pro-Sovietism is gaining considerable strength among the peoples of the Arab world. As evidence of this he pointed out that Dawalibi, recently elected "Speaker of the House", the second-ranking official in Syria, last year publicly stated that if Syria had to choose between the West and the Soviet group, he would choose the latter since the Soviets are not pro-Zionist. In other words, the conflict with Israel was the basic factor in Arab thinking today, and anyone assisting Israel was in the Arabs' black book. Therefore the US should attempt to recover some lost prestige by ceasing to favor Israel. In addition to helping ourselves by such a position, Zeineddine said, we would strengthen the Arabs' hand in their dealings with the Israelis and create a more propitious condition for their reaching a lasting peace settlement with Israel. Up to now the Israelis had been aggressive and intransigent since they felt they could count on US support in the final analysis for any aspirations they wished to realize. For instance, he felt that a conference under Article VIII of the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Agreement would at the present time achieve nothing since the Israelis would not be reasonable.

At this juncture Zeineddine took occasion to make plain that Syria would not hesitate to take what action it felt necessary, including military, to protect its territorial sovereignty from Israeli expansionism, and, he continued, let any Arab government which failed to back Syria beware of retaliation from its people.

Ross deprecated such talk of war and stressed the extreme importance to all Near Eastern countries of their achieving a lasting peace settlement and removing causes of Near Eastern dissension which could only weaken the area at a very parlous time. He returned to the matter of an Article VIII conference and asked what the Syrian government might hope to achieve if one were called. Zeineddine was careful with his words, but gave the impression that what Syria would like to do at this point would be to propose an alteration of the Armistice Agreement which would do away with the Demilitarized Zone by negotiating a division of it between itself and Israel. Zeineddine complained that the Israelis were establishing a *de facto* predominance over the Huleh sector of the Zone by deporting all Arabs from it and setting up an armed military force in support of a greatly increased police force. If Israel should be allowed to get away with this, Syria would be in an unfavorable position with regard to dividing up the Zone and Zeineddine wondered whether it might not improve its position by endeavoring to work out an arrangement whereby perhaps the southern sector along the South-east corner of Lake Tiberias would be given o Syria in exchange for the central sector being incorporated in Israel. He seemed to think at least that this would give Syria a bargaining osition that it does not at present have, in view of Riley's failure to ave the deported Arabs returned and to clear the excess Israeli police orce out of the central sector.

(This guarded speculation by Zeineddine throws light on the Israeli ntention voiced several times recently to members of the Mission, at all the Syrians want from an Article VIII conference is to set rth "unacceptable" territorial claims. Apparently the Syrian thinking as indicated above has got to Israeli ears and is not pleasing to Tel Aviv, which holds that all territory formerly in the Mandate automatically became Israeli territory with the termination of the Mandate and the proclamation of Israel's independence.)

Ambassador Zeineddine also discussed at some length the implication of the Huleh drainage project, not only to Syria, but to Jordan as well. Repeating what the British had informed us he had said to Sir Gladwyn Jebb the previous day, he alleged that the drainage plan would render inoperative the Jordanian irrigation system depending on the Jordan. He alleged that already the saline content of the irrigation water used by Jordan had increased five times, and prophesized that on the southern end of Lake Huleh the salt content would go up so high that Jordon would be deprived of this irrigation. Zeineddine also complained of Riley's interpretation of Paragraph 3 of the May 18 resolution and, repeating his complaints at Riley's failure to get the deported Arabs back home and to make Israel withdraw its military forces and extra police from the Zone, reiterated his threat that Syria would not hesitate to initiate military operations it felt necessary to safeguard its security. He said that we had the impression that progress was being made on the two questions of the police and the Arab deportees and that we thought Riley was within his rights in authorizing resumption on drainage operation on lands the Israel owners of which had agreed to permit such operations.

262.84A41/3-1251

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Israel (Eban)[1]

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note of March 12, 1951 requesting reparations from Germany.[2]

The Government of Israel must be aware of the revulsion which the monstrous crime against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis in their planned extermination and despoliation of the Jewish peoples of Europe aroused in the American people and their government. The Government of Israel must also be aware that from the inception of the occupation of Germany, it was the determined policy of the Government of the United States to bring before the bar of justice those persons responsible for the planning and execution of the crime and, to the greatest possible extent, to undo the wrongs inflicted on the victims of Nazi persecution. Special measures taken by the United States Government in implementation of that policy were elaborated in the Department's note of March 21, 1951 to the Embassy of Israel, and the Department again assures the Embassy of the continuing concern of the Government of the United States for mitigating the effects of Nazi cruelty.

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[1] This note was cleared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mr. Matthews, and by Secretary Acheson, who took it with him to the White House on July 5 in order to inform the President of its substance. The President approved the note on July 5. (Memorandum by Mr. G. Lewis Jones to Mr. McGhee, July 5, and memorandum of conversation with the President by the Secretary of State, July 5, neither printed; McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468) With respect to the presentation of the note to Israeli Minister, see the memorandum of conversation, *infra*.

[2] See the memorandum of conversation, March 19, p. 604.

The Government of Israel, in support of its request for reparation from Germany, alleges that it is the only state which can speak on behalf of the Jewish people and that the claims of the Jewish people were disregarded in the allocation of reparations from Germany. In connection with those allegations, the Government of the United States calls attention to the following considerations:

> (*a*) Throughout the period of Nazi domination of Germany, the United States and other countries offered sanctuary to many thousands of persons of Jewish origin fleeing from their Nazi persecutors. At the end of the war it enacted special laws to open its doors to the flood of unfortunate people made homeless, destitute and infirm by the ravages of war and oppression. Furthermore, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have made the major contribution to the International Refugee Organization, which has facilitated the resettlement of Jews in Israel. These voluntary acts of assistance demonstrate the concern for and the large measure of responsibility which the Government of the United States has assumed for the welfare of the Jewish victims of Nazi oppression.
>
> (*b*) Although they were not represented at the Paris Reparation Conference, the claims of the persecutees were given special consideration. The Paris Reparation Agreement allotted all non-monetary gold found in Germany, a fund of $25,000,000 from German external assets to be liquidated in the countries which remained neutral during the war, and all assets in neutral countries of victims of Nazi action who died without heirs for the relief and rehabilitation of non-repatriable victims of German action. It was recognized at the time that the overwhelming majority of these victims were Jewish, and immediately thereafter the Five Power Agreement of 1946 provided that ninety percent of the $25,000,000 fund and non-monetary gold and ninety-five percent of the heirless properties should be used for such victims. Furthermore, the Government of the United States notes that pursuant to the agreement between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United Kingdom of March 30, 1950, the latter turned over to the Government of Israel the proportion of reparation in respect of the mandate for Palestine which was received by the British Government under the Paris Reparation Agreement.

In bringing to the attention of the Government of Israel the reparations and indemnities thus far received by the Jewish refugees, the Government of the United States does not imply that it regards them as full compensation for their sufferings. It concurs in the view of the Israeli Government that no material compensation can be sufficient. It would point out, however, that many nations and peoples experienced tremendous losses and sufferings at the hands of the Nazis and that none can expect its reparation receipts to reflect compensation in any substantial measure.

The Government of the United States must also point out the bearing of certain agreements, to which it is a party, on further reparation demands on Germany. Immediately following the termination of hostilities, the Occupying Powers established the form of reparations to be exacted from Germany; in so doing they agreed that reparations must be of a character which would not impose a financial burden on the Allies, and that policy is unchanged. They then convoked a conference of those nations which made the greatest contribution to winning the war, for the purpose of distributing the share in German reparation allocated to the three Western Powers under the Potsdam Protocol. From that conference emerged the Paris Reparation Agreement, which not only determined the percentage share in reparation of the signatories but also provided that the reparation receipts shall be regarded as covering all their claims against Germany arising out of the war but without prejudice to the final settlement of German reparations. The effect of these decisions is to preclude the assertion by the Government of the United States, on its own behalf or on behalf of other states, of further reparation demands on Germany pending a definitive settlement in the nature of a peace treaty. It is impossible to predict when such a settlement will be possible.

The Government of the United States therefore regrets that it cannot impose on the Government of the German Federal Republic an obligation to pay reparation to Israel as a condition to implementation of the decision reached by the Foreign Ministers at their conference in Brussels to place Allied-German relations on a new basis. The Government of the United States wishes to emphasize, however, that the new relationship will not effect a definitive settlement of all problems arising out of the war and that it will not prejudice the consideration of further claims for reparation in the negotiation of a final settlement with Germany in the nature of a peace treaty.

Washington, [July 5, 1951.]

262.84A41/3-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] July 5, 1951.

Subject: Reply to Israel Note Requesting German Reparations of $1,500 Million.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo.

Participants: Theodore Kollek, Minister, Embassy of Israel.
Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel.
Mr. McGhee—NEA.
Mr. Lewis—GER.
Mr. Waldo—NE.

In the absence of the Ambassador, the Israel Minister Theodore Kollek was requested to call to receive the Department's reply [2] to the Israel note of March 12, requesting United States assistance in obtaining $1,500 million reparations from Germany. I told him that while we regretted the reply was negative, we had not asked for our share of reparations from Germany and were precluded by an agreement with France and Britain from asking for reparations on behalf of others, at least pending the negotiation of a final peace settlement. In order not to prejudice any negotiations which the Israelis might wish to undertake directly with the West German Government, however, we would not release the text of our reply and imagined that Israel likewise would not wish to do so. I hoped that the Israel Government understood that the fact of a negative reply had no bearing on the sympathy which the United States had had for the Jews who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis. As Israel well knew, the United States had given many concrete evidences of its sympathy in this regard. I said that Mr. Lewis of the Bureau of German Affairs was present to answer any detailed questions the Israel representatives might have on the note.

Mr. Kollek said that the Israel Government was prepared for a negative reply. He wished to point out, however, that the request had not been based on the actual damage done to the Jews but rather on the moral issue that Israel had absorbed many of the Jews who had suffered and lost property at the hands of the Germans. The Minister expressed his appreciation for all that had been done by the United States to alleviate the suffering of the Jews and to assist Israel. So far as compensation from Germany was concerned, Israel did not expect to let the matter rest and would probably approach the Department again on other aspects of this matter. A prominent American economist had been hired by the Israel Government to survey the German economy to determine that country's capacity to pay compensation to Israel.

Mr. Lewis told the Minister that the United States was sympathetic to Israel obtaining some form of compensation from Germany and we had authorized our High Commissioner to talk with other High Commissioners with a view to freeing the balances which had accrued to the Jewish Restitutions Successor Organization to be used in the purchase of German goods useful to Israel.

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[2] *Supra.*

Mr. Kollek said that Bremen had already reached a settlement with the Jewish Restitutions Successor Organization to the extent of 20 million marks. Israel hoped a similar settlement could now be reached with Wurttemberg-Baden. Settlement with Bavaria was more distant.

Mr. Lewis said that the fact that the American note was negative did not indicate any diminution on our part of pressure on the Germans to fulfill their commitments on restitutions and balances. At this time notes almost identical to the United States reply were being delivered to Israel representatives in London and Paris. The United Kingdom had agreed not to publish the note unless there was considerable pressure to do so, and we had asked the French to withhold publicity also. If for some reason or other it should subsequently become necessary to release the reply, we would consult with the Israelis beforehand. The Israel representatives expressed appreciation for the Department's action on this latter point and said that they would prefer not to release the text of the Department's reply. (The following day Mr. Waldo informed Mr. Keren that the French had agreed to no publicity on this matter.)

683.84A/7-651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 6, 1951—7 p. m.

12. Dept believes Israel shld not cast aside lightly informal suggestion Syrian Rep Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Comm mtg June 20 that potentialities exist in meeting reps Syria and Israel FonOffs to discuss problems Demil Zone and to seek *modus vivendi.* Notwithstanding Israel view expressed Embtel 928 June 28[2] and Embtel 2 July 3,[3] Dept of opinion Israel wld have nothing to lose by holding such discussions. Since beginning, Arabs, with exception Jordan Govt, have adamantly refused direct negots either formally or informally with Israel. Syrian move is therefore new development which shld be welcomed by Israel as possibly significant step towards objective long sought by Israel. Dept believes that with or without comprehensive agenda, it wld still be possible for Israel to explore questions outstanding Syria Israel. Israel wld be well advised to discuss with Syrians their views terr solution Demil Zone since agreed settlement some aspects this problem might pave way solutions other questions. Even if no settlement reached, Dept believes discussions might have merit clarifying for both sides issues involved. World public opinion obviously attaches certain onus to the side in a dispute unwilling to

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. G. L. Jones and Waldo (NEA); cleared with UNP; transmission authorized by Mr. Kopper. Repeated for information to Damascus, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, London, Paris, Jerusalem, Ankara, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] *Ante*, p. 737.

[3] *Ante*, p. 742.

discuss issues which are potential peace threat. Dept hopes Israel FonMin will not persist rigid views expressed reftel.

ACHESON

974.531/7–751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 7, 1951—3 p. m.

40. Dept understands Israel has decided request early SC consideration Suez Canal restrictions and meeting anticipated near future. Deptel 1288 Jun 12[2] indicated that while we wld prefer Egypt lift restrictions voluntarily, if matter came to SC we wld be obliged state our disapproval restrictions. We recognize that among risks involved in matter coming before SC are Egypt introduction Anglo-Egypt case, further exacerbation of Pal situation, Arab charge further evidence US pro-Israel policy. These, however, wld carry no weight with Israel which is within its rights in bringing matter before SC. Only hope avoiding SC discussion wld be if restrictions were lifted now by voluntary Egypt action.

We therefore wonder whether it wld be useful if you informed FonMin likelihood early SC action and expressed most informally our belief that Egypt's interests wld best be served if it quietly lifted restrictions at this time. If you believe such informal approach wld be useful and has chance of success, you are authorized to make it. In such event suggest you info Brit, Fr and possibly Neth colleagues.[3]

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Stabler; cleared with Messrs. McGhee, Waldo, G. L. Jones, and Ludlow. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Paris, The Hague, and New York.

[2] *Ante*, p. 712.

[3] In telegram 46 from Cairo, July 14, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had told him informally that Egypt would be prepared to "alleviate" the present restrictions if that would prevent the matter from being considered by the Security Council, but Egypt could not at this juncture abolish them. Caffery told Salaheddin that the matter was already before the Security Council. (974.531/7–1451)

357.AC/7–751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Jerusalem[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 7, 1951—3 p. m.

4. Unpal 276. For Palmer.

1. Dept appreciates your reply (Palun 409)[2] to Unpal 270[3] and

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Barco and Ludlow; cleared with Mr. Hickerson and with NEA and NE; authorized for transmission by Mr. Wainhouse; signed for the Secretary by Mr. McGhee. Repeated by air to the Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Ankara.

[2] Dated June 23, p. 728.

[3] Dated June 12, p. 714.

understands background what appears here more pessimistic outlook than entirely justified. Dept had hoped and still believes at least parts program outlined Unpal 270 can be effectively adapted to PCC's frustrating situation. Dept realizes PCC's lack positive accomplishment during two and one-half years including failure UN consider its Jerusalem plan, failure its efforts bring parties into direct contact, and failure obtain support any parties for its suggestions on repatriation, territorial adjustments, compensation or release of blocked accounts made unavoidable present feeling stalemate and equally strong feeling need for effective new procedures.

2. Dept feels, although subject matter of Unpal 270 will not be new to PCC, Unpal 270 contains basis for attempting new procedures. Dept believes were PCC to pursue actively most promising points contained therein it cld best do so by assuming role of commission of mediation as Arab States have repeatedly requested. Continuing informal and individual discussions various points wld probably not produce more results than PCC's similar efforts during past 6 months. On other hand PCC action along lines Dept suggestions wld in our opinion require a more direct and formal approach of mediation within framework conference between Israel and PCC on one hand and reps Arab States and PCC on other. PCC wld decide place for such conference taking into account effective organization wishes parties; Dept preferences are (1) Istanbul; (2) Crete or Rhodes; (3) Cyprus.

3. We feel this conference shld be for purpose discussing and suggesting solutions for specific problems such as those raised in Unpal 270 and shld not be presented as a "Peace Conference." PCC wld not be expected suggest at outset direct negots between Israel and Arab States but in course of conference some questions might be advanced to point where direct contacts cld be established. Dept wld be prepared give all appropriate diplomatic support for PCC convening such conference and assuming mediation role and, where necessary and feasible, for successful solution specific problems.

4. For your guidance and within framework foregoing, Dept reviews below principal items Unpal 270.

A. *Israel treatment Arab residents and repatriation.* After ascertaining facts either independently or through Fr, Turk and US diplomatic reps Tel Aviv this subject might be taken up in connection with negots with Israel for repatriation of appreciable number of refugees under para 4 part 2 of ConGen doc 17 Rev 1 as reported to Dept, a key possibly being to find those classes of refugees whose repatriation cld be considered by Israel as beneficial to its economy. In addition PCC might negot with Israel return of selected groups of property owners for residence and resumption of control of their property thus obviating some of the larger compensation claims.

B. *Compensation.* As indicated in para 3 part 2 of Unpal 270 an agreement between Israel and Arab States on principle of compensation and approx total amount, per PCC ref doc (ConGen Doc 17 Rev 1), wld greatly advance possibilities ultimate payment compensation and might create disposition among UN Members provide financial means by which Israel might pay compensation. Shld PCC as result negots be able obtain announcement by Israel its agreement to practical proposals and Arab States willingness accept such proposals, financial aspects of problem might prove less difficult. Likewise announcement Israel's agreement proposals for practical solution compensation problem might give PCC talking point for Arab States' relaxation trade and other restrictions, thus assisting Israel meet compensation obligations. Exploring such questions within framework conference on basis of mutual benefits might any case produce hitherto unexplored possibilities, particularly if Israel in fact more ready to adopt "unorthodox" solutions.

C. *Possible Polit Settlement.* Dept believes any opportunity shld be seized encourage and stimulate discussion matters arising under armistice agreement with view to revision or modification agreements by parties. In addition suggestions contained in para 4 Unpal 270 Dept feels there are other important subjects for negot such as unsolved problems Jerusalem area, use Jordan waters.

5. PCC efforts will have to be coordinated with extensive diplomatic preparation by Fr, Turk and US FonOffs and with such UK aid as wld be helpful. Likewise Dept wld concert with Fr and Turks in clarifying respective roles Chief of Staff TSO and PCC in negots relating settlement issues arising under armistice agreements. Dept feels agreement reached on any problem arising out of armistice agreements as result PCC efforts wld encourage possibilities undertaking at later stage larger revision armistice agreements either through PCC negots or negots by Chief of Staff.

6. Dept believes above provides basis for PCC's deciding assume more positive role. Barco has reported fully on PCC's activities and views. On his return he will be able discuss with you immediate steps contemplated necessary to accomplish these objectives. Your comments and suggestions requested. Dept believes you will wish defer discussion with your colleagues and secretariat until Barco's return. Maximum desired effect announcement new effort by PCC wld require careful coordination and preparation which might be jeopardized by premature publicity.

7. Fol is suggested timetable:

A. You and Barco meet Geneva approx July 20.

B. PCC reconvenes about July 25 to agree on conference plan, discuss agenda, fix venue, opening and terminal dates.

C. PCC members report to respective FonOffs before Aug 5.

D. Aras will extend PCC's invitation to Arab States and Israel for conference at Istanbul. Target date Sept 1.

E. FonOff's will urge parties participate with highest possible representation.

F. Report fol conference for UNGA cld be written either in Istanbul or Paris.

ACHESON

974.5301/7–951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, July 9, 1951—1 p. m.

17. Re Suez. Dept views on SC consideration of Suez Canal dispute as follows:

1. Dept holds little hope that diplomatic representations to Egypt re lifting blockade restrictions will succeed;

2. Dept inclined neither to encourage nor discourage SC action but assumes Israeli initiative that problem will be brought before SC in near future.

3. Dept firmly of opinion US shld not take lead in SC debate but shld support SC action which may effect lifting Suez restrictions. Dept assumes that UK and Fr will be inclined take lead in debate and we will want cooperate closely with them. US does not intend initiate or sponsor res on problem unless it appears likely res attempting to effect lifting of blockade wld fail of adoption without US co-sponsorship.

4. Dept believes two aspects problem will have to be considered during SC debate:

(*a*) Restrictions as they affect Egypt–Israel relations;

(*b*) Restrictions as they affect US interests without regard to Egypt–Israel situation, that is effect blockade on rights other UN Members.

Re (*a*) US position in SC debate wld in large measure be conditioned by theory of complaint Israel presented to Council. SC cld consider problem as facet Palestine problem which SC has been authorized to consider by GA, or alternatively as dispute continuation of which is likely to endanger maintenance of internatl peace and security, or on both theories.

Re (*b*) US position wld be, as expressed on numerous occasions to Egypt Govt, that restrictions, unreasonable, impracticable, and unjust, and adversely affect US interests. We wld emphasize restrictions detrimental legitimate world commerce and as such might well impair general internatl relations.

5. Objective of res shld be lifting restrictions on grounds that there is no basis for their continuance. Egypt justification for continuance restrictions on ground of belligerency untenable since SC wld deem armistice agreement terminated belligerency. SC cld call upon or recommend Egypt lift blockade or possibly merely suspend blockade

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Stabler (NE) and Ludlow (UNP): cleared in substance with McGhee (NEA) and Ranney (BNA); cleared also with G. L. Jones (NE) and Wainhouse (UNP); authorized for transmission and signed for the Secretary by Hickerson (UNA). Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Jerusalem (for Ambassador Palmer), Paris, and London.

pending opinion of ICJ as to whether Egypt has legal right to exercise such blockade.

6. Dept agrees with USUN that certain risks are involved in SC consideration this question and believes that res shld be tailored in such way as to produce maximum effect with least possible exacerbation of relations.

7. Foregoing may be discussed only with UKDel at this time.

ACHESON

683.84A/7-951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 9, 1951—6 p. m.

14. Views set forth Deptel 12, July 6 were conveyed to FonMin this morning. In reply he stressed point that Israel entirely willing participate in formal or informal conversations of general character; objected only to conf limited to discussion demilitarized zone and matters already on MAC agenda. He emphasized Israel has not refused to discuss demilitarized zone as one of several subjects, but he feels that to agree to discuss the demilitarized zone alone wld indicate to Syrians either that Israelis willing to compromise on territorial question, which it is not, or that it is capable of undertaking conversations which it knows in advance can only be barren of useful result.

FonMin stated frankly he was fearful lest Dept thinking be that Israel shld yield to Syrian pressure to divided demilitarized zone as easiest way of settling vexing problem. He reiterated Israel unwilling make such concession for reasons reported Embtel 2 July 3. He thought moreover it would be positively harmful to prestige and authority of MAC to have representatives of respective FonOffs hold discussions limited to matters already on MAC agenda. Apparently Syrian Govt has been unwilling to have discussions on broader basis.

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Ankara.

320.2 AA/7-951 : Despatch

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, July 9, 1951.
No. 13

Subject: Remarks of John B. Blandford, Jr., Director, UNRWA, at Meeting with the Advisory Commission

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Bergus; sent also to the Arab capitals, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

On July 6, 1951, Mr. J. B. Blandford, Jr., Director, UNRWA, met for the first time with the members of the Advisory Commission.[2] By coincidence the meeting was also the 100th session between the Commission and the Director.

The meeting was opened with a few words of welcome to Mr. Blandford on the part of the Commissioners. Mr. Blandford, in expressing his appreciation, stated that even though he had moved to the Director's side of the table, the team which had worked so well together over the past year remained with the same membership.

Mr. Blandford then proceeded to give a composite picture of his talks with the three major contributing Governments, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Mr. Blandford found substantial agreement in all three capitals as to the interpretation of reintegration. Reintegration means the providing of homes and jobs to refugees, principally the building of villages near employment opportunities. It is expected that the Agency's effort will be primarily in the field of agricultural resettlement. The Agency might also undertake minor engineering works necessary for the creation of long-term employment, such as the construction of access roads to villages and village irrigation facilities.

The Agency's program should fit into a large-scale economic development effort in the receiving countries to be financed by international bank loans, oil royalties, grants in aid, and local government budgets. This large-scale effort would undertake the big engineering jobs which must be done, such as building roads to open up new territories, large water and power projects, etc. The Agency can cooperate directly in the large-scale program by assisting in obtaining economic information and stimulating economic development.

The immediate problem before the Agency is essentially the political problem of getting local government cooperation. The Near East Governments must agree to accept refugees for reintegration—this cannot be by-passed. Detailed negotiations will be necessary, the end of which will be to obtain the maximum involvement by local governments in the Agency's program.

Therefore the Agency should be in a position of maximum strength during these negotiations, keeping in mind the Arab League condition that the international community undertake to see the entire reintegration job through. Mr. Blandford hopes to get as much of the negotiation task as possible completed before the next session of the UN General Assembly. For this reason Mr. Blandford hopes that the contributing governments will do their utmost to make the Agency as strong as possible during the forthcoming negotiations. This could be done either by large cash contributions or by commitments from contributing governments which would enable the Agency to formulate a program of reintegration investment. Mr. Blandford mentioned the target of 50 million per year for three years of reintegration.

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[2] The members were as follows: J. Tarbé de St. Hardouin (France), Refet Bele (Turkey), Sir Henry Knight (United Kingdom), and Robert B. Macatee (United States).

Mr. Blandford found that all three of the major contributing governments had the impulse to tackle the economic problems of the Near East bilaterally. He succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the US Government that the needs of the Agency should first be met before the US would embark on a bilateral program. He pressed this same viewpoint in London and Paris and found no vigorous dissent. There was general agreement that the refugee problem had the first political priority and was the most important form of economic development—the transformation of nearly one million people who are presently an economic blight into a social and economic asset to the receiving countries. He requested the Advisory Commission's agreement with this viewpoint and hoped that the members would so advise their Governments. There was a danger of the western democracies' by-passing the difficult immediate need in favor of more pleasant bilateral economic development projects.

Mr. Blandford pressed each of the three Governments to reconsider its contribution with a goal of $75 million for the current fiscal year so that a first-year program of $50 million for reintegration could be negotiated with the Near East States. The President of the United States has requested the Congress for $50 million contribution to the Agency. The present Congress is economy-minded and may well cut deeply into the Mutual Security Bill of which the US contribution to the Agency forms a part. However, there are reasons for optimism based on the special appeal of the refugees. Last year a Congress which made many cuts in foreign aid appropriations passed the entire amount requested for assistance to Palestine refugees.

Mr. Blandford stressed the need of obtaining larger contributions in London and Paris. With adequate financing the Agency might be able to squeeze two years of reintegration work into one. The French and British Governments promised to consider his request; however, the matter needs extensive follow-up, and Mr. Blandford asked the French and British members of the Commission to make a special effort.

Mr. Blandford closed his remarks by again pointing out the necessity of his having at least commitments from contributing governments so that he could negotiate programs with the Near East states. He expressed the hope that the United States Government would explore the possibility of giving contract authority to the Agency.

JOHN H. BRUINS

974.5301/7-1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 10, 1951—4 p. m.

61. Re Suez: Yesterday afternoon in meeting with Jebb (UK) and Lacoste (France) present, Gross gave US views on SC consideration of Suez Canal dispute in accordance with Deptel 17, July 9.[2] Re our view of role we should play (para 3), group agreed res requesting Egypt to drop restrictions would probably pass even if US did not co-sponsor if, of course, USSR does not veto. We said Israelis had told us Malik had informed them USSR would as usual on Near Eastern matters abstain. Jebb and Lacoste thought this most important and insured res adoption. However Lacoste later privately expressed to us his personal deep disappointment at our reluctance to co-sponsor possible res. He said Egyptian attitude is indefensible, US, UK and France are signatories to tri-partite declaration on stability in Middle East, and they should take strong and open leadership in combating restrictions so widely prejudicial.

Jebb asked what would happen if res of above mentioned type adopted: Would Arabs leave UN? Would Egyptians defy res? Would we support sanctions in that case?

Re our view armistice agreement terminated belligerency, Jebb questioned this interpretation, pointing out armistice agreement did not end state of war. He said our theory would require UN lift all restrictions against No. Korea as soon as armistice agreement signed. Lacoste observed the French Govt had always refused to recognize state of war existed between Israel and Arab states, and felt in any case armistice agreement terminated whatever hostilities had been going on in Palestine. Both he and Jebb felt need for legal opinion whether state of belligerency ceased with armistice agreement.

Gross inquired whether UK would sponsor res on Suez. Fowler (UK) replied instructions just arrived, not yet seen by Jebb, indicated London prepared to take leading part in res even unto sponsoring.

At Jebb's instigation there was some discussion regarding whether he should step down during Suez debate. Lacoste pointed out Turkey had not stepped down when co-sponsoring May 18 res on Syria-Israel dispute and Gross thought decision depended on whether UK was directly and manifestly party to dispute.

AUSTIN

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.

[2] *Ante*, p. 756.

974.531/7-1151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1951.

Subject: Israel's Submission of the Suez Canal Case to the Security Council

Participants: Ambassador Abba Eban—Israel
Mr. Hickerson—Assistant Secretary
Mr. Ludlow—UNP
Mr. Waldo—NE

Ambassador Eban called upon me today at his request to inform me that the Israeli Government will present a complaint to the Security Council tomorrow against the Egyptian blockade restrictions affecting the Suez Canal.[2] In expressing the preliminary views of his Government on the presentation of this case to the Council he stressed three factors which he believed affected not only Israel but other members of the Council and the United Nations.

1. The restrictions placed on shipping by Egypt were having a seriously detrimental affect not only upon Israel's economic well being but also upon the shipping interests of all the maritime powers. The Suez Canal represented a point of strangulation to much of the shipping of the world and individuals sending ships through the canal were reluctant to take on cargo which might be subject to interference or controversy over their destination. The blockade, for example, was making the use of the Haifa refineries extremely difficult in that tankers from the Middle East could not pass through the canal to Haifa. As for Israel, it had hopes of trade with Commonwealth and sterling area countries, which trade was made impossible by the inability of ships from East African areas and Commonwealth countries to the east to traverse the canal.

2. The continuance of the blockade posed a problem to the security of the Middle East. He pointed out that the Commonwealth conference in London had evidenced a concern of countries like Australia and New Zealand over the security of the Near and Middle East and the relationship of the canal to the area's security. Mr. Eban felt that the United States as well as the British Commonwealth nations, in evidencing concern over the security of this area would undoubtedly wish to see the interference, which the Egyptian blockade represented, ended.

3. The United Nations aspect of the case was, in Mr. Eban's opinion most important. In the opinion of his Government the problem of the Suez Canal was but part of the entire problem of the enforcement of the Arab-Israeli Armistice system. General Riley, in his decision of June 12, has indicated that the action of the Egyptian Government in maintaining the blockade was clearly an aggressive and hostile act,

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow.

[2] On July 12 Ambassador Eban presented the Israeli complaint in a formal letter, dated July 11, addressed to the President of the Security Council. (U.N. Doc. S/2241.)

not consistent with the intention of the Armistice system, and he had recommended that, since the problem was in essence one too great to be decided by the Egyptian-Israeli Special Committee, Israel should resort to the Security Council for satisfaction. Israel, according to Mr. Eban, believes that the Armistice Agreements should be complied with by all signatories and not just by Israel. He said that there was no other instance where a Government had maintained for so long such an obvious violation of the Armistice system. In submitting its case to the Security Council, Israel was concerned that the allegation of a state of war should be allowed to persist. If such were to be the case, all of Israel's neighbors were at war with Israel and therefore, perhaps, Israel should undertake to devise hostile action against the surrounding countries as a matter of defense and retaliation. It was Israel's intention that the Suez Canal case should have as its objective the direction of the countries concerned toward the achievement of a final peace in the area. Mr. Eban felt that Council action against the Egyptian restrictions would have a salutary affect on Egypt's respect for the United Nations and for those governments which would be calling for the lifting of such restrictions. He felt sure that Egypt would comply with a directive from the Council. Certainly, Israel could hope that Egypt's compliance would be on the order of Israel's compliance with the May 18 resolution which, however distasteful to Israel, had been complied with.

I thanked him for the presentation of his views on the Suez case and informed him of our desire to see the restrictions lifted. I stated that I believed that Israel and the United Kingdom were the two countries most concerned with the problem and accordingly should assume the lead. I pointed out to him that we had made numerous representations to Egypt concerning this problem and said that, while I had been a little reluctant to see this case come before the Security Council because of various complicating factors and related problems I did not now believe there was any basis for opposing Council consideration. I did wish to point out, however, what, I was sure, the Israeli Government had already taken into consideration, namely that with the Suez case before the Council some of the Arab states might be led to demand a discussion of the extent and willingness of Israel's compliance with Security Council resolutions. I said that recent reports of General Riley, particularly the one of July 9[3] concerning the difficulties which he was having over the repatriation of Arab refugees to the demilitarized zone were causing us some concern and we felt that the Government of Israel should consider this matter of their own compliance. I asked him quite candidly, if he felt that Israel would be coming before the Council with clean hands

In reply Mr. Eban stated that while he was not fully familiar with General Riley's reports he felt that Israel had complied with the requirements of the May 18 resolution. However, with regard to my suggestion and inquiry, he would look further into the matter. Concerning the repatriation of the Arab refugees to the demilitarized zone he said that it was his understanding that refugees had been presented with an opportunity to decide whether they wished to return to the demilitarized zone, where chaos still reigned, or whether they preferred, as the majority of them did, to remain in the security of Shaab where law and order prevailed. In any event, he thought it was quite clear that it was not in the best interests of the Arab refugees for all of them to return to the demilitarized zone.

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[3] U.N. Doc. S/2234.

The Ambassador closed by saying that in presenting the case to the Council there was much planning yet to do and he assumed that the Israeli and United States delegations would have further consultations. I did not comment on this assumption.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

974.5301/7-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, July 11, 1951—6 p. m.

226. Head Afr Dept FonOff[2] asked us stress to Dept importance UK attached to our co-sponsorship SC resolution calling on Egypt lift Suez Canal restrictions. FonOff gathered we were already prepared support arguments against restrictions in SC discussions, thereby making clear to Egypt where we stood. Added weight our co-sponsorship of res was in FonOff's opinion vital to achieving maximum result.

FonOff doubts wisdom having canal dispute referred to ICJ in view risk adverse decision. Because of increasing parliamentary and domestic restlessness over Suez issue, FonOff is anxious for SC take some decisive step against restrictions.

Public attention has again been called to Egypt behavior by detention *Empire Roach*[3] entrance Gulf Aqaba (an incident headlined by popular press today) and Fon Secy will be obliged explain govt's attitude on this provocation in House Commons this afternoon. UK is making strong protest Egypt action both in Cairo and with Egypt Amb here who was called to FonOff this morning. FonOff denies that Egypt had any right detain and board ship and is particularly exasperated by manner in which search carried out, which included some looting, and by belief Egypt should have been well aware this was simply another of routine trips to take supplies to Aqaba which have been carried on for some time.

GIFFORD

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[1] Repeated for information to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

[2] Roger Allen.

[3] With respect to the detention of the British ship *Empire Roach*, see *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, 5th series, vol. 490, cols. 424, 835, and 1408.

IO Files

Memorandum by Edward P. Maffitt of the United States Mission the United Nations, to the United States Representative at t United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL [New York,] July 12, 195
US/S/1794

Subject: Suez

Yesterday afternoon Denis Laskey, Bob Fowler and Francis Vall
brought in a draft resolution on the Suez matter and discussed the U
views thereon. We talked of the Israelis' intention to send a reque
today to the Security Council President for a meeting on Suez, a
Fowler said that he understood that the Israelis were suggesting to t
Norwegians and the Australians that they ask to be present at t
Security Council debate.

The British said they did not yet have instructions whether to ho
the Israelis off and thus bring the Suez problem up by calling a me
ing to discuss General Riley's report. It appeared that John Couls
would rather have the Israelis take the step, in the belief that t
would involve the UK less. On the other hand, most of the other me
bers of the UK Delegation felt that it would involve the UK l
simply to call a meeting as President to discuss a report provided f
in the November 17, 1950 Security Council resolution.

When I asked what the British reasons were for wishing this matt
brought up at this time Laskey listed the following in the order
their importance: *a*) there is much agitation in the House of Commo
against a situation prejudicial to British commercial interests, i.e., t
Haifa Refinery; *b*) the UK at all times worries over any obstacle
free and unrestricted use of international waterways; *c*) the situati
shown by Riley's report of the special committee's decisions indica
that a situation exists which is likely to endanger peace and securi
in the Near East; *d*) the UK would welcome any development whi
might loosen up the relations between Israel and the Arab states, a
it believes that this would come about to a certain extent if Eg
should drop the restrictions, especially on oil (Iraq) but also on ge
eral commercial and diplomatic relations (Jordan and possibly others

We then discussed the form the debate in the Council might ta
It was recognized that there were two elements involved, the Ca
restrictions which Egypt was maintaining, and other obstacles
trade and communications with Israel. Laskey asked whether "
might help" the United States to have the draft resolution broade
in Paragraphs 9 and 10 to cover restrictions from which we we
suffering commercial prejudice. This brought us to a discussion
the role we would play in the debate. I pointed out that the British ha
learned our instructions on this point, especially with regard

co-sponsorship, and that there had been no change therein. Laskey said that Jebb would be happy if we would report to the Department that the UK Delegation feels that our failure to co-sponsor would greatly weaken the resolution since it would make it appear that we were not wholeheartedly behind the attempt to make Egypt lift the restrictions. I said that our statement at the table would make our views clear enough, but this seemed to make little impression on our British friends. They made some mention of the Tri-Partite Declaration as a factor we should take into consideration, although they realized that this was not the occasion to invoke it. When I asked what co-sponsorship the UK had in mind they replied that the only other SC Member that might be interested in co-sponsoring in addition to the French and ourselves (*sic*) would be the Dutch, although they did not exclude the possibility that Turkey, for the sake of peace and security in the area, might consider co-sponsoring as it did in the May 18th resolution on the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Vallat cautioned against being led by the Egyptians into an argument based on purely legal issues, since the intricacies of the 1888 Convention might confuse the issues and since the argument might lead to the matter being referred to the ICJ, a move which he thought perhaps would weaken the pressure on Egypt. Laskey was not sure that this latter point was valid.

As for timing of presentation of the British draft resolution, the British felt that it should not be until we had heard what line the Egyptians would take.

[Annex]

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE EGYPTIAN RESTRICTIONS ON SHIPPING THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL

The Security Council:—

1. *Recalling* that in its resolution of the 11th August 1949 relating to the conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States it drew attention to the pledges in these agreements against further acts of hostility between the parties:

2. *Recalling* further that in its resolution of 17th November 1950 it reminded the states concerned that the armistice agreements to which they are parties contemplate the return of permanent peace in Palestine, and therefore urged them and other states in the area to take all such steps as will lead to the settlement of the issues between them:

3. *Noting* that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation in his report to the Security Council of 12th June 1951 considered interference with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel to be a hostile and aggressive act, and con-

trary to the spirit of the Armistice Agreement, whose effective functioning is thereby jeopardised:

4. *Further noting* that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation recalled the statement of the senior Egyptian delegate in Rhodes on 13th January 1949 to the effect that his delegation was inspired "with every spirit of cooperation, conciliation, and a sincere desire to restore peace in Palestine", and that the Egyptian Government has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff that they desist from the present practice of interfering with goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal:

5. *Considering* that the exercise of the power of search and seizure against international commercial shipping is a right generally recognised only to a power acting in the lawful exercise of belligerent rights:

6. *Considering* that since the permanent armistice regime has been in uninterrupted existence between Egypt and Israel for more than 2 years and 3 months, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or require to exercise belligerent rights for any legitimate purpose of self-defence:

7. *Finds* that the maintenance of these blockade measures is inconsistent with the spirit of the Armistice Agreement and an abuse of the exercise of maritime belligerent rights:

8. *Further* finds that these measures cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the grounds that they are necessary for self-defence:

9. *And further considering* that the restrictions on the passage of oil tankers through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies of refined oils required for their economic reconstruction:

10. *And considering* that such restrictions together with the sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent an intolerable restriction of the right of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another and with the Arab states and with Israel:

The Security Council:

11. *Calls upon* Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.*

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*The UK Delegation has recommended to London omitting Paragraph 5; omitting the bracketed words "since" and "neither . . . self-defense" in Paragraph 6 and inserting in place of the latter the words "and that in fact there is no present state of hostilities between Israel and Egypt"; omitting "and . . . rights" in Paragraph 7 and "of refined oil" in Paragraph 9; and replacing "oil tankers" by "goods" in Paragraph 9. Laskey and co. also agreed that "blockade" was possibly not the correct word in Paragraph 7. [Footnote in the source text.]

974.531/7–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 12, 1951—5 p. m.

29. Embtel 17 July 10,[2] Deptel 14 July 9[3] recd July 11. Chief US Div FonOff yesterday called on rep Emb and outlined Israel position on Suez Canal matter, which he said had been set forth in *aide-mémoire* presented to membs SC[4] and is, therefore, not reviewed this tel. Reiterated that Israel looking to support of US in this matter, and stressed dangerous precedent of Egyptian restrictions which might come to plague us in any East–West conflict. Stated that Israel basing position largely on Riley's reasoning and condemnation Egyptian restrictions in June 12 statement. Israel is concerned lest US not take a strong position in Suez case, in which Israel feels it is clearly in right. They believe weak res wld only strengthen Egypt in present course.

Emb understands from Brit Leg that Brit FonOff has drafted resolution which more or less parallels Israel thinking, and that Brit Emb Wash has been instructed take it up with Dept. Brit apparently favor strong res, but cognizant risks if UN [*US?*] not prepared back it up.

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated for information to Cairo.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Same as telegram 17 to New York, p. 756.

[4] A copy of the Israeli *aide-mémoire*, dated July 10, not printed, is in IO Files: US/S/1793.

974.531/7–1351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 13, 1951—5 p. m.

33. Emb believes US can ill-afford take other than forthright stand on such an important issue as restrictions by Egypt on Suez Canal traffic. Without attempt review gen considerations, I mention only one of local application: Since we sponsored May 18 res sharply critical of Israel and may find it necessary join in criticizing Israel further re implementation ref res, it becomes important that we be no less critical of Egypt in present case.

Emb believes moreover that merits case fully justify strong position and that para 3 Deptel 14, July 9[2] does not go far enough altho our emphasis may well be on Point IV BIE restrictions as they affect US interest and rights other UN members in order more readily refute charges action merely evidence pro-Israel policy. From standpoint US interests as viewed from this mission, Emb agrees with opinion Brit FonOff as reported London Embtel 226, July 11 [3] to Dept that weight our co-sponsorship needed to realize maximum result.

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[1] Repeated for information to Cairo, London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Jerusalem.

[2] Same as telegram 17 to New York, p. 756.

Davis

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[3] *Ante*, p. 763.

683.84A/7-1451: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET Tel Aviv, July 14, 1951—9 a. m.

36. FonMin Sharett has expressed concern over impression that differences exist between UNTSO and Israel Govt when he (Sharett) thought substantial agreement had been reached in his prior conversations with General Riley. Emb believes FonMin sincere in expressing such opinion, but possibly too inclined to interpret the lack of any specific reply to his arguments as tacit agreement. He stated in general Israel position re compliance May 18 SC res wld be based on text armistice agreement itself, explanatory notes, minutes of negots, and series of rulings of chairman MAC. As to Arab land question he observed SC cld always authorize action on land, with or without expropriation but with due compensation, without prejudice or prejudging ultimate solution sovereignty question.

He states Israel had complied with paras 3 and 10, May 18 res re work suspensions and return of Arabs to demilitarized zone, and said he had drafted communication chief staff UNTSO inquiring whether provisions calling for further investigation of complaints, particularly that of Israel re Al Mutilla attack, had been carried out and if so with what result. Referred also to para 12 which expressed hope that res might promote "return to permanent peace in Palestine" and to subsequent Arab actions such as public statement Khaled Am Azm Bey, Syrian PriMin, to effect Syrians will never make peace with Israel and will not even discuss matter, also Arab League decision intensify blockade, and inquired whether any representations had been made to Syria or other Arab states this connection. Stated his hand wld be greatly strengthened if such were case.

Davis

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[1] Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

684A.00 TA/7-1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 14, 1951—10 a. m.

37. In recent informal conversation FonMin stated that with regard to proposed US econ assistance in ME he had never advocated such aid shld be confined to Israel or Arabs shld not be aided, and direct aid shld be based on (1) actual needs (2) pace of development of recipient countries and (3) exertions of countries themselves.

As to relations with Arab states, he discussed at some length and with obvious interest possible means of influence Arab population to make it polit possible for leaders make peace with Israel. He made frank but not particularly helpful observation that "basic thing in current Israel history is immigration, not relations with Arabs". He evinced some interest, if not enthusiasm, for possible coordinated use of existing facilities to correct misapprehensions, create confidence and lessen ill will. He apparently does not regard improvement as vital to Israel's interests, and is inclined to be skeptical regarding efficacy any attempt change Arab thinking by either deeds or words.

On other hand he fears further deterioration in situation and says he anticipates that Egypt, encouraged by example of others, may soon take action against Jews and their property.

When I mentioned his Nazareth speech (Embtel 13, July 9)[2] in Arabic to local Arabs, and expressed view that treatment of Arab minority had great importance to Israel's internatl position, particularly in Russ and West Eur, he said that his reception at Nazareth had been courteous rather than warm, that the crowds had viewed him with curiosity and outward respect but there was complete lack of friendliness. He said a higher percentage of Arab children are in school than during days of mandate and it is Israel policy treat minority with consideration. He expressed conviction however that it is too much to expect Arabs will be happy as minority. He made further revealing remark re his thinking to effect his govt had refrained from giving too much publicity to things done for Arabs since it did not wish encourage illegal infiltration or further demands for repatriation.

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] Telegram 13 from Tel Aviv, July 9, not printed, summarized a speech by Mr. Sharett on July 6 in Nazareth, Israel's largest Arab center (784A.022/-951).

683.84A/7-1451 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, July 14, 1951—8 p. m.

26. We have been reviewing problems underlying Syro-Israeli dispute in light stimulating tels such as Depcirtel 2, July 2;[2] Deptel 8, July 6[3] also Tel Aviv 895, June 23 [*21*][4] re necessity for facing up to territorial question. We are convinced this last problem shld be dealt with speedily and courageously together with that of water rights. Fol paras continue our comment (see Legtel 6, July 5)[5] on points raised in Depcirtel July 2.

In seeking solution this vexing problem our aim shld be reduce irritations in gen so that we can proceed step by step to larger issues. We note Emb Tel Aviv report SC res May 18 had both beneficial and adverse aspects in Israel. As for Syrians they had made their case prestige-wise and we are sure that had initial good effect not been dissipated by Israel non-compliance and Riley's decision for resuming drainage work Syrians cld be brought to accept settlement along lines whereby Israel's legitimate objective wld have been gained. It does us little good to talk about this now except that we must take into account Syria's sense of outrage in considering future lines of action. Syria's June 20 proposal for *ad hoc* talks looked good to us and we deplored Israel's "all or nothing" attitude toward this proposal (Tel Aviv's 14 July 9).[6] Reiteration of our stand for gen settlement can only be expected to evoke flat rejection and thereby stop us from moving toward precisely that objective. It seems to us that for Israel to refuse bona fide negots on individual components of peace leave it open to charge of hypocrisy. To Syrians goodwill is lacking when Israel flouts *ad hoc* talks while temporizing on SC res of May 18. Assertion that talks wld be designed serve Syrian territorial ambition (Tel Aviv's 2, July 3)[7] is no more valid than Arab claim that full peace talks cld only serve Israel. Any step toward partial settlement is step toward full peace. Cannot point be made that reduction of friction along comparatively short frontier with Syria through *ad hoc* talks might pay dividends in lasting *modus vivendi* with perhaps most embittered Arab State?

Leg forwarding by despatch its analysis Syrian territorial and other claims and interests in zone. UK Leg here has also submitted report presumably available to Dept. We believe Syria cld be persuaded settle for moderate territorial gain for prestige purposes if interests in water rights protected. Possibility resettling zone Arabs now Israel in any territory given Syria on east side of Jordan shld make division of zone attractive to Israel.

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, the Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and Ankara.

[2] *Ante*, p. 739.

[3] The same as telegram 12 to Tel Aviv, July 6, p. 752.

[4] Not printed.

[5] *Ante*, p. 744.

[6] *Ante*, p. 757.

[7] *Ante*, p. 742.

Israel's insistence on claiming exclusive control of Jordan as its "lifeline" points up once more dangers to area peace inherent in water rights question. Judging from recent action Israeli doctrine seems to be that expansion its population and economy justifies and may necessitate diversion to Israel or otherwise manipulating of all water resources around its periphery. We trust this is not in fact Israel policy as Syrians believe it to be. In case of Jordan River such policy wld affect legitimate, vital rights of Syria and Jordan as well and we believe Riley fully justified in views expressed Beirut tel 1, July 3.[8]

There is also third party to dispute in state of Jordan which lays claim to Hammeh area (Amman tel 175, April 6)[9] and has made complaints re use of Jordan water. Moreover we do not forget that other water projects such as Syrian and Jordan Yarmuk projects will create additional complications. If *ad hoc* talks can be arranged some way shld be found to take into account Jordan claims. Consideration might then be given to creation of internatl machinery to supervise use of water (which is key problem in this sensitive area) until final peace can be achieved.

In connection with *ad hoc* talks we believe PCC might provide a suitable frame for discussion. We also approve idea that polit reps might be added to MAC's. Well chosen reps under control of MAC chairman might discuss specific issues with profit, clarifying policies disputants and at same time accustoming all parties to idea of discussion face to face. We are not terrified by prospect that such discussion wld be useless and sometimes acrimonious. One of worst aspects of present situation is that both sides are uninformed on the real situation and state of mind in each others country. We have had to live with fact that both Israel and Syria have been using Arabs as pawns of national policy. Perhaps we can better cope with this problem if by broadening scope of discussions this can be brought into open.

We suggest consideration be given to fol lines of action:

(1) Communicate to Syria and Israel and publicly announce our concern over Israel's noncompliance with res re return of displaced

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[8] Beirut's telegram 1 to Damascus, the same as its telegram 6 to the Department, not printed, reported General Riley's impression from a discussion with the Prime Minister of Jordan on June 28 that the Jordanian policy was to postpone indefinitely any work on the Huleh project, this being the same line taken by Syria. Riley stated that the Jordan River may be considered as much a lifeline for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as for Israel. (785.022/7-351)

[9] Not printed.

Arabs and withdrawal paramilitary forces. Statement by US and other sponsors on their attitude toward Israel's noncompliance cld recapture in Syrian and other Arab states some of good will with which they originally recd res.

(2) In coordination with other sponsors take Syrian, Jordan and Israel into our confidence to our thinking on desirability their settling territorial and water rights questions and necessity prompt completion drainage project. We cld also suggest possibility settling displaced zone Arabs on east bank of river shld they so desire. (This does not represent modification Leg belief all zone Arabs shld be returned to their villages even though they might reside in tents while destruction of villages being made good.)

(3) At same time announce our support of action to prevent resumption Huleh drainage operations on Arab-owned land until SC res May 18 in other respects fully complied with and zone Arabs given opportunity make free decision re their lands.

Unless some such plan involving settlement by agreement can be evolved only alternative would seem to be SC action to impose settlement. We need not labor point that "simple solution" such as expropriation of Arab land against Syrian opposition wld revive other griefs in Pal dispute.

Cannon

674.84A/7-1651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 16, 1951—5 p. m.

73. 1. During call on McGhee Jul 13 Egypt Amb on own initiative urged Dept find way postpone SC consideration Suez restrictions on basis this worst possible time debate such explosive question in view Iran question and delicacy Anglo-Egypt relations. McGhee replied only hope postponement wld be voluntary action now by Egypt Govt to lift restrictions. While US not anxious this matter come before SC, failure Egypt Govt raise restrictions made SC consideration unavoidable.

2. Egypt Amb also stated that if SC called on Egypt re restrictions there was possibility Egypt Govt might not comply as other States did not find compliance necessary. McGhee emphasized irreparable damage to Egypts position in world councils if such attitude adopted.

3. Dept wld appreciate ur estimate re Egypts compliance with SC res calling for raising of restrictions.[2]

Acheson

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and New York; sent by air to Jidda, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman.

[2] In telegram 62 from Cairo, July 18, Ambassador Caffery replied as follows:

"I do not believe that Egyptian conscience wld be greatly troubled by defying possible SC Resolution on Suez Canal restrictions. They wld undoubtedly cite as justification past instances of Israeli non-compliance with SC Resolutions. Also they wld be influenced by Iran flouting Hague Court." (674.84A/7-1851)

683.84A/7–1651 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL   NEW YORK, July 16, 1951—7:51 p. m.

93. Re Syrian Israeli dispute: At UK instance Gen Riley met this afternoon with Jebb and staff (UK), Lacoste and Ordonneau (France), Ross and Maffitt (USUN) to discuss Syrian-Israeli dispute. Following para contains statements re Israeli compliance with May 18 res which Riley made in confidence. He emphasized he could not speak so freely at SC table.

There is nothing more he can do at present to obtain fuller implementation by Israel of May 18 res. Only part of res Israel has fully carried out is cessation of drainage operations on Arab-owned land. Less than ½ (357) of interned Arabs have been returned to zone: Those returned are concentrated at what was Baqquara and are not allowed by Israeli police to go out of town even to water and graze cattle; Israelis insist these Arabs have contact (purchases, etc.) only with Israel, in no case with Syria; at least 15 owners of lands within the seven acres have not been returned and perhaps 20 more may be still in Israel; of 153 mentioned in his report as not interviewed, Israelis themselves interviewed and returned 95. Regarding policing, Israel is in complete control of zone with police everywhere, 30 of which are concentrated at El Khouri farm with machine guns "to protect drainage workers". Riley will submit his final report at end of this week. Key to Riley's decision authorizing resumption of drainage operations on Israel-owned land was armistice agreement Article V and explanatory note which he interpreted as giving him power in agreement with Arab and Israeli communities (he considers Palestine Land Development Company a community for this purpose) to exercise certain powers.

Riley's only suggestion for solution of problem now is that Syria and Israel must sit down together and negotiate it. It was generally felt by reps present that impasse over scope of negotiations was insurmountable at present.

Reducing problem to simplest terms, Riley gave opinion that Syria was using Arab lands involved in Huleh project as lever to force Israel to rectify border more in line with what Syria considers its security requires.

In his forthcoming report Riley can only state facts in connection with manner in which Israel complying or not complying with May 18 res. Key fact is that Israel fails to recognize it does not possess sovereignty over demilitarized zone.

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[1] Repeated to Tel Aviv and for information to Damascus, Beirut, and London.

In past week new element has arisen in form of "High Commissioner's land." This, he said, is land, ownership to which has not been established. Problem it presents now is that Palestine Land Development Company has just begun operations on bottom of Jordan River. Riley holds they have no right to work on this land without his permission and he is sending dispatch requesting work not be done on such land.

There was discussion of Jordan water problem. Riley said he needed experts to determine effect of project on Syrian and Jordanian irrigation. Jebb inquired whether SC might order investigation of effects by UN Commission of inquiry. Riley said Israel has fixed November 1951 as deadline for completion of project and investigation would take time. However, UNRWA is already in existence and might with assistance make investigation quickly. Blandford had told him such investigation would be great help to him, but he was not equipped to undertake it. Ross wondered whether project would affect rehabilitation of refugees. Riley replied affirmatively, and cited Yarmouk River which is part of resettlement plans and will be affected by project.

Summing up, Riley said answering Ross, that without question, if Israel continues its close grip on zone and its strict measures applied to returned Arabs, situation will be dangerously explosive. He may even have to send Arabs across line into Syria for their own protection and this might set off explosion.

Jebb outlined tentative council procedure if Huleh matter comes back to it (which all present agreed Syria would bring about when Riley's report was in): That SC study Riley's report, confirm May 18 res, and perhaps adopt res directing that investigation of water matter be made.

AUSTIN

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State[1]

[WASHINGTON,] July 17, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Mr. Abraham Feinberg, at the Suggestion of the President.

Discussion:

Since Mr. Feinberg's visit on April 5 (Tab A),[2] the following events have taken place relating to the Israel request for $150 million grant-aid:

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo; sent also to Mr. Matthews.

[2] The memorandum of conversation of April 5 is printed on p. 619.

On May 24, the President recommended to the Congress the adoption of a Mutual Security Program with recommendations for: $23.5 million in economic aid for Israel, $23.5 million in economic assistance for the Arab States, $50 million for the Arab Refugee Program, and authority for $41.5 million in direct grants of military assistance to supplement purchases on a cash reimbursable basis by the states of the area.

On May 27, one hundred and fifty-five members of the House of Representatives urged early study and favorable action on bills to authorize economic aid to Israel. It is significant that their statement made no specific reference to the Congressional bill of April 2 authorizing $150 million for Israel. Other than that, there have been no outstanding efforts to push the Congressional bills authorizing $150 million for Israel. It is believed that the Israel government is aware that the Department does not favor a grant of $150 million to Israel and considers that the Mutual Security Program incorporates the total aid for the Near Eastern countries which the United States is prepared to grant this fiscal year.

On July 5, Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee and a prominent oil man, told me he did not think that the Mutual Security Program provided sufficient economic assistance for Israel. He was aware of the need for an impartial and objective program for the Near East, and suggested that the allocations for Israel and the Arab states be raised from $23.5 million to $75 million piece. He said that if this were possible, he was sure he could get Congressional leaders to withdraw their bills for $150 million. He id not wish the Department's aid bill, which he supported generally, o be embarrassed by Congressional debate on the $150 million grant-id bills. I explained to Mr. Blaustein why we could not raise the gures.

ecommendations:

1. If your discussion with Mr. Feinberg discloses that he is still terested in the passage of the $150 million aid bill to Israel, it is ecommended that you inform him (*a*) that the Department believes at the plan for the Arab states and Israel outlined in the Mutual ecurity Program provides a fair, impartial and generous plan of sistance for the area; (*b*) that the sum proposed for Israel takes to account Israel's request for $150 million grant-aid; (*c*) that the 0 million for the Arab refugees could be considered as much an direct aid to Israel as to the Arab states; (*d*) that United States dgetary limitations, as well as the needs of other areas of the orld, preclude assistance to Israel in any greater amount.

2. You might wish to tell Mr. Feinberg that the United States has eady provided considerable assistance to Israel, as follows: (*a*) 35 million from the Export-Import Bank; (*b*) $100,000 for tech-

nical assistance; (*c*) $87,580 under the Exchange of Persons Program and (*d*) $23,101,867 worth of free assistance from the Departme of Agriculture in the form of surplus agricultural commodities ou of an approximate total of $47 million to all countries for the sam period.[3]

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[3] No memorandum has been found with respect to a further conversation Mr. McGhee with Mr. Feinberg.

674.84A/7-1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, July 17, 1951—8 p.

58. Azzam Pasha tells me that he is very much concerned about th Suez restrictions at SC as he apprehends that it will cause anoth flare-up of Arab countries against the UK and US, which he does n believe to be in the gen interest at this time and he fears that it wi cause Arabs to take a still more unrealistic attitude than they are no taking towards the Iron Curtain, and he is especially concerned abo their position on other questions of world importance before the U

I asked him if he had any suggestions to offer, and while he talk a lot he came up with nothing constructive.

CAFFE

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[1] Repeated for information to London, the Arab capitals, Moscow, Tel Av and Paris.

974.5301/7-1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Departme of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, July 17, 1951—6 p.

342. While awaiting Egypt explanation *Empire Roach* incide in reply to Brit note[2] (expected to fol Egypt cabinet mtg understo scheduled for tomorrow), FonOff inclined believe incident attrib table excess zeal and nasty manners local Egypt officials.

Vessel was stopped 4½ miles SSW Enterprise Channel with 3-mile limit Egyptian territorial waters, but not protected zo Morrison had difficulty in Commons yesterday (Embtel 339 July 1 because he cld not say that FonOff legal advisers concede right Egy stop (but not detain) foreign vessel in territorial waters for simple inspection purposes. *Roach*, in fact, had been stopped briefly once before, but there was no inconvenience and master thought fact not worth reporting. What UK really objects to is abusive manner in which recent detention carried out. However, FonOff feels it cannot now afford let Egypt know it condones any detention. Also, strong feeling in UK Parliament inhibits any equivocation over technicalities.

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[1] Repeated for information to Cairo.

[2] The text of the British note of July 11 to the Egyptian Government is prin in *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 490, col. 1409. also *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1951, p. 448. For the text of the reply of Egyptian Government on July 23, see *ibid.*, p. 449.

[3] Not printed.

FonOff hopes incident will not be repeated and believes companion vessel to *Roach*, engaged on same Suez–Aqaba run, has since completed voyage thru gulf entrance. FonOff denies any validity to news report, evidently emanating Cairo, that UK wld declare certain ships UK public vessels and these wld then be granted clearance by Egypt.

Partial release to press of report from *Empire Roach*'s master confirm looting and provocative manner of search.

GIFFORD

784A.00/7–1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, ?] July 18, 1951.
US/S/1805

Subject: General Position of Israel.

Participants: Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Director, NE, Department of State

I lunched today with Israel Ambassador Eban at his invitation. Eban was more friendly and relaxed than I have seen him for a long time. He did not appear to have any particular axe to grind and the conversation covered a broad area.

Suez Canal Dispute:

Eban did not seem to have a very easy mind regarding the Suez Canal dispute. He realizes that it may open a Pandora's Box, involving Anglo-Egyptian relations, Treaty of 1888, etc., etc. He hoped that the debate could be limited strictly to the area of the Israel complaint. Eban appeared to have no doubt that Israel could make a strong case against Egypt in debate. He said that he had been working up the Israeli case and had discovered that Egypt appears to have "secretly declared war" against Israel in early 1950: prior to this time Egypt had stated in writing that there was no need for a peace settlement with Israel since Egypt was *not at war with Israel.* Eban hoped that the US would help in the job of getting Egypt to lift the restrictions—the main object of the exercise.

I said that the US is still considering what its position will be in the SC but it is well known we object to the Egyptian restrictions as interference with commerce, impractical, etc. I said that I thought the Egyptian restrictions worked against the interests of Egypt since they prevented the British Government from moving towards the Egyptian position in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. The parliamentary situation in the UK with regard to Suez is one of the simple facts of the situation. I said that it seemed to me that the simplest way to obviate the acrimonious debate sure to take place in the SC would be for Egypt quietly to suspend its restrictions *before* the debate began. I inquired whether, if Egypt did this, Israel would feel impelled to "crow over Egypt". Eban replied that he thought not: Israel is chiefly interested in having the restrictions lifted; moreover, Israel continues to think that Egypt is the key to a peace settlement with the Arabs and obviously the SC action would not facilitate such a settlement.

Israeli Elections: [1]

Eban said that the news that he has received from Israel indicates that things are "going pretty well for our side"; i.e., Ben Gurion. He thought that once the elections were over, Israel would be in a better position to make political decisions. He, Rafael and Elath (from London) are returning to Tel Aviv during August to consult. He planned to do his best to remove the idea prevalent in some circles in Tel Aviv that the US has shifted to a pro-Arab policy. He has reported continually that the US is trying to follow the line of being neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel. He thought that the May 18 Resolution was taken far too seriously in Tel Aviv as a pro-Arab move by the United States.

I assured Eban that he would be correct if he reported the US is "neither pro-Arab, nor pro-Israel". The May 18 Resolution, I said, is based upon firm support of the UN. We called the shots as we saw them. It seemed to me that the reasonable and consistent line would be for us to take the same attitude in connection with the Suez Canal dispute.

Prospects for Peace:

Eban gloomily volunteered, with regard to the prospects for peace with the Arabs, that he regretted that he could see "no light at the end of the tunnel". He did not feel that time is improving the prospects for peace, since the Arabs did not appear to be interested in peace.

This gave me an opportunity to describe our views on "tissue knitting" and Israel's "orthodox approach". With regard to the former, I mentioned the informal trade and other relations which appear to have been worked out between Israel and the Lebanon. I said that I was delighted that the Flight Information Center in Beirut, inaugurated July 5, had announced that it would work with aircraft of any nationality. This was "tissue knitting". I thought that something would be gained if only a few kilometers, a frontier between Israel and its Arab neighbors, could be settled as boundaries: this might be done through unilateral declarations.

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[1] The second general election since the founding of the State of Israel was held on July 30, 1951.

I pointed out to Eban that the "orthodox approach" (i.e., save everything for the final peace bargaining) had been tried for 2½ years and had been unsuccessful. It seemed to me that the alternative, or "unorthodox" approach should now be attempted. In this connection I mentioned (*a*) Haifa free zone; (*b*) Arab blocked balances; (*c*) willingness Israel to sit down and talk with the Arabs (e.g., Syria) on any subject; and (*d*) Israel's opening, as a "unilateral act of strength", road across the Negeb for the free use of anybody wishing to use the road within certain security safeguards. With regard to (*d*) I hazarded the guess that there would be a good deal of traffic on this road within a very short time and that the Arabs using the road would help create the atmosphere necessary for more formal peace arrangements in the future.

Eban raised the point of the "cultural" lag which now exists between the Arab States and Israel. He said that Israel today has very little knowledge of Arab thoughts and feelings, although under the mandate there was a brisk traffic in ideas between the Arabs and the Jews. He said the tendency in blockaded Israel is to ignore the existence of the Arab World except as something menacing and encircling. He thought this was wrong because "the Arabs represent a powerful and worthwhile culture".

I commented that it was up to men like Eban, who previously had known the Arab World intimately, to bring home to the Israeli Government and people the importance of their geographic and ethnic surroundings. Eban remarked that Ben Gurion "hardly knows there is an Arab World—Sharett does know".

Commenting on "tissue knitting", Eban said that the difficulty with this course is the political one inside Israel where it is extremely hard to explain while Israel is the object of an economic blockade and daily menaces from the Arabs, why Israel should undertake courses of action favorable to the Arabs. He saw the reasoning behind "tissue knitting", but he was afraid that it called for a special breed of Israeli—a "Super Israeli" who would accept the principle of "unorthodox" acts, in the face of Arab League boasts of plots for his destruction.

974.5301/7-1851 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, July 18, 1951—7:32 p. m.

108. Re Suez. Yesterday Fawzi (Egypt) at his request called on Gross and spent over an hour with Gross, Ross and Maffitt. He said he wished to do his personal best to help in present situation regarding Egyptian restrictions on trade and communications with Israel. He assured us Egypt did not fear SC meeting on Suez matter since it has done and is doing nothing which a govt in state of war with another could not do. To contrary, restrictions considerably short of maximum permissible and are being cut down. Egypt had to safeguard its sovereignty and security. Need to protect its security required Egypt to prevent Israel obtaining oil. At same time Egypt did not want to deny oil to nations of free world. Fawzi hoped some way might be found out of this paradox. He seemed concerned at possibilities presented by forthcoming SC debate and urged that nothing be done in council that would undermine Egyptian sovereignty since Egypt would be unable accept such action. He cautioned against (1) our entering SC debate without clear idea of what we wanted done and (2) "railroading through" res without giving parties chance to make their views known. He hoped there could be res agreed upon in free consultation outside of council before debate joined.

Fawzi went on to say that if anything could be done to "alleviate" burden caused us by present restrictions, he would be very happy. He suggested we explore possibilities and he asked whether SC meeting very imminent. He seemed to have in mind placating us by some gesture or other before council meeting to hear Israeli complaint. At same time he was confident we realized debate would not be confined to Suez Canal restrictions since it would be difficult to prevent whole range of UK-Egyptian problems such as 1936 treaty, Sudan, etc., from coming up.

Referring to views he expressed last autumn, Fawzi said US must attend to bolstering up of NE. He had heard our policy was to give only such military assistance to all Arab states together as we gave to Israel alone. He deprecated this. He felt we should seek to build up Arab world and regain its confidence. In this connection he made obscure recommendation that if we cannot give Arabs exactly what they want we offer them something else, to show them we are friendly. Fawzi put in disclaimer of any intention to bargain and said he was simply giving us his friendly personal advice.

AUSTIN

683.84A/7-1951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 19, 1951—12:37 p. m.

110. Re Syrian-Israeli Dispute. Re Usun 93, July 16.[1]

We suggest for Dept's consideration following program of action re Syrian-Israeli dispute over Huleh drainage project:

1. An effort to persuade Riley, having consulted in NY, to return to Palestine and make one more strong try to iron out differences and bring parties together for solution this dispute. SC meanwhile would not be convened. Before returning to Palestine, Riley might file report he now has in mind reciting facts in situation as he now sees them but indicating that he is returning to Palestine after consultation here for purpose indicated. It may, of course, be very difficult to persuade Riley to follow this course since in his present mood it seems clear that he wants to leave the baby on the SC's doorstep. If Riley should, before returning to Palestine, file a report of the nature he apparently has in mind, it would be very difficult to avoid council mtg at this point; it might, therefore, be preferable if Riley refrained from issuing a further report at this time.

2. If Riley is unwilling to return to Palestine as indicated above or if he should return and his mission should result in failure, SC might take up matter with view to following action.

(*a*) Reaffirmation and clarification of essential parts of May 18 resolutions (in order strengthen Riley's hands) and SC request to him to renew his effort.

(*b*) In order assist SC in its consideration of problem since it appears to have ramifications concerning water supply for entire Jordan area, SC might request Blandford (with assistance, if needed, of technical experts provided by SYG) to study and report to SC as matter of urgency on economic and related implications, including problem of refugee resettlement. In view of previous studies which have been made and Blandford's knowledge of General situation, he should be able to produce such report in relatively brief time.

AUSTIN

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[1] *Ante*, p. 773.

974.531/7-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 19, 1951—6 p. m.

87. 1. Counselor, Egypt Emb called on Dept Jul 17 on instrs and referring ur talk with FonMin (Embtel 46, Jul 14)[2] inquired if Egypt

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Stabler (NE); cleared with BNA, UNP, and L/NEA; signed for the Secretary by Mr. McGhee. Repeated priority to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and New York, and by air to Jidda, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman.

[2] Telegram 46 from Cairo, July 14, not printed, is summarized in footnote 3 to telegram 40 to Cairo, p. 758.

"eased" restrictions for maritime powers without in any way changing restrictions as they affect Israel, US wld be willing seek postponement SC debate. Egypt UNDel spoke along same line with USDel.

2. Dept pointed out time now running out and only way debate cld be postponed wld be for Egypt lift all restrictions voluntarily soonest. Dept made clear that only complete removal restrictions cld justify any action looking toward postponement and expressed doubts it wld be practicable proceed along line suggested by Egypt Emb. (FYI It is understood that no mtg yet sched but may take place next week.) Dept also pointed out that quiet suspension of restrictions or their alleviation to pt of invisibility wld probably satis maritime powers. When Dept inquired whether Egypt approach might be discussed with Brit and Fr, Egypt Emb Rep said he preferred matter remain between US and Egypt at this time.

3. Counselor promised report conversation to FonMin but emphasized tremendous difficulties involved Egypt Govt taking this action.

4. Dept feels that ur approach has had beneficial effect on Egypt Govt which may prefer not face full SC airing and is endeavoring find way out. We are concerned ugly prospect of SC debate this subj which cld be Pandora's Box. We wld like to help Egypt off limb of its Suez restrictions particularly since latter so enmeshed in polit sit UK that it goes far prevent Brit moves toward Egypt's mil needs and aspirations. However we do not believe maritime powers willing accept anything less than alleviation restrictions amounting to their removal. If Egypt prefers make only oral undertaking to this effect this might suffice secure support for postponement debate but later dropping of issue as having no foundation in fact wld depend on visible evidence this undertaking, i.e. passage ships and goods through Canal without interference. Shld Egypt wish follow this line we wld do what we cld to put it across. If line is to be attempted, however, its success or failure will be Egypt's responsibility.

5. You may wish mention conversations reported in this and Deptel 73 July 16[3] to FonMin and in ur discretion points made in above para. While you will know best how to handle this, it is important that Eg not gain impression we are too eager about this.[4]

ACHESON

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[3] *Ante*, p. 772.

[4] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 88 from Cairo, July 22, not printed, that the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed high appreciation in connection with the contents of the Department's telegram 87. Salaheddin said that Egyptian public opinion would not let the Egyptian Government go further than considerable alleviation of restrictions and would not stand for their removal. (974.531/7-2251)

974.5301/7–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 19, 1951—7 p. m.

43. 1. In view nature Israel complaint Dept considers Suez question shld be brought up in SC as part of gen Pal question and SC action shld be based primarily on Egypt's violation of spirit and intent of Armistice Agreement. Altho second aspect Suez question para 4*b* Deptel 17[2] wld be treated incidentally, Dept quite concerned that too great emphasis on effect of blockade on other than Israel commerce and on belligerent rights might lead to suggestion UK, US, Fr and possibly Neth are also parties to dispute with Egypt in view of protest made by these powers, and under Chapter VI procedure shld abstain in voting on proposed or similar res. While such suggestion cld be handled by Jebb as Pres, Dept feels strength of SC position vis-à-vis Egypt might be considerably weakened. Furthermore, problem of exercise belligerent right is legal question which cld only be finally determined by ICJ and we believe SC shld not attempt assert its right to deal with this problem.

2. Dept has noted drafting modifications suggested by UKDel re paras 5, 6 and 7 and is in full agreement with those suggestions. We wld suggest that para 6 cld be strengthened by a quotation from Armistice Agreement, specifically para 4 Art 1 and/or para 2 Art XII. We believe that this wld indicate that factually speaking hostilities not only no longer exist, but are ruled out indefinitely. This is basically what Dept had in mind in para 5 Deptel 17. We consider effect all these changes wld be that SC action basically rests on Egypt violation of intent and spirit Armistice Agreement.

3. It is probable Egypt arguments in presenting case will be predominantly legalistic, based on Riley findings, alleged belligerent rights, and 1888 Convention. It is possible Egypt will request consideration these pts by ICJ and in this event US, in view its consistent policy re utilization ICJ, wld be inclined support. Shld Egypt make such request and it gained support, we wld envisage modification para 11 of UK draft res so that SC wld call upon Egypt to suspend restrictions pending ICJ advisory opinion. We share UK preference that this procedure be avoided but UKDel shld be left in no doubt re our attitude.

4. While effect Suez restrictions on maritime powers not involved in problem and shld not form basis for SC action, we nevertheless be-

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[1] Drafted by Stabler (NE), Ludlow, and Bechhoefer (UNP); cleared with McGhee (NEA) and with L and BNA; transmission approved by Hickerson. Repeated for information to London, Tel Aviv, and Paris, and by air to Ankara, Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman.

[2] Dated July 9, p. 756.

lieve it wld be appropriate for SC in its res to note wider implications restrictions. UK draft in gen recognizes proper relationship of this element thru placing para 9 and 10 after SC findings. Dept suggest this relationship cld be further clarified thru amending para 9 and 10 to read as fol:

> ". . . and further noting that the restrictions on the passage of goods thru the Suez Canal to Israeli ports are denying to nations, at no time connected with the conflict in Pal, invaluable supplies required for their econ reconstruction; and that these restrictions together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israeli ports rep unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another."

5. US disposed to co-sponsor if suggested approach to SC debate and substance suggested revisions including UKDel's contained page 2 UK draft res (US/S/1794)[3] are acceptable to UK. In co-sponsoring we assume UK will continue to take lead particularly in securing other co-sponsors.

6. As UK res with suggested modifications wld appear to be satis, Dept wld see no necessity for considering Israeli draft res. In fact we can see considerable disadvantage in Israel pressing its views or circulating draft res.

7. Re timing dept assumes Jebb will wish to initiate SC consideration of this complaint during his presidency.

ACHESON

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[3] Dated July 12, p. 764.

974.5301/7–1951: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, July 19, 1951—7:07 p. m.

114. Re Suez: In conversation with Maffitt this afternoon Riley, UN TSO chief of staff, said he thought he knew what Fawzi had in mind when he hinted that there might be some way to work out oil situation so that free countries of West would not be prevented by Egypt from obtaining maximum oil supply. At lunch with Fawzi few days ago, Riley said, Fawzi had discussed this dilemma, caused by Egypt's need to safeguard its security vis-à-vis Israel and had indicated he thought way could be found out of it. Riley asked him point blank whether he had in mind deal whereby Egypt would let oil through to Haifa in return for Israel clearing out of Aqaba area. After slight hesitation Fawzi replied in affirmative. Riley deduced from this that if Israelis would consider some such bargain, Egypt might take step which could well affect whole matter of Arab em-

bargo against Israel. At same time Riley realized prospects of Israeli agreement to such arrangement are remote and could materialize only as part of a basic overall agreement between Israel and Arab states.

AUSTIN

83.84A/7-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, July 20, 1951—5 p. m.

58. Embtel 14, July 9[2] and Embtel 2, July 3.[3]

FonMin stated today Israel has taken initiative in providing conf with reps of Syria and has suggested fol agenda;

1. Settlement of outstanding issues in spirit of SC Res of 16 Nov 1948, 11 Aug 1949 and 18 May 1951 and Israel-Syrian Gen Armistice Agreement.
2. Coop between local auths on each side of frontier on matters of mutual concern such as:
    (1) Public security.
    (2) Health.
    (3) Agriculture, etc.
3. Question of economic relations between Syria and Israel.
4. Other questions agreed upon by two parties.

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] *Ante*, p. 757.

[3] *Ante*, p. 742.

83.84A/7-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

ECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, July 20, 1951—5 p. m.

59. Info in Deptel 38, July 17[2] very timely.

Fon Min handed me today copy of what purports to be communication dated July 18 from Chairman ISMAC to Mr. N. Hurowitz whom Fon Min described as local rep Pal Land Development Company which reads as fols:

"I wish to inform you of fol opinion of Chief of Staff UNTSO Pal which has been expressed to me: (*a*) Chief of Staff considers that public lands, i.e., those lands in the demilitarized zone (incl Jordan River bed) the right which were vested in High Commissioner for Pal are lands which still remain in disputed status.

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[1] Repeated for information to Damascus, Beirut, and London.

[2] Not printed; but same as telegram 93 from New York, July 16, p. 773.

(*b*) Chief of Staff, therefore, does not believe that PLDC has right to work on these lands until clarification of their status has been obtained.

Will you pls inform me as soon as possible of your views relative to above. It is particularly requested that you inform me as to acceptance or non-acceptance on part of PLDC of foregoing ruling of Chief of Staff".

Communication signed by S. G. Taxis, Col. USMC. Comment fols.

Davis

683.84A/7-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 20, 1951—5 p. m.

60. Re Embtel 36, July 14.[2]

Comment on Embtel 59, July 20.[3] Fon Min spoke with strong feeling of content ltr July 18 from Col Taxis saying it was "new surprise from Gen Riley". He pointed out it represented complete reversal Israel's understanding position taken heretofore and quoted Gen Riley's reply to Mr Von Balluseck, Neth rep, to effect that ISMAC wld have jurisdiction over Palestine Land Development Co concession only where it involves land within demil zone which is the property of Arab refugees. He quoted Gen Riley further as stating this "is the only part of that concession with which we have anything to do. It is not the concession itself but the expropriating of land to carry out the purpose of the Huleh concession." He explained care had been exercised avoid any trespass on Arab-owned lands and in excavations in river bed opposite Arab property soil removed had been conveyed some distance to non-Arab property. He complained further that such a "highly important, not to say explosive, communication, shld be addressed to a local rep" of the PLDC when it raised questions which cld be decided only on highest level of govt.

I did not undertake to discuss technical aspects Israel's relationship with UNTSO in Huleh dispute, but stated informally and on my own responsibility that much capital was being made of Israel's alleged non-compliance with UN dictates, and that Israel can ill afford any policy other than complete and whole-hearted coop with UN.

Davis

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[1] Repeated for information to Damascus, Beirut, and London.

[2] *Ante*, p. 768.

[3] *Supra*.

674.531/7-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, July 20, 1951—noon.

66. Embtel 33, July 13 [1] also 59 [2] and 60, July 20.[3]

FonMin contrasted today forthright attitude US Govt in sponsoring resolution condemning Israel with what appeared to him to be its reluctance and hesitation to take clear-cut position on action Egypt in obstructing Suez Canal traffic. Believe his remarks were prompted by report from Eban on recent conversations New York and Washington which Sharett found far from encouraging. He expressed view that by failure to sponsor resolution, or by merely refraining from commenting, US may encourage and imply tacit acceptance of pernicious Egyptian doctrine that state of war still exists and that it has right to interfere with international traffic ways.

FonMin referred to press story yesterday from Cairo that Egypt prepared permit passage of tankers but only under certain conditions (that Israel give undertaking products wld not be used in aggressive war against Arab States and that some kind of international board on which Egypt wld be represented be set up to protect interests Arab countries). Sharett said it wld be easy for Israel to give such assurances since it contemplates no aggressive action, but idea of board unacceptable. He feels moreover principle involved shld not be compromised. He said once more it was difficult for him to reconcile our active line on Huleh with apparently negative one on present case, that he felt failure of powers to take stand on such important principle wld be a "smashing blow to whole edifice of armistice agreements". He concluded with comment that Egypt cld hardly say its interference with waterway to Akaba was other than military.

Comment follows.

DAVIS

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[1] *Ante*, p. 767.
[2] Dated July 20, p. 785.
[3] *Supra*.

74.531/7-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

ECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, July 20, 1951.

67. For attention McGhee. Comment on Embtel 66, July 21 [*20*] [1] lso 60, July 20 [2] and Deptel 49, July 19.[3]

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[1] *Supra*.
[2] *Ante*, p. 786.
[3] Not printed. (674.84A/7-1951) It transmitted the text of the British draft esolution on Suez restrictions which is printed as an annex to US/S/1794, uly 12, p. 765.

Emb reiterates opinion expressed Embtel 33, July 13[4] to effect US can ill afford fail take forthright stand on Suez question. After reading UK draft resolution Deptel 49, feel we have much to gain and little to lose in ME and world by co-sponsorship and clearcut support resolution and important principles involved.

As to relations with this country, I believe we shld not delay in making clear our views re effect its actions have on chances for making peace in ME. Sharett has expressed his views bluntly but fairly, this time it is Israel's surprise at our delay in taking definite stand on Suez question. Consider it important speak with equal candor on subject reftels. If Israel's conduct so [*in?*] Huleh dispute and other matters is regarded as so unsatisfactory as to represent danger to effectiveness of UN in maintaining peace in ME, and color our whole attitude toward Israel, the time has come for plain speaking. If Dept concurs, I recommend I be instructed to leave govt here in no doubt re nature of and reasons for US displeasure. In this connection wld appreciate having urgently a carefully documented statement of points in Huleh and other matters in which US and UN regard Israel's conduct unsatisfactory.

It is believed further that to tell Eban alone will not be sufficient. Such action wld probably lead to renewed habile self-justification and be only partially effective. Parallel action here is considered important if we are to achieve best results and protect standing of Emb. Believe my position here will be seriously prejudiced if I fail to give ample and clear forewarning before this govt again be confronted by adverse decisions re its actions in Huleh and other matters for which it has not prepared its public.

Wld appreciate Dept's comments soonest since above considered very urgent in view reaction to development in Huleh question reported Embtel 60, July 20.

DAVIS

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[4] *Ante*, p. 767.

974.5301/7-2051 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 20, 1951—7:12 p. m.

127. Re Suez, Deptel 43 of July 19.[2] We are concerned over several aspects of Suez matter which we bring to Dept's attention as meriting consideration.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv; repeated for information by air to Ankara, Jidda, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] *Ante*, p. 783.

It seems to us that canal and other restrictions practiced by Egyptians are so inextricably bound up with larger NE and ME problems that action on them must be considered in light of over-all issues. We understand desired result, but result toward which we are heading is not clear to us since Cairo's 62 of July 18,[3] as well as opinions of Turks, French and other dels here indicate probability Egypt will not heed SC request for dropping of restrictions. Fawzi (Egypt) made very clear his govt had delicate problem with Egyptian people over question of country's sovereignty. Govt of Egypt could probably not accept any council action of coercive nature (our tel 108, July 18).[4] This in addition to what fears Egypt may have of Israeli expansionism.

Further to this considerable factor there are at least 2 others we should note. One is that, as indicated mytel 122 of this morning,[5] there is increasing uncertainty that UK draft res will obtain majority. In any case our maximum effort will be necessary to swing balance with members such as Turkey or China to obtain majority, assuming, as we possibly should not do, that Netherlands del instructions to support British draft, as amended by UKDel, hold. We question whether US should be thus forced into lead. Deptel 43 of July 19 in para 5 assumes UK will continue take lead. Jebb yesterday in his emphasis on importance of US co-sponsorship clearly implied UK unable swing it without our "strong cooperation", which is a euphemism for initiative:

We assume that if draft res does not have assured majority, SC debate on substance of res should be avoided if possible. Confirmation this assumption is requested.

The other factor is fanatical nationalism manifested in assassinations of Riad el-Sol and King Abdullah,[6] which we take to be manifestations of wide-spread Arab hostility to West stemming from past history and creation of Israel. We wonder whether strong US role in council action against Egypt will not further stimulate this nationalist reaction.

We should probably add our view that Egypt may have its problem with UK as much in mind as its situation vis-à-vis Israel. Fawzi has warned that this will inevitably come up if Suez restrictions are considered by SC and it may be that the latter will not be soluble without some attention to the former.

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[3] See footnote 2, p. 772.

[4] *Ante*, p. 780.

[5] Telegram 122 from New York, July 20, not printed, reported on separate conversations with Bebier, Sarper, Quevedo, and Tsiang on the subject of Suez (974.5301/7-2051).

[6] The former Premier of Lebanon, Riad el-Solh, was assassinated in Amman on July 16 following a visit to Jordan as King Abdullah's guest. King Abdullah was assassinated on July 20 in Jerusalem; for documentation, see pp. 977 ff.

Assuming that our immediate objective is to get restrictions lifte and taking into account bearing of above circumstances on methods o so doing, we feel that early council action on a res is not best approach either to Suez matter or to over-all problem. Following launching o SC debate on Israel complaint and Egyptian reply, we should like t see further and intensified diplomatic efforts, including USUN talk with Fawzi (Egypt) pursuant to his offer of cooperation reported i ourtel 108, in effort to develop possibilities of action outside of SC If results are not visible within two weeks or so council could mee again to consider appropriate action, whether adoption of a res, o making use of UN methods of peaceful settlement such as appointment of conciliation commission (possibly on UNCFI lines) or o rapporteur under rule 28 as conciliator or mediator. If necessary, following effort of one of these two, arbitration might be tried along lines of March 30 res on Kashmir. Door would thus be kept open and Egyp would not be forced into position of intransigence.

A logical selection for rapporteur if this move should be tried would be Muniz of Brazil. His personal qualifications, his country's neutral position, taken together with disqualification for one reason or other of most other SC members, practically narrows choice down to him.

With situation created by such council move, US would be free t exercise informal good offices behind the scenes, without constraint o Egypt imposed by public coercive aspects of precipitate SC action.

Dept comments foregoing urgently requested, since I have agreed t see Jebb and Lacoste Mon eve for definitive discussion.

GROS

320.2 AA/7-2351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, July 23, 1951—4 p.m

68. Rapun 190. From Bergus. Summary Blandford conversations a reported AdCom July 21:

1. Saw Syrian Prime Min eighteenth. Prime Min opened by stressing importance preservation right to repatriation and compensatio Blandford expressed hope formula cooperation might be found whic wld implement Feb Arab league decision without raising politic questions. Prime Min asked reintegration program be kept separat general economic development because: (*a*) Syria does not want re econ benefit from refugees; (*b*) for political reasons Syria prefers be econ development for own citizens; (*c*) benefits econ development program wld come too slowly alleviate refugees' present plight. Blandfor said programs need not be linked. Prime Min at first did not accep Blandford view refugee program needs broad discussion and coopera-

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[1] Repeated for information to Damascus.

tion other Arab States. Prime Min said projects peculiar each country and multilateral approach unnecessary. Later indicated some agreement necessity broad approach. Prime Min said Syria willing study projects to reintegrate all refugees presently in country. (Estimated PRA pilot projects submitted two months ago too small for serious consideration.) Stated Syria prepared in principle accept refugees from elsewhere, e.g. Lebanon. Asked PRA not to restrict proposals to agriculture; many refugees had urban skills and needed opportunity industrial employment.

Comment: Seems regrettably obvious present Syrian Govt unprepared take firm steps in direction participation over-all program envisaging final solution refugee problem. Govt will probably continue stalking tactics. Syrian preoccupation "public opinion" demonstrated by later Prime Min statement to press reporting only Prime Min's insistence on repatriation. Recent political assassinations will not make Syrian politicians any bolder. Return Qudsi govt to power might help but PRA will probably have to await full effect pressures other Arab States particularly Egypt.

2. Lebanese President on twentieth assured Blandford deep Lebanese interest and full support PRA program. Lebanon prepared approach problem in manner achieve total solution and to work with other Arab Govts this end. President happy PRA now more dynamic, stated it was "too conservative" in past. Stressed Lebanon's inability absorb large number refugees but stated Leb wld ultimately accept "symbolic" number refugees of Lebanese origin. Agreed necessary relationship reintegration and general economic development.

[Bergus]
BRUINS

974.5301/7-2051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1951—7 p. m.

49. Dept appreciates thoughtful analysis urtel 127 Jul 20.[2] In reaching decisions contained in Deptel 43 Jul 19[3] Dept gave most careful thought to broader implications SC consideration Suez Canal problem in relation to stability and security in NE and recognized that unpleasant prospects and risks (Deptel 15 Jul 7)[4] were involved (which may have now increased to some degree as result of assassination Abdullah and Solh). We have always preferred that Suez restrictions be settled through normal dipl means and indeed we are still endeavoring through Emb Cairo to achieve that end. However, if Egypt Govt does not give tangible evidence in very near future

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Stabler and Ludlow; signed for the Secretary by Hickerson; repeated to London, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Paris, and for information to Jidda, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman.

[2] *Ante*, p. 788.

[3] *Ante*, p. 783.

[4] The same as telegram 40 to Cairo, July 7, p. 753.

that it shares our preference, we cannot see how SC action can b
postponed much longer, unless of course reported lack of support fo
UK res continues. We feel that in cases where violence is being don
to Armistice Agreements, either in spirit or letter, and where S
action is unavoidable, failure on our part to face up to issues can onl
have most damaging effect on integrity Armistice Agreements and ou
policy of impartiality. In addition price of Arab friendship on thes
terms wld seem high.

It shld, therefore, be clear that while we are not anxious for earl
or even any, SC action, we are not willing exert pressure postpon
such action if no legitimate reason exists for so doing.

We shld know in next few days whether Egypt Govt has any in
tention to "settle out of Court," but in meantime we must continu
assume likelihood SC debate some time in the next several weeks. R
this, reported lack of support for UK res poses most important prob
lem. Deptels 17[5] and 43 emphasize that we do not intend to take lea
in SC debate and we see no reason to change that pt of view. We hav
however, indicated disposition to co-sponsor UK res provided certai
conditions are accepted, and once we have settled with UK, and pre
sumably Fr, on these conditions, additional support for UK re
likely to be attracted (we assume that since we have not yet agree
with UK, Turkey, China and others not yet aware of our decision r
co-sponsorship).

In essence we presume that calling of SC mtg now depends on (1
whether or not dipl approaches succeed and, (2) mustering by UK
of support for its res. At this pt answers to these questions are un
known but if response to (1) is negative and (2) positive we wld no
be inclined to discourage calling a mtg even under US presidency.

In our view best time for SC to discuss Suez question wld be whe
Riley submits his report on Huleh wherein he wld presumably discus
Israel non-compliance with May 18 res. It is understood report ma
be made about Aug. 15. These two items discussed at same time wl
demonstrate effectively US impartiality and basic concern over en
forcement of armistice system. This procedure might also lessen possi
bility accusation US–UK requiring Egypt comply with intent o
Armistice Agreement while ignoring Israel noncompliance May 1
res.

We feel that once SC debate has commenced it shld be carried
through to conclusion with only brief delay if settlement outside o
SC appears likely. Resort to methods of settlement such as Concilia-
tion Commission, *rapporteur* or mediator wld seem undesirable once
SC action has begun but resort to some device might be necessary. Re
expedient of UNCFI procedure Dept believes that US wld run risk

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[5] Dated July 9, p. 756.

of being Israel's nominee which wld compromise our position of impartiality. Resort to Kashmir arbitration procedure also risky as yet not tested re likelihood any pts between parties cld be settled prior to obligatory arbitration. Re *rapporteur*, if UK prepared to accept possibility delay and no concommitant guarantee of solution of problem, resort might be made to appointment such with short stipulated time wherein to report to SC.

Dept reiterates its view that US position in SC debate shld be based primarily on enforcement spirit and intent of Armistice Agreement with secondary attn being paid to adverse effect restrictions on our interests. Our attitude wld be governed by our understanding of the facts in the case and our desire to enforce Riley's and MAC's position and wld be consistent with our previous pronouncements in SC re Pal problem.

While we recognize there is chance Egypt might not comply with SC res calling for raising of restrictions we do not consider that our position shld be predicated on this assumption. Consequently, we are not prepared enter into discussions on sanctions question now.

ACHESON

785.00/7-2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Barrow)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1951.

Subject: Future of Jordan.

Participants: Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Meir Shalit, First Secretary, Embassy of Israel
G. Lewis Jones—NE
John A. Waldo—NE
John R. Barrow—NE

Discussion

Mr. Eban opened the conversation by saying that apart from profound shock, the initial reaction of the Israeli Government to the assassination of King Abdullah was one of some concern for the future. Israel had entered into an Armistice Agreement with Jordan on the basis of its respect for the integrity of King Abdullah and on the understanding that there would be a certain balance between the military forces on either side of the border. This situation would be radically changed if Jordan were to be incorporated into a "great sprawling Iraq" with which Israel had no Armistice Agreement and which had shown itself to be very hostile toward Israel. If any such merger were imminent, the pressure exerted by the Revisionists in Israel would be greatly intensified. Israel would be somewhat less fearful of incorporation of Jordan into Syria because it had armistice arrangeme with Syria, but believed that for the present the status of Jor should not be changed. It was conceivable that some day when political climate in the Near East improved, Israel would be abl acquiesce to some form of an Arab Union taking place, but fr Israel's point of view any step in that direction now would premature.

Mr. Jones asked Mr. Eban whether he was personally sold on thesis that unification of Jordan with any other Arab state wo necessarily impose a greater security threat to Israel. It was possi he thought, that there would be so many internal problems in bring about a true coalescence, that there would be no question for quite s time of such a state seeking to attack Israel. Mr. Eban said he fea that one of the prime motivations for a merger of the Arab St would be the hope of bringing stronger pressure to bear against Isr

Mr. Barrow remarked that assuming, for the sake of argumen peaceful union of Iraq and Jordan were brought about it would s to be the normal procedure for Iraq to assume all of Jordan's in national obligations, which would presumably include the Armis Agreement.

The discussion then turned to speculation as to who was responsi for Abdullah's assassination. Mr. Eban said that he did not think rumors that the ex-Mufti was involved could be discounted. It an unfortunate fact that nearly every Arab leader who had dealt w Israel in the Armistice negotiations had been assassinated—Nokra in Egypt, Zaim in Syria, Riad Solh in Lebanon, and now Abdull He said these assassinations did not all spring from the same sou and the motives no doubt went beyond the mere fact that all of th leaders had had dealings with Israel, but this striking coincidence it was a coincidence, would undoubtedly be a strong deterrent to other Arab leader dealing with Israel.

Mr. Barrow said that he admitted that the assassination of Abdul made the prospects for Palestine settlement bleaker than ever wondered whether there might not be a bare possibility of some g bits being developed in the present situation that could be used turn the present tragedy to advantage in bringing about a peace settlement.

Mr. Eban said he thought that the only way the Arabs could brought to make peace was by the Great Powers bringing str pressure to bear, e.g., by the withholding of economic and milit aid. Mr. Jones noted that leaders in Syria were making political capi out of renouncing United States aid and he thought any pressure the kind Mr. Eban suggested would result only in a feeling of m tyrdom and produce the opposite effect desired. On the other hand, United States was trying to sell the "peace" line in virtually ev conversation it had with Arab representatives, and he thought it possible that some day the cumulative effect of these efforts would pay off.

Mr. Jones remarked that if Israel felt obliged to oppose incorporation of Jordan into another Arab state, it had a staunch ally in Egypt who was just as opposed to any other Arab state gaining power and influence which might threaten Egypt's hegemony in the Arab World. Perhaps now was the dramatic moment for Israel's making a unilateral "act of strength". The Arabs would all be expecting Israel to pounce on Arab Palestine or at least to play the dog-in-the-manger. If Israel would cross them up by taking a tack in the opposite direction with some "tissue-knitting" gestures, such as, for example, giving Egypt a free-way across Israel territory to the other Arab States, the wind might be taken out of the sails of those Arab leaders who claimed Israel could never be a "good citizen" of the Near East.

Mr. Eban remarked that the fallacy in Mr. Jones' reasoning was that it contained no element of reciprocity. He was sure a rather imposing list of practical "tissue-knitting" concessions could be drawn up and set off against concessions of parallel value to be made by the Arabs. However, Israel could not be expected to make unilateral gestures without some reciprocal benefit.

Mr. Jones said it was the unilateral nature of the act which was important if Israel was to gain goodwill from it. Although admitting that Mr. Eban's approach was the orthodox one, it was obvious that up to now it had not worked. So long as Israel gave the impression that it had an inferiority complex and had to trade off each little advantage for some reciprocal advantage, he felt the Arabs would continue to be intransigent. On the other hand, if Israel adopted the attitude that it was a strong state that was going to exist for a thousand years and that it could therefore afford to take "acts of strength", the Arab psychology might be significantly changed.

Mr. Eban said that he appreciated this argument, but it was nevertheless a fact that Israel was pressed in by its larger Arab neighbors and said he thought Mr. Jones should put himself in the position of an Israeli leader trying to defend a unilateral gesture before the Knesset. The members of the Knesset would inevitably want to know what benefit the Israelis had derived from their gesture since the desire for a *quid pro quo* was a normal attribute of human nature.

Mr. Jones said that he thought it possible that Mr. Eban had indeed put his finger on the fallacy of his argument, namely that it would take a "super-Israeli" to carry out the policy. Nevertheless, he thought the effect of allowing an Egyptian leader like Salaheddin to drive through Israel on a free-way to Amman or Damascus to attend an Arab League meeting (even though the purpose of the meeting should be to condemn the Israelis) should be considered in the light of what a strong talking point it would be in endeavoring to convince people of

the Arab World that Israel's announced intentions of being
neighbor were genuine.

Mr. Shalit remarked that he thought unilateral acts of str
Israel's part would increase Israel's prestige in the rest of th
but doubted that the Arabs would interpret it the same wa
lieved the Arabs would think it a sign of weakness and an in
that the Arab economic boycott of Israel was having a tellin
This in turn would only encourage the Arabs further to tig
boycott. Mr. Jones agreed that this might be the snap reac
thought the Arabs would start to wonder if the policy was co
The concessions involved would not be very great; Israel co
full security precautions, and if the policy didn't work, th
sions could later be withdrawn.

The discussion ended with Mr. Eban's asking the estimate
present as to how the death of Abdullah would affect the
attitude toward Jerusalem. Israel's opposition to internation
of Jerusalem had been strategically less important than Jord
if a new Jordan regime were to take a weaker stand on the
he wondered what the outcome might be. In after thought
that there were some concrete economic and financial reas
any Jordan Government would tend to oppose internationa
and he supposed that Abdullah's death would not affect the
greatly. In this, those present concurred.

974.531/7-2251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 24, 1951–

116. For Amb from McGhee. Wld it help you re Deptel 87
(Embtel 88 Jul 22)[3] if I were to put raising restrictions t
Counselor here (Amb unfortunately absent on West Coast)
friends of Egypt recall Egypt's high role in formation UN
like prospect Egypt being hailed before SC for restrictions
Do little if any harm to Israel; *b*) Exacerbate Anglo-Egypt r
c) Have resulted protest most maritime powers; and, *d*) Co
to instability in area?[4]

I might make pt that Egypt's voluntary compliance with
Riley's special comite decision before pressed to do so by SC

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Stabler and G. L. Jones and signed for the
by Mr. McGhee. Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and New York
air to Jidda, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman.

[2] *Ante*, p. 781.

[3] See footnote 4, p. 782.

[4] In telegram 106 July 26, not printed, Ambassador Caffery answ
question in the affirmative (974.531/7-2651).

as model to world including Israel of proper UN spirit and wld win Egypt internatl acclaim.[3] [McGhee.]

Acheson

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[3] On July 25, Ambassador Caffery reported that Salaheddin had again expressed the hope that means would be found to end the Suez restrictions controversy without bringing it to the Security Council. Salaheddin stated that the United States, and only the United States, could take effective and pertinent action if it desired to do so. Caffery reiterated to Salaheddin that the only means to accomplish this would be to abolish the restrictions. The latter again replied that Egypt could alleviate restrictions considerably but could not abolish them. (Telegram 98, not printed, 974.531/7-2551)

974.531/7-2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, July 25, 1951—8 p. m.

101. If object suggested Security Council proceedings (Deptel 104 July 23)[2] is to obtain dropping of Suez restrictions, my opinion is that they will not be successful because Egypt enthusiastically backed by all Arab countries will probably not accept an adverse Security Council decision.

If there is some other object I wld appreciate being informed.

I assume I need not emphasize that US co-sponsorship wld involve a definite worsening I repeat definite worsening of US-Arab relations, which in Egypt have taken a change for better, and we wld be blamed more than the Brit; also it wld involve strengthening Arab countries neutralist attitude in connection with differences between US and the Iron Curtain.

Caffery

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[1] Repeated to London and New York.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the text of telegram 127 from New York, July 20, p. 788.

357.AC/7-2651

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1951.

Subject: Letter to Ambassador Palmer, United States Representative on the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission.

Background:

NEA and UNA have become increasingly concerned over the inactivity and decreasing effectiveness of the Palestine Conciliation

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow.

Commission in fulfilling the duties assigned to it by th
Assembly and the Security Council. We believe that at leas
effort should be made by the Commission to carry out it
prior to the Sixth General Assembly, particularly in the li
present situation prevailing in the Near East. We are propos
fore, that the Commission consider at its forthcoming
Geneva the possibility of requesting the Arab states and Isr
in Istanbul with the Commission. At the conference the C
would attempt to have the parties agree upon as many of
enumerated in the letter as possible.

Since Ambassador Palmer must assume the leadershi
plans for the Commission, we believe that it would be of g
toward this end if you would sign this letter to him as bei
of an instruction to him. We also believe the possession of
would give effective assistance to Ambassador Palmer in de
his colleagues. Finally, we believe that whether the conf
ceeds or fails this letter would enhance our record in ha
Palestine problem.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter.

Concurrences:

UNA NEA

Attachment:

Letter to Ambassador Palmer.[2]

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[2] For text of the letter as sent on July 27, see p. 799.

974.531/7-2051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 26, 195

76. Dept's attitude toward Suez question (urtel 67 Jul
pressed recent Deptels based on Dept's views intrinsic mer
and not from dissatisfaction Israel record re compliance SC
Dept has however pointed out to Israel reps that clean hand
situation wld strengthen Israel's position on Suez. While
cerned over Israel's noncompliance Huleh res, we do not
formal representations this matter until Riley has submitte
report. Dept understands Riley wishes postpone submission
until after Israel elections order avoid possibility Huleh i

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Waldo and Ludlow. Repeated for informat
York.

[2] *Ante*, p. 787.

used as polit football in election campaign. After submission Riley report Dept plans instr you take lead re Huleh, and Dept will backstop with Eban. Meanwhile, you shld stress informally to Israel Auths on appropriate occasion importance Israel's full compliance with SC res May 18.

Re Embtels 59 and 60 Jul 20,[3] US assumes Israel will comply with this request Chief of Staff in accord SC res May 18, which states SC considers it inconsistent with objectives and intent Armistice Agreement to fail respect requests Chairman MAC as they relate to his obligations under Art Five.

ACHESON

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[3] *Ante*, pp. 785 and 786.

357.AC/7-2651

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Geneva[1]

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1951.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR PALMER: The Department has given careful consideration to the problems confronting the Palestine Conciliation Commission in its task of carrying out the instructions it has received from the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Department has reviewed the Commission's activities since its creation by the General Assembly in 1948, in light of the present situation in the Near and Middle East and has been greatly assisted in its deliberations by the reports it has received from the United States Delegation to the Commission. We have been seriously concerned with the fact that up to the present the Palestine Conciliation Commission has not made a more significant contribution to the settlement of the problems dividing the countries of the Near East and we firmly believe that the Commission has an obligation imposed upon it to seek solution of the problems and difficulties involved in the Palestine situation. The Department has concluded that at an early meeting of the PCC you should advocate new and more vigorous efforts by the Commission, which, as a result of its wide experience, is in the best position to deal with the present situation. In this connection the Department has given careful consideration to the views and concern of the Governments of France, Turkey and United Kingdom.

I should like to outline for your guidance in your discussions with your colleagues on the Commission the steps which the Department feels the Commission might now undertake:

1. The Department of State believes that the mandate of the General Assembly to the Palestine Conciliation Commission is of such

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. G. L. Jones, Barco, and Ludlow.

a nature as to require a more authoritative and direct role on the part of the PCC than it has heretofore assumed. The nature of the problems with which the Commission must deal necessitates in our opinion a procedure based upon the Commission's authority to mediate between the various governments concerned. The Department believes that the experience of the past two years should convince Israel and the Arab States that the United Nations body created for this purpose by the General Assembly is best fitted for this function.

2. The assumption of the role of mediator in the matters dividing the governments concerned presupposes the necessity for negotiations as envisaged in the various resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, particularly the resolution of December 18, 1950. The Department is of the opinion that the PCC might decide that the time has come when a conference for this purpose should be called.

3. The Department believes that such a conference should be for the purpose of discussing and suggesting solutions for specific problems including the repatriation of refugees, territorial adjustments, compensation, the release of blocked accounts and other important subjects such as unsolved problems in the Jerusalem area and the use of the Jordan waters. Specifically, the Commission might put forward suggestions based on the following considerations:

> *a*) A multilateral non-aggression declaration or pact to be entered into between Israel and the individual Arab states on the initiative of the Commission might greatly reduce tensions in the area and produce an atmosphere conducive to the solution of individual problems.
>
> *b*) An approach to the problem of repatriation might start with the selection of those classes of refugees whose repatriation could be considered by Israel as beneficial to its economy. Likewise the return of selected groups of property owners for residence and resumption of control of their property might obviate some of the larger compensation claims.
>
> *c*) The agreement of Israel and the Arab States on the principle of compensation and the approximate total amount might advance the possibility of ultimate payment. Similarly the announcement of Israel's agreement to proposals for a practical solution of the compensation problem might provide the PCC with a talking point for the Arab States' relaxation of trade and other restrictions.
>
> *d*) An agreement to accord the Mixed Armistice Commission greater scope in the handling of current *ad hoc* problems might greatly improve day to day relations. A PCC-fostered agreement between the parties for the elimination, partition, reduction o redelimitation of the demilitarized zones, or the definition of the armistice lines or segments thereof, as *de facto* national boundaries pending final settlement, might bring the parties appreciably closer to a final peace.

4. The Department hopes that if the PCC decides to undertake the more direct and formal approach of exercising its mediation functions within the framework of a conference between Israel and the Arab States, results may be achieved of mutual benefit to the parties concerned. In response to the Commission's request, the United States wil be prepared to lend all appropriate diplomatic support for the convening of such a conference. The Department appreciates the fact tha

all of the specific problems which at present divide the parties may not be susceptible of immediate solution but believes that if one or more of these outstanding problems were settled satisfactorily this would be a much needed contribution to peace and security in the area.

5. It would be appreciated if you would inform the Department as soon as possible concerning the results of your consultations with your colleagues in order that adequate time may be permitted for consideration of such future dispositions as may be necessary by the next General Assembly.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

974.5301/7–2751 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 27, 1951—5:53 p. m.

153. Re Suez. With Israeli and Egyptian first statement on record[2] and SC mtgs begun, we think next step to be taken with view to developing case along lines preferred by US should be frank talk ourselves alone with Fawzi. Such occasion will present itself Monday, July 30, when Gross lunches with him. In telecon which resulted in this date, Gross told Fawzi we had in mind trying to find out what specifics Fawzi could develop re recent rumors of Egyptian proposals or intentions. Fawzi indicated that he would be prepared to go into this at lunch.

We think operations in NY carried out by UK and French as well as ourselves can, unless Caffery is engaged in a delicate one in Cairo which might be prejudiced by talks here, be utilized to get across to Egyptian Govt beyond doubt and wishful thinking what and how firm our position is. We should like to tell Fawzi (*a*) we are in no doubt re merits of case and want restrictions entirely dropped; (*b*) question is how to get them lifted; (*c*) we are Egypt's friend and would hope it can spare itself the blow to its prestige of SC res of nature we are talking over with British and French (summary of which we would communicate to Fawzi); (*d*) has Fawzi any specific proposals to this end?

Jebb has engagement to see Fawzi Monday afternoon. French have instructions to press for intensive diplomatic explorations and can be counted on to add their bit with Fawzi. Both they and Brit prefer tripartite approach to Fawzi and although Jebb has indicated to him, without our authorization, UK desire for joint US–UK–Fr discussions, we have not committed ourselves to join and do not propos to do so unless our separate talk with Fawzi suggests a joint approach clearly desirable.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, and Cairo.

[2] The Security Council discussed the matter of restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal at its 549th to 553d, 555th, 556th, and 558th meetings, on July 26, August 1, 16, 27, and 29, and September 1. See U.N. Docs. S/PV.549–553, 555–556, and 558.

Re talk with Fawzi, we should be greatly helped by Dept's views on following subjects before lunch Monday:

(1) Is Dept prepared to state flatly there is not and has not been state of war between Israel and Egypt;

(2) Is it our minimum demand that Egypt fully suspend restrictions or lighten them "to point of invisibility";

(3) In light of Fawzi's assumption in his SC statement yesterday that Egypt is at war and has full right to practice canal restrictions and carry out blockade measures even on high seas, could SC sig off from giving opinion on this point of such basic importance to armistice agreement system in general;

(4) Does fact that Caffery still may have initiative in Cairo have any restrictive effect on conversations with Fawzi in NY?

Finally, to achieve maximum impact on Egyptian Govt, we recommend identical approaches as above (points *a–d*) also by Dept to Egyptian Emb and Caffery to FonOff.

AUSTIN

974.5301/7–2751: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 27, 1951—8:25 p.m.

157. Re Suez: Eban (Israel) accompanied by Lourie and Rafael called at his request on Gross this morning. Ross and Maffitt were present. His stated desire was to exchange views in light of statements at SC table yesterday.

First and probably most important point Eban made was that Fawzi's statement expounded principle that state of war exists between Israel and Egypt and that Egypt therefore has right to take what measures it feels necessary in interest its own security including high-seas blockade operations. Eban's conclusions from this statement were two-fold:

(1) Regardless of what may be developed outside of SC looking toward solution this particular case, formal SC action is now unavoidable since Egypt has posed questions of principle. Matter is no longer just between Israel and Egypt, but between UN and Egypt. If UN acquiesces in Egypt's attitude, basis of armistice agreements system will be undermined. SC cannot "honorably and expediently" avoid facing this issue squarely.

(2) If Egyptian view is allowed to stand, Israel, which has based its policies on theory that hostilities are over and parties are working toward early permanent peaceful settlement, must revise these poli

cies and be prepared take measures corresponding to those taken by Egypt.

Eban said that underlying significance of Suez issue is that there is no disposition in Arab world to work toward peace with Israel. Therefore armistice agreements system must for indefinite period be basis relations Israel with Arab states. Therefore Israel wishes to reinforce system, and Arabs to take advantage of it to wage economic warfare in safety against Israel. Unless UN takes measures, Israel will suffer injustice and must look to protection its own interests.

For our part, Gross said very little doubt our own mind re merits of question and we have no reason to think Dept has altered view that failing successful settlement outside of Council we will move toward res which we are prepared to co-sponsor if agreement reached on it, which would request lifting of restrictions. At moment too early to say whether we will table a res; we have not talked with Fawzi and did not know what, if anything, Egyptian Govt may have in mind to permit desired result be achieved without formal SC request. We did not necessarily envisage passing directly from private talks to Council res since Council could choose from variety of approaches. Gross wondered what ideas Eban might have in mind re next Council action.

Eban said that on past experience it was obvious Egypt would stall if pressure lifted. Tactically therefore res should be tabled Wednesday. At each stage of progress toward final action Egypt had full opportunity correct its position. However, as he had said, it was difficult to see how Council could avoid some formal action to deal with Egyptian claim of existence state of war.

Gross was puzzled how we get desired result. Did Eban assume Egypt would comply with res? Eban replied affirmatively, Rafael adding res would give Egyptian Govt justification before its people for dropping restrictions. Gross thought there might be significance in nature of Fawzi's speech which avoided controversial elements such as degree Israeli compliance May 18 Res on Huleh. Did Eban think Suez might be settled in connection with solution larger issues?

Eban replied Arabs have ruled out such settlement. Furthermore Israel would deprecate any attempt to take Suez out of its "specific and definite context" and link it up with extraneous matters. He emphasized Suez problem should be faced squarely and settled without giving Egypt chance to delay further.

Gross said we were far from suggesting dilatory program and were simply wondering what action would be most effective. Eban said appearance of res on table would be most effective action.

Gross summed up saying impossible now to foretell what situation will be Wednesday and what action might be indicated. Therefore we wanted to keep position flexible. At appropriate time position could be taken re res or other procedure if indicated. Fact Egypt would know of US disposition to support res would constitute maximum pressure and it was questioned whether public appearance of res would tend to freeze situation.

Austin

974.530/7-2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT CAIRO, July 29, 1951—3 p.m.

122. I certainly have no objections to USUN (Usun unn July 27, 8 p. m.)[2] exploring every possible avenue with Fawzi and approve Gross-Fawzi luncheon talk Monday, and by all means go ahead with mtg suggested by Lacoste (mytel 121, July 28).[3] However, we must not lose sight of fact that Fawzi will only be able to act with approval of Egyptian FonMin whose reaction to any proposals will be based on fol factors:

1. Egyptian public opinion.
2. Belief that Egypt has at least an arguable legal case (with which some legal experts concur).
3. Egyptians wld not worry particularly about "blow to prestige" nor defying SC resolution and are a little skeptical about our official protestations of friendship.

For these reasons maximum which we may expect is "alleviation". Furthermore Egyptians believe that they can detect signs of confusion in our camp.

I remind Dept I talked yesterday on all this with FonMin.

Caffer

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[1] Repeated to New York and for information to London.

[2] The same as telegram 153 from New York, July 27, p. 801.

[3] Telegram 121 from Cairo, July 28, not printed, contained a report from the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs that Lacoste had suggested to Fawzi a "four representatives" meeting to discuss Suez restrictions (974.5301/7-2851).

974.5301/7-2751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 30, 1951—8 p.m

60. Re: Suez; re: Ludlow-Maffitt telcon.[2]

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Stabler (NE) and Ludlow (UNP); cleared by Mr. G. L Jones (NE) and Messrs. Crowe and Hewitt (L); authorized for transmissio and signed for the Secretary by Mr. Popper (UNP). Repeated for informatio to London, Paris, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Memorandum of telephone conversation not found in Department of Stat files.

Dept agrees that conversation with Fawzi along lines suggested urtel 153 Jul 27[3] wld be desirable and useful and suggests you be guided by Deptels 15,[4] 33,[5] 42,[6] and 52[7] (Deptel 53 Jul 25).[8] We feel that if Fawzi has something specific in mind regarding settlement this problem outside SC, now is the time for him to give details.

Re questions raised by urtel, fol are Dept's views:

1. Dept has not recognized that state of war has or does exist between Egypt and Israel and we presume Egyptians understand their allegation of state of war is completely contrary to their obligations under Charter, various SC resolutions on Palestine and Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreements. You are authorized to state this view to Fawzi, but it wld be better not to be drawn into argument over legal technicalities, re state of war and belligerent rights. Dept will forward brief enlarging on this point. While we wld prefer not to discuss this question in SC debate (Deptel 43 para one),[9] it may be that point raised in ur question 3 wld require some statement on our part, but it might be limited to general considerations rather than debate re legal theories involved.
2. Our minimum demand is that restrictions be suspended *in toto* or alleviated to point of invisibility. Re this, para 4 Deptel 42, Jul 19, shld be useful.
3. As Fawzi has raised this point of principle in SC, we agree that SC probably cannot remain silent on this point. If, however, as we anticipate, UK draft res is tabled, SC's opinion on this point cld be expressed through suitable amendment to res.
4. Since SC is now dealing with issue, we agree with Caffery that his consultations (Cairo 122 Jul 29)[10] shld not in any way restrict your conversations with Fawzi. We presume Caffery will continue his conversations if he deems it desirable and it might be your approach to Fawzi wld assist him.

Re ur final recommendation, Egypt Amb is absent from Wash and we doubt that conversation with Counselor wld serve useful purpose. As indicated, Caffery is already fol suggested line with Egypt FonMin who instructs Fawzi.

Our feeling is that for time being and certainly until results of talks with Fawzi are known that US-UK-Fr approach shld be left in abeyance. Additional reason for this is that US, UK and Fr have not yet reached agreement on res or on procedure.

Acheson

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[3] *Ante*, p. 801.
[4] The same as telegram 40 to Cairo, July 7, p. 753.
[5] The same as telegram 73 to Cairo, July 16, p. 772.
[6] The same as telegram 87 to Cairo, July 19, p. 781.
[7] The same as telegram 116 to Cairo, July 24, p. 796.
[8] Not printed.
[9] Dated July 19, p. 783.
[10] *Supra*.

974.5301/7-3051 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET
No. 205

CAIRO, July 30, 1951.

Subject: Foreign Minister's Threat To Invoke Article VIII of the Suez Canal Convention of 1888

In a recent conversation with the Foreign Minister he made the off-hand remark that the Egyptian attitude towards restrictions on the Suez Canal traffic to Israel was so strong, that if necessary "Egypt would invoke the portion of the 1888 Convention which called for the convocation of consultative committee of the signatory powers when the security of the Canal was threatened, and thereby bring Russia into the question".

The Foreign Minister was undoubtedly referring to Article VIII of the convention which reads as follows:

> "The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution. In case of any event threatening the security or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three of their number under the presidency of their Doyen, in order to proceed to the necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Government of the danger which they may have perceived, in order that that Government may take proper steps to insure the protection and the free use of the Canal. Under any circumstances, they shall meet once a year to take note of the due execution of the Treaty.
>
> "The last-mentioned meetings shall take place under the presidency of a Special Commissioner nominated for that purpose by the Imperial Ottoman Government. A Commissioner of the Khedive may also take part in the meeting, and may preside over it in case of the absence of the Ottoman Commissioner.
>
> "They shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation."

Whether or not the Egyptian government could get three of the signatory powers to call for such a meeting would appear to revolve around the question of what countries are regarded as the legal heirs to Austria-Hungary.

The British Embassy was not particularly concerned at this development when the matter was discussed with it. The feeling is that Article VIII has by usage become obsolete. Furthermore, if by some manipulation Egypt were able to convene such a meeting, Britain as a signatory would be in a position to point out that she had consistently brought to the attention of the "Khedivial Government" the restriction which existed to free navigation of the Canal.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Mattison.

Furthermore, the British Embassy has pointed out that commentaries on the subject assume that in accordance with diplomatic practice in meetings of this type any decisions taken would have to be unanimous.

On the surface, therefore, aside from possible legal obstacles which would render the article obsolete, there are many practical barriers which would make it difficult for the Foreign Minister to carry out his threat.

The Embassy would appreciate the Department's comment on the legal points involved.[2]

Jefferson Caffery

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[2] The Department's reply was contained in telegram 354 to Cairo, September 12, p. 855.

974.531/7–3051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY New York, July 30, 1951—9:27 p. m.

164. Re Suez: Gross and Ross lunched with Fawzi (Egypt) and Counselor Egyptian Mission to UN today on Fawzi's invitation. Gross outlined Dept's views as set forth in Deptel 60, July 30 (timeliness of which was very helpful) and Deptels referred to therein. Noting that views expressed were similar to those expressed by Dept to Counselor Egyptian Embassy and Amb Caffery to Egyptian FonMin, Gross emphasized para 2 of Deptel 60, namely our view that restrictions should be suspended *in toto* or "alleviated to the point of invisibility". He gave equal emphasis to para 4 Deptel 41[*42*], July 19 (Dept's No. 87 to Cairo).[1]

Fawzi said he thought he understood our position and he wanted to make sure that we understood the position of his govt. "Big stick" of an SC res or any other big stick would not accomplish purpose desired. We could not ask another govt to "commit suicide" nor would it do so if we were to make such an extreme demand. No Egyptian PriMin or FonMin would be able to face the Egyptian Parliament or the press or "go for a walk in the street" if he yielded to big stick tactics. Such tactics were reminiscent of Hitler and would be unbecoming to us. If effort made to apply such tactics, Egyptian people would be convinced that American "steam rollers" were once again being used. No one was more cooperative than the Egyptian FonMin and no one was more courageous than he in willingness to face Egyptian people with solution to problem such as Suez which might be far from perfect from Egyptian viewpoint. A coalition govt in Egypt necessarily composed of minorities would never face problem in same spirit of cooperation and courage.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 781.

We said we thought we appreciated dilemma in which Egyptian Govt found itself. On the one hand were domestic difficulties to which Fawzi referred; on the other hand Egyptian Govt appeared to be on what might be described as a "bad wicket" so far as UN members were concerned, particularly members of the SC. Appreciating their dilemma and motivated by friendliest feelings we wanted to help Egypt out of their present difficult situation if possible. Members of SC were of peace stability, and therefore to process of strengthening the area.

Reverting to earlier remarks, Fawzi repeated the effect Egyptian conviction that restrictions on tankers passing through Suez and destined for Haifa could not be lifted without very substantially strengthening Israel economically, politically and militarily; that, apart from other considerations, for Egypt to lift restrictions unilaterally would upset thereby balance of power in Near East; and that Egypt could not take this action without "compensation".

Following Gross' departure, Ross endeavored to get Fawzi to be more explicit. It seems fairly clear, in the first place, that Fawzi was using the term "compensation" not so much in the sense of payment for something as in the sense of restoring equilibrium. Fawzi indicated that since Israel would be strengthened economically, politically and militarily by lifting the restriction on the passage of tankers, "compensation" should be sought in the same three fields. He refused to be drawn out further than this, adding that Egypt wanted to be "as wise as water", to quote an ancient Far Eastern proverb. By this he seemed to mean that we should find some point, however small, on which we could agree as a starting point in our endeavor to unravel the problem before us.

In the course of the discussion Gross indicated without overemphasizing that we did not feel Egyptians had much of a case on the matter of state of war or belligerent status. Fawzi was not at all inclined to argue these points; in fact, he rather brushed them aside in the interest of discussing the matter as a practical political problem.

AUSTIN

974.531/7-3151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 31, 1951—6:33 p. m.

167. Re Suez. Gross and Ross lunched with Jebb (on his invitation) and Lacoste, Laskey present. Fawzi in separate conversations with Jebb and Lacoste yesterday apparently took almost precisely same

line as he took with us yesterday. Interesting variation as reported by Jebb was that Fawzi, in referring to possibility of lifting certificates required of shipmasters in transit through canal implied that shipmasters would not, of course, thereby be bound not to unload cargoes at Haifa. Jebb said this possibility had been mentioned to British Amb Cairo perhaps two years ago; British objection then as now on combination of legal and practical grounds. In mentioning this possibility to us yesterday Fawzi, saying that possibility had been brought to attention of AmEmb Cairo (he did not say when), indicated Egyptian Govt would naturally expect shipmasters would feel morally bound not to unload cargoes at Haifa.

As we had anticipated Jebb was inclined to take very skeptical and condemnatory line vis-à-vis Egyptian protestations desire to cooperate. Lacoste, on other hand, while professing skepticism was strongly inclined to take go slow line and manifested desire French Govt to play string out to end with Egyptians.

Referring to Fawzi's suggestions re alternative oil installations, Lacoste recalled that there had been alternative pipeline facilities running to Tripoli coast of Lebanon. He speculated, in context Iraqi interest Suez problem, whether Tripoli possibility should not more thoroughly be examined. We asked that he get more info on this aspect of matter which he promised to do.

We questioned in foregoing context whether in long-range interest of Atlantic community possibility of alternative oil installations (relative to Iranian and Haifa facilities) should not be explored. Both Jebb and Lacoste were noncommittal but Jebb, and Lacoste more so, seemed interested. Gross made clear that fundamentals our position remain unchanged, namely, that we felt maintenance of restrictions was wrong and that restrictions should be lifted at soonest possible time. Lacoste, and Jebb as well, of course agreed. Jebb was inclined to argue for tabling of res tomorrow; on other hand, Jebb, apparently impressed by weakness of voting situation in Council, was amenable to almost anything that would maintain some degree of momentum.

With regard to res we left no doubt we were inclined to co-sponsor and thought there should be no difficulty in working out agreement on text; only problem we foresaw was matter of timing. Lacoste, as yet without definitive instructions on text of res, felt it should not be tabled tomorrow. Jebb, remarking he probably should not say so, nevertheless said he would agree to "anything" in way of res we considered desirable, essential thing being, which might be accomplished in one short para, that we call upon Egypt to lift restrictions. Jebb expressed, without apparent conviction, however, that tabling of res would have effect on Egyptian Govt decision to lift restrictions. Lacoste was very strongly impressed, however, that Egyptians would not comply, at this time at least, with strong res. Jebb very readily agreed

with idea that res, once agreed upon text, might be shown
tians (and of course to Israelis) within next day or two prin
purpose of indicating to Egyptians probable end result of
unless Egyptian Govt meanwhile came through with more a
than had been forthcoming up to now.

Both Jebb and Lacoste readily agreed that tomorrow's
day's) mtg of SC should be essentially routine, opportun
given to Fawzi and Eban to restate their cases. Jebb may
structions to make statement; if he makes statement tomorr
be in broad, general terms. We explained that us being in P
we would probably follow precedents and give other members
cil opportunity to make statements before we spoke. Lacoste
initial statement France might make would be in general te

Jebb was somewhat intrigued with idea of Riley appeari
Council but readily yielded to Lacoste's objections, Lacoste
understood Riley did not want to appear on this case.

Lacoste rather strongly and Jebb very readily agreed
essentially routine mtg tomorrow and some days delay, next
well be appointment of Muniz as *rapporteur*. See ourte
July 31,[1] on present thinking of Muniz this subject.

Lacoste displayed some interest, and Jebb mildly so, in
French discussions with Fawzi. We pointed out disadvant
saw them: (*a*) Appearance of our being "suppliants", and
being on short tether without negotiating flexibility. We
dropped idea "tripartite" discussions, at least at this point.
Lacoste agreed most effective approach ensuing days would
be through Caffery to Egyptian FonMin.

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[1] *Infra.*

974.531/7–3151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (
the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY New York, July 31, 1951—

168. Re Suez: Muniz called Gross to ascertain our prese
re appointment of *rapporteur*. Although he had not yet r
structions from his govt, he expressed personal view that
should not be appointed unless (*a*) he were authorized to "
on the basic issues dividing the Arabs and Israel and (*b*)
some prospect of success in such efforts. He believed that we
expect a solution of the Suez issue by taking it out of cont
whole problem of Israel–Arab relations and applying a "

Gross explained US viewpoint that Suez question is in reality an issue of compliance with armistice agreement and that purpose of *rapporteurship* was to present Egypt with an opportunity to find a method of voluntarily complying with their obligations under the armistice agreement without formal SC action. Gross agreed with Muniz that we should not now decide question of appointing *rapporteur*, but we should within the next few days have a full exploration with him and other colleagues on the council re next steps.

Gross also gave to Muniz full account of discussions with Fawzi, reported ourtel 164 dated July 30, 1951.[1] Muniz gave impression of having second thoughts about putting his nose in a wringer, but agreed to full exploration of problem.

AUSTIN

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[1] *Ante*, p. 807.

974.5301/8–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

SECRET LONDON, August 1, 1951—7 p. m.

670. At conclusion my discussion on Iran with Morrison this morning, he took occasion to urge that US and UK stay in close step on problem Suez canal restrictions, reveal no hesitation or doubts to Egyptians about the case for abolishing restrictions and, in this connection, get on with SC action without further delay. He had felt obliged instruct Jebb make his statement in SC today and thought any delay in pushing SC action wld merely play further into Egypt hands. He did not mean we shld cease exploring possibilities of settlement short of SC action, but he did think US and UK efforts in this direction shld be closely coordinated and shld not deter decision by SC.

Brit are convinced that, in absence any practical proposals from Egypts and countless times they have already been approached on subject, they have no intention lift restrictions and are merely throwing sand in our eyes in pretending anything else. In Brit view, only thing likely budge Egypt at this point is knowledge that SC will act decisively. Brit inclination therefore is not to delay much longer in tabling UK res even tho full agreement on sponsorship may not have been reached. Brit do not think any other steps short of this, such as appointing *Rapporteur*, will get us anywhere.

GIFFORD

974.5301/8-151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, August 1, 1951—7:49 p. m.

178. Re Suez: Sarper gave Ross today summary long conversation he had with Fawzi yesterday. Fawzi gave Sarper essentially same story he gave Gross and Ross Monday with following significant additions:

1. Fawzi very explicitly and categorically said Egypt would not comply with SC resolution. Sarper thinks this is no bluff and is himself convinced Egyptians will not comply. Fawzi argued this would be first time Egypt had not complied whereas Israelis had many times failed to comply with UN resolutions. Moreover, US, UK, Netherlands as parties to dispute would not be entitled to vote; therefore resolution would be illegal.
2. Fawzi, re alternative oil refining facilities, spoke of Turkey as well as Egypt and Lebanon as alternative locations. He said setting up of alternative facilities was matter of 3 to 6 months; meanwhile, restrictions would be alleviated. He went further, however, indicating if assurances were forthcoming that alternative facilities would be established Egypt would abolish restrictions forthwith.

Ross gave Sarper full, frank exposé US present attitude and course: (*a*) Restrictions contrary at least spirit of armistice agreement and obstacle to peace and stability NE; (*b*) we did not agree argument state war, belligerency; (*c*) Egypt wrong and objective should be voluntary lifting restrictions soonest. We prepared co-sponsor resolution and working out details with UK and French dels. On arriving at agreed text would of course give to Sarper (he urged to be given text in time to get instructions; otherwise, no choice but abstain). We also thought we might give text to Fawzi (and Israelis) as fair warning; Sarper thought this good idea.

On question of *rapporteur*, Sarper informed UK FonOff against, French del favored, US position still reserved. (Coulson personal view that *rapporteur* idea might well serve useful purpose if time limit one week set.)

Sarper convinced and strongly expressed view that if solution can be found at all it can only be found outside SC. Reserved re *rapporteur* idea. If function only to report back to SC, no useful purpose. If get matter settled outside council, might be worthwhile. In any case minimum of 2 weeks necessary, taking into account (*a*) slowness communications between Cairo and Egyptian del here and (*b*) necessity Egypt consult other Arab States.

AUSTIN

.00/8-251

emorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

CRET [WASHINGTON,] August 2, 1951.

bject: Israel's Concern Re Peace With the Arabs and Other Matters.

rticipants: Mr. Theodore Kollek, Embassy of Israel
Mr. G. Lewis Jones, NE

scussion:

Mr. Kollek called on me today at his request and said that the occa-n for his visit was the fact that he plans to depart for Israel Au-st 4 and return to Washington about August 25. His visit was in lieu that of Ambassador Eban who has been detained by the Suez case in Security Council. Eban might visit Israel in September. Kollek d that he was anxious to have a first-hand picture of developments Israel following the election.

ections:

Regarding the Israel election, Kollek said that he believes that Mapai d the General Zionists should coalesce for a single purpose: i.e., to ree on holding direct elections and to set a date for new elections. He ke of the disabilities which the present system of proportional resentation subjected Israel.

ter Problems:

Kollek said that he had had lunch yesterday in New York with neral Riley (whose impartiality he praises), who had spoken in y gloomy terms of the situation in the Demilitarized Zone. Riley as the only solution a Regional Water Scheme in which Syria, panon, Israel and Jordan would participate; Riley saw no possi-ty of this happening in the foreseeable future, and according to llek, Mr. McGhee agreed with him.

Kollek said that he could not imagine anyone in Israel rejecting the a of a Regional Water Scheme: he wanted to know whether I, too, s doubtful regarding the practicability of such a scheme.

replied that such a scheme was the only one that made any sense, that I doubted that it would have any hope of success while Israel tinues to adhere to its "orthodox" approach. I said that the Arabs see no evidence of Israeli goodwill; consequently they will hold k from such a scheme. Kollek seemed to accept this.

Continuing along the line of the "unorthodox" approach, I told llek that I was most interested to hear that he had mentioned the Hamma Salient last evening to Mr. Jack Waldo as being something ch Israel might be willing to yield to Syria. I said that this (and right of Syrian fishermen to fish in the Sea of Galilee, which he

had also mentioned) were very small things but to me their sig
icance was the fact that Kollek had mentioned them at all; they v
the first indications that I had had that Israel might be prepare
give up anything to Syria.

Kollek said that he was not talking as an Israeli official but it
his personal belief, which he thought others in the government w
support, that a deal could be made with regard to el Hamma as
of an agreement involving the entire Demilitarized Zone. K
indicated that he thought Israel had "missed a bet" in refusing t
down with the Syrians recently. He favored the Israel-Syrian M
"which is really a political instrument," being staffed with For
Office officials from both sides. On this basis he believes somet
might be worked out under the aegis of the MAC.

I expressed the view that it would be too much to expect
Syrians to buy a "final peace settlement" at this time even th
agreement were reached regarding areas of jurisdiction in the
militarized Zone. The most that could be hoped for is that the pa
might agree upon lines of a part of a temporary *modus vivendi*
the full knowledge that these lines would eventually become
frontiers under a final peace settlement.

Diplomats vs. Soldiers

Kollek then turned to the question of the internal struggle in I
between the Foreign Office and the General Staff. He said Riley
mentioned this to him, and he had to admit that there was
foundation for the view that in Israel as well as elsewhere i
world soldiers and diplomats were not infrequently at odds.
ever, he thought these differences were much exaggerated and
time would show that the diplomats will come out on top. I said
as I understood the situation much depends upon the personal
of Ben Gurion who is the "giant" on the scene in Israel. K
agreed, but said that Ben Gurion is a Democrat and that he
of many instances in which he might have circumvented a decisi
the Cabinet which had gone against him. However, he had re
to follow any course except the democratic decision of the Cabine

The Arab State of Mind

Kollek asked me directly "Can you talk to the Arabs? Do
make sense? What are they thinking about? We, of course, c
talk to them, and our information is very poor regarding the
of mind of the Arabs".

I told him that I would reply with the utmost candor and
proceeded to paint a picture of Israel as seen from the Arab si
the line. I ended up with the generalization that fundament
Arab thinking is the belief that Israel possesses neither good
nor goodwill towards its neighbors and said that when we were

to cite specific instances supporting Israel's contention that they possess both, I was bound to say that, aside from the uniting of Arab families more than two years ago, I could think of no instance which would carry weight with the Arabs. I spoke of the dilatory and pettyfogging tactics of Israel in connection with compliance with the May 18 resolution and remarked that the overly-legalistic approach of Israel to this resolution was conclusive evidence to the Arabs that Israel intended to do what it wanted to do. I said it would be helpful in dealing with the Arabs to have a case in which Israel eschewed equivocation in its compliance. The Arabs felt they were intelligent enough to know the sense of a Security Council resolution—to understand it. By the time the Israel lawyers got through with a resolution it was something else.

It may have been Kollek's natural courtesy or that he was dissembling, but he gave me the impression of not only being grateful for my unvarnished sketch of Israel as seen by the Arabs, but to a degree concurred with regard to the poor manner in which Israel has complied with the May 18, 1951 resolution.

Ingathering of Exiles

At the close of the interview I asked Kollek to tell me frankly whether Israel planned to start the ingathering of 70,000 Jews from Iran along the lines of the ingathering from Iraq. I said that so far as I knew, the level of anti-semitism in Iran was not abnormally high and I thought the friends of Israel, including the United States, would not favor a deliberately generated exodus there.

Kollek replied that there was a school of thought in Israel which believes that when a nationalistic government of the Mossadegh type comes into power sooner or later they turn against their minorities and this has caused consideration to be given to the Iranian Jews. He did not believe, however, that efforts would be made to bring them to Israel unless the situation generally deteriorates. There could be no doubt that the need of the Roumanian Jews to come to Israel is far greater than the need of the Iranian Jews.

I opined that the Iraqi operation had been bad for Iraq. I said that I hoped the Iraqi Government would not disenfranchise the Jews who had elected to remain Iraqi citizens. Kollek argued that short range, Iraq may have lost some skills, but he thought that long range it is "better for a country to be homogeneous" as would be the case if all of the Jews left Iraq. I asserted that homogeneity of population is not always a good thing and pointed with pride to the fact that the United States is in no sense homogeneous. Kollek's only answer was "The United States is different."

357.AC/8-351 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Concilia
Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT GENEVA, August 3, 1951—n

109. Palun 422. USDel has today, Aug 2, concluded discuss
with Fr reps Marchal and Boisanger and principal secre
Azcarate of Dept's proposal for new efforts by PCC. We are ha
report there is full measure agreement that Dept's proposals are tir
and necessary if PCC is to make contribution to solving any Pales
problems or to contribute to stability in present uneasy situation
All are agreed present air of great expectation in area can be
talized on by prompt effort of this kind and hope our three
can coordinate promptly their dipl support for comm's action
reps have raised two questions concerning mtg place and Brit
tude on which Dept's guidance wld be most helpful.

(1) Fr feel it will be difficult persuade Arab govts to partici
in mtgs held Istanbul. Boisanger has pointed out that in recent
versation with Atassi, Syrian Amb Paris, Atassi spoke out ag
Turk initiative in area. Boisanger also recalled that when PCC
posed mtgs last year, Abdul Monem Egypt rep, stated flatly E
tians wld never meet in Turkey. Boisanger and Marchal re
Egypt as key to Arab acceptance. Fr reps, having talked with Fo
have therefore proposed Paris as best mtg place. They feel that hi
representation can be expected if Paris is chosen and that in
conference continued beyond Nov 6 no disruption of mtgs wld o
They also feel it most important that in course of conference
contact shld be maintained with Brit Govt and favor Paris for
reason. They feel Dept's other suggested mtg places wld create
munication difficulties for themselves as well as for Arab dels. T
Marchal reported that preliminary telephone conversations with
indicated FonOff was agreeable both to substance Dept's prop
and to Paris as mtg place. Boisanger has returned to Paris for
ther consultation and Marchal will follow him on Saturday. U
will meet at Quai d' Orsay with Fr reps on Tuesday to learn F
final decision.

(2) Prior to this time Fr reps hope for clarification of Brit att
toward Dept's proposals. They believe Brit opinion will greatl
fluence FonOff decision, and expect Fr. Amb London to make im
ate inquiries there. In order have full info for our conversations
Fr FonOff, we hope Dept can inform USDel both Geneva and
by Monday afternoon re Brit reaction.

Pending Fr FonOff decision, Fr and USDels have agreed on
of invitation to be telegraphed govts concerned, which it is hope

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[1] This is a reference to the projected convening of the Sixth Regular S
of the General Assembly of the United Nations at Paris on November 6

be sent by Aug 10. Accordingly suggested date for convening conference has been set at Sept 10. We have suggested to Fr reps and will suggest to Aras on arrival that comm not reconvene in Jerusalem prior to receipt of parties' acceptance or rejection our invitation in order avoid comms being involved in discussions with local auths of its proposals. Marchal had hoped make immediate tour of area in order acquaint himself with area and personalities, but has agreed postpone trip until immed after receipt of parties' final answers. He will not engage at that time, however, in discussion of business of proposed conference. FrReps recognize necessity for FonOffs of three govts represented on PCC to undertake gain parties acceptance.

Emb Ankara has informed USDel Aras arrives Geneva tomorrow third. We have scheduled mtg for immed after his arrival and will report promptly his reaction.

Fol is text proposed invitation as agreed with FrReps subj Aras' approval:

> "I have the honor to inform you that the UN PCC, mtg in special session in Geneva, has decided to invite the govts of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and the Govt of Israel to participate in mtgs with the comm to discuss solutions to the problems outstanding between Israel and the Arab states.
>
> "During the period fol the adoption by the UNGA of its res of 14 Dec 1950, the PCC has continued to seek solutions for problems arising out of the Palestine situation. In accordance with the res, the comm created its refugee office for the purpose of making practical arrangements for the solution of the refugee problem. The comm is ready to make a new effort to lend assistance to the parties in seeking solution of this and other questions outstanding between them. In the course of the proposed discussions, the comm will be prepared to exercise its mediatory functions by suggesting specific solutions to specific problems for consideration by the parties.
>
> "The comm invites the govt of (blank blank) to participate in these mtgs and to designate its reps. It is proposed that the conference be held in Paris beginning on 10 Sept 1951, and it is hoped that it will be possible for the comm to report the results of the conference to the next regular session of the UNGA, 6 Nov, 1951." [3]

[PALMER]

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[3] In Palun 423, August 3, identified also as telegram 115 from Geneva, not printed, Ambassador Palmer stated in part that Aras had agreed in principle with the Department's proposal and draft letter of invitation (357.AC/8–351).

683.84A/8-351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, August 3, 1951—2 p.

111. Pursuant to Deptel 76, July 26[2] I took occasion when calli
on DirGen FonOff Eytan at his request to mention informally imp
tance Israel's full compliance with SC May 18 res. Mention was m
of unfavorable impression created by Israel delay in initial com
ance with res and bad polit effect in Syria and elsewhere of stateme
at time over radio and in press to effect stoppage did not mean a
thing, was only a token and wld be for short period which
exactly specified. Such statements obviously prevented Israel from
riving any internatl polit advantage from work stoppages.

Eytan appeared to follow above line of reasoning but said his g
felt it had complied fully with May 18 res and other dictates UNT
(Incidentally FonOff advised that ltr of Col Taxis to Horowitz wh
was subject Embtels 59 and 60, July 20[3] was later withdraw
Eytan pointed out that Arabs removed from demil zone by Is
Govt had been given opportunity to say whether they wished to ret
and those so desiring had been returned. He added, however t
former residents who had fled to Syria are not being permitted to
turn, thus indicating no change in policy of continuing control of de
zone.

In conclusion he reiterated that his govt intends to cooperate f
with UN and believes it has complied with May 18 res. I made
attempt discuss details of compliance, which is matter between Is
Govt and UN, but warned against placing too much confidence in
lateral interpretations with which UN auths might not concur as
done prior to passage May 18 res.

Comment: Emb agrees it was wise postpone report on or discuss
of Israel non-compliance Huleh res until after elections as public bl
fully unaware any deficiencies in Israel's compliance and govt app
ently once more has fallen under spell of its own legalistic reasoni
It is believed accordingly that Israel Govt and public are in dange
repeating mistakes which led to May 18 res. If Dept and Gen Riley c
cur, it is recommended therefore that bill of particulars re respect
which Israel compliance with May 18 res is unsatisfactory shld
given to Israel FonMin before any report on subject is made pul

DA

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[1] Repeated to New York.

[2] *Ante*, p. 798.

[3] *Ante*, pp. 785 and 786.

800.413/8-351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 3, 1951—9 p. m.

105. For Ambassador only. White House under pressure send message [2] to World Zionist Congress Jerusalem,[3] but not disposed to do so because (1) private org (2) mtg outside US and (3) severe and unnecessary polit repercussions flowing from this act in Arab states. Such message might well retard Israel progress toward peace with Arabs. Dept presumes messages also being sought from UK, Fr and other govts. If this is case, Dept hopes it may be possible for you to act in concert with your colleagues, but in any event you shld send short innocuous message to Benj. Browdie, Pres., Amer Zionist Organization, over your signature in your capacity as Amer Amb but not on behalf White House or USG. Such message might relieve pressure here.

Urtel 108 Aug 2 [4] just recd. In light sit reftel wld message from you involve complications?

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. G. L. Jones and Waldo; cleared with Mr. Hassett at the White House.

[2] The source text bears the following notation: "Mr. Hassett wishes Amb Davis to send some sort of msg."

[3] The 23d World Zionist Congress met in Jerusalem from August 14 through August 30. Ambassador Davis had reported on July 31 that after consultation with his British and French colleagues in Tel Aviv, he spoke to the Chief of the American Section of the Israeli Foreign Office on the subject of invitations to the forthcoming Congress, suggesting that invitations to the opening session be extended to include consular representatives in Jerusalem, but not members of the diplomatic corps in Tel Aviv. (Telegram 104 from Tel Aviv, not printed, 800.413/7-3151)

[4] Telegram 108 from Tel Aviv, August 2, not printed, reported that the Jewish Agency had decided not to invite the Tel Aviv diplomatic corps to the Congress (800.413/8-251).

800.413/8-651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, August 6, 1951—4 p. m.

115. Re reaction FonOff to advice that Jewish Agency not invite diplomatic corps to opening of Zionist Congress in Jerusalem (Embtel 108 August 2), Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Chairman Amer Section Jewish Agency, discussed matter with me over weekend and expressed agreement wisdom of decision in view Jerusalem question and disposition Arabs exploit such things for propaganda purposes.

Apparently he had been in touch with FonMin Sharett who had told him Emb had taken matter up with Dept. I explained Dept had no objection acceptance invitation but left matter for local decision after consultation certain colleagues. Those consulted agreed with me that presence of dipl corps at Congress wld not be beneficial in view situation ME to interests of our respective countries, Israel or Congress itself.

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[1] Repeated for information to Jerusalem.

Comment: It is believed Dr. Goldmann will use his influence to prevent criticism anticipated by chief Amer section FonOff.

DAVIS

484A.118/8-651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Eban.

Participants: Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
Col. Chaim Herzog, Military, Naval, Air Attaché, Embassy of Israel
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Waldo—NE

The Ambassador called, accompanied by the Counselor and the Military Attaché, to have his picture taken with me in my office by a photographer of the *Saturday Evening Post* for use in an article on Mr. Eban which will appear in a forthcoming issue of that magazine. After the photographs had been taken, the Ambassador discussed the following subjects:

1. *Munitions Licenses for Israel:*

The Ambassador launched into a discussion on a subject which he had mentioned to me on several previous occasions; namely, the delay in the Department's approval of certain license applications for military equipment for Israel. The Ambassador decribed Israel's military preparations as only a fraction of those of the neighboring countries. He said that Egypt had an armaments budget of $200,000,000 and that Syria's was proportionately as great; that no other country in the Near East was threatened to the extent Israel was. It appeared to him that there was conflict between the Department's policy of license restrictions and its policy of mutual aid as set forth in the US Government's program.

I told the Ambassador that when I had discussed the situation with him on previous occasions I was not fully informed of all aspects of the problem. The licensing of military equipment for foreign countries was undertaken by an interdepartmental mechanism, on which the Munitions Division is the State Department representative. Our policy on arms shipments to the Near East is based on the Tripartite Declaration, which states that the countries of the Near East should receive arms for purposes of internal security and to play their part in the defense of the Near East. The Huleh disturbances, however, had appeared sufficiently alarming to warrant the temporary suspension of certain Israel license applications. There was therefore a definite connection between the Huleh situation and the temporary halt in the licensing of arms shipments to Israel. Subsequent to that time, a number of licenses had been approved. While I had not been able to study the problem fully, I believed that over a period of time the rate of license approvals would return to normal.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo.

The Ambassador said he was certain that there were no aspects of the Huleh situation which could warrant a belief that hostilities would be resumed. He said he hoped that Syria had received similar treatment. I told him that Syria's license applications were very few but that in so far as there were any, they had been suspended at the time of the incidents. I added that I did not understand what the Ambassador meant in his letter in referring to joint defense discussions with the United States.

The Ambassador replied that he had not intended this to be taken literally, but that Israel had been encouraged by General Marshall to put forward its ideas on its possible contribution to the defense of the Near East, although he knew there were no actual plans under consideration. I said that up until now we had no commitments in the area and no plans for forces there; that a mutual security program may be the basis for a new approach, but that there was no such approach at this moment. The British had primary responsibility there. The Ambassador said that with regard to Israel's arms request from the US, one aspect of the situation which should be borne in mind was that, while the US is not the only country from which Israel is able to buy arms, and quite apart from the availability of arms in the UK or France, Israel would like to establish a certain reciprocal dependence between itself and the US. The Ambassador said that Israel's proposals to the Department on Israel's possible contribution to the defense of the area and the suggestion that the Israel Director of Military Training should come to this country were made with this factor in mind. I said we appreciated this fact and we regretted that we do not yet have some more positive basis for assistance.

The Ambassador continued that the feeling in the Middle East was that, while guarantees by Britain and France were valuable, there would be a greater feeling of security if the US were associated in some way with these guarantees. I said our position was that we have so many commitments it was difficult to meet all the demands. Authorization to grant arms shipments to the Arab states and Israel would be a good basis for a new approach.

2. *Huleh Situation:* The Ambassador said that Israel objected to the continued holding up of Israel engineering plans for the Demilitarized Zone out of deference to the property rights of certain Arab landowners. He said that the May 18 Resolution was a two-way resolution and that the Mixed Armistice Commission should undertake to consider the Israel complaints of Syrian aggression. The Armistice Commission, however, had not met for several weeks. Another point of fact was that El Hamme had been absorbed completely into Syria's economy and the MAC should undertake to consider this question. The Ambassador pointed out that Riley had expressed a lack of satisfaction with Israel's compliance regarding the return of Arabs to the Demilitarized Zone and the policing regulations in the Zone. Israel desired to solve all the practical problems relating to the Demilitarized Zone. There were certain differences of juridical theory with regard to sovereignty in the area, but Israel would undertake to discuss this matter with Riley. The Ambassador had therefore written Riley a letter [2] on this subject on the instructions of the Israel Foreign Office. While Israel was perfectly willing to continue to deal with Riley here in the US, they would much prefer to negotiate with him in Israel. Without Riley's presence there it was very difficult to carry on negotiations. The Israel government had sent the Syrians a letter dated July 10 which it was understood only reached Syria last week. The Israelis considered, therefore, that only Riley had the necessary prestige to take up the issues on the spot.

I told the Ambassador that we were concerned with the slowness of Israel's compliance but were not in a position to judge the facts, and would therefore await General Riley's report. I expressed the hope that Israel would accept the advice of Riley and other UN authorities in the Commission and not try to rely on its own unilateral interpretations of the Armistice Agreement. Such attitude might prejudice Israel's chances on other issues on which Israel wants compliance, including the Suez question. The Ambassador said that Israel wished to comply, but did not wish to prejudice its legitimate interest in the Demilitarized Zone. I repeated that we would rely completely on General Riley in this matter, and told the Ambassador his problem was with the General, who, we hoped, would soon return to the field of operations.

3. *Suez:* The Ambassador then took up the question of the Suez and went over the points which he had reiterated on several previous occasions, concluding that it was clear to Israel that the SC should go forward immediately, since it was difficult to assume that Egypt would undertake any alleviation of Suez Canal restrictions without the

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[2] A copy of the letter, dated August 4, was contained in airgram A-11 to New York, August 10, not printed (683.84A/8-1051). Regarding the letter, see also the last paragraph of telegram 81 to New York, August 8, p. 824.

adoption of an SC resolution. The Ambassador expressed reasonable certainty that Egypt would comply with a resolution. I mentioned the fact that compliance with the resolution was not always a positive matter, but sometimes negative as the Ambassador knew. The Ambassador merely replied that he hoped that if it were possible to straighten out this question with regard to the existence of a state of war, it might then be possible to negotiate with the Egyptians on other questions. The Ambassador was informed that the French, British and the US were finalizing a joint resolution on Suez today, and it was hoped it would be possible to show that resolution to Israel and other delegations today. We could not say, however, whether the resolution would be tabled on Thursday.

800.413/8–751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, August 7, 1951—noon.

118. Agree view Deptel 105 August 3[1] that White House message to World Zionist Congress Jerusalem wld affect adversely Israel's relations with neighbors. Believe Amer citizens interested in Israel sometimes too inclined press for action this kind without considering effect on important US and Israel policy objectives. In present case, unfavorable polit effects unquestionably wld outweigh any possible advantages. UK and Fr colleagues here uninformed whether similar messages being sought from their govts. They agree, however, messages inadvisable from political viewpoint whether from govts or local missions.

In view possible complications mytels 108 August 2[2] and 115 August 6[3] and other disadvantages already discussed, wld prefer avoid sending message from me as Amb to Pres Amer Zionist Org especially since no such message has been requested locally by Browdy or other leader ZOA. Recommend we express view Emb subject comes up there that it wld be to advantage both US and Israel avoid unnecessary messages this kind in present circumstances.

If Dept nevertheless wishes me to send message, one will be sent upon receipt instrs to that effect.[4]

DAVIS

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[1] *Ante*, p. 819.

[2] Telegram 108 from Tel Aviv, not printed, but see footnote 4, *ibid.*

[3] *Ante*, *ibid.*

[4] In telegram 122 to Tel Aviv, August 9, not printed, the Department agreed that no message should be sent. A notation on the source text by Mr. Waldo indicated that this decision was based on a conversation with Mr. Nash (S/S–PR) reporting a talk with Mr. Hassett of the White House. (800.413/8–751)

357.AC/8-851 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 8, 1951—7 p. m.

118. Shld you be queried concerning unfortunate press reports from UN sources Jlem to effect US is preparing "vast scheme aimed at solution Palestine problem" you may say that these reports completely erroneous. Fact is US in line its obligations as member UN and PC has instr its rep PCC to suggest more authoritative and direct role o part of PCC than heretofore assumed re solution Palestine questio (Deptels Jslm 137 June 12 Unpal 270 [2] and 7 [4] Jul 7 Unpal 276). It understood PCC presently considering possibilities such new approach in Paris. Any proposals to parties, however, will be responsibility of PCC and will have been worked out by that UN org.

FYI as result query Israel Emb Wash re press reports, Dept explained foregoing to Israel Emb Rep. Expressed hope Israel wl accept any invitation extended without requiring submission detaile agenda beforehand. Said solution smallest aspect Palestine proble wld be constructive step forward and hoped Israel wld forego pa insistence on "orthodox approach".

ACHESO

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo; cleared by UNP; authorized for transmission a signed for the Secretary by Mr. G. L. Jones. Sent to Amman, Tel Aviv, Jerusale Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Baghdad, and Cairo. Repeated for information London, Paris (for Ambassador Palmer), and Ankara.

[2] *Ante*, p. 714.

[3] *Ante*, p. 753.

683.84A/8-351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 8, 1951—8 p.

81. Re Jones-Maffitt telecon Aug 3 on Huleh situation [2] Dep believes Riley shld return to NE soonest. Although in principle w feel Riley shld be available answer queries SC mbrs re Suez we believ that since Aug 9 meeting now postponed he shld not be require remain longer in New York.

Dept believes that in view of length of time Riley has been in US it wld be desirable he make investigation on spot before issuing fin report. While procedure Riley adopts is for his decision, we wld su gest that after quick investigation he give tentative report to Israel, either in writing or orally as he sees fit, based on what he now has in mind modified by such additional facts as may come to light during above investigation. Israel cld then have advanced warning and chance take remedial steps to meet final report on Huleh to SC which Riley wld release not later than Aug 31. Similar action shld be taken toward Syrians if found in default by Riley.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo; cleared with UNP; signed for the Secretary Mr. McGhee. Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, London.

[2] Memorandum of telephone conversation not found in Department of St files.

In order assist Riley we wld hope that he wld also give Davis in confidence this draft report which cld serve as basis discussions between Davis and Israel Govt in hope persuading latter comply fully before issuance final report. It is possible that threat of publication this report again pointing to Israel's culpability might have salutary effect re compliance. You may wish give Riley substance Tel Aviv's 111 Aug 3 [3] which most helpful.

Dept wishes you make clear to Riley above suggestions are made in response his informal query our views.

FYI in McGhee–Eban discussions Dept Aug 6 latter gave Dept copy letter to Riley dated Aug 4 listing number of points re Huleh which Israel Govt desires discuss with Riley. Dept expressed concern at slowness Israel compliance SC res May 18 but stated not presently in position to judge facts pending report from Riley. Expressed hope Israel wld accept Riley's advice and not attempt base Israel position on unilateral interpretations unacceptable UN. Pointed out Israel failure comply with res might well prejudice likelihood of compliance by others on other Palestine problems. Agreed however that early Riley return NE might facilitate progress toward solution Huleh problem and that direct Riley–Israel Govt discussions preferable to discussions NY between Eban and Riley.

ACHESON

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[3] *Ante*, p. 818.

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Ambassador in Israel (Davis)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 9, 1951.

DEAR MONNETT: I want to express personally my appreciation for the outstanding telegrams which you have sent in recently. When we have a vexing problem to worry about it seems that you anticipate it and provide unusually timely and helpful comment.

As you know, we have been faced with the problem of being urged to send a message to the World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem. However, we believe, as you do, that for the President to send a message to this organization in Jerusalem would be politically disastrous. Our thought that you send a short note to Mr. Browdy was a suggestion which we believed might satisfy the American Zionists in lieu of a message from the President. We are, however, in full accord with your excellent message no. 198 of August 7,[2] a copy of which, you might be interested to know, the White House requested for use in countering the arguments for such a message.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo.

Regarding the Huleh, we hope Riley will get back to his post as soon as possible. I know you have seen by now the Department's telegram no. 120 of August 8[3] to this effect, and we agree fully with you regarding the desirability of a "bill of particulars" which you might use in discussions with the Israelis as suggested in your message no. 111.[4] We have some additional information here, given us in confidence by the General, consisting of an exchange of letters between himself and Sharett, and we shall get them to you as soon as possible. It would also be helpful if you would telegraph to us Riley's "bill of particulars" as soon as you receive it from him. Unfortunately, I am afraid we are not out of the woods so far as the Huleh situation is concerned.

As for the Suez issue, I think the Israelis are wrong in claiming that we have been dragging our feet. We have agreed to cosponsor the resolution and to speak against the restrictions as inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the Armistice Agreement. The difficulty is that the Israelis set down a line of policy which they believe is the only right one to follow. If we differ with them, there are the usual complaints. At the moment the next SC meeting is scheduled for August 16, and it is probable that a resolution will be adopted at that time if Egypt has not voluntarily withdrawn the restrictions before them. It is impossible to guarantee what final action will be taken by the SC, however, since a number of the Council members have doubts about the case.

Regarding the Mutual Security Program, it is interesting to note that the Israelis and the American Jewish Community appear to have "bought" our policy of impartiality. The argument now is, of course, that, while there is no objection to giving the same amount of money to the Arabs as to Israel, it is necessary to increase the sum proposed for Israel in the MSP. We believe, however, that Title 2 of the Aid Bill will pass without any great modification. It is even possible at the moment that the funds for the Arab refugees will be increased to provide for reintegration expenditures in subsequent fiscal years. That is what we had hoped for initially, but the Bureau of the Budget ruled it out.

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[2] The reference here is to telegram 118 from Tel Aviv, August 7, p. 823, which originally was erroneously numbered 198.

[3] The same as telegram 81 to New York, *supra*.

[4] Dated August 3, p. 818.

I hope you enjoyed your trip to Beirut. I am sure you found that city a pleasant change and relaxation after your arduous duties in Tel Aviv. We feel that the idea of exchanges of visits between the Arab countries and Israel is worth pursuing, not only because such visits give Chiefs of Mission and their subordinates an opportunity to consult, but at the same time they permit them to acquire impressions of life on the other side of the Armistice Lines.

I hope you will have an opportunity to have a long talk with Teddy Kollek while he is in Israel. He had a very interesting conversation with Lewis Jones before he left, a memorandum of which you will receive shortly.[5]

I congratulate you on an excellent job of reporting and representation. It makes our problems vastly more simple here to know that Tel Aviv is in such sound and able hands.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

George C. McGhee

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[5] See the memorandum of conversation of August 2, p. 813.

357.AC/8–951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Jerusalem[1]

CONFIDENTIAL — Washington, August 10, 1951—8 p. m.

26. Unpal 281. Re Palun 426 Aug 9,[2] Dept gratified speed and decision PCC re conference and agrees schedule outlined reftel.

Re last para,[3] however, Dept does not agree major task of gaining parties' acceptance shld be left to govts members PCC. In Dept's view this task primarily responsibility PCC and not member govts. Dept believes PCC shld be prepared fol up invitations with further communications to recipient govts if necessary. Efforts US, UK, Fr, and Turk shld be supplemental to "major effort" PCC this regard.

As indicated in July 27 letter to you,[4] US prepared "lend all appropriate dipl support for convening of such conference." Accordingly, Dept instructing its reps in capitals Israel and interested Arab States to discuss question with UK, Fr, and Turk reps to end that maximum support be brought to bear for govt concerned to accept PCC invitation.

Webb

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Ludlow (UNP) and Waldo (NE); approved for transmission and signed for the Secretary by Mr. G. L. Jones (NE).

[2] Not printed; it dealt with the meeting place and schedule for the forthcoming conference of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (357.AC/8–951).

[3] The last paragraph of Palun 426 stated in part that the PCC was now leaving to the governments represented on the Commission the major task of gaining the parties' acceptance in the conviction that this could best be obtained by the avoidance of further direct action by the Commission during this period.

[4] *Ante*, p. 799.

857.AC/8-1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Barrow)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1951.

Subject: 1. Egypt Suez Canal Restrictions.
2. Grant Aid to Israel.

Participants: Faiz El-Khouri, Minister of Syria
G. Lewis Jones—NE
John R. Barrow—NE

Discussion:

The Minister came in on instructions from his Government to state that "the Syrian Government considers the attitude taken by the United States in being a co-sponsor of this (the Suez) resolution an attitude which means support and backing of the Jews against the Arabs and the Arabs' interests". The Minister went on to say that the Syrian Government considers any help, moral or material, to the Jews harms the Arabs.

Mr. Jones replied that the United States Government based its action *primarily* on its policy of support for the armistice systems of the Near East. It was the same, in fact, as our policy on the Huleh question. We were neither for or against the Arabs or the Jews, but we were for the armistice agreements and against any actions which we believed contravened those agreements, either in letter or in spirit. The Egypt Suez Canal restrictions, we thought, definitely violated the spirit of the Egypt–Israel armistice.

The Syrian Minister asked if the West's need for oil from the Haifa refinery was not a factor in our action. Mr. Jones replied that undoubtedly this was an element in our thinking, but his previous statement, in which the governing word was "primarily", was still valid. Our foremost concern was the armistice agreements which we regard as essential to the peace and stability of the Near East.

The Syrian Minister remarked that his Government did not consider Egypt's actions a violation of the Egypt–Israel armistice agreement, and alluded to General Riley's findings on that point which he regarded as very equivocal.

2. *Grant Aid to Israel*

The Syrian Minister said that he had heard that certain members of Congress were advocating an amendment to Title II of the administration's Mutual Security Program to provide additional grant aid to Israel. Mr. Jones said he had no information about it and recommended that the Minister "wait and see".

The Syrian Minister repeated the view that any aid to Israel would be considered by the Arabs as an unfriendly act. He paraphrased an

Arab proverb which said, "It is better to prevent harm to myself, than to advance my interests." In other words, he said the Arabs would rather receive no aid, if Israel would also receive no aid. Mr. Barrow said that the Syrian Minister's remarks seemed to be in direct conflict with the United States' attitude of "positive" rather than "negative" impartiality toward the Arab States and Israel.

Mr. Jones then recalled the story of the man who was visited by an angel who had told him he could have anything he asked on the understanding that his neighbor would receive twice as much. The man had pondered this offer for a long time and finally said to the angel, "Please put out *one* of my eyes."

The Syrian Minister's reply was that Israel never was and never would be a neighbor of the Arabs.

320.2 AA/8-1051 : Despatch

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, August 10, 1951.
No. 74

Subject: Conversations of Director of UNRWA (PRA) with Egyptian and Jordanian Officials

On August 7, 1951, the Honorable John B. Blandford, Jr., Director of PRA, reported [in] detail to the Advisory Commission concerning his recent visits to Egypt and Jordan. A summary of his remarks follows:

1. *Egypt*

Mr. Blandford saw the Egyptian Foreign Minister in Cairo on July 23. Salaheddine Pasha opened the conversation by referring to the recent assassinations and disorders in Jordan and Lebanon. He stated that the Palestine problem was at the bottom of these troubles, a fact which emphasized the necessity of seeking a speedy solution.

The Minister agreed that an over-all reintegration program involving all the Arab States was essential, and stated that Egypt would be willing to join in negotiations looking toward a three-year program aimed at solving the refugee problem.

Egypt was already setting the example by her cooperation with the Agency in the Sinai project. Even though the preliminary reports of the water exploration team were disappointing, and large-scale projects there proved unfeasible, the symbolic value of Egypt's working together with PRA would be considerable.

Egypt was prepared to urge Syria to cooperate in the Agency's program. Egypt recognizes the necessity of moving large numbers of refugees from their present locations to sites where reintegration facilities could be provided. However, Arab cooperation in refugee movement and in the reintegration program must not be interpreted by anyone, particularly Israel, as a sign that the Arabs were forgetting the problem or ready to forgo support of refugee rights against Israel.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Bergus. Sent also to the other Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Tripoli, and Benghazi.

The Minister stated his belief that the Arab League should be the forum for negotiations for the over-all program and suggested that Mr. Blandford get in touch with Azzam Pasha.

Salaheddine Pasha volunteered the view that Egypt and the Arab States were opposed to the Agency's assisting refugees in emigrating to countries outside the Arab World. The Arabs did not want the refugees dispersed and wished to see them remain in Arab States. There was no objection to PRA's sending skilled refugees to Libya.

The Director next saw Ismail Cherine Bey, commander of the Egyptian frontiers, and Egyptian Government Liaison Officer with PRA (succeeding Ali Marei Bey, presently Egyptian Director of Protocol). Cherine said he had two additional areas available in the Sinai Peninsula if the present explorations continue to be disappointing. He would like a joint committee set up to advise a first-class project manager. Cherine would make every effort to find an eminently qualified Egyptian for project manager. However, if none were available, he would have no objection to a foreigner.

Cherine expressed his enthusiastic support of an over-all program and promised every assistance in persuading other Arab states, particularly Syria. He reported that his own private inquiries convince him that the ex-Mufti of Palestine is no longer opposing reintegration and would agree to large-scale projects in Syria.

Cherine stated that Egypt does not wish to assume the responsibility for administering refugee relief, preferring to concentrate her energies on reintegration.

The Director saw Azzam Pasha briefly who was most cordial and stated that it was up to PRA to take the next step and to present its program for Arab consideration. He declared that the facilities of the Arab League were available to the Agency for use in negotiations.

Mr. Blandford was able also, through the kindness of Ambassador Caffery, to discuss the situation informally with the American, British and French chiefs of mission in Egypt. The Turkish representative was not available.

2. *Jordan*

Mr. Blandford arrived in Amman in the afternoon of August 3. Through the kindness of Minister Drew, he was able to have discussions with the American, British and French Ministers (the Turk again being unavailable) in the presence of Sir Alexander Galloway, PRA's new country representative in Jordan.

After reviewing basic policy, Mr. Blandford reported to the group a conversation he had had with General Riley of the U.N.T.S.O. in which they agreed to the usefulness of an international study of the legal aspects of the waters of the Jordan River and its tributaries. Such a study, by sorting out the problems involved, would be an essential basis for any future agreement among riparian states as to the use of the waters. PRA's hopes to reintegrate large numbers of refugees in Jordan depended heavily on the availability of the Yarmuk River. The French Minister indicated strong agreement with

Mr. Blandford's thinking and stated he had some days before sent a similar proposal to his Government.

At the suggestion of Minister Drew, the representatives in Jordan of the countries represented on PRA's Advisory Commission plan to meet periodically with Sir Alexander Galloway for information purposes.

The following morning Mr. Blandford paid his respects at the tomb of King Abdullah and called on the Regent, Emir Naif. The Regent assured the Director that, in the tradition of his distinguished father, he would cooperate fully with the Agency, so long as he *was* Regent.

The Director then saw the Prime Minister, the Minister of Reconstruction, and the Minister of Health. The Prime Minister said his Government was prepared to discuss a three-year program and agreed concerning the necessity of cooperation among all the Arab States. The present Government wishes to discuss the question of Jordan's taking over relief administration at cabinet level before making any further proposals in this regard. Mr. Blandford detected a possible loss of enthusiasm on the part of Jordan for shouldering the unpopular responsibility of relief administration.

The Director had an opportunity of visiting the Musa Bey Alami resettlement project near Jericho. The present plans are to settle 25 families as individual farmers, 100 wage-earners on a 500-acre plantation, and to provide an agricultural school for 100 refugee boys. The Director and the Advisory Commission have agreed to PRA assistance being made available to Musa Bey for the execution and possible enlargement of the project.

Mr. Blandford talked with some of Musa Bey's assistants on the project, one of whom listed some interesting categories of refugees who could or would *not* be reintegrated on the project: (*a*) refugees who are so poor that they would need outside assistance to enable them to survive until a crop came in; (*b*) refugees who are so troublesome that the project managers don't want them; (*c*) refugee capitalists who want to take over and exploit several one-family tracts; (*d*) refugees who still stubbornly refuse anything but repatriation; and (*e*) refugees who worry about the quality of land available on the project.

3. *General*

Mr. Blandford concluded his report to the Advisory Commission by reiterating his earlier view that the major problem ahead is not Arab Government cooperation but cooperation from the refugees themselves.

There might also be later hesitation on the part of the Arab States at pulling large numbers of refugees away from Israel's present borders. The Arabs might reason that this would create a vacuum which Israel would be all too eager to fill.

There seems to be appearing a reluctance on the part of the Arab States to take over relief administration.

Mr. Blandford concluded by stating that he would be ready at an early meeting to discuss the steps towards framing a specific proposal to the Near East Governments for an over-all reintegration program.

JOHN H. BRUINS

974.5301/8–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, August 11, 1951—10 a. m

200. For McGhee. Azzam Pasha came to see me this morning with message for McGhee. He said he is alarmed over the Suez Canal restrictions Security Council implications and is convinced that the only ones to gain in the long run will be the Commies in Egypt who wil exploit the "persecution" of Egypt by the great powers and Egypt' impotence in the face thereof especially since Iraq has the pipelin which is the only logical supply source for the Haifa refinery, an yet it is Egypt not Iraq that is being "picked on".

He said that no matter what his personal inclinations are he wil be forced in the case of an adverse decision of the SC to call a mtg o Arab League which will call upon Egypt not to comply with th decision and also will call upon all petroleum supplying countrie including Kuwait and Bahrein to refuse to furnish oil to tankers proceeding to Haifa.

I transmit this to you just as he said it for what it is worth.

CAFFER

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[1] Repeated for information to London and the Arab capitals.

974.5301/8–1351 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of Stat

SECRET CAIRO, August 13, 195

No. 354

Ref: Embtel No. 200, dated August 11, 1951[2]

Subject: Azzam Pasha's Call re Suez Canal Restrictions

Azzam Pasha's call on me, and his direct intervention on the Su Canal problem is only surprising in that it did not occur before.

Azzam and I have had a good relationship and he has in the pa definitely soft-pedaled the Suez Canal issue. His call in that conne tion was obviously as the result of needling on the part of Salaheddi

The intervention of the Arab League at the present juncture is be deplored, as it will only produce greater misunderstanding ar friction if the Security Council resolution is passed. The League well-known ability to produce unpleasantness out of a least commo denominator has been amply demonstrated in the past and there no reason to believe that the results will be any different in the prese case.

JEFFERSON CAFFE

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Mattison; sent also to New York, the Arab capitals, Londo and Tel Aviv.

[2] *Supra.*

357.AC/8-1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY JERUSALEM, August 14, 1951—7 p. m.

41. Palun 428. Prior my departure on Sat[2] from Geneva, Shiloah telephoned from Paris requesting I come here for conversations thought might be important. I therefore made last minute changes my schedule and met Shiloah in Paris Sun morn.[3] He told me he had dined with Boisanger Sat even and that Boisanger had informed him of comm's decision not to discuss conference agenda prior to convening of conf. He said that while he had not been in touch for several days with Tel Aviv, he was reasonably sure Israel Govt wld accept, but in order be prepared make useful contribution to conf discussions, it wld be necessary to know in advance questions we proposed to take up. At same time Israel Govt's decision wld be affected by SC action on Suez. If Suez res was not passed Egyptians wld interpret council's action as endorsement their position re state of war with Israel. If Egyptians were so bolstered, there cld be little hope of successful outcome proposed conf.

In this connection I pointed out that shld Suez not be satisfactorily dealt with by SC, there was even more reason for holding conf. Shiloah asked if this meant that PCC intended take up "clarification" of status armistice agreements. I told him, without referring to proposed nonaggression declaration, that such a question certainly wld come within scope of general questions with which we hoped to deal. He seemed pleased this idea. As for his other questions concerning agenda, I told him comm had decided before adjourning that it wld not enter into a discussion with parties of agenda items in order avoid any question of priorities. I said that while we expected Arabs to raise question of priority for repatriation, we hoped avoid this issue prior to conf by recalling that conf wld be based on mandate recd from successive GA's and that by acceding to Arab States request for mediation we wld be in position make suggestion re order of discussion. Told Shiloah that I wld be prepared to discuss in greater detail various subjects for consideration at later date but that I cld not, in view of comm's decision, undertake such discussions until after parties acceptances. Shiloah seemed personally to accept my arguments and to favor intended procedure. He was unusually outspoken in saying he expected Israel wld accept, although he reverted several times to ill effects of unsatisfactory SC decision on Suez.

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[1] Repeated priority to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, London, Paris, and Ankara.

[2] August 11.

[3] August 12.

This morn fol tel was forwarded to me from Geneva in Palm
absence, who is expected arrive by ship in Haifa end of week:

"Palmer Chairman PCC—I have the honor to acknowledge rec
of your cable of 10 Aug inviting the Govt of Israel to participat
mtgs convened by the Conciliation Comm beginning in Paris o
Sept 1951.

"The Govt of Israel has consistently pursued a policy of coopera
with the Conciliation Comm and seized every opportunity of disc
ing problems outstanding between Israel and the Arab States. It
help the Govt of Israel in considering the invitation conveyed in
behalf of 10 Aug if the comm were to indicate to it whether the in
tion is to hold mtgs separately between the comm and reps of Is
on the one hand and between the comm and dels of the Arab State
the other, or whether, as suggested by the term "conference",
planned to conduct direct mtg between the reps of Israel and of
Arab states. It wld also be helpful if an indication cld be given
the proposed agenda for the conf or the method by which an ag
agenda might be worked out.

"I shld much appreciate an early reply to this enquiry for
guidance of my govt and meanwhile avail myself of this opportu
to renew to you the expression of my highest consideration and
sonal esteem. Signed Moshe Sharett, Min FonAff of Israel."

I propose reply to Sharett as follows:

"In reply to your tel of 13 Aug I have the honour to advise th
extending its invitations to meet in Paris on 10 Sept the CCP has
guided by the relevant resolutions of the GA which call upon
parties to seek a solution of all questions outstanding between the
negots conducted either with the Conciliation Comm or directly.
Govt of Israel may be assured that the proposed discussions in
will be conducted fully in accordance with the provisions of
resolutions."

At its last mtg before adjournment PCC agreed that substance a
shld be comm's reply to question similar those raised by Sharett.
much as such a reply at best is indication comm does not wish di
with parties questions raised by Sharett, I felt it desirable explai
position personally and to suggest Israel might wish now with
its query. I therefore called upon Biran at noon today and revi
with him my discussion with Shiloah and the position comm had t
explaining our desire avoid discussion of question of priorities
Arab Govts. I said that if Israel raised question concerning ag
and we entered into discussion these points with Israel, it wld be
cult not do so with Arabs shld they raise similar questions. We
this wld seriously jeopardize successful outcome PCC's new e
and wld lead us back to same situation we had been in for las
years. I said that I had recd impression from Shiloah that Israe
favorably inclined our invitation and that I wondered if Shil
report our conv had not perhaps crossed Sharett's telegram. In

case, Israel Govt might prefer withdraw tel since reply by comm, which might be regarded as unresponsive, might well make acceptance politically more difficult. I pointed out polit advantage to Israel in unequivocal and prompt acceptance, and that if Israel did ultimately intend accept why not capitalize on such advantages. Biran appeared appreciate latter point and agreed convey my suggestion to Sharett this afternoon. He thought Sharett might want to talk with me later in day. I will follow up with further talks with Shiloah on his arrival Thursday. Comm's decision not enter into discussion agenda however seems to me proper and expedient.

Re Unpal 281,[4] I do not see how comm can consistently in view this decision under-take "major effort" obtain parties acceptance. It was at USDel suggestion comm did not reconvene Jerusalem, in order avoid possibility Aras and Marchal being involved in discussions with govts. Nor do I feel that in interest maximum freedom of action after convening of conf it is tactically desirable now for PCC engage in correspondence govts concerned beyond that indicated by proposed reply to Sharett. I had understood these tactics were approved by Dept prior my departure and had indicated in Palun's 422 [5] and 423 [6] such procedure wld be followed when referred to Fr and Turks being persuaded avoid return to area. In view timetable adopted on necessity extensive preparatory work prior comm's reconvening Paris 27, I do not feel time permits "major effort" by PCC, which in this case wld mean JCI USDel, and wld probably necessitate tour of area. "Major effort" is obviously necessary and wld be readily undertaken by USDel if circumstances permitted and made it desirable to do so. I believe in present circumstances however efforts by US, Fr, Turk, and UK missions in area will be decisive for convening conf. Signed Barco.[7]

[PALMER]

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[4] Dated August 10, p. 827.

[5] Dated August 3, p. 816.

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 817.

[7] In telegram 27 to Jerusalem (for Mr. Barco), identified also as telegram Unpal 282, not printed, the Department stated that it approved and commended the action reported in Palun 428 (357.AC/8-1451).

684A.85/8-1551 : Telegram

The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN, August 15, 1951—1 p. m.

58. Re Tel Aviv tel 138, Aug. 11.[2] In conversation with PriMin Aug 15 he mentioned proposal of Israeli MAC del to discuss problem

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[1] Repeated for information to Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Telegram 138 from Tel Aviv, August 11, not printed, stated in part that Embassy officers had been informed at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Footnote continued on following page.

of Jordan waters. Jordan MAC del had referred matter to govt as outside competence of MAC. PriMin appeared impressed by Israeli action which he described as coinciding with Jordan's desire to reach amicable settlement. He expressed hope that UN wld appoint neutral comm to study problem which he remarked as essentially technical.

I mentioned to PriMin interest of UNRWA in problem because of importance Jordan waters in settlement of refugees in Jordan valley. In event of discussion of appointment of neutral, technical body it occurs to me that UNRWA might sponsor study as it already maintains friendly relations with govts involved and recourse to UNRWA wld obviate creation of new internatl body.

Drew

Footnote continued from preceding page.

that day that on or about August 1 the senior Israeli delegate on the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission asked the senior Jordanian delegate to inform his government of Israel's willingness to enter into agreements with Jordan for equitable regulation of the waters of the Jordan Rivers with Dagania (684A.85/8-1151).

684A.86/8-1551 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 15, 1951—8 p. m.

146. Dept requests US reps Arab states and Israel consult Fr Turk and UK colleagues with view making concerted approaches bring maximum influence bear on Govt concerned to accept PCC invitation of Aug 10 meet with Comm in Paris "to discuss solution of problems outstanding between Israel and Arab states". Dept hopes high ranking Reps can be designated attend conf and no conditions will be placed by parties on acceptance invitation. Suggest point out that US making this approach in light its obligations as member UN and PCC and hopes conf may result in significant steps toward solution of at least some of many problems outstanding. US believes Israel and Arab states have clear duty accept invitation under their obligations to UN arising from GA Res of Dec 14, 1950 and earlier Res. Israel and Arab states thus have excellent opportunity demonstrate their expressed interest in maintenance peace and stability NE by sincere effort work with PCC toward solution various problems at issue. If questioned re agenda (Depcirtel 118, Aug 8),[2] you shld state this mat-

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo; cleared with Mr. Ludlow; authorized for transmission and signed for the Acting Secretary by Mr. G. L. Jones. Sent to London, Paris, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman. Sent for information to New York and to Jerusalem for Ambassador Palmer.

[2] *Ante*, p. 824.

ter for PCC to work out in Paris with parties, who Dept earnestly hopes will agree meet face to face.

US reps London, Paris, Ankara discuss with FonOff and request similar instrs be sent soonest UK, Fr, Turk Reps in NE states invited by PCC.

Dept hopes these approaches can be made within week's time in manner considered most efficacious by you and colleagues. In ur discretion, officers US missions NE authorized take above line in private conversations with officials Govts to which accredited.

WEBB

684A.85/8-1551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 16, 1951—7 p. m.

49. Dept hopes you will raise subj urtel 58 Aug 15[2] again with PriMin soonest along fol gen lines: Dept welcomes reports from Emb Tel Aviv and statements by Israel Reps US to effect Israel Govt willing and anxious discuss Jordan water situation with Jordan. Dept considers Israel attitude this matter commendable and glad learn Jordan attitude responsive. Dept has discussed situation informally with Gen Riley who agreeable MAC handling situation if parties wld agree this procedure.

Dept believes Armistice machinery already in effect most suitable for negot this primarily technical problem, which not capable solution without direct discussions between parties at some stage, and believes MAC competent consider this and any matter at issue between Jordan and Israel which two parties agree discuss therein. Additionally, para 3 art 8 Jordan–Israel Gen Armistice Agreement clearly estabs competence Special Comite consider "such matters as may be referred to it." This section agreement also provides that MAC may exercise supervisory functions over agreed plans and arrangements formulated by Special Comite. If Jordan wishes pursue legalistic approach, Dept suggests Special Comite might agree consider Jordan water dispute and then refer it to MAC. MAC and Special Comite only UN orgs in which direct discussions between Israel and Jordan take place on continuing basis. Moreover, if SC considers Jordan complaint wld probably refer matter for investigation to MAC or other UN body now in operation.

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Waldo and G. L. Jones (NE); cleared with Mr. Popper (UNP); repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, and New York.

[2] *Ante*, p. 835.

Under Riley chairmanship Jordan–Israel MAC might appoint s
comite of impartial engineers survey Jordan River from Tiberia
Dead Sea and report to MAC recommendations for solution Jord
Israel water dispute. Engineers might be made available by UNR
or other neutral source.

Simplest most expeditious course wld be for Israel and Jor
name their water experts advisers Israel–Jordan dels MAC and
experts agree on spot nature survey and other practical steps us
both parties. FYI Israel suggests this simple matter of dam clo
during winter.

Problem Jordan water is probably as unpolitical as any exis
between Jordan and Israel and shld be susceptible quiet hand
by technicians. Dept hopes Jordan Govt will not reject Israel o

Report devels.

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974.531/8–2251

The Ambassador of Israel (Eban) to the Assistant Secretary of S
for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhe

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 22, 1

DEAR SECRETARY MCGHEE: I write with reference to the conve
tion held this morning between Ambassador Ernest Gross and
Gideon Rafael, a member of our delegation to the United Nati
In the course of that conversation, Ambassador Gross enqu
whether we had heard rumours of an intention in some quarte
suggest that the Suez item now before the Security Council b
ferred to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

I have no doubt that the United States would take the same vie
Israel on this somewhat ludicrous suggestion, if it were to aris
view of the extreme gravity of the contingency, however, I take
opportunity of putting in writing some of the considerations w
Mr. Rafael was instructed to express to Ambassador Gross.

There is no doubt that the procedure described in this unsubs
tiated rumour would confer fatal and simultaneous harm both
the existing armistice system, and on the forthcoming concili
conference. With respect to the former it must surely be adm
that the Security Council has outdone itself in unprecedented d
ence to Egypt, giving that country an unexampled opportuni
bring its actions into conformity with international opinion.
majority of the members have expressed themselves in favor

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[1] Memorandum of conversation not printed.

specific resolution. If the Council were now to evade formal action, after the many postponements already accorded, we should have the unedifying spectacle of the highest organ of international security on its knees before Egypt, confessing its impotence to give formal expression to its own majority opinion. I suggest, in all moderation, that the Security Council would be unable to act with any authority or respect on any Palestine question ever again. Moreover, the inescapable conclusion that the Security Council would refuse in any circumstance to give a ruling in favor of an Israel complaint which all agree to be fully justified, would have a disastrous effect on the Security Council's authority in respect of any problem in which Israel is involved. Moreover, the armistice machinery would remain paralysed if the Security Council were to prolong this refusal to give a ruling on the most important armistice question outstanding between the Parties.

Hardly less disastrous would be the effect of such a move on the Paris conference itself. There would be little prospect for that conference to succeed or even to exist at all, if the Security Council, after weeks of debate and consultation, were to acknowledge that Egypt has a veto over the formal expression of United Nations views. It is certainly inconceivable that Israel and Egypt could hold discussions on progress towards peace, at a time when the latter state maintained its theory of active belligerent rights, while the former was denied an authoritative Security Council judgment on that pernicious theory. Furthermore, the doubt which would justly arise in Israel whether the United Nations exists at all as a tribunal capable of expressing a verdict on an Israel complaint, would destroy the minimum confidence necessary for the conciliation procedure to function under United Nations auspices.

The maintenance of the armistice system is not something to be discussed in Paris. It is an unconditional obligation of the Parties and an indispensable prelude to any further effort to proceed beyond the armistice system.

In view of the deep interest that the United States has evinced both in the maintenance of the armistice system and in the attempt to make progress beyond the armistice during the Paris discussions, I feel sure that you will join in opposing any such tendency, should it be expressed, to debase the dignity of the Security Council and to doom the Paris talks to failure.[2]

With warm personal regards,

I remain, yours very sincerely, ABBA EBAN

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[2] A reply was sent on August 25 over the signature of Mr. Berry, who was Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Mr. Berry assured Ambassador Eban that the Department did not look favorably on the suggestion that the Suez item be referred to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. (974.531/8-2251)

974.5301/8–2351 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 23, 1951—11 a.m.

173. Fr UNDel informed USDel Aug 21 Fr FonOff strongly believes Suez restriction problem shld be transferred to PCC which wld endeavor mediate solution and has instructed Fr Del press SC members adopt this course.[2]

If FonOff queries you, you are authorized state Dept opposed this procedure for fol reasons:

1. SC has special responsibility re Pal question and is, in our view, court last resort to armis agreements parties in armis violations.
2. SC is now dealing with matter and it wld be inappropriate for PCC to become involved.
3. In any event PCC Sep 10 mtg still in doubt and therefore PCC cld not act immed.
4. Such procedure wld establish dangerous precedent and wld undermine auth SC in dealing effectively with armis violations.
5. SC has already postponed action this question longer than desirable.

In view above Dept believes SC shld no longer delay in executing its responsibility for upholding armis agreements and wld envisage vote on draft res either Aug 27 or next SC mtg after. Paris shld take initiative in approaching FonOff.

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Stabler (NEA); cleared with Mr. Popper (UNP), Mr. Allen (EUR), and in substance with Mr. Monsma (ARA); approved for transmission and signed for the Secretary by Mr. Kopper (NE); sent to Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Quito, Belgrade, The Hague, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Cairo, London, Jerusalem (for the PCC Representative), and New York.

[2] This was reported in telegrams 252 and 258 from New York, August 21 and 22, not printed (974.5301/8–2151 and /8–2251).

357.AC/8–2451 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Department of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, August 24, 1951—3 p.m.

56. Palun 434. Eyes alone McGhee from Palmer.

As planned am leaving Jerusalem today. Expect see Blandford Beirut tomorrow, Riley Paris Sunday.

Had thought Riley, Bergus, Blandford fully briefed re Dept thinking and that they wld understand that throughout PCC consideration of possibilities suggested in Secty's letter to me [1] USDel had been in touch with and counseled by Dept. Hope they now understand clearly Dept relation to USDel initiative and that USDel leadership in expeditious PCC consideration of proposals favored by Dept was in response to Dept desire that no time be lost. Although dates in schedule proposed by PCC were later than those suggested by Dept, USDel appreciated and PCC was encouraged by Dept approval with expression of gratification.

Unreserved collaboration of French and Turk reps was obviously due to their knowledge that USDel initiative was inspired by Dept and their feeling that we cld count on Dept guidance and support within US policy as understood by USDel from Secty's letter and in light of Barco's consultation with Dept. Doubt in this regard cld not but prejudice possibilities of success even in small way in what is at best exceedingly difficult and perhaps thankless task. You may imagine how disturbed I was that new French rep on PCC in his first contact with UNRWA under its new American leadership, from which so much is expected, shld have experienced such doubt because of Blandford's apparent unawareness of background of Dept thinking re PCC role, and that Marchal came away with impression that new UNRWA dir resented PCC activity at this time.

Although in response to Deptel June 12, Unpal 270,[2] I expressed doubt as to timeliness of new course of action for PCC as envisaged by Dept, I have been ready to participate in new PCC effort because I felt Dept considered this important even though results might fall far short of those desired. When I suggested in mytel June 23, Palun 409,[3] that consideration shld be given to Riley's views, I had in mind importance of understanding collaboration between all UN bodies concerned with Pal problem. I have always felt that any uncertainty in Dept as to the considered views of Americans in key positions such as that of TSO chief of staff or dir of UNRWA or US rep on PCC or any lack of understanding on our part as to US policy might seriously prejudice UN activities and US standing in this area. Barco's consultation with Dept and Secty's letter to me have proven invaluable to PCC and you may be sure that with my colleagues I shall do my best to carry out Dept's suggestions and to maintain relations with Riley and Blandford and his successor as US rep on UNRWA AdCom that will facilitate our effective collaboration.

[Palmer]

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[1] Dated July 27, p. 799.
[2] *Ante*, p. 714.
[3] *Ante*, p. 728.

320.2 AA/8–2751 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, August 27, 1951—1 p. m.

190. Rapun 207. 1. Pursuant Unrap 181 AdCom director met Palmer Beirut 24 and 25. Two brief meetings taken up largely with background of Paris meeting and leading part of US in promoting. Arrangements made have director represented during drafting agenda Paris last week August.

2. Director and Adcota still have large reservations re effect Paris meeting will have PRA program. As Blandford put it, there have been two philosophies approach to solution Pal problem. One is direct method of trying get parties together negotiate overall agreements. Three-year effort this direction has not conspicuously succeeded. Other is indirect method of attacking individual problems arising from conflict in attempt successively remove obstacles to peace. Unfortunately both methods cannot be used simultaneously without jeopardizing each other.

3. It had been our understanding US Govt now preferred indirect approach. Statements of Pres, Secy and McGhee to Congress on PRA appropriation give firm impression US belief is that solution of refugee problem will be large step toward restoration peace and stability Near East. This view has evidently won support in House Representatives. Important thing is that because of or despite US public statements Arab politicians, even reactionary Mufti, have through own rationale decided cooperate PRA solution and enter negotiations 3-year program. Dept's encouragement MAC solutions specific problems also case in point.

4. First Arab reactions to PCC invitation have not been reassuring to PRA. Blandford has detected disposition on part Syria to delay awaiting Paris outcome. Lebanon and Egypt have expressed concern Paris meeting might postpone reintegration negotiations for indefinite period.

5. Certain suggestions in Secy's letter to Palmer of July 27 (copy of which indirectly reached USDel only on Aug 24) also cause concern. Putting entire subject of repatriation on agenda can only revive hopes on part Arab states and refugees for large-scale return to Israel where there have been strong indications Arab tacit acceptance impossibility this solution. Specifically proposal repatriate refugees who are "economically useful" to Israel strikes us as impracticable and possibly undemocratic (recalls Nazi categories of "economically useful" Jews whose extermination was postponed). Suggestion that Israel would be able select best refugees for repatriation leaving dregs to

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris for Palmer as 8.

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Arab states can only arouse bitterest Arab resentment towards UN and US. Compensation discussions also of vital importance to PRA.

6. If Arabs accept Paris invitation will mean they see some propaganda or other advantage. In view present tense situation Near East following political assassinations Arabs probably will be able do little at Paris except repeat outworn shibboleths.

7. Therefore respectfully request Dept explore all possibilities guiding Paris discussions in such manner as to create minimum impingement PRA program.

8. Blandford will receive paraphrase this telegram and his comments will be transmitted to Dept.

Bruins

683.84A/8-2951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY New York, August 29, 1951—8:58 p. m.

278. Re Syria–Israel dispute. Gross and Ross met this morning with Eban on Huleh case. Jebb, (UK), Ordonneau (France) and Savut (Turkey) represented other co-sponsors of May 18 res.

Gross initiated discussion by indicating mtg was not adversarial, but called to permit informal joint exploration of points that seemed to be at issue. He then outlined these points as set forth in memorandum previously agreed to by the sponsors. (Copy transmitted in next following telegram.) Copy of these informal notes was given to Eban at end of meeting.

Eban's attitude throughout mtg was conciliatory but firm reflection his govt's views on points of issue. His comments on these points may be summarized as follows: (Fuller report of meeting will be sent by pouch.)

1. *General observations:*

a. Stating Israel's objection to res prior to passage, Eban said that once res had passed Israel's policy was that of full compliance irrespective of their reservations and apprehensions. He pointed out in this connection that Israel has complied with all requests Riley has made concerning drainage operations.

b. Eban stressed Israeli view that intention of res was only the temporary suspension of drainage operations, that total compliance with the res involves benefits as well as duties and it was hoped that process of implementation would lead to full resumption of drainage project as soon as possible.

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[1] Repeated priority to Beirut, Damascus, and Tel Aviv. The Mission in the best position to do so was requested to convey the substance of this telegram to General Riley.

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c. Israel understood emphasis of para 12A of res as concerning return of Arabs "removed by Govt of Israel" not those who had fled to Syria.

d. Most important factor in Israeli view was that during first week of May aggression had been committed by Syria not only against the demilitarized zone but also against Israeli territory involving primarily Syrian regular forces and also local Arabs mobilized for purpose.

2. *Return of Arabs:*

Eban seemed assured that arrangements could be worked out with Riley for return of Arabs referring however to para 22 of Riley's report of August 26. Eban said he did not have instructions and pointed out that return of these Arabs involved question of Israeli security involving status of El Hamma which had become in effect de facto part of Syria through process of annexation.

3. *Policing of demilitarized zone:*

In this case also, Eban seemed assured, at least hoped, that "practical middle line" solution could be worked out with Riley. He stressed that armistice agreement provided for Israeli and Arab (not Syrian) police in demilitarized zone and predicted that it might be impossible to reach agreement with Riley on juridical status of Israel in zone. He indicated belief Riley seemed to desire change in administrative arrangements which had obtained during last two years based upon 26 June 1949 letter from Bunche to Sharett which was decisive in securing Israeli agreement to armistice agreement, and which, Eban emphasized as one of elements in determining what is right and what wrong, which should not be disregarded by Riley. In this connection Eban talked about the necessity for a new administrative statute for the zone. These considerations, however, should not foreclose reaching practical arrangement with Riley. Israel, Eban said, cannot persist in claiming the right to police the entire zone, but Riley could not deny to Israel the right of administrative linkage with Israeli villages. In summary, Eban indicated that Israel would probably recognize necessity of withdrawing police from Khoury farm permitting Khoury family to return and have access to water, of abolishing restrictions on movement of UN observers and abolishing restrictions on the movement of Arabs who have or who might return.

4. *Tel-el-Mutilla:*

Referring to para 11*b* of May 18 res, Eban urged that SC should take seriously Israeli complaint now three months old of what Israelis consider most serious violation of armistice agreement. He hopes sponsors would agree with Riley, in letter to Eban predating last report, that MAC should be convened and that highest priority should be given to an investigation and finding concerning this complaint.

5. *MAC:*

Eban emphasized that Israel was the party pressing for convening of MAC to consider pending complaints and that prior conditions insisted upon by Syrians were matters that should be brought to MAC if not settled otherwise.

6. ***Partition demilitarized zone:***

Eban saw disturbing signs in paras 18, 19 and 20 of Riley's last report that Riley favored partition of demilitarized zone; Eban also observed he understood that Riley's view was shared by some govts among the co-sponsors. Saying that minimal objective of armistice negotiations from Israeli view was that Syria not be brought to water line, Eban observed that removal of all Syrian authority from proximity to water sources was only thing worthwhile in armistice agreement. He said a major Israel objective in any peace settlement would be to keep Syria away from water line. (End summary Eban's initial comments.)

In response to question by Gross concerning rehabilitation of Arabs dealt with in para 28 of Riley's last report, Eban said he had received cable from Sharett indicating that Israel would try to make Arabs "as comfortable as possible". Admitting this was rather vague, Eban observed that question of Israeli liability must be established. The extent to which Israel might or might not be liable involved the question of culpability of local Arabs mobilized by Syrians in aggressive action first week of May. MAC should investigate this question. It was not matter in regard to which Riley could make finding. Eban added he did not wish to indicate either a positive or a negative attitude, but simply that question was one for MAC to consider. With regard to trading rights of Arabs referred to in para 17 of Riley's report, Eban said in response to question by Gross that there was nothing in armistice agreement (Art 5 in particular) giving Syria economic or political rights in relation to Arab inhabitants of demilitarized zone.

UK, French and Turkish reps agreed with outline of points of issue set forth by Gross. Jebb added a number of comments along following lines with which other co-sponsors indicate agreement.

Emphasizing that members of SC would not support thesis that demilitarized zone belonged to Israel, Jebb observed that if this question were held in abeyance there would be no problem. If, on other hand, Israel behaved as though zone belonged to her we would be "right up against it". He thought it would be better therefore if Israel behaved on the assumption that the zone did not belong to her. If Israeli police were withdrawn from area where they had no business to be and if there were no further encroachments he thought that measures had to be taken to compensate the Arabs and he thought the matter of letting Arabs trade with Syria was a small one involving no important question of principle. Referring to question of Riley being given authority to expropriate Arab lands, Jebb emphasized that no commitment had been given in SC on May 18 and that action by the council depended upon Riley's certifying that the May 18 res was being carried out with few if any reservations. Upon receiving such certification from Riley, Jebb believed attitude of Council members would not be unsympathetic. There would be a presumption in favor of pushing ahead with drainage work provided the Council believed that a question of international peace and security were involved. An important question which would have to be determined was whether there would be any adverse effect on the water supply of Jordan and Syria. Gross added that in view of co-sponsors, before referring to SC, Israel should appeal to MAC under Art 7, para 8 of armistice agreement if it disagreed with Riley's position that chairman did not have authority expropriate lands.

Reps of co-sponsors emphasized purpose of informal discussion was not to cut Riley–Sharett conversations in any way. In our opinion this informal amicable discussion served useful purpose in letting Israelis know in frank and friendly way where co-sponsors stand on important points at issue.

AUSTIN

683.84A/8–2951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, August 29, 1951—8 : 58 p.m.

279. Re Syria–Israel:

Following is text of informal notes handed to Ambassador Eban this morning at meeting with co-sponsors of May 18 res discussed in immediately previous tel.

"(1) Co-sponsors note with satisfaction Israeli action on drainage project in compliance with 5th para of res.

"(2) Interim report of Aug 16 indicates Israelis have not complied with 10th para of May 18 res re Bunche's explanatory note on draft of Art 5 of armistice agreement. Co-sponsors consider Israeli attempt to police entire demilitarized zone inconsistent with that para since they understood para to mean that zone policing should be on local basis, Israeli police for Israeli settlements, Arab police for Arab villages, and size and operation of police forces to be determined by MAC chairman.

"(3) Report also indicates non-compliance by Israelis with 12th para of res since procedures for returning Arabs to zone and treatment of Arabs already returned to zone are not satisfactory. In this connection following paras from General Riley's fourth interim report (document S/2300) were discussed.

"15. Return of Arabs removed to Shaab area.
"16. Right of Arabs to trade with Syria.
"21. Return of Arabs who fled to Syria.
"22. Return of Arabs now in vicinity of El Hamma to Es Samra and Nuqueb.

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[1] Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, and Tel Aviv. The Mission in the best position to do so was requested to convey the substance of this telegram to General Riley.

"28. Compensation and rehabilitation of Arabs returned to demilitarized zone.

"(4) Report indicates non-compliance by Israelis with 14th para of res since restrictive measures on movement of UN observers within zone have been imposed by Israeli police.

"(5) Report indicates parties have not complied with paras 7, 8 and 9 of res in that they have not agreed to a MAC meeting since June despite a number of complaints pending.

"(6) Co-sponsors feel that both parties must make fullest use of machinery of Syrian-Israel general armistice agreement. This includes meeting in MAC to discuss outstanding complaints and other issues of concern to one or the other party."

Austin

320.2 AA/8-3151 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, August 31, 1951—3 p. m.

211. Rapun 209. Summary latest Blandford negots as reported to AdCom 29th.

1. Blandford called on new Syrian PriMin 22nd. After recounting history Pal problem for record, PriMin then stated Syria prepared recognize *de facto* situation mean that Syria had large responsibility for solution problem including for example that large number refugees presently Lebanon must be given better living and employment conditions Syria. Asked Blandford submit memo for Cabinet consideration and promised urgent consideration and cooperation. Blandford later saw Syrian FonMin who reiterated Syrian desire for memo and assurance Syrian good-will to PRA. Stated major problems ahead included: (1) Obtaining agreement Syrian landowners (later admitted some Syrian public land available), and (2) Syrian "public opinion" which still thought reintegration mere camouflage Israel's thwarting 1948 UNGA res. Re latter FonMin stated PCC Paris mtg might introduce new complications.

2. Blandford saw Cherine Bey in Alex 23rd. Fol conversations Blandford gave Egyptian Govt written assurances: (1) PRA projects Sinai wld not overlap Egypt's own projects such as [garble] dam; (2) PRA recognizes Egypt retains mineral rights Sinai; (3) will cooperate with Egypt working out procedures deal with Bedouin squatters presently occasionally occupying some reintegration sites; (4) PRA projects will not jeopardize refugee rights under 1948 res. Cherine strongly reiterated his suspicions (Brit experts in Sinai disguised intelligence agents and urged Blandford recruits personnel from smaller western countries). Blandford promised look for experts in small states. PRA water-drilling equipment shld arrive Sinai next few days.

Bruins

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[1] Repeated for information to Damascus, Cairo, Paris, and London.

974.5301/8–3151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 31, 1951—8 p. m.

307. 1. Egyptian Amb called on McGhee Aug 30 and asked whether in our opinion his intervention with his Govt re Suez restrictions wld be useful. He was concerned by effect SC condemnatory res and hoped get SC and Egypt out of this dangerous position.

2. We reviewed various efforts which had been made Wash, NY and Cairo to obtain practicable proposal from Egypt for raising restrictions and pointed out such efforts unsuccessful. We emphasized our regret SC res neces but we were obliged to call shots as we saw them.

3. Amb suggested he might propose his Govt that destination certificates merely state oil and other supplies not going to Israel and omit exact destination. When ships left Egyptian terr waters, their destination cld no longer be controlled by Egypt. If Egypt discovered certain ship had later called at Israel port, that wld be test for "flexibility" admin regulations. Amb thought black list regulations wld not be strictly applied. He inquired whether we wld seek postponement SC mtg to permit him time to communicate his Govt.

4. Dept replied that such proposal had been made before and we not receptive. However if Amb felt such approach his Govt might be useful, decision was his. In any event we were doubtful such proposal wld be acceptable. Moreover, we cld not on this basis consider further postponement SC action.

5. As Amb did not indicate whether he had decided communicate with FonMin, above is merely for ur info.

WEBB

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Stabler (NE); signed for the Acting Secretary by Mr. McGhee. Repeated for information to London, Tel Aviv, Ankara, New York, and Paris.

Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council on September 1, 1951[1]

The Security Council

1. *Recalling* that in its resolution of 11 August 1949 (S/1376), relating to the conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States it drew attention to the pledges in these Agreements "against any further acts of hostility between the Parties";

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[1] U.N. Doc. S/2322. Approved by the Security Council at its 558th meeting on September 1 by a vote of eight in favor (including the United States), none against, and three abstentions (China, India, and the USSR).

2. *Recalling* further that in its resolution of 17 November 1950 (S/1907) it reminded the States concerned that the Armistice Agreements to which they were parties contemplated "the return of permanent peace in Palestine", and therefore urged them and the other States in the area to take all such steps as would lead to the settlement of the issues between them;

3. *Noting* the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Security Council of 12 June 1951 (S/2194);

4. *Further noting* that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization recalled the statement of the senior Egyptian delegate in Rhodes on 13 January 1949, to the effect that his delegation was "inspired with every spirit of co-operation, conciliation and a sincere desire to restore peace in Palestine", and that the Egyptian Government has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff made to the Egyptian delegate on 12 June 1951, that it desist from the present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel;

5. *Considering* that since the Armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search, and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence;

6. *Finds* that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in paragraph 4 above is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement;

7. *Finds further* that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure;

8. *Further finds* that that practice cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence;

9. *And further noting* that the restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel;

10. *Calls upon* Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.

784A.00/9–451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Israel Ambassador Abba Eban.

Participants: Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Moshe Keren, Counsel, Embassy of Israel
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Waldo—NE

The Ambassador said that he was calling to take his leave before departing for a week's rest at Lake Placid. He then reviewed briefly several items:

1. *Suez:* The Ambassador expressed his gratitude for US support on the Suez Canal issue and his relief that the resolution had been adopted by the SC on Saturday, September 1. I said that, as the Ambassador knew, our position all along had been one of support for the resolution. The Ambassador then alluded to the surprise Russian move on Wednesday, August 29, requesting postponement.[2] He said that the Russian representative[3] had told him that actually the Soviet position was against the restrictions, whether they were restrictions on the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal or other international waterway of this sort. The Ambassador said he had noted that the Arab States had received a temporary morale boost in the belief that the Russians were now prepared to support them. It was agreed that their disillusionment with the Soviet Union was the severer for the fact that the Soviet gesture requesting postponement had been made at all.

2. *PCC:* The Ambassador said that his Government fully intende to accept the PCC invitations but hoped the Arab States would n insist on refusing to discuss outstanding problems with Israel face t face as a precondition of their acceptance of the invitation. The Am bassador was informed that the Egyptians had accepted the invitatio without making this a precondition. I said it was probable they woul refuse to talk directly with the Israelis at first, however, but we hop that in the course of the discussions they might be brought to quiesce in direct talks. It would probably be easier to get them to agr to direct talks if no publicity were given to their initial refusal and attempt was made to argue the point publicly. The Ambassador s he felt that unless direct talks were held it was highly improbable t any progress toward a settlement could be achieved. He pointed that, after all, the Arabs negotiated directly with the Israelis o continuing basis in the several Mixed Armistice Commissions and

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo.
[2] At the 556th meeting of the Security Council; see U.N. Doc. S/PV.556.
[3] Semyen Konstantinovich Tsarapkin.

even talked directly with them at the Lausanne Conference, but never in a formal meeting. He expressed the hope that the US would do its best to get the Arabs to agree to go along with the idea of direct negotiations, or at least to keep them from interjecting any preconditions into their acceptance of the invitation. I said that we would certainly look into it and do what we could in this regard.

Mr. Waldo mentioned that the PCC report in the autumn of 1950 had recommended that direct discussions were necessary to permit constructive progress toward a peace settlement. The US had supported the conclusions of the PCC report.

3. *Plans for the General Assembly:* The Ambassador said that he wanted to have a good talk with me some time in the future concerning US plans for the GA. I said that I would be happy to do so. The Ambassador asked if we knew whether the Jerusalem question would be raised in the Assembly. I said that I did not know about this. Mr. Waldo said that there were several countries, including Israel, opposed to General Assembly consideration of this question; we were not particularly anxious to bring it up. It was possible, however, that one of the Latin America delegations or delegation of a Catholic country might raise the question. In the event the question should be raised, our tentative view was that our position this year would be very similar to that of last year. We would probably support a resolution along the lines of the Swedish Draft Resolution [4] of last year. The Ambassador agreed that it would be desirable not to discuss this question at all but if it were determined that some country planned to raise the question he thought the interested delegations should be prepared to introduce and support promptly a plan along the lines of the Swedish Draft Resolution in order to forestall opposition and the likelihood of another Belgian plan. I told the Ambassador that Mr. Plitt, former US Minister in Tangier, would be NEA's representative at the GA this year and we would all get together for general discussion of the Assembly at a later date.

4. *Requirements:* The Ambassador said he also wished to mention the subject of requirements. Israel was having a great deal of difficulty in obtaining steel these days. Steel was necessary for pipe and pipe was necessary for irrigation purposes to increase crop acreage which would provide for the vast numbers of new immigrants. The Ambassador said that the various representatives of the American Government who dealt with requirements had been very cooperative with the Israel representatives and in most instances they had received the necessary requirements tickets. The difficulty began, however, when Israel representatives attempted to get their orders filled by the steel companies. The attitude of the latter was that Israel was

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[4] U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.63.

a relatively new customer and that the old customers deserved priority. The Ambassador asked me if there was anything the Department could do to assist Israel to obtain the necessary steel from private concerns. I said that we would certainly look into it; that Mr. Hyman might usefully talk with Mr. Norman Burns in NE. We would see what we could do.

5. *Visit of Foreign Minister Sharett:* I inquired when the Foreign Minister was arriving in the US. The Ambassador replied that Mr. Sharett would arrive in the US on the 13th of September. He would be in Washington the 20th of September and would stay about three days. While here he would address a meeting of the National Economic Conference for Israel—the bond-raising organization. I said I should like to do something for him and hoped he would hold a little time open, either for lunch or dinner, or something of that sort. The Ambassador said that could certainly be arranged and he would let me know.

6. *Huleh:* The Ambassador then got up to depart, and I mentioned to him the fact that I understood the cosponsors of the SC Resolution of May 18 had held useful talks with him in New York; that I was glad to hear this. I thought that the talks Israel would have with General Riley in Tel Aviv would also be most important. The Ambassador said he understood the General had already talked to the Foreign Minister, but an account of the conversation had not been received.

320.2 AA/9–751 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, September 7, 1951—1 p. m.

229. Rapun 214. 1. Blandford saw Sharett and Meron Jerusalem 6th. Re refugees still receiving PRA rations in Israel Blandford took offensive stating that three years had now passed and Israel had not yet succeeded reintegrating over 20,000 Israeli citizens of which 3,000 Jews. When Meron brought up previous Israeli requests for PRA reintegration assistance Blandford replied Israel who is asking and getting large-scale aid from abroad to reintegrate newcomers should attack this "unfinished business" first and reintegrate own refugees without calling on UN. Blandford stressed more beneficial to Israel that PRA funds be devoted exclusively to resettlement refugees Arab States. FonMin Meron seemed most impressed these arguments and promised definite Israeli reply within fortnight.

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[1] Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, London, and Paris.

2. In passing Sharett stated Israel now prepared discuss compensation without insisting general settlement. Also made several unclear statements re compensation negots gist of which seemed to be that if Israelis and Arabs met face to face Israel would raise question war damage for tactical bargaining purposes. However if negots held through UN machinery Israel prepared forego war damage claims. Perhaps Emb Tel Aviv can clarify.[2]

BRUINS

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[2] See telegram 229 from Tel Aviv, September 11, p. 854.

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357 AC/9–751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, September 7, 1951—7 p. m.

222. Re Embtels 60, July 20 [2] and 111, August 3.[3] FonMin told me last night he felt encouraged over progress talks between Gen Riley and reps Israel Govt. He had had prelim conversation with Gen Riley which had been followed by long session yesterday morning between Gen Riley, Col Taxis and M. Vigier for TSO and Mr. Eytan, DirGen FonOff, Gen Yadin, Brig Makleff, Col Ramati, Mr. Dafne and Mr. Shiloah representing Israel Govt. Sharett remarked with obvious satis that he understood virtual agreement had been reached on all major points.

Later Eytan expressed similar views saying he believed satis basis had been worked out for settlement of outstanding questions with respect Huleh situation. He stated that most important question had of course been that relating to policing of demil zone, and that armistice agreement empowered MAC chairman to authorize employment of limited numbers locally recruited civilian police for internal security purposes. Since chairman was only to authorize employment it was clear that some other auth shld actually select and employ necessary local police. Since numbers were to be limited it was conceded that chairman's power to auth shld extend to determining numbers to be employed. He stated further that policing of Jewish and Arab villages wld extend to immed surroundings and that implementation of plan wld contemplate coop between police of various local districts in demil zone.

As to return of Arabs, Eytan said it had been agreed that those expelled from northern zone shld be allowed to return but other arrangements wld be made with respect those formerly in southern zone since latter had no lands to farm in that district. He stated that right of TSO officials and observers to have free access to all parts of demil zone was unquestioned. It was understood also that return of Arabs to Khoury farm wld be permitted.

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[1] Repeated for information to General Riley at Beirut.
[2] *Ante*, p. 786.
[3] *Ante*, p. 818.

Emb comment: Fact that Israel officials were silent re Gen Riley's interim report and degree to which they now show disposition to meet points raised indicate that they took serious view of report and wish to improve their position vis-à-vis TSO. On other hand concessions they have made do not include any relinquishment of actual control of demil zone, and problem of policing may still give rise to difficulties.

Expressed great interest in progress of negots and reiterated view expressed to FonMin as reported Embtel 60, July 20 that in view capital being made of Israel's alleged noncompliance it is important that this country place itself in correct and unassailable position this respect. Added that prompt and full compliance with May 18 res might well have important bearing with effectiveness Suez res.

DAVIS

320.2 AA/9–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, September 11, 1951—6 p. m.

229. Re Rapun 214 Beirut tel 229 September 7[2] to Dept saying this Emb might be able clarify FonMins statement about condensation [*compensation?*]. Sharett statement to me still far from clear. In introducing subject I referred to conversation with Harold Hoskins reported Embtel 865 June 12[3] re desirability consider compensation question without insisting on making it part of gen settlement. Sharett confirmed he still has open mind on subject but says now much will depend upon Arab attitude. If they are ready to settle some problems and improve relations, even though not willing make gen settlement, Israel will be responsive and will not hold rigidly to original position, that is, gen settlement or nothing. As to war damage claims he said question wld inevitably have to be discussed in negots with Arabs sometime, but Israel wld be willing discuss subject of compensation with UN reps without necessarily relating it to claims for war damages. Understand it is not Israel intention forego such claims entirely.

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated for information to Beirut (for Mr. Blandford), Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] *Ante*, p. 852.

[3] *Ante*, p. 710.

611.80/9-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET CAIRO, September 11, 1951—8 p. m.

312. I feel impelled to say that I have been surprised by extent our relations in this part of world have suffered as result of our stand on Suez restrictions, and I apprehend we will be suffering from this for some time. It has caused, for instance, a recrudescence of the Pal question which in Egypt had become quiescent, and may have bearing on our ability to do things, particularly in connection Anglo-Egypt negots. It has caused Arab revival of talk for closer relations with Russia.

I report this only because it is better to face facts.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated for information to London.

974.5301/7-3051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 12, 1951—6 p. m.

354. Dept has been giving careful attention ur desp 205 July 30[2] on invocation Art VIII Suez Canal Convention, and fol comments are made in light situation resulting from SC passage Res Sep 1.

US wld wish avoid any mtg dip reps under Art VIII of 1888 convention, and any efforts by Egypt convoke such mtg. It is poss Egypt FonMin not now seriously considering such move in view recent Sov conduct in SC, although monitored news desp suggests some action might now be taken under Art VIII of convention. Emb can best determine whether any approach Egypt FonMin at this time wld be useful. Shld Emb decide discuss question with FonMin or shld FonMin himself raise matter, fol points might be used in effort dissuade Egypt from Art VIII action.

(1) In view circumstances surrounding negots 1888 convention and subsequent Anglo-Fr agreement 1904, doubtful whether Art VIII Canal Convention ever became operative and consequently whether it cld now be applied. Legal memo re this being air pouched.

(2) Canal restrictions have already been considered by SC and Egypt has been called upon remove them. Egypt's compliance with SC res constitutes its major obligation as UN member. Therefore, any further consideration these restrictions under Canal Convention cld not alter effect SC res or Egypt's obligations.

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Stabler (NE) and Meeker (L/UNA); cleared with L/NEA, NE, and UNP; signed for the Secretary by Mr. G. L. Jones. Repeated for information to London, Tel Aviv, and New York.

[2] *Ante*, p. 806.

(3) Even if mtg convoked by Egypt shld take place we d
whether Egypt wld find support from majority participants fo
position.

(4) Involvement USSR in this question wld only serve as con
cating factor and wld probably work to particular disadvan
Egypt. Recent abortive Sov action in SC is good example this asser

(5) Dept's tentative view is Austria and Hungary, by virtu
Art 234 Treaty St. Germain and Art 217 Treaty Trianon, are
successors to Austria-Hungary. However, in any discussion
Egypt FonMin, Dept wld prefer any Emb comment on this poi
limited to expression that problem of succession to Austria-Hun
wld raise additional doubts in connection with Art VIII.

Ach

357.AC/9-1251 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliati
Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 12, 1951—8

1610. Palun 440. 1. Fol receipt Unpal 286, Sept 6,[1] USDel subm
to French and Turk reps a redraft of proposals to be submitte
parties conforming to Dept's suggestions. Final agreement was rea
this morning after protracted daily meetings in which French
raised numerous objections both as to form and substance. These
jections came as surprise inasmuch as Marchal had indicated his a
ment to original USDel proposals at informal meeting in which
were discussed. It is clear he has had difficult time with FonOff w
misgivings may be attributable to Brit lack of enthusiasm for co
ence and French preoccupation with (*a*) their interest in Israel-Sy
demilitarized zone question and possible French commitmen
Syrians in this connection, and (*b*) their fear that if PCC m
"supreme effort" now and fails, continuance of PCC beyond this
will be unlikely. It is clear to us that French are prepared to
whatever opportunity arises to inject PCC into Israel-Syrian bo
question and that they see in possible disappearance PCC, in e
conference fails, blow to French influence in Mid East. In any
they appeared desire continue procedure followed in Lausanne
Geneva and postpone time when PCC wld take initiative by pre
ing its own proposals as basis discussion.

2. Despite these difficulties, we have succeeded in reaching a
ment on text opening statement, text PCC proposals, and follo
procedure: (1) Opening meetings with Arab and Israel dels mor

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[1] Telegram Unpal 286, September 6, identified also as telegram 1407 to
for Ambassador Palmer, contained the Department's views on a draft wo
paper on the objectives of the forthcoming PCC Conference as transmitt
Palun 437, August 30, neither printed (357.AC/8-3051).

and afternoon of Sept 13, at which time statement, text of which contained below, will be read by me as chairman; (2) Second meetings with Arab and Israel dels on Monday Sept 17 to give parties opportunity to reply to opening statement (Arabs requested no meetings before Mon in view three-day Moslem holiday); (3) Following these replies Comm to submit proposals, text of which given below, to parties at meeting to be scheduled as soon as practicable.

3. Dept will note from text PCC's proposals that nonaggression declaration has been incorporated as preamble, with understanding that Comm will emphasize importance of agreement to such declaration as preliminary to consideration of its comprehensive proposals, in accordance with Dept's views as contained para 1, Unpal 286.[2] Refs in declaration to relevant articles armistice agreements were not included in view fact Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement differs with respect to articles from other agreements. Hence only general reference to obligations of members UN and signatories armistice agreements was included.

4. Dept will also note that para 5 has been redrafted to avoid specific reference to future conference for revision armistice agreements in accordance Dept's views. USDel continues believe there are substantial reasons for PCC's advocating that questions under para 5 be considered in subsequent meetings for this purpose. We believe such a proposal contains greater hope for direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states than present conference and that it will be inducement Israel consider comprehensive proposals favorably. We also continue feel that PCC is equipped to deal with specific questions under armistice agreements only in general way, and that shld PCC formally take up any of specific questions under para 5, French wld endeavor bring Israeli-Syrian question to forefront. Later conference has merit permitting any UN organ or rep lead discussions and if endorsed by GA wld have greater chance success than at present. We have therefore suggested to our colleagues that at appropriate time PCC might, under para 5, advocate subsequent meetings for full scale consideration questions enumerated and that for present we wld limit our formal efforts to proposal that parties agree in principle to discussion these items. We have also indicated we wld agree have informal discussions of specific questions under para 5 during course present meetings.

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[2] In the first paragraph of Unpal 286, the Department suggested that a nonaggression declaration might be submitted to the parties separately from the comprehensive proposals since it would be a document both sides should be able to sign without too much hesitation or reservation. The Department suggested the declaration refer to the obligations of parties under Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the United Nations Charter and Article 1 and 3 of the respective armistice agreements which remained in force pending a final peace settlement and hoped that a favorable atmosphere could be created through initial consideration of the nonaggression item.

5. Fabre, UNRWA liaison officer representing Blandford, was given by Barco full explanation USDel proposals on 6 Sept with request Fabre transmit to Blandford full account. USDel understands Fabre has not done so, on assumption Blandford wld receive indication US position from Dept, altho he has conveyed his belief to Blandford that US proposals are satisfactory from UNRWA standpoint. USDel suggests Dept repeat agreed text PCC proposals to Beirut for Blandford and to other US missions in area, as well as to London and Ankara. USDel still hopes Dept will be able obtain greater UK support our efforts and this connection that UK will be prepared appoint liaison officer for Paris meetings.

6. Agreed text Chairman's opening statement follows:

"As the Chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission during the Comm's initial meetings here with you, it is my privilege, and it is a pleasure for me, to welcome you on behalf of the Commission as participants in this Paris conf.

"We find in the acceptance of our invitations to this conference, by the govts of the five neighbor states to which the invitations were addressed, encouragement for our belief that those who entered into the armistice agreements have an earnest desire to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine.

"Those engagements, entered into almost three years ago, had a two-fold purpose: To put an end to bitter warfare and to pave the way for a transition to a lasting peace in a land sacred to three of the world's great religions.

"The first purpose has been achieved: the warfare between the neighbor states has been stopped. But there has been little progress toward the achievement of the second purpose—that is, the working out of a peaceful settlement of the problems dividing these neighbor states.

"The objective of this conference, in which we hope to continue to find encouragement from your participation, is to see, through mediation, solutions to these problems which, as we see them, can be broadly grouped into two categories: (*a*) problems mainly affecting the rights and status of individuals, and (*b*) problems mainly affecting the rights, obligations and relations of states.

"The first group includes such questions as the repatriation, compensation and resettlement of the refugees; claims for indemnification for damages resulting from hostilities; and disposition of blocked accounts.

"Among the specific problems in the second group are: Delineation of boundary and demarcation lines; demilitarized zone and no-man's lands; arrangements for free-port facilities; water, fishing and navigation rights; communications and telecommunications; and such problems as narcotics, contraband and health control.

"Many of these problems have been the subject of discussions between the Comm and the parties during the past three years. In a sense, these discussions have been useful. They have made abundantly clear the views, aspirations and ideas of the parties to the dispute.

But the time has now come to make constructive use of this clarification of views, aspirations and ideas. That is the task the Comm has undertaken by assuming its mediatory functions at this conference and by offering to submit concrete proposals for consideration by the parties.

"In drafting the proposals to be submitted to you, the Comm has been guided by two considerations: fairness and realism. We have tried to take into consideration all the views expressed during the past three years by the parties to the dispute, as well as the political, social and economic realities observed by us. We have come to the conclusion that the Palestine problem must be considered in its entirety, and that its solution must be sought in a fair and realistic spirit of give-and-take.

"In considering the Palestine problem in its entirety, we are following the guidance given to us by the GA. The Assembly res under which our Comm operates—and under which you are cooperating with us—emphasizes the general character of the Palestine problem. In drafting our mediatory proposals for discussion in this conference, we have had to keep in mind that the GA has instructed us to assist the govts and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them. We feel certain that in considering our proposals, you will keep in mind that the assembly, in the same resolution, has called upon the parties to the dispute, to seek agreement by negotiations with a view to the final settlement of all outstanding questions. It is impossible to miss the meaning of this call and the clear emphasis of the res on the interdependence of the various elements of the Palestine problem. Experience has shown that concentration on one or the other isolated paragraphs of the res out of context has not helped in the promotion of peace in Palestine. All the elements are necessary, but they are useful only if linked together according to an overall plan. For example, the res instructs us to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees, and we did not forget that instruction when we drafted our proposals for this conference. Nor did we forget the instruction given us in the same res, to seek agreements between the govts which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for free access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities. On the one hand, a sound economic development is impossible in an area with hundreds of thousands of homeless people uncertain of the future and their standing in society. On the other hand, refugees—and non-refugees for that matter—cannot be settled securely anywhere in an area badly lacking economic development.

"Surely the inter-relation of all the aspects of the problem is too obvious to be overlooked.

"The Conciliation Comm has not overlooked it in weighing the mediatory proposals to be placed before you at this conference. In drafting those proposals, we have considered that any solution of the refugee question will involve important commitments by Israel. But we have also considered that Israel cannot be expected to make such commitments unless, at the same time, she receives reasonable assurances from her neighbors as to her national and economic security.

"The solution of the refugee problem proposed by the comm envisages the repatriation and integration of some of the refugees in Israel and the resettlement of others in Arab countries.

"Such undertakings will necessitate the creation of additional land by means of development and irrigation and agreements between the parties on the use of water resources. These agreements will, in turn, involve revisions or extensions in scope of existing armistice agreements, as well as appropriate economic arrangements.

"No constructive progress towards a solution of your problems is possible unless all the parties to the dispute at the outset of our discussions here, express their determination to respect each other's right to security and freedom from attack, to refrain from warlike or hostile acts against one another. and to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine.

"These are the considerations which have inspired the comprehensive proposals which the Comm will place before you as the pattern for this conference.

"At this time of our initial meeting here with you, my colleagues and I have endeavored to help you to understand the general pattern of proposals which we desire to submit to you for consideration after you have had an opportunity at our next meeting to respond to this statement. We believe that you will understand our feeling that the measure of the helpfulness of our proposals will be found not only in the extent to which they offer opportunities for progressive action but also in the extent to which we can all work together to make the most of these opportunities.

"It is now almost three years since the GA formulated a UN policy for the settlement of the problems arising out of the Palestine conflict. Notwithstanding successive efforts to find a way to such a settlement, we have as yet made no progress that to the casual observer is in any way apparent. Without attempting to determine where the primary responsibility for that failure may be, we all here must now recognize that we share the responsibility for coming to grips with these problems in a new spirit of determination, realism and honesty. No one of us can fail to hope that the problems with which we are dealing will be solved, or fail to wish to make his distinct contribution to their solution. It is easy enough to look at the record of the past three years and remain skeptical. What is needed now from all of us is extra determination, extra faith, extra goodwill. Too much depends on the outcome of our efforts here for any of us to indulge in second thoughts, flagging determination or lack of faith in our ability to arrive at a just solution. The conciliation Comm is ready and determined to do its part. In doing its part, it counts on your understanding and cooperation in fullest measures."

7. Agreed text PCC comprehensive proposals for submission to parties follows:

"On the basis of the considerations set forth by the Chairman in his opening statement, the Comm desires to submit to the parties for consideration a comprehensive pattern of proposals.

"As a part of this comprehensive pattern, the Comm wld emphasize the importance of a preliminary accord in reaffirmation of the undertakings of the parties as signatories to the armistice agreements and as UN members in the form of the fol preamble:

"*Preamble:*

"In accordance with the obligations of states members of the UN and of signatories to armistice agreements, the govts of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and the Govt of Israel solemnly affirm their intention and undertake to settle all differences, present or future, solely by resort to pacific procedures, refraining from any use of force or acts of hostility, with full respect for the right of each party to security and freedom from fear of attack, and by these means to promote the return of peace in Palestine.

"*Proposals:*

"With a view to the settlement of outstanding differences dividing the parties, the Comm submits the fol proposals for their consideration:

> "1. That an agreement be reached concerning war damages arising out of the hostilities of 1948, such an agreement to include, in the Comm's opinion, mutual cancellation of such claims, by the Govts of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and the Govt of Israel;
>
> "2. That the Govt of Israel agree to the repatriation of a specified number of Arab refugees in categories which can be integrated into the economy of the state of Israel and who wish to return and live in peace with their neighbors;
>
> "3. That the Govt of Israel accept the obligation to pay, as compensation for property abandoned by those refugees not repatriated, a global sum based upon the evaluation arrived at by the Comm's refugee office; that a payment plan, taking into consideration the Govt of Israel's ability to pay, be set up by a special comite of economic and financial experts to be established by a UN trustee through whom payment of individual claims for compensation wld be made.
>
> "4. That the Govts of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and the Govt of Israel agree upon the mutual release of all blocked bank accounts and to make them payable in pounds sterling.
>
> "5. That the Govt of Israel and the Govts of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria agree to consider, under UN auspices, and in the light of experience gained during the past three years, the revision or amendment of the armistice agreements between them, especially with regard to the fol questions:
>
> "(*a*) Territorial adjustments, including demilitarized zones;
> "(*b*) The creation of an international water authority to deal with the problems of the use of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers and their tributaries, as well as the waters of Lake Tiberias;
> "(*c*) The disposition of the Gaza strip;
> "(*d*) The creation of a free port at Haifa;
> "(*e*) Border regulations between Israel and her neighbors with special attention to the need for free access to the holy places in the Jerusalem area, including Bethlehem;
> "(*f*) Health, narcotics and contraband control along the demarcation lines;

"(*g*) Arrangements which will facilitate the economic development of the areas: resumption of communications and economic relations between Israel and her neighbors."[3]

[PALMER]

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[3] The Conference of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was held in Paris from September 13 to November 19, 1951. An account of these meetings is contained in *Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Covering the Period from 23 January to 19 November 1951* (U.N. Doc. A/1985). Reports on the meetings by the U.S. Representative in addition to those here printed are found in Department of State decimal file 357.AC.

357.AC/9–1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, September 14, 1951—6 p. m.

1648. Palun 444. Fischer, Israel rep, called this afternoon to inform USDel of Sharett's reaction to chairman's opening statement.[2] He said Sharett had expressed his surprise that statement went beyond question of compensation. He thought ref to repatriation wld prove to be red herring which wld make progress difficult. Chairman's statement wld have to be referred to cabinet, and reply to PCC wld not be possible for several days.

I told Fischer Arab reps expected receive proposals Monday[3] and that it wld be unfortunate if PCC cld not meet with Israel del on same day. I suggested that if he was not prepared Monday to reply to chairman's opening statement, he might say so at that time but indicate he was ready to receive PCC proposals for transmission to his govt. I said I thought it wld be undesirable for Israel Govt to formulate position on opening statement without first knowing content of proposals. Fischer felt he cld not ask PCC for proposals on Monday in view his govts attitude, but added that he wld be willing attend meeting and merely state he cld not yet make reply to opening statement; he wld leave it to PCC to submit proposals then and wld be prepared receive them for transmittal to his govt. He is so informing Israel Govt.

USDel feels this procedure is most desirable and hopes there will be no adverse reaction in Tel Aviv.

[PALMER]

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, and Jerusalem.

[2] See Palun 440, September 12, p. 856.

[3] September 17.

320.2 AA/9–1451 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, September 14, 1951—midnight.

248. Eyes only McGhee from Blandford. While awaiting opportunity to contribute success of Paris mtg, believe I shld pass along fol observations:

1. While it has been Departmental policy publicly to identify PCC with conciliation of past polit issues and UNRWA with coop on constructive econ measures, two efforts are interlinked and there shld be constant private consultation.
2. Because of special circumstances of my return to area, extensive consultation Arab leaders and early identification with econ approach to problem, reintegration and new homes and jobs three-year program, multi-purpose contribution scheme, proposal larger use of MAC's and suggestion Jordan engineering mission have expected request personal consultation.
3. Had completed entirely satis first-round visits Arab Govts re three-year program when Paris mtg announced. Subsequent four visits have each raised spectre of delay and of hazarding concrete commitments before assembly mtg. Paris conferences shld recognize this.
4. There is as yet no normal UN channel of consultation on Paris negots. Secretary General apparently uninformed. PCC chairman advises he reports to Dept. Departmental communication through US member AdCom inadequate because is incomplete and long delayed.
5. UNRWA arrangement for re Paris gives us running report, but we lack background of basic documents and thinking. Do not know Departmental thinking on UNRWA role on compensation. Did not have info as to proposal that Arabs agree settle unrepatriated on condition Israel repatriate or of present approach of tying together econ development with old polit issues although we have important experience along these lines.
6. Above comment intended to be constructive and contribution success mtg as well as our effort. Meanwhile we are starting hopefully second round of visits.

[Blandford]
BRUINS

320.2 AA/9–1451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 17, 1951—8 p. m.

256. Unrap 194. ReLegtel 248;[2] Unrap 193 gives full info. Tentative agenda PCC modified at Dept suggestion to take into account opinions Rapun 207.[3] Macatee's presence Paris and Beirut will be helpful as he briefed PRA views and Dept thinking future roles PRA

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Gardiner (NEA); cleared by Messrs. Ludlow (UNP), Tomlinson (UNE), and Kopper (NE).

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated August 27, p. 842.

and PCC. Liaison between UN agencies shld be arranged by UN SYG. Dept puzzled by seeming absence of exchange of info between PCC and PRA in past and hopes you, Macatee and Amb Palmer will take all possible steps to correct this.

While Dept appreciates Paris mtg may be used as pretext to delay acceptance PRA projects by Arabs, believe you will appreciate necessity for PCC to discharge role assigned to it by GA prior to GA mtg in order latter be able to determine future course of action particularly re PCC. Dept recognizes certain amount overlapping exists but believes this can be handled.

In any event we wish encourage PRA proceed development plans constructive action funds available balance 1952 and subsequent years. Essential PRA propose blueprints PRA projects acceptable to Arabs in good time for consideration GA Nov. US 1953 legis schedule involves BOB hearings Nov 15, Cong presentation Jan 15. 1953 proposals must be more specific than 1952 if US contribution PRA is to be maintained.

Pls convey foregoing to Blandford in response Legtel 248. McGhee away briefly other business.

WEBB

357.AC/9-1851 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 18, 1951—1 p. m.

1698. Palun 445. On afternoon of 15th Fischer, Israel rep, called at his request to inform USDel he wld not be able fol procedure we had agreed upon for today's mtg as reported Palun 444, Sept 14.[2] He had however submitted certain suggestions to his govt which he hoped wld be accepted and wld provide way out of difficulty. He agreed inform me of his govt's reply to his suggestions as soon as recd.

Yesterday evening Fischer called again to say Shiloah wld arrive Paris 8:15 Monday morning and wished call upon USDel as soon as possible after his arrival. This morning, Monday, Fischer arrived at Emb without Shiloah, who he said had not arrived as scheduled. Under circumstances he cld not receive PCC proposals and requested Comm withhold submission to Arab Dels. I explained Arab Dels had clearly expressed their wish receive PCC proposals at today's meeting after they had responded to chairman's opening statement and that in our opinion it wld be unfortunate for Comm to have to submit proposals to one of parties without communicating them to other. I wld, however, inform my colleagues of Israel Rep's request.

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, and Jerusalem.

[2] *Ante*, p. 862.

At immediately fol PCC meeting Comm decided if Arab Dels concluded their statements in today's meeting and continued indicate their desire receive proposals, Comm had no choice other than submit proposals this time. To withhold proposals at request of one govt when four govts had indicated wish receive them wld inevitably create impression PCC delaying its proposals in order make them compatible with Israel views. At this morning's meeting with Arabs after statement by Shukairy in name of all dels, I therefore read text of proposals to dels and provided them with copies. In reading text, I divided proposals into two parts, preamble and proposals proper indicating PCC view that consideration preamble was important preliminary to consideration remaining items. Shukairy's statement fols:

"The Arab League Dels desire at outset, to repeat their thanks to the warm welcome extended to them by the Honorable Commission. We wish also to place on record our appreciation of able explanation of term 'conf' frequently referred to in opening statement of the Comm. Apart from being praiseworthy, the interpretation of the chairman on this point tends to remove any misinterpretation. The Arab Dels wld like to seize this opportunity to reiterate their readiness to collaborate with the conciliation Comm in its efforts to arrive at a just and equitable settlement of the Palestine question. Ever since the Comm embarked upon its mission, the Arab League Dels have been responding to invitations to meet the Comm in Beirut, Lausanne, Geneva and New York. It is in this spirit that we have come to Paris to resume our meetings with the Comm.

"We have given a careful study to the opening statement delivered by the chairman of the Comm last meeting. The general pattern of the proposals the Comm intends to place before us is so wide that it is not appropriate at this stage to attempt a detailed analysis. It is only when we are presented with specific proposals that we deem it possible to define our final attitude.

"The Statement of the Comm, however, has introduced certain criteria and considerations foreign to the resolutions of the UN, and not within the context of the Palestine problem. To begin with, it is our respectful submission that the PCC as its name and terms of ref indicate, is confined to dealing with the Palestine problem. All the outstanding questions together with the refugees problems are part and parcel of the Palestine question. As such, the problem does not involve rights, duties and relations of states. Interstate relations are matters regulated in accordance with the established principles of international law, inasmuch as such relations are acts of sovereignty which are exercised at will and discretion. The creation, cessation or absence of relations between states are exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of every state. These relations ranging between recognition and 'bon voisinage' agreements exclusively fall within the orbit of national sovereignty, and as such cannot be subjected to the cognizance of the UN or any of its organs.

"Confident that the Comm does not challenge this principle, the Arab Dels can rest sure that the proposals to be offered by the Comm will be restricted to the issues relevant to the Palestine problem. The Comm, we believe, will refrain from touching upon any matter incidental to the rights, duties and relations of states. Yet it is worthy in this connection to point out that the provisions of the armistice agreements have taken due care of the security situation in Palestine. Ample injunction has been made in the said agreements against resort to mil force or any aggressive action. As parties to these agreements we shall continue to respect obligations thereunder. This undertaking of no aggression, no resumption of hostilities and no resort to the force of arms is the sole obligation that the charter of the UN can dictate over states members.

"In second place, the Arab Dels wish to point out that proposals envisaged by the Comm shld be within the framework of the resolutions of the GA. With regard to the problem of the refugees, the Comm has a specific mandatory task in para II of the res of 11 December, 1948. It is well understood that the fairness and realism referred to in the statement of the Comm will be applied in the direction of implementing the resolutions of the GA. Any other interpretation wld lead to the frustration of the GA resolutions. It must be remembered, however, that the role of the Comm with regard to para II is implementation and not conciliation. The Assembly has already decided the issue by fairness, realism and any other criterion it has to apply. The matter of the refugees stands *res judicata*, passed to the Comm for effective implementation.

"Thirdly and without discussing the interdependence or otherwise of the various aspects of the Palestine question, the Arab Dels deem it necessary to emphasize the priority and urgency which shld be accorded to problem of the refugees. Recognized by the GA the rights of the refugees are not contingent or dependent upon the say of Israel. The only qualification placed upon the refugee in his option to return to his home is his readiness to live at peace with his neighbors. Peace here shld emanate from the refugee himself. It is obvious that the rights of the refugees do not constitute commitments by Israel. Israel's respect to these rights, apart from being fundamental and imperative, does not place upon the Arab States obligations not imposed under the charter of International Law. Under the GA res of 1947 the rights of the Arabs in Israel prevail over any constitution or enactment of law. To ask the Arab States to provide assurances for the economic security of Israel in return to the respect of the rights of the refugees is a novelty in international dealings. The economic security of Israel is Israel's concern and duty. Israel claims to be a sovereign state and it is for her to secure an economy which is her making and in which we have no say. The deplorable plight of the refugees shld not be used as lever to secure Israel in the very economy she has planned. The rights of the refugees are preexisting the existence of Israel, and the Arab Dels legitimately consider themselves under no obligation towards the economic development, stability or security of Israel.

"In conclusion, it is appropriate to recall that the Arab League Dels have discussed with the Comm the various aspects of the Palestine question. The refugees, the territorial aspects, blocked accounts, broken families and various other conservatory measures—all have been exhaustively examined. To each of these items due time and effort have been dedicated. Concentration of discussion was not a monopoly to one aspect or the other. The failure so far is not due to certain procedures. Likewise, it is not due to concentration on one item or its isolation from the general context. The reason is to be found primarily in tne negative conduct of Israel and its persistence not to recede from the '*fait accompli*'."

The incessant and sincere efforts of the Comm to achieve the acceptance by Israel of the res of the GA did not succeed. The protocol of May was ignored by Israel. The armistice lines, against the express provisions of the armistice agreement, are final in the eyes of Israel, to say nothing of expansionist intentions. The attitude of Israel as shown in the various documents of the Comm, has contributed in bringing about the failure of the conciliation efforts.

It has thus become clear that the process of conciliation lacks a party to conciliation. Before Israelis made to respond to the call of the UN for cooperation with the Comm within the perimeter of the resolutions of the GA the conciliation efforts will remain fruitless. For our part we shall continue to collaborate with the Comm in goodwill, faith and determination."

After my reading text PCC proposals, Arab Dels stated they wld not respond at this time but wld reserve their comments for more detailed exposition by Comm of its proposals at subsequent mtgs. USDel was encouraged by relative moderation Shukairy's statement, absence insistence prior settlement refugee question before discussion other subjects and apparent acceptance Comm's proposals as substitute for agenda.

During this mtg, Shiloah arrived in Paris and telephoned requesting USDel lunch with him. I informed him at luncheon of action taken at mtg with Arab Dels and urged him see way clear to receive PCC proposals at mtg scheduled with Israel Del this afternoon. In long discussion of pros and cons Comm's procedure, Shiloah indicated Israel preoccupation was with idea of PCC's putting forward own suggestions for solutions various problems during course of mtgs. For PCC to suggest any solutions was in fact, to take position on what Israel shld "give" and to prejudice whole issue by stiffening Arab attitude. PCC, he indicated, shld restrict itself to discussing with parties choice of agenda items and leave to parties negotiation solutions under such agenda items. In response to our question as to whether Israel did not expect "give" something in course of negotiations, Shiloah clearly implied Israel cld not consider giving anything, and referred to Israel's original offer re repatriation as withdrawn. He believed, however, it would be appropriate for Comm to call upon the parties to sign a non-aggression declaration, which Israel wld be prepared to do at once, and to refrain from submitting other suggestions. He felt Israel cld not even consider other matters until after signature such an agreement.

USDel explained, without apparently convincing Shiloah, that best chance in our opinion for successfully negotiating nonaggression declaration was to emphasize it as preliminary item for discussion and agreement before consideration items in pattern of proposals. But we further explained that to submit to Arab Dels nonaggression declaration as sole item for discussion wld be to invite their refusal consider such item until they were informed full extent Comm's other proposals.

On matters arising under armistice agreements Shiloah stated Israel wld never agree discuss with all Arab Dels items relating only to relations between Israel and one Arab Govt and that Comm shld propose parallel conf in which Arab Dels interested in over-all problems wld be invited only to such problems together, while series individual mtgs shld be arranged on problems involving Israel and single Arab country.

USDel again urged Shiloah find way receive proposals at this afternoon's mtg and pointed out discussion such as was then taking place between us wld be more profitable and less academic if Israel Del had before it very proposals under discussion. It was our impression at this point Shiloah agreed receive proposals at this afternoon's mtg.

At mtg, however, Israel Rep declined receive proposals in brief statement read by Fischer as follows:

> "Before making any ref to the statement made by Mr. Palmer on Thurs last, my del wld like to submit to the Comm a few observations on the atmosphere surrounding the opening of the conf. The very word 'conf' invokes in the public mind the idea of the invited parties mtg round the same table. It is not surprising that the public and the press shld tend to interpret the calling of the parties to separate mtgs as the result of the refusal of certain of them to meet the other, which other can be none but Israel, whose attitude in principle is well-known. The adoption of an official attitude by the Comm wld serve to avoid any misunderstanding suggesting that the invitations separate mtgs were not the free choice of the Comm.
>
> "My del deeply deplores the statements made on the occasion of the conf by certain Arab leaders. Statements which go so far as to proclaim that the Arab States refuse 'to the end of time' to make peace with Israel indicate a disposition as incompatible with the spirit of the UN as with that of the conciliation Comm's mission. In fact, these statements proving in advance the failure of the Comm's effort. The Arab Govts accepted the invitation, but their acceptance can be nothing more than a pure formality, devoid of any reality, unless the attitude of extreme hostility again so recently manifested is replaced by the expression of a sincere desire to live in peace with their Israel neighbors.
>
> "My del thought it necessary to make these few gen remarks before referring to the text of the statement marking the official opening of the conf. The text of that exposition of the Comm's intentions was communicated to the Israel Govt in order that they might transmit to us their instructions as to a reply. The nature and importance of the text are such that my del will be unable to give the Comm the

elements of a reply until it has recd its instructions. I can assure the Comm that the question is being studied with all the despatch appropriate to the importance of the subj.

"In the meantime, my del has recd instructions to answer the common, one specific and essential point, which it emphasizes as being the first requisite for any positive advance towards a peaceful solution of the problems before us.

"It is in the desire to live peaceably together, as good neighbors, with the Arab people, that my govt has sent us as its reps to this conf. It is therefore without any reserve that, at the beginning of the conf. my govt expresses its determination—and I quote the text of Mr. Palmer's statement—to respect each other's right to security and freedom from attack, to refrain from warlike or hostile acts against one another, and to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine.

"As to the proposals, I wish to recall the chairman's statement to the effect that the Comm offered to submit proposals to the parties.

"This offer was communicated to my govt which has not as yet had time to take a stand on this matter. Therefore, I cannot on my own auth take the initiative of agreeing to receive the Comm's proposals.

"It was stated at the first mtg that the proposals wld not be tabled before the parties had had an opportunity of answering the chairman's opening statement.

"I wld like to recall that before this present mtg I had expressed the hope that the Comm wld find a way of not handing in its proposals before my govt had had an opportunity to answer the opening statement. Also, I believe that it wld have been more equitable not to give these proposals to one party when the other party had indicated that it was not ready to receive the same proposals. The reason why I am not in a position to receive the Comm's proposals at the present time is that a question of a principle is involved. Also, I want to repeat that the Comm had clearly stated that the proposals wld be tabled only after the parties had answered the chairman's statement. It is not for me to answer the question of whether the proposals shld have been tabled before the govts had decided on their answer, but under the present circumstances I must await a decision of my govt before being able to receive the Comm's proposals."

In view Fischer's statement, I stated Comm regretted Israel Rep was not in position receive proposals but that we hope he wld soon be in position to do so. Comm wld await further word from him.

If Israel continues object to principle of PCC's putting forward suggested solutions, USDel sees little hope for success present mtgs. Very raising of issue is bound have adverse effect upon Comm's position with Arab Dels which in our opinion is better at this point than at any time in past 2 and 1/2 years. Comm is, however, proceeding with plans for further mtgs with Arab Dels when nonaggression declaration will be presented as first order of business. Outcome these discussions unlikely be encouraging to further work if meanwhile it is known PCC is in jurisdictional impasse with Israel, implying Israel's unwillingness consider concessions.

[PALMER]

641.80/9–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, September 18, 1951—6 p. m.

257. Emb comment Depcirtel 178 [*173*], Aug 23.[2]

a. As to possibilities sterner Brit pol NE countries victims "irresponsible nationalism", Emb believes that firmer Brit pol in NE in making but that it will tend to favor Israel rather than other sides. This country is exercising care not to provoke UK while Brit are striving for further improvement relations with Israel which have recovered to marked extent since 1948.

b. Although conscious of decline in Brit prestige as result events in Iran and Egypt, Israelis still regard UK as principal fon influence in NE, and have great respect for its experience. Although US principal source vital econ support, Israel still tends identify interests with those of UK. It is mindful importance Brit market and values UK positive polit assistance as in Suez dispute where both countries aims were identical. For historical and other reasons Israelis may overestimate Brit strength in area. They watch hopefully for signs of UK "get tough with Arabs" pol, laud any indications of such pol, and compare such unfavorably with alleged US "appeasement" of Arabs.

c. Emb agrees views para 3 London Embtel 786, Aug 9[3] and excellent despatches such as London's 737[3] that close coop with UK in NE essential. It believes further common agreed pol necessary with respect not only to polit principles and objectives but also as to methods and timing. It believes further that care shld be exercised not permit development frictions which wld weaken effectiveness coop with UK and that vigilance shld be exercised prevent success attempts of any nations play off powers against each other.

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Paris, London, and Jidda.
[2] *Ante*, p. 840.
[3] Not printed.

357.AC/9–2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, September 20, 1951—4 p. m.

261. Further comment on subject Embtel 257 Sept 18.[2] While Emb agrees close cooperation with UK in NE is essential, it believes cooperation with Fr and Turk also important. In recent conversations,

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[1] Repeated for information to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus Jidda, Jerusalem, London, and Paris (for Ambassador Palmer).
[2] *Supra.*

my Brit, Fr and Turk colleagues expressed interest in outcome present PCC mtg in Paris, hoped progress cld be made toward area peace but saw little prospect of success. Adverse factors: Generally negative and irreconcilable attitude of Arabs on the one hand, and unconstructive, guarded, legalistic approach of Israel on the other.

As to Israel, it will be recalled FonMin had been apprehensive from outset over PCC mediatory role and undertook in his letter of acceptance to reserve Israel position re prospective PCC proposals. Prelim statement apparently confirmed suspicions, going beyond limits Israel hoped wld obtain, and running counter to this country's determination establish (1) that she will not accept any substantial number of refugees for repatriation, nor (2) consider territorial concessions, particularly those that might affect water sources.

Emb comment: Since primary need of region is peace between Arab States and Israel, Emb believes supreme effort shld be made at present PCC mtg to bring about gen settlement; but feels that without all-out backing by UK as well as govts represented on PCC and unless alternative to gen settlement is made distinctly unattractive to countries concerned, chances of success at present mtg more remote. Failing success present effort make progress toward peace, Emb believes there shld be well-planned coordinated effort to alter basic attitude of both Arabs and Israelis through direct appeal to populations by every available means. For psychological approach to be effective however, much wld depend upon Israel Govt since it wld play leading part. Given this country's able leadership and highly literate population, it shld be expected to show more statesmanlike and less pettifogging approach to problems vis-à-vis Arabs. Genuine, sustained and determined effort to lessen distrust and build confidence wld certainly increase Israel's stature in world opinion and have calming effect in ME. An impeding factor at present is Israel's self-righteousness and concentration on self-justification which obstructs any real understanding of Arab feelings and how they might be changed. Israel considers itself the injured party and finds it difficult understand, therefore, why it shld be expected placate Arabs. There is accordingly little interest manifested in making real effort to inspire in Arab peoples desire for peace, security and obvious advantages of return to normal relations.

It is believed further that policy of friendly helpfulness and impartiality on part of West Powers is good as far as it goes but unless supplemented by effective psychological approach it will not go very far; and that in absence of fundamental change in attitude of Arabs and Israelis toward each other, whether as result of present PCC mtg or otherwise, it wld be most unwise to build up armaments in this area.

DAVIS

357.AC/9-2051 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State

SECRET DAMASCUS, September 20, 1951—6 p. m.

145. Depintel Sept 12, 1 a. m.[1] Agreements reached by Riley with Israelis appear represent significant advance over situation described fourth interim report.[2] Syrians will, however, retain sense of injury and resentment toward UK and Western powers over Huleh unless complete compliance by Israelis is secured. In this connection we are puzzled by apparent absence any provisions for returning remainder of Arabs from Shaab or elsewhere in Israel to zone. Although Riley visited Damascus we have not seen him. Beirut can perhaps clarify last point.

Even 100 percent compliance will of course only bring basic problem to critical stage since ways and means expropriating Arab land will then be in order. We would recommend urging Syria and Israel call for revision armistice under Article VIII with object division of zone and suitable guarantees (International Commission) for water rights (Legdesp 32, July 20),[1] but only if Israel attitude whole zone problem could be improved. Developments Paris not conducive optimism this respect (Paris 1698 to Dept Sept 18).[3] To advise Syria request conference under Article VIII carries applied guarantee we will use our influence with Israel to assure bona fide negots on *quid pro quo* for Syria's acquiescence in drainage project. Only *quid* so far suggested remains division of zone. On other hand, to stand aside and let problem drift back to SC seems likely produce situation very similar recent Suez affair with further impairment US and general Western position in Arab world only certain consequence.

Syrian Govt, press, and public have made little to-do over Riley's fourth interim report presumably being mindful of disillusionment which followed jubilation over May 18 resolution. However, issue will again come to life when and if Riley reports definitively and expropriation is threatened. Legation would appreciate guidance in above dilemma.

CLARK

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Reference is to General Riley's fourth interim report, dated August 16 (U.N. Doc. S/2300).

[3] *Ante*, p. 864.

320.2-AA/9-2051 : Despatch

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, September 20, 1951.

No. 142

Subject: Preliminary Discussion of UNRWA's (PRA's) Three-Year Reintegration Program with Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

On September 12, 1951, the Honorable John B. Blandford, Director of UNRWA (PRA), met with H. E. Mr. Charles Helou, Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. A memorandum of that conversation, prepared by Mr. Blandford, is enclosed.[2]

During the conversation Mr. Blandford handed to Mr. Helou a copy of the outline of the Agency's proposal for a three-year reintegration program, which is attached as Enclosure No. 2.[2] This proposal, which has received the approbation of the Advisory Commission, will be discussed by the Director with the Near East Governments during his present second round of visits.

The salient points of Mr. Helou's remarks were:

1. Although Lebanon can undertake nothing more than symbolic reintegration on her own overcrowded territory, she is prepared to render strong political support to PRA. If necessary and desirable, Lebanon will take the initiative in obtaining Arab League approval for the program.
2. Mr. Helou suggested that in conversations with Arab Governments, particularly Syria, PRA should stress the financial side of its program, particularly the immediate large local expenditures which would result.

The role of the PCC in these negotiations was also discussed.

JOHN H. BRUINS

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Bergus; sent also to Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Paris, and London.

[2] Not printed.

357.AC/9-2151 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

RESTRICTED PRIORITY PARIS, September 21, 1951—8 p. m.

1800. Palun 448. PCC met this afternoon with Israel del. Fischer made following statement:

"I wish again to thank the Comm, in the name of my del. for its welcome to us. It has always been the earnest desire of my govt to see permanent peace established between Israel and her Arab neighbours for the sake not only of the ME but of the World as a whole. My govt is convinced that peace and ME ability in the ME is a vital necessity for the peace of the World. The Israel del has come to this conf for the purpose of negotiating a final peace settlement with the Arab States.

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, and Jerusalem.

"We have already had an opportunity of making known to the Comm the view held strongly and consistently by the Govt of Israel, that only by direct negotiations between Israel and her neighbours can there be any real hope of achieving peace. This, indeed, is the conclusion which the Comm itself reached last year and which it duly reported to the GA. If the Arabs had any genuine desire for the settlement of the problems outstanding between us, they wld agree to talk these problems over and work out mutually acceptable procedures. They cannot in reason claim to want a settlement, and at the same time refuse to discuss it with the other party concerned. If direct and frank talk is made impossible by the Arab dels continue refusal to meet us and talk things over, I fear our presence here will be of no great profit.

"As a first step towards the achievement of peace my del, as already indicated, is willing to subscribe to a declaration such as that indicated by the Comm, concerning each country's right of security and freedom from attack, and binding each to refrain from warlike or hostile acts against another and promote the return of permanent peace. We agree entirely with the Comm, if I may use your words, that no constructive progress towards a solution of our problems is possible unless all the parties, at the outset of these discussions here, explicitly accept these obligations. We are prepared here and now to extend to each and every one of the Arab States the offer of a pact of non-aggression. We shld see in acceptance of this offer a real token of the Arab States willingness to work towards the essential goal of this conference—the restoration of peace in the ME.

"The plight of the Arab refugees was the direct result of the hostilities launched by the Arabs themselves against Israel to crush her out of existence at best, and the real claim of the refugees lies against the Arab Govts which sent their armies to invade Israel in cynical violation of their international obligations. I am, however, authorized to state that the Israel Govt is willing to make a contribution to the resettlement of the refugees, but it must naturally insist that such an arrangement be mutual. As the Comm well knows, Israel has taken in some 200,000 Jewish refugees from the Arab States in the past 2 or 3 years, a large number of whom were deprived of their property and assets by the Arab Govts concerned. My del is willing to embark upon a discussion of this question with the Arab States with a view to finding a constructive overall solution to the problem of the refugees.

"We are also willing to take up the question of blocked accounts though here too it is understood that any discussion of the matter will include the blocked accounts in Iraq of the Jews who have left that country and found admission to Israel.

"The whole emphasis of our efforts rests on the achievement of peace. We suggest that three preliminary steps may well lead us all to this objective. First of all, acceptance by all the parties of a non-aggression agreement along the lines suggested. Secondly, direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States, in conformity with the conclusion which the Comm itself reached last autumn. Thirdly, before any proposals are considered, an agreement on what are the outstanding problems which shld constitute the agenda of this conference, for it is impossible to envisage that a conference can succeed if the parties have not even agreed, or been given the opportunity to agree, on what are to be the subjects of discussion and on the procedures to be followed.

"If the Arab dels refuse to commit themselves to a policy of peace, if they are unable to say that it is peace they have come here to seek, then, Sir, if we are to be completely frank and realistic, I feel bound to say that this attitude of the Arabs condemns our efforts to failure in advance. If, on the other hand, they are as anxious as we are to pave the road towards peace, they wld find our del happy to meet them in a common effort to achieve this high aim, and I feel certain that success wld not elude our grasp."

After hearing above statement, and thanking Israel del for continued cooperation, I said that Comm assumed Israel del was now ready receive PCC proposals in accordance with procedure already announced that proposals wld be submitted after dels had had opportunity to reply to Chairman's opening statement. Fischer replied that Israel Govt had doubts as to advisibility of procedure which had been outlined in the opening statement, but that inasmuch as Chairman had indicated Comm felt now was appropriate time deliver proposals, he was prepared "receive them for transmittal to his govt." Proposals were therefore delivered to Fischer and following communiqué has been issued with Israel del concurrence: "A meeting between the CCP and the Israel del took place on Friday, 21 September. In the course of the meeting the Israel del reiterated its readiness to cooperate with the Comm.

"After the del of Israel had replied to the statement made by the Chairman of the conciliation Comm at the opening of the conference, the text of the Comm's proposals, which had been given to the Arab dels on Monday, 17 September, was handed to the del of Israel.

"These proposals will be published after all interested govts have had an opportunity to study them."

[Palmer]

357.AC/9–2451 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, September 24, 1951—6 p. m.

1834. Palun 450. 1. Shiloah, now in US, returning Paris shortly. After talks with Sharett and Eban he will probably seek to explain to Dept Israel Govt concern re PCC submittal formal proposals without having first reached understanding with parties re agenda in this form and procedure.

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Jerusalem.

2. Shortly before Israel del submitted September 21 Israel Govt response [2] to PCC opening statement Shiloah personally expressed to me hope that if response was disappointing or seemed somewhat unpleasant US Del wld not take it too seriously. I felt then he wished avoid appearance Israel responsibility for possible breakdown PCC discussions here and I had same feeling in last minute talk he sought Sept 22. In course of talk I told him US Del naturally disappointed Israel govt response had not evidenced better understanding present PCC effort and doubly disappointed in that some phrasing and particularly refs to Arab states had made next steps more difficult for PCC. I suggested it wld have been helpful to PCC and in Israel's interest if recent Arab pronouncements unfriendly to Israel had been ignored at this time by Israel Govt.

3. Shiloah said Israel Govt's general concern re new PCC effort strongly expressed last week's cabinet mtg which he attended. He explained concern as due to: (*a*) Feeling that proposals as submitted indicate a position taken by PCC and preclude bargaining between parties Israel Govt considers essential for settlement "outstanding differences" whether through direct negots or with PCC mediation or under other UN auspices; (*b*) conviction Arabs regard proposals as involving commitment by PCC and therefore establishing minimum concessions which they may expect from Israel; (*c*) doubt Arabs disposed sign non-aggression accord preliminary to consideration of proposals without knowing details of proposals and prospects for obtaining such minimum concessions at least; (*d*) certain misgivings as to possible unanticipated significance of present PCC effort, whether this conf with its new PCC procedure and program as submitted to parties might involve policy questions in NE which Israel Govt wld not recognize as within PCC competence but might better discuss with US govt and other interested govts.

4. In further ref to form of proposals and importance of bargaining possibilities Shiloah mentioned as examples questions of war damages and port facilities at Haifa. He emphasized that while Israel had large claims for war damages there cld be no Egyptian, Syrian or Lebanese claims against Israel for war damages and therefore no basis for mutual cancellation. Re question of port facilities at Haifa, he referred to his participation in Jordan-Israel negots concerning this and other questions and implied Israel might be disposed take up this question again on bargaining basis.

5. Shiloah expressed particular immed concern over possibility that PCC proposals handed to Arab dels Sept 17 and to Israel del Sept 21 might be released for publication at early date.

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[2] See Palun 448, September 21, *supra*.

He said he feared that impact on public opinion both in Israel and in Arab States wld seriously prejudice chances of Israel Govt effectively participating in "conf" program as proposed by PCC.

6. I assured Shiloah no concealed Pol objective in present PCC effort; new approach natural outcome unsuccessful experience previous years; no "take it or leave it" intentions; in preparing program and proposals PCC endeavored provide for, hopes maintain, atmosphere conducive to "give and take" solutions. Am sure Shiloah does not doubt sincerity of my assurance. He went out of his way to avoid appearance Israel not interested in "give and take" solutions. But in Wash he or Eban will undoubtedly emphasize Israel govt doubts re purpose and usefulness present PCC effort and advisability and effectiveness program of proposals. US Del believes Dept and Amb Davis can be of great help now in encouraging Israel Govt participation in discussions here on basis PCC program as submitted to parties; also highly desirable that at same time Arab Govts be encouraged by US and other interested govts to subscribe to non-aggression accord, urging of which solely by PCC might prove embarrassing if not actually regrettable shld Arab states in view of outspoken Israel Govt insistence on a non-aggression accord as condition precedent, consider PCC emphasis on importance of such accord as primarily in interest of Israel.

7. PCC secretariat officers report growing conviction among Arab dels Comm is simply acceding to Israel demands. Press report contained *NY Times* Sept 21 dated Tel Aviv Sept 20 contains substance Israel Govt reply to be delivered to Comm fol day. Art V discusses Israel position regarding various items of PCC's proposals, whereas Israel rep requested Comm on 21st defer publication its proposals. Incidents of this nature increase PCC difficulties with Arab dels and tend provoke statements like that of Shukairy to Assoc Press in Paris *Tribune* today to effect Arabs wld not sign pact proposed by Israel. PCC is today therefore issuing to press text of proposals with fol press release: "On 17 Sept the PCC submitted to the dels of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria proposals for solutions to the problems outstanding between Israel and the Arab states, as foreseen in its invitations to the parties on 10 Aug. These proposals were recd by the del of Israel on 21 Sept. At that time the Comm announced that it wld make public these proposals after all interested govts had had an opportunity to study them.

"In view of statements already having appeared in the press in various countries concerning certain parts of the Comm's proposals, including the preamble, the Comm feels it is now desirable to make public the full text of its proposals. The Comm emphasized that the above-mentioned preamble was submitted to the parties as part of an integrated comprehensive pattern of proposals. At its next mtg with the parties, the Comm will be ready to discuss this comprehensive pattern of proposals."

US Del feels this action necessary for retention initiative by PCC and continuing emphasis on essential equilibrium its proposals.

[PALMER]

357.AC/9-2651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Paris[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 26, 1951—7 p. m.

1816. Unpal 292. Re Palun 448.[2] In anticipation possible unfavorable Israel reaction PCC integrated proposals Dept suggests you personally give Israel rep fol friendly expression US views:

1. US shares Israel belief direct negots most likely obtain profitable results but believes Israel shld appreciate (*a*) GA Res Dec 14, 1950 leaves PCC no other choice but continue present negot procedure in absence Arab willingness undertake direct discussions and (*b*) Israel continued insistence on direct negots not likely produce results and might be rock on which conf might founder with Israel receiving blame. US does not dismiss possibility of shift Arab attitude re direct negots in later stages conference provided progress made in indirect negots.

2. US concerned by Israel tendency insist on exacting from Arabs precisely defined bargain in return for possible Israel concession. It is US view if Israel is to move towards lasting peace settlement with Arab neighbors it shld manifest sincere willingness carry out responsibilities toward refugees without regard possibilities of final written peace settlement. Dept believes Israel shld be prepared make substantial concessions re compensation as evidence Israel good faith irrespective attitude Govts Arab States.

3. US hopes Israel will understand spirit in which PCC has made proposals and will at least undertake discuss with PCC points suggested. US believes it shld be possible for Arab States and Israel reach agreement on at least some suggestions contained in PCC proposals either under PCC auspices without sitting face to face or through

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow; cleared with Messrs. G. L. Jones and Waldo; approved for transmission by Mr. Wainhouse; signed for the Secretary by Mr. Hickerson. Repeated for information to Tel Aviv.

[2] Dated September 21, p. 873.

informal mtgs on outside between Israel and Arab reps even though such limited agreement not immed extended overall peace settlement.

4. As we see it, Israel has more to gain from present PCC Conf than Arab States. Conf can founder from present Israel insistence on face-to-face talks and comprehensive peace settlement. Unfortunately, little or no progress toward overall settlement has been discernible past two years. On other hand present conf provides oppor for Israel and Arab reps make clear their views claims and counterclaims to each other on broadest variety problems, and we think Israel wld be missing important bet if they shld let slip this their first oppor since early 1950. We feel that, in addition to broad topics set forth by PCC, there must be nr of minor ones which might be dealt with to advantage both sides and which cld be settled framework overall settlement. PCC will have had some success if only a few of the severed tissues are knit up.

ACHESON

357.AC/9–2751 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, September 27, 1951—6 p. m.

1901. Palun 451. At present stage PCC is concentrating efforts in both formal and informal meetings on persuading parties (*a*) to accept preamble and (*b*) to agree discuss remaining five points of PCC proposals. Prior to meeting with Arab dels 25th Barco and Azcarate had informal discussions with each Arab del urging them accept preamble as best means going forward with negotiations. Abdel Monem, Egyptian rep, seemed most receptive idea that Arab position wld be enhanced by prompt acceptance preamble, but stated he cld not accept on his own responsibility. He did have authority state in open meeting Egyptian Govt had no aggressive intentions whatever and wld settle any differences with other party strictly in accordance with armistice agreement. He indicated that after having made such a statement, if Comm wished to conclude that this amounted to acceptance of preamble, he might be agreeable Comm's issuing communiqué to effect PCC received statements of Arab States peaceful intentions which PCC considered an acceptance of principles of preamble.

At subsequent meeting with Arab dels I asked on behalf of PCC that Arab dels accept preamble in order to make it possible proceed to seek comprehensive solution to Palestine problem along lines set forth in PCC's pattern of proposals. In course of Abdel Monem's reply he stated Egypt wld respect armistice agreements as long as other party did same but that if Comm wished have a further affirmation of Egypt's pacific intentions, he was prepared give it.

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Jerusalem.

Fawzi Mulki, Jordan rep, stated Arab dels had reaffirmed their pacific intentions in joint reply to chairman's opening statement. Jordan had always respected provisions of armistice agreement and continued consider them as binding. Any further declaration by Arab Govts wld only be repetition of what had already been said.

Shukairy, Syrian rep, stated it was too early either accept or reject preamble, which he said shld be regarded as conclusion or result of agreement. When agreement had been reached on substantive matters preamble cld serve as instrument for expressing intentions of the parties. He felt Arab Govts cld make no more satisfactory declaration than that contained in armistice agreements.

Fol these statements meeting was recessed while Secretariat submitted to Arab dels proposed communiqué stating Arab dels had made statements reaffirming their peaceful intentions, and had accepted principles of preamble. Arab dels however cld not agree to issuance of such communiqué. Alternative drafts were submitted but with same negative results. Meeting was therefore adjourned.

In considering present position, PCC has decided it must continue urge acceptance preamble by both sides and agreement by both sides consider PCC's five proposals. We feel minimum satisfactory reply to Israel's demand for non-aggression pact is acceptance by Arab States of statement already proposed by Comm in form of preamble. Likewise PCC feels Israel shld accept declaration in form proposed by PCC without making issue of something PCC itself had not asked Arab States to accept. Present plan is have next meeting with Israel del when PCC will request Israel accept preamble and agree discussion its further proposals. Acceptance by either side at this stage will undoubtedly give PCC stronger arguments for acceptance by other. Encouragement to both sides by Dept and US Missions wld be invaluable.

[PALMER]

Editorial Note

On September 28, the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWAPRNE), John B. Blandford, Jr., submitted an annual report (U.N. Doc. A/1905) to the United Nations General Assembly. The report covered the period from May 1, 1950, when UNRWAPRNE took over from its predecessor, the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), to June 30, 1951.

320.2 AA/9-2851 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, September 28, 1951—1 p. m.

294. Rapun 226. Blandford visited Egypt 26th for discussions with FonMin, Azzam, Cherine Bey. Delivered outline three-year program FonMin and Azzam. All three most friendly and cooperative. All three optimistic re Syrian cooperation, promise support, and suggest Blandford see Shishikli. Cherine skeptical re PCC Paris meeting but Azzam stated Arabs did not accept invitation merely to walk out of meeting and expressed hope small areas agreement could be found. Azzam hopes get over-all Arab agreement cooperate with PRA at forthcoming league meeting. He and FonMin asked Blandford be available during League meeting answer questions if necessary.

FonMin stated PRA had Egypt's full confidence and Egypt hoped cooperate fully despite political differences with UN members and possible forthcoming break relations between Egypt and Brit. Also mentioned US Point Four and MSP as area where Egypt can cooperate despite political differences.

Blandford concludes "PRA has goodwill and support Egyptian Govt".

BRUINS

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[1] Repeated for information to Cairo, Damascus (as 35), Baghdad, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jidda, London, and Paris.

357.AC/9-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, September 28, 1951—5 p. m.

288. Avner, acting chief Amer division FonOff informed Emb officer last evening Paris conf now appears be one merely of polit maneuvering. Both sides expect it to fail and only question is which will be blamed by West powers for failure. If on other hand there shld be any real chance for genuine settlement, Israel wld be ready make real concessions including perhaps repatriation small number refugees (smaller however than "political" figure of 100,000 previously used).

When asked what single thing Arabs cld do to evoke reciprocal response from Israeli, Avner replied "all that the Arabs wld have to do wld be to come directly to us, say they realize Israel is now a fact, that they are limited by slowness of Arab public opinion in accepting that fact and will as consequence have to go slowly, but it is their genuine desire to talk realistically with view to reaching agreement".

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated for information to Ambassador Palmer at Paris.

357.AC/9-2951 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, September 29, 1951—8 p. m.

157. In two-hour conversation with FonMin Sept 22 Atasi expressed to me desire to cooperate with US, saying only Israel question stood in way. He spoke earnestly of Syrian Govt and people's overriding fear of Israel, emphasizing steady inflow immigration and US funds. I replied along usual lines urging reliance on tripartite declaration, Israel pacific intentions and UN guarantees against aggression.

He asked me call again today appearing greatly distressed re PCC proposals in Paris. He said reports from Paris and Syrian diplomatic reps elsewhere indicate US is trying "force" Arabs make peace settlement with Israel. Re-emphasizing Syria has no aggressive intentions, he said PCC proposals seem directed toward enlisting Arab cooperation to provide Israel with means of economic support (Legtel 138, Sept 16).[2] He declared this was too much to ask of Arabs who had sovereign right take measures they regard essential their own safety.

He said some Arab leaders had recommended against accepting PCC invitation but he and others had prevailed on Arab League accept in order show Arabs continued hope for redress by UN of past grievances. He deplored Chairman's opening statement which he said implied Arabs had to make concessions Israel in order gain even its partial compliance with past resolutions. These were not proper subjects for negotiation but for enforcement by UN. In fact all that needs be done is for UN, and particularly US, require Israel comply with past GA and SC resolutions and objectives PCC will be realized.

He placed blame for noncompliance on US tolerance Israel illegal actions and continued US economic support. He and every other Arab are convinced all US has to do is to threaten cut off its aid and Israel will comply. He cited as example US attitude reports he had received that French had proposed division Syria–Israel demilitarized zone along waterline and UK concurred but US reaction was "negative" one to refer question to PCC, implying US support Israel's refusal this proposal. He urged change in US policy toward Israel bring about compliance UN resolutions, citing them one by one.

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[1] Repeated for information to Ambassador Palmer at Paris and to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Jerusalem, London, and Ankara.

[2] Not printed; it stated that the Legation in Syria had grave misgivings as to the inclusion of paragraph 5(*g*) in the PCC proposals (see Palun 440, September 12, p. 856). In the Legation's opinion, open reference to economic cooperation and the resumption of trade relations was premature in the present atmosphere and unnecessary in that if the other proposals were accepted, trade might follow. If the paragraph were included, the Legation feared it would be seized upon by all its opponents as a "trick clause" favoring Israel and represented as the real reason for which the Arabs were invited to Paris. (357.AC/9-1651)

I countered each point stressing urgent need for Arab delegations Paris abandon negative attitude and show constructive approach. I said whole world believed it wld be to best common interest for Arabs make peace with Israel but denied any attempt being made "force" general peace settlement on them. Surely each and every PCC proposal merited close consideration by Arabs and Israel and any progress achieved wld be a forward step. I suggested the acting Syrian delegate (Min Adnan Atasi is still vacationing in Syria) consult with Amb Palmer in order clear up misapprehension under which Syrians seem to be laboring.

Atasi said he will probably depart Sept 29 for Arab League mtg Alexandria and I obtained his assurance he wld try work against wholesale rejection PCC approach or withdrawal from Paris conference. I am convinced he has sincere desire improve relations with US but it is obvious he is very worried about Syrian popular and parliamentary reaction to PCC proposals. He declared there is basic conflict in US policy which tries enlist Arab cooperation in defense against USSR while ignoring threat Arabs see in an aggressive Israel harboring designs on controlling a domain "from the Nile to the Euphrates". For US to consider Israel as a partner with area countries in defense of Middle East is "like trying mix fire and water". He strongly emphasized Syria is part of free world and has nothing in common with USSR which it abhors. However, only by removing Arab fears of Israel through effective measures can US enlist support Arab Govts and peoples.

Wld appreciate Dept's comments and suggest renewed talks with Syrian Min Washington.

CLARK

320.2 AA/10-151 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL DAMASCUS, October 1, 1951—5 p. m.

176. Re Beirut Legtel 35, Sept 28.[2] Existing state of politics, in which army interference is privately acknowledged but publicly disclaimed, makes us wonder if private meeting between Blandford and Shishikli would achieve desired end obtain Syrian cooperation. We suspect that civilian leaders, who are already resentful Shishikli's position and his past interferences, might publicize and use as basis for attacks on both Shishikli and West UNRWA approaches to him by-passing civilian officials. For this reason we doubt if Shishikli

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[1] Repeated for information to Beirut, Cairo, Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, London, Paris, Ankara, Moscow, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

[2] The same as Rapun 226, September 28, p. 881.

himself wld appreciate being bought out by UNRWA to put pressure on civilians re refugee question.

We have informally worked on Shishikli for more realistic Syrian attitude to whole Palestine problem at every possible opportunity and he is becoming more amenable. We believe that if, as presently appears likely, civilian leaders can be persuaded cooperate in three-year program Shishikli now ready go along. Positive advice from Azzam, Salaheddine, and Cherine to Shishikli and other Syrians wld of course be most helpful.

CLARK

357.AC/9–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—7:56 p. m.

137. Fol represents Dept thinking re Legtel 145 Sep 20[2] and Huleh situation in gen: Dept gratified over progress Riley has made since his return NE in obtaining Israel compliance SC res May 18 and considers Israel govt over past month has shown greatly improved spirit cooperation, which Dept hopes will continue during negots last few points at issue. Dept considers Riley in position determine when compliance satis and time at hand to study ways and means to permit engineering project continue in demil zone with due regard to property and water rights of Arab inhabitants in zone and vicinity. Dept believes Riley has these points in mind and will probably include them in his final report together with detailed description of remaining problem. On basis Riley's report, US and other cosponsors SC res will be in better position consider next steps to be taken.

Dept understands and appreciates feelings of alarm which Syrians have toward energetic econ development taking place on her border, believes however Israel development projects Huleh swamp shld not be held up indefinitely. We believe US and UN assurances as well as tripartite decla are adequate guarantee. US support and cosponsorship SC res May 18 and Suez res Sep 1 convincing proof US prepared impartially take firm line against any state NE which fails live up to UN obligations re Pal.

Dept agrees Armistice Conf may be one means settling this matter but believes that Israelis wld consider primary aim of such conf to provide definitive settlement status of demil zone. This wld mean agreement of Syria and internatl community that Israel wld have clear title to sovereignty over its share of zone. Do not believe Israel wld agree to admin partition of zone without prejudice to final settlement but wld insist any agreement this matter between Syria and Israel shld provide estab definitive boundary in area. Believe Syrians shld bear these considerations in mind if they decide call for armistice conf. Re mechanics calling such conf, see third para Deptel 91 Aug 25, rptd Tel Aviv 167, Beirut 194.[3]

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo; cleared by UNP; repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Beirut, London, Paris, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, Cairo, Amman, Jerusalem, and New York.

[2] *Ante*, p. 872.

FYI, fol represents Dept's tentative speculation re possible seeds of solution this problem:

1. Believes settlement this question between Syria and Israel cld best be facilitated through long estab MAC mach thus preventing spotlight of internatl and particularly Arab League publicity from interfering with negots.
2. Wld prefer see elimination demil zone which because of indeterminate status represents potential source future difficulties between Syria and Israel.
3. We do not believe settlement on Jordan water line practicable in light situation estab by Armistice Agreement under art V and Bunche explanatory note, but we have never discussed this with Fr.
4. Believe Syrians wld do well consider accepting small terr concession in demil zone with neces guarantees re water rights (probably incl UN supervision) in return for elimination of Zone and problems represented thereby.
5. Israel might agree to Syrian annexation El Hamma and possibly northern bit of terr of demil zone if by such agreement it cld estab rights of full sovereignty over remainder of zone.
6. If any evidence that Syrians might be responsive to settlement on these lines, Dept might consider informally exploring further Israel attitude on this question.

WEBB

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[3] Not printed.

357.AC/10-451 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 4, 1951—10 p.m.

2022. Palun 452. As indicated Palun 451,[2] PCC has continued urge acceptance by Israel and Arab dels our preamble as necessary preliminary to consideration comm's five proposals. PCC recd Oct 1

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Jerusalem.

[2] Dated September 27, p. 879.

Israel proposal dated 28 Sept (annex A below)[3] for formal peace pact. On 28th I had requested Fischer call on me and read to him paraphrase of Unpal 292 as friendly expression US view. Fischer stated he wld immed inform his govt of these views but made no ref to Israel's proposal. In subsequent informal meetings with Israel reps, US del and secretariat officers informed Israel del we did not believe formal pact as proposed by Israel was feasible at this time and continued urge desirability agreement upon declaration conforming to Comm's own preamble.

Meanwhile no formal meeting between Comm and Israel del has been held pending outcome further talks with Arab dels. These talks have shown that Arab dels are not willing subscribe to any declaration which in their opinion goes beyond undertakings of respective armistice agreements. It is apparent that dels of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have adapted their attitude to that of Egypt, and that Egyptian rep is adamant in declining go beyond reaffirmation undertakings of Egyptian armistice agreement. Specifically he will not agree to include any ref to (*a*) settlement of all differences present or future solely by resort to pacific procedures or (*b*) refraining from acts of hostility. His position is obviously governed by Egyptian attitude toward Suez question.

As indicated Palun 451, PCC has continued feel minimum satisfactory reply to Israel's proposal for nonaggression pact is acceptance by Arab states of declaration in form and substance as submitted by Comm to parties and that similarly Israel shld accept declaration in form proposed by PCC without making issue of something PCC itself had not asked Arab states to accept. After thorough exploration with Arab dels of possibilities for agreement on declaration conforming in substance to PCC preamble it now seems clear PCC will risk complete breakdown of present conf unless it can find way accept from Arabs something less than substance proposed preamble. We are aware of course that this will not satisfy Israel's demands, but believe best procedure is to turn now to consideration PCC's five proposals by indicating PCC itself is satisfied parties statements have brought about conditions which PCC had regarded as desirable for creation atmosphere conducive to negots. With this procedure in view, Comm today recd from Arab dels text of a declaration which they had agreed upon among themselves for presentation to Comm (quoted as annex B below).[4] Comm intends meet tomorrow with

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[3] Not printed; the text of this draft nonaggression pact between the Government of Israel and each of the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, submitted to the PCC by the Delegation of Israel on September 28, is printed as Appendix I to the Commission's letter of October 6 in U.N. Doc. A/1985, p. 16.

[4] Not printed; the text of the draft declaration submitted to the PCC on October 3 by the Delegations of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria is printed as Appendix II to the Commission's letter of October 6, *ibid.*

Israel del to hear explanation Israel's proposed nonaggression pact. Fol this mtg and in absence new factors arising from tomorrow's mtg with Israel del indicating departure from their insistence on formal nonaggression pact, Comm proposes address to each of dels of Israel and Arab states fol ltr:

[Here follows draft letter, with annexes, addressed by the Chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission to the Delegations of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and to the Delegation of Israel. For the text of the letter as sent on October 6, see U.N. Doc. A/1985, page 15.]

[PALMER]

357.AC/10–551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

TEL AVIV, October 5, 1951—6 p. m.

314. Re Embtel 288, Sept 28.[2] Walter Eytan, Director General FonOff, assures me Israeli Govt wishes make progress at PCC mtg in Paris and will work to that end. While it of course favors formal nonaggression pacts in form proposed, it wld accept as reasonably satisfactory substitutes either: (1) Separate declarations using formula based on UN Charter and armistice agreement which wld make clear latter are not superseded but extended, or (2) Agreement by govts concerned on joint declaration to same effect. He stated however his govt cld not agree to further alternative that commission itself declare itself as satisfied all parties accept principles in question, since he feels there is no substitute for their expression in some form, and considers last alternative makes "pettifogging distinction".

He said while Israel of course believes direct negots are preferable if not indispensable and still hopes they will yet be possible, here again he gave assurance that his govt wld not be so insistent on direct negoiations as to close doors to progress by any other means. He stated urther his govt wld also be realistic about its desire to reach final omprehensive agreements, saying Israelis want peace with neighbors ut realize Arab commitments may make gen settlement impossible at resent, and will accordingly content themselves with something less or present. Above assurances were no doubt prompted by Palmer's tatement to Israeli del in Paris pursuant Deptel 1816 to Paris, 237 el Aviv Sept 26.[3]

DAVIS

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[1] Repeated for information to Ambassador Palmer at Paris.

[2] *Ante*, p. 881.

[3] *Ante*, p. 878.

357.AC/10-451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Paris[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 5, 1951—8:02 p. m.

2035. Unpal 293. Re: Palun 452.[2] Dept has fol suggestions which your discretion you shld discuss with colleagues as possible alternative present plans to which Dept has no basic objection:

A. Instead submitting note in reftel to Arab Israel Dels, PCC shld submit fol compromise proposal: "The Dels of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and the Del of Israel declare that their respective govts, as signatories to armistice agreements concluded pursuant to UNSC's Res of 16 Nov 1948, with a view to facilitating the pacific settlement of the Pal problem, reaffirm their intention to respect their undertakings given in the said agreements, not to resort to mil force in the settlement of the Pal question, and to respect the right of each party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other." You will note redraft similarity to Arab draft with deletion ref continuance work PCC and deletion "in accordance with UN resolutions."

B. PCC shld urge acceptance its redraft as a most conclusive public manifestation intention of parties and least likely to misunderstanding from contentious phrasing. Inquiries from any del re deletion ref continuance work PCC should be answered by noting purpose of conference and declaration is not continuance of PCC work but of settlement of Palestine's problem. Comment on deletion of reference to UN resolutions should be avoided since maintenance this ref may restrict any Arab discussion PCC 5 point proposal and mgt be used by Arab Dels as a basis for the justification unwillingness negotiate without prior settlement refugee problem.

C. If dels insist on amendments to compromise draft which are objectionable to Commission, Commission could deliver letter outlined in Palun 452 of which last two paras particularly important.

D. Dept agrees US Dels position re formal pact as proposed by Israel. Inform Fischer US hopes Israel can accept compromise draft promptly as being surest way of proceeding to discussions specific 5 points.

E. Arab Dels and in particular Egypt shld be urged to accept compromise draft as substantial concession by PCC to end apparent objection to PCC's original suggestion that all differences present or future being settled solely by specific procedures and further deletion ref to the refraining of any use of force and hostility. You mgt advise Egypt Del in friendly confidence deletion these elements PCC original draft mgt have unfortunate connotation if no agreed declaration reached and public speculation arises from failure to reach prompt agreement on public declaration. If PCC believes Dept's suggested step would merely result in prolonged wrangle conf shld proceed as now planned.[3]

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Ludlow and Waldo; approved for transmission by Mr. Popper. Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem.

[2] Dated October 4, p. 885.

WEBB

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[2] The revised text of the letter of October 6 addressed by the PCC to the Delegations of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and to the Delegation of Israel was transmitted by Ambassador Palmer in Palun 453, identified also as telegram 2047 from Paris, October 6, not printed (357.AC/10-651). For text, see U.N. Doc. A/1985, p. 15.

Ambassador Palmer reported on October 8 that the U.S. Delegation to the PCC had just that morning received Unpal 293, 2 days after submission of the October 6 letter. Had Unpal 293 been received earlier, he stated, the U.S. Delegation would have made further efforts in accordance with the Department's suggestions. Palun 454, identified also as telegram 2056 from Paris, not printed. (357.AC/10-851)

357.AC/10-1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Paris[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 10, 1951—1:04 p. m.

2103. Dept commends warmly the patience and skill PCC has displayed in Paris negots under impetus of your leadership. We feel conference has already proved worth while and will enable PCC submit comprehensive report to GA re current position parties letting chips fall where they may. Believe you will agree however PCC mtg shld not be continued beyond point of usefulness. If in your opinion a stalemate has been reached without likelihood of future progress you may wish to recommend adjournment of conf. If you and your colleagues believe useful purpose wld be served Dept considering requesting US reps Arab states attending conf and Israel convey fol msg to govts to which accredited, and wld also suggest Fr and Turk govts send similar instrs. Dept does not believe stage reached at which useful or advisable for US to make representations to parties on matters of substance.

"1. US regrets parties to PCC negots have not yet seen fit avail themselves of new oppor to make progress toward peace.

2. US believes conf will have served useful purpose by clarifying points at issue and enabling PCC to report fully to GA current positions of parties toward solution of problems at issue between them.

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Waldo and G. L. Jones; cleared with UNP; repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Ankara.

3. US urges govt of blank to give most serious consideration whether present mtg in Paris does not offer it unusual oppor to reach some measure of agreement on some of many outstanding problems. We are confident PCC will exercise all appropriate offices to assist to this end."

Your comments and suggestions welcome.

ACHESON

357.AC/10–1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 11, 1951—1 p. m.

2125. Palun 455. USDel and PCC greatly appreciate and are encouraged by Deptel 2103, October 10.[2] USDel is in full agreement Dept's opinion and expects next mtgs with Israel and Arab dels will show whether mtgs have gone beyond points of usefulness. Fischer informed us this morning Israel Cabinet decision on PCC letter (Palun 453) [3] will probably be taken today. We have delayed official mtgs with Arab dels until after receipt Israel reply.[4] Meanwhile, USDel believes representations as contained Deptel 2103 wld be useful at this stage, particularly if, as Fischer has indicated, Israel reply will be confined to question of non-aggression declaration and will not deal with question of consideration PCC proposals. We also believe similar representations by French and Turk Govts wld be desirable and, as Dept suggests, will take up question with French and Turk colleagues.

[PALMER]

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[1] Repeated for information to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 889.

[4] The text of the Israeli reply, dated October 19, to the Commission's letter of October 18, was transmitted in telegram 2327 from Paris, Palun 458, October 21, not printed (357.AC/10–2151).

320/10–1251

The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Paris [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 12, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Although you have probably not been officially informed, I am sure you have had in mind that the Department will wish you and Jim Barco to serve as advisers on the General

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow.

Assembly Delegation during the period when the Palestine items are under consideration. We have no information as yet as to the time when the Palestine items may come up on the agenda. We assume that it probably would not be in the early stages of the session. We will advise you as soon as we have information as to the time when you may be needed.

In writing you this personal word now I should like to outline the developing views in the Department on the present activities and future role of the Conciliation Commission. We have been giving these matters very careful consideration. For the present, we believe that the conference is progressing as well as could be expected, if not better than we had reason to hope for. We detect, as you have, a healthy sign of moderation in the Arab statements thus far, appreciating, of course, that their statements, as usual, are more extreme than they need to be. As to the Israeli position, you have received our views regarding our concern over their attitude thus far and our hope that they may be inclined to appreciate the "unorthodox" way on negotiation which you and many of us have advocated to Israeli officials for a long time past. While we share your concern over the possibility of a press headline battle leading to a premature hardening of the positions of the Arab States and Israel, we believe that the conference is offering an excellent opportunity for the opposing views to be aired sufficiently to permit the parties themselves, the Commission, and the other Members of the United Nations fully to appreciate the differences and the potential areas of agreement, and to understand our view that the tissue-knitting progress between the parties, however slow, is the most productive toward a final peace settlement in the area.

Whether or not the parties agree upon a non-aggression declaration, or reach agreement on any of the other items, we see the conference as a necessary step towards the Commission's preparing for the next General Assembly a full and frank report of its efforts to carry out its mandates. Should the conference be unproductive, it would be of even greater importance that the Commission's report detail the reasons for the conference's failure, and that the report be as frank as necessary in declaring exactly what are the difficulties which have confronted the Commission from its very establishment and which have prevented the parties from seeking or reaching any agreement of a substantial nature. Should the conference be unproductive you and your colleagues should not be afraid to say so, and you on the spot can best determine when impasse or failure has developed. Should such a situation develop it would seem wise to terminate the conference quickly, after which the Commission should expeditiously set about its task of writing a report for submission to the General Assembly.

If on the other hand, as we have reason yet to hope, the conference takes a few steps forward, however slight, it will be in greatest measure attributable to you.

We will, of course, be in continual communication with you whichever course the conference may take, but I would like to reiterate that we stand ready to render such guidance and assistance as we can. We do feel, however, that the Department should not intervene here with the parties on behalf of the Commission, since it is our desire that such negotiations as they may be take place between the parties through the Commission in Paris and not here in Washington.

Sincerely yours, JOHN D. HICKERSON

IO Files

Department of State Position Paper[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1951.

SD/A/C.1/373

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

THE PROBLEM

To determine the position of the United States on the various aspects of the Palestine question which will be considered at the Sixth General Assembly, i.e., the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC).

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. With regard to the report of the PCC:

1. The United States should initiate or support General Assembly action leading to the abolition of the PCC if the Commission's report so recommends, or if the present conference at Paris indicates little or no chance of success.

2. The United States should initiate or support GA action commending the PCC and the parties at the Paris conference for their progress, if the PCC so reports, and urge the parties to continue (or renew) their efforts under the aegis of the PCC in order to achieve a settlement of the Palestine problem.

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[1] Prepared as a position paper for the U.S. Delegation at the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (U.N. Doc. A/1985) was considered by the Assembly at the 33d to 41st meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee between January 7 and 15, 1952. The question of assistance to Palestine refugees was considered by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at its 42d to 47th meetings from January 16 to 22. The Report of the Committee (U.N. Doc. A/2070) was considered by the General Assembly at its 364th and 365th plenary meetings on January 26, 1952.

3. The United States should urge, if mutually agreeable to the PCC and the Director and Advisory Commission of UNRWA, that the General Assembly assign to UNRWA all aspects of the refugee problem including the reintegration program, renewing arrangements for the settlement of compensation claims, the protection of refugee rights, and the authority bestowed on the PCC under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, relating to the facilitation of the economic development of the area.

4. In the event the abolition of the PCC is agreed upon, the United States should urge that the General Assembly:

(*a*) Assign the functions of the PCC relating to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between the Arab States on the one hand and Israel on the other to the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization who for the purpose of carrying out such assignment would be designated UN Agent General for Palestine;

(*b*) Make him answerable to the Security Council for the purpose of reporting to that body and receiving such directives from it as it might give;

(*c*) Recommend to the Security Council that it continue to watch closely the Palestine question;

(*d*) Request the Security Council to submit a special report on the activities of the Agent General for Palestine.

B. With regard to questions relating to the report of UNRWA, it is recommended that the United States Delegation:

1. Support the recommendations of UNRWA for relief and reintegration programs along the lines set forth in Section B of the attached draft resolution;

2. Indicate that the United States is prepared to pledge, subject to Congressional approval, up to $——— million.

C. With regard to General Assembly action on both reports, the United States Delegation should urge that the items be considered together in one of the Political Committees and that they be dealt with in a single consolidated resolution, co-sponsored, if possible, by the Member States represented on the PCC and the Advisory Committee of UNRWA (France, Turkey, and the UK).

DISCUSSION

A. *The PCC Report:*

1. The report of the PCC will probably be the source of controversy. While the exact nature of the report cannot as yet be indicated *it would seem wise to assume that the PCC in its report will indicate failure in its efforts to reach some degree of settlement of the issues outstanding between the Arab States and Israel.* In so indicating, it will quite possibly point out: (*a*) that its very terms of reference made negotiating virtually impossible since the Arab States have refused to sit down at the same table for the purpose of negotiating with the

Israelis; (*b*) that the Israelis for their part have indicated a basic hostility to the mediating initiative of the Commission; (*c*) that for negotiating reasons the Arab States continue to use the settlement of the refugee question, particularly the issue of repatriation, as a pretext for their failure to reach a political settlement with Israel, while Israel for its part has little if any intention of repatriating any Arab refugees, although Israel might pay substantial compensation for the property of refugees who are not repatriated; (*d*) that even with the matter of refugees out of the way there is no present likelihood that the Arab States collectively wish to reach an ultimate peace settlement with Israel, and Israel, for its part, evidences no basic willingness to compromise in the interests of a possible peace settlement with any single one of its neighbors. The report would summarize the situation as it exists today as being one which can only be resolved through indication by the Arab States and Israel of good faith and of a willingness to make concessions and to face existing realities, such as the following:

a. Repatriation of Arab refugees to Israel is a dead issue.
b. Substantial territorial readjustments are entirely unlikely.
c. Israel must give concrete indications to the neighboring Arab States of its willingness to pay substantial compensation to Arab refugees and make such substantial political and economic concessions as will indicate to the Arab States that Israel truly desires to live at peace with them and will not remain a threat to their individual and collective security. The report might conclude that the PCC feels that it is no longer qualified both by the terms of its reference and by its own prestige to continue to act as the United Nations body for carrying out these obligations. Whether or not, however, the PCC did recommend its own dissolution, the General Assembly would be confronted with a record of failure about which its Members would undoubtedly feel impelled to consider remedial steps.

2. Faced with a report of this kind, the Members of the General Assembly may be willing to accede to the suggestion that the PCC be dissolved but they will desire that some instrumentality should exist for carrying on the United Nation's obligation to achieve a settlement of the Palestine problem.

3. If the General Assembly abolishes the PCC it must decide what is to be done with the assigned functions of the commission. These functions are: (*a*) working out arrangements relating to repatriation or resettlement and compensation of Arab refugees; (*b*) negotiation of all political problems remaining in the way of a final peace settlement of the area.

It would seem feasible that with regard to (*a*) these functions of the PCC could be transferred to the UNRWA. The refugee office of the PCC, together with records and personnel required by the UNRWA, could be transferred to the UNRWA on the assumption that the budgetary allotment for this office could be made available to the UNRWA. Such a transfer would have the following advantages:

a. It would be the most effective step possible to remove the problem of refugees from future political negotiations and it would treat the problem in the context of an economic and social problem involving legal and economic rights of individuals;
b. It would remove the current confusion now apparent in the Palestine area over two United Nations agencies associated with the Arab refugee problem;
c. Handling refugee reintegration and compensation might be more efficient and at the same time this administrative arrangement might enable the agency to use the negotiation and payment of compensation as a means of assisting reintegration. The functions relating to the protection of Arab refugees rights and property could also be transferred to UNRWA. There are no fundamental or budgetary problems connected with this transfer.

In view of the present inability to foretell the extent of the PCC's success or failure at its Paris conference; the administrative and political problems entailed in a transfer of these functions from PCC to UNRWA; and the fact that both the PCC and the UNRWA Director, Mr. Blandford, are expected to be in Paris for part of the General Assembly session it would seem logical for the Commission Members and Mr. Blandford to consult together and agree upon the nature and extent of the transfer of functions which ought to be made. For the reasons cited we would favor such transfer as might be agreeable to the PCC and the Director and Advisory Committee of UNRWA.

4. As for the remaining functions, i.e., those relating to the political negotiation of a final peace settlement for the area, it is believed that the General Assembly could assign these functions to an Agent General for Palestine. We believe that this position should be held by the present Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization, Lt. General William E. Riley. In our opinion the consolidation of functions would reduce the apparent proliferation of UN efforts in the Palestine area. General Riley's prestige, experience, and negotiating ability make him ideally suited for this function.

5. The terms of reference of the Agent General for Palestine would be indicated for him by the General Assembly resolution establishing the position. The General Assembly could also make him directly answerable to the Security Council for the purpose of reporting to that body and receiving directives from it. By making the Agent General for Palestine answerable to the Security Council, the General Assembly would be assuring itself that the parties would be under much greater continual political obligation to settle their difficulties than is the case today where the PCC, as an agency of the General Assembly, finds itself able to report to its parent body only on an annual basis.

It has been our experience that the Palestine question is one of the very few cases in which the Security Council has been able to function continually through a majority vote without Soviet objection. It is suggested that the Council should continue to demonstrate and exercise its authority through this procedure of answerability. Another attraction to this set-up is that changed circumstances during the course of the negotiations possibly leading to a settlement can produce situations where the Council could promptly clarify and expand the functions as the situation dictated. Under present conditions the PCC has had to labor under the difficulties of receiving instructions and terms of reference only annually, at best.

6. It is, of course, possible that the PCC may be able to submit a report, as a result of the present conference in Paris, which would indicate some degree of progress toward the final settlement of the Palestine problem. If this were the case there would be little likelihood that the Commission could or would be replaced by a new method of negotiation and settlement such as the suggested Agent General for Palestine. Accordingly the Delegation should be prepared to indicate its initiative or support for a resolution urging the Commission and the parties to continue or renew their efforts to reach a final settlement of the Palestine problem. (An alternative draft covering this possibility is included in Part A of the attached draft resolution.) Such resolution, however, could well contain the provisions set forth in paragraph 3 above concerning the PCC's present functions relating to refugees.

B. *Report of UNRWA.*

7. The report and recommendations of UNRWA have not yet been submitted. It may be anticipated, however, that the report will recommend a three-year reintegration and relief program in amounts approximating those set forth in the attached resolution.

8. During the spring and summer months the Director and Advisory Commission have taken advantage of the somewhat more cooperative attitude displayed by the Arab Governments with regard to the reintegration program which was authorized by the General Assembly in resolution 393(V) of December 2, 1950. In these conversations the Arab Governments have indicated that they would be prepared to proceed with reintegration projects provided that the refugees did not surrender their right to repatriation or their rights to compensation. They further indicated that in proceeding to cooperate in the program they must be assured by the major contributors that the latter were prepared to see the program through. During the past two months Mr. Blandford, who succeeded General Kennedy as Director, has been pressing ahead with discussions with the Arab Governments, and has virtually completed negotiations with the

Jordan and Egyptian Governments for projects in those countries which will provide homes and continuing employment for a substantial number of refugees. The internal political situation in Syria has prevented conclusive negotiations on projects, but the Syrian Government, nevertheless, is inclining a receptive ear to several alternative types of programs. The Government of Iraq, which until recently has not been at all disposed to talk about reintegration of refugees other than those it is presently caring for (4000), has recently indicated a more cooperative attitude but insisted that reintegration possibilities in the other Arab countries first be exhausted. On the basis of these developments, combined with the provisions in the Mutual Security Act authorizing the United States to contribute up to $50 million for the Palestine refugee program, the time is now ripe to adopt a target date for the completion of this program and to estimate the total costs. The adoption of such a program at this time will be of value to contributing governments in making their future plans and to the Agency in concluding its negotiations with the Arab Governments.

9. *Comment on Section B of Draft Resolution.*

The following comments deal with the paragraphs of the draft resolution concerning the operation, budget, and organization of UNRWA.

Paragraphs 14, 15, and 16

The figures cited in these paragraphs are State Department estimates which may need to be revised after the Report of UNRWA is available.

The estimated cost of the three-year reintegration program is a rough calculation for the settlement of between 100,000 and 150,000 refugee families (5 to a family) at a cost of between $1,000 and $1,500 per family. This will not take care of all the 880,000 refugees who are now on the Agency's ration rolls. It is anticipated, however, that economic development programs of the countries concerned will be accelerated by United States grant aid in addition to bank loans, and that a substantial number of the urban refugees will find employment opportunities in this manner rather than by the direct assistance of the Agency. The Agency will give primary emphasis on agricultural projects. This estimated cost does not include the value of lands which the Arab Governments are expected to make available. We believe it important to make note of this point in the resolution in order that there may be no misunderstanding between the Agency and the Arab Governments regarding payment for lands.

A figure of about $60 million for continuation of the relief program for three years takes account of the fact that relief costs cannot be too sharply reduced until reintegration projects are actually completed. The direct aid and services contributed by the Arab Governments are of real value to the Agency and should be recognized. They are specifically mentioned in these paragraphs in order to show that the sums required for relief must be in currency or supplies. A revised budget for fiscal 1952 is necessary because of the probable availability of $50 million from the United States under the Mutual Security Act. This is equal to the total amount requested for UNRWA by the General Assembly in resolution 393(V).

We have been pressing the British and French to increase their contributions for fiscal 1952 in view of the opportunities for carrying out the program which are now offered. These efforts will be continued prior to the General Assembly. The Department has proposed that the British offer of last December to contribute $1 for every $3 contributed by the United States (assuming a U.S. maximum of $30 million and minimum of $25 million) be applied to a minimum possible $50 million United States contribution. The initial pledge made by the United States at the last Assembly was $25 million, but the announcement of a larger pledge awaits the completion of appropriation legislation. We are also urging the French to contribute one-half of the amount contributed by the British. The ratio of 6-2-1 between the US, UK and France is approximately the ratio between their respective contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations. If the British and French contributions materialize at this ratio, a sum of $75 million would be available for the period July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952. Pledges to date from other governments for this period come to approximately $1,800,000 exclusive of direct aid and services of the Arab Governments. It is anticipated that the Agency will request at least $25 million for relief, rather than $20 million because of higher costs. As provided in General Assembly resolution 393(V), the balance would be available for expenditure or commitment on reintegration.

Although we have no reports on what the Agency is contemplating for fiscal 1953, it is reasonable to expect it to recommend a larger figure for that year than any other. For this reason a tentative figure of $90 million is indicated, with $70 million available for expenditure or commitment on reintegration, and $20 million for relief. During this fiscal year the Agency will need to be in position to make its maximum commitments even though expenditures may lag behind.

The following table recapitulates the foregoing and shows the estimated totals for each year:

	Reintegration	*Relief*	*Total*
1951–2	$ 55	$25	$ 80
1952–3	70	20	90
	25	15	40
	$150	$60	$210

Although it may not be possible fully to reach these targets, it is of great importance to indicate what they are and to show that a terminal date is definitely in view. UNRWA, like the IRO, may need an extension of life to complete its work. However, the approximate total costs should now be indicated and every effort made to raise the necessary funds. It should be understood that the contributing governments would not be expected to make payments on their contributions except as the Agency requires funds to carry out reintegration projects already agreed and to meet the necessary relief costs.

Paragraph 18

The Agency has been exploring with the Arab government the possibility of transferring to them the administration of the direct relief program. This is a responsibility which they will have to assume sooner or later, whenever international assistance is terminated. As long as the Agency is charged with direct administration it is subject to attacks by the refugees themselves and by the press. Both Jordan and Egypt are reluctant to undertake the administration of the relief program and wish to keep the Agency directly responsible for administration. A provision in the General Assembly resolution should be of assistance to the Agency in negotiating this transfer. There are certain advantages which the governments may derive from such a transfer, for their health, welfare and education programs will undoubtedly benefit from the assistance provided by the Agency.

Paragraph 19

No provision has been drafted on the method of financing. It is assumed, however, that contributions will be sought on a voluntary basis as in the past. The most important immediate task is that of establishing a firm commitment on the part of the UK and France for the current program as indicated above. It is to be hoped that the proposed ration of 6–2–1 or one approximating it, can be negotiated for the balance of the program. The additional sums required to meet the budget might be left to the Negotiating Committee if that body is re-established by the General Assembly.

Paragraph 20

This paragraph is similar to that in previous resolutions and needs to be maintained. The Agency has a good record of repayment of loans advanced from the Working Capital Fund. It has never requested more than $3 million and has sought loans only when they were absolutely necessary to carry on the program.

Paragraph 21

The terms of reference of the Advisory Commission, as set forth in resolution 302(IV) have given rise to a few difficulties between the Director and the Advisory Commission. Under paragraph 8 of that resolution the Advisory Commission was "to advise and assist the Director of UNRWA in the execution of the program; the Director and Advisory Commission shall consult with each Near Eastern government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects". During the first year of operations these functions were justifiable, particularly in view of the fact that the Members of the Advisory Commission were selected by their governments to spend full time on the work of the Agency. With the experience gained and with the selection of Mr. Blandford as Director, the role of the Advisory Commission in the execution as well as the selection and planning of projects is less important. There have been suggestions that the Advisory Commission be abolished. We do not concur in that suggestion, but consider that a re-definition of functions along the lines contained in paragraph 10 will clarify its role.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE QUESTION

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolution 194(III) of December 11, 1948; 302(IV) of December 8, 1949; 393(V) of December 2, 1950; and 394(V) of December 14, 1950,

Having examined the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/______) and the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (A/______),

(In the event the PCC is to be replaced)	*(In the event the PCC is to be continued)*
Noting with concern that agreement has not been reached between the parties concerned on the final settlement of questions outstanding between the parties concerned	*Noting* that the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine indicates that some (good) progress toward the final settlement of the Palestine problem has been made by the parties concerned

Recognizing that in the interests of the peace and stability of the Near East such a final settlement should be achieved,

A

1. *Considers* that the governments and authorities concerned have the primary responsibility to reach a settlement of their outstanding differences.	1. *Considers* that the governments and authorities concerned have the primary responsibility to reach a settlement of their outstanding differences.
2. *Urges* the governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the Armistice Agreements and to seek agreement with the view to an early settlement of all questions outstanding between them.	2. *Urges* the governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the Armistice Agreements and to seek agreement with the view to an early settlement of all questions outstanding between them.
3. *Expresses* its appreciation for the efforts of the Conciliation Commission to carry out its mandate, and particularly for the report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East and for the work of the Commission in examining the problem of compensation;	3. *Commends* the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the governments concerned for the progress which they have made toward a final settlement of the Palestine problem,
4. *Decides* to heed the request of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine that it be discharged of its duties:	4. *Requests* the conciliation Commission to report to the nex General Assembly on the furthe efforts which it may undertak pursuant to this resolution.

5. *Establishes* an Agent General for Palestine who shall undertake the task of achieving a final settlement of the questions outstanding between the parties and toward this end authorizes him to initiate and pursue such negotiations as he believes necessary and to report to the Security Council concerning his activities;

6. *Designates* the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization as the Agent General for Palestine;

7. *Requests* the Security Council to give such directives to the Agent General for Palestine as it may decide upon and further requests the Security Council to submit a special report to the next General Assembly on the exercise of the functions of the Agent General for Palestine under this resolution;

8. *Requests* the Secretary General to provide the Agent General for Palestine with such assistance as may be necessary and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required for the performance of the Agent General's functions under this resolution.

B

9. *Commends* UNRWA and the Near Eastern Governments concerned for the elaboration of constructive projects and the development of a forward looking program of lasting value to the refugees themselves and to the countries which receive them;

10. *Considers* that all phases of the refugee problem should now be dealt with by a single United Nations body and decides therefore that matters pertaining to the Palestine refugees and to economic development, hitherto entrusted to the Conciliation Commission, shall in the future be dealt with by UNRWA;

11. *Considers* that the three-year program of reintegration recommended by UNRWA should be implemented and that every effort should be made to conclude both the relief and reintegration programs not later than June 30, 1954;

12. *Directs* UNRWA to make the necessary arrangements for the settlement of refugee compensation claims due from Israel, and requests UNRWA and the Government of Israel to consult together with

a view to the provision of payments by Israel to discharge compensation claims;

13. *Requests* the Secretary General to provide the Director of UNRWA with such staff and facilities as may be necessary to enable UNRWA to carry out the functions hitherto entrusted to the Refugee Office of the Conciliation Commission.

14. *Considers* that the equivalent of approximately $150 million will be required to carry out a three-year reintegration program for the period July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1954, exclusive of the value of lands to be contributed for this purpose, and that the equivalent of approximately $60 million in currency or supplies will be required for relief during the period July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1954, exclusive of contributions from local governments in direct aid and services;

15. *Approves* the revised budget recommended by UNRWA for the period July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952, amounting to the equivalent of $80 million, of which $55 million shall be available for the reintegration program and not more than $25 million for relief, exclusive of direct aid and services;

16. *Approves* the budget recommended by UNRWA for the period July 1, 1952, to June 30, 1953, of the equivalent of $90 million of which $70 million shall be available for reintegration, and not more than $20 million for relief, exclusive of direct aid and services;

17. *Authorizes* UNRWA, as circumstances permit, to transfer funds available for relief to the reintegration program;

18. *Calls* upon the governments concerned to conclude agreements with UNRWA for the transfer of administration of the direct relief program to those governments with the understanding that UNRWA will continue to carry the cost of the supply program and to provide assistance for the health, welfare and education programs, subject to such inspection and verification of accounts as may be necessary for UNRWA to carry out;

19. (Methods of Financing);

20. *Authorizes:* the Secretary General in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds, deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding $5 million, from the working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December, 1952;

21. *Decides* that the Advisory Commission in lieu of the functions attributed to it in paragraph 8 of resolution 302(IV) of December 8, 1949, shall perform the following functions:

(*a*) Adopt quarterly plans of expenditure after review of proposals submitted by the Director;

(*b*) Collaborate with the Director in making recommendations concerning the program, budget and operations of the Agency for submission to the General Assembly;

(c) Advise the Director on the coordination of other programs of economic development in the area;

(d) Advise the Director on such policy matters as may be submitted to it by the Director or raised by any of its Members;

20. *Requests* the governments concerned to cooperate with the Agent General and UNRWA and to extend them every facility for the purpose of carrying out this resolution;

21. *Commends* the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, for the cooperation and assistance which they have rendered to UNRWA and urges them and other specialized agencies concerned to render all possible services, taking into account the emphasis to be given to the reintegration program;

22. *Expresses* its thanks to the various religious and philanthropic organizations whose programs have brought much needed supplementary assistance to the Palestine refugees and requests the Director of UNRWA to explore with them the possibilities of increased assistance in connection with the reintegration program.

IO Files

Department of State Position Paper [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1951.

SD/A/C.1/372

THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position which the Delegation should take on the question of an international regime for Jerusalem.

While the Assembly may not have the question of Jerusalem on its agenda at the outset of the sessions the facts: (1) that Jerusalem has been a topic of discussion at the last four Assemblies, particularly in connection with the general Palestine question; and (2) that there have been some indications from several delegations of their continued interest in an international regime for the protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, tend to indicate that it may become a matter for discussion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The basic position of the Delegation should be to support such a solution of the Jerusalem question as will be acceptable to Israel

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[1] Prepared as a position paper for the U.S. Delegation at the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

and Jordan and meet with general concurrence by the world community.

2. If the question is raised in informal discussions the Delegation should indicate that it does not believe that the question can be profitably discussed in this Assembly, since the criteria in Recommendation 1 are not likely to be met, but the Delegation should not actively oppose consideration of this problem if other delegations indicate a sincere desire to bring the matter before the Assembly.

3. The Delegation may indicate that it is willing to participate in informal discussions on any reasonable plans which may be brought forward.

4. While attempting to discourage proposals which lack the elements of acceptability set forth in Recommendation 1 the Delegation should maintain a flexible position on proposals for Jerusalem which may be advanced by other delegations until such time as there appears to be a genuine likelihood of achieving the criteria set forth in Recommendation 1.

5. If any proposal is brought to a vote the Delegation should not support it if it lacks the elements of acceptability indicated in Recommendation 1.

COMMENT

The foregoing recommendations are based on the following factors:

1. The primary objectives in any consideration of the Jerusalem question are that a solution is acceptable to the main parties interested, i.e. Israel and Jordan and that this solution can obtain the necessary support from the other Members of the UN. On the basis of past history, the majority of the UN Members favor a far more extreme form of internationalization than either Israel or Jordan have thus far indicated that they could accept. We have not yet seen any good prospect of reconciling these positions and unless, for unforeseen political reasons, either Israel or Jordan decides to accept a more extreme form of international organization than they have now indicated, we can see no prospect of any reconciliation at this Assembly.

2. In view of the unlikelihood of reconciling the views of Israel and Jordan, on the one hand, and the views of a large number of other nations, on the other, concerning the extent of an international regime for Jerusalem; in view of the obviously yet unsettled situation in the Palestine area; and in view of the fact that there are many other more pressing problems before the General Assembly, we may indicate that we do not believe that the Jerusalem question can be profitably discussed in this Assembly since overall agreement is highly unlikely and any proposal not acceptable to Israel and Jordan could not be put into effect, nor would it contribute to the peace essential to the Palestine area.

3. In line with our desire to be constructive in all General Assembly consideration of this problem, we may indicate that we are willing to participate in informal discussions with other Delegations over any reasonable plans which may be put forward and that we welcome any proposals which may be conducive to a solution of this problem. It

would be hoped that our participation in informal discussion carried on for the most part outside of meetings might reveal a solution which would satisfy our criteria for acceptance so that, should occasion demand, we could publicly support such a solution.

4. The closest to a practicable solution which might have met the criteria for acceptability was the Swedish plan submitted at the last General Assembly.[2] This plan had backing from Israel and the indicated sympathy of a large number of influential delegations including the U.S. Delegations.

For the text of this plan and details regarding consideration given to it by the Fifth General Assembly see Jerusalem background book.[3]

5. On the basis of experience in past Assembly Sessions and barring an unexpected change in the position of Israel and Jordan we see no point in supporting any schemes for the internationalization advocated by such proposals as the special report of the Trusteeship Council presented at the last General Assembly, and the Jerusalem Statute prepared by the Palestine Commission for consideration at the Fourth General Assembly, since all of these proposals were unacceptable to Israel or Jordan, or both whether or not they had the necessary majority support from the other Members of the UN.[4]

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[2] U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.63.

[3] Collection of United Nations documents compiled for use by the U.S. Delegation at the General Assembly; copy in IO Files: Lot 71 D 44.

[4] For documentation on these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 658 ff. The question of an international regime for Jerusalem was not placed on the agenda of the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

884A.131/10–1351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY TEL AVIV, October 13, 1951—1 p.m.

348. Eyes only McGhee. Embtel 325 Oct 9.[1] SecGen MinFin provided Emb officer with fol info on govt's present fon exch sitn:

(1) Current reserves nil.

(2) Commitments (not requirements) to Dec 31 £17 million.

(3) Estimated receipts to Dec 31, £12 million incl £3 million loans (now under negot) and collections in US from UJA and bond drive.

(4) Apparent deficit to Dec 31 of £5 million they hope to make up thru extension current maturities, sterling and franc credits, and additional dollar credits.

(5) Sitn described as "berydohrn" and still deteriorating. Fon exch now required to clean up present arrearages and get control of sitn said to be $15 million.

While govt had been operating on shoestring basis for many months, present sitn according to SecGen precipitated by mil purchase of approx £1 million, the 29 Sept maturity of which had not thru error been budgeted. Subsequent defaults on fon exch commitments were caused by this upset of an already very tight fon exch budget. SecGen did not think govt's credit had as yet been seriously impaired nor has there been significant shutting down of short-term commercial credits (floating debt of such credits said to be in upper 7 figures' amt). Attitude bank and character inquiries recd indicate, however, widespread concern.

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[1] Not printed.

Prospects not encouraging for making up apparent deficit £5 million to Dec 31. Brit elections holding up Horowitz London negots and Petsch's death deprived Horowitz of his best Fr contact. SecGen said £3,000,000–3,500,000 on pledged sterling securities one possible outcome of Horowitz current London talks.

Apparent from above info that unexpected defense obligation was merely breaking point in an already seriously overextended position. Additional details on present sitn were promised by Wed Oct 24 when I plan to see Kaplan with Bayne.

Further comments and recommendations will then follow.

Davis

357.AC/10–1151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Paris[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 18, 1951—4:22 p. m.

2289. Unpal 294. Re Palun 455[2] and 456,[3] Deptel 2103 Oct 10.[4] Dept now of opinion recent actions Egypt re Suez and Sudan and its rejection MEC proposals make inadvisable proposed representations to Arab govts for time being.

Re Cairo and press reports Arab League rejection PCC proposals stating Arabs "Do not recognize the Conciliation Comm auth for formulating such proposals" Dept believes you might make fol observations informally to appropriate Arab dels, particularly Abdel Monem if deemed wise:

1. US had hoped Arab League states wld take advantage opportunity afforded by presentation PCC proposals discuss matters thoroughly and that rejection of proposals wld be blow to efforts to make any progress toward peace.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow; cleared for transmission and signed for the Secretary by Mr. Wainhouse. Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Amman, Ankara, London, Damascus, and Beirut.

[2] Dated October 11, p. 890.

[3] Palun 456 from Ambassador Palmer, identified also as telegram 2250 from Paris, October 17, not printed, contained a partial text of the Israeli reply of October 14 to the PCC letter of October 6. It also contained the text of a response to be sent by the PCC to Israel on October 18. (357.AC/10–1751) An Israeli reply to the PCC on October 19 was reported in Palun 458 from Ambassador Palmer, identified also as telegram 2327 from Paris, October 21, not printed (357.AC/10–2151). With respect to the three letters, see U.N. Doc. A/1985, p. 7.

[4] *Ante*, p. 889.

2. If Arab dels will reject proposals out of hand, PCC might well feel obliged request Arab dels indicate views to PCC on each separate item listed in proposals since failing over all agreement PCC wld feel Arab shld explore all possible areas limited agreement.
3. Lacking some concrete indication soon that Arab dels will negot even on limited basis, PCC left no alternative terminating conf and indicating complete failure to GA.

Re Israeli letter rejecting comm views its letter 6 Oct, Dept strongly endorses firm position PCC's reply in Palun 456. You shld informally advise Israeli Del you, and if necessary US Govt, believe:

1. Such letter particularly at this stage negot hasty to the point of being ill-advised in that in view known developments in NE Israeli intransigence at this time clearly not in its best interests. Whatever might have been opinion of Israeli and Arab dels re preamble at this stage negot Israel shld be indicating eagerness explore all aspects PCC's proposals however slight prospects of progress toward over all agreement with Arabs.
2. Wld be most advantageous Israel undertake prompt reconsideration its position which if allowed to stand may well serve as basis for termination conf with subsequent PCC report to GA of complete failure.
3. Any real prospects negot with Arabs which Israel continually asserts most desirous to have will be considerably lessened by Israel's resorting to press re position vis-à-vis Arabs.

In your discretion informally you might assure Arab dels and Israeli Del both sides being advised by you reconsider their positions.

FYI Dept suggests if it appears feasible particularly in light Palun 456 you mgt raise with colleagues idea of submitting at appropriate time and if some progress appears possible compromise draft set forth in Unpal 293.

ACHESON

884A.10/10-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, October 19, 1951—6 p.m.

370. Pls pass Treasury. ReEmbtel's 348, Oct 12[*13*].[1] 361 Oct 17.[2] Met Kaplan in Jerusalem Oct 18 as scheduled accompanied by Bayne, Parker and Jones. Gen fin situation reviewed and position set forth Embtel 348 generally confirmed. Causes present crisis described as fol:

1. *Drought.* Effects felt increasingly after May and necessitated higher rate wheat imports. Situation aggravated by six months retardation irrigation program because delays allocations steel pipes to Israel.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 905.
[2] Not printed.

2. *Immigration.* First six months' figures greatly exceeded planned program. Increases primarily due to Iraqi and Rumanian inflows.

3. *Receipts.* Short fall in expected US private contributions and bond sales reflecting "business slow-down in US particularly soft goods industries". Cash receipts bonds only $60 million against total pledges $80 million. Kaplan regards this experience as confirming his presently more pessimistic estimate such collection as against other more optimistic estimates. He expects lower rate continue at least Jan.

4. *Short-term debt.* Following disappointing receipts (point three above) there was excessive flotation short-term commercial bank credits maturing Oct–Dec without cash or alternative credit availability in sufficient magnitude to cover. Preliminary estimates these maturities for this period is $45 million.

Present crisis developed suddenly by coincidence in late September of all above factors. Kaplan requested immed assistance of approx $15 million from MSP appropriation to meet current problem and said if such assistance cld be immed it wld increase its value many fold.

Bayne, Parker and Jones of Emb will meet with Israeli Treas officials October 21 for analysis technical aspects problem during which appraisal impact of defense expenditures on current emergency will also be reviewed. For this discussion program recommendations will be sent forward.

Israel Govt seems interested that these discussions be conducted primarily through Emb here by Israel Treas officials, altho also stated report was being made in Washington thru Israel Emb (apparently as per Deptel 273 October 16).[3] Sherman financial advisor NY Supply Mission here primarily this purpose. *Emb comment:* I believe inclination to deal through Emb Tel Aviv shld be encouraged and that willingness show greater frankness in discussing over-all position, including defense, can best be encouraged this end where statistical data concentrated. Subject to appraisal technical data now being assembled, I believe it wld be in our interest to attempt meet Kaplan request on theory since we are committed to help this country anyway, it wld be advantageous to help them now when they need it most. It wld mean a great deal to them, and incidentally to us, to save them from eventual embarrassment which cld not help but affect adversely their internatl reputation and position in ME. This is on assumption matter is question of timing and will not represent major change in program.

DAVIS

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[3] Not printed.

884A.10/10–2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, October 21, 1951—11 p. m.

371. While serious deterioration morale of population generally is not yet apparent, overtone of doubt and anxiety marked in official circles. Food situation still deteriorating while power and transportation facilities continue to be inadequate with no immed promise improvement in face growing population.

Continued reductions in rations and continued failure to distribute established rations has led to partial breakdown of commodity and wage controls. The consequent significant and growing volume of black-market transactions in controlled commodities and fon exchange, together with scarcity of goods generally has resulted in growing inflationary pressures marked by sharp open-market price rises and sharp declines in value of Israel pound in relation to gold sovereigns and dollars.

Because of acute fon exchange shortages and particularly because of lack working balances, govt has been unable to come to grips with these problems. While world-wide shortage critical materials for power irrigation and transportation has contributed to present situation, the most immed problem and the one in which assistance is most urgently needed is getting fon exchange for food and essential commodity imports in amts sufficient to reestab ration distributions and commodity controls.

Israel Treasury has provided fol detail of govt financial position (millions of dollars):

1. Fon exchange obligations maturing Oct–31 Dec 1951 for fol: Import credits 32.8; settlement of swings in bilateral trade agreements 2.0; defense imports credit settlement 9.0; POL 1.2; total 45.0.
2. Anticipated earnings: proceeds of exports and invisibles 11.0; remittances (UPA) and transfers (bond sales) 15.0; total 26.0; uncovered balance of obligations 10.0.

Discussion of amt of minimum requirements for maintaining import pipeline over next three months as well as estimates of Israel capacity to obtain renewal of credit facilities to finance such requirements were inconclusive. Estimated requirements figure cld be held to between $25 and 30 million which was assumed to be manageable thru credit renewals provided fall maturities are met. Govt also felt confident of ability to extend maturity of at least $4 million of obligations.

Cash balances of treas are nil in sterling and under $100,000 in dollars. It was categorically stated no additional balances now due Treas from UJA, UPA or bond sales account.

This poses particular problem in that requirement is for immed funds to fill gap in settlement of due obligations, all of which cover shipments already recd. In effect Israel Govt has been operating without working dollar balances since March 1950 and from Jan 1951 without any exchange. It has been obliged to finance entire import on instable structure of short-term bankers credits and acceptances at considerable cost. Present situation, amounting to an overbought position, threatens so to jeopardize credit standing as to endanger imminent collapse of financing structure. This eventuality wld obviously greatly increase cost to US of sustaining economy.

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[1] Repeated for information to London.

While we were informed that above summary represents total of maturing short-term liabilities and prospective assets, Horowitz' conversations in London will, if successful, bring additional relief. Shld UK Treas advance pound 3 million requested for settling sterling POL position, approx. pound 1 million wld be additional margin. (We assume UK will not grant Israel Govt's request for 20 million pound development loan in near future.) This we consider, shld not be deducted from assistance contemplated by US, but shld serve either to give essential increase in flexibility to present position or to meet costs packing citrus crop.

Kaplan request (Embtel 370, Oct 19)[2] for immed assistance is given validity by above figures. Requirement thus becomes emergency finance to honor obligations maturing in last quarter calendar 1951 for whole range of imports. Gap US might fill now cld be programmed from essential "austerity" imports. This wld not only prevent collapse presently over-extended external credit structure but appears appropriate use Section 205 MSA funds by insuring supply of essentials for maintenance immigrant well being as well as stability whole economy. Israel Govt officials listed austerity program until Jan 1 as fols in million dollars (tho not necessarily from dollar sources): foodstuffs and animal feed 19.9; seeds, fertilizer, agric shares 2.554; industrial raw materials 2.9; truck spares .7; non-sterling POL 3.3; chemicals, pharmaceuticals .3; rough diamonds 1.7; total 30.452. Detailed breakdowns of foregoing have been given.

Dept for Fryer TCA and Gardiner NEA from Bayne and Parker.

In view practical absence working balances and assuming Washington agreement of gap-filling emergency proposal which we recommend, assistance will require time-saving procedure to be effective. In working level discussions we have agreed with Israel reps to suggest fol procedure to TCA/W for 15 million emergency allocation, reserving right to revise procedure for balance of funds available. We emphasized any disbursement by US wld be subject to bilateral agreement or letter of intent which wld provide for performance guaranties; we did not specify latter in our conversations with Israel Govt officials. Procedure discussed which Israel Govt also cabling, is in five steps:

1. Estab of joint US-IG acct in Bank Leumi for 15 million.

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[2] *Supra.*

2. Acct at disposal of IG Treasury against counter-signature of appropriate TCA mission official.
3. Funds to be used only for refinance of existing short term credit facilities for programmed commodities or for new purchase under program.
4. IG will provide within 10 days bankers confirmation that ltr of credit was opened for programmed transaction as represented.
5. Joint account wld be reimbursed as first charge on free IG funds in any case of misrepresentation or short fall by supplier, etc.

Above procedure has advantage of not requiring provision of cash by IG which has none and of using normal business channels. It has, however, disadvantage of postponing maturities for essential items which may not be met ultimately from IG fon exchange receipts. This might prejudice flexibility whole program, and restrict it to a maintenance of essential supply. This we do not consider desirable. We have throughout discussions distinguished between section 205 funds and section 203 funds to allow program leeway for Mission's future operations. In any event, earliest arrival of Mission Chief and comptroller wld appear necessary.

We have had only limited discussions of counterpart except to point out that US wld require it. It appears likely from obvious inflationary conditions caused by heavy internal defense and capital expenditures that 95 percent counterpart wld be best used for debt retirement or other appropriate deflationary measure.

Govt presentation has so far failed to satisfy us that we are seeing complete picture. Particularly mil component of total annual fon exchange requirements has been withheld altho promises that this will be given, continue. We have reasonable grounds for assumption that present crisis arises from undeterminately high level mil expenditure over past few months which exhausted available resources for even food imports, and thereby disrupted both import scheduling and refinancing program. Furthermore, data furnished on total fon exchange payments and receipts fail to account fully for known receipts.

For example fin exchange receipts for Jan–Aug period this year show only $40.5 million transferred to Israel Treasury from combined UJA receipts and bond sale proceeds. Latter alone stated to be $60 million thru Sept. This discrepancy may be explained by direct procurement for refugees not scheduled thru Israel Govt accts, mil disbursements, or direct payment on long term obligations. However, we cannot now certify that we have complete picture or particularly, that their statement of exhaustion all balances is correct.

Our considered recommendation therefore is that at least $15 million be made immed available to Israel Treasury to meet matching obligations and thereby preserve credit structure. Additional reservations concerning longer range over-all fon exchange expenditures and earnings require more rigorous examination and analysis prior to finalization program for balance aid funds. We are increasingly convinced that mission must extend responsibility to review of entire import program including at least access to mil requirements schedules. In our discussions here we have met several high level officials who, informally, urged such outside control as essential.

Emb will continue lines of inquiry established this week. Cooperation of Israel reps while less than satisfactory, is improving and there is reason to expect will increase particularly as they become accustomed to closer work in relationship in Israel with US reps.

Emb concurs completely in above.[3]

Davis

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[3] In telegram 301 to Tel Aviv, October 26, not printed, the Department stated that it was actively working on the recommendations of this telegram and would advise as soon as possible with a definite decision on the request for emergency aid (884A.10/10–2151).

Telegram 427 from Tel Aviv, November 2, not printed, stated that subsequent discussions with Israeli officials had not altered the recommendations set forth in telegram 371 with respect to the need for approximately $15 million in emergency assistance (884A.10/11–251).

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

SECRET [Washington,] October 22, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Israel Minister and Mr. George Newell

The Minister of Israel, Mr. Theodore Kollek, will call on you at 3 o'clock today, accompanied by Mr. George Newell, Vice President, Manufacturers Trust of New York City, to discuss briefly Israel's critical foreign exchange situation and the interest of the Manufacturers Trust and National City banks in the possibility of extending a loan to the Israel Government.

You will recall that in the course of Ambassador Eban's visit with you on Friday, October 12, the Ambassador mentioned the seriousness of Israel's present foreign exchange situation. Finance officials of the Israel Government have informed our Embassy at Tel Aviv that (1) Israel's current foreign exchange reserves are nil, (2) Israel is faced with an apparent exchange deficit between now and the end of calendar 1951 of I£ 5 million ($14 million) which they hope to make up through extension of current maturities, sterling and franc credits, and additional dollar credits, and (3) the situation is still deteriorating; the foreign exchange now required to clean up the present arrearages and to get control of the situation is said to be $15 million.[2] Although Israel's officials do not believe that their Government's credit has as yet been seriously impaired, the attitude of the banks and the character of the inquiries received by the Israel Government indicate widespread concern.

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Burns and Waldo; cleared with Mr. Gardiner.

On October 15, Minister Kollek discussed Israel's exchange situation with officials of State and Treasury. In response to a question as to what Israel would like to see done to assist her in her present plight, Mr. Kollek said they would like very much to have the US Government pick up the check for between 10 and 12 million dollars' worth of the consumers goods which the Israelis have imported since the beginning of fiscal 1952. He had in mind the possibility of this sum being made available from MSP funds, once Congress has passed the appropriate legislation. Although no assurances were given Mr. Kollek that this sort of support could be expected from the US, he was informed that there was a distinct possibility that something along these lines could be worked out. It was emphasized, however, that it was impossible to foretell when Congress would complete its action, how much money would be available to Israel when the legislation is finally enacted, or the exact manner in which the funds may be utilized.

Subsequent to the above conversation, Mr. Kollek discussed the possibilities of obtaining a loan from Manufacturers Trust and National City with officials of these banks. Evidently the two banks have formed a consortium for this purpose, and are viewing favorably the possibility of extending a loan of upwards of $10 million to Israel. In his discussions with the bank officials Mr. Kollek mentioned that MSP funds might be forthcoming in the near future and that the Department was considering what steps might be taken, once the legislation is passed, to pick up 10 to 12 million dollars of Israel's bills covering consumers goods imports. Mr. Kollek previously received the Department's approval before mentioning that such a possibility was being considered.

Recommendations:

That you inform Mr. Newell that it is expected that the President will sign the MSP at any time and the Department hopes to make Israel's MSP allotment of funds ($60/62 million) available as quickly as possible thereafter.

After a short discussion with Mr. Newell, it is suggested that you tell him that Mr. Gardiner will be glad to continue the discussion in his office since he is familiar with all the details.[3]

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[2] See telegram 348 from Tel Aviv, October 13, p. 905; telegram 370, October 19, p. 907; and telegram 371, October 21, *supra*.

[3] See the memorandum of conversation *infra*.

884A.00 TA/10-2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Israel Minister and Mr. George Newell of the Manufacturers Trust.

Participants: The Honorable Theodore Kollek, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Mr. George Newell, Vice President, Manufacturers Trust, New York City
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NEA—Mr. Gardiner
NE—Mr. Waldo

Mr. Kollek introduced Mr. Newell and explained that he had brought him in order to discuss briefly with the Department problems arising out of Israel's acute shortage of foreign exchange and the resultant efforts of the Israel Government to obtain immediately sufficient dollars to tide them over until funds were available on a large scale from other sources, such as the grant-aid program of the US.

Mr. Newell said that the Manufacturers Trust frequently loaned money to the various Jewish institutions, such as the United Jewish Appeal, United Palestine Appeal, the Keren Kayemeth,[2] and the Jewish Agency; that these loans were short-term loans and that the security for them was generally collections already in progress. The Israel Government now wished to have a loan of approximately $10 million for the purpose of paying debts acquired since July 1, 1951. Mr. Newell said that he was interested in learning of the status of the Mutual Security Program and the possibilities that any money available thereunder would be used to pay commitments acquired by Israel before the passage of the Bill, between July 1, 1951 and the present.

I told Mr. Newell that the Mutual Security Program itself was now law and the Appropriations Bill would probably soon be signed by the President. So far as the administration of the money itself was concerned, it was about certain that the TCA under Mr. Bennett would administer the money for the Near East, including Israel. It would therefore be up to Mr. Bennett to make the policy decision whether the money could be used to pay past debts acquired by Israel. I pointed out, however, that the TCA would probably follow precedents already set by ECA and, as he was aware, the ECA had picked up the check for a number of countries on past purchases when it first had gone into business.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo.

[2] The Jewish National Fund.

I was of course unable to give Mr. Newell any specific assurances that this would be the case, since it was the prerogative of Mr. Bennett to make the decision. Mr. Newell said that he was aware before coming to my office that he would be unable to obtain such a commitment but that he was interested in discussing generally the problem involved. After leaving my office Mr. Newell went to Mr. Gardiner's office where there was further discussion, and Mr. Gardiner explained that the administration of the bill would be guided by the debate which took place in the Congressional committees and a reading of those hearings would disclose that the ECA pattern would be followed. Mr. Gardiner gave Mr. Newell copies of Congressional hearings as well as of the Mutual Security Act.

On the following day Mr. Kollek called Mr. Waldo and requested him to convey his thanks and appreciation to Mr. Gardiner and to me for the very helpful general discussion which we had had with Mr. Newell. Mr. Kollek said the discussion had sufficed to convince Mr. Newell to begin the negotiations for the loan to Israel.

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1951.

Subject: Visit of the Israel Ambassador

The Israel Ambassador is calling on you today at 3:30 to discuss developments in Paris at the Conference of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. It is understood that the Ambassador is rather concerned over a telegram which he received from the Israel Minister in Paris who is representing Israel at this conference. Apparently Mr. Fischer and Ambassador Palmer have held a conversation in which the latter allegedly used "strong language" to the effect that Israel would be responsible for breaking up the PCC negotiations if it refused to consider the five substantive proposals.

The Israelis have been unhappy about the compromise the PCC decided upon in connection with the non-aggression declarations. Agreement on the text of these declarations was originally intended to precede consideration of the five proposals. Since the Israelis and the Arabs could not get together on any wording, the PCC, in a letter of October 6 to both parties, quoted the text of the two drafts—the comprehensive Israel one, and the strict constructionist Arab one which was based solely on the military provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The PCC letter then stated that the two drafts represented a satisfactory preliminary basis for the parties to proceed to discuss points at issue. The Israelis take the position that the PCC letter is not satisfactory since by quoting the Arab declaration they consider the PCC is giving the stamp of approval to the Arab attitude, which of course fails to include any injunction against hostile acts, such as the Suez Canal blockade. The Israelis feel that what they consider tacit approval by the PCC of the Arab declaration definitely prejudices the SC interpretation of the Armistice Agreement incorporated in the Suez Canal Resolution of September 1.

On October 19, Israel stated its doubts that the Arab text of the non-aggression declaration could constitute a basis for the pursuit of further negotiations. Apparently Ambassador Palmer has now told the Israelis that PCC did not consider that the PCC note quoting the two separate texts of the non-aggression declaration in any way prejudiced the Armistice Agreements and that controversy over this point should not be permitted to hold up discussion of the substantive points at issue. In doing so the Ambassador may also have used "strong language" in telling the Israelis that they would be responsible for breaking up the PCC Conference if they refused to discuss the proposals, particularly in the light of the fact that the Arab states have already agreed to discuss them.

Recommendations:

That you inform the Ambassador that we appreciate and sympathize with his Government's views on the question of the non-aggression declarations. As the Ambassador is aware, however, the United States does not accept the Arab position on the Suez Canal blockade. We should point out that the absence of any injunction against hostile acts in the Arab text of the non-aggression declaration does not thereby justify the commission of such acts or legalize the Suez Canal blockade.

The Arab delegations have now agreed to discuss the substantive proposals. We would hope some progress could be made on this matter. We hope, therefore, that the Israel views in connection with the non-aggression declaration, which appear rather legalistic, will not hold up consideration of the points at issue. It would be our suggestion that Israel might wish to state its objections to the Arab non-aggression declaration and then at the same time agree to consider the substantive points. We do not believe that Israel can lose anything by discussing with the Commission the various items. It is unlikely that any final settlement can be reached at this time, but any informal or partial settlement should be welcomed by all concerned.

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Israel Ambassador

Participants: Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Shmuel Bendor, Officer in Charge, U.S. Affairs, Israel Foreign Office
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Waldo—NE

The Israel Ambassador called, accompanied by Mr. Bendor. He complained that the PCC, in particular the US delegation, was pressing the Israel delegation to agree to consider the substantive proposals of the PCC without further discussion of the non-aggression declaration. The Ambassador restated the Israel position; i.e., that the PCC letter of October 6 prejudiced the SC interpretation of the Armistice Agreements which was contained in the SC Resolution of September 1 concerning the Suez Canal blockade. The Ambassador contended that the PCC letter was not satisfactory, and urged the Department to instruct the US delegation to reopen the entire question of the non-aggression declaration in an effort to get the Arab delegations to agree to a wording which would signify their agreement to refrain from "hostile acts." The Ambassador insisted that the fact that the Arab delegations had refused to include any reference to hostile acts in the non-aggression declaration thereby legalized the position that they were entitled to commit them.

I told the Ambassador that I thought the Israelis were taking too legalistic a position on this question. (The pertinent sections of the PCC letter were then read aloud.) It did not seem to me that the letter in any way prejudiced the Armistice Agreements, the SC Resolution, or even indicated that the PCC considered the Arab delegation one hundred percent satisfactory. I said I thought the PCC passed lightly over the non-aggression declaration because they were convinced that no further useful purpose would be served in attempting to work out phraseology for the non-aggression declaration which would be satisfactory to both the Arabs and the Israelis. It did not appear necessary to waste any more time on this question since no agreement could be reached on it. It was desirable to proceed to considering other problems on which there might be some possibility of agreement. I said that at least both sides had indicated their willingness to refrain from acts of force against one another.

I told the Ambassador we would inform our delegation to the PCC of the representation made by the Israel Ambassador in Washington, but that we still hoped useful discussions could be held by both sides on the various proposals which the PCC had submitted. The Ambassador said he was not satisfied. If the PCC would not reopen the question of the non-aggression declaration the Israel Government would agree only to consider those problems on the PCC agenda which were of mutual interest to the UN and Israel but not those of concern to the Arab states. I again urged that the Israelis not be too fussy, and emphasized that no harm could come to the Israel position and no commitment would be involved in discussing with the PCC all of the points.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo.

The Ambassador then turned to another question, and said that Israel was desperately short of steel and hoped that some special arrangement could be made which would permit Israel to get a 25,000-ton additional allocation for the first quarter. The Ambassador said he understood that Mr. Fleischman of the Defense Production Agency was willing to allocate some of the 500,000-ton reserve of International Trade for this purpose. I said I would be happy to take the matter up with Mr. Fleischman as soon as I got the necessary data, which I believed NE was preparing.

357.AC/10-2451 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 24, 1951—5 p.m.

2391. Palun 459. On 22nd, I communicated to Fischer, Israel rep, Dept's views as contained Unpal 294.[2] I told Fischer in addition that PCC had decided it wld not serve any purpose to reopen at this time question of non-aggression declarations and that it intended make further explanations of its comprehensive proposals to Arab dels at meeting scheduled for morning of 24th. Comm wished on same day make similar explanations to Israel del.

Fischer stated that as result of position taken by Arab States in their non-aggression declaration, it was impossible for Israel del to enter into discussion involving negotiation with Arab dels. There remained a possibility, however, that Israel del might go on with discussions with Comm itself. Before Arab declarations, the procedure that had been followed involved negotiations with Arab dels, although this was, of course, through the Comm in accordance with the GA Res of Dec 14. This was clearly no longer possible. Inasmuch as Sharett arrived from New York that afternoon, Fischer thought he would be able tell us following day whether meeting on Wed afternoon cld be held and whether in course this meeting Israel del wld be in position hear Comm's further explanations with understanding they were now dealing with PCC only.

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[1] Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, London, Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Jerusalem.

[2] Dated October 18, p. 906.

On 23rd, PCC addressed letter to Israel del stating Comm wld postpone meeting previously fixed for 23rd to 24th at 4 p. m. at which time Comm wld be prepared hear observations del wished present. At same time PCC wished communicate same detailed explanations of its proposals as wld be communicated to Arab dels on morning of 24th. Late 23rd, Israel rep telephoned PCC to say del wld not receive instructions before afternoon of 25th or morning of 26th and that meeting with Comm cld not be held until afternoon 26th.

Comm has in these circumstances been left with no alternative but to proceed with further explanation its proposals with Arab dels as scheduled and this morning made statement text of which is quoted in next fol tel. After hearing this statement Arab dels made no comnents other than usual remarks of wishing continue collaborate with Comm, referring particularly to anniversary of founding of UN as proper occasion reaffirmation these intentions. PCC had not intended provide dels with text of statement until after making same statement o Israel del at Fri meeting, but upon receiving urgent requests for text from each Arab del, Comm decided make statement available to them ater today with understanding it wld not be released by dels or PCC ntil after communication to del of Israel on Fri.

It remains uncertain whether Israel del will attend next meeting prepared hear PCC's explanations its proposals. In event they shld gain postpone meeting or in other way avoid hearing statement, US el believes PCC shld transmit statement by letter.

[Palmer]

20.2 AA/10-2451 : Despatch

The Minister in Lebanon (Minor) to the Department of State[1]

ONFIDENTIAL
o. 214

Beirut, October 24, 1951.

ubject: Approval of Arab League for Arab States to Cooperate with UNRWA (PRA)

There is enclosed a translation of the text[2] of a decision made by e Arab League on October 7, 1951, to cooperate with PRA in its roposed three-year program aimed at the creation of better living nditions and employment opportunities for Palestine refugees.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Macatee; sent also to London, Paris, the Arab capitals, and l Aviv.

[2] Not printed

The decision is followed by ten clauses setting forth the conditions under which the Arab States will cooperate. These conditions reflect: 1) Arab desire to assist the refugees while not prejudicing their political rights; 2) Arab insistence that the major financial burden of the program be borne by the United Nations and concern lest the refugees become an economic burden to the host states; 3) Arab demand that in the execution of the program full respect be paid to the sovereignty and independence of the Arab States.

Comment: The decision represents an important step forward in PRA's effort to provide a solution to the Palestine refugee problem. The conditions of cooperation are not new or arbitrary—in fact, all of them except No. 6 were implied in the three-year plan proposals submitted by PRA to the Arab States and the League.

This decision provides a setting in which PRA can hopefully enter into negotiations for specific projects with the individual Arab states.

HAROLD B. MINOR

357.AC/10-2751 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 27, 1951—5 p. m.

2477. Palun 461. PCC met with Israel del afternoon 26. Mtg opened with long statement by Fischer reviewing present situation with respect to conference. *Inter alia* Fischer stated that by PCC's "accepting Arab States refusal to affirm the validity of the principles of the charter and decisions of SC, an organ of UN had declared itself satisfied with Arab declaration which showed intention to pursue acts hostile to Israel in violation of armistice conventions, treaties and decisions." Arab refusal subscribe to declaration originally demanded by comm implied Arabs "refusal to negotiate, in as much as no one could participate in negots having as their objective finding of solutions for outstanding problems if in beginning they put in doubt those questions already settled."

Del of Israel hoped comm wld pursue its efforts obtain from Arab dels "explicit recognition of their obligations under armistice agreements and charter of UN . . .[2] conference called by comm was by nature negot between Israel and Arab States. Such negots directed through comm were conditional upon explicit recognition of Arab States of internatl engagements to which they had subscribed . . these negots cld not be continued until Arab States substituted for their declaration of 3 October an affirmation of their intention to respect their obligations vis-à-vis Israel both as signatories of armistice agreements as interpreted by SC and as members of UN."

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Jerusalem.

[2] All ellipses in the source text.

"Israel del reaffirmed its desire to collaborate with comm and was ready to examine with comm any question which cld be subj of discussion between Israel del and comm as an organ of UN, it being understood that any question implying negots direct or indirect with Arab States must be postponed until Arab States had unequivocally subscribed to armistice agreements, the decisions of SC and provisions of charter of UN."

As chairman I stated that observations of Israel del wld be studied carefully by comm but that comm believed at same time Israel del wld find it helpful receive same explanation of comms proposals as had been communicated to Arab dels on Wednesday. Fischer replied that he was prepared to hear comms statement and wld transmit it to his govt. I then read statement previously communicated to Arab dels (Palun 460).[3] Mtg adjourned without further comment by Israel del or PCC.

US dels conversations during past few days with Fischer, Shiloah and Rafael indicate Israel del may be prepared take up with PCC unilaterally single question of compensation. They seem to assume this is question which can be considered by them with PCC alone without engaging in "negots" with Arab dels. It seems clear they are determined not to continue with conference as envisaged in PCC's original invitation or within framework of PCC's mediation between parties as outlined comms pattern of proposals.

Israel dels position seems to be based on firm Cabinet decision and explicit instructions. PCC is, therefore, faced with situation anticipated in Deptel 2103, Oct 11 [*10*].[4] PCC has made clear it cannot now reopen question of nonaggression declarations, which Israel has made conditions precedent to further negots through comm with Arab dels. On other hand, while Israel has indicated willingness consider unilaterally with comm individual questions, no official statement as to which questions Israel has in mind has been communicated to comm. Before PCC cld enter into unilateral discussions with Israel, it seems to US del that present conference wld have to be terminated. Questions arise as to procedure PCC shld follow in terminating conference and whether under these circumstances it is desirable continue unilaterally afterwards with matters chosen by Israel for discussion. In latter case PCC's "authoritative" role of mediation wld seem to terminate likewise. In any case it wld be at an end as far as Arabs are concerned.

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[3] Palun 460, identified also as telegram 2396 from Paris, October 24, not printed, contained the text of a statement which the Palestine Conciliation Commission submitted on October 24 to the Arab delegations at the conference in Paris in further explanation of the five points constituting the PCC's comprehensive proposals (357.AC/10-2451).

[4] *Ante*, p. 889.

Situation will be considered by PCC in mtg 29th. Dept's views for our guidance wld be appreciated.

[PALMER]

320.2 AA/10-2951 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Minor) to the Department of State

SECRET BEIRUT, October 29, 1951—3 p. m.

439. Rapun 245. Re Unrap 213.[1] Summary Blandford views.

1. Agrees Agent-Gen should replace PCC which too unwieldy for negots. Strong, not too orthodox or legalistic Agent-Gen might get results. We unclear whether Dept intends combine TSO and Agent-Gen only in case Riley appointed, or intends this regardless who appointed. Blandford unenthusiastic, Riley doubting sufficiency his political acumen. Would prefer new face. Feels combination and Agent-Gen requires careful study since limitation TSO's powers by armistice agreements may present obstacles. Title "Agent-Gen" might arouse resentment as implying sovereignty. Something like "conciliator" preferable.

2. Would welcome formal transfer to PRA from PCC of broad mandate for economic development as already done by implication. Agent-Gen should be responsible old polit problems arising from hostilities. PRA shld be responsible solely for new economic approach to restore peace stability. Compensation remains old political problem. PRA shld not have to fight for compensation. By so doing wld enlarge PRA reintegration responsibilities because guess is that three-quarters compensation will go to large property-owners not presently PRA's clients. Compensation due present clients insignificant, which reintegrated refugees cld keep as additional bonus, or cld be collected along with rent for reintegration facility. Once Agent-Gen attains polit agreements on compensation and repatriation, is willing PRA attempt implement them. Agrees PRA director and Agent-Gen consult together to this end.

3. Feels terminal date program and total budget inseparable as subj of discussion. Wld substitute "approx 3 years" for "June 30, 1954". While impossible forecast exact cost, feels reintegration will cost $200 million and relief $50. Has no firm opinion on question of tactics, i.e. whether resolution shld specify $150 million with Arabs bargaining us upward, or whether shld bowl them over with large offer of $200 million.

4. Agrees generally with desirability early turnover relief admin. Somewhat concerned that once Arab states get control ration rolls they will find more reintegration clients.

5. Pleased that by implication negots now taken from AdCom and given solely to director. Sees two alternatives for future AdCom: (1) body to coordinate members own bilateral programs with PRA

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[1] Identified also as telegram 388 to Beirut, October 26 (not printed); it requested a summary of the views of Blandford and Macatee on the refugee situation. (320.2 AA/10-2451)

multilateral, or (2) board of visitors meeting quarterly or semi-annually with highly formalized procedure.

Doubts propriety AdCom "adopting" rather than "advising" on expenditure plans and prefers six months rather than quarterly plans as giving more financial leeway for director. Agrees on joint director-AdCom recommendations to UNGA. Feels this good opportunity clarify AdCom as UN body or group or reps of govts.

6. Hopes UNGA will direct UN specialized agencies negotiate agreements with PRA as to respective roles in PRA program.

7. Feels PRA and Agent-Gen shld be treated in separate UNGA resolutions, thus strengthening idea of separation old polit problems from new economic approach. *End Summary.*

Comment: By Macatee. Basis my brief experience AdCom agree generally Blandford's views and feel they wld be endorsed by other AdCom members. Somewhat surprised Blandford's attitude re Riley, of whom I have highest first impression. Blandford's private opinion does not affect his excellent personal relations Riley.

MINOR

357.AC/10-2951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Paris [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 29, 1951—6:43 p. m.

2515. Unpal 299. Re Unpal 298 [2] and Palun 461.[3] Dept shares views USDels penultimate paragraph Palun 461 but believes in order make PCC record straight and provide basis for one last appeal to Israeli Del, and for subsequent adjournment PCC conf, if Israeli Del still unmoved, following suggested as possible course of action:

1. PCC in formal communication to all dels shld indicate its estimate progress made thus far. Letter shld indicate fact all dels now advised PCC's explanation points in its comprehensive proposals. Shld indicate PCC concern re approaching date commence GA and necessity PCC submit comprehensive report its activities as soon as possible thereafter, and, accordingly shld request all dels indicate by approx Nov 6 whether they prepared discuss with PCC all points in comprehensive proposals. Prelim views of all dels PCC on points and explanations also invited by that date. Letter wld, of course, indicate clearly PCC's determination continue conf as long as necessary with continued cooperation all dels.

2. In such manner as you see fit you shld indicate to Israeli del US view formal letter from PCC to all dels must of necessity represent last

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow; approved for transmission and signed for the Acting Secretary by Mr. Hickerson.

[2] Identified also as telegram 2500 to Paris, October 28, not printed; in it, the Department expressed its hopes to Ambassador Palmer that the PCC would postpone a final decision with respect to the future of the Paris conference pending his receipt of the Department's considered views in Palun 461 which would be forwarded as soon as possible (357.AC/10-2851).

[3] Dated October 27, p. 920.

opportunity Israel indicate willingness explore all points raised in PCC's comprehensive proposals. Indication of willingness discuss all points without further wrangle non-aggression declaration most likely result Israel's credit, whether or not subsequent discussion each individual indicates negative Israeli or Arab position or lack agreement between Israeli and Arab dels over possible final settlement. US appreciates Israeli willingness discuss question of compensation as definite step forward but cannot see what Israel believes can be gained by (*a*) emphasis this pt to exclusion all others and (*b*) legalistic position Israel discuss individual questions only with PCC.

3. Position indicated in 2 above will be given to Eban by Hickerson Oct 31 at mtg resulting from Eban's initiative, unless you indicate opposition this step.

4. If Arab or Israeli replies unacceptable, PCC then in position indicate formal belief conf shld be adjourned forthwith.[4]

WEBB

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[4] In Palun 462, identified also as telegram 2525 from Paris, October 30 (not printed), Ambassador Palmer informed the Department that the U.S. Delegation would advocate in the PCC meeting of that afternoon the action suggested by the Department in paragraph one of this telegram and stated that the U.S. Delegation fully agreed to the action envisaged in paragraph two of the telegram (357.AC/10–3051).

On October 31 the PCC addressed a letter to all delegations taking part in the Paris Conference of the Commission. In the letter, the PCC reiterated the point of its letter of October 6 that a basis for negotiations existed, and requested the delegations to state whether they were prepared to discuss with the Commission all points of the Commission's comprehensive pattern of proposals. (Palun 464 from Ambassador Palmer, identified also as telegram 2561 from Paris, October 31, not printed (357.AC/10–3151)) The Arab delegations responded affirmatively; the Israeli Delegation, while maintaining its previous position, stated that it was prepared to submit its comments on the Commission's proposals (Palun 465, identified also as telegram 2707 from Paris, November 7, not printed (357.AC/11–751)).

320.2 AA/11–851 : Despatch

The Minister in Lebanon (Minor) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, November 8, 1951

No. 243

Ref: Beirut's telegram No. 229 of September 7, 1951, to the Department (Rapun 214)[2]

Subject: Arab and Jewish Refugees in Israel

As reported in the telegram under reference, on September 5, 1951 Mr. John B. Blandford, Jr., Director of UNRWA (PRA), discussed with the Israeli Foreign Minister the question of the 20,000 Arabs and 3,000 Jews in Israel still drawing PRA rations. Mr. Blandford urged that Israel should take on full responsibility for these people who were, after all, bona fide residents of the country.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Bergus; sent also to the Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.

[2] *Ante*, p. 852.

There is enclosed a copy of a letter sent to Mr. Blandford dated October 3, 1951, by Dr. G. Meron, Chairman of the Israel Delegation to PRA.[3] Dr. Meron makes the point that his Government had never denied responsibility for its residents. He then states that Israel will take no final decision in this matter pending the outcome of the Arab-Israeli discussions at the present Paris conference of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. There is also enclosed a copy of Mr. Blandford's reply, dated November 2, 1951.[4]

Comment: In June 1950, the Israeli Government admitted full responsibility for the refugees within Israel at a meeting with the Director and Advisory Commission of PRA. The Israelis stated that they would reintegrate these people with or without international aid. They did argue, however, that assistance from PRA could greatly speed up the process.

It would appear that Israel, now that she is to receive $50 million from the United States for the express purpose of settling refugees, is prepared to withdraw its request for PRA assistance. However, Israel will be very careful to insist, for the record that her shouldering full responsibility was originally her idea.

As regards Israel's postponement of the final decision in this matter until the outcome of the PCC conference, Mr. Blandford is fond of citing this as another instance where PCC's action has delayed PRA's program.

HAROLD B. MINOR

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[3] Not printed.

[4] Not printed. Mr. Blandford replied in part as follows:

"I must admit this decision is a bit disappointing for two reasons. First, I leave for Paris Wednesday, the seventh, for a meeting with my Advisory Commission to complete our joint report for the UN Assembly. I had hoped to omit from the report references to UN support of resident refugees in Israel, especially in the light of recent large appropriations from other sources for refugee settlement in Israel. Second, during the recent weeks I have made steady progress with other Governments of the area toward constructive measures for improving refugee living conditions upon the sound premise that such a program should proceed without reference to the discussions or conclusions of the Paris meeting of the Conciliation Commission and without delay." (320.2 AA/11-851)

357.AC/11-1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, November 10, 1951—2 p. m.

2784. Palun 466. In opinion USDel, Israel's reply to PCC letter of Oct 31 by implication reiterates Israel's previous position that it cannot discuss questions involving negots with Arab States before change in Arab position re nonaggression declaration but is prepared discuss selected questions with Comm which do not involve negotiating with

Arab States. Israel has not specifically answered question put to it in PCC's letter of Oct 31 as to whether Israel was prepared discuss within framework of present conf all points in PCC's comprehensive proposals. USDel feels that Israel del shld be asked to make explicit their answer to this question and PCC has authorized chairman to make such inquiry on informal basis as soon as remaining Arab answers recd. It seems likely in view Sharett's statement Nov 4 to Knesset that Israel will reply to this further inquiry in vein similar to that contained their previous communication of 19 Oct. In these circumstances PCC remains faced with question whether, in conf based upon resolutions of GA calling upon parties to negot with each other thru Comm, and in view of firm position PCC has taken that all questions shld be considered by parties in context of comprehensive pattern and with Comm mediating between them, PCC shld now discuss with Israel items chosen by Israel for discussion with Comm alone and on condition such questions are not to be negotiated with Arab States.

USDel's opinion is that it wld be desirable to be able to include in PCC's report to GA Israel del and Arab dels specific comments on any or all of PCC's proposals, but that it will be difficult for PCC to receive Israel's comments during this conf under conditions Israel imposes. Israel's position as announced by Sharett Nov 4 [1] that as long as Arab States refuse accept PCC preamble Israel must defer entering into discussion of "any problem between it and Arabs" and that Israel will negot re compensation only with UN agency, is in fact refusal to proceed with conf on terms that PCC has maintained from beginning are essential to success. Hence if Israel maintains this position, we believe conf shld terminate before entering into any consideration with Israel of counter-proposals on new terms. This view is shared by Args, Turk rep, and Secretariat, but is opposed by Marchal, French rep, who seems wish prolong conf as such as long as possible. Marchal seems motivated by desire avoid putting any blame on parties for conf's failure and hope of avoiding sitn which might lead to PCC's discharge by GA. French attitude in this respect foreshadows difficulties USDel will encounter in proposing discontinuance PCC and transfer PCC functions to other UN body.

In USDel opinion, however, PCC can best clarify sitn if, having recd final negative answer from Israel as anticipated, Comm shld inform parties conf in these circumstances has been terminated, but that in order complete full report to GA, comments already requested on all points of PCC's proposals shld be given to Comm in writing. Dept's views requested question of timing PCC's report to GA remains uncertain in view fact GA Secretariat pressing for its submission within few days to permit distribution before comite's debate, fact *Ad Hoc* Comite agenda may be exhausted by end of month necessitating early debate re Palestine questions, and fact UNRWA members indicate little likelihood that a delay in presenting their report wld result in anything more substantial as to its contents. Substance PCC's conclusions and recommendations, therefore, becomes matter some urgency. USDel is in general agreement Dept's position paper and has from beginning conference been working with these objectives constantly in mind. In particular USDel is in full agreement that PCC shld report frankly failure its mission. Specifically this failure shld be attributed to impossibility implementation its terms of reference as contained para 11, GA Res of 11 Dec 1948, and that PCC shld, therefore, be discharged of its responsibilities. USDel also believes UN interest in overall political questions shld be maintained and that PCC general responsibilities for assisting parties in arriving at final peaceful settlement shld be given to other UN body. We are convinced, however, that any UN body will be seriously handicapped if PCC's terms of reference as contained para 11, GA Res become part of such body's terms of reference. In particular we agree with Blandford and AdCom that UNRWA's resettlement responsibilities wld be seriously hampered shld UNRWA be given responsibility for negotiating repatriation and compensation (SD/A/C.1/373, P4, para 3).[2] In somewhat lesser degree, Riley's present functions might likewise suffer were he given any responsibilities re repatriation and compensation. Greatest importance, therefore, in our opinion attaches to necessity overcoming handicap PCC's terms reference whatever body or bodies replace PCC. PCC can report its opinion that terms of reference cannot be implemented by itself or any other UN organ but question remains how these terms of reference can be eliminated in GA debate.

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[1] The Israeli Foreign Minister's speech of November 4 was summarized in telegram 442 from Tel Aviv, November 6, not printed (784A.00/11–1951).

Re Dept's position paper, para B–10, draft resolution (SD/A/C.1/373, P16) might well perpetuate for UNRWA difficulties PCC has experienced and shld in our opinion be eliminated. Paras A–5, 6, 7, 8 draft res are in our opinion appropriate terms of reference for agent general provided language of para A–5 does not lend itself too readily to inclusion responsibility for repatriation and compensation.

Questions this nature will have to be considered by PCC within next few days and decision will have to be taken as whether PCC shld itself make any specific recommendations for eliminating undesirable terms of reference or for particular UN organ or machinery to replace PCC. We hope receive Dept's views earliest.

[Palmer]

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[2] Dated October 12, p. 892.

320.2 AA/11-1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, November 10, 1951—6 p. m.

2802. Rapun 251. Re Unrap 216.[1]

1. At AdCom mtg with Dir Nov 9, USDel stressed Dept's concern ref lack of detailed justifications and suggestion report be delayed in hope of strengthening report. Unanimous opinion was that there is insufficient basis to hope that delay wld accomplish desired result.

2. At risk repeating much already known to Dept, submit fol résumé of AdCom and Dir thinking;

3. Since Dir assumed duty, PRA has passed through polit phase now hoped reaching final stage. Slowness of progress is inherent in situation; leaders have tended to await outcome of PCC conf and lately to be distracted by MEC issue. Arab League's agreement to cooperate with PRA is milestone. Since then Dir has in ceaseless round of visits appreciably prepared way for specific program but always faced with reality that Arab govts will not be forced, and their extreme sensitivity to refugee and public opinion. Now clear that some govts, notably Syria, wld go further than have done were it not for fact that public opinion cannot be abruptly reversed. Ten days ago, Dir offered Syrian Govt 25 million dols for reintegration. Govt believed ready program that amount and start projects if it can be done quietly while public opinion is prepared. Egyptian govt is definitely cooperative, but proj details await final outcome Sinai water survey. Jordan can probably program 10 million current FY if PRA participation Yarmuk assumed. Lebanese Govt greatly intimidated by large and vociferous refugee population supports reintegration in League but cannot identify itself at least not with projs in Lebanon. Iraq supports three-year plan and currently will accept artisans. However, cannot politically announce its later prospects for receiving large number.

Against this is unyielding insistence refugees upon repatriation and refusal accept reintegration and their conviction it is device further to fortify Israel. They accept relief as right and reason west will continue it rather than have chaos in NE which wld ensue if it were discontinued.

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[1] Identified also as telegram 412 to Beirut, November 5 (not printed); it stated in part that the Department had received the draft joint report of the Advisory Commission and Director of UNRWA and regretted that the Agency was unable at this time to describe reintegration operations in greater detail. The Department also stated its belief that a delay of 1 month or 6 weeks in the presentation of the report to the General Assembly might enable the Agency to develop a more persuasive presentation and detailed justification. (320.2-AA/11-551)

Blandford states that altho his dealings with Arabs have been materially affected by prolonged PCC negots, he believes Arab govts will accept conclusive and generous three or four-year plan and under it will cooperate with agency in quiet programming of current $50 million. Thinks, however, that attempt to allocate all refugees to specific projects in all Arab states and Israel at this time wld be prejudicial to progress already made and wld worsen an already tense atmosphere.

4. Pending receipt of such further instructions or suggestions as may be forthcoming from Dept, plan is meanwhile join with AdCom in completion of report along lines original draft.

5. Since arrival Paris, understand there is some question delaying debate on Palestine matters for reasons unconnected with PRA report. In such case, feel sure AdCom wld wish corresponding delay in completion its report in hope of some development which wld add substance to it.

Bruce

320/11–1551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Paris[1]

CONFIDENTIAL Washington, November 15, 1951—7 : 07 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 158. Unpal 300. Re Palun 468, 469.[2] In view irreconcilable positions parties as demonstrated by statements Israeli and Arab Dels Dept believes conf shld be ended. Accordingly, you shld urge colleagues at mtg Nov 16 advise parties conference is over, and comm shld promptly set about preparation GA report.

Webb

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow, cleared with Mr. Waldo, approved for transmission by Mr. Popper, and signed for the Acting Secretary by Mr. Hickerson.

[2] Dated November 14 and 15, neither printed, these messages respectively gave the Israeli and Arab Delegations' statements on the PCC proposals (357.AC/11-1451, /11–1551).

UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224

Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip A. Mangano, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 15, 1951.

Subject: Memorandum on Meeting on Palestine Matters

Participants:
Ambassador Palmer, US Representative on the PCC
Mr. Barco, Deputy US Representative on the PCC
Mr. Macatee, US Member of Advisory Commission, Palestine Refugee Relief Agency
Mr. Sandifer, US Delegation
Mr. Stein, US Delegation
Mr. Joseph Palmer, US Delegation
Mr. Winslow, US Delegation
Mr. Mangano, US Delegation
Mr. Lewis Jones, Director—Near East Affairs, Department of State
Mr. Crawford, House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff

I. The meeting was called this afternoon to permit a full exchange between the US representatives on the two UN Palestine agencies and members of the Palestine working group in the US Delegation to the General Assembly. The basic problems considered were: (*a*) the question of consultation between responsible members of the US Delegation and General Riley on the subject of the additional political functions with which he would be invested according to the US position on the Palestine case after the presumed dissolution of the PCC; (*b*) the present status and prospects for completion of the PCC and Advisory Commission reports to the General Assembly, which reports are presumably to be considered together by the *Ad Hoc* Committee; (*c*) other questions relating to the proposed new distribution of functions as between the office of General Riley and the UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine).

II. Ambassador Palmer began by saying he had seen General Riley last evening, but did not feel free to go into details with him on the functions which the US would propose be entrusted to him by General Assembly action this year. Mr. Sandifer pointed out that it would be best if Ambassador Jessup would take these matters up directly with General Riley; alternatively, other representatives of the US Delegation could undertake these consultations. Ambassador Palmer and Mr. Barco then reviewed the course of PCC negotiations with the Arabs and the Israelis during the present PCC Conference, which is now about to close. They indicated a very wide divergence of approach between the Arabs and Israelis on almost all of the proposals which the PCC had made in its five-point program for progress toward a final possible settlement. They agreed that the PCC was clearly unable, with its terms of reference, to carry forward the work of negotiating and conciliation. Any new authority charged with such tasks would find it just as difficult unless given different terms of reference. Ambassador Palmer expected the PCC report could be completed sometime in the last week or ten days of November; he did not expect the PCC to adopt any recommendations, but felt that it might formulate conclusions based on its evaluation of the replies of the parties to the various PCC proposals. Ambassador Palmer and Mr. Barco felt that General Riley certainly should not be saddled with responsibility for the question of compensation or repatriation of Arab refugees, since this would only plague him as it had the PCC. They both felt that these functions should not, on the other hand, be turned over to the UNRWA, since Blandford was definitely opposed to that, and since responsibility for those questions would prejudice the UNRWA's chances of successful activity in the resettlement and reintegration field.

III. Mr. Macatee then reported briefly on the status of the Advisory Commission report which the Department had felt to be inadequate and lacking in sufficient concrete data to justify the necessary fund-raising campaign among the interested governments. He said that the Advisory Commission report is well advanced and that the prevailing opinion in his agency is that they cannot present much more concrete data at this time because of the reluctance of Arab governments to negotiate firm commitments. He said that the Arab governments are afraid of refugee opinion, particularly in Lebanon, and that they are approaching the UNRWA proposals with great caution. He made a strong plea not to have the Blandford office saddled with any of the political problems which had been faced by PCC.

IV. After these presentations, the meeting held a general discussion of the major points raised. They arrived at the following thoughts and considerations which had been pointed up by this exchange of views: (*a*) it would be necessary in the next day or two to have high-level consultations between the US Delegation and General Riley; similar consultations would probably be necessary with Mr. Blandford; (*b*) the touchy issues of compensation and repatriation (which had been handled hitherto by a special branch of PCC) should, if possible, be pigeonholed somewhere without requiring any of the authorities dealing with Palestine problems to engage in much activity in those fields. It was generally felt that more might possibly be done in the field of compensation than in the field of repatriation, since the Israelis had so clearly indicated that repatriation was out of the question for a long time: (*c*) thought might be given to asking the Interim Committee to have a sub-committee keep generally in touch with the problems of compensation and repatriation, without unduly emphasizing them;

alternatively, some other means might be found of avoiding a complete passing over of these issues without, however, encouraging unduly active work on them under present conditions.

V. Mr. Lewis Jones (the State Department's Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs), who is at present in Paris on other business, said that he had been asked by the Department to sound out French views on the future of PCC. He said he had not felt it appropriate to discuss the US position on this case with the French, but he had asked them for their views. They had told him they felt the continuance of PCC to be generally desirable. Commenting on the other points under discussion at the meeting, Mr. Jones felt that the political negotiation function could well be played down for some time, and that major support should be given to the very real and immediate problem of finding means of relieving the plight of the some 800,000 refugees in the Arab countries who, if not rehabilitated, would be a dangerous influence in the Middle East and a breeding ground for Communist influence.[1]

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[1] Telegram Delga 122 from Paris, November 9, not printed, summarized much of this conversation and requested the Department's instructions as to the manner and extent the Delegation to the General Assembly should consult with Riley and Blandford (320/11–951). In telegram Gadel 120 to Paris, November 10, the Department stated that the Delegation should advise Riley in confidence of the substance of the position paper of October 12 (p. 892) with regard to his proposed functions and advise him that these were the present views of the United States. The Department requested that it be indicated that these views had not yet been discussed with other delegations and that it was not deemed advisable to do so while the PCC Conference was going on. The Department further stated that Riley's confidential reactions should be invited. (320/11–1051)

320/11–1751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer), at Paris[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 17, 1951—11:36 a.m.

Gadel 182. Unpal 301. Re Palestine.

1. On assumption PCC conf ending and PCC now preparing GA report,[2] and on further assumptions Blandford and Riley now in Paris and confidentially advised US position in SD/A/C1/373 of Oct 12,[3] Dept now of opinion important US GADel Riley and Blandford confer confidentially re possible reassignment of functions shld PCC be abolished. Dept fully appreciates views expressed by Blandford, Palmer, and Barco re possible handicap obligation Blandford negot

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow; cleared with NE, NEA, and UNE; approved for transmission by Mr. Popper.

[2] The Progress Report of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine to the General Assembly (U.N. Doc. A/1985) was considered by the Assembly at the 33d to 41st meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee from January 7–15, 1952.

[3] *Ante*, p. 892.

re repatriation and compensation. Dept hopes that PCC report will to fullest extent possible indicate impracticability of repatriation. While hoping this view in PCC report might be instrumental in achieving elimination ref repatriation in GA res this year, fact cannot be overlooked keeping out ref to obligation carry out repatriation in Pal GA resolution will be difficult. Dept present view is that assignment of repatriation and compensation responsibilities contingent to considerable degree on results US GADel's conversations with Blandford and Riley. During course of such discussions US GADel shld point out to Blandford and Riley negot of compensation with Israeli Govt cld be carried on by Agent General as successor to PCC to point at which Agent General and UNRWA Director shld mutually determine compensation payments, as factor in settlement economic problems in Near East, cld be turned over administratively to UNRWA. In line with this thinking Agent General wld conduct such negots re repatriation as mgt be required.

2. Re Palun 469,[4] Dept concerned note in Arab replies strong allegation responsibility UN for refugee problem, and particularly Egypt suggestion if Israel cannot pay compensation UN shld shoulder burden. Dept of opinion that PCC in GA report shld in strongest language possible indicate its view UN not responsible for present impasse. UN agencies have done and are doing everything in their power to assist parties, whose primary responsibility it is and must remain to work out political differences and economic problems in area.

3. Re Palun 466[5] re timing report, Dept will be largely guided by US GADel views. Dept believes PCC and UNRWA reports shld be made available GA in such fashion at such time maximize likelihood their being considered together. Dept has assumed *Ad Hoc* Comm wld not consider Palestine items until late session but if agreement reached re reports, assignment of PCC functions, single debate Pal items and cosponsorship, Dept agreeable earlier time.

4. Re report, Dept hopes it will see draft soonest prior submission SYG.

Webb

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[4] Dated November 15; not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 929.
[5] Dated November 10, p. 925.

330/11-1851 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

Damascus, November 18, 1951—3 p. m.

286. Yesterday Sec Gen Fon Off discussed sit demil zone at length with Leg officer. He agreed personal attacks on Gen Riley by "mil

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[1] Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Paris, London, the Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and Ankara.

spokesman" (Legdes 267, Nov 16)[2] tactless but asserted all Syrian mil and civil leaders believe Riley's actions re dispute and his interpretation SC res of May 18 leave him open to serious charges partiality. In face Riley's attitude and his failure achieve implementation res, Syria unwilling participate further MAC mtgs.

Sec Gen said in Syrian mind there are three separate issues which shld not be mixed:

(1) First, May 18 res must be fully implemented before MAC cld meet. Shld Syria participate MAC in present circumstances it wld be acknowledging UN's inability achieve implementation res and wld be acquiescing in *status quo* in zone. Israel para mil forces wld still be in zone, Arabs forcibly removed from zone by Israel wld have been repatriated in token numbers only, and Israel wld be continuing engineering operations because of Riley's untenable interpretation of May 18 res. Effect wld be to force Syria to accept Israel *faits accomplis.* Syria's bargaining position in MAC wld be prejudiced by Israel's *de facto* control of zone.

(2) Syria recognizes necessity for definitive line instead of zon
as suggested as early as last Feb by Qudsi (Legtel 400 [*404*] Feb 20).
As Qudsi then pointed out, Syria cannot for polit reasons propos
adjustment herself but willing study proposals made by others. Syri
had hoped something wld come of French proposal to take dispute t
PCC but had heard "informally" that US had killed this idea. (Le
Officer commented this untrue but that US had always urged suc
matters be kept in context MAC as provided under art 8 of armistice.
However, before adjustments cld be considered May 18 Res must b
implemented. Otherwise, Syrian case lost from start and Syria w
be in fact negotiating under duress.

(3) Although any line agreed on wld be as definitive as other armi
tice frontiers of Israel, a "final" settlement of frontier lines a
sovereignty, even in limits demil zone, unthinkable until all UN resol
tions including repatriation, compensation, and partition (*sic*) e
cuted. All adjustments made in demil zone wld be made as part
armistice and cld not be allowed prejudice final determinations. Th
so far as Syria concerned, any proposal involving final settlement w
be *ipso facto* unacceptable as basis for discussion. How cld Sy
expect unprejudice final settlement if Israel refused implement any
several UN resolutions? And if UN cld not enforce May 18 res, h
cld it be expected enforce final settlement or zonal adjustments?

Comment: Re-airing of demil zone dispute cld have disastr
effects on Syrian consideration MEC and MSP. Although rec
statements by "mil spokesman" have not yet provoked public inte
on scale of last May and June, Syrian leaders nevertheless preoccup
failure Israel implement May 18 res. Sooner or later this preoccupat
some new incident in zone, or SC action to expropriate Arab lands

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[2] Despatch 267 from Damascus, November 16 (not printed), transm
the text of a statement on the Syria–Israel demilitarized zone which was rel
to the press by a Syrian "military spokesman" on November 14, and which
largely a personal attack on General Riley (330/11–1651).

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 591.

lead to interjections whole issue into MSP and MEC discussions by extremists and Syrian press.

Syrians are clearly unwilling present adjustment plan themselves, and it may be difficult persuade them consider proposal from any other party if Govt sticks to Secy Gen's line that there can be no MAC mtgs until May 18 res fully executed. In any case atmosphere heated by Israel's failure implement res will make talks bitter.

With success MSP and MEC at stake here it seems essential Israel Govt or Riley shld be persuaded put forward proposal suggesting adjustments in zone (Tel Aviv tel 58 July 20[4] to Dept). Assuming Syria cld be persuaded return to MAC to comment on such proposal, this seems only means determining Syrian price for adjustment. Unless we know Syrian price there seems little hope for adjustment either in or out of MAC.

CLARK

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[4] *Ante*, p. 785.

780.5/11-1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Edwin A. Plitt of the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 19, 1951.

Subject: General Matters of Interest to US and Israel

Participants: The Secretary
His Excellency M. Moshe Sharett, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Sharett called on the Secretary at his own request and was received by the Secretary in his office at 3:30 this afternoon. The conversation lasted for nearly an hour and a number of subjects were discussed, principally by Mr. Sharett. The noteworthy part of what he had to say is given in substance as follows:

Mr. Sharett referred first of all to the Secretary's speech this morning which he described as having been firm in substance and moderate in tone, yet, at the same time revealed an extraordinary concentration of thought on the subject of his address, many points of which the Secretary emphasized effectively by extemporaneous interpolations. Mr. Sharett expressed the hope that the call the Secretary issued would be heeded, which he felt sure could be counted on because of the enlightened exposition which he had made of this very high type of proposal.

Mr. Sharett then expressed some thoughts on where we (the US) and Israel stand in regard to the Middle East defense in which Israel wants to take its part because it would be impractical for it to live in isolation in that area where, as well as elsewhere, preparations have to be made to thwart another world war. If another war should come, Mr. Sharett said Israel would be prepared, not only in its own defense but well beyond its boundaries, to play its part. Israel, he said, was not quite certain as yet what powers will be able to throw their full weight to defend the Middle East effectively. He said he mentioned this because he wanted his talk with the Secretary to be absolutely frank and that the latter, he hoped, would gain thereby a clearer concept of what Mr. Sharett was trying to say.

He pointed out that from a practical point of view the fact must not be lost sight of that the job of the US has become so global that it should be realized that the US can't be expected to defend everyone and everything. He said it was not a question of the world going up in smoke, which we could not afford to let happen. But, if a conflagration did arise, he assumed that we both would defend ourselves together. He, nevertheless, wanted to apprise the Secretary of the precariousness of Israel's position should such a conflict englobe the Arab states as well. Israel can't be expected to disregard the Arabs completely. On the other hand, the United States must do everything possible to have them on the right side, particularly in regard to the facilities they would be in a position to contribute. He pointed out the fact that the Arabs still consider themselves at war with Israel and that Israel, therefore, could not impart vital defense information to the Arabs. Although Mr. Sharett expressed the hope that Egypt might still have a change of heart which would alleviate the entire situation in the Middle East, this could not be counted upon and that, therefore, the US–Israel association would have to assume a very special character. He concluded this theme by saying that this was one point on which he wished the Secretary to know his thinking.

Another subject which Mr. Sharett felt that he was obliged to mention was the Jewish population still in Soviet Russia in connection with which he wanted to emphasize the tragic situation of Soviet Jewry. He said there appeared to be absolutely no hope for improvement of their condition nor for their escape except for so few which he described as only a trickle which occasionally got through to Greece. Not only are there still 1,750,000 Jews in Soviet Russia, but there are also two and a half million in Rumania and possibly 50,000 elsewhere. All of these should in principle find their way to Israel but, even if it were possible for them to get away and immigrate into Israel, it would throw a terrific burden on an impoverished country. He said the problem of taking care of even the trickle that comes from those countries with high hope to re-establish itself in Israel is a major one and that the stopping of all immigration of this kind may even have to be considered. However, so long as it is not absolutely necessary to interfere, Israel does not want to stop these people from coming in. He mentioned that practically all of the Jews from Bulgaria, Poland

and Czechoslovakia have been absorbed. Mr. Sharett said that the Secretary is well aware of how the Soviet regime writes off ethnic elements for which it no longer has any use. He explained that in the last world war this savage policy did not affect the Jews in Russia because Russia was fighting Germany, the arch enemy of Jewish people. Now, however, should a new world-war break out, it would not be likely for Russia to have much consideration for the Jews within its borders. Nevertheless, five million Jews will be ready to fight the Russians. What Mr. Sharett said he was trying to convey was that we must do all possible not to hasten the extermination of Jewery in the Soviet Union.

Veering off to another subject, he said that in addition to the problems facing Israel, there is another looming up very fast and that is the Arab world vis-à-vis the West. He said our combined interests naturally favor Israel's firm association with the West and specifically with the United States. But, because of Israel's geographic position, it would not be advisable for such association to be too formally established. He said that neither of us wants war and knowing this, he feels certain that the United States must be trying to come to an arrangement with the Arab world, of the value of whose potential help the United States could not be but fully aware. In view of this, Mr. Sharett thought that it would be of particular help to us if it were possible to say that Israel is not part or parcel of MEC. He added that the US would be helping itself best if Israel kept apart, and furthermore explained that if Israel joined, it would only be an additional provocation to the Soviets. He said that he viewed this particularly in the light of the tragic fact that, as he had previously mentioned, there are so many Jews in Russia who would become the victims of Russian ire and who must by every possible means be protected from extermination.

Having outlined the foregoing, Mr. Sharett made the suggestion that continued talks between the heads of states are in order. Mr. Sharett said that he had already suggested to Britain that serious exchange of views should take place with a view to heading off disaster.

Mr. Sharett then expressed his and his country's appreciation for the assistance it was receiving from the United States which is helping Israel to get stronger and stronger, and then said that even this is not enough; that more concrete help is needed by Israel in order to develop its road system, other public facilities, and more purposefully to expand Israel's industrial apparatus. He told the Secretary that Israel preferred to take the initiative in these matters and that he was perfectly willing to go to the Departments of State and Defense with a view to developing closer cooperation with the US should any emergency arise. He said that the Israeli Prime Minister had already outlined to Ambassador Davis much of the foregoing but that he felt this program so important that he wished to bring it to the Secretary's attention personally.

Continuing the conversation, Mr. Sharett once again referred to Israel's relationship with Soviet Russia. He asked the Secretary not to become concerned if at times Israel feels that it must and consequently takes Soviet Russia into consideration in the carrying out of its policies. He explained that it is all part of the problem of protecting the Jews in Russia, and pointed out that Israel's talks with Russia could actually prove of help and certainly of use to the United States. He said: "We, of course, intend keeping you informed."

The Secretary listened attentively to Mr. Sharett and thanked him for speaking so frankly his mind on the various subjects covered. He told him that with this knowledge of Israel's thinking, it naturally made it easier for us particularly with reference to the developing of our ideas in regard to the Middle East which, because of recent events, called for frequent changes of thought. The Secretary mentioned the Middle East Command with regard to which the planning is going forward with the idea of having a command nucleus available for use when needed and which in such an event would become a central point for Middle East cooperation. Such centralization in time of peace would provide an organization for emergencies to enable countries to take part if they wanted to do so, and that this was being emphasized in present talks between all countries concerned. At this stage the establishing of such a hub would have its advantages over the development of a vast military organization. Mr. Sharett agreed but maintained that Israel preferred to be in direct touch with the United States and British authorities concerned rather than through a combined command at this stage of developments.

Mr. Sharett then took up matters pertaining to the General Assembly agenda with specific reference to the Palestine item, saying that he felt that a certain chapter might now come logically to a close. He seemed to refer to the chapter on conciliation, saying that the PCC might be terminated. He praised highly Ambassadors Davis and Palmer and commended the French representative, Léon Marchal, for the contributions he had made, as well as the Turkish member which he referred to as an elder statesman. Mr. Sharett said that if the PCC had not achieved the results that it may have set out to obtain, it was no fault of its own. He said that nevertheless it had failed in its objective and that this now called for an examination. He said that at this juncture three complexities faced Israel and the United States, listing them as follows:

(*a*) security—which is covered by armistice agreements, General Riley being backed by the SC. This to be continued;

(*b*) the human problem of refugees in respect to which the United Nations has universally accepted that this work is to go on. He mentioned that the US had voted $15,000,000* for resettlement and then said that the refugee situation should be taken entirely out of the peace problem and that the resettlement of these people should get under way.

(*c*) the whole complexity of interstate relations between Israel and the Arab states. Somewhat bitterly, he alluded to the complete cessation of the exchange of goods between them. He mentioned that the United Nations had succeeded only partly in solving this problem; that Mr. Bunche had done everything he possibly could, but that a peace settlement still remained in abeyance.

Mr. Sharett made a point with reference to the foregoing that the mere existence of a UN organization serves to retard results rather than solve the problems. He said: "The Commission talks to Israel and the Commission talks to the Arabs, but nothing comes of it." He said that in his Government's opinion it is just a waste of talent and personnel as well as money, besides being harmful. The net result is that Israel holds on to one position and the Arabs hold on to another position and yet both are members of the United Nations. His suggestion is that so long as no war conflagration has to be coped with, both parties to the dispute should be left alone and given time to iron out their difficulties; that the United Nations should refrain from interceding in the existing controversy. He assured the Secretary that he was certain that a peace settlement could be worked out between the contending parties because where there is a will there is bound to be a way. Gen. Riley, he said, should be equipped with full powers.

In commenting toward the end of the conversation on what Mr. Sharett had said, the Secretary agreed that the American analysis of the situation in general did not differ very much from that of the Israelis. Mr. Sharett once again referred to the yearly grants which Israel had received and for which the Government, Parliament and people of Israel were so appreciative. He then reminded the Secretary that application for next year's grant was being prepared now, and said that at least $125,000,000 would be needed. In this connection he solicited the Secretary's assistance in having the US administration support the application for the grant. Mr. Acheson made a sympathetic but noncommittal reply.

Mr. Sharett once more referred to Israel as a very poor country ravished by two thousand years of exploitation, where no raw materials to speak of are available, and that consequently everything needed for the development of a nation would have to be poured into it. He referred to Israel's claims for help from Germany in recognition of the untold damage done to the Jews by the Hitler regime and in referring to Mr. Adenauer having accepted in principle to help, Mr. Sharett tried to solicit US sympathy and particularly action to support German payments in kind to Israel. He mentioned in this connection that negotiations between Israel and Germany were being undertaken and that he wanted American help in order to get help for Israel. The Secretary pointed out to Mr. Sharett that he had been listening with much sympathy to what he had had to say but that in respect to the latter subject the fact had to be taken into consideration that payments, whether in kind or otherwise, to be made by Germany would in a considerable measure and in the last analysis have to be borne by us. This would throw a further burden on our resources, with which the Secretary could not be in sympathy.

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*Probably meant $50 million. [Footnote in the source text.]

Mr. Sharett expressed his disappointment at this response and then took leave.

784A.5 MAP/11-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, November 21, 1951—5 p. m.

505. Dept's 345, Nov 10.[2] In view certainty Israel will approach US for substantial increase over current figure for econ grant in aid fiscal 1953 Emb believes fol desirable course action:

1. To suggest in advance to Israel Govt and Israel advocates in US need to relate US aid to Israel to basic factors affecting foreign relations of Israel and of US in ME. Friends of Israel shld be made aware of dangers implicit in approach such as was made by Israel in March 1951 in disregard all attendant circumstances except Israel's need for funds, when harm was done to our policy objectives and to Israel-Arab relations.

2. Israel's requirements shld be stated in terms of Israel's internatl balance sheet to take into account indebtedness for compensation due to Palestine refugees. This indebtedness shld be liquidated as promptly as its amount can be assessed by UN, as matter of equal priority with Israel's current cash needs.

3. In putting forward its request Israel shld relate requirements Israel over-all development program and grant in aid role therein clearly defined; shld emphasize needs to settle Jewish refugees already arrived and unassimilated, Israel's intentions to make its way within limits of present frontiers (armistice lines), and intentions limit military actions to self defense and area defense.

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris, London, Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Jidda.

[2] Telegram 345 to Tel Aviv, November 10, not printed, stated that a representative of the Israeli Embassy in Washington had on November 9 submitted a "preliminary draft" note requesting economic assistance for fiscal year 1953 totaling $126 million, without including reference to grant military assistance. (884A.00 TA/11-1051) On November 19, Ambassador Eban handed Assistant Secretary McGhee a note formally requesting a grant of this amount from the U.S. Government for fiscal year 1953.

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4. Planning shld be precise enough to enable US aid mission to use as basis for daily pressure to assure proper handling of resources; it shld set priorities, i.e. farm development over urban housing, and timetables of production, import and export targets with terminal date of aid program in mind.

5. Plans of Israel to increase population through ingathering, shld be related in planning to absorptive capacity of country.

Davis

320/11-2251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, November 22, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 305. Subj: Palestine. Nov 21 Jessup and staff members consulted with Blandford. Jessup outlined Dept's position on possibility locating repatriation and compensation functions of PCC in UNWRA. Blandford strongly opposed this for following reasons going so far as to say it might threaten success of his program.

1. UNWRA has been able establish considerable good will with Arab govts as non-political agency working solely on refugee care and maintenance, resettlement and reintegration. Addition of political issues wld create serious obstacles. Obviously UNWRA work handicapped by political developments but now it is able maintain degree of detachment from political questions which wld be impossible if repatriation and compensation functions transferred to UNWRA.
2. There is relatively little relationship between compensation which might come from Israel and refugee care and reintegration program since small percentage (Blandford hazarded guess 20 percent) of refugees presently cared for by UNWRA wld be eligible for compensation.
3. Political issues including repatriation and compensation can best be handled by separate individual working with Arab Govts, taking problems up piece by piece. Blandford gave blocked accounts and possible minor territorial adjustments as possible face-saving device as illustrations. In response to question re Israeli proposal for payments into UNWRA capital fund Blandford said such payments wld pollute the fund and make it difficult for Arabs to accept payment for assistance from this source.

Re position of Palestine item on agenda, Blandford indicated Arab states had expressed some interest in having discussion of PCC report and UNWRA report separated. He agreed and felt it desirable to get major political discussions out of way on PCC report and have discussion of UNWRA report restricted to technical and financial aspects of program.

Blandford agreed PCC shld be liquidated. Riley's views and functions not discussed with Blandford.

Acheson

320/11-2251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, November 22, 1951—10 p.m.

Delga 307. Re: Palestine. Evening Nov 20 Jessup and staff held preliminary discussion with Gen Riley (Gadel 182)[1] re GA action to place PCC function assisting political settlement in hand successor machinery, assuming abolition PCC. Jessup initially asked Riley how far he himself cld go in attempts bring parties together for negots under his authority as Chairman MACs, and asked his views re termination PCC. Riley replied he felt able, in his present capacity, to call for bilateral discussions between Israelis and particular Arab state, but such discussions or negots wld be limited to scope to possible revision armistice agrmts. He said he favored liquidation PCC but with some agency in reserve on whom parties cld call if they wished, or if situation developed favorable to initiating negots among parties. He added that Arabs, in particular, wld probably wish some UN rep assist in such negots.

He believes responsibility for moving toward further negots rests clearly with the parties and not with UN, though latter shld have a person or agency available to assist or recommend if suitable climate develops. Shld opportunity develop for negots, he feels better progress wld be made on bilateral rather than multilateral basis, since crucial problems are at issue between Israel and Egypt (Gaza) and Israel and Syria (Huleh), with Jordan and Lebanon indirectly affected. He feels Egypt is key to progress.

In response Jessup's suggestion GA cld grant Riley a broader political authority, he replied that wld be needed if, in addition his present functions in connection armistice agrmts, it were intended he shld deal with political problems beyond scope of armistice agrmts. Riley seemed quite receptive to Jessup's suggestion and thought GA cld adopt broad formula saying chief of staff is available for work in political field. Sense of mtg was that, while Riley's present powers stem from armistice agrmts, as confirmed by SC, GA cld properly authorize attribution additional political functions to chief of staff and request him assume them. Jessup asked Gen if he thought such GA action might "backfire" or cause parties to shun political negots. Riley replied parties need a little push, but initiative wld have to come from them and, under present conditions, primarily from Israelis. He did not feel that such GA action wld handicap his present work under armistice agrmt. He felt under above general formula he wld have authority discuss political problems with parties on bilateral basis which he considers indispensable. He said certain measure separate dealing with parties necessary in any case since armistice agrmts are strictly bilateral instruments. Jessup and staff suggested GA might invest chief of TSO with general authority of assist parties in field of polit settlement and Riley agreed.

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[1] Dated November 17, p. 932.

Riley is convinced that French attempting perpetuate PCC in order assert their interests in Near East. He recalled that in 1949 they had wished keep him out of Palestine. USGADel staff indicated Turkish thinking leans direction continuance PCC, but without such strong feeling as French.

Jessup inquired Riley's reaction our thinking that problems refugee repatriation and compensation ought to be taken out of political sphere and placed in humanitarian sphere. Riley strongly agreed, but said there is almost no prospect of repatriation. Question who shld be vested with responsibility re repatriation and compensation was not further pursued.

ACHESON

UNP Files : Lot 58 D 224

Memorandum by John C. Ross to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] November 23, 1951.

Subject: Trygve Lie's Ideas Concerning the Future of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and Refugee Organization

Gross and I ran into Trygve Lie this afternoon and had tea with him. He was full of a discussion he had had last night with Eden, at which Lie put up to Eden his ideas concerning the future of the PCC and the Palestine refugee organization. In brief the essence of Lie's "plan" is to set up in New York a UN Middle East Committee consisting of Egypt, Syria, Israel, Turkey, Greece, U.S.A., United Kingdom, France, either Iran or Pakistan, either Argentina or Chile. This committee would advise Riley, who would be given the PCC conciliation functions, and Blandford, who would continue as refugee director. The PCC and the refugee advisory committee would be abolished. Lie said that Eden seemed impressed by this idea. He said he thought the Arabs would like it, also Israel. He said he thought it was a fine thing to get the Arabs and the Israelis to work together on a committee.

Lie said he also discussed this idea with Azzam Pasha who thought it was a good idea but wanted to consult some of the Arab experts.

Lie asked me to tell you that he would like very soon to spend an evening with you and Azzam Pasha.

I told Lie that we were thinking of a somewhat simpler approach, that we tended to agree with his ideas concerning the assignment of functions to Riley and Blandford and the abolition of the PCC and the refugee advisory committee. I said that we, however, were thinking of trying to develop as simple an approach as possible and I questioned him about what he expected this UN Middle East Committee to do. I said that I would, of course, pass his ideas along.

There is no question that Lie, who clearly has an *idée fixe* on this subject, will continue to press it in various quarters. My own instinctive reaction to it is quite strongly negative, but I have no doubt you will want to have it fully considered by the staff.

Editorial Note

On November 29, the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, John B. Blandford, Jr., together with the Advisory Commission of the Agency, submitted a special report (U.N. Doc. A/1905/Add. 1) containing recommendations for the future conduct of the program of assistance to Palestine refugees. The report requested the General Assembly to endorse and urge contributions for a $250 million program of assistance to Near Eastern governments for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, to be carried out over a period of approximately 3 years starting July 1, 1951. It was proposed that the program provide $50 million for relief and $200 million for reintegration, with local governments assuming the maximum possible administrative responsibility at the earliest date. The report stated further that every effort should be made by the Agency and the governments to arrange for the transfer of relief administration to the governments not later than July 1, 1952. It was recommended that expenditures for relief be reduced in suitable proportion to expenditures for reintegration, with both ceasing at the end of the period.

320/11-2951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, November 29, 1951—11 p. m.

Delga 424. Re Palestine: US GADel staff offers for Dept's consideration fol analysis of situation after discussion with Riley and Blandford (Delga's 305 and 307).[1]

1. Re position paper proposal for transfer general political functions including mediation to Riley and repatriation and compensation to Blandford under resolution such as contained Dept's position paper (SD/A/C.1/373):[2]

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[1] Both dated November 22, pp. 941 and 942.

[2] Dated October 12, p. 892.

Riley is agreeable to plan insofar as his functions affected, and we feel that such course is practicable. Lie, Bunche and Cordier also seem favorable. However, Blandford disagrees insofar as his functions wld be affected.

A. In favor transfer repatriation and compensation to Blandford are fol factors:

(1) Consolidation all refugee questions within one agency most effective course from administrative and budgetary standpoint;

(2) Control of UN activities with respect to repatriation and compensation more easily managed by agency with full range of responsibility on refugee problems. Past experience indicates UNRWA has regarded activities by parallel bodies harmful and obstructive. Overlapping wld thus be avoided.

(3) Favorable Congressional appropriations for refugee relief and resettlement might be facilitated if Israel's compensation obligation is related administratively or at least to UNRWA activity;

(4) Transfer these functions to UNRWA, a body already dealing with major share of refugee problems, might be expected produce less heated political discussion in GA than resort to more transparent shelving device;

(5) Transfer such responsibility to UN body or individual with no other activities to justify existence wld subject such body to opposition now attached to PCC and continue to focus attention on ineffectiveness UN in these problems.

B. Factors against such course:

(1) As pointed out in Delga 305, effectiveness UNRWA work cld be gravely impaired if it were saddled with what Arabs still consider basic political issue;

(2) British have informally indicated they do not favor;

(3) Blandford's vigorous opposition to transfer any new functions to UNRWA rests on belief;

(*a*) Compensation payments wld go largely to others than those now on agency relief rolls;

(*b*) Disputes over issues such as amount of total compensation due and division of available sums between claimants wld lead UNRWA into relationships disastrous to reintegration plans;

(*c*) Saddling UNRWA with repatriation wld also undermine its prospects success in more practical programs for which it responsible;

(*d*) Retention within political agency of office for refugee claims wld not prevent administrative linking compensation and reintegration in individual cases when appropriate;

(4) Arabs likely resist transfer of this important political function to a technical, economic agency.

2. Re transfer general political functions plus responsibility for repatriation and compensation to Riley.

A. Fol considerations favor this solution:

(1) Consolidation all political activities in one individual avoids overlapping and simplifies organization and administration;

(2) Maintaining principles of repatriation and compensation within agency having other functions to justify its existence might call less attention to ineffectualness of UN these matters;

(3) Maintenance of recognized political character repatriation and compensation questions wld reassure Arabs.

B. Fol factors against this solution:

(1) Riley's probable inability to accomplish anything re compensation might easily impair his usefulness in Arab eyes in discharging his TSO functions;

(2) Such course amounts to hand-over present unsatisfactory PCC terms reference to single individual;

(3) Extension Riley's functions might not prove acceptable to parties;

(4) Riley's feeling that attribution to him of repatriation and compensation functions wld impair his prospects of effective exercise conciliation function.

3. Fol factors with respect to each of solutions envisaged sections 1 and 2 above must also be considered:

A. Division of PCC functions between Riley and Blandford might lay US open to charges of attempted American domination;

B. French desire remain represented on PCC or successor political body dealing with NE problems likely to lessen prospect their active support for resolution like that Dept proposes. Possibility somewhat similar Turkish attitude must also be born in mind.

4. Re transfer general political role as well as repatriation and compensation to Riley plus an advisory commission to Riley on his new functions only:

A. Fol considerations favor this course over 2 above:

(1) French opposition might be lessened with opportunity for representation on advisory commission;

(2) Objections based on alleged American attempts at domination might be reduced.

B. Fol considerations against this solution;

(1) Does not overcome basic objections to transfer repatriation and compensation to Riley as described under 2–B above;

(2) Creation new advisory commission perpetuates multiplicity UN bodies for Palestine and confusion of responsibility.

5. Further possibility might be creation of new office or commission with hdqtrs in New York whose membership might be slightly expanded beyond present composition PCC. Scope of activity such new body cld range from present over-all political role of PCC to

more limited role of technical functions in fields of compensation and repatriation. If such body had over-all political responsibility, including repatriation and compensation Riley's present functions wld not be enlarged. Alternatively, if technical commission or special office under SYG were vested with sole responsibility in repatriation and compensation fields, Riley cld be given broad political functions not including those two questions.

A. Fol factors favor this solution:

(1) Such a body (particularly if given over-all political role) wld probably appeal to French and Turks;
(2) Such body wld be away from area and cld reduce its activities to a desirable minimum and avoid friction with Riley and Blandford, either of whom cld consult with such body if desired; such body cld be available if and when attitudes of parties warranted active consideration compensation and other questions.

B. Fol factors against such solution:

(1) Creation new body perpetuates multiplicity agencies dealing with problem;
(2) With little likelihood such body cld accomplish anything UN wld remain butt of widespread criticism now directed at PCC.
(3) Real difficulties in drafting terms of reference which parties wld not deem in violation principles established in earlier GA resolutions on question.

6. Re continuation PCC with hdqtrs in New York, but with authority to meet elsewhere as needed, to consider proposals from the parties and to take such action thereon as circumstances permit,

A. Fol factors favor this solution:

(1) Such course can least of all be interpreted as designed to shelve compensation and repatriation issues or to cancel out rights and obligations of parties laid down in previous GA resolutions; hence might minimize debate in GA;
(2) British now seem favor this solution;
(3) French and Turks probably favorable;
(4) Opportunity wld continue exist for any practical steps leading to negots for compensation agreement;
(5) With commission in New York focus of attention Arab states and refugees might shift to practical programs of UNRWA and TSO.

B. Fol factors against this solution:

(1) Cld still elicit Arab charge UN was avoiding coming to grips with repatriation and compensation issues;
(2) PCC's outmoded terms of reference wld continue be obstacle to any practical results.

7. *Comment:* On basis foregoing analysis, staff convinced essential to re-examine position in SD/A/C.1/373 since it seems impossible of

realization without threatening effective future operations of Blandford and Riley. We are impressed with difficulty devising a separate agency to handle repatriation and compensation problems for which justification convincing to parties can be made. We are also keenly aware of delicate and uncertain status MEC, which may be fundamental to future of security and stability of ME. We feel that, if time is allowed for Arab adjustment to establishment MEC, pieces now causing area instability might fall gradually into place. With specific reference to Palestine question we believe US should be guided by idea of doing nothing at present re MEC which would further complicate the already delicate situation by further arousing Arab sensibilities, which have already been worked up by Moroccan and Egyptian issues.

With full recognition of the disadvantages of continuing PCC on less active basis, we are impressed with possibilities inherent in course outlined in section 6 above. On this basis we wld envisage concentration on improvement of PRA program and leaving Riley's operation untouched. PCC (based normally at New York) wld operate on standby basis and remain unobtrusively available to assist under more favorable political conditions.

If explorations here shld indicate willingness of parties, especially Arabs, to accept transfer of political functions to Riley without specific mention of repatriation and compensation functions, wld Dept see any objection to this course? This wld mean authority to deal with subject was implicit in Riley's terms of reference, but he wld not have mandate to take specific action. In evaluating this course it is essential to weigh possibility Arab disappointment over inaction on repatriation and compensation undermining confidence in Riley's TSO operations.

AUSTIN

262.84A41/11-3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1951.

Subject: Visit of the Israel Ambassador.

Participants: Mr. Webb, Acting Secretary
H. E. Abba Eban, Israel Ambassador
Mr. Theodore Kollek, Minister, Embassy of Israel
GER—Mr. Lewis
NE—Mr. Waldo

The Israel Ambassador called at his own request to discuss three matters: (1) Israel demand for reparations from Germany; (2) Israel's attitude toward the Middle East Command and Middle East defense; and (3) Israel's request for aid from the United States for the coming year.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo.

1. The Ambassador outlined generally Israel's position on reparations from Germany and referred to previous discussions in the Department and the earlier Israel note[2] on this question and the Department's reply thereto.[3] He deplored the fact that the Western Powers were apparently preparing to welcome Germany back into the Community of Nations, and said that this would be tantamount to rewarding the Germans' evil doing. In connection with Israel's request for reparations, Israel considered a step forward Chancellor Adenauer's statement concerning Germany's recognition of its guilt toward the Jews and its obligation to pay its just debts.[4] The Ambassador felt that further and more concrete evidences of Germany's good intentions were necessary, however. He was aware of the US position in this matter: that Israel should negotiate directly with Germany on the question of reparations, but said that Israel could not take such a step at this time in view of public opinion in Israel, which was strongly against such a move. He referred to the fact that a group of American citizens representing certain American-Jewish organizations had recently discussed the overall problem with me. Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency, who had participated in these discussions, would shortly take up the problem with Chancellor Adenauer. Although no Israel official would participate in these talks, the Israel claim was the principal one outstanding and would therefore be covered by Mr. Goldmann. The Ambassador said that he hoped Mr. McCloy would give his strongest support to the principal of these discussions and would urge the Germans to cooperate.

The Ambassador handed me a note[5] which he said was in reply to our note on reparations, with the request that the Israel position be supported vis-à-vis the Germans. I told the Ambassador that I would read the note most carefully and would refer it to the officers of the Bureau of German Affairs for study and comment. Mr. Lewis said that the Ambassador knew what our position was in this matter and that we still felt that Israel should make every effort to negotiate directly with Germany as soon as that were politically feasible.[6]

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[2] Dated March 12; not printed. See memorandum of conversation, March 19, p. 604.

[3] Dated July 5, p. 748.

[4] Chancellor Adenauer's statement was made in the Bundestag on September 27; see *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages*, Bonn, Session 165, p. 6697.

[5] Dated November 30, not printed (262.84A41/11–3051).

[6] The Department's reply to the Israeli note of November 30 was contained in a note of January 24, 1952, which read in part as follows:

"The United States Government has been and is of the opinion that a settlement of the Israel claim against Germany should be effected through direct negotiations between the Israel Government and the Government of the German Federal Republic. Thus it is gratified that the Israel Government requested and obtained parliamentary authorization to accept the German Federal Government's offer to negotiate such a settlement. The United States Government will await with sympathetic interest the outcome of the negotiations." (262.84A41/11–3051)

2. The Israel Ambassador reviewed generally Israel's attitude toward the MEC and Middle East defense, and again reiterated Israel's desire to cooperate with the West without any formal commitment for relationship to the incipient Middle East Command. The Ambassador summarized the Israel position, which was identical with Israel's views expressed to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv by the Prime Minister of Israel, and to Mr. McGhee by the Ambassador himself. He mentioned the following new development:

The Israel Government had informed the British Government that Israel was now prepared to continue with Britain the preliminary and tentative discussions which had been held in Israel last February between General Robertson and Prime Minister Ben Gurion. I told the Ambassador that, with regard to Israel's attitude toward the Middle East, we were appreciative of their views; that I thought it was very possible it might be determined that an informal relationship between Israel and the MEC might be in the best interests of everyone, but that this matter would have to be worked out in due course. So far as the discussions between the Israel Government and the British were concerned we were glad to be informed that they would take place and welcomed them, but, as the Ambassador well knew, we were not yet at the point where we were prepared to enter into similar discussions.

3. On grant-aid the Ambassador said that he had recently submitted to Mr. McGhee a note on behalf of his Government requesting $126 million. He said that this request embodied Israel's economic needs as represented by the estimated gap in its balance of payments for the coming year. He expressed the hope that the US would give strong consideration to the request. I told him that we would certainly take the Israel request into account in studying plans for economic assistance to Israel in the coming fiscal year.

683.84A/12-351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, December 3, 1951—4 p.m.

319. ReLegtel 286, November 18.[2] On three recent visits to all Syro-Israel demilitarized zones with Asst Army Attaché I obtained much clearer picture basic issues involved. My impressions reported in full by despatch [3] and illustrated by photographs are as follows:

1. Drainage project eminently worthwhile and one only wonders why it was not undertaken before.

2. Equally clear that zone question is by far most important single issue between Syrian mil auths and Israel, and difficult see why Israel

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris, Tel Aviv, the Arab capitals, London, Ankara, Jerusalem, Moscow, and Tripoli.

[2] *Ante*, p. 933.

[3] Not further identified.

has not in spirit of compromise seized this golden opportunity improve prospect of friendly relations with Syria.

3. Both upper zone and most of Al Hummeh salient 100% Arab and logically fall within Syrian sphere. Nevertheless, they represent smaller compensation than I had imagined for benefits Israel will undoubtedly gain when question of sovereignty is settled.

4. I am impressed by Syrian fears as to adverse effects on its defensive military position opposite Huleh Lake and Swamu which are now for most part unfortified, but argument for water line as defensive position on Jordan in central zone not impressive. Syrians have persuasive argument, however, that line along Jordan River south of Huleh and through part of Tiberias essential in order prevent incidents from cattle grazing, fishing, and similar activities engaged in by Syrians and formerly covered by bon voisinage agreement with Palestine. Conditions now are vastly different from when mandate line drawn after First World War. Syrians point out if old mandate line becomes final boundary Israel will possess strip of territory ten meters wide along entire Syrian shore on Tiberias north of Nugelb. It seems to us Syrians have valid point this wld entail explosive potentialities.

5. Major Jaddid, Syrian member MAC who accompanied us, believes settlement meeting all legitimate Israeli needs can be arranged. He says Syria willing enter into agreement perhaps along with Jordan and Lebanon guarantee Arabs will not use more Jordan River water than at present; this consists mainly of irrigation for Buteiha and it would be impracticable for Syrians siphon off Jordan water between Tiberias and Huleh. However, he was equally firm in declaring Syria and Lebanon could greatly diminish flow of Jordan to Israel by manipulating tributaries shld Israelis fail agree on reasonable settlement. Israel thus has vital stake in reaching agreement.

6. There are many evidences of Israeli fortifications on zone contrary armistice agreement since May 18 especially on hill above Ein Gev. We saw other evidences Israeli non-compliance May 18 resolution only shortly balanced by presence roadblocks below Al Hummeh probably erected with Syrian help.

7. We talked with 2 of 25 zone Arabs who reportedly escaped from Shaab via Lebanon. They described Israeli practices including physical abuse which if true are shocking revelation as to why Arab evacuees changed their minds about returning to zone (Legtel's 707, June 7[4] and 6, July 5).[5]

8. Further harm can be done to our RPC UN prestige, US relations with Syria, and prospects future Israeli peace agreement with Syrians if Security Council orders expropriation Arab-owned land for drainage project without Syrian agreement.

I was encouraged to find Jaddid sincerely anxious resolve zone questions, and to hear him say he joined in my wishes. He is highly regarded by De Page of UNRWA who says he is most objective and cooperative of Syrians officials. We concur. It is of interest it was he who first suggested water line to Mazim Qudsi (Legtel 404, February 20).[6] He seems close to Shishikli.

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[4] Not printed (683.84A/6–751).

[5] *Ante*, p. 744.

[6] Telegram 404 from Damascus, February 20, is summarized in footnote 2, p. 591.

I was at all times careful make clear my visits were solely for my own background and that this question was one for UN to decide.

Dept officials may wish obtain Gen Riley's comments this tel and if so we wld appreciate hearing his views.

CLARK

320.2 AA/11-851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 4, 1951—6:35 p. m.

410. View imminent implementation aid program to Israel Dept rep discussed substance Leg Beirut desp no. 243 Nov 8[2] (copy of which available Emb) with Israel Min Wash and urged that soon as aid program well under way possibly beginning New Year Israel Govt undertake responsibility providing assistance for twenty thousand Arabs and three thousand Jews in Israel still drawing PRA rations. Israel Min stated believed his govt wld agree this suggestion.

Ur discretion suggest Emb take similar line with FonOff. Might wish indicate US supporting Blandford's recommendations as principal contributor Arab refugee program and light of substantial US aid to Israel for refugee relief and resettlement projects.

WEBB

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo; cleared with NEA, UNP, and UNE; repeated to Beirut as Unrap 224 and to Paris as Gadel 339.

[2] *Ante*, p. 924.

784A.5 MSP/12-451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, December 4, 1951—7 p. m.

544. Re Embtel 538, December 3.[1] Horowitz and Avriel emphasized today very urgent need for funds to pay off recent Bank America $5 million loan reimbursable out grant-in-aid. They pointed out prompt retirement this loan soonest might make possible renewal all or part of loans originally totalling $25 million (15 million to Jewish natl fund and 10 on bond collection) but subsequently reduced to

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[1] Telegram 538 from Tel Aviv, December 3, not printed (784A.5 MSP/12-351), referred to the draft text of the note to conclude an interim agreement for economic assistance to Israel under the Mutual Security Act and stated that the note appeared to meet the needs of the situation. The draft text had been transmitted in telegram 406 to Tel Aviv, December 1, not printed (784A.5 MSP/12-1051). The final version of the note as sent on December 7 is printed on p. 95[illegible] and is substantially the same as the draft in telegram 406.

Telegram 538 further reported that the Israeli Minister of Finance had on December 2 stressed once more the urgency of Israel's need for assistance stating that the month of December promised to be the most critical month it had experienced since the establishment of the state in 1948. The Embassy accordingly recommended early signature of the note.

present figure of $13 million (8 million on JNF and 5 million on bonds). In view exceedingly tight Dec situation, such Bank Amer refinancing was described as very important and hope was expressed that funds under interim agreement wld be made available within next few days.

In view insistence by some Amer firms (see Embtel 502, Nov 21)[2] that they be accorded equal treatment in retirement of overdue dollar indebtedness, Emb raised question of possible repercussions under present plan of cleaning all of POL indebtedness while leaving other dollar accounts slip during Dec (see Embtel 530, Nov 30).[3]

Horowitz and Avriel stated that they were left no alternative during Dec that importance of oil made cleaning up these accounts imperative, but that they wld ask Kollek to get in touch with Amer Export and TWA particularly in order enlist their continued coop during critical month Dec. Major items overdue dollar indebtedness known to Emb are TWA approx $80,000, Amer Export $320,000, Kaiser Frazer $900,000 and Anderson Clayton over $220,000. Horowitz stated maturities wld fall off during January and Feb after the heavy accumulation during Dec.

Horowitz and Avriel desired info on when where and to what account, counterpart deposits were desired. Emphasized desire and readiness Israeli Govt comply promptly with US wishes this matter.

DAVIS

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[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; it reported on the dollar income ($4 million), obligations ($26 million), and net dollar requirements ($22 million) of Israel for the month of November (884A.10/11-3051).

UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1951.

Subject: Discussion with the Ambassador of Israel re 1) Future of PCC; 2) Opportunity Missed; 3) Condemned Iraqi Jews; and 4) Shishikli and Syria.

Participants: H. E. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
G. Lewis Jones—NE

Israeli Ambassador Eban invited me to lunch with him today. The general discussion can be summarized as follows:

1. *Future of PCC:* Ambassador Eban said that Mr. Sharett had been disturbed by Mr. Lie's idea of an eleven-member committee to carry on the work of PCC. Israel believed PCC had outlived its usefulness. Heretofore Israel had thought and talked in terms of peace with the Arab States but it had now come around to the conclusion

that a general peace settlement with all of the Arabs is a long way off; this is true also of peace settlements with individual Arab States. Ambassador Eban said that his Government is now convinced of the great importance of the Armistice Agreements to peace and stability in the Middle East. These agreements were signed documents. They could be altered by agreement of the parties and such alterations, including alterations in Armistice lines, need not receive wide publicity. He thought in the present circumstances it was easier for both the Arab States and Israel to operate within the framework of the armistices. For this reason, Israel hoped that whatever happened General Riley's relationship to the Armistice Agreements would *remain unchanged.* General Riley's title might be changed but he is *fundamentally the guardian of the armistices* and such he should remain.

Under his aegis, Israel might work out in the MACs settlements of outstanding problems with individual Arab States. If such settlements should continue to be called "armistice agreements" that was all right with Israel.

I said that there was the question of what should be done with "compensation" and "repatriation"; these were very important to the Arabs and must be taken care of if great discussion was to be avoided in Paris.

Ambassador Eban suggested that since these two points have to do with the Arab refugees, he thought that they should be assigned to Mr. Blandford.

I took strong exception to the idea of loading "repatriation" and "compensation" on Blandford. I said that the UNRWA in its resettlement activities had not yet kept up with the birthrate. Just as I agreed that General Riley should not be loaded down with jobs which would make his truce-keeping more difficult, so Mr. Blandford should not carry the extra weight of these political problems. I said that Blandford himself felt that his resettlement efforts would be jeopardized if he were given "compensation" and "resettlement".

Ambassador Eban said he was not aware that Blandford held this view and seemed impressed by the argument that nothing should impede refugee resettlement.

I told Ambassador Eban that we had taken no decision on this matter; that there were various schools of thought, one of which included an inactive residuary legatee of PCC at the New York headquarters of UN.

2. *Opportunity Missed:* I could not resist telling Ambassador Eban, on a strictly personal basis, that I thought Israel may have muffed a chance during the recent PCC meetings. I said that there was no need for me to reiterate with him our idea that the "orthodox" approach of Israel towards peace with the Arabs had shown no results and was

unlikely to do so. He knew that we favored the "unorthodox" approach. In the case of PCC, Israel had let itself get into the hands of "orthodox" lawyers. Instead of the Israeli side of the story as printed by PCC being a bold avowal of their willingness to make sacrifices to live at peace with its neighbors—a document which we could cite to Israel's detractors—instead the Israeli story was the closely reasoned, legalistic "orthodox" line. I said that we would never know whether Israel had taken the right or wrong decision, but there were those of us who had hoped that Israel would not stand upon technicalities and ceremonies but would make full use of the PCC forum. To my surprise, Eban did not take issue with me on this point; on the contrary, I had the feeling that his sympathy with the "unorthodox" approach might be growing.

3. *Condemned Iraqi Jews:* Ambassador Eban said that Mr. Kollek would be coming to see me shortly to discuss the case of the condemned Iraqi Jews. He said that irrespective of the facts of the case (Israeli information showed that the evidence and trial were not all they should have been) a far better approach to the Iraqis would be *not* to find fault with their legal procedures but to raise the question of the general desirability of showing clemency to the condemned Jews by committing their sentence to life imprisonment. Ambassador Eban said that Israel had had a number of cases involving Arabs, in some instances espionage by Arabs, in which the death sentence was fully justified. However, on political grounds Israel had decided not to execute the men. He hoped that Iraq would take a similar line. I gave no substantive reply.

4. *Shishikli and Syria:* Ambassador Eban asked for information regarding developments in Syria. I told him the facts of the Syrian coup and mentioned the fact that it was Colonel Zaim who signed the Armistice with Israel. I said that it was my understanding that the Syrian military is dissatisfied with the present situation along the Israel-Syrian Armistice line; they would like to see this liquidated.

Ambassador Eban remarked that he thought Shishikli might be a force for good in Syria. He said also that there were in the armies of the Arab States generally some good young captains and majors who know their business and were reasonable men.

784A.5 MSP/12-751

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Israel (Eban)[1]

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1951.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to current negotiations between representatives of the Government of Israel and representatives of the Government of the United States of America looking to the conclusion of an agreement for a program of economic assistance and technical cooperation and the relief and resettlement of refugees as authorized in the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951. Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement concerning this program, which is now under study, and in order to provide emergency economic assistance to Israel as authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, I am setting forth below certain principles and procedures on which our two governments have reached agreement.

1. In accordance with Section 511(*b*) of the Mutual Security Act, assurance is requested that the Israel Government has agreed to join with the United States Government in promoting international understanding and good-will and in maintaining world peace and to undertake such action as they may mutually agree upon to alleviate the causes for international tension.

2. The United States understands that the Israel Government has taken careful note of the provisions of the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951 and the laws mentioned therein under which assistance may be provided, and that it intends to conclude an agreement with the United States Government as required by those provisions.

3. Pending the conclusion of this comprehensive agreement, however, my Government understands that the Israel Government has an immediate requirement of $25,730,000 to pay for certain materials delivered by suppliers and shipped to Israel since July 1, 1951, materials now ready for shipment and delivery, and new purchases urgently required, all of which are for refugee and relief projects in Israel. In recognition of this need the United States Government will make available beginning immediately up to $25,730,000, out of funds authorized under Section 205 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, to pay for these materials and such services as may be mutually agreed upon. Payments out of this sum will be made under appropriate procedures to be mutually agreed upon.

4. It is understood that such immediate requirements may include up to $14,230,000 of current unpaid dollar obligations for refugee relief and resettlement projects or for reimbursement for payments for deliveries effected since July 1, 1951 of materials comprising parts of such relief and resettlement projects.

5. As a further means of carrying out the purposes for which the assistance made available by the United States Government is being provided, the Israel Government will deposit in a special account in the name of the Israel Government not less than the Israel pound

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Waldo (NE), Dorsey (NE), and Cardozo (L/E); cleared by G and L/T and by Messrs. Emery and Merchant (S/MSA), Bingham (TCA), Stinebower (E), and Gardiner (NEA).

equivalent, according to the official rate of exchange, of the dollar sums which may be paid under this agreement. Such deposits will be made from time to time upon notification to the Israel Government by the United States Government that payment has been made pursuant to this understanding. The sums required to be deposited in this special account shall be adjusted to conform with any change in the basis of computation of the amounts to be deposited that may hereafter be agreed upon. The sums in this Israel Government account shall be held or used for such purposes as may be agreed to between our two governments in furtherance of economic and technical assistance and the relief and resettlement of refugees.

6. The Israel Government and the United States Government will establish procedures whereby the Israel Government will so deposit, segregate, or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any program of assistance undertaken by the United States Government so that such funds shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure, or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization, or government when in the opinion of the United States Government such legal process would interfere with the attainment of the objectives of the program of assistance.

If the Israel Government agrees that the foregoing represents an accurate statement of the understanding of our two governments on this matter, I should appreciate receiving from you a written acknowledgment of this fact so that this note and your reply thereto may constitute an interim agreement between our two governments on this subject.

Accept [etc.] JAMES E. WEBB

784A.5 MSP/12-751

The Ambassador of Israel (Eban) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1951.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated December 7, 1951 referring to current negotiations between representatives of the Government of the United States and representatives of the Government of Israel looking to the conclusion of an agreement for a program of economic assistance and technical cooperation, and the relief and resettlement of refugees, as authorized in the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951.

I have the honor to confirm that the principles and procedures which you enumerate in your note of December 7, 1951 are those on which our two governments have reached agreement, and that the aforementioned note contains an accurate understanding of our two governments in this matter.

The Government of Israel wishes to assure the Government of the United States of America that it agrees to join with the Government of the United States in promoting international understanding and good-will and in maintaining world peace and to undertake such action as they mutually agree upon to alleviate the causes for international tension.

I have the honor to confirm that your note and this reply may constitute an interim agreement between our two governments on this subject.

Accept [etc.] ABBA EBAN

320/12-851: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (*Austin*) *to the Department of State*[1]

SECRET PARIS, December 8, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 576. Re Gadel 361, Dec 6.[2] Fol are Gen Riley's comments on points raised Damascus 319, Dec 3:[3]

1. Riley agrees drainage project eminently worthwhile. He understands that project not undertaken prior 1948 because of hydroelectric company's rights to waters to north and its opposition to carrying out project. Since 1948, of course, political conditions have not been favorable.

2. Riley agrees re importance issue. He points out Israel has expressed willingness discuss overall prob and in Aug submitted 4 point agenda to Syrian Govt thru MAC. Syria, however, turned suggested agenda down because unwillingness discuss resumption normal econ and trade relations, which was Israeli's fourth point. Also in Syrian reply, statement made all other points cld be discussed in MAC. Riley thinks if Israeli wld agree to River Jordan line, Syrians wld not raise objection to project. Riley emphasizes, however, that project might well affect flow of Jordan which in turn might affect use of Jordan River south of Lake Tiberius. Therefore considers Jordanian agreement to any change in flow of Jordan essential. Aside from Jordanian angle, however, crux of matter is that Israelis desire comprehensive agreements that wld be basis on which peaceful settlement cld be reached. Syrians not willing go this far.

3. Riley agrees and adds that if Israelis obtain Al-Hummeh salient, it wld give them control of mouth Yarmuk and provide them with means damming river to detriment Syria. Riley points out, however, source of Yarmuk is in Syria which cld, presumably, take retaliatory measures.

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[1] Repeated for information to Damascus.

[2] Not printed; it suggested that the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly inform General Riley of the substance of telegram 319 from Damascus and request his comments (320/12-651).

[3] *Ante*, p. 950.

4. Riley says he has consistently advocated water line since Mar 1949 and had discussed matter with number of Israeli leaders before recent discussions took place between Syria and Israel. Difficulty now is that Syria desires only a change in boundary while Israel wants a wider settlement. Syrian dissatisfaction present line is that it derives from 1923 treaty between UK and French as mandatory powers, about which, Syria points out, they had nothing to say, sole intent of line was to give Brit mandate control of Jordan River and Lakes Tiberias and Huleh. Riley feels 1923 definition that boundary shall run 10 meters from waters edge vicinity of Tiberias is unrealistic and that Syrian opposition understandable on practical grounds.

5. Riley agrees with Clark's comments re Jaddid in this and antepenult paras. He confirms Jaddid close to Shishikli but does not always reflect govt views, due political complications. Riley particularly underlines importance Jaddid's observations re strategic position Syria and Leb occupy with respect Jordan River; as source of Jordan is in Leb and sources of tributaries in Syria.

6. Riley says he is not sure there is convincing evidence of Israeli fortifications in zone contrary armistice agreement. He concedes there may be ditches, etc but says Syrians equally have built such installations. He adds, most flagrant violation of armistice agreements is roadblock vicinity El-Hummeh in DZ which was erected after Israeli police approached El-Hummeh in Apr this year. When tension within zone removed chairman will request road block be removed.

7. Riley points out difficulty of proving or disproving statements such as those made by 2 Arabs with whom Clark talked. He says he has received similar statements, but also has statements from other Arabs to effect they have not been maltreated.

8. Riley prefers not comment.

Austin

320/12–851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET Washington, December 8, 1951—12:57 p. m.

Gadel 391. 1. Amb Eban, calling on Hickerson Dec 6, indicated Israel's hope new UN machinery wld not be established replace PCC in event it abolished by present GA. Stated belief new UN machinery wld serve no useful purpose since peace settlement for foreseeable future highly unlikely. Assumed UNRWA wld continue, and believed continuance present MAC machinery most likely means achieving any progress toward improvement Arab-Israel relations next year or so.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Ludlow, cleared with NE, authorized for transmission by Mr. Popper, and signed for the Acting Secretary by Mr. Hickerson. Repeated to Tel Aviv.

Such improvements cld be effected through bilateral agreement amending armistice agreements broadening MAC authority. Expressed genuine concern at possibility Riley might be given additional functions, believing wld be prejudicial effectiveness his operations chief of TSO. Hickerson informed Eban, as of time his visit, Dept's position not firm on handling Pal problem in GA. Our thinking tending to idea standby PCC. Also still attracted idea Agent Gen for Pal. Eban interested hear USGADel estimate Pal items might be considered in *Ad Hoc* Comm week Dec 17. His plans leave Wash that date might be changed since it assumed he will handle Pal items for Israel.

2. Re possible Israeli offer troops for Korea, Eban referred Amb Davis's representation Israel FonOff. Elaborated difficulties confronting Israel in making affirmative answer requested troops pointing out difficulties hostile surrounding Arab States; present delicate relations with USSR; and econ difficulties sustaining such armed contingents if sent Korea. Eban indicated Israel not decided whether make offer. Wld discuss matter further with PriMin on return Israel, end this month. FYI Kollek Counselor Israel Emb in course calling at Dept Dec 5 informally indicated Ben Gurion disposed consider offer troops for Korea providing number other countries also offered troops and public appeal by UN made for troops, thereby assuring Israel's offer wld not appear tardy jumping on bandwagon. Hickerson informed Eban public statement re troops being considered; troops definitely needed for long time to come; and we hoped other countries wld contribute. These observations based on Kollek's info. Hickerson proposes speak to Eban again about troops before Eban's departure Israel on 17th.

WEBB

784A.5 MSP/12–1051: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 10, 1951—5:30 p.m.

421. Re Deptel 530 Nov 30[2] and 538 Dec 3.[3] Totec. Purpose this tel inform you current Washington activities re emergency assistance Israel.

1. Mutual Security Administrator has agreed in principle to make immediate emergency advance funds Israel in order magnitude $25,730,000.

2. Interim agreement being negotiated for this amount. See Deptel 406, Dec 1.[3] Expect consummation these negotiations this week.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Silver (TCA); cleared with Messrs. Dorsey (NE) and Ohly (MSA); signed for the Acting Secretary by Mr. Macgregor (TCA).

[2] Not printed; see footnote 3, p. 953.

[3] Not printed; see footnote 1 to telegram 544 from Tel Aviv, December 4, p. 952

3. Concurrently Mutual Security Administrator being requested formally allocate $25,730,000; part to be used for reimbursing GOI shipments made since July 1 programmed items ($14,230,000), remainder to meet cost current shipments essential programmed items. Expect allocation funds within ten days.

4. Dept now reviewing with Israeli Emb officials documents evidencing shipments for reimbursement purposes. Expect agreement on which shipments eligible reimbursement by end this week.

5. Procedures being worked out here for handling financing current shipments from emergency allocations without prejudice long term procedural arrangements remainder program.

6. Please show McDaniel upon arrival.

WEBB

357.AC/12-1251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, December 12, 1951—7 p. m.

573. Deptel 420, Dec. 8.[2] During conversation between officer Emb and acting chief US div FonOff[3] yesterday, latter expressed views paralleling those of Eban that no new machinery shld be established to replace PCC if latter abolished, and saw no need for any PCC functions being assigned TSO or UNRWA.

FonOff rep was of view problems Israel-Arab relations may be grouped into three categories, (1) security (2) refugees (3) relations between sovereign states. First is in province TSO and SC, while UNRWA is proper organ deal with second. This is not a matter of internatl concern at present, unpleasant as relations may be, they involve no internatl crisis, and SC always available. He also felt that what was needed was a more favorable atmosphere and psychology on part Arab states; that if they were genuinely interested in improved relations and wanted to talk with Israelis, there were always ways of doing so, e.g., under armistice agreements, without formality of publicity which might embarrass any favorable moves. Said that he thought period "in which dust might settle" was not needed.

In reply to inquiry, FonOff rep indicated he presently saw no hopeful signs looking toward peace settlements; characterized present situation ME as fluid, and might turn for better in 2 or 3 years or as many decades, when Arabs came to recognize fact of Israel's existence. While opinion not crystallized, he anticipated no softening of Syria's attitude under Shishikli, who he characterized as apparently "another man on horse back".

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris for GADel, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.

[2] The same as Gadel 391, December 8, p. 959.

[3] Michael Comay.

DAVIS

320/12–1551 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 15, 1951—6 p. m.

Delga 686. 1. Staff now considering draft UNRWA resolution embodying recommendations of Point REPT director and AdCom and applicable parts draft attached position paper (SD/A/C.1/373).[1] General outlines of program discussed informally by staff with Vorys and Mansfield. Both admit need for program but suggested that distribution program over four-year period rather than three-year period would be more acceptable US Congress and other parliaments light other financial requirements next year. They questioned particularly large increase for second FY as too ambitious. Would appreciate Dept's view these suggestions.

2. Delegation needs specific instructions on position we can take here as to amount entire program and yearly distribution total. In draft resolution we propose $250 million program, of which $50 million will be for relief. Program for next fiscal year $118, of which $18 million will be for relief.

3. Since $118 million for second year will be needed largely for commitments rather than expenditures we propose discuss with Blandford feasibility of planning match his commitments with corresponding commitments from contributing govts rather than outright cash appropriations. Wld Dept and Budget Bureau agree to request full amts scheduled program in contract authorization (three years) spreading cash requirements over four-year period? Blandford considers it essential have in hand full commitments from contributors prior discussions with Arab states. USGADel staff concurs this view.

ROOSEVELT

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[1] Dated October 12, p. 892.

320/12-1751: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 17, 1951—7:21 p. m.
PRIORITY

Gadel 490. Re Delga 686[2] UNRWA. Dept analyses problem as fol:

1. UNRWA needs firm authorization and termination date, and $250,000,000 program appears reasonable magnitude. Three year preferable to four year period suggested reftel in view fact refusal accept three year suggestion in report may create lack confidence in validity other concepts report and cast doubt on effectiveness termination provision.
2. Agree provisions in legislation permitting execution firm contracts preferable to cash appropriations made obviously with intent spread expenditure over two subsequent years fol fiscal year for which authorized. Dept was unable however to interest either BOB or Cong in such procedure for Pal refs for 1952 and was advised method unworkable.
3. If large increase not made FY 1953 similar increase essential FY 1954 if concept short term program is to be maintained.

Hope foregoing proves helpful. Dept already submitted proposal BOB pledge 70% 1953 Budget or total maximum US contrib $82.6 million. Will advise soonest on receipt BuBudget decision.

Advise UK and Fr reaction suggestion contrib 6-2-1 ratio total programs.

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Gardiner; cleared with Messrs. Tomlinson and Emery.

[2] *Supra.*

IO Files: Lot 71 D 440

Memorandum of Conversation, by James W. Barco of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS,] 18 December 1951.
US/A/AC.53/8

Subject: Palestine in the General Assembly

Participants: Mr. Moshe Sharett, Israeli Foreign Minister
Mr. Arthur Lourie, Israeli Delegation
Mr. Gideon Rafael, Israeli Delegation
Mr. Philip Jessup, USGADel
Mr. Joseph Palmer, USGADel
Mr. James Barco, USGADel

Mr. Sharett opened the discussion by saying that he had called to see Mr. Jessup to compare notes on the coming debate on Palestine.

He would be returning to Israel at the end of this week and would not be coming back. Before he left, he wished to see whether the Israel and American Delegations stood together on the question of Palestine. While there had been contacts between the Israel Embassy and the State Department, this was the first "business meeting" that the Israel Delegation had had with any delegation in Paris.

Mr. Sharett referred to his previous conversation with Mr. Jessup[1] and reviewed what he had then said with respect to the Israel view of the problem, which he had divided into three parts: 1) Security in the area. In this connection Mr. Sharett felt that no change in the present armistice supervision arrangements were necessary. 2) The humanitarian problem. The problem of Arab refugees was one which was being handled satisfactorily by UNRWA. 3) Relations between Israel and the Arab States. International intervention was not necessary at this time.

Mr. Sharett said however that since this first talk with Mr. Jessup the Israel Delegation had been able to clarify their views. These clarifications had resulted partly from the Israel Delegation's talks with Mr. Blandford. His Delegation now understood more fully Mr. Blandford's approach to the question, and he wished to say that the Israel Delegation had no quarrel with it. They could understand that the UNRWA operation should be separated from political questions and that negotiations with Israel on the question of compensation should not be confused with the reintegration program at this stage. The question of determining the amount and the mode of payment could be left to negotiations between Israel and an organ of the United Nations. The question remained what organ should be designated for such negotiations. Mr. Sharett also recalled that he had stated that there was no need for United Nations machinery to deal with inter-state relations at the present time; that the parties themselves can advance from the armistice agreements under existing machinery; but whatever machinery there was, the essential thing was the will to come to agreement and as long as that was lacking, machinery was unimportant. However, the Israel Delegation had now concluded that the maintenance of some organ ready to help in widening the scope of the armistice agreements when and if the parties were ready was desirable, and the Israel Delegation had likewise concluded that whatever organ was set up should deal with both this question and the question of compensation. In this connection they were aware that a new organ might possibly be made up of states who were not familiar with the compensation question and had concluded that the Refugee Office of the PCC with its technical knowledge might be attached to any new organization to deal with this question. That left the question open as to what the new organ should be, where it should sit, of whom it should be composed, its name and terms of reference.

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[1] Memorandum of conversation not found in Department of State files.

Mr. Sharett said that the Israel Government felt that there should be an entirely new arrangement which would make a clear break with the past. It should not be the PCC, the continuance of which would suggest a perpetuation of the PCC's methods. While these were not on the whole bad, the PCC had made one mistake in bringing all the Arab States together en bloc. This should be avoided in the future and the nature of the new organ should be such as to convey to the parties concerned that an entirely new approach was being made. Above all there should not be a continuation of the practice of making a semblance of negotiations when everyone knew that there were no true negotiations being carried on.

The Israel Delegation felt that the new organ should be called a "Good Offices Committee." This was not merely a question of title but reflected the substance of what the Israel Delegation believed desirable. It should be clearly indicated that the new organ was not to meet continuously or expected to report at the end of the year. It might do nothing at all for half a year or a year but should be ready to act when requested by the parties. The Israel Delegation saw the merit of maintaining the present membership of the PCC. It would have welcomed the addition of the United Kingdom, if membership could be increased to four; while if only three members were to be selected, it would prefer the United Kingdom to Turkey. Israel had had misgivings in 1948 about the Turks, although not all of these had been borne out. The fact was Turkey could not always take a detached view of the Middle East being, as she was, part and parcel of the area. Israel would, however, make no issue if there were good reasons for retaining Turkey as a member, and if to bring in the United Kingdom would complicate matters, Israel would make no issue on this. In any case, Israel had not spoken to the United Kingdom about it.

As to the seat of the organization, Mr. Sharett said that there seemed common agreement that New York was the best place. The terms of reference of the new body should be very simple. They should state 1) that the organ should be available to lend its good offices for any negotiations that might take place as a result of the application of any of the parties, and 2) that the Good Offices Committee should continue to deal with the question of compensation either directly or through an intermediary body such as the Andersen Refugee Office.

In reply to Mr. Sharett, Mr. Jessup said that the study and thinking in the American Delegation had proceeded along lines closely parallel to that of the Israel Delegation. He went over the points briefly to see if any differences of view existed. With respect to security, he felt that there was no difference of opinion; that the Truce Supervision Organization and the Security Council were sufficient. With respect to refugees, our thinking, like that of the Israel Delegation, was that the arrangements were generally satisfactory. One point which Mr. Sharett had not mentioned was the question of blocked accounts. We understood that the Israel Delegation had indicated to the PCC that there was no problem in principle concerning the release of blocked accounts. It would be most helpful at this time in consideration of the Palestine question if Israel could make some step in the direction of unblocking the Arab accounts.

Mr. Sharett replied in this connection that the Israel Delegation had signified its willingness to discuss the question of blocked accounts but had reached no final decision. The Israel Government for the present must reserve its position but further clarification might be forthcoming in a few weeks. The problem for Israel was that the payment of blocked accounts involved an immediate payment of hard currency to the benefit of Israel's neighbor states who still insisted that they were at war with Israel. The Israel Government's difficulty would be to explain to parliament how they could justify such a payment in these circumstances. Mr. Sharett indicated parenthetically that the accounts of Jews blocked in Iraq about equalled the Arab accounts blocked in Israel, that is, each amounted to about 5,000,000 pounds sterling.

Mr. Jessup reiterated that in this field where it was much easier to move than in other matters, action by Israel at this time would be very helpful, and he felt sure that the Israel Government had this in mind. Mr. Jessup then said that the thinking in the American Delegation had run over all of the alternatives on the Palestine question. With respect to the establishment of some new body, we thought it undesirable to give the parties the idea that a new movement was beginning to undertake something that the PCC had not been able to do. If a new body with a new name were to be established, we would run the risk of creating the idea that some new initiative was about to take place. Our thinking started from the same premise as that of the Israel Delegation, that it was desirable to avoid creating the impression that something new was brewing. To keep the PCC on a standby basis might most successfully carry out this idea.

We agreed with the Israel Delegation, Mr. Jessup said, that changing the membership of the body might create new problems and new frictions. On the whole, it seemed that the simplest thing to do was to avoid novelty, to keep the same name and to create the idea of a standby basis. This might accomplish what we all had in mind. While the question of compensation and repatriation can't be obliterated, Mr. Jessup observed, it seemed possible to move along with them; whereas to raise the question specifically of a new body's terms of reference might result in over-emphasizing the repatriation question.

Mr. Sharett replied that in his opinion a retention of the PCC suggested continuing the old procedures, while their idea was that a new body would definitely suggest new procedures. As to repatriation, it was one thing not to proclaim that repatriation was definitely off; it was quite a different thing to reaffirm that repatriation must be implemented. It was in the interest of an early solution of the refugee problem and the wider problems of the area, if there were no reaffirmation of repatriation.

Mr. Rafael added that the Israel Delegation had been impressed by the PCC's conclusions which, he said, corresponded to the realities of the situation. The Israel Delegation found that the PCC's conclusion, that the attitudes of the parties and changed conditions in Palestine made it impossible for the PCC to carry out its mandate, was a bold, correct and realistic statement of which the United Nations should take advantage. Mr. Sharett added that by following the Israel Delegation's suggestion, for a new body, the General Assembly would in fact be taking advantage of the PCC's conclusions. Mr. Jessup added at that point that the PCC's conclusions with respect to its mandate included the conclusion that it could not follow its present procedure. It was a most important point and the change to less active procedures that the United States had in mind could best be undertaken by the transfer of the PCC's headquarters to New York and representation on the Commission by the permanent representatives to the United Nations. Mr. Lourie remarked that under the kind of resolution the Israelis had in mind there would be no occasion for keeping the Palestine question on the General Assembly agenda. Mr. Sharett added that whatever resolution was adopted, it should not obligate the body to submit an annual report. Annual reports always insured debate on the question. A report also acted as an incentive to activity which might be artificial.

Mr. Jessup observed that it would be desirable in this year's debate not to approach the question on the basic issues but on the question of appropriate United Nations machinery. If the temper of the discussion could be lowered it would be most desirable and it would also be preferable to avoid discussion of the issues every year. Mr. Palmer added that he wondered if debate on the new body contemplated by the Israel Delegation might not provoke a detailed examination of the new body's terms of reference and result in stronger language on repatriation. Mr. Sharett agreed that this was a point to be considered.

Mr. Palmer also referred to Mr. Sharett's comment regarding the PCC procedure of dealing with all of the Arab countries en bloc and said that we did not feel that this would necessarily be the case if the PCC went on the standby basis we had in mind. Mr. Sharett replied that this was a most important point and had been one of the main reasons for their proposing a new body. If it could be assumed that the body in existence would be flexible as to procedure, this would be most desirable. At the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Sharett asked when he might expect something from the US Delegation in a more crystallized form in reply to which Mr. Jessup said that we would keep in touch with his Delegation and hoped to have further discussions soon.

Mr. Sharett left with Mr. Jessup a draft resolution[2] embodying the Israel Delegation views, a copy of which is attached.

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[2] Dated December 15; not printed.

683.84A/12-351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 19, 1951—6:46 p. m.

246. Dept commends ur excellent tel 319 Dec 3.[2] You have already noted Riley's comments contained Delga 576 Dec 8.[3] Re ur 286 Nov 18,[4] Dept fears irresponsible personal attacks on Gen Riley by Syrian mil spokesman can only exacerbate sitn between Israel and Syria. Probably basic Syrian irritation increased by Riley's report to SC on Tel el Mutilla incident to effect Syrians had manifestly participated in fighting in Demil Zone. Report is mild in tone, however, and Dept considers it objective and in accord SC res May 18. In Dept's view Riley's acts and reports sitn to UN have been fair and impartial, and we believe he made sincere effort carry out his responsibilities under SC res of May 18. Syrians shld be cautioned against either believing or attempting make capital out of Israel propaganda, which frequently attempts make it appear Riley willing bargain with Israel or in full agreement with latter's position.

While latest Riley report to SC, dated Nov 6, indicates he not yet entirely successful obtaining compliance Israel re Demil Zone, seems clear he also had difficulties Syrian side. Syria as well as Israel has refused meet in MAC. Dept believes this refusal is violation para 8 SC res May 18. Unless and until Syria Israel resume mtgs in MAC, Dept believes it unwise Riley attempt call armistice conf or refer problem back to SC, since wld appear SC wld indicate unwillingness attempt resolve this problem while both parties maintain un-coop attitude toward UN and refuse discuss through machinery estab for this purpose. Riley and not Syria is judge extent Israel compliance, and Israel non-compliance is no justification for continuing Syrian refusal participate in MAC mtgs.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo, cleared with Mr. Ludlow, and repeated to Tel Aviv (as 454), Beirut, Amman, Jerusalem, Paris (as Gadel 512), Jidda, Baghdad, Cairo, London, and Ankara.

[2] *Ante*, p. 950.

[3] *Ante*, p. 958.

[4] *Ante*, p. 933.

Israel's attitude this matter equally untenable in Dept's view. Art 5 Armistice Agreement assigns gen supervision Demil Zone to Chairman MAC, and not to MAC itself, but if Chairman wishes MAC discuss Zone problems neither side shld refuse participate, particularly in light May 18 Res.

Dept increasingly concerned that when either Syria or Israel disagrees with UN position Palestine it attempts force UN comply with its point of view by obstructionist or legalistic tactics. Unless Syria and Israel meet in MAC with sincere desire settle their problems Dept doubts wisdom of attempting progress toward settlement on any other level UN. Syria shld also be willing take responsibility for its own suggestions and agree consider Israel counter-suggestions. Syria's objections to making proposals in MAC might be obviated by assurance UN and Israel that mtgs wld be kept secret.

Dept believes any new arrangement re Demil Zone cld be considered modification Art 5 Armistice Agreement and line estab cld become part of armistice line, which as stated in Armistice Agreement wld be "without prejudice to final settlement" but which in fact wld be sufficiently final satisfy Israel. Dept agrees that commercial relations Israel and Syria obviously impossible for some time to come.

Dept hopes Leg Damascus and Emb Tel Aviv will lose no oppy influence govt to which accredited coop with UN along foregoing lines.

Request USDel Paris obtain Riley's views generally on foregoing and his ideas on next steps to be taken.[5]

ACHESON

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[5] The U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly reported on December 22 that General Riley was in full agreement with the Department's views as stated in this telegram. He felt the only problem he would wish to refer back to the Security Council would be an actual violation of the cease-fire; he envisaged no new steps, at least during the General Assembly session, beyond continuing efforts through the Mixed Armistice Commission. (Delga 791, December 22, not printed (320/12-2251))

784A.5 MSP/12-2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, December 20, 1951—6 p. m.

609. Yesterday I presented McDaniel to PriMin Ben-Gurion, MinFin Kaplan, MinComIndus Joseph, and Econ coordinator Naphtali. In conversation with Kaplan and Avriel, principles bi-lateral agreement were discussed. In this connection, McDaniel strongly recommends and I concur, that no commitments on subject-matter agreement be made to Israel auths Washington pending further conversations here. Particularly we wld wish to avoid recurrence such statement re counterpart as appears in text draft interim note (Deptels

406 Dec 1[1] and 422, Dec 10)[2] "the sums in this Israel Govt account shall be held or used for such purposes as may be agreed upon between our two govts in furtherance of relief and resettlement of refugees".

McDaniel emphasized desire that 5 percent of all pounds deposited by Israel Govt under exchange notes and contemplated bi-lateral agreement shld be credited USG for its use within Israel for such purposes as USG may elect. Kaplan and Avriel made no objection, merely observing that such funds shld be used within Israel.

ReDeptel 436, Dec 13,[3] we consider it important that counterpart funds be available to both Emb and Econ Aid Mission for all purposes which USG may elect. If, as indicated in Deptel 436, such funds "not intended cover all Emb admin and operating costs, but only those broadly associated with implementation aid program", an impossible personnel situation as well as admin difficulties wld inevitably arise.

Issue must also be faced squarely that present exchange rate is unrealistic and operates, in effect, as heavy tax on US personnel and govt.

McDaniel proposes include in agreement language to safeguard right of officer in charge US Emb jointly with officer in charge of aid mission to fix realistic exchange rate for 5 percent counterpart funds credited USG. When realistic rate so established, it shld be made available equally to Emb and aid mission personnel, and for admin and operating expenditures.

Davis

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted the draft text of the note which was sent on December 7 to Ambassador Eban; see footnote 1 to telegram 544 from Tel Aviv, December 4, p. 952.

[2] Not printed; it confirmed the exchange of notes with the Israeli Embassy in Washington on December 7 (784A.5 MSP/12-1051).

[3] Not printed.

320/12-1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 21, 1951—5:21 p.m.

3618. Re Gadel 490.[2] FYI Budget Bureau marked up $65 million for Pal refugees instead of $82,600,000 requested. Considered larger figure wld probably over-finance Agency requirements FY '53 and that increase from $50 million in 1952 to $65 million in 1953 wld show increased US support and not hamper Agency's ability negotiate projects Arab States. Also thought approval total 3 yr program would suffice give assurances Arab States. $65 million calculation roughly based on dividing Agency's 1953 and 1954 requirements and applying 70% for US contrib each year.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Tomlinson.

[2] Dated December 17, p. 963.

In view foregoing, Delga 686[3] and Gadel 490 Dept wld appreciate views GADel and AdCom dels re magnitude '53 budget before attempting increase $65 million.

ACHESON

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[3] Dated December 15, p. 962.

Secretary's Memoranda: Lot 53 D 444

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1951.

Subject: Approval of a program of economic aid of the order of $80,000,000 to Israel for 1953

The grant program for Fiscal Year 1952 for economic assistance to Israel has been established by legislative history in the sum of $64,590,000. This balances mathematically funds available to the Arab states for technical and economic assistance added to our contribution to the United Nations for the relief and rehabilitation of the Arab refugees from Palestine.

In a Note to the Department dated November 19, 1951, the Israelis have requested assistance totalling $126 million for Fiscal Year 1953. This amount is part of a three-year program of investment looking to the ingathering of an additional 600,000 Jewish people. This program is considered excessive. Israel cannot hope to become viable economically with such numbers of new immigrants. Such a program would increase international tensions in the area.

Alternative programs of assistance have been submitted to the Bureau of the Budget by the Department, one approximating $27 million, and the other, $83 million.

The $27 million program represents an expanded concept of technical assistance, and is designed to balance mathematically bilateral programs of like amount proposed for the Arab states. This program is too small to achieve our objectives in Israel and to prevent collapse there; the requirements of Israel for foodstuffs alone are materially larger than anticipated when Israel's needs were calculated last March, because of serious drought in 1951.

The $83 million program has been prepared following an analysis of the present financial situation of Israel and the prospects of Israel's foreign exchange position in Fiscal Year 1953. This program is designed to absorb into the productive economy of Israel refugees already arrived and to permit a moderate rate of immigration.

Israel's future as a self-sustaining state depends on reconciliation with the Arab states, and integration into the economy of the Near and Middle East. Aid to Israel involves considerations affecting both the United States and Israel in their relations with Israel's Arab neighbors.

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Gardiner; cleared with NE, TCA, E, S/MSA, A, and H.

Israeli officials, citing the unabating hostility of the Arabs, feel they cannot adopt conciliatory policies towards them. On their part, the Arabs, taking into account the very substantial number of immigrants who have entered Israel since 1948 (approximately 600,000), and noting the frequently avowed policy of Israel to continue unrestricted immigration, are little disposed to come to terms with a neighbor who appears to be preparing for aggressive expansion. United States Government economic support of Israel, making possible the continuation of heavy immigration into Israel, causes grave doubts among the Arabs as to the sincerity of the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950, which was intended to stabilize the present armistice frontiers. Arab doubts of the ability of Israel to maintain an expanded population within its present borders have a measure of validity.

United States assistance toward Israel can be squared with a policy looking toward improvement of United States relations with the Arabs, but only if the Arabs are convinced that Israel will be content with only moderate increases in its present population and will, therefore, have no reason to expand beyond the confines of the present armistice lines. The fact that the movement of refugees from displaced persons camps in Western Europe is now completed makes a policy of limited immigration into Israel reasonable. Israel's current financial difficulties are largely the result of immigration policies conducted without reference to economic considerations, and of the Arab trade boycott.

In the Department's view, a balanced judgment calls for a program of assistance approximately $80 million. Such a program should be conditional on understandings with Israeli authorities looking to slowing down in rates of immigration, and firm planning for a terminal date of United States aid, as well as policies of conciliation to the Arabs.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you approve inclusion in the budget of a program of economic assistance to Israel for Fiscal Year 1953 of the order of $80,000,000.

DEAN ACHESON

684A.85/12-1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 21, 1951—7:28 p. m.

3635. Dept increasingly concerned over recent reports from Tel Aviv of incidents on Syrian-Israel and Jordan-Israel borders, continuing failure Syrian-Israel MAC to meet (Gadel 512) [2] and deteriorating relations in Jordan-Israel MAC. This latter connection suggest you inform Riley re Tel Aviv Embtel 599 Dec 19.[3]

Dept interested Riley's comments recent reports from Tel Aviv and hopes he will give consideration returning Palestine soonest when his services no longer required Paris. FYI since US position re Pal question does not foresee Riley appointment as Agent Gen and improbable near future SC will be called on consider Huleh problem, wld appear nothing prevents Riley's early return to deal with deteriorating Armistice sitn.

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Waldo; cleared with UNP; repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo.

[2] The same as telegram 246 to Damascus, December 19, p. 968.

[3] Not printed; it summarized a report in the *Jerusalem Post* of December 19 that the Israeli delegate on the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission withdrew from the Commission's December 18 meeting in order to prevent a vote on a change of the border line in the Qalqiliya area which would have transferred to Jordan's control 100 dunams of Israeli territory (684A.85/12-1951).

683.84A/12-2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET TEL AVIV, December 27, 1951—4 p. m.

627. Emb finds Deptel 454 of Dec 19 [2] re Huleh controversy very helpful, particularly on fol points:

1. Recommendation that Syrians not react unduly to Israel pronouncements making it appear special understandings have been worked out with Riley. In this connection Emb has lost no opportunity to impress Israel auths with harmful effect on relations with Arab countries of statements in Knesset debates, press and radio to above effect. Eban, Kollek and various influential visitors from US agree Israel Govt and public shld become more sensitive to Arab opinion, and avoid conduct that needlessly worsens relations.
2. Dept's point that Riley as rep UN auth. and not Israel or Syria, is judge of whether there has been compliance with SC res or other UN mandates. Unilateral interpretations and allegations of noncompliance have contributed to present unsatisfactory state of affairs.

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris, London, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jerusalem.

[2] A repeat of telegram 246 to Damascus, December 19, p. 968.

Believe it necessary that UN auths call their own score re compliance, and insist that even acknowledged instances of noncompliance still do not justify refusal to participate in MAC mtgs.

3. Importance of encouraging parties to demonstrate sincere desire settle problems at MAC level or through other direct negots.

Advantage is being taken of Eban's presence to discuss desirability of review of policy toward Arab countries and questions in dispute. He admits that position taken heretofore has been sterile and that new approach is needed to inspire Arab confidence and cooperation. It was mentioned that repeatedly Israel has deprived itself of political advantages from actual or proposed concessions by the manner in which they were announced. Cited as example cessation of work on Huleh project after Knesset debate which rendered stoppage meaningless and served only to increase Syrian irritation.

Also mentioned Syrian reaction to detailed list of reservations which destroyed political effect of otherwise constructive announcement of willingness consider compensation apart from general peace settlement. He readily conceded undesirability of attempting to link compensation of Pal refugees for lands abandoned with any question of claims against Arab Govts.

Eban commented also on matter which has long concerned Emb, namely negative attitude of Israel Govt and public toward important objective of seeking improve Arab-Israel relations by direct negots. Altho he considers lack of interest due more to discouragement than failure to appreciate importance of such improvement, he agrees with Emb that sustained psychological approach by Israel, designed to influence Arab thinking shld be tried. It cld do no harm and might conceivably prepare way for real progress later. At least such effort wld involve avoidance of harmful actions and pronouncements and substitute constructive program. It is believed we shld encourage efforts to change present negative attitude of both sides but at same time avoid pressing for concessions especially during time when govts concerned will not dare enter into direct negots. We shld avoid also encouraging either party to expect unrealistic concessions (see Embtel 2, July 3).[3]

Seriousness of recent financial crisis has high-lighted for Israelis desirability of improving relations with neighbors, lessening defense burden and reestablishing normal trade. For this reason, and because number of Congressional and other Amer visitors have recently stressed to Israelis importance to Israel and US of improved Arab-Israel relations, direct negots at this time might find Israelis more receptive than heretofore to realistic Arab proposals. Emb does not underestimate depth of feeling behind Arab reluctance negotiate with

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[3] *Ante*, p. 743.

Israel, but if Eban succeeds in effecting change in Israel tactics, it is hoped Arabs will respond in manner to make some real progress possible.

Davis

320.2 AA/12-2951 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 29, 1951—8:08 p. m.

557. Financing Palestine refugee program requiring according present plans $250 million three-year period ending June 30, 1954, poses serious problems.

It is in best interests US and UN secure as broad participation as possible in contribs this fund.

Both Israel and Arab states have expressed interest in success of program.

Possible source financing is Israel. Statements have already been made by Israeli auths indicating Israel may contribute in settlement Arab claims compensation.

Fol suggestion has been made and we understand is now being studied in Israel circles re possibility using for refugees revenues which wld indirectly accrue Israel from operation Haifa refinery.

Israeli Govt officials calculate that if Haifa were operated 100% capacity, Israeli Govt wld benefit to extent $7 to $9 million annually, and Israel's petroleum imports, if made from Middle East sources and moved to Haifa either via pipeline or via Suez, rather than South American sources, wld cost annually $12–$15 million less.

Dept wld appreciate comments del and missions concerned re advisability encouraging this suggestion to run Haifa full capacity on Middle East oil with Israel agreeing devote full calculated savings $20–$25 million annually or very substantial fraction this saving to refugee fund for period continuing until compensation as finally determined by UN auths had been paid in full. Iraq wld benefit by receiving increased oil royalties and might find it difficult reject this plan with its obvious benefits directed to rehabilitation of Arab refugees. Savings to Israel would accrue after refugees had been compensated and then wld depend on willingness Arabs continue permit oil flow Haifa.

Acheson

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Gardiner; cleared with NE, UNE, and UNP; repeated to London, Paris for GADel, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Cairo, Tehran, Jidda, Beirut, Amman, and Damascus.

POINT FOUR GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL

[For text of Agreement signed at Hakirya (Tel Aviv) February 26, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 3 UST (pt. 1) 379.]

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL CONCERNING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

[For text of Interim Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington December 7, entered into force on that date, see 3 UST (pt. 2) 2874.]

JORDAN

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF JORDAN FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION OF KING ABDULLAH

110.15 McG/3-2951 : Despatch

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET AMMAN, March 29, 1951.

No. 234

Subject: Conversations Between Mr. McGhee,[2] King Abdullah, Jordan Prime Minister and Other Members of the Government.

On March 26, 1951, Mr. McGhee, who had just arrived for a two day visit to Jordan, was received in audience by His Majesty King Abdullah. Also present at the meeting were the Jordan Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and myself.

After some complimentary opening remarks in which he expressed pleasure at having the opportunity to visit Jordan again after an absence of two years, Mr. McGhee congratulated King Abdullah on the great progress in economic development which had taken place in the country since his last visit. He paid tribute to the King and his Government for the clear cut stand which had been taken in support of United States and United Nations action on the Korean question and for His Majesty's wish that Arab Legion soldiers participate in the fighting against Communist aggressors. Mr. McGhee added that the well organized Arab Legion and the courage of its soldiers were widely known and admired in the United States. The King was visibly touched by these remarks and said that while he regretted it had not been possible to send Arab Legionnaires to Korea, the United States could count on this force to do all within its power to repell aggressors or invaders in this part of the world.

Mr. McGhee then touched on the refugee problem,[3] indicating the admiration of his Government for the welcome which King Abdullah had extended to Arab refugees and the helpful policy which his Government had adopted in regard to this very difficult problem. . . . Mr. McGhee indicated that it was his opinion that radical changes would be necessary and he hoped that such changes, together with the cooperative attitude of Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries, would in the near future enable the resettlement of large numbers of refugees. He stated that the United States would continue economic assistance and he was confident that the United States would meet the very large obligation it had undertaken to contribute to the relief and reintegration fund. He stated that he also felt confident that Jordan, apart from aid in connection with the refugee problem, could continue to count on economic assistance, possibly through an expanded Point IV program.

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[1] Repeated to London, Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, and Jerusalem.

[2] For information on Assistant Secretary of State McGhee's tour of the Near East in February and March 1951, see the editorial note on p. 49.

[3] For documentation on the Palestine refugee problem, particularly on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, see pp. 559 ff.

King Abdullah then reverted to the question of the defense of the area, giving a long exposé of his views regarding the necessity for building up further the defenses of Greece, Turkey and Iran, with particular emphasis on the exposed position of the latter country. He remarked that although adequate defenses might at the present or in the near future exist in these states, lack of unity, indecision and political instability in most of the Arab States had prevented them from building up anything like effective defenses for any eventual resistance to invasion.

Mr. McGhee said that the United States and other free Governments of the world recognized the great danger of Soviet aggression which existed in several corners of the world and particularly in the Middle East. However, the United States and its Western European allies were engaged in a large scale re-armament and mobilization program. If any possible Russian invasion could be delayed for a period of eighteen months, the overwhelming superiority of the Western Powers in war material and manpower would, in all likelihood, remove the fear of Russian attack on any of the countries bordering it. In substantiation of this view, Mr. McGhee quoted figures on the extent of plane, tank and gun manufacture in the United States as compared with Russian output, which clearly showed that after the elapse of a year and a half the Russians would be far outstripped in war-making potential.

These figures and facts greatly impressed the King, who agreed with Mr. McGhee's conclusions, but stated that lack of unity in the Arab world would constitute a serious weakness in developing the strategy of the defense of the Middle East and that, regardless of our strong position eighteen months hence, it should be our policy to encourage such unity. . . .

In reply Mr. McGhee stated that the United States Government was not against the union of like-minded people when such union was accomplished of their own free will and without the use of force. Nor was the United States opposed to disunion of such people after they had nited if they wished to take such action. However, the United States ould not sanction . . . unilateral action to bring about union. He and is colleagues felt very strongly that action of this character taken in n undemocratic and unilateral manner would diminish rather than uild up the stability and security of the area and, were it ever attempted, the United States Government would be obliged to oppose it. . . . [The King] fully understood the import of Mr. McGhee's words, and conversation on this subject ended with a promise from the King to the effect that . . . he would do all in his power to build up the defenses of the area and that in the event of invasion or attack the United States could count on him to fight at its side.

Mr. McGhee expressed keen appreciation for these remarks and stated that he felt a great deal more could be done to accomplish our mutual objectives in the area through cooperation and coordination between the Middle Eastern countries on defense matters. He felt that such cooperation and coordination could possibly be as effective as overall unity of governments and of fighting forces within one sovereign area.

The conversation got around to the question of Jordan-Israeli relations and in this connection Mr. McGhee reaffirmed the intention of the United States Government to implement the Tripartite Declaration[4] should a serious violation of frontiers take place. In reply to this the King said that he had no fear whatsoever as regards his frontiers with the Israelis. . . .

As regards the likelihood of a greater degree of agreement between Israel and Jordan in the near future the King stated that there had been discussions in recent weeks but that the Israelis had shown no willingness to make any concessions. He added that unless the Israelis found themselves able to reach agreement with the present Prime Minister, Samir Pasha Rifa'i, who was well known for his moderate and reasonable attitude, he was certain that there was no likelihood of such agreement being reached in the foreseeable future.

The audience was concluded with complimentary remarks on both sides and expressions from Mr. McGhee of his admiration of the King's grasp of world affairs, his practical outlook and of his frankness in laying before him his innermost ambitions regarding Arab union.

Following Mr. McGhee's audience with King Abdullah, he had extended conversations with Prime Minister Samir Pasha Rifa'i, Foreign Minister Ahmad Bey Tuqan and other members of the Jordan Government. . . . [The Prime Minister] felt that union of the

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[4] For text of the three-power statement by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States regarding security in the Near East, released to the press May 25, 1950, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886. For documentation on the subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 122 ff.

Fertile Crescent was inevitable and it was the duty of Arabs to work for it. The method of achieving the union, the organization of the union or confederation, and the person who should be at the head of it, would be matters which would have to be worked out on the basis of common agreement. In this connection he referred to Dr. Qudsi's federation scheme and expressed the hope that it would be the basis for achieving a greater degree of cooperation and coordination and ultimate unity between the countries of the Fertile Crescent. (In this regard attention is invited to Legation's despatch 229 of March 22, 1951[5] which recorded a conversation at length between the Prime Minister and myself.)

In subsequent conversation with the Prime Minister, Samir Pasha sought to impress upon Mr. McGhee two important points. First, he repeated and emphasized the fact that Jordan was in dire need of substantial economic assistance in order to develop its limited resources with a view of achieving some degree of self-sufficiency. This, of course, was a question quite apart from assistance which would be necessary in order to contribute to the resettlement of refugees. Mr. McGhee reaffirmed his intention to assist in every way possible in order that the United States Government might be able to expand substantially its economic assistance to Jordan through some sort of enlarged Point IV program. The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for these remarks.

Second, Samir Pasha took up in some detail recent developments in connection with Jordan-Israeli negotiations under the Armistice Agreement.[6] He stated that while previous Jordan Governments had done little to insure implementation of the Armistice Agreement, it had become his policy from the beginning of his assumption of power to accept the obligation to implement fully the Armistice, in particular Article VIII, assuming he could count on a cooperative and conciliatory attitude on the part of the Israelis. He regretted that so far he had not found the Israelis to be motivated by such feelings. (In this connection see the Legation's despatch 223 of March 19, 1951[7] which summarized Samir Pasha's proposals made on March 16 and the reaction of the Israelis.) Samir Pasha dwelt at great length on the question of Mount Scopus and of his offer to provide free access to the Jewish institutions there in order that they might resume their normal functioning, subject to the fact that United Nations control of the area would terminate and that Jordan control would be sub stituted. The institutions in the area would have the status of foreign institutions in Jordan territory and would be protected as such. He was surprised to learn that the Israelis considered the area as Israeli territory, a claim which had no foundation in any of the agreements made. He asserted that Jordan could implement its obligation under Article VIII to provide free access only if Jordan exercised control of the area. He produced a copy of the Armistice Agreement, official maps and a copy of the agreement made prior to the Armistice, under which the United Nations assumed "protection" of the institutions in the area, in order to convince Mr. McGhee of his argument. Mr. McGhee stated that while on the basis of evidence presented it appeared that Samir Pasha had a good case, he felt certain that during his visit to Israel he would be presented with evidence by the Israelis which would probably indicate that they also had a case. In any event, he hoped that by reducing legal quibbling to a minimum some form of agreement could be reached. Samir Pasha agreed that quibbling on technical points should be reduced wherever possible, but he felt that if Jordan, or for that matter Israel, had a good legal case on any particular subject it should be recognized. In this connection he had serious criticism of the Mixed Armistice Commission which, very often, sought to resolve disputes on the basis of compromise without special regard to legal right. He felt that since the Armistice Agreement was, like any other document of its nature, open to legal interpretation, it was advisable for the Jordan Government to procure qualified legal advice which did not exist in the country. He had asked for the services, for a brief period, of a competent international lawyer from England who was due to arrive soon.

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[5] Not printed.

[6] For documentation on these negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. v pp. 594 ff. and *ibid.*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 658 ff. The Agreement was signed Rhodes on April 3, 1949. For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of th Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1.*

[7] *Ante*, p. 601; for other documentation on talks between Jordan and Israel, s pp. 559 ff.

The conversation ended with Samir Pasha expressing the hope that he could count on Mr. McGhee to continue to adopt a friendly attitude toward Jordan in matters affecting Jordan-Israel relations.

A. DAVID FRITZLAN

785.00/7-551 : Telegram

The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN, July 5, 1951—11 a. m.

4. Legtel 233 June 28.[2] On July 4 on Jerusalem road, had casual encounter with King,[3] Crown Prince Tallal and latter's son, Prince

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[1] Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Geneva.

[2] Not printed; it reported on Crown Prince Talal's arrival in Amman on June 27 after an unexpected departure from London where he had been resting and undergoing psychiatric observation.

[3] Abdullah ibn Hussein, King of Jordan.

Hussain. Tallal appeared tense but acted normally during brief roadside conversation.

At reception July 5 of Diplomatic Corps at Palace on occasion of post-Ramadan Feast, King introduced Dr. Ford Robertson who was at his side, explaining that Tallal, on doctor's advice did not attend reception. King said to Corps Tallal leaving for Geneva in next few days to continue treatment interrupted by early departure from London. He mentioned to Corps our mtg on road on previous day. I infer this was subtly planned to bring Tallal's condition out into open and possibly as hint that King may look to young Prince Hussain as eventual successor to throne. His action in stopping me on road to present young Prince and reference to it at Diplomatic reception were obviously with some purpose in mind.

. . . .

Suggest Consulate Geneva, through Dr. Robertson or otherwise, might be able follow developments there.

DREW

785.00/7-2051 : Telegram

The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT AMMAN, July 20, 1951—1 p. m.

26. Legtel 25, July 20.[2] Death of Abdullah, mental condition and absence from country of Crown Prince Tallal, and minority of Tallal's son Hussain, pose immed serious constitutional problem regarding succession on which too early to comment.

Legion enforcing martial law immed. Police guards on foreign Legs being strengthened. I am taking all possible precautions assure safety of Amer personnel and residents and Leg property. Amer staff member will be on duty at chancery 24 hours day. While confident ability Arab Legion maintain order I do not exclude possibility disorders by irresponsible elements including refugees with anti-foreign overtones.

Have informed Amer Con branch [in] Arab-held Jerusalem requesting it do likewise and keep Dept and me promptly and fully informed.

DREW

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[1] Repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Damascus, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

[2] Not printed; it conveyed the following message to Washington, repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv: "King Abdullah assassinated about noon July 20, at mosque Jerusalem." (785.11/7-2051)

Editorial Note

On July 20, President Truman sent condolences to Crown Prince Talal, and Acheson sent a message to Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai. Later in the day, on official information that Emir Naif had been proclaimed Regent, the President sent a message to him expressing regret that he should be called upon to assume the regency under such unhappy circumstances. For texts of these messages, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1951, page 171.

785.11/7-2051

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 20, 1951.

Subject: Assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan

Discussion: In continuation of my earlier memorandum of this date on this subject, our strictly tentative estimate of the immediate effects of this event in Jordan and neighboring countries is as follows:

Jordan: The Arab Legion under British tutelage will be able to maintain internal control. The Anglo-Jordan treaty will be a deterrent to military action by neighboring countries. The prospective new King Talal's reign is likely to be brief in view of his questionable sanity, and the question of securing the popular acceptance of a successor will be difficult particularly in view of the low reputation in the Arab world of all the eligible members of the Jordan royal family.

Syria: Syria may press for attachment of Jordan to Syria, but at present Syria has a great many internal difficulties, not to mention trouble with Israel in the Huleh area. Military action by Syria is considered unlikely unless Israel should make a move against Jordan.

Lebanon: We foresee no possibility of the Lebanese taking action except to ask for great power guarantee of Lebanon's independence. The Lebanese will be thoroughly frightened.

Saudi Arabia: King Ibn Saud will derive a certain satisfaction from the death of his old enemy, but Saudi Arabia is unlikely to take any positive action.

Iraq: The Iraqi Government will exert strong diplomatic pressure for its long standing plan for federating or unifying the two Hashemite kingdoms. Iraq would no doubt wish to include Syria in the unification plan. Military action by Iraq, especially if warned by the UK and US, is unlikely unless Israel should march.

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[1] Drafted by Barrow and Jones of NE.

Israel: It is unlikely Israel will take military action unless an Arab State marches or threatens to march into Jordan. In the latter case, Israel might use this as a pretext for rectifying its frontiers and realizing its ambition for full control of all of Palestine.[2]

Egypt: In view of its desire for hegemony in the Arab World, Egypt will try to prevent any other Arab State from acquiring dominance over Jordan. It is not in a favorable geographic position to take military action.

Arab League: There will undoubtedly be a meeting of the Arab League to discuss the situation but no concrete results are likely.

Mufti: The inconclusive information available causes us to believe the assassination may have been inspired by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, who claims to represent the Palestine Arabs, rather than the followers of the late Riad Solh. We believe the assassination is more likely to have been the result of a vendetta rather than a deliberate act of any Near Eastern state. Soviet involvement by financing the Mufti is possible but not proved. There is no evidence that Israel, which loses by Abdullah's death, is connected with the assassination.

Summary: In short, any immediate military conflict is considered unlikely, but in the long run there will be an increased Arab pressure for some form of larger Arab territorial unit with Iraq and Egypt vying for hegemony in the Arab World. Saudi Arabia will oppose any increase in the power of the Hashemite rulers of either Iraq or Jordan, and Israel will bitterly oppose any larger Arab formation.

US Objectives: Our objectives are: (1) To stabilize the situation so that the future of Jordan can be worked out in a calm atmosphere. A circular telegram [3] has been dispatched to the Arab States and Israel instructing our Chiefs of Mission to counsel restraint and moderation.

(2) Our long range objective is to find a solution to the problem which will preserve the strategic position which the UK has enjoyed in Jordan, at the same time taking into account the fact that Abdullah's death may create an opportunity for peacefully incorporating Jordan into a more viable territorial unit. Discussions of the problem are being initiated with the UK.

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[2] At this point in the source text, the following sentence is inserted, presumably in McGhee's handwriting: "Of all the Arab leaders, Abdullah was the most cooperative toward Israel."

[3] Telegram 69, July 20, not printed. (785.11/7-2051)

785.11/7-2451

Paper Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs for Discussion by the Policy Planning Staff

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1951.

Subject: **Future of Jordan: Possible Alternatives**

ALTERNATIVE No. 1

Jordan to remain an independent monarchy under Tallal, Hussein or Naif

ADVANTAGES

1. The UK strategic position would presumably be unaffected (although Tallal is reportedly less well disposed toward UK than was Abdullah).

2. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Syria under its present regime would probably favor maintenance of *status quo* since none of these is in a favorable position to annex Jordan and would oppose Iraq's or Israel's doing so. These states would seek to integrate Jordan more closely into the Arab League than heretofore.

3. The Armistice Agreement with Israel would be unaffected; Israel would like to rectify its frontiers, but would agree to the *status quo* if thwarted from doing so by the Great Powers.

4. France would favor the *status quo* since it fears a UK-dominated Arab Union.

5. Some leading Arab-Palestinians and Jordanians having vested interests in positions of influence will prefer the *status quo*. However, if Tallal and his followers are ousted they may join forces with Iraqis or others seeking annexation.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Jordan is not a viable territorial unit, and its existence as an independent state was intimately related to the personality of Abdullah. This may be a golden opportunity to correct an entirely illogical situation.

2. None of prospective successors has a high standing in the Arab World. Of all, Tallal as Crown Prince is best known in limited sense, but all now question his capacity to rule.

3. Iraq and the majority party in Syria (The Populists) will favor incorporation of Jordan into an Arab federation or union. Probably the majority of the people of the northern Arab States favor unification and will lay blame on the UK and US if Union does not come about, claiming latter opposing (*a*) to protect UK "imperialistic position" and (*b*) to appease Israel.

4. East and West Jordan will never be fully compatible under the present political arrangement.

Alternative No. 2

Jordan to be federated or unified with Iraq

ADVANTAGES

1. Communications between the two states are not particularly good, but there are no insurmountable geopolitical obstacles.

2. Merger of the Hashemite clan "a natural".

3. The Iraq financial situation will soon be good enough to take on the additional burden, although the UK subsidy and UN aid to the refugees will be needed initially. Continuing need for the subsidy may be an advantage in preventing any drastic change in the UK strategic position.

4. The UK position in Iraq is less certain than in Jordan, but UK interests in Jordan are less likely to be adversely affected under a merger with Iraq than if Jordan assimilated elsewhere.

5. UK treaty question would be thorny but not impossible to resolve so long as Nuri and Coterie in power.

6. US and UK encouragement of the merger would give the lie to the charges that the great powers are resisting Arab unity and might be an effective psychological move to cause the Arabs to shed their present nihilism.

7. The Arab Legion and Iraqi forces might in time be welded into a trim fighting unit capable of assisting Western forces substantially in holding the line at the Iranian frontier.

8. The great powers could possibly use support of unification as *quid pro quo* for a settlement with Israel, but chances of success of this maneuver would be very remote.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Iraq, with increased power and influence, will possibly develop muscle-flexing tendencies toward the UK and US. This would be even more true should Nuri be eliminated.

2. There is no armistice agreement between Iraq and Israel and the Iraqis are among the most hostile toward the Jews. There is a strong likelihood of Israel opposing the merger and using it as a pretext for gaining additional territory.

3. Pressure on Syria and on Lebanon for incorporation into Arab Union would be intensified.

4. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the controlling clique in the Syrian Army would be bitterly opposed, and it is possible, though not inevitable, such a move would rip the Arab World asunder.

5. Possible dynastic quarrels among the Hashemites.

ALTERNATIVE No. 3

Attachment of Jordan to Syria (or vice versa)

ADVANTAGES

1. Geopolitically sound—even more so than in the case of union with Iraq from a communications and ethnic standpoint.

2. It is possible, though remotely so, that this would result in an increase in UK influence in Syria since Syria definitely would need continuation of UK assistance to Jordan during the initial period of the merger.

3. Syria has an Armistice Agreement with Israel, Iraq does not.

4. Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be less bitterly opposed to Syrian aggrandizement since the present Syrian Government is more closely oriented toward them than to Iraq and presently has no chance to threaten their hegemony in their respective domains.

5. Syria is the most independent of the Arab States and fundamentally its traditions are more progressive and democratic than those in the rest of the area. . . .

6. Merger with the Arab Legion would improve the rag-tag Syrian Army so long as the Legion's UK officers were retained.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Syria is internally divided, unstable, and Army controlled; it has troubles with Israel in the Huleh area.

2. The Syrians are rooted, to a degree, in republicanism and have a low opinion of all the Jordanian Royal family, whereas the latter would probably be unwilling to renounce the throne in Jordan in favor of a republican regime.

3. Syria could possibly eventually assume the financial burdens of Jordan but not so quickly as Iraq. Initially they could give no assistance to Jordan.

4. Syria is presently in a bitter mood toward US and UK and the "Dawalibi psychology" might be extended to Jordan.

5. The UK Treaty question would be extremely difficult.

6. If UK influence remained, a clash between the UK and France might be expected, particularly in view latter's belief, that it has a special position in Syria.

OTHER ALTERNATIVES AND POSSIBILITIES

The alternatives previously mentioned are those which have a chance of being accomplished relatively peaceably. There are several other alternatives and possibilities which would probably involve military action of one sort or another, but which may nevertheless confront us:

1. The ex-Mufti's Gaza Government will emerge from shadow to substance in Arab-Palestine; Jordan to be confined to the eastern

bank. The disadvantages of this are obvious and enormous, and the US should oppose this development by every possible means.

2. Arab-Palestine and/or Jordan to be partitioned among neighboring Arab States and possibly Israel; Ibn Saud's claim to the Aqaba-Ma'an region (as stated in the 1927 exchange of letters attached to the Treaty of Jidda with the UK) to be recognized. The Arab Legion would resist by force any attempt made in this direction.

3. Israel to annex old Palestine; Jordan to remain independent on the eastern bank or another Arab State, such as Iraq, to annex Jordan up to the eastern bank. From the point of view of easing Israel's immigration and territorial problems and making its frontiers more natural, this proposal has much merit. However, the Arab States would resist to the last ditch and the US and UK would be in for a bad time in the Arab World if it supported such territorial acquisition by Israel.

4. A military protectorate over British tutelage to be established in Jordan. The severity of reaction in the Arab World to this would be tremendous.

CONCLUSIONS

Of all the alternatives mentioned above, number 1, that is the maintenance of the *status quo*, is the least risky. The US and UK do not have much to lose under this alternative, and from the standpoint of the UK strategic position the *status quo* may well be the best arrangement. It would also save us the trouble of trying to reconcile Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Israel. In any event, the US and UK should not take the initiative in advancing proposals to bring about a change in the status of Jordan since this would give credence to the "grand imperialist design" idea.

However, it seems inevitable that pressures will increase in Iraq, in Jordan and among the majority political party in Syria for unification of Iraq and Jordan, of Iraq, Syria and Jordan, or more remotely, of Syria and Jordan alone. When and if such a movement develops, it will be equivocal as to whether it has popular support in the countries concerned and whether it can jell in the face of opposition from other Arab States. The determining factor, which will likely move the train of events in one way or another, is the US and UK attitude.

The Western Powers may well harbor some legitimate fears as to the effect of the Arab union movement on their own interests and how the Israel-Arab situation would be affected. However, considering the problem in a deeper psychological sense, it is possible that the US and the UK would be "missing the boat" if they took a negative or indifferent attitude toward a genuine unification movement. The Arab nihilism of today, which is resulting in a gradual disintegration of the US and UK position in the Near East, is undoubtedly a product of defeatism and frustration. Any step, even a partial one, towards realization of deep-seated Arab aspirations may do more than any sums of money that could be poured into that part of the world to create that psychological something called "the will to resist" aggression from outside. The US and UK will win no gratitude for supporting an Arab union, and, as pointed out previously, they may well be confronted with some "muscle-flexing". Nevertheless, it is possible we have something real to gain in giving the northern Arab States a sense of having achieved something positive. The new life thereby breathed into the nihilistic Near Eastern atmosphere may for the time being diminish Arab preoccupation with anti-Western ideas.

Moreover, the possibility should not be overlooked that the Arab Union movement will gain impetus and come upon us notwithstanding and that instead of controlling events, events will control us. It would only be prudent to try to control the movement so that we would be in a position to salvage our vital interests as a price for our support. Later the movement may be completely in the hands of extremist elements and beyond our control. If we support a merger, we should, in view of the relatively greater stability offered, lean in the direction of unification with Iraq.

There should be several important conditions attached to our support for any merger of Jordan with another Arab State namely: (1) All international obligations of Jordan will be continued in good faith, particularly the UK Treaty and the Armistice Agreement with Israel (unless the parties to these treaties and agreements should deem it mutually desirable that they be renegotiated or superseded by some other mutually satisfactory arrangement).

(2) The unified state should give appropriate guarantees of non-aggressive intent and respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all other neighboring states. We should require that Iraq, if it is to be the predominate power, endeavor to mend its fences with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Some form of easement or territorial concession to Ibn-Saud in the Aqaba-Ma'an region may be a useful gambit in this.

A difficult problem would be posed in connection with relations with Israel and the status of Arab-Palestine which has not been recognized (even by the Arabs) as under Jordan sovereignty. Israel would oppose, possibly to the last ditch, its being taken over by Iraq. If a merger goes forward, it would take the utmost diplomatic pressure and probably invocation of the Tripartite Declaration to persuade Israel not to seize the territory by force. At the same time, we should make it clear that we would not recognize Iraq's or any other Arab State's claim to the territory unless the Iraqis are willing to negotiate a settlement with Israel or at the very least, abide by the terms of the Jordan–Israel Armistice Agreement.

785.00/7-3151 : Telegram

The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY AMMAN, July 31, 1951—noon.

51. In meeting with new PriMin Tawfiq Pasha Abul Uda July 31 held at his request he summarized gen govt policy and situation as fol:

1. *Assassination:* Not over 100 persons mostly associates of murderer now in custody of which some 15 may be brought to trial by special court to be established at once. 50 additional persons detained for investigation have been released. Only persons killed in mosque were King and murderer plus 6 members Royal Guard wounded. PriMin assured me accuracy his facts which shld effectively refute greatly exaggerated rumors and reports abroad about reign of terror in Pal and mass arrests.

2. *Econ situation:* Govt fears alignment Mufti org with Commies may capitalize on drought induced econ distress to create disorders which in turn wld be utilized by neighbors to intervene in Jordan. When new Parliament convenes Sept he will submit for its approval urgent econ relief program for which he will seek our aid. He asked me to notify Dept of forthcoming request but did not specify further. He was not impressed by my outline of pending legis for continuing refugee aid and MSP assistance which he welcomes for long range benefits but fears of no help in immed crisis.

3. *Israel relations:* Govt will enforce strict observance armistice agreement but will not continue Abdullah's policy of seeking bilateral settlement with Israel. It will join any collective step by other Arab state or wld follow Egypt's lead in peace move. I reminded him our continuing interest in and support of restoration normal relations between Israel and Arab states. He hoped I cld help reassure Israel of his pacific intentions.

4. *Greater Syria:* PriMin said govt will not perpetuate Abdullah's Greater Syria policy for which he expressed personal distaste. When I recalled tripartite declaration he assured me Jordan wld never play aggressive role. He dismissed any idea of union with Iraq in near future but hinted at close relations with certain neighbors (probably Iraq, possibly Syria as well) and eventual union of Arab states by peaceful means.

5. *Royal succession:* PriMin said constitutional procedures wld be followed; expressed loyalty to both Naif and Tallal and indicated guarded optimism re latter's health which already benefited by removal of tensions arising from conflict with late father. He hopes in next three weeks Tallal's mental condition may be clarified.

I was favorably impressed by serene and statesmanlike attitude of PriMin towards problems of future. He is determined to maintain Jordan sovereignty and independence but not afraid to break with personal policies of late King such as his . . . hostility to Arab League and Egypt in particular, and Greater Syria scheme.

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[1] Repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

He sought earliest possible mtg with me as he regards UK and US as foremost allies. His frank invitation to maintain close personal contacts and offer him advice on matters common interest augurs well for continuation of close assoc enjoyed with predecessor Samir Rifai.

If hostile or ambitious neighbors can be deterred from fishing in Jordan waters US and UK wld be justified in reasonable optimism that Jordan will continue friend of West and element of polit, mil stability in area. We shld begin thinking now however how we can contribute to bolster new regime which for long time to come will miss forceful if occasionally erratic, hands of Abdullah on reins of govt. I wld suggest utility policy level talks with UK either Washington or London to ascertain Brit views and future policy particularly re continued fin support Arab Legion, possibility major expenditure for expansion mil bases and bilateral econ aid.

DREW

785.00/8-551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, August 7, 1951—8 p. m.

49. Msg along fol lines shld be conveyed to King in reply his msg (Embtel 68, Aug 5) : [2]

USG grateful for HM's views on present situation in NE arising from tragic death of King Abdullah and as is well known to HM, shares his deep concern for maintenance tranquillity and stability in area. It is hoped by USG that people of Jordan will be permitted to work out whatever destiny they may choose in calm, deliberative atmosphere. The United States wld look with disfavor upon any change in status of the sovereign states of the NE brought about by force or external intervention. At the same time it is cardinal principle of American policy to respect right of peoples freely to choose their own form of government. HM may be sure that US will continue to follow developments in NE carefully and will not fail to give this matter careful consideration which it merits.

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Jones and Stabler (NE) and cleared by McGhee.

[2] Not printed. In it, King Saud expressed concern over reports that Iraq and Syria were acting to incorporate the territory of Transjordan. The King expressed the hope that the United States would help maintain the *status quo* in regard to Transjordan. (785.00/8-551)

785.00/8-851 : Airgram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

BAGHDAD, August 8, 1951.

A–144. In the course of a conversation this morning with Shakr al Wadi, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, the subject of union with Jordan arose and Shakr Pasha discussed it at some length. Although he was circumspect in his approach and guarded in language he conveyed two basic thoughts, both of which are of interest and importance.

The first was that the Iraqi Government and the people as a whole, including the extremist elements, were in favor of such a union; that with the removal of King Abdullah from the scene Jordan would tend to fall apart and that the only thing which was holding it together was the Arab Legion, an instrument of British policy; that as time went on the pressure against British influence and control would grow, possibly to such proportions as to result in disorder and chaos; that the time was approaching in Jordan and Iraq when the Arabs would have to take control and assume responsibility for their own affairs; and that this could best be accomplished by a union of the two countries, possibly under one King.

The second was that the Regent and the Government of Iraq were fully aware of the sources of hostility to such a union and in deference to those there was no intention to move rashly or quickly; that nothing would be done without the greatest care and consideration of all the factors involved; that the purpose of the Iraq Government was to create conditions of stability and not instability and that this would take time and careful planning. He said they were awaiting with interest the outcome of the elections in Jordan and the decisions taken by the Jordan Parliament at its meeting the end of August. He mentioned among those elements which were against a union the Palestinians resident in Jordan, who were by no means assimilated, and he gave it as his opinion that any unconsidered or hasty action by the Iraq Government would result in immediate seizure by Israel of the parts of Palestine now incorporated into Jordan.

Comment: I am inclined to accept Shakr Pasha's intimations that the Iraq Government and Regent do not intend to make any ill-considered precipitate moves in the direction of union. This reflects the views expressed by the Prime Minister and other members of the Government, although it is of course in the Arab nature to state what the listener wants to hear and some weight must be given to that consideration. I have, however, been impressed by the strength of the convictions entertained here that union with Jordan must be effected at some time or other and I believe that every effort will be made by the Hashemite House of Iraq to create and establish, as circumstances may permit, conditions precedent and favorable of such a union.

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[1] Copies sent to Amman, Basra, Beirut, Benghazi, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

The Department will not have overlooked the intimation expressed by Shakr Pasha that British control and influence is becoming unwelcome as time goes by, not only in Jordan but in Iraq.

EDWARD S. CROCKER

785.00/8-1051 : Telegram

The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET AMMAN, August 10, 1951—10 a. m.

53. It is time to call a halt to the intrigues of Jordan's neighbors over the disposal of her far from prostrate form.

In Amman the Iraqi Min is flagrantly continuing the campaign for union of Jordan and Iraq started by Nuri Said at the time of Abdullah's funeral. It is widely reported that Egypt Leg is agitating for independence of West Jordan (former Arab Pal) under mandate of the Arab League and the Saudi Arabian Leg for partition, northern Jordan going to Syria and southern part to Saudi. Reference to these intrigues is found in Damas tel 69 [2] to Dept Aug 6 and Jidda tel 68, Aug 5.[2]

While there is as yet no indication that Jordan will be willing pawn in these maneuvers they are having disturbing influence on internal polit sit and can hardly fail to comfort the ex-Mufti and his followers. Externally they are bound to disturb the precarious equilibrium which has prevailed in the NE since 1948. (For Israeli reactions see Depcirtel 81 July 26.)[2]

I hesitate to suggest that we, either alone or in concert with UK and Fr undertake *démarches* through our diplomatic reps for fear that anti-West forces in certain countries seize on such action to allege for intervention. I recall the adverse reaction in Syria to our approach to that govt when in March 1950 it was threatening to close the border with Jordan.

However, I do recommend that we consider the denunciation in Wash jointly with identical statements by UK and Fr in London and Paris of corollary to tripartite decision of May 25, 1950 to the gen effect that we oppose any alteration of *status quo* in NE unless people affected by proposed change of sovereignty are given opportunity freely to express their wishes respecting the change. I believe such statement wld clearly fall within the purview of tripartite decision. It wld probably be well recd Leb and remaining NE states cld hardly oppose it openly. It might lay to rest suspicions of Brit connivance at Iraq–Jordan union (Damas tel 42 July 23).[3] At least it wld encourage Jordan Govt to require diplo reps recd by it to conform to accepted usage and cease their scandalous intrigue.

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[1] Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

[2] Not printed.

Dept will appreciate that I have only touched on highlights of sit which susceptible of extensive elaboration. Other possible lines of action may occur to Dept such as statement in sense suggested not tied to tripartite dec; confining action to UK and US or alternatively oral representations to missions concerned in Wash and London. My personal preference wld be for course proposed in preceding para.

DREW

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[3] Not printed.

Editorial Note

On September 5, the Jordanian Cabinet decided that Crown Prince Talal of Jordan should be proclaimed King the following day upon his arrival in Jordan from Switzerland. On September 6, he took the oath to uphold the Constitution in the presence of both houses of Parliament.

785.00/9–2051 : Despatch

The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL   AMMAN, September 20, 1951.
No. 69

I have just returned from my first private audience with His Majesty King Talal I. I carefully refrained from discussing any official business with him having in mind the heavy load he has had to carry during the two weeks since his return from Switzerland. Aside from the physical and mental strain which he underwent in connection with his return and assumption of office, he has been obliged to receive countless deputations of Jordanians of all degrees, as well as official delegations from Iraq, Syria and Egypt, with delegations from Saudi-Arabia and Lebanon on the horizon.

While I never knew Talal intimately in the past, I found him seemingly completely normal and quite his old self. He is naturally a timid, soft-spoken and almost self-effacing person. In the course of our brief conversation this morning, he visibly opened up and became more expansive as we discussed trivial personal matters such as the forthcoming departure for England of Crown Prince Hussein to attend school at Harrow. In connection with some of the sensational reports published abroad regarding the anti-British sentiments of the young Crown Prince, it is not without interest that the King mentioned that Hussein was delighted to go to Harrow, where his cousin, King Feisal of Iraq is also a student.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo, Baghdad, London, Paris, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tripoli, and Benghazi.

If the King has retained any trace of abnormal mental condition, it was certainly not apparent to my untrained eye. Other visitors who have seen him have all gained the same impression. I have been reliably informed that people who have seen him together with Queen Zain and their children have found them a happily reunited and normal family displaying every indication of deep mutual affection.

Immediately after Talal returned an incident occurred which gave rise momentarily to fear that his mental recovery might not have been complete. The night of September 7, his brother, Prince Naif, appeared at the Italian Hospital to request asylum, alleging that Talal had threatened his life. This blew over in a day or so and apparently arose from some intrigue on the part of the two Turkish Princes, cousins of Prince Naif, who arrived in Amman shortly after Naif assumed the Regency. Evidently they persuaded Naif that Talal was gunning for him and that his life was in danger. It is quite understandable that Talal was not pleased with Naif when he learned that his younger brother was party to the plot to seize the throne as reported in Legtel 75 of Sept. 4, 2 p.m.[2] Reportedly he had refused to speak to Naif. Subsequently, however, Naif's wife, Princess Sultana, through Queen Zain, was able to effect a reconciliation between the brothers and they are known to have gone to the Mosque to pray together on September 12. In addition, King Talal has appointed Naif a Major-General in the Arab Legion.

The assumption of the throne by Talal and his apparent restoration to good health continue to be well received by the Jordan public. The King himself seems to be doing very well indeed. He has carried off his royal functions with all the aplomb and dignity which he inherited from his late father. He is reliably reported to want to withdraw as much as possible from intervention in the internal political affairs of the country and to rule as a constitutional Monarch. This would fit in with the constitutional changes proposed by the Prime Minister in his address to Parliament on September 18. (See Legation's Despatch No. 68 of Sept. 20, 1951).[2] Talal has also stated that he will not receive any journalists or newspapermen of any nationality. In view of the many false statements which have appeared about him in the foreign press, his attitude in that regard can be understood, even though it is quite possible that he will eventually recede from this stand.

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[2] Not printed.

The Department will doubtless have learned through the press of the issuance of a royal decree naming Hussein as Crown Prince and successor to the throne. While this act was not required under the constitution, it should have the result of clarifying the situation and making it more difficult for the royal succession to be placed in question in the event of Talal's death or incompetency.

On the international scene all is quiet. When the Prime Minister in his address to Parliament stated that neither he nor his colleagues were thinking of union with Iraq, in my opinion it closed the door to any further agitation as far as Jordan is concerned for union with Iraq or any other move to combine with or be divided among its neighbors.

To the gratified surprise of observers of the Jordan scene, the country now appears to have successfully survived the crisis caused by the assassination of King Abdullah and to have emerged into waters as calm as can be hoped for in this part of the world. There are only two clouds on the horizon; one is the severe economic crisis through which the country is passing and the other is the fear that irresponsible nationalist members of Parliament will agitate for abrogation of the treaty with Britain and ejection of British officers from the Arab Legion with the naturally serious political complications which would ensue. Other than those factors, there are reasonable grounds to hope that Jordan may carry on under Talal pretty much as in the past, remaining a friend of Great Britain and other western democracies and a useful area of resistance to Communist expansion in the Near East.

The British appear to think that all is quiet as Glubb Pasha is going off on leave for a month and Sir Alec Kirkbride plans to go fishing in Aqaba for several weeks.

GERALD A. DRE

Editorial Note

On October 17, in airgram A–105, Drew reported on his conversation of October 14 with King Talal. He said the King had receive from the four Chiefs of Mission an announcement of the proposal t establish a Middle East Command and assured him "emphaticall and spontaneously that Jordan's participation would be whol hearted." (785.11/10–1751) For documentation on the development plans for a Middle East Command, see pages 1 ff.

POINT FOUR GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN

[For text of Agreement signed at Amman February 27, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 2 UST (pt. 1) 812.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PURSUANT TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION

[For text of Agreement signed at Amman December 20, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 3 UST (pt. 2) 2551.]

KUWAIT

ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED STATES CONSULATE IN KUWAIT

NEA Files: Lot 57 D 177: "Kuwait, 1950"

Memorandum by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Administration and Foreign Service (Cameron) to the Acting Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1950.

Subject: Exequatur for United States Consul in Kuwait

Reference is made to your memorandum of December 13, 1950,[2] addressed to NE—Mr. G. Lewis Jones, which was referred to the Office of the Legal Adviser for an appraisal of the importance of the legal principle involved in the question of signature of the exequatur to be issued to an American Consul to be stationed in Kuwait. You state that the British Government insists that under its 1899 treaty with Kuwait the British King should sign such an exequatur, and that furthermore the British have formally rejected the United States' compromise suggestion that the exequatur might be signed by both the British King and the Sheikh of Kuwait.

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[1] This memorandum was attached to a memorandum from Cameron to Awalt, dated January 2, 1951, which read: "The attached memorandum was drafted before our telephone conversation of last week on this subject. It is sent to you herewith for your files and in confirmation of our conversation."

[2] The memorandum reported that the opening of an office in Kuwait had been the subject of discussion between the Department of State and the British for approximately three years. The British recognized the need for an American Consulate in Kuwait but had been reluctant to allow one because they feared similar demands from other countries, which might expose Kuwait to disturbing influences. The most troublesome matter, however, involved the issuance of an exequatur. The British Government insisted that since it was authorized by an 1899 agreement with Kuwait to control its foreign relations, the British King should sign the exequatur; and it had rejected the U.S. compromise solution that the exequatur be signed both by the British King and the Sultan of Kuwait. The Embassy in London reported that the Foreign Office was adamant, and if the United States wanted to open an office in Kuwait it would have to be on the basis of an exequatur signed by the King.

Awalt's December 13 memorandum concluded that the problem was purely legalistic and the U.S. decision would have to rest on whether the principle or the office was most important to us. Since the 150 U.S. nationals in Kuwait were expected to be joined by large additional numbers with the anticipated discovery of oil by Aminoil in the Neutral Zone, Awalt recommended opening a Consulate in Kuwait under the British terms. He suggested, however, that the matter first be referred to the Legal Adviser for an appraisal of the importance of the legal principle involved. (NEA Files: Lot 57 D 177: "Kuwait, 1950, Establishment of a Consulate")

Unless this Government were disposed to refuse to recognize that the British Government had any authority over the foreign relations of Kuwait, or unless the Sheikh of Kuwait was unwilling to receive our consul under such circumstances, it would appear that there are no legal objections to accepting the exequatur prepared in the form suggested by the British Government.

It is the practice of this Government and of many other Governments to issue to a foreign consul an exequatur signed by the head of the receiving government, as evidence of his recognition as consul. However, the exequatur is only evidence of recognition. Hackworth (IV: 666) states that recognition need not follow any prescribed form. It may be in the nature of a communication, written or oral, formal or informal, addressed by the foreign office to the local diplomatic representative of the consul's state or to the consul himself. Under the 1899 treaty between Great Britain and Kuwait, the Sheikh will not "receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government . . . without the consent of the British Government." If the British wish to signify their consent to the Sheikh's receiving our consul by issuing him an exequatur, signed by the King, and the Sheikh is satisfied to receive a foreign consul who has been issued such an exequatur, without insisting on co-signing the document, or issuing a formal document under his own signature, it would not appear that the United States was in a position to object.

It is true that in acquiescing in the exequatur issued by the British Government the United States will have recognized that the British do exercise a degree of control over the foreign relations of Kuwait. However, the United States is hardly in a position to insist further upon acceptance of its own interpretation of the 1899 treaty. The United States is not a party to that treaty, and the treaty does not affect any right of the United States. If the Sheikh is satisfied with the British interpretation, that would seem to end the matter. The acquiescence of the United States to this procedure does not, however, constitute recognition that the Sheikh possesses no sovereignty at all, as the Sheikh's action in receiving our consul, and perhaps issuing him a berat, may be considered as an exercise of his sovereignty. A determination of the measure of sovereignty he retains might well be allowed to wait until such time as the then existing circumstances require the United States to take some positive action on an important question.

Editorial Note

On March 12, 1951, Enoch S. Duncan was appointed American Consul in Kuwait. A Consular Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom was signed in Washington on June 6, 1951, and entered into force on September 7, 1952. For text, see 3 UST 3426 or TIAS 2495. Telegram 2 from Basra, July 6, reported that Duncan had arrived in Kuwait on June 27 to officially open the American Consulate.

736D.00/7-851 : Despatch

The Consul in Kuwait (Duncan) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL KUWAIT, July 8, 1951.

No. 2

Subject: Call on His Highness esh Sheikh Abdullah Salem es Sabah

In accordance with arrangements made by H. G. Jakins, Political Agent in Kuwait, I called on His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah Salem es Sabah at 8:00 a. m. on Sunday, July 1, 1951. At the request of Mr. Jakins, I arrived at the Agency at 7:50 and we proceeded to Dasman Palace in his automobile.

His Highness greeted us at the second floor stair landing just outside the room devoted to his morning maglis. He extended his hand and spoke a word of welcome in precise English. We then entered his chamber and were seated.

The interview lasted thirty minutes and was conducted with Mr. Jakins acting as interpreter. He speaks quite fluent Arabic but in general ignores the niceties of formula expression with which the speech of the Kuwaitis I have heard is very much concerned. I found Mr. Jakins' speech relatively easy to follow and his translations adequate although somewhat short. His Highness speaks in a low almost rumbling voice which I found in the initial interview difficult if not impossible to follow.

His Highness expressed the hope that I would find it possible to adjust myself to the heat and living conditions in Kuwait and enquired as to when my staff would arrive and where the consulate and residence would be established. I explained that I was engaged in looking at available buildings and that it had seemed better for me to come out alone to select accommodations and have the staff and furnishings follow in a month or so when there would be provision to receive them. I inquired if His Highness would care to make a suggestion about a suitable location, and he quoted in return an Arabic proverb to the effect that seeking would provide a suggestion.

His Highness then made a long statement to the effect that the American and the British people are friends, and that they are both his friends and that it would be this way in Kuwait; that all business and relations would be conducted in a spirit of cooperation. I thanked His Highness for the expression of this sentiment and assured him that it was in this spirit of friendly cooperation that the American government and people regarded Kuwait and the relationships that would arise from the establishment of a consulate in Kuwait.

His Highness then asked Mr. Jakins if he had any late news, and Mr. Jakins summarized briefly the status of plans for cease fire discussions in Korea and the developments in Abadan with regard to the so called anti-sabotage law.

His Highness apologized for being unable to offer coffee or other refreshment because of its being the month of Ramadhan. I replied that rather I must thank him for being kind enough to receive me. Mr. Jakins then asked if we might be excused. His Highness accompanied us to the door of the car where he said goodbye in English and shook hands holding my hand in the way of the Arab and applying a series of pressures, which act is difficult to interpret as to whether it means great pleasure at meeting, an effort to communicate more completely and express sincerity, or merely a reaction of custom.

During the drive back to the Agency, Mr. Jakins spoke of the contrast between the present Ruler and the previous one; he noted particularly that he felt the present ruler to be more understanding of problems and easier to deal with. He described the previous ruler as having an autocratic bearing with a stubborn element in his makeup.

The Ruler is certainly impressive in his quiet dignity, and although he appeared somewhat tired, probably as a result of the rigors of fasting, he managed to convey by his looks and smiles a feeling of sincere friendliness.

Enoch S. Duncan

LEBANON

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH LEBANON

887.00 TA/1-2651 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 26, 1951—6 p. m.

517. ReDeptel 501 Jan 24.[2] Dept continues believe early signature FCN Treaty and Point Four General Agreement wld be excellent practicable means strengthening US-Leb relations. Point Four Program for Leb can be implemented only after Leb signs General Agreement.

Suggest you discussing foregoing with Leb Govt.

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Harlan B. Clark, Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs.

[2] Not printed; it treated the subject of Communist aggression in Korea. (693.95/1-1851)

ISA/MDAP Files : Lot 52-26 : Policy NE Milit Aid : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BEIRUT, February 7, 1951—2 p. m.

432. Department pass Amman. General Robertson[2] told me he had informed Lebanon Government defense of ME is primarily British responsibility and had asked whether Lebanon would grant facilities in case of war. President[3] agreed to full cooperation in case of war but could not admit troops during peace time although he said he would accept first USSR movement into Iran or Turkey as state of war without waiting for formal action by governments or UN. General Robertson defined Lebanon role in preparing for war demanding it provide anti-aircraft defense of Beirut and perhaps Tripoli, communication facilities, and some coastal defense. He said if Lebanon would ask him for equipment to fill this role he would assist in obtaining it. He told me his conversations with President and PriMin[4] had

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[1] Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, and London.

[2] Sir Brian Robertson, Commander in Chief of British Forces in the Middle East, visited several countries of the area in February to discuss military defense matters.

[3] Bishara al-Khuri.

[4] Riad el-Solh.

been cordial and they both maintained that France should not participate in Lebanon defense plans. No written agreement had been made and Robertson did not ask for one.

PINKERTON

883A.14/6-1451 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, June 14, 1951—1 p. m.

758. Dept pass Cairo. Resignation of Rene Busson as Pres and DiGen of Banque de Syrie et du Liban announced June 10 by bank's board of directors in Paris, which also named Emile Oudot, senior director, as temporary successor (Busson has been in Paris for several weeks).

This news was bombshell since Busson was top exponent Fr influence this area. Up to now there have been no indications that Fr wld accede to any such move in direction of decreasing her own influence or that Leb auths wld dare bring pressure for such action. This wld not necessarily apply to action by Syrian auths.

Leg has been attempting to ascertain motivations, especially whether initiative came from Fr or from Syria-Leb. Authoritative sources are reticent, but best guess, based on background info and persons usually well informed, is that Busson's resignation was requested because bank's board in Paris (1) was displeased at his involvement in deals on side which netted him and friends large personal profits, and (2) that appointment his enemy, Philip Takla, as Leb FinMin June 7 presaged difficulties for bank. Leg desp 669 [2] gives further background.

Busson's removal makes it possible that hitherto dominant Fr influence in Leb financial affairs may decline, at least for next year or two until successor can get his roots down. Possibility exists that hitherto poorly organized Leb MinFin under Takla may be modernized and may pursue policy less restricted by influence of Fr controlled, semimonopolistic, unregulated bank.

Leg believes we cld take advantage this situation by offering Takla (1) Amer team of fiscal experts to modernize present muddled budgetary and accounting system of ministry of [apparent omission] (2) financial assistance under mutual security program when approved by Congress for implementing Point IV surveys already under way, or both. Before doing so, Leg requests Dept's reaction as to whether it desires to promote Amer interests in this manner and if so, to what extent we are prepared to take advantage of this turn of events. Since Leb wld doubtless be slow to request our aid, best means of approach, if Dept so authorizes, wld be to sound out Takla informally. During his recent term as FonMin he was quite friendly to US and, as Dept is aware, is protégé of Pres of Leb.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Damascus, and Cairo for Parker. Pinkerton, the former Minister in Lebanon, left the post on April 24.

[2] June 13, not printed.

BRUINS

883A.14/6-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 27, 1951—noon.

934. Dept appreciates suggestion urtel 758 Jun 14 [2] and agrees resignation Busson may presage decline Fr influence Leb financial and econ affairs. At same time Dept believes any suggestion US endeavoring replace Fr in Levant wld not only have most adverse effect on US-Fr relations (already ruffled re NE, particularly over Malta) [3] but might also raise questions in Leb and Syria re US motives. This connection we have clearly indicated to NE govts MSP will be carried out in close collaboration with Fr and UK.

We fully aware difficulties which local Fr reps both official and private have put in way Pt. IV projects in Levant. Leg's good work in overcoming obstacles Pt. IV raised by Fr commendable, but care must be exercised not overplay hand. Open rift between US and Fr or airing of complaints against Fr before Syrians or Lebs wld have unfortunate psychological effect on NE countries, outweighing any advantages to be derived Amer assistance Lebs or Syrians management financial affairs.

Moreover, we consider long Fr experience Leb and Syrian financial and econ problems shld not be lightly regarded despite anachronistic monetary and banking policies BSL. It is possible recent change BSL direction may indicate Fr themselves aware these imperfections and endeavoring correct them.

In essence we feel Fr entitled to whatever role in Levant commends itself to Syrian and Leb govts and basis US-Fr relations shld be complementary not competitive.

Altho FY 51 funds exhausted Dept wld be willing consider Leb request Amer Fiscal Experts FY52, provided funds appropriated. Request which wld be treated entirely on own merits shld have strong justification. Alternatively Leb since it is member IMF might well consider consultation with IMF with view obtaining needed financial advice and experts thru that org. Dept has no objection your discussing

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Damascus. Drafted by J. R. Barrow (NEA) and G. L. Jones (NE) and cleared by Godley (WE), Milne (MN), and the Technical Cooperation Administration.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For information on the Malta talks between British and American military officials on the Island of Malta in January and March 1951, see footnote 5, p. 28, and the letter designated Mil/3039/ME, March 13, p. 94. For documentation on French concern over exclusion from the Malta talks, see volume IV.

Leb financial problems with Takla or others but you shld be careful not give impression US seeking Leb request for fiscal experts or that US desires or expects replace Fr in financial affairs.

Foregoing has been discussed with Blandford who concurs in gen approach.

ACHESON

611.83A4/7–2151 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, July 21, 1951—10 a. m.

65. Dept pass Cairo. In private talk with Minister Charles Malik[2] July 20 I discussed tactics of negotiating treaty of friendship, commerce, navigation with Lebanon which he also wishes to see concluded. I suggested best timing might be to proceed right after signing of such treaty between US and Egypt. Malik said he thinks Leb will not necessarily follow Egypt in this. He looks forward to a series of indications that Leb will be less inclined to accept Egyptians cue in foreign relations. This interesting since he is nearing conclusion of lengthy conferences with Leb authorities including President.

I then said we might soon sign FCN treaty with Israel (Deptel 809 of May 22),[3] adding I had not mentioned this to FonMin or other Leb authorities in belief it might unnecessarily muddy the waters. I also pointed out to him general position as outlined in Dept cirgram Dec 28, 1950, 8:55 a. m.[4] that such treaties are not to be regarded as token or special political favor. Malik reacted strongly, saying he hoped I wld report to Dept his personal opinion that such act wld postpone conclusion of treaty between US and Leb or any other Arab state at least 2 years. He believes there is no point in formalizing our already excellent relations with Israel at expense of a further setback in our relations with Arab states. I then asked his opinion of how long it wld take to conclude Leb treaty in event State Dept postpones action on Israel. He said he cld not estimate.

Later same day I called on new FonMin[5] and after finishing several other pending items I asked him about chances of FCN. He said that after summer adjournment of Chamber Deputies in about 10 days he would be ready to discuss changes in wording desired by Dept and thought treaty could not be concluded before Chamber reassembles in

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[1] Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

[2] Lebanese Minister to the United States, on consultation in Lebanon.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Not printed. For documentation concerning the policy of the United States to modernize its treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 681 ff.

[5] Charles Helou succeeded to the post of Foreign Minister under the new government of Prime Minister Abdullah el-Yafi. The announcement was made on June 7, 1951.

October. He saw no objections in principle but repeated opinion he expressed June 9 that he would have to pick an appropriate time.

In my opinion, Malik, while understanding, friendly and helpful, not above indulging in exaggeration where Arab interests are involved. However it is hard to exaggerate intensity of Leb anti-Israel feelings which are number one deterrent to our aims here since we are labelled as number one Israel friend (see Leg despatch number 20, July 10).[3] It will be recalled that we signed Point Four agreement with Leb right after similar one with Israel. Pres told me at that time he wanted agreement word for word like that of Egypt and did not mention Israel angle. Lebs may slightly soften when we get to handing out economic and military grant aid if we are not too delicate to connect that with treaty matter. Leg suggests above be evaluated in connection with immediate advantages Dept expects will be gained from Israel treaty, and that Dept consider whether latter might be postponed to October–November, also taking into account highly touchy feelings in this area intensified by recent political assassinations.

BRUINS

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[3] Not found in Department of State files.

611.83A4/7–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 30, 1951—8 p. m.

108. Urtel 65 July 21[2] Dept believes possible administrative details may delay conclusion FCN Treaty with Israel about two or three weeks. However, Dept cannot postpone longer and wld prefer earliest possible sig if nothing gained by waiting. FCN with Egypt still long way from conclusion. FCN with Leb has been under consideration by Lebs for some four years but sig has been postponed by Lebs for variety of political reasons having no relation treaty itself. If FCN Treaty with Israel concluded first fault lies entirely with Leb.

When Malik discussed proposals for strengthening Leb-Amer relations with me in 1949 (memo of conv Mar 4, 1949)[3] we talked of FCN Treaty as logical first step toward bringing about closer US-Leb relations which Lebs at time seemed desire. Dept continues believe Treaty mutually advantageous means starting process toward closer US-Leb relations and logical complement Pt IV[4] and projected MSP. However, Dept has no intention belaboring this view. As one of Treaty's principal architects who thoroughly understands reasoning behind every provision, Malik in better position than anyone convince Leb Govt of Treaty's advantages. Because of friendship for Leb, Dept will not close door on Treaty question, but after this initiative must come from Lebs.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv. Drafted by Barrow (NE) and cleared by Burns (NE) and Setser (CP).

[2] *Supra.*

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, p. 789.

[4] Signed at Beirut May 29, 1951. See p. 1016.

Suggest you discuss foregoing with Malik and in your discretion with appropriate Leb auths and report reaction soonest.

ACHESON

611.83A4/8-951 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Bruins) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, August 9, 1951—2 p. m.

132. Dept pass Cairo. After talks with Charles Malik and FonMin July 20 (Legtel 65, July 21)[2] on FCN treaty negotiations, I decided in view of FonMins desire to postpone talks until Chamber of Deputies adjourns (now planned for Aug 21) and in view some press items to effect Legation is trying to force assistance upon Lebanese, that a period of letting Lebs authorities alone would be best tactics for present. Consequently I have made no appointments at FonOff since July 20 and when social opportunities offered have remarked to appropriate officials that door is open for discussions on aid and FCN any time but since all this is primarily for benefit of Lebs, we are not urging matter and further initiative is up to them.

Deptel 108, July 30[3] directing exactly same procedure as regards FCN was most timely. I conveyed message in it to Malik Aug 1, the very day before he had a long discussion with the Pres and entire cab covering various angles of Leb-US relations. No such conference had ever been held before. Malik's immediate reaction was one of seriousness and a desire to confer about it with high authorities. He said it put a big responsibility on him and he was very glad to have Dept's views before conference of Aug 2. Thereafter, he said he wanted to have another private talk with FonMin, and other officials before giving me full report.

Meanwhile on occasion US fleet visit Aug 6, I had long talk with PriMin (Legdesp 69, Aug 7)[4] mainly on Communist danger in which he concluded that with our help he wanted to make Leb a leader and a model among Arab states toward alignment with West without losing its own national characteristics. I said we certainly welcomed this statement and would be happy to have Leb be first Arab country to sign FCN treaty with US and did he think Leb wld have the courage to do it. He replied he personally wld favor it, but could not make further promises at present.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1005.

[3] *Supra*.

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

Aug 8 Malik said he could now convey definite reaction of his govt on FCN, namely that attitude toward US continues friendly and they agree in principle but regard present time politically most inopportune for concluding matter. He said postponement is not due to Soviet influences but almost entirely to situation in and among Arab states. Leb relations with Syria are in bad state not to mention chaos in Syrian Govt. Throne of Jordania swaying in air. Egypt is especially touchy due to canal situation and difficulties with British. In fact there could hardly be a worse moment politically for Leb to step out and sign treaty.

I reminded Malik of statement in Deptel 108 that signature has long been postponed for variety of reasons having no relation to treaty itself and thus Leb is merely continuing to recant as before. He said this is true but we could not expect Lebanon to deal with US independently of its relations with neighbors. He added there are no present impediments to continued smooth political and economic relations between US and Lebanon and as in past minor troubles can be dealt with through normal channels whether there is a treaty or not, also that US has similar relations with many European and other countries and has given them large amounts of aid without existence of comparable treaty relationship.

To my inquiry whether Lebanon is not reading more into this treaty than is really in it, since we regard it as logical first step toward closer relations rather than as fruition of friendship, Malik replied both Lebanon and neighbors wld regard treaty as political move having important implications in Arab world and that this govt simply will not take the step until general situation improves. They regard expected ratification this month of Point Four agreement by Chamber of Deputies as being as much of a forward step [as] they could take with US under existing circumstances.

For present Legation will continue tactics outlined in Deptel 108 unless otherwise instructed.

BRUINS

611.83A/8-3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1951.

Participants: Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon
Mr. George Hakim, Counselor, Legation of Lebanon
Mr. George C. McGhee, Asst. Secretary, NEA
Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Director, NE

Dr. Charles Malik returned very recently from a stay of approximately three months in the Lebanon and, as he told me in our first talk on August 28,[2] he brought back with him a wide range of instructions from the new Lebanese Government regarding U.S.-Lebanese relations. Those instructions cover the social, economic and defense fields. It was the latter category that Dr. Malik proposed that we discuss at lunch today.

Mr. Malik started off with the assertion that the most unkind thing the Western Powers could do for the Middle Eastern States is to be passive and neutral regarding developments there. He hoped that the Western Powers would reconcile their differences and henceforth pursue a more forthright policy in the area. He said that there was a difference between old fashioned imperialism and exploitation and firm but friendly guidance. The Near Eastern States clearly needed western tutelage. He admitted that a firmer line by the Western Powers would give rise to Soviet charges of imperialism and intervention. He believed, however, that "you cannot please everybody" and that the Western Powers should, in their own interest, as well as the interest of the Near East, be willing to give firm guidance when this is required. . . . He did not think that the Western Powers should be squeamish.

Mr. Malik, denying that he was in any sense a military man, advanced the thesis that the U.S.-UK-France must desire a defense structure in the general area of the Near East. The Lebanon and most of the NE States, with the exception of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, are Mediterranean countries. Consequently, he suggested that all of the states of the Mediterranean, "including Spain", should be bound into some form of Mediterranean Pact in which the U.S. and UK would participate. He thought that Egypt would be interested in such a pact. He knew that the Lebanon would be; he thought the Syrians would also be receptive and, by "special arrangement", Israel could be in such a pact. Mr. Malik said that there could be no objection to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, if they desired to do so, adhering to the Mediterranean Pact.

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[1] Copies sent to London, Paris, Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus. Drafted by G. L. Jones.

[2] Memorandum of conversation not found in Department of State files.

What did I think?

I replied that in our strategic thinking we looked first to the threat. The threat to the NE would take the form of a Soviet thrust from the north and east (via Iran, Iraq and Turkey). It was most unlikely that Lebanon would be threatened from the Mediterranean where Soviet activity would likely be confined to submarine action designed to cut the supply line. The defense of the Near East should take place in the mountains of Turkey and Iraq. It is for this reason that we conceived the Arab States and Israel as a strategic entity. Yugoslavia, Italy and Spain had almost nothing in common with Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia in defense matters.

I told Mr. Malik that he had undoubtedly seen press references to a Near East Command Structure. There was nothing firm I could tell him on this subject, but if such a command, supported by the U.S., UK, France, Turkey and Egypt came into being, would the Lebanon cooperate? Mr. Malik replied that he was sure that the Lebanon would cooperate in any scheme which (*a*) did not jeopardize Lebanon's membership in the Arab League, and (*b*) did not alter Lebanon's attachment to the Mediterranean. He said the Lebanon was full of ideas regarding defense. He had in his pocket lists of military matériel which the Lebanon proposed to seek from the United States. He looked forward to talking to me about these lists. He indicated that the Lebanon was resolved to stay in the camp of the West and that too much importance should not be attached to the minor "go-slow tactics" of the Lebanese Government with a view to displaying solidarity with the other Arab States. The decision had been made and the Lebanon would not go back on it.

Mr. Jones said that the area defense concept inevitably brought up the problem of Israel. In two wars the communication facilities of Israel and Haifa Harbor had been of the utmost importance. Israel, on geographic grounds, must be part of any area defense pattern. From the political point of view, Israel was solidly Western oriented.

Mr. Malik and Mr. Hakin did not take exception to this statement.

I told Mr. Malik that I was very glad to have his assurance regarding the firm will of Lebanon to defend itself. It came as no surprise to me because the President of the Lebanon, when I talked with him last Spring [3] had given me similar assurances. The key element it seemed to me was "will". The will to resist is the element upon which the United States and the Western Powers can build. Clear examples of this are Greece and Turkey. Their will came first and the aid followed. Unfortunately, neutralist talk in the Arab States was not helpful in attracting aid for them. Demonstrations of will, on the other hand, are likely to produce results; and Arab State should say to the U.S.: "these are our plans to strengthen ourselves militarily. We would like your help but whether or not you give it, we are determined to carry these plans through."

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[3] A record of this conversation has not been found in the Department of State files.

I said that it seemed to me that the Arab States who refuse to stand up and be counted on the side of the West are doing themselves and the world at large a disservice. I appreciated that there was nothing in Arab "neutralism" comparable to the "neutralism" of Nehru. Just the same, Congress, if it is to be sympathetic, must have some positive signs of Arab will to go upon.

Mr. Malik said that he thought the Arabs would give us signs—witness what he had just told me about the attitude of Lebanon—but that we should not be discouraged if they are somewhat slow. The West, on its side, has done very little for the Arabs for a long time. The problem of Israel and the refugees is still upon the scene. The United States and the other Western Powers must have patience in their dealings with the Arabs, realizing that their heart is in the right place.

The conversation was inconclusive. Mr. Malik, on his side, produced the idea of complete Lebanese goodwill toward the West. For my part, I hope I left him with the impression that the West is not indifferent to the defense problems of the Near East but, on the contrary, is giving the matter the most careful study.

611.83A/11–751 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Minor) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, November 7, 1951—5 p. m.

488. I took opportunity in convers with Pres last night to give summary my impressions Leb-Amer relations, speaking in French from extensive notes I had made earlier. I spoke along lines mytel 482, Nov 7,[1] beginning by statement my pleasure fine reception here,[2] evident goodwill which exists toward my country, and of high level of life and leadership in Lebanon. But, I added, in spite these favorable conditions I regretted to observe that attitude Leb Govt on many matters, which I enumerated and of which Dept is well aware, have been negative and uncooperative. This seemed to add up, I declared, to a rather unfriendly policy on part Leb Govt. Pres Khoury admitted there has been reserve on part Leb Govt but, as Abi Chahla had de-

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Harold B. Minor presented his credentials on October 18, 1951.

clared, this derives not from unfriendliness, but from atmosphere created by numerous conditions.

I said that it seems to me Lebanon and NE have arrived at important crossroad. A policy of neutrality or non-coop cld bring disaster, while one of coop with Western powers in MEC [3] and Point Four cld on contrary be salvation of NE. Pres agreed with this statement and said Leb leaders have every intention of following Western powers. Returning to question of Leb-Amer Relations I pointed out that long failure Leb Govt to ratify Point Four agreement or appropriate money did not show desire to have Point Four aid, nor did it reflect President's frequently stated strong desire to make Lebanon a shining example of development in NE. Time I said, is running out and fund wld have to be allocated where needed and wanted. I felt that my govt wld not desire to press any country to receive aid and therefore I doubted if it was prepared to take further action on Point Four until Lebanon showed more desire for aid and willingness to do its part. Pres replied that he is indeed keen on this aid but he gave usual excuses as to delay in ratification of agreement.

I referred to Pres's conv with Lenahan of MedReCo and indicated that in business field there seems to be great reserve as to investment of capital in Lebanon. Pres denied that Lebanon "has drunk of Iranian wine" and urged me to use influence with companies to be more considerate of Lebanon, which is small and short of dollar exchange, and not take legalistic and narrow attitude. I replied that I thought companies were genuinely concerned at drift of events and wld require assurances from Leb Govt.

Convers was carried out in frank and entirely friendly atmosphere. Pres is man of good will, but I am not sure he is able or willing to take advanced pro-American attitude at this time when feelings are running high. He stated, hopefully I thought, that whereas in Egypt and Iran govt has lost control to the mobs, this has not happened in Lebanon. Nothing in our convers altered my opinion that a policy of "friendly firmness" toward Lebanon is required at this time.

MINOR

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[3] For documentation on the Middle East Command, see pp. 1 ff.

Editorial Note

On November 9, 1951, McGhee and Kopper had a final talk with Malik before his departure from Washington for Paris as a member of the Lebanese Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. Most of the conversation reflected United States concern over abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement and rejection by Egypt of the Middle East Command proposals. For a summary of this portion of the conversation, see the extracts of the memorandum of conversation by Gnade, November 9, page 419.

The only reference in the memorandum to United States-Lebanese relations appeared in the following paragraph:

"Turning to United States-Lebanese relations, Mr. McGhee asked that Dr. Malik tell Foreign Minister Helou of his deep concern at the many difficulties which had recently arisen in Lebanese-United States common problems. He cited ten points on which there are outstanding differences—points of no enormous importance and which could be easily worked out for the common benefit. Such an uncooperative attitude, he felt, was unbecoming to two countries with such close connections, and he himself was sharply distressed that relations between the two countries were apparently so poor. He did not understand how this could be when President Khouri, Dr. Malik himself, and other Lebanese leaders were always so cordial in their conversations, and the Lebanese ties to this country were so close. Despite this cordiality and these ties, the Lebanese Government actions—and lack of action—contradicted the apparent good feeling. During Mr. McGhee's two and one-half years in office he had given earnest and sympathetic interest to Arab problems—refugees, Clapp mission,[1] MSP, TCA, MEC, and so on—but all the United States gets is rebuffs. Although the Arabs have many friends in the United States, Arab-American relations are set back by these constant rebuffs." (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Syria and Lebanon 1948—Memoranda")

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[1] For documentation on the Economic Survey Mission headed by Mr. Clapp, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 594 ff.

Conference Files : Lot 59 D 95 : "Paris Bipartite and Tripartite Talks"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer)

SECRET [PARIS,] November 19, 1951.

Participants: The Secretary
M. Charles Helou, Lebanese Foreign Secretary
M. Charles Malik, Lebanese Delegation
Mr. Joseph Palmer, United States Delegation[1]

At his request, the Lebanese Foreign Secretary saw the Secretary this afternoon. He began by saying that he wanted the United States to be assured that Lebanon's international position is fundamentally oriented towards the United States and the West. He was aware that lately there have been some points of friction between the US and Lebanon, but he wished to assure the Secretary that these were entirely unintentional, minor in nature, and that they would be removed in the future.

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[1] Palmer was an adviser on the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly at Paris.

The Foreign Minister went on to say that even prior to the publication of the MEC proposals, the Lebanese Government had made it clear that it does not want the Lebanon's strategic position oriented in any other direction than towards the West. While recognizing the importance of strategic considerations, however, he wished to emphasize that the Lebanon was able to render a more positive service to the West in the moral and cultural fields. He hoped that the West would recognize these contributions of the Lebanon and would place as much importance on them as on the strategic concept. He went on to say that he hoped that the United States looks with favor on stability in the Near East, including the Lebanon, and is prepared to exert its influence towards this end since it is only with U.S. support that the Lebanon can play its role morally, culturally, and strategically. In particular, the Lebanon would like to see a more pointed and specific assurance regarding the U.S. desire to see its independence continued; he hoped very much that we appreciated the importance of maintaining the *status quo* in the Near East. Any fundamental territorial changes would be detrimental to the Lebanon and to the Near East as a whole. It is a matter of utmost importance to the West that the *status quo* be preserved, since, to the extent that it is changed, the position of Lebanon will be correspondingly altered with a consequent lessening of its ability to play its role in interpreting the eastern world to the western world and vice versa.

The Secretary stated that he wished to make it clear that we do not regard Lebanon merely as a strategic point on the map. He understood completely what the Foreign Minister meant and wished to assure him that we appreciated and valued Lebanon's role as a cultural and moral force with a great past, present and future. We are extremely anxious to cooperate with the Lebanon. He knew that our two countries have had differences at times; sometimes this is our fault, and we have perhaps occasionally bungled in our approach to problems. But fundamentally our intentions are the best, and we are most anxious to maintain close, friendly and cooperative relations with the Lebanon. We will continue to do our best to work closely with it in all fields.

With respect to the question of Lebanon's independence, the Secretary said the United States believes that stability in the Near East can best be achieved by opposing alterations in the *status quo* by force. We have made this clear publicly, and we still stand by it. To permit the alteration of the *status quo* in the Near East by force would only produce friction and instability. We have therefore made it clear that in our view, changes in the *status quo* could only be established by the free will of the people concerned and not by force. We have had a recent experience in Korea with an attempt to amalgamate two politic entities by force, and, in these circumstances, the United Nations ha taken a firm stand, and the United States has borne the largest share o the burden. He did not want to go into too many details regarding the action the U.S. would take in a given situation involving a threat to Lebanese sovereignty. He had always made it a practice since he had become Secretary of State, to say "less" rather than "more", since he did not want any misunderstandings in the event that we were called upon to deliver. He felt safe in saying, however, that any attempt to suppress the Lebanon by force would be regarded by the United States as a very serious matter.

The Lebanese Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction at this statement and said that there were three points which he wished to add to his previous remarks. He merely wished to leave these points in the Secretary's mind and would not ask for any comment. (1) He was glad to hear what the Secretary had to say about amalgamations by force, but he also felt that it is necessary to make distinctions in the case of free amalgamations. Some free amalgamations might be freer than others and others might be *ipso facto* undesirable in themselves. (2) He wished to reiterate his point that the continued existence of the Lebanon constitutes an advantage to the West. (3) He wished to refer to the Lebanon's fear that the continued unrestricted flow of immigrants into Israel might create an explosive situation which would force Israel to burst its borders. In such an event, the Lebanon would be squarely in the path of Israeli expansion.

The Secretary said that he quite understood these points. He agreed that it was necessary to make a distinction in the case of free amalgamations, which, of course, must be looked at in the broader framework of international stability. He wished furthermore to make it clear that we attach great importance to the conception of the Lebanon as a bridge between the East and West, constituting part of both worlds and understanding both worlds.

The Secretary then said he would like to speak more specifically on the defense question. He reviewed the genesis of the MEC proposals, emphasizing that we never considered them to be a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian problem, but that we did envisage them as constituting an avenue which would lead to a solution of that problem. He expressed concern that Egypt seemed bent, as a point of national pride, on persuading the other Arab states to reject the proposals as it had done. He regarded this as contrary to Egypt's own interests. So long as the proposals remain open, they constitute a multilateral approach to the whole area defense problem through which Egypt could, in the course of time, possibly find a solution to its current problems with the U.K. But, if Egypt and the other Arab states closed the door, he foresaw no other possible way out for Egypt.

The Foreign Minister replied that insofar as lies within his country's power, it will always exert its influence in the direction of amity and concord. It would continue to concert and consult with its sister Arab states. The Lebanon has not yet committed itself regarding the MEC proposals but will do its utmost to promote their careful consideration.

Editorial Note

Telegram 562, November 30, from Beirut reported that the Point Four general agreement had been ratified in parliamentary debate on November 27 and that the Lebanese President and Prime Minister were reported to be pleased by the action. The Legation added that although stress had been placed on the fact that the agreement was purely economic, many deputies and other Lebanese felt that its passage marked the end of Lebanese neutrality in the East-West struggle and the beginning of cooperation with the West and the United States in particular. (883A.00 TA/11–3051)

AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LEBANON

[For text of Agreement concerning the Litani River Survey Project, effected by exchange of notes signed at Beirut February 15, 21, and 24, 1951, entered into force February 24, 1951, see 5 UST (pt. 1) 304.]

POINT FOUR GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LEBANON

[For text of Agreement signed at Beirut May 29, 1951, entered into force December 13, 1951, see 3 UST (pt. 2) 2843.]

SAUDI ARABIA

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA; CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS FOR UNITED STATES TENANCY AT THE DHAHRAN AIRFIELD AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA[1]

711.56386A/1–351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State[2]

SECRET PRIORITY DHAHRAN, January 3, 1951—8 p. m.

152. From Hare at Riyadh. Department pass General Kuter Commander MATS Andrews Field.[3] Returned Riyadh December 30 as planned[4] where joined by General Day same day and by General O'Keefe January 1.

At courtesy call on King following arrival he particularly stressed sovereignty problem in connection DAF agreement. He had be careful domestic reaction by uneducated and foreign reaction by certain Arab ill-wishers. He hoped we would be indulgent if Saudi negotiators dwelt on points bearing on this subject. Night session that day and three long sessions following day devoted detailed and searching discussion conditions under which military assistance would be accorded. Saudi negotiators were obviously displeased by strictures imposed by law and bore down hard in attempt have legal limitations attenuated or to obtain compensating advantages. Principal points covered were:

1. Costs: Exactly how were they determined? Were prices really advantageous? Could SA be assured no other country could purchase more favorably?

2. Military assistance agreement should run for specified period in order guarantee adequate equipment and training in future. Since

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[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1112 ff.

[2] Repeated to Jidda. This message was sent by the Ambassador in Riyadh to the Consul General in Dhahran and was transmitted to the Department of State through the facilities of the Consulate in Dhahran.

[3] This message was relayed to General Kuter at 8:30 p. m.

[4] For the December negotiating sessions for the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia, see telegram 400 from Jidda, December 24, 1950, and footnotes thereto in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1197. Enclosed with despatch 202, December 23, from Jidda, not printed, was a chronology of the meetings at Riyadh, December 14–23, and a tentatively agreed draft of the first few articles of the Agreement. (786A.5/12–2350) The Ambassador returned to Jidda on December 23, after agreeing that the Americans would go back to Riyadh on December 30 to continue drafting the treaty.

military assistance connected with DAF agreement the periods should be same, i.e., 25 years.[5]

3. Training should include not only use of equipment but articles of war in general. Desire was that SAG military establishment should be given real American imprint.

4. SAG desired commitment that arms specified in JCS recommendations would in fact be furnished.[6]

5. Guarantee was desired that all equipment would be new. This was point on which King very insistent.

6. Assurance was desired that US would equip and train balanced Saudi Air Force. This a point on which both Prince Mansour and King felt strongly and intended have regardless of difficulty or cost.

7. All expenses of training should be borne by US.

8. Specific assurances should be given re sending Saudi military students to US and they should be given special facilities, particularly re expenses.

9. Provision re non-transfer was objectionable but this point not pressed.

10. Prescribed methods of payment were found very onerous and certain clarification required.

11. Reservation by US of right to divert items or not complete services if found necessary in national interest was found very disturbing since it regarded as placing whole agreement in jeopardy.

On these and other less important points we endeavored explain or give counter argument as case might be but, soften blow as much as we could, it was obvious Saudis were distinctly unhappy when faced with bleak and uncompromising provisions of law.

Discussion terminated on understanding American group would prepare new draft note and seek advice from Washington on certain points (following despatch will cover this matter in full[7]).

New Years was a black day for the American group at Riyadh. Up to this time, although progress had been exasperatingly slow and tactics of Saudi negotiators had given new meaning to frustration, we had been forging gradually ahead and only needed complete redraft of remaining articles of DAF agreement in order complete this phase of negotiations on *ad referendum* basis. Then lightning struck from a clear sky.

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[5] Telegram 188 from Washington, November 29, 1950, not printed, authorized the Ambassador to begin negotiations with Saudi Arabia on cash reimbursable military assistance. Negotiations for military aid were to be carried on simultaneously with negotiations for the new Dhahran Airfield Agreement. (786A.5-MAP/11-2950)

[6] In 1949 the United States sent a survey group to Saudi Arabia to study that country's security requirements and ways in which the U.S. requirements at Dhahran Airfield could be correlated with Saudi Arabian military needs. Fo the "JUSSGSA Field Report With Final Recommendations for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy, and Air Force," also known as the O'Keefe Report, see *Foreign Rela tions*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1112. For information on the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of the O'Keefe Report, see the editorial note in *ibid.*, p. 1184.

[7] Despatch 220 from Jidda, January 13, not printed, requested Departmen of State instructions regarding the draft note on military assistance. It con tained three enclosures: a first draft of the revised note to the Saudi Arabia Government on cash reimbursable assistance, a Saudi Arabian redraft of th original U.S. note, and a later U.S. redraft of the original note which took in account the Saudi Arabian draft. (786A.5 MAP/1-1351)

At morning session I opened by saying authorized proceed on "mission concept" basis. Shaikh Yusuf then said he also had message to deliver from King. American and Saudi DAF drafts had been presented King and advisors. Strong opposition had developed on part of latter with result that His Majesty had completely changed position. He desired maintain friendly relations with US and could be counted on help in emergency but his sovereignty must remain untouched. Proposed draft goes beyond existing DAF agreement and Azores agreement (Yusuf had 1948 press release on this). King had established kingdom and sovereignty over it by own efforts and did not desire at his advanced age do anything adversely affect that sovereignty. His people were ignorant and he did not want give them reason turn against either himself or Americans. Fact US ready give SA procurement military assistance does not mean SA prepared conclude agreement re DAF. Question whether military given was for decision of US.

By way of further explanation Shaikh Yusuf explained only way negotiations could proceed was begin again from beginning and eliminate anything touching sovereignty in order make clear SAG had full authority over DAF. In other words, situation would be similar that Jidda airport and any American participation would be on civilian technician basis. It was time talk frankly. There was difference between war and peace time. American group had said it was unable discuss security SA from external attack; SA therefore unable discuss except in terms times of peace. Those opposing proposed drafts were saying US getting war time rights in peace time without treaty to cover situation. Twenty-five year period was main difficulty and SAG not impressed by arguments re necessity in order get appropriations from Congress; in fact SAG was completely without interest in further construction. Military jurisdiction was also important point of contention. Re storage, we could continue but guards must be Saudi. Desired avoid any US military appearance at DAF.

I expressed great surprise this reversal in position taken by HM himself and pointed out it was to meet exactly this situation that "mission concept" had been adopted and redrafting done. How was it possible in light of realities of situation to avoid military appearance? Similar situations re military installations existed elsewhere and had been met by arrangements like those provided in drafts. Why should SA feel its sovereignty prejudiced when others did not, et cetera?

Shaikh Yusuf said he wished take back report to King including various statements of mine. I said only message I would authorize was that we had had due regard throughout discussions for sovereignty question and for that reason had supported "mission concept" on understanding approved by HM. My government had now approved that concept in principle as basis discussions.

Saudi group suggested suspending sessions pending our call and said would arrange audience with HM if I wished.

American group then went into deliberate seclusion with result that next move was "courtesy visit" January 2 by Yusuf and Khalid. Their attitude showed marked improvement over day before. I asked three questions:

(1) Had report including my message been given HM and what was result?

(2) What would be situation of American military organization at Dhahran if present agreement ran out before agreement reached? This situation must be clarified in order report promptly to Washington.

(3) Was it still thought desirable I see HM?

Yusuf said report had been made King and my message helpful. Twenty-five year period was big stumbling block. He suggested two-year agreement renewable automatically for two years unless one of parties gave notice to contrary. Re existing situation he saw no reason why present arrangement should not be extended six months or year.[1] Ample time should be allowed to arrive at satisfactory arrangement. Re jurisdiction at DAF there were series circumstances under which question could arise and considerable study would be required. Khalid Bey then made plea for not attempting reduce too much to writing and said unwritten arrangements often more satisfactory here than written word.

Meeting ended with statement by Yusuf that he would arrange meeting with King but later in day he said unnecessary. He also said Kin had approved six-month extension existing agreement.

Re background this chain events we have gathered following fr various sources:

(1) Leaders of opposition have been Prince Abdullah and Rashi Ali and highly emotional letter of latter to King was immediate ca King's reversal.

(2) Critical articles of negotiations in Egyptian papers *Al-Ah* (December) and *Al-Misr* (December 29) have been taken very m to heart here. Both articles indicated leak somewhere.

(3) Prince Saud returned from twenty-five day hunting trip December 30 and at meeting of King and advisors January 2 took s against reversal of position by King.

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[1] In response to a query from Jidda, telegram 241 from Washington, Janu authorized Hare to request whatever extension of the Dhahran Air Field A ment would be most helpful to his task (711.56386A/1-551). In despatch 2 Jidda, January 29, Hare enclosed a copy of his note of January 12 reque an extension of the existing agreement for 6 months, until August 1, and a from the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office, dated January 29, granting his re (711.56386A/1-2951).

(4) Prince Feisal (now in Jidda) on contrary is said to be among those opposing agreement.

(5) Situation in Iraq re demand for cancellation of British treaty makes Saudis hesitant seem be entangling selves in similar difficulty.[9]

(6) Saudi thinking said to be influenced by news report that Iranian intransigeance resulted in Ambassador Grady going Washington and returning with $25 million additional aid.[10] If such tactics worked in Iran, why not Saudi Arabia?

Foregoing is progress report. Will reserve comment until situation clarifies further. Present situation (night January 2) is that Shaikh Yusuf drawing up new proposals for our consideration. Signed Hare.

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[9] For documentation, see pp. 545 ff. and *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 633 ff.

[10] Regarding a $25 million Export-Import Bank loan to Iran, see *ibid.*, pp. 445 ff. Documentation on Iran for the year 1951 is scheduled for publication *ibid.*, 1952–1954, volume x.

711.56386A/1–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State

SECRET JIDDA, January 12, 1951—4 p. m.

441. Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, FinMin, asked me call on him yesterday re DAF negotiations situation. Said when he was in Riyadh during first part of negotiations[1] he was told everything going well but he had recently heard difficulties encountered. Could I tell him what had happened?

I gave him résumé of developments in Riyadh which he frequently interrupted by interjections re short-sightedness of those who did not understand . . . desirability of US having military stake in SA and harmful advice being given King by foreign "boarders" at court who more interested promoting personal interests than those of SA. In particular FinMin poo-hooed idea of domestic reaction against agreement.

At conclusion of conversation FinMin said he felt so strongly on subject that considered imperative he go Riyadh to discuss personally with King in endeavor effect return more realistic approach. Said it should be frankly acknowledged that US military installation at DAF was in interest both countries and he felt should use his influence to counteract bad advice being given King. Specifically he asked to be given for his information copies of our proposal of YY's recent counterdraft[2] when translation completed, together with compromise draft of first articles of agreement worked out during earlier phase negotiations.

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[1] For information on the first part of the negotiations, see footnote 4, p. 1017.

[2] In telegram 155 from Dhahran, January 5, Hare informed the Department of State of a redraft of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement given him by Yusef Yassin. He reported that Yassin's "approach was to disregard practically everything that had been done and said during past three weeks and to dash off new draft articles on the spot." The Ambassador transmitted a translation of Yassin's draft as an enclosure to despatch 221 from Jidda, January 13. Despatch 224 from Jidda, January 31, contained Hare's comments on the Yassin draft. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56386A.

Despite unorthodox nature this suggestion, I did not feel advisable rebuff FinMin, particularly bearing in mind his personal power second only that of King and that lines of authority here mean relatively little. I accordingly told FinMin would be glad furnish documents in question on understanding that it was at his request and that he would make this clear to King so I would not be placed in position of having acted improperly. FinMin smiled indulgently and said to leave matter entirely to him. He would so arrange that his visit Riyadh would appear to be for other purposes and next thing I could expect to hear on matter would be message from King extending invitation to return Riyadh for further discussion.

I cannot estimate to what extent FinMin's professions of willingness help may only reflect enthusiasm of moment and well known antipathy for YY but, if he carries through as says he intends, his intervention may facilitate getting back to more practical approach. Translation of YY's redraft (Dhahran telegram 155, January 5) not yet completed but from what I have seen it appears unacceptable document for use as basis for negotiations and obvious next move would have to be insistence on getting back to fundamentals. If FinMin can turn trick on his own initiative, it may spare us necessity of forcing issue ourselves. Present situation is that translation of YY's redraft being completed for transmission first available pouch. Will also wire summary and comments.

Hare

711.56386A/1–1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

Jidda, January 16, 1951—noon.

452. Following telegram deals with status DAF negotiations and should be read as companion piece to immediately preceding telegram on military assistance (Embtel 451, January 16).[2]

1. Aside from difficulty caused by behind-scenes influences at Palace negotiations were plagued throughout by lack background Saudi negotiators and their failure do necessary preparatory work. . . .

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[1] Repeated to Dhahran.

[2] In this telegram, Hare reported that the Saudi Arabians wanted arms badly but felt they deserved grant aid rather than cash reimbursable assistance. When they realized grant aid was impossible they tried to obtain a number of additional benefits as compensation and, the Ambassador reported, "fact that Saudis regard military assistance as *quid pro quo* for DAF agreement gives them a real reason to endeavor drive hard bargain." His estimate of the situation was that the Saudi Arabians would come to terms in the end, particularly if the United States agreed to an expanded training program and the establishment of a small balanced air force. (786A.5/1–1651)

2. It was to get away from resultant coursing about in ever-widening circles that we insisted on Saudis putting ideas down in writing. Result was Yusuf Yassin's hastily thrown together draft which translated and forwarded Department.[3] Despite our request that Yusuf Yassin keep constant eye on our proposal during his drafting, paper which he produced is unacceptably one-sided and substantially along lines his presentation on January 3 including 2-year period, as reported in mytel 155 from Dhahran. Although this document completely unsatisfactory for negotiating purposes it at least has virtue of giving US something tangible to say "no" to and then try to get back on some more reasonable negotiating basis.

3. As to course of action we should now follow my thoughts run along much same lines as those expressed by Generals O'Keefe and Day in their telegram to General Kuter,[4] i. e., that some basic re-thinking must be stimulated in high places. I am not sure however that we will find it necessary to do stimulating job ourselves. I refer in this connection to talk with Abdullah Sulaiman as reported in Embtel 441, January 12.[5] Another new factor in situation is that Fuad Hamza has just arrived here en route to Riyadh and that Yusuf Yassin will be going to Cairo in next day or so to attend Arab League meetings so perhaps others may do our stimulation for us.

In any event, assuming that promised six months extension confirmed, we can now afford to allow stipulation here simmer for short time and use opportunity for review by Department of Documents submitted to it and preparation further instructions. If nothing then happens on this end of the line we can take initiative as normal procedural step since understanding when we left Riyadh was that we would submit our report and Yusuf Yassin's draft and request instructions.

4. In its consideration this matter it is suggested that Department and Defense give particular attention to period of agreement. This was point on which opposition seemed to have real substance even among those tending favor agreement in principle. Not only were Saudis not convinced by our arguments that 25-year period necessary for planning purposes and obtaining appropriations but they seemed genuinely fear long period commitment as tending put Saudi Arabia in position vis-à-vis US similar position of Egypt and Iraq vis-à-vis Britain.

At present Saudis are talking in terms of two years but believe they would go to five years without too much difficulty. If such a period could fit in with our military planning it would have advantage of being for same term as proposed military assistance program and would also relieve potential political measures which would almost certainly be generated by 25-year agreement regardless of spirit of friendship in which negotiated. It is difficult imagine "imperialism" of 5-year or even 10-year duration but somehow 25 years sounds different. Furthermore, world situation has changed so drastically since we originally began talking of 25-year period that review of this point now would seem reasonable.

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[3] See footnote 2, *supra*, for an account of the various drafts by Yassin and telegram 155 from Dhahran.

[4] Copy not found in Department of State files.

[5] *Supra*.

Wish emphasize that we have held line firmly on 25-year period and may still be able to get it but respectfully submit we should give serious consideration to 5 or 10-year period on renewable basis as concession which might not only facilitate negotiations but at same time meet our actual needs.

5. Another point which came up repeatedly in negotiations was terms under which we hold airfields elsewhere. Saudi representatives were particularly interested in obtaining copies other agreements and made frequent reference press release on Azores as being more liberal than our proposals to SAG. We stated unable say what information available on subject but would inquire. Could Department supply us with appropriate information and comments on this subject which would serve convince Saudis they are getting good deal? If this possible, our negotiating position will be strengthened and at same time pressure on Saudi negotiators by Palace critics would be considerably diminished.

Information would also be particularly helpful on provisions in other agreements on legal jurisdiction re military dependents and American civilian employees and claims by foreign nationals since this is point on which Saudis particularly difficult and have shown disposition go into complicating detail. Policing of installations is another point on which information for purposes of argument would be helpful.

6. Although it would be our intention avoid using Yusuf Yassin's draft as basis further negotiations we would also appreciate comments even of an informal character on points included therein, but not mentioned above, since same subjects can be expected come up again even in more objective discussion.

7. Although negotiations thus far have been exasperating because of atmosphere with which we have to deal and character of Saudi negotiators, I still feel there is reasonable prospect for agreement although we may have to resort to stronger tactics to jolt Saudis into recognition of facts of life. For moment, however, it would seem advisable allow short time to see if more favorable reaction may not

come about by itself due entry new figures on scene here.[6] I may get some indication how wind is blowing when I go Riyadh on 19th to present Admiral Carney.[7]

HARE

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[6] Telegram 258 from the Department, January 20, advised the Embassy that "text Azores agreement on file Emb in State *Bulletin* Mar 14 1948 and background statement *idem* June 27 1948. You might also draw attn 99 year aspect US bases Brit terrs." In addition, it concurred in the suggestion that the Embassy delay the resumption of negotiations for a short time. (711.56386A/1–1651)

[7] Telegram 469 from Jidda, January 23, *infra*, reported the Ambassador had presented Admiral Carney to the King on January 19.

711.56386A/1–2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State

SECRET JIDDA, January 23, 1951—6 p. m.

469. Part 1 of 2.[1] Wheel of fortune re DAF has spun again and stopped on new number.

Whereas originally had been idea FinMin go personally Riyadh discuss DAF with King, seems he took advantage passage Fuad Hamza through Jidda last week (he had been out of country some 8 months for health reasons) to take strong line re desirability reaching DAF agreement and turned over to Hamza basic documentation which we had furnished at his request (Embtel 441, January 12[2]). His intervention seems to have been effective because on occasion presentation Admiral Carney to King January 19[3] latter remarked Fuad and Khaliq Gargoni would be available for any discussions and they called on me for final audience that night to discuss situation.

Fuad was friendly and businesslike. He asked me review status negotiations and inquired if there had been "difficulties". Gave objective account of talks and said present situation was that full report including YY draft had been sent Washington for review. Re "difficulties" negotiations had not been such as result in actual impasse on any one point but trend had been unsatisfactory for 2 principal reasons: first was that YY had insisted on negotiating not on basis of our carefully prepared draft but of hastily improvised suggestions which were subject constant change with result we found ourselves going in circles rather than on road to agreement. Second was that, whereas we had been prepared to do anything reasonable to meet Saudi problem re sovereignty, Saudi negotiators had taken sufficient cognizance of fact DAF was primarily of interest to US as military installation. This fact had to be faced squarely as basis for productive negotiations.

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[1] Part 2 of this telegram, not printed, recommended that the negotiators be authorized to accept the proposal to use the existing agreement as a basis for negotiating and that the Department of State send specific instructions on proposals to differentiate between rights to be given in time of peace, emergency, and war (711.56386A/1–2351).

[2] *Ante*, p. 1021.

[3] See telegram 452, January 16, from Jidda, *supra*.

Fuad said was in entire agreement re necessity recognizing military character of DAF; in fact it was in interest of SAG that US should have military strength in SA. Re sovereignty SA apprehensions re unfavorable repercussions were very real, particularly re neighboring Arab states. In circumstances he expressed view we were in basic accord re substance and that agreement should be reached without undue difficulty.

Re procedure, approach which he would have suggested if he had been here at beginning negotiations would have been use existing agreement as basis and add, delete or modify as required. He felt strongly we should now proceed that manner.

He also recommended agreements should make specific stipulation re rights to be given in time of peace, emergency and war. In time war all SA would be available to US (Khalid Bey confirmed this as having been assured by King himself) but would be preferable avoid seeming become too deeply entrenched in time peace. It should also be made clear that rights given US would not be extended to forces of some other country (he mentioned Israel specifically in this connection).

I replied that, re procedure, our draft had in fact been based on existing agreement and felt should constitute good negotiating basis. Furthermore my instructions were prepared from that angle. However when Fuad (who of course had been Saudi negotiator in drafting existing agreement) insisted strongly on using existing document as basis I did not feel desirable become involved in wrangle and said would submit idea to my government. Furthermore, although I did not so admit to Fuad, there is a certain logic to his suggestion which is difficult refute.

Re distinguishing between peace, emergency and war I noted forseeable difficulty in making determination of state of emergency. This was type of situation which presented problem re definition and which also could present difficulties of political nature in varying situations. As matter of fact state of emergency actually existed at moment as indicated by President's proclamation. Fuad agreed such was in fact case and suggested that proclamation by President could be taken as factor in defining state of emergency.

Re rights in time war I observed difficult foresee developments with sufficient clarity to make specific provisions but possible some general reference in principle might be made paving way for extension additional rights in time war. Fuad indicated agreement. I felt advisable tread very carefully here since we could easily become involved in discussion leading to renewal of old demand for treaty of alliance or commitment of similar character.

Hare

611.86A/2–551

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State[1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, February 5, 1951.]

SAUDI ARABIA

A. OBJECTIVES

The United States desires to maintain close and friendly relations with the Government of Saudi Arabia. It is to our interest that a strong government control Saudi Arabia and toward this end we look with favor upon Ibn Saud's regime, hope for a peaceful succession by the Crown Prince when the time comes, and support the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. We favor the development of education and political consciousness among the people of Saudi Arabia and a greater feeling of social responsibility on the part of the ruling class. We want to see sound development of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia and on a competitive basis in so far as new concession areas are concerned. It is a major objective that Saudi Arabia's economic possibilities be developed to provide more services and diversify national income, since it is a primitive country which needs development in every kind of public enterprise to raise the standard of living, stabilize the economy, and promote trade and diversification of domestic industry. It is also our purpose to assure for ourselves and our friends and allies the strategic advantages of Saudi Arabia's geographical position, petroleum resources, and the continued general antipathy of the Saudi Arabs for communism.

B. POLICIES

While US policy has been the target of adverse criticism and bitterness in some countries of the Near East, Saudi Arabia has remained firm in its friendship for the United States. It has served as our spokesman and interpreter to less friendly Arab states, and has, through the prestige and conservative nature of its King, exerted a stabilizing influence on the Near East generally. In order that we might retain Saudi Arabia's friendship and support it is to our interest to: (*a*) continue our fight against Communist infiltration in the Near East and promote the stability of the area; (*b*) advance the security of Saudi Arabia by the sale of defense materials, training of Saudi

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[1] Department of State Policy (Information) Statements were concise documents summarizing the current United States policy toward, the relations of principal powers with, and the issues and trends in a particular country or region. The statements were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. They were generally prepared by *ad hoc* working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State and were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions abroad, under cover of formal instructions from the Secretary of State, for comment and criticism. The Policy Statements were periodically revised.

Arabian defense forces, and by assurances on appropriate occasions of American interest in Saudi Arabia's independence and territorial integrity; (*c*) demonstrate our support of and confidence in King Ibn Saud and Crown Prince Saud upon his succession; (*d*) assist in the orderly development of the economy and public welfare of Saudi Arabia; (*e*) give friendly counsel to all parties to a dispute involving Saudi Arabia and encourage prompt solution of the controversy; (*f*) observe the utmost respect for Saudi Arabia's sovereignty, sanctity of the Holy Places, and local customs; (*g*) encourage improved fiscal management and monetary stabilization; (*h*) assist sound American enterprise interested in engaging in desirable business or commercial development in the country; and (*i*) foster philanthropic, but non-religious, enterprise of public interest. In all our efforts to carry out our policies in Saudi Arabia we should take care to serve as guide or partner and avoid giving the impression of wishing to dominate the country.

1. *Political*

The Government of Saudi Arabia is essentially a personal one and our political relations with the country are perforce closely associated with only a few officials. These are King Ibn Saud, the Crown Prince, the Foreign Minister, Prince Feisal, the Defense Minister, Prince Mansour, and the Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, whose position is tantamount to Prime Minister. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, Fuad Bey Hamza, the King's Counselor, and Najib Salha, Deputy Assistant Finance Minister, are also important and influential officials of the Government. It is desirable to win and retain their friendship and support. A most effective way to do so is to bring many of them to the United States. The King should be invited to make a State visit to Washington. It is unlikely that His Majesty can accept because of his age, but the Crown Prince will undoubtedly be directed to come as his father's representative, as he did in 1947.[2] The Crown Prince is very eager to return. He was most favorably impressed by the United States during his previous visit and he has repeatedly expressed to Americans in Saudi Arabia a wish to come again.

Prince Feisal was very embittered by our stand and by the General Assembly action on Palestine in 1947. Although his attitude has improved he is still critical and cynical upon occasion. He has, however, expressed the wish several times during the past year to visit the United States in a non-UN capacity. We should capitalize on his incipient change of heart and urge his return. He is one of the most intelligent of the Princes and his influence is strong in Saudi Arabia, especially in the Hedjaz. His good will could be very useful in US-Saudi Arabian relations on both government and business levels.

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[2] For documentation on the Crown Prince's visit, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 1331–1333.

Prince Mansour has never been in the United States and, like many of his brothers, has expressed a desire to come. In his capacity as Minister of Defense it would be appropriate to arrange a visit as guest of the Secretary of Defense in connection with Saudi Arabian purchases of military equipment now possible under Public Law 621 recently enacted.[3] The influence of Fuad Bey Hamza on the King is very strong. He has been in the United States, but only as a member of the Crown Prince's entourage. If a visit could be arranged for him alone so that suitable attention could be given him, it might pay useful dividends. Likewise, an invitation to Sheikh Yusuf Yassin would flatter his ego and contribute to the cordiality of our relations with the Foreign Office.

Another essential element in cementing our friendship is to demonstrate convincingly the impartiality of our friendship toward Israel and Saudi Arabia. The King realizes the reasons for our friendship for Israel and that he cannot hope to change that situation. He does feel, however, that our interests in Saudi Arabia are greater than in Israel and that he, therefore, should expect at least equal treatment. Public statements by executive officials of the Government should avoid unfavorable references to Arab States, and the friendly sentiments so often expressed for Israel by such leaders should sometimes be matched by similar expressions about Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

It is also our policy whenever possible to meet requests of the Saudi Arabian Government. We recognize the inexperience of Saudi Arabia in dealing with complex problems and its inability to perform many services for itself owing to the paucity of trained technicians and its inefficient administration. We have accordingly rendered an impressive list of services including lend-lease aid, medical assistance, mapping, military training, agricultural development, water survey work, financial advice, and loans. We have also encouraged private American firms to render useful services to the Saudi Arabian Government.

Saudi Arabia, along with the other Arab states, was badly disillusioned with the United Nations because of the General Assembly action on Palestine. The United States should work towards re-creating Saudi Arabian respect for the United Nations and confidence in its fairness and high principles as well as to encourage its more active participation in United Nations affairs.

We have in principle favored Saudi Arabia's desire to secure its internal defense as a stabilizing factor in the Near East and as a protection to American interests in Saudi Arabia. It is in line with our desire to strengthen Saudi Arabia politically. It cannot be expected that the Saudis will be trained and equipped to a point that they could resist attack by a large power. They could be trained and equipped to deal with a limited outside attack taking the form of harassment, sabotage, and delaying tactics. A reasonable program for training and equipping Saudi Arabian forces, therefore, is in the interest of Saudi Arabia but also in our own strategic interest.

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[3] For information on Saudi Arabia and Public Law 621, concerning cash reimbursable military assistance, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1182.

Although the continuance of US maintenance and operation of the Dhahran airport is primarily a military and aviation matter, the obtaining of more than a temporary extension for US operation of that base is essentially a political problem. The original US-Saudi Arabian agreement covering the Dhahran Air Base expired on March 15, 1949 and has been the subject of several temporary extensions since that date.

Saudi Arabia has several boundary disputes with British protected states along the Persian Gulf.[4] The necessity of settling them has been stimulated by oil discoveries in the area and the possibility of additional reserves in the disputed areas. The United States is impartial toward the settlements of these conflicting claims but it considers itself a party at interest because of the interest of US firms in the area; it encourages progress in the solution of the problem in order to promote the peace and orderly development of the area; it supports direct contact between Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms with British advisory assistance as more conducive to an acceptable solution; and it would support any means to arrive at a solution and any settlement which is acceptable to both sides.

Early in 1948 the Saudi Arabian Government sought our advice on the question of its sub-soil rights in the Persian Gulf offshore areas and on May 28, 1949 it issued a decree claiming rights similar to those claimed by the United States in the Truman Proclamation of 1945. At the same time the Saudi Arabian Government issued a decree on territorial waters in the Persian Gulf which is contrary to our concept of international law on the subject. On December 22, 1949, we informed the Saudi Arabian Government that its definition of inland bays and waters and the six-nautical-mile concept of territorial coastal waters described in the decree were not in keeping with international practice and we wished to record our reservations on those points.

The United States has on many occasions given assurances to Saudi Arabia to allay the King's anxiety that the Hashemites, with or without British encouragement, might encroach upon his country. We have assured the King on numerous occasions that the political independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia are of serious concern to the United States and that in case of any threat we would support the Saudi Arabian Government in the United Nations. We have also made clear to Arab states that it will be contrary to US policy, the principles of United Nations, and the stability of the area for any state to take aggressive measures against another. Following the Chiefs of Missions Conference at Istanbul in November 1949 the United States induced the United Kingdom to give similar assurances on its own part. Again on May 25, 1950, following the Foreign Ministers' Meetings in London, a tripartite declaration was made to all governments of the Near East reiterating the interest of the United States, United Kingdom and France in preserving peace and stability in the area.[5] It should be our policy to continue giving such assurances to Saudi Arabia whenever the King's anxieties become aroused.

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[4] For documentation on boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf in special treaty relations with the United Kingdom, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. vi, pp. 91 ff.

Saudi Arabian law does not permit the establishment of Christian churches in the country, nor are services lawful. The spiritual needs of the large number of Christians living in the Dhahran area have been taken care of by assembly in private on Aramco premises and on the air base under the auspices of the Air Force chaplain. The regularity of such assembly attracted the attention of local Arabs who entered and witnessed the proceedings. Saudi Arabian officials asked that such services be discontinued and that the chaplain be recalled. The Embassy and the Foreign Office, however, never allowed the subject to become a matter of official record because it was recognized that our Government could not agree to depriving American citizens of their spiritual requirements, nor could the Saudi Arabian Government approve what the Haditha forbids. It was accordingly agreed that Christian services hereafter should be conducted in the strictest privacy behind locked doors and the chaplain recalled would be replaced.[6]

2. *Economic*

It is our policy to encourage the Saudi Arabian Government to take sound measures to build up the economy of the country, lending our assistance where appropriate, and to foster the creation in Saudi Arabia of conditions conducive to expanding multilateral world trade. We should also encourage eventual Saudi Arabian adherence to the GATT.

In seeking to exercise our influence in Saudi Arabia in support of world trade expansion, we must recognize the limited experience of Saudi Arabs with the western world. We are confronted with a lack of understanding by all but a few leaders of the whole pattern of western economic, political, legal, and cultural life, which is infinitely more complex than their own. They do not yet understand the desirability and mutual advantages of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the United States of the type which we are now proposing to more advanced countries. and which we hope ultimately to conclude with the Saudi Arabian Government. However, we believe it would be useful to explore with them the possibilities of enlarging the area of our economic and commercial relations which can be appropriately covered by treaty. Our Ambassador has accordingly been authorized to discuss with the Saudi Government an abridged draft of our standard Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.[7] This action had been deferred until the conclusion of a Point IV agreement which was signed on January 17, 1951.[8]

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[5] The Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East was published in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886. For documentation on the declaration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 122 ff.

[6] See despatch 155 from Jidda, April 3, and telegram 124 from Jidda to Dhahran, May 7, *ibid.*, pp. 1155 and 1173, respectively.

We should encourage Saudi Arabian participation in regional economic activities which are consistent with the provisions of the GATT, having in mind not only the possible economic advantages of Saudi Arabia's cooperation with other states of the Arab world, but also the desirability of accustoming the Saudi Arabs to a role in more developed types of economic activity which will lead them to fuller appreciation of interdependent world economic problems and the need for a cooperative approach to them.

The United States has strong commercial, political, and strategic interest in the progressive development of Saudi Arabian oil resources and the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's income at a high level.[9] These objectives were threatened by the closure of sterling markets to oil produced in Saudi Arabia. All of Saudi Arabia's known oil resources are under concession to American companies. Aside from political considerations, these American companies were able to obtain the concession in Saudi Arabia primarily because the Government was convinced that its income and other benefits would be greater under development by American than by British or other interests. If these American corporations are to maintain their concessions in Saudi Arabia it is essential that royalty payments and other benefits be not less than the Government might expect to receive under development by other interests and oil development and benefits must be maintained at least on a parity with neighboring countries and sheikhdoms where concessions are held by British chartered companies. The American firms marketing Aramco oil in the sterling and continental areas were supported by the United States in their negotiations with the British to overcome the disabilities forced on them. As a consequence, Cal-Tex, Ltd. reached an agreement with the British Government in accordance with which an increasing proportion of Cal-Tex sales to the sterling area would be paid for in sterling with the goal being to reach 65% payment in sterling by 1952. In as much as this agreement requires the company to reduce the dollar cost of its operation, it required, among other things, coordinate agreement by the Saudi Arabian Government to accept up to 25% of royalty payments in sterling. There still remains the problem of working out with the Saudi Arabian Government the rate at which it will accept sterling royalties. A short term agreement has also been concluded by Cal-Tex with the French for payment in francs of 25% of their purchases of Aramco crude. These arrangements and the international situation generally have made Aramco cutbacks in production unnecessary and forestalled a reduction in income which would have been difficult for the Saudi Arabian Government to accept.

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[7] Documentation on a possible Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Saudi Arabia is in Department of State file 611.86A4.

[8] Telegram 454 from Jidda, January 17, informed the Department of State that Saudi Arabia had signed a Point Four agreement (800.00 TA/1-1751).

[9] For information on U.S. interest in Saudi Arabian oil resources, see pp. 268 ff.

The influence of Aramco on the Saudi Arabian economy and on our political relations with that country is so great that Aramco's policies and actions must be carefully watched and, if need be, guided. It can do a great deal to preserve American prestige and interests in the area and to combat communism. For example, Aramco's labor policy toward its 14,500 Arab workers is not only of nation-wide importance in Saudi Arabia, but is a critical factor in the development of western orientation and democratic processes. The Department should, therefore, encourage Aramco to pursue progressive and enlightened policies in connection with wages, housing for Arab employees, training and education, and to shift responsibilities to Saudi Arabians as fully and rapidly as possible.

In as much as Saudi Arabia's oil wealth is an expendable resource and it possesses no other significant wealth, it is essential that the Saudi Arabian Government secure its future economy by utilizing as much of its oil revenue as possible to establish new and more lasting sources of income.

Recent experience in providing Saudi Arabia with financial counsel indicates that, whether because of lack of experience in complex financial matters, the influential position of members of the business community, or political considerations, the government is not yet ready to give mature consideration to intelligent long-term financial policies. Nevertheless, we should continue our efforts to counsel the Saudis in financial and monetary matters when appropriate opportunities are presented, although we must avoid putting ourselves in the position of assuming responsibility for monetary measures undertaken by the Saudi Government.

Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to introduce modern budgeting and accounting practices in respect of government revenues and expenditures and to develop a comprehensive and long-range program for modernizing and adapting the Saudi Arabian monetary system to meet the requirements of the Saudi economy. Such a program can be undertaken only under the direction of competent foreign advisers, and the Saudi Arabian Government should be induced to recruit and place their reliance on such advisers. It is our objective to provide advisers on monetary and fiscal matters under the Point IV program. It is likely, however, that Saudi Arabia will not recognize the need for this kind of action until it has tried other monetary schemes and found them unsuccessful. It is to be expected that patience, friendly and detached advice, and the immutable force of circumstances will bring the Saudi Arabian Government around slowly to orthodox financial practices. The financial aspects of our diplomatic activities in Saudi Arabia are at present, and will probably be for some time to come, as important as the political aspects. Meanwhile the Saudi Arabian Government is casting about for every means of keeping its Treasury full, short of the obvious one of putting its financial house in order. It continues to meet its financial problems on an *ad hoc* basis relying upon Aramco to see it through when other means fail. Aramco is currently being pressed to provide greater financial benefits to the Saudi Arabian Government.

The Saudi Arabian Government notified Aramco that it wished to revise certain conditions of their concession agreement for the purpose of obtaining higher revenues. It cited as reasons for revision the more generous terms of the Pacific Western Agreement, other concession arrangements in other countries, and the unexpectedly large oil resources in Aramco's concession area. Negotiations were begun in early December, 1950 which resulted in the signing of a new agreement on December 30, which has satisfied Saudi demands for a complete revision of the 1933 Aramco concession and should minimize chances of major friction during the immediate future. The agreement brings into the Near East for the first time the "Venezuelan principle" of a 50–50 division of net profits gained from oil operations and is expected to have far-reaching effect on other oil-producing countries in the Near East.

Aramco, in adopting the 50–50 principle, has assumed liability for payment of Saudi Arabian income taxes which for 1950 will bring total estimated company payments to approximately 33 cents. These payments may be made in any currencies accruing from oil sales and will now be based on International Monetary Fund exchange rates in place of the free market rate of gold on which the former agreement was based. Aramco officials hope that income taxes paid to the Saudi Arabian Government will be credited against company taxes in the US and that this financial increase to the Saudi treasury will settle all outstanding problems with the Saudi Government. Problems involving Aramco's Trans-Arabian Pipeline subsidiary still exist, however, and the implementation of the new agreement can be expected to give rise to some measure of controversy such as Saudi Arab inquiry into Aramco prices to parent companies. However, the new agreement, together with the anticipated high level of production and sales should guarantee good relations between the company and the Government.

The conclusion of the agreement has been a source of great concern to the British who recognize that these liberalized terms may lead to a demand for a new round of royalty increases throughout the area. Iraq, which has recently been granted an increased royalty of approximately 33 cents per barrel in the Iraq Petroleum Agreement of August 1950, is now likely to demand further concessions that may lead to increased tension in Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) relations with the Iraq Government. The Aramco settlement has also served to emphasize to the Iranian Government that its original demands for a "Venezuela-type" of profit-sharing formula for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) were not unrealistic and are now in line with the new trend in the Near East. Iranian officials have expressed hope that American generosity in Saudi Arabia will have a favorable effect on Iranian negotiations with the British company, which looks with disfavor, however, on the Aramco terms. After two years of parliamentary debate which has delayed a settlement of the AIOC problem to the detriment of company-government relations and the economic and political stability of Iran, the Iranian parliament has put the matter in the hands of a parliamentary oil commission which is expected to insist on financial terms comparable to the Aramco agreement, in addition to a number of other concessions. Meanwhile, the Gulf Oil Corporation is approaching the US State and Treasury Departments, the British Government, and AIOC, which shares the Kuwait concession with Gulf, with a view to reorganizing their corporate structure in Kuwait in order that the company may be put in a position to offer and to profit from an Aramco type of agreement.

Although the US Government can publicize and capitalize to some extent on the American aspects of the Aramco deal, which will bring Saudi Arabia higher revenue than that received by Iran and Iraq, we cannot at this time criticize AIOC and IPC as companies whose policies are less liberal than that of Aramco. Since Aramco hopes for US tax credit for most or all of the taxes paid to the Saudi Government, in the end the US Government rather than Aramco may be the source of increased payments to Saudi Arabia. However, Aramco's introduction of the partnership principle is believed to have been a dramatic and timely answer to the Communist line regarding Near East oil company "imperialism". We believe in general that there is hope that the 50-50 principle will, despite other concession contract negotiations, result in increased basic stability in the Near East. We consider the Venezuelan profit-sharing formula an almost inevitable development and one which represents as firm and defensible a basis as can be reached for the stabilization of concessions. We believe that Near East oil companies can at this time afford to pay increased benefits in return for their concessions in these uniquely rich oil reserves and thereby promote Western economic, political and strategic interests.

In an effort to increase its revenue from taxes, the Saudi Arabian Government hired the services of a private American income tax expert, Mr. John F. Greaney, to come to Saudi Arabia in August 1950 to study the tax system and recommend means of reorganizing it. An income tax has now been enacted in Saudi Arabia; it will be our purpose to see that its application is non-discriminatory with respect to American enterprise. Saudi Arabia should also be urged to collect and publish basic statistics relating to such matters as foreign trade, monetary circulation and prices.

The United States should try to influence the Saudi Arabian Government to use its own and borrowed capital on projects or programs which will increase its food production, improve transportation, and distribute more widely the benefits of improved public health and educational facilities. Loans to cover essential import requirements of consumer goods should not be encouraged, because current income of the Kingdom is large enough to cover such current expenditures even after a considerable portion of future royalties are obligated for development projects.

To further the objectives of economic development policy, the United States should assist in the accomplishment of desirable projects and programs by making available, on a cooperative basis, US technicians and demonstration materials and by sending Saudi Arab nationals abroad for technical training. A survey of the resources of Saudi Arabia and the drawing up of a broad plan for their development appear desirable. We should also encourage private US investment and commercial activity in Saudi Arabia, endeavoring especially to diversify US commercial interests so that the US is not identified exclusively with oil development.

US policy on economic development assistance to Saudi Arabia, as well as to other Middle East countries, is aimed at raising living standards in order to foster political and economic stability. This is especially important in Saudi Arabia since the increasing volume of oil being taken out of the country by American companies leads the people to expect that they will derive direct economic benefits. Sharing of such benefits should be more extensive in order to avoid future possibilities of unrest. We should continue to urge and assist Saudi Arabia to carry out the reforms necessary to permit the effective utilization and distribution of the government's income from oil royalties. This income constitutes the bulk of the national income of Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi Arabian Government should be encouraged to view it as available for the improvement of the economic life of the whole population and to develop an attitude of responsibility and trusteeship toward its utilization.

Saudi Arabia will have available from time to time, for the granting of concessions, areas released from the Aramco concession as well as certain areas offshore. In order to insure maximum development of Saudi Arabian oil resources, we should encourage acceleration of Aramco relinquishments of all areas which the company cannot reasonably plan to develop in the near future. We should continue to favor the granting of concessions covering such relinquished areas, on a competitive and non-discriminatory basis, to firms of the US and other nations friendly to the United States, independent of firms now holding concessions in the Middle East.

We support TWA in its management of the Saudi Arabian Airline so long as the relations of this company with Saudi Arabia remain in conformity with US aviation and political policy.

We desire to press the negotiation of a civil air agreement and to ease the present restrictive regulations against air traffic in connection with Israel. We also want to negotiate a long term Dhahran Air Base agreement to replace the short term arrangement now existing. We are agreeable to the continuation of American technical and managerial assistance to the Saudi Arabian Airlines. We wish to encourage Saudi Arabia to develop its aviation facilities and to establish an adequate civil aviation department, possibly with some advisory American personnel. We also want to advance a training program for Saudi Arabs in aeronautics.

A draft civil air agreement in simplified form was submitted to the Saudi Arabian Government for its consideration in February 1950. In view of Saudi Arabian delay in discussing the proposed draft, we have asked for an extension of one year to September 30, 1951, of the existing arrangement.[10]

It is our hope that an adequate inland transportation system can be developed by Saudi Arabia. It is not our policy to propose United States financial assistance for the development of railroads. US assistance should be made available to Saudi Arabia for road, highway, airport and harbor construction, and an Export-Import Bank loan of $15,000,000 was extended August 5, 1950 for those and similar developmental projects.

The general policy of (*a*) giving diplomatic assistance to US communications companies in establishing or maintaining communications circuits with foreign countries on a non-exclusive basis and (*b*) favoring the development and conduct within foreign countries of communication services controlled by their own nationals is especially apropos in the case of Saudi Arabia. There is now a direct radio telegraph circuit to New York from Jidda. In November 1949 the US Government persuaded the Saudi Arabian Government against renewing the monopoly agreement they had with the British owned Cable and Wireless Company, Ltd., on international telegraphic service.

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[10] Documentation on the negotiations between the United States and Saudi Arabia on a proposed civil air agreement is in Department of State file 611.86A94.

3. *Cultural*

The greatest handicap to Saudi Arabia's advancement is the lack of education among its population. We must encourage Saudi Arabia to broaden its educational system along non-parochial lines toward the end of providing a modern elementary education for all children of the country. More secondary schools should be established beyond the ten now reported. Scholarship encouragement should be given to those wishing to go to college abroad, in the Near East and in the United States. Vocational schools for boys and home economic centers for girls are needed. Above all, the ruling class should be persuaded to give their children western education through the college years in order to fit them for their later responsibilities.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

King Ibn Saud has had very close and friendly relations with the United Kingdom but as American influence has increased in Saudi Arabia, Britain's position has declined. Britain's relative inability to compete with American goods and services; limitations on the use of sterling; the imperialistic reputation of the United Kingdom; the Saudi Arabian fear of hostile encirclement owing to British treaty relations with Hashemite Iraq and Jordan and territorial disputes with neighboring British protected principalities; and the general decline of British power and prestige since the war, all have tended to relegate the United Kingdom to a secondary position in Saudi Arabian esteem.

The Saudi Arabian Government has shown strong preference for the United States in many ways. It granted us rights to the Dhahran Air Base. It rejected an alliance with the British in 1948 and sought a tripartite arrangement including this country, or a bilateral alliance with us alone. It has sought military assistance from the United States, and the King has on several occasions sought assurances for the security of Saudi Arabia in a way which indicated his distrust of the United Kingdom because of its special relationships with adjoining states and principalities. It has been difficult for some British official and business people to become reconciled to this changed situation, but the Foreign Office is pleased that United States interests are there to share British responsibilities in the area generally.

Because of the large number of pilgrims coming to Saudi Arabia from the East Indies, Saudi Arabia's relations with the Netherlands

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were formerly of some importance. In May 1950 the Netherlands turned over its Legation to the Government of Indonesia. Dutch interests are now largely confined to the Netherlands Trading Society, an old established banking institution in Jidda.

Turkish influence in Saudi Arabia, once predominant, is now confined to the Turkish Legation at Jidda, the sharing of certain social customs, and some family ties.

Saudi Arabian relations with other Arab Moslem states are mixed. Ibn Saud fears Iraq and Jordan which are ruled by the Hashemite family, former rulers of the Hedjaz. He suspects King Abdullah's plan for a "Greater Syria" as a threat to the territorial integrity of his own country. He is also suspicious of the cordial hospitality offered by Iraq and Jordan to the Rashidi princes who covet the northern Nejd. Saudi Arabia has a good working basis of friendship with Lebanon and in May 1950 Lebanon opened a new modern hospital in Jidda. Syria was on very friendly terms with Saudi Arabia but the political instability of its Government has disturbed the firmness of these relations. A loan agreement was concluded with Syria in January 1950 by which Saudi Arabia agreed to lend Syria $6,000,000 in three installments and to give technical assistance in the Latakia port development. Only the first installment of $2,000,000 was paid to Syria and it is unlikely that any more will be forthcoming. Saudi Arabia does not consider Syria sufficiently anti-Hashemite and there is influential opinion that Saudi Arabian security is better protected by the tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950 and by arms purchases. Ibn Saud's closest important contact in the Arab world is with Egypt. Ibn Saud has a paternal feeling toward King Farouk. They have exchanged official visits . . . . Ibn Saud has endeavored to exert a tempering influence on Farouk in Egypt's relations with the United States. Saudi Arabia has close relations with Pakistan, and its friendship with Afghanistan was notably advanced by the state visit of King Mohamed Zahir in March 1950. Ibn Saud expressed his hope to the King during his visit, and to the Government of Pakistan, that a peaceful, friendly, and satisfactory settlement could be reached in the boundary dispute between those two Moslem states. Relations with Iran are friendly but not cordial. Diplomatic relations broken off after the pilgrimage incident of 1943 have been re-established. Saudi Arabia's desire to be friendly was manifested in May 1950 when, contrary to local religious tenets, it allowed the body of Resa Shah Pahlevi to be brought to Medina for prayers by the tomb of the Prophet before being flown to Tehran for final interment.

Yemen leans heavily upon Saudi Arabia for guidance in important matters . . . . Relations with Kuwait and Bahrein are very close and friendly and members of their ruling families are welcome visitors to Saudi Arabia. . . .

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Ibn Saud is suspicious of all Jews and he hates Zionists and their doctrine. He is strongly opposed to Israel . . . . He does not contemplate establishing diplomatic or economic relations with Israel. He fears the Jewish state as a bridgehead into the Near East of Communistic ideas and influence. Out of religious conviction this hatred of Communism is deep and strong. He has kept Saudi Arabia free of its influence and he can be counted upon to oppose Russia and Communistic policy and doctrine. His prompt approval of United States' action in Korea and subsequent endorsement of the UN Security Council resolutions illustrate his attitude. Saudi Arabia maintains no diplomatic relations with Russia.

The King does not hold Italy in high esteem and he is in favor of independence for the former Italian colonies. Neither does he have a high regard for France who holds Moslem North Africa in dependent status.

Saudi Arabia is a luke-warm supporter of the Arab League and has been a moderating influence in it. Ibn Saud's distrust of Hashemite motives has made it difficult for Saudi Arabia to have full confidence in the Arab League. Intra-League rivalries have broken it into two opposing blocs, Egypt-Saudi Arabia and Iraq-Jordan, which constantly compete for the support of Lebanon and Syria. Saudi Arabia has joined the security pact within the Arab League from which Iraq and Jordan have remained aloof.

Saudi Arabia's attitude toward the United Nations is one of disillusionment since November 29, 1947 when the General Assembly voted on partition of Palestine. The Saudi Arabian Chief Delegate, Emir Feisal, was bitter in the extreme and he has remained cynical toward it. Saudi Arabia considers the United Nations the tool of the big powers where their interests are concerned. The King was quick to endorse action in Korea against the Communists, but his support is prompted by friendship for the US rather than by confidence in UN. Saudi Arabian confidence in UN can only be restored if UN takes as firm a position against Israeli violations of UN resolutions as it did in Korea.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

From about 1931, when American interests in Saudi Arabia first began to take active form, until near the close of 1947 our relations with Saudi Arabia were unusually good. As a result of our policy toward Palestine, Saudi Arabian friendship for the United States cooled considerably, particularly because Prince Feisal, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, took our policy as a personal rebuff. Even during this period, however, King Ibn Saud maintained a balanced viewpoint and constantly exerted a restraining influence upon Arab extremists. Now that the Palestine problem has entered a less acute phase, our relations with Saudi Arabia are improving. If we continue to take a firm position regarding the frontiers of Israel and the Arab refugees, if we stand firmly against Soviet expansion, if we give sympathetic study to all reasonable Saudi Arabian requests for assistance, and if we do not attempt to upset the basic religious pattern of life in Saudi Arabia by too rapid an introduction of western ways, our relations with Saudi Arabia will become increasingly cordial. To bring this about we should continue to help the Saudis to develop the petroleum and other resources of their country and to use the income to modernize Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has a long way to go to meet the social standards and responsibilities of other nations, but it is trying very hard to improve itself and it has done well, considering that its sustained efforts have been only a postwar development. It has also had the serious internal obstacle in the fanatical religious opposition to change and the growth of western influences. It behooves us, therefore, to applaud what Saudi Arabia has done and is doing, and not criticize it for what it has not yet been able to do.

We must prove our friendship for Saudi Arabia by exploring ways of assisting King Ibn Saud to strengthen his defense which will also be valuable in enabling the Crown Prince to hold the country together on the death of his father.

We enacted legislation in 1950 under which Saudi Arabia became eligible for arms purchases in the United States for defense purposes. We have also completed and approved a survey of what these purchases should be, although the problem of financing such purchases remains to be solved. Even with strict budgetary control it would be difficult to find the means to purchase the equipment recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to maintain the military establishment in Saudi Arabia that the program will require. We should, therefore, discourage Saudi Arabia from taking on a commitment it cannot meet. This would be in keeping with our policy toward many other countries and it would accord with the importance attached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the strategic and geographic position of Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis Russia.

It has become increasingly evident during the swift expansion of American political, economic, and strategic relations with Saudi Arabia that for our objectives to be adequately realized, both we and the Saudi Arabs must achieve genuine understanding of each other. To this end, it is our policy to give the greatest encouragement and aid to American public and private efforts which are being devoted to the leveling of linguistic and cultural barriers. It remains obvious, however, that the Saudi Arabs themselves have the greater obstacles to overcome, for they must reach an understanding of the whole pattern of Western economic, political, legal and cultural life, which is infinitely more complex than their own. Only when the Saudi Government officials with whom we deal are equipped intelligently to cope with such problems as modern finance and trade can our two countries work efficiently together.

There are two routes by which this understanding can be reached: (*a*) by encouraging Saudi Arabia to develop closer contact with the parts of the Arab world which are rapidly reaching such an understanding; and (*b*) by drawing them into closer relations with other friendly and enlightened peoples. The first route will afford the most immediate results, but it is toward the second, which is the more difficult but the sounder, that we must direct our strongest efforts. For the present, our attention is devoted to the strengthening of a nuclear group of Saudi Arabs who will be equipped to comprehend our system. Only when comprehension has thus become really strong and they themselves have been able to raise the general educational level of their people can there be hope for full, mutual understanding. Meanwhile, we should encourage and promote wherever possible the development in Saudi Arabia of modern media for public instruction, such as radios, press and films.

We can be more effective by encouraging a broader knowledge of Arabic among Americans in both official and private capacity, in Saudi Arabia. The study and use of a foreigner's language is a compliment which he never fails to appreciate, and it is always the most effective means of overcoming the obstacles to sympathy and understanding.

In summary it may be said that apart from complications created by the Palestine problem, our policy toward Saudi Arabia has been markedly successful. It has caused King Ibn Saud to say that outside of certain Arab states the United States is the closest friend of Saudi Arabia. And at the same time our policy through its encouragement of American private investment has helped the Saudi Arabians to modernize their country at an unprecedented rate.

786A.5/2-2350

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance (Burns)

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 6, 1951.

MY DEAR GENERAL BURNS: The negotiations between the United States and the Government of Saudi Arabia on Military Assistance and Dhahran Air Field were initiated by our Ambassador, Raymond A. Hare, on December 14, 1950.[1] Early in the conversations it developed that King Ibn Saud and Prince Mansour, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense, are determined to have a combat air force and training "regardless of difficulty or cost". They noted particularly the absence of fighter or bomber aircraft in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and expressed keen desire to have combat aircraft, especially fighters, included.

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[1] See telegram 400 from Jidda, December 24, 1950, in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1197.

Prior to the opening of negotiations, the Saudi Arabian Government entertained serious thoughts of obtaining these requirements from the United Kingdom. The latter was disposed to approve, in view of the strength of Saudi insistence, of the sale of a dozen or so obsolescent fighters. Following the initiation of our negotiations on military assistance, however, the Saudi Arabian Government indicated its preference for inclusion of combat planes in the United States program.

Ambassador Hare informed the Saudi Arabian Government that he would refer this question to Washington for consideration. It is recalled that Secretary of Defense Johnson stated in his letter of August 11, 1950,[2] transmitting the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to this Department, that the recommendations could be modified upward if expedient to do so. Approval by the Joints Chiefs of Staff of a small number of fighters might be expected to improve the possibility of reaching a satisfactory agreement on Dhahran Air Field. This Department has no objection on a policy basis to a small fighter force for legitimate defense purposes, and refers the matter accordingly to you for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Presumably approval of such a force would for some years be a matter of principle only since there are no Saudi pilots and their training would require some time.

Prince Mansour has also expressed his desire for inclusion in the Military Assistance Program of permanent base shop facilities for maintenance purposes in addition to the mobile shop facilities provided for in the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations.

A third request by His Royal Highness, which is referred to you without comment, is that the ammunition allowance be increased to provide a five-year reserve.

A final important factor for which the Saudi Arabian Government argues very strongly in the negotiations is the need for over-all military training, which is requested for a specified period of time. By over-all training the Saudi Arabs have made it clear that they want not only training in the use of new military equipment, but also complete reorganization of the Saudi Arabian defense forces with training in all phases of military activity. The Saudis stress training as a principal stipulation in discussing the terms of an agreement on military assistance, and they closely associate the period during which training should be given with the life of the proposed Dhahran Air

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[2] Not printed, but see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1134.

Field Agreement. It would, therefore, be very helpful to Ambassador Hare in his conduct of the negotiations, if not essential to his success, if a commitment could be made regarding both the extent and duration of military training that might be offered.

It would be appreciated if you would request early consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the above points raised by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense.[3]

Sincerely yours, H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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[3] The Secretary of Defense replied on April 4; see p. 1049.

786A.5 MAP/2–951

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt), to the Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1951.

Mr. Mitchell has recently replaced Mr. George A. Brownell as Special Adviser to the Secretary of the Air Force. He asked me to call on him yesterday at his office in order to brief him on the general background of the negotiations in Saudi Arabia. We discussed the events leading up to the opening of negotiations in Riyadh on December 14. Mr. Mitchell said that he had read through the material recently submitted by Ambassador Hare and that there were some questions which had arisen about which he would like to ask. In the first place he said that some of the modifications in the JCS recommendations which the SAG negotiators had asked for would be difficult to obtain from JCS. He made a particular reference in this connection to the combat air force and the base maintenance shop. In respect to the combat planes I remarked that I hoped that JCS could give approval because it would for many years be merely a matter of principle. I pointed out that the SAG had no pilots and would have to start from scratch in training of flying personnel which would require at least three and possibly five years before we would be called upon to sell any of the planes required. Mr. Mitchell asked if the State Department attached great importance to approval of the combat air force and I replied that that would depend entirely upon the importance the Department of Defense attached to the Dhahran Air Field. I recalled that the Ambassador had stressed that this was one of the matters about which there was unanimity of opinion in the Saudi Arabian Government and that recent efforts to obtain fighter planes and training through British channels were indicative of the seriousness with which the SAG viewed it. Mr. Mitchell then told me that getting an agreement for Dhahran Air Field was a matter of very great importance and had a very significant place in our strategic planning. He also added that defense plans for Dhahran were of a rather urgent nature which called for the completion of certain construction projects by July or August of this year. I told Mr. Mitchell that I was very glad to have this information because the last statement of policy on it by JCS was nearly three years old. I also added that this made it all the more important that JCS should not give a refusal to the Saudi Arabian request. In a subsequent conversation with Col. Malcolm on this subject he asked whether this opinion should also be applied to furnishing bombers and he pointed out that in one of the Jidda Embassy despatches mention was made that Emir Mansour wished bomber, training and reconnaissance planes. I told him that I believed the terms of the act under which Saudi Arabia became eligible for military assistance automatically precluded us from providing weapons of offense such as bombers. Col. Malcolm agreed and added that it would also be unnecessary to provide reconnaissance planes because their function could be just as well performed for their purposes by fighter planes and have the additional advantage of being considerably more economical.

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[1] A handwritten note in the margin read: "This is a very interesting and significant paper. BYB [Burton Y. Berry] should know. Am holding copy for GLJ [G. Lewis Jones]. SKCK [Samuel K. C. Kopper]." Berry apparently saw the memorandum, since lines are drawn through his initials in the upper corner of the page.

The SAG request for overall training is also a matter which might offer some difficulty, Mr. Mitchell said. I agreed that it was a knotty problem and one which we had tried to pin down more closely last fall prior to Ambassador Hare's departure. We had endeavored at that time to obtain information regarding the phasing of training operations over a period of years which would be coordinated with the acquisition of military equipment. We were unable to get a statement other than that training would be offered. Now that the SAG request for training had passed beyond training in the use of the new equipment only, I said that I felt it was more important than ever that JCS indicate with some precision just what we could do over a given period of time.

In view of SAG reluctance to enter an agreement for twenty-five years, Mr. Mitchell said that USAF was considering what period would be the shortest beyond which we would not be interested. He said that general opinion now was in favor of a ten-year period but that was not necessarily definitive. Any further reduction, however, would probably have to be referred for a decision to the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. Mitchell said that he thought it would be difficult to provide a base maintenance shop because that could be a very elaborate and expensive establishment which might be generally unsuited for Saudi Arabian needs. He said that he believed JCS would go along with supplying mobile equipment through the third echelon and that an arrangement might be suggested whereby the major overhaul of engines and other equipment could be done outside the country while substitute parts would be supplied on loan. I told him that I thought the economy of an arrangement of that kind should appeal to the SAG but I stressed the importance of having some base shop of a non-mobile character which could be as modest as JCS might care to recommend. That would enable us to approve the SAG request and still meet the requirements of practicality.

Mr. Mitchell referred again to the importance that Dhahran had in defense thinking and stated that the Carney letter to Admiral Sherman had received the urgent attention of the Joint Chiefs who were in the process of considering a position paper [2] on the importance of DAF. I asked Mr. Mitchell if the importance now attached to DAF would continue if and when other base right arrangements were agreed to in Aden as a part of the NATO plans. He assured me that it would.

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[2] No copy of such a paper has been found in Department of State files.

786A.5/3-351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET JIDDA, March 3, 1951—1 p. m.

547. While awaiting instructions to permit renewed DAF and military assistance negotiations following thoughts submitted for consideration Department:

1. In discussion DAF agreement with Secretary Finletter at Istanbul,[2] he indicated he was not particularly concerned re prospect of shortened period [3] but said he attached great importance to immediate and free use of DAF in event outbreak hostilities. I assume this latter idea has been considered in preparation new instructions . . . . An analogy between this situation and that in Turkey is apparent.[4]

2. I trust Department and Defense appreciate importance Saudis, and particularly Minister Defense Prince Mansour, attach to question of combat aircraft. Although in my discussions with them Saudis

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[1] Repeated to Dhahran.

[2] For documentation on the Istanbul Conference of February 14–21, 1951, see pp. 50 ff.

[3] The original draft of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, transmitted to Jidda as an enclosure to Instruction 19, November 17, 1950, proposed a 25-year agreement. Telegram 155 from Dhahran, January 5, reported that Yassin's draft proposed a 2-year period, with automatic renewal. Instruction No. 33 to Jidda, March 1, informed Hare there was "no inflexible attachment on our part to the 25-year period," and the Department of the Air Force would approve a retreat from 25 years to 10 years. It instructed the Ambassador, however, not to consider a period of less than 10 years without specific reference to Washington. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56386A.

[4] See pp. 1100 ff.

appeared fairly interested in army and naval equipment included in JCS program, it was clear that what really brought a glint to their eye was idea of Saudi Air Force. In situation where Saudis are strongly dissatisfied with cash reimbursable feature of proposed assistance, is it too much to hope that we cannot at least meet them part way in allowing them to purchase something they really want? I appreciate all the arguments re availability, Saudi incapacity in aviation, etc., but this is a case where cold logic on our side may be expected to meet correspondingly frigid reception by Saudis. It is submitted that this is a case where a gesture in deference to Saudis desires might pay important dividends. For instance, we might even wish to defer idea of naval program in favor of very modest air program.

3. In view of extent of re-thinking required in connection reconsideration DAF or military assistance matters by Department it would be immensely helpful if either Department or Defense could send out someone who has been following these matters closely and could act as consultant in renewal negotiations. During original negotiations I had advantage of having been in Washington shortly before and was consequently familiar with background but in meantime much water has flowed over dam and assistance of a qualified consultant would be invaluable.[5]

Hare

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[5] Telegram 310, March 13, from Washington, advised Hare that when negotiations resumed, "Dept will be prepared to assign Thayer, NE, for short temporary detail, and Def also considering sending officer acquainted JCS views, if you concur." In telegram 559 from Jidda, on March 14, Hare replied that he would be glad to have Thayer assist, "on understanding he will be fully briefed re military desiderata . . . also heartily welcome defense officer acquainted with JCS views." The Department of State replied, in telegram 332, on March 26, that only a group of consultants could meet the requirements Hare listed in telegram 559. For that reason the Department of Defense considered it more expedient to recall General Day to Washington for a quick full briefing with a group of specialists. Hare concurred, in telegram 576, March 27, from Jidda. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56386A.

711.56386A/3-2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt)

CONFIDENTIAL

[Washington,] March 28, 1951.

Subject: Discussion with Mr. William Mitchell about DAF Negotiations.

Participants: Mr. Mitchell—Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force
Mr. Jones—NE
Mr. Awalt—NE

Problem: To afford an opportunity for Mr. Jones to inform Mr. Mitchell of his reactions to Saudi Arabian affairs in general and DAF in particular during his recent visits to Jidda and Dhahran.

Action Required: To prompt a greater sense of urgency in Defense to do whatever is necessary for completing the DAF negotiations.

Action Assigned to: NE

Summary:

Mr. Jones said that he was very glad to have had the opportunity recently of making a trip to Saudi Arabia where he was able to receive Ambassador Hare's first-hand observations about the negotiations this far, as well as to visit Dhahran to see what we actually had at the airfield. At Dhahran he also had the opportunity of meeting General Day of whom he carried away an extremely high opinion.

Mr. Jones said that he thought it was important to know at the outset what importance Defense attached to Dhahran, because in the first place Ambassador Hare and General Day were not sure of current thinking in Washington in this regard, and because time was running out on us . . . . Mr. Mitchell stated that the importance of Dhahran was increasing in USAF estimation every day. He added that even with Dhahran we do not have enough bases in the area for our purposes and that the plans for improvement and utilization of Dhahran were so essential that USAF was giving some thought to increasing the ante by some sort of a lump sum payment if necessary. . . . Mr. Jones suggested that a more practical approach might be to give some equipment rather than cash. Since the SAG attaches so much importance to a combat air force, he thought the gift of a few T–6 trainers, fitted out as showily as possible, might make a useful impression . . . . He emphasized the importance of speed, however, by pointing out that to give quickly is to give twice. Mr. Mitchell thought the suggestion an interesting one which might bear looking into. Mr. Jones also mentioned how distasteful to the SAG were the cash-in-advance aspects of reimbursable aid, which is reasonable to demand only of "crook nations", and the waiver of obligation we insist on which allows us to divert material in the national interest. Mr. Mitchell said that USAF realized how objectionable these qualifications were and that their legal office was in the course of investigating means of avoiding these two factors in the MDAP agreement if at all possible. He also stated that the JCS had taken a favorable position toward the SAG requests for an air combat force, ammunition stocks, base workshop, and a training program at both the staff level and in utilization of the equipment. He said some final work was being done on these recommendations which would be completed very shortly.

Mr. Jones again emphasized the need for concluding the negotiations as quickly as possible because of the consistently decreasing effectiveness of the King and because the longer negotiations were protracted the more demanding the SAG was likely to become. He added that it was important to conclude this agreement with Ibn Saud because he alone in Saudi Arabia had the strength of purpose and prestige to commit his country to an agreement of this kind which would undoubtedly brook great opposition for nationalistic reasons if attempted by his successor. He also said that we have no reason to doubt that Crown Prince Saud would not be equally desirous of making an agreement with the US of this kind if he were King, but that he lacks the influence over the people of Arabia that his father enjoys and would not therefore be in a position to make such a commitment.

Mr. Mitchell asked whether it would be advisable to have Ambassador Hare return with General Day. Mr. Jones said that we had given serious consideration to having the Ambassador return when Defense suggested that General Day be brought back. It was feared, however, that if the Ambassador returned it would tend to indicate to the SAG that we were attaching much more importance to the DAF than they had previously realized so that the ante for DAF would, therefore, be automatically jacked up. Mr. Jones added that we were in receipt of a reply from Ambassador Hare concurring in General Day's recall and he said that if the Ambassador had thought it advisable for him to return also, he would have been sure to have suggested it in his reply.[1]

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[1] See footnote 5, *supra.*

786A.5/4-451

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 4, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to your letter of 6 February,[1] regarding the desire of the Government of Saudi Arabia to have a combat air force. The questions of permanent base shop facilities in Saudi Arabia, an ammunition allowance to provide a five-year reserve, and the need for over-all military training were also associated with the issue of a Saudi Arabian combat air force.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the points raised by the Deputy Under Secretary of State, are as follows:

a. There is no objection to a small fighter force for legitimate defense purposes. The determination of actual types and quantities of aircraft and other material should be accomplished by a small United States joint military group which will visit Saudi Arabia to make detailed arrangements in implementation of the over-all agreement.

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[1] *Ante,* p. 1042.

b. Approval should be given for inclusion in the Military Assistanc
Program of permanent base shop facilities to the extent desired b
the Saudi Arabian Government.

c. Approval should be given to the request for a five-year reserv
supply of ammunition.

d. The maximum training commitments in connection with the pro
posed Dhahran Air Base Agreement are:

> (1) Establishment of a joint military advisory mission in Sau
> Arabia composed of: Army, 25–50 officers and 60–100 enliste
> men; Navy, 3 officers and 8 enlisted men; and Air Force, 13 office
> and 19 enlisted men.
>
> (2) Training of Saudi Arabians in United States Servi
> schools, not to exceed the following totals during the first pha
> of the program: Army—244; Navy—25; and Air Force—160.
>
> (3) First phase of training program to extend for five yea
> but program to be reviewed near the end of that period in the lig
> of conditions then existing; some training assistance to contin
> throughout the life of the agreement.
>
> (4) The training program should include tactical unit tra
> ing as well as the training in equipment uses.
>
> (5) The details of the program should be worked out by
> U.S. Joint Military Group after negotiations for United Sta
> rights have been satisfactorily consummated.

I suggest that Ambassador Hare be authorized to negotiate wit
the framework of the foregoing comments.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSH

711.56386A/4-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of S

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, April 30, 1951—

638. Fol are comments on Deptel 362, Apr 27:[1]

1. History Palestine question is such that 150 million grant
Israel, or even sizable portion that amount; cld only serve substan
basic Arab apprehension re special position Israel in US policy
cast new doubt our profession of good will toward Arab States
when our long efforts at reassurance beginning have effect. F
wld be not only to cloud our relations with countries this area at
when their cooperation badly needed, but also to reduce pro
improving relations between Israel and Arab States which we
been endeavoring foster as essential element NE security.

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[1] Not printed; it asked Hare to comment on the possible effect on the D
Airfield negotiations of a $150 million program of grant aid to Israel
smaller program of grant aid to Saudi Arabia. It reported: "thought w
grant aid one year basis might jeopardize US efforts obtain long ter
agreement by tending reduce period to that of grant and that gra
partially covering MDAP program might result in SAG insistence on all
(711.56386A/4-2751)

Re DAF negotiations, impact such action could be extremely harmful and difficult see what convincing words cld be found explain what Saudis wld surely regard as biased act belying our assurances impartiality between Arab States and Israel.

Fact is that, prejudiced as Arabs may be re Israel, their basic reaction is fear of having stand alone to face Israel backed by unlimited Western economic and political support. Feeding these fears will do harm not only ourselves but Israel and Arab States as well.

2. Re prospect grant military assistance SA, this type "action rather than words" which King has long sought, which shld give Saudis feeling of greater confidence and reassurance re their security . . . and which wld also be very substantial *quid pro quo* in negotiating for DAF. If we cld have made such offer in Dec we wld surely have had long term agreement concluded by now.

. . . .

3. Re inclusion SA in proposed regional econ aid program, believe important points are that all countries in area shld be eligible and that publicity specific country allocations, from which invidious comparisons cld be drawn, shld be avoided if possible. However, misgivings Saudis might have in this regard wld doubtless be more than overcome by being made unique regional recipient of grant military aid. . . .

. . . .

HARE

886A.2553/4-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, April 30, 1951—4 p. m.

641. Re Embtel 631, Apr 25.[2] Acting Aramco rep Henry yesterday informed Hamad Sulaiman, Dep Fin Min, that company wld write letter Dutch Bank stating will pay latter $4 million of June 15 tax installment on that date. Despite fact letter will not be delivered until late today, SAG finances currently so straitened that Min Fin officials telephoned bank less than one hour after yesterday's Henry–Hamad conversation demanding funds and Dutch Bank has already in past 24 hours paid out over $1 million of the 4 million due on Henry's verbal assurance letter is in works.

Hand-to-mouth nature SAG financing further evidenced by receipt yesterday by Aramco of letter from Min Fin Abdullah Sulaiman, still

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

[2] Not printed: it reported a request to Aramco by the Saudi Arabian Deputy Finance Minister for a letter to the Dutch Bank, stating that Aramco would pay $4 million of the June tax installment of $11,500,000 on June 15 (886A.2553/4-2551).

Riyadh with Najib wrestling with "budget" requesting company to deliver to SAG "bonds" (best available translation Arabic original) guaranteeing payment June, Sept and Dec tax installments when due (see Embdes 293, Mar 2 [3] (approximately 17 characters garbled)) what desired is type short term negotiable paper which SAG might be able discount more readily than existing letter delegation procedure. Basis this hope not known, but perhaps required by Chase which reported interested in discounting June payment (Embtel 617, Apr 19).[4] Delaby reports most New York banks now require signatures Aramco parent companies before advancing funds SAG. In view para 1 above, balance June payment subject "bonding" now $7,500,000.

HARE

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[3] Not printed; it transmitted a revised Aramco estimate of the 1950 income tax payments due the Saudi Arabian Government in 1951, from $44 million up to $50 million (886A.2553/3–251).

[4] Not printed; it reported the Chase National Bank had received a proposal through the local Arab bank for an advance to the Saudi Arabian Government against anticipated June tax receipts from Aramco. Chase submitted an offer to advance $10 million against anticipated receipts of about $12 million, but had not received the Saudi Arabian answer at that time. (886A.10/4–1951)

711.56386A/5–951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 10, 1951—7 p.m.

380. Re DAF Dept informing Greenhill, Brit Emb, Gen Day recalled recently for quick briefing session. Day now rejoining Amb Hare for resumption negots early date and effort obtain agreement quickly. Importance DAF increasing in US strategic consideration.... Initial effort seek long term agreement defeated largely owing impact Anglo-Egyptian differences [2] on SA sensibilities and as consequence US prepared accept much shorter term. Negots entering very delicate and we hope final stage and we trust Brit will say or do nothing rock boat this period.

Brit informed here gen character and magnitude proposed NE mil grant aid program (Embtel 655, May 9 [3]) of approx $40,000,000. Brit also told SA wld be recipient largest share owing US special interests, but amount left vague.

Dept hopes conduct in conjunction def mil-polit conversations with Brit re whole program for NE soon in accordance basic NSC paper on subj which contemplates correlated US-UK action re mil assistance to area.[4]

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[1] Drafted by Jones and Awalt; telegraphic transmission and classification approved by Jones; cleared with Haselton, NEA, and Silver, S/ISA; and discussed with Patrick of Defense.

[2] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 343 ff.

[3] Not printed; it requested guidance "re extent to which Brit informed nature contemplated conversations on DAF and military assistance with particular reference possible grant mil assistance NE countries." (711.56386A/5–951)

You may discuss with Trott along above lines ur discretion.

Comment: Dept doubts Trott informed thus far by FonOff, but fol US-UK talks FonOff will presumably circularize Brit NE missions topsec basis.

ACHESON

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[4] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1 ff.

711.56386A/5-3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, May 31, 1951—1 p. m.

698. Arrived Riyadh with General Day Yingling May 17 and returned Jidda today with agreed drafts on both DAF [2] and mil asst,[3] which, although not in all respects what we might have desired, believe give us essentials specified in our instructions.

Saudi negotiating was conducted almost exclusively by Yusef Yassin assisted by Khalid Gargoni, with Prince Feisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Prince Mishaal, new Min Defense, occasionally in attendance. At outset negotiations Yusef Yassin insisted that draft which he prepared at end of previous discussions (Embdes 221, Jan 13[4]) should be used as basis negotiations. Unsatisfactory character of that document and usual intransigence of Yusef Yassin negotiations resulted in protracted and involved discussion but general attitude of Saudi negotiators was better than previous discussions and by slugging it out practically word by word reasonably satisfactory compromise was finally reached. It was clear throughout negotiations that main preoccupation of Saudis provide "window dressing" to meet sensitivity on sovereignty question and every para of agreement on DAF and to lesser extent on mil asst was scrutinized by Saudis from that angle.

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[1] Repeated to Dhahran.

[2] The agreement on Dhahran Airfield was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 402 from Jidda, May 31 (711.56386A/5-3151). Agreed text is printed in 2 UST (pt. 2) 1466 and TIAS 2290.

[3] A note constituting an agreement on cash reimbursable military assistance with the Saudi Arabian Government, together with an explanatory letter covering points the Ambassador was authorized to discuss with the Saudi Arabian negotiators but which were not appropriate for inclusion in the agreement itself, were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 403 from Jidda, May 31 (711.56386A/5-3151). The text is printed in 2 UST (pt. 2) 1460 and TIAS 2289. A chronology of the discussions on Dhahran Airfield and military assistance at Riyadh from May 17 to May 30 was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 401 from Jidda, May 31 (711.56386A/5-3151).

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1021.

Highlights of DAF agreement follow:

1. Period was fixed at 5 years renewable automatically for additional 5 years unless either party gives notice of intention to revise or terminate 6 months prior to termination of first 5 year period. Prince Feisal stated orally for record it was intention of SAG to continue for full 10 years and that that figure could be used for planning purposes but Saudis deemed preferable divide in 25-year [*2–5 year*] periods for publicity reasons.

2. Specific limitation on numbers of planes and mil personnel eliminated in new draft and this made subject agreement between Commander DAF and Min Defense on basis developments and requirements. General Day accordingly addressed letter to Min Defense requesting increase to 20 planes and 1,500 men and written reply by Min Defense so authorizing was promptly given.

3. Civilian personnel are exempted from customs, taxes and other govt charges.

4. Jurisdiction was thorny problem with Saudis insisting on jurisdiction over all civilians and also over mil personnel off base. We were eventually forced drop question civilian exemption but obtained agreement that in cases offenses by mil off base but in general environs (Dhahran, Dammam, Khobar Ras Tanura, et cetera) Saudis would arrest and conduct prompt preliminary investigation and then turn offenders over to US authorities for trial and punishment. Mil offenders outside this area would fall under Saudi law but this not believed important since such travel rarely occurs except for MATS flights which so far have given no difficulty.

5. On basis of general provisions in agreement, drafts prepared of exchanges letters between General Day and Min Defense [5] covering allocation of existing buildings and listing of technical services to be performed by US mil establishment. In both cases *status quo* essentially preserved with few changes agreed to by General Day.

Regarding mil asst, all Saudis, including even Prince Feisal, were obviously pleased by forthright character our proposals which went far in creating favorable atmosphere for DAF negots. Mention of possible grant assistance was also well received and foreseen complications entirely failed to develop either re effect on cash reimbursable negots or re assumed eligibility Israel, in both of which cases Saudis showed gratifying sense of perspective. Two most difficult problems in discussion asst concerned desire of SAG to receive only new equipment and question of diversion in US national interest. As result of discussion Saudi negotiators were brought to understand and accept our view on these subjects but convincing King was quite another matter since these were both subjects to which we personally attached great importance. In fact, seemed possible both DAF and mil asst agreements might be hanging in balance when King raised diversion matter on last day of negots but were fortunately able to reassure him this was an article of general application specified by law and was not a policy question affecting SAG–US relationship.

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[5] Copies of six letters exchanged between Day and the Minister of Defense were transmitted with the draft agreement as enclosures to despatch 402 from Jidda on May 31 (711.56386A/5–3151).

Main point which I wish stress and which I know Gen Day will support is that present draft agreements and related documents which have been hammered out in two weeks of discussion not only represent best we can expect to obtain from Saudis in existing situation but also, as far as DAF is specifically concerned, constitute agreement which gives American commander at Dhahran essential administrative powers required. It is not the tidiest of documents but it is one with which commander DAF can "live" on the understanding that practical adjustment rather than rigid application of the written word usually governs in such matters in this country.

I therefore strongly recommend that documents being submitted shld not be subject to any change whatsoever unless such is absolutely necessary. As far as Saudis are concerned they regard documents as in final form and they have been given approval as such by King. To suggest changes at this time on any points, however small, wld run the very real risk of reopening the whole field of discussion in circumstances which might be less favorable than those in which we recently negotiated. I believe that risk shld not be run except for compelling substantive reasons. Yingling agrees.

I also urge that these documents be cleared by Defense and State as matters of utmost urgency in order that signature may be effected while current is running in right direction.[6]

General Day is telegraphing his estimate and recommendations separately to Defense.[7]

HARE

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[6] In telegram 709 from Jidda, June 3, for McGhee, Hare restated his recommendation that the draft agreements on military assistance and Dhahran Airfield "be approved without change if possible and with utmost speed." (711.56386A/6-351)

A letter from McGhee to General Burns, dated June 7, quoted telegram 709. McGhee then added: "I strongly endorse these recommendations and steps are being taken in this Department to expedite consideration as soon as the despatches now enroute from the Embassy at Jidda are received. I hope that you will find it possible to alert all interested officers in the Department of Defense to be ready to give the draft agreements the promptest possible attention as soon as they are received." (711.56386A/6–751)

McGhee sent a similar letter to Finletter on the same day, enclosing a copy of his letter to Burns. In the letter to Finletter he stressed the need for prompt approval of the draft and said: "A word from you emphasizing the urgency of the matter might be most helpful." (711.56386A/6–751)

A letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated June 15, concurred in the recommendation that the Dhahran Airfield Agreement be accepted as written and suggested that Hare be authorized to sign it (711.56386A/6–1551).

[7] *Infra.*

611.86A94/6-651

The Commanding General, Dhahran Airfield (Day), to the Special Assistant, Secretary of the Air Force (Shaw)[1]

SECRET

[DHAHRAN,?] 2 June 1951.

DEAR MR. SHAW: I enclose a draft copy of the new Dhahran Airfeld Agreement with comments. I have just returned from fifteen days in Riyadh and a most exasperating and difficult negotiation. We have achieved more than I thought we would be able to. The atmosphere in Riyadh was cordial, but extreme sensitivity on the part of the Saudis made every item of discussion a subject for prolonged argument. We were forced to work from Shaikh Yussuf Yassin's Saudi draft and the simple problem of getting this into acceptable English was a large one. This . . . plus lack of understanding made for a hard time.

I suggest that you pave the way for review of the draft, before signature, by our legal people. A broad viewpoint by them is essential for any requirement to go back for changes in the agreement will subject the entire document to renegotiation. There are forces at work within the Saudi Government not favorable to us and the Government itself at the present time is not too stable. Because of this, speed in reviewing is also essential and I hope we can get approval back here within a matter of a few days after receipt in Washington. Perhaps Colonel Malcolm and Maddux can monitor this through as they did my letter of instructions while I was in Washington.

By and large we have what we want in the way of major operating rights and we can live with those things in the agreement we do not particularly like.

The official documents will be forthcoming immediately through the State Department, but I thought this advance copy would help save time in review.

I would appreciate a line from you as to your reaction to the results.

Sincerely,

E. M. DAY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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[1] On June 6 Shaw sent the letter, together with a copy of the draft agreeme containing Day's comments and the letters exchanged by Day and the Sau Arabian Minister of Defense, to Colonel Malcolm. They were attached to a lett which read, in part: "In view of the importance which both General Day a the Ambassador attach to the expedition in commenting on or approving of th draft, you may wish to start the clearance process with the attached adva copy." (611.86A94/6-651)

886A.2553/6-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, June 28, 1951—5 p. m.

758. Owen Aramco informs he summoned to meeting with MinFin afternoon June 27 which also attended by Najibsalha, Mahhammad Surrziz Suroor and other MinFin officials.

MinFin adroitly opened meeting by referring Iran situation and stating SAG entirely satisfied with Aramco contract[2] and he wld be glad so state in writing if Owen desired. He then observed that "within scope of existing agreement" and friendly relations existing between company and SAG latter now signed seek assistance Aramco in form of advance of 50 percent anticipated tax receipts for current term (payable of course under Dec 1950 agreement during calendar 1952). MinFin stated budget had recently been completed and approved by King (for summary see fol tel[3]) and it was now necessary implement it but necessary funds lacking. He then suggested Owen work out details arrangement for advance with Salha.

Owen replied he wld pass word to his principles and wld also hear what Salha had say but he wld venture prediction that Aramco cld hardly be expected comply with request. MinFin who had by then been out of room several times . . . did not seem in mood pursue question further and discussion consequently ended at this point.

Comment: foregoing SAG admission stringency and request Aramco aid comes as no surprise Emb in view developments since MinFin took over sole controls SAG finances in May and stringency was foreshadowed Embtels 677, May 15[4] and 705, June 2[5] as well as Embdes 405, June 4.[6] For several years, continually mounting income has been dissipated in spectacular fashion with no thought for morrow and special loans and facilities have not altered trend e.g. Aramco $6 million loan of Jan 1950 railroad and loan repayment deferments by

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

[2] For documentation on the Aramco contract of December 1950, see pp. 268 ff., and *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 9 ff.

[3] Telegram 4 from Jidda, July 2, not printed, reported on the salient features of the Saudi Arabian budget. It read, in part: "SAG has so far spent over one-half 1951 income from Aramco without, on admission Fin Min to Owen, having been able implement above budget which drawn up on basis full utilization that income. Sole bright spot is that salaries have been brought virtually up to date from position in some cases as much as six months in arrears." (886A.10/7-251)

[4] Not printed; it reported on a reorganization of the Saudi Arabian Finance Ministry (886A.10/5-1651).

[5] Not printed; it reported the Saudi Arabian Government had received more than $30 million in tax payments from Aramco, leaving approximately $20 million for the rest of 1951, and advised the Department of State the Saudi Arabian financial position would not get better for the rest of 1951 (886A.2553/6-251).

[6] Not printed; it concerned personnel changes at the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance (786A.13/6-451).

Aramco of May 1950 conclusion new agreement last Dec and TAA advances extended so far this year which now total ¾ whole amount due. In fact as income rises stringencies only appear become more pronounced and in capacity Shaikh Abdullah makes impossible putting together any coherent story of where expenditures have gone. We believe SAG financial situation by no means hopeless but that SAG wld have to pull in horns if attempt made get by on present income anticipated balance this year. Since MinFin rashly agreed increase payments to Royal Family when in Riyadh during budget discussions he in no position now go to King and ask for retrenchment . . . .

And if SAG request clever tactical move view Iran[7] situation we do not believe any lasting improvements in use income wld result should Aramco agree make advance. Claim that funds needed implement budget is specious since latter drawn up several months ago and based upon income anticipated at that time. Rather it appears SAG stubbornly persisting endeavor repair leaky water tank by pouring more in at top, a procedure which we believe will continue as long as more water available and that a halt should be called somewhere.

HARE

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[7] For information, see p. 544.

886A.10/7–251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, July 2, 1951—noon.

3. Re Embtel 758, June 28.[2] In conversation with Owen June 28 pursuant request for advance from Aramco made previous day (see reftel) Salha pointed out SAG requirements $10 million monthly and thus wld need additional $45 million from Aramco (i.e., approx 50 percent tax due in 1952) to cover expenditures for next nine months (until end new Saudi fiscal year). Salha estimated net income from Aramco at about $3 million monthly (which Owen says approx correct) for period, which in no way sufficient meet needs.

Owen replied he "flabbergasted" by SAG request in view current high level income. Pointed out SAG wld receive fol in addition royalties during next nine months:

$12 million December tax installment, $9 million from customs (based on Salha's estimate), plus approx $25 million early next year as first quarter installment on income tax due 1952. In this context no apparent need $45 million and he very much doubted Aramco wld agree. (Owen did not mention pilgrimage and other receipts which, added to above, roughly equal $90 million Salha says SAG needs for next nine months.)

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

[2] *Supra.*

Salha then stated Min Fin wld accept letter from Aramco stating company wld agree pay $50 million during first half 1952.

Meanwhile other signs SAG stringencies are appearing. Dutch Bank reportedly has refused make further advances govt even pursuant an Aramco letter promising payment as result bank's extended credit position and uneasiness concerning recent financial developments here. On June 27, Dutch Bank unable honor SAG dollar and riyal drafts presented by Bechtel as result current negots liquidate past obligations due that company. Riyals were paid out of Salha's "private account" at Indochine.

SAG also has had default on installment payment due June 27 to French combine guilding arms factories near Al Kharj and has been unable pay Indochine anything on Saudi gold sovereign contract, even though first 100,000 coins already here.

In view Dutch Bank inability make further advances SAG and continued unwillingness Indochine do so we know of no local source able meet demands. Heat will therefore be on Aramco and mention has also been made in passing of possibility loan from USG although we have not been approached as yet. In view present trend events financial stringencies here during latter portion this year can be expected have important repercussions on Saudi Governmental structure and SAG–Aramco relations. Shaikh Abdullah's strong point with King has always been his ability produce funds when needed. If, however, he now unable perform we believe King may be expected react strongly particularly in view growing criticism of Shaikh Abdullah because of his personal habits.

HARE

786A.5 MAP/7-951

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt), to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1951.

Subject: Briefing Session with the Joint U.S. Military Group for Saudi Arabia.

The joint U.S. military planning group are now slated to leave Washington July 12. The earlier date[1] is necessary in order that the group may avail themselves of a special MATS plane otherwise departing empty that morning for Europe. It is the only alternative to MATS bucket-seat freight flights or commercial. The group is coming to State for a briefing session on Tuesday, July 10, at 2:30.[2] The meeting will be in the NEA conference room. The group is made up of the following thirteen officers:

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[1] Telegram 442 from Washington, June 27, not printed, had advised Jidda the military party planned to leave Washington around July 15 for Dhahran (711.56386A/6-2751).

OMA—Col. V. H. Connor
Army—Col. Jean D. Scott
Lt. Col. David Firesel
Lt. Col. Ira W. Grande
Lt. Col. Lewis C. Williams, Jr.
Lt. Col. Jack Neal
Lt. Col. William A. Eadie
Navy—Cmdr. Frank L. Fulloway
Cmdr. Edward P. Laughan
AF—Col. Robert R. Stewart
Lt. Col. Bunn Hearn, Jr.
Lt. Col. C. O. Hopson
Lt. Col. James W. Parsons

It is suggested that it may be instructive to the group to have some background on our interests in Saudi Arabia. The selection of the United States as a country without imperialistic ambitions has been a voluntary choice on the part of the SAG whenever it has sought foreign assistance. American enterprise, both private and government, has therefore been responsible for a large measure of the development that has taken place in Saudi Arabia. The discovery and exploitation of oil, of course, is the outstanding example of U.S. enterprise there. It has provided generous financial returns to the country and a multitude of other benefits such as sinking water wells, building roads, and providing employment, good housing, education, and medical care for thousands of workers and their families. Three modern harbors were American built; the railway to Riyadh, to be completed in October, is entirely US engineered; the Saudi Arabian Airlines was organized by TWA; the new wireless and broadcasting stations were established by American firms; several roads and all the airports were done by Americans; agricultural and irrigation assistance has been extended by us; and the financial, agricultural, and mining advisers to the SAG are American citizens. A much longer list of lesser activities could be cited in which US enterprise has been active. They have reflected much credit upon this country and have increased our interest and stake in Saudi Arabia.

Events leading to the mission of this joint military group began in June 1947 when the SAG sought a military alliance with us. This was before NATO and would have constituted a radical departure from traditional US policy. We could not do it and offered instead to co-clude a formal treaty of friendship and commerce. Lacking the alliance, the SAG then expressed its need to build up its own defense forces and asked to purchase arms from the U.S. At the same time the SAG made it clear that we should have to extend military assistance, including training, if we expected to obtain a long term renewal of the DAF agreement expiring on March 15 of the following year (1949). The subsequent outbreak of the Palestine war and the UN arms embargo delayed action on the request. After the close of hostilities, renewed requests prompted us to recommend to the SAG that a survey should be made of Saudi Arabia's military requirements. This was not only for the purpose of ascertaining the needs of the country, but also to gain time in which to obtain Congressional approval of military sales to Saudi Arabia. This suggestion was accepted and Brig. Gen. Richard J. O'Keefe, CO, DAF, was appointed by the Joint Chiefs to make such a survey. He and his mission accomplished this in the fall of 1949 and his report was sent to the JCS in December.[3] Meanwhile the military assistance bill as finally passed by Congress in 1949 excluded the Near Eastern countries. An amending bill was submitted again in 1950 and passed which enabled the President to designate any nation as eligible for cash reimbursable military assistance whose ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, is important to the security of the U.S.[4] Saudi Arabia was so designated on October 26, 1950. The JCS had already completed their study of the O'Keefe report and made their recommendations in August calling for an Army of about 18,000 men, a small Navy and Air Force, and appropriate equipment.

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[2] Memorandum of conversation, *infra*.

On the basis of these recommendations and Saudi Arabian eligibility for military assistance, the US was able to initiate the negotiations in December 1950 for a new long term DAF agreement. These negotiations were successfully concluded with an exchange of signatures on June 18, 1951. Meanwhile certain additional requests of the SAG for a combat air force, broader training, repair facilities, and more generous ammunition stores were conceded by the JCS in April 1951.

From the first approach by the SAG on this project to the present, over four years have gone by. The Saudi Arabs have been impatient for results. All the prerequisites have now been met and there remains the US responsibility of transferring our commitments into fact. The speed with which Defense has prepared to move is most gratifying and will serve to impress the SAG very effectively with the sincerity of our intentions. No relaxation should be permitted in our efforts to fulfill our obligations as promptly as possible.

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[3] For the text of the undated copy of the "JUSSGSA Field Report With Final Recommendations for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force", see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1112.

[4] Additional information on this topic is in the editorial note, *ibid.*, p. 1182.

It is suggested that the group should be admonished against being discouraged or depressed by what they see in Saudi Arabia. The wealth of the country and the benefits of western contacts have failed as yet to touch the lives of most of the population in any fundamental way. Saudi Arabia is still a primitive country served by a very harsh Providence. Illiteracy is the rule rather than the exception. Malnutrition and disease sap the strength and ambition of many of the people. The job to be done will have to start almost from scratch, and it may be difficult to coordinate the Government's desire for rapid tangible results with our ability under the circumstances to produce. The phasing of deliveries of equipment and progress in training might best be conservatively scheduled in order to avoid possible criticism later for failing to achieve intended results on schedule.

The British have been training Saudi Arabian Army officers and NCOs at Taif since January 1947. A military cadet school has been established there for both basic and specialized training. British experience might be very useful as a guide in planning and in appraising Saudi capacity to absorb military instruction. Friendly coordination with the British training mission to avoid duplication of effort has been agreed upon by both State and Defense. The British Government has been so informed and it concurs. It is possible that the SAG may wish to terminate British training activities when the US mission becomes operative. The British are our principal allies, and the defense of the Near East generally is, in the first instance, their responsibility. Those relationships should not be disturbed. We accordingly prefer that the British mission should remain and possible Saudi Arabian suggestions to the contrary should be discouraged.

I believe the above represents the more substantive material which may be helpful in conducting the briefing session with the military group. Lesser points which may arise in open discussion can undoubtedly be handled on an *ad hoc* basis.

786A.5 MAP/7-1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1951.

Subject: Briefing Session for the United States Military Planning Group Going to Saudi Arabia July 12.

Participants: Military Planning Group (13 Army, Navy and Air Force officers)[1]
OSD—Major Ruth Briggs
S/ISA—Mr. John Bingham
Mr. George Emery
Col. T. W. Swett
L/EUR—Mr. Raymond Yingling
NE—Mr. G. L. Jones
Mr. R. A. Thayer
Mr. F. H. Awalt

Summary:

Mr. Jones gave a comprehensive outline of American interests in Saudi Arabia and how they developed. He also reviewed events of Defense character which have lead to the formation of the mission upon which the group were departing. He advised them against being discouraged or depressed by the conditions which they would meet in Saudi Arabia. He also discussed the participation of Egyptian officers in the Saudi Arabian delegation. He pointed out that the pattern was well established in the Saudi Arabian Government of utilizing the services of foreign Arabs and that although we might prefer that outside elements should not participate in the discussions, it was a situation which would have to be accepted and they would have to talk with whatever representatives were designated. The group was also briefed on the position agreed upon between State and Defense regarding coordination of our training activities with the British training mission at Taif. The importance of speed in getting on with the job was emphasized.

Mr. Yingling discussed briefly his recent experience in negotiating the two agreements with the SAG. He emphasized how necessary was patience on our part in dealing with the Saudi Arabs. He also said that we should avoid giving the impression of colonialism. The Saudi Arabs, he said, were extremely sensitive regarding their national dignity and sovereignty and would resent any suggestion of an imperialistic attitude. He added that the King and Crown Prince Saud were very disposed toward the US but that some of the King's advisers were not. There is nothing we can do about that, he said, except to be careful that we acted in complete fairness towards Saudi Arabia.

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[1] Listed in the memorandum of July 9, *supra*.

The meeting was open for general discussion and the question was raised about what criterion should be applied to the Joint Chiefs recommendations; that is, are the dollar limitations definitive or is the list of equipment the determining factor of what should be delivered to the SAG? In reply it was observed that the valuations were of necessity indicative only since there was constant change in the cost of materials. Even the equipment, it was stated, may not necessarily be treated too strictly. It was believed that the equipment recommended by the JCS was quite generous and it was very possible that it would be found at the end of five years that the SAG would not have utilized fully its authority to purchase. On the other hand, it was suggested if it was found that the equipment was insufficient for Saudi Arabian purposes or that other equipment not recommended was more suitable, the JCS would undoubtedly wish to consider appropriate modifications.

The question of responsibility for the cost of training was raised. It was explained that this problem was not entirely settled but was under current discussion in both State and Defense and there was every reason to believe that it would be completely answered before the planning group were ready to begin substantive conversations in Saudi Arabia. It was pointed out in this connection also that the question of training costs and two other matters, US military jurisdiction over training personnel and custom exemptions, were matters which were still to be negotiated and were the responsibility of the Ambassador.

In conclusion Mr. Jones expressed his appreciation for the fine backstopping that our Embassy in Jidda as well as State Department in Washington had consistently received from all officers concerned in the Department of Defense during the recent negotiations. He said he was confident that this close cooperation would continue and he assured the planning group that they would have every assistance this Department could offer during their tour of duty in Saudi Arabia.

Editorial Note

The United States Mutual Defense Assistance Program Survey Team to Saudi Arabia arrived in Dhahran on July 17. Telegram 38 from Dhahran, July 19, reported that the size of the mission and its prompt arrival had greatly impressed Saudi Arabian officials (786A.5 MAP/7-1951). The day after their arrival the members went to Riyadh, where they had an audience with the King, and General Day met with the Minister of Defense. Negotiations were carried on at

Dhahran and Taif between the Survey Team and Saudi Arabian representatives under the direction of the Minister of Defense. ("Composition and Activities of the Survey Team," Enclosure A to Report by the Military Group, Joint United States Mutual Defense Assistance Program Survey Team to Saudi Arabia on Reimbursable Aid Agreement with the Government of Saudi Arabia, 786A.5 MAP/9–1051)

A copy of the basic agreements was submitted as a report by General Day to the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense on August 15. Provision was made in the agreements for Saudi Arabian construction of a base installation at El Kharj, or another suitable location, with facilities necessary for the Headquarters of the Saudi Arabian Army, the United States Permanent Mission, and one class of Saudi Arabian trainees. The exact scope of construction was to be determined later by a joint group of United States and Saudi Arabian officers. Recommendations were included in the report for the selection, indoctrination, and support of the United States Mutual Defense Assistance Mission. (Enclosure F, *ibid.*) The report also contained a military assistance program (Enclosure G, *ibid.*) listing basic concepts for reorganizing and training the Saudi Arabian military forces and four annexes setting forth a proposed organization for and disposition of the Saudi Arabian Army; a training program to be accomplished over a five-year period; cost estimates for Army facilities and equipment; and plans for the creation of a Saudi Arabian Air Force, with training and major equipment to be provided over a three-year period, and for supporting installations. In general, the program provided for a Saudi Arabian Army of three regimental combat teams and a general headquarters; an Air Force of one composite tactical squadron, one airbase squadron, and a headquarters; no naval forces; and a military training mission. The Minister of Defense approved the proposals in a letter to General Day dated August 20. (Enclosure H, *ibid.*)

A copy of the Survey Team Report, dated September 10, was received from the Department of Defense by the Department of State on September 12. A Department of State memorandum with comments on the report, drafted between October 2 and October 11, suggested some minor changes, but concluded by saying it considered the work of the Survey Group as depicted in the report "an impressive and outstanding accomplishment," and hoped the final report would be considered and approved by the Department of Defense at the earliest possible time (786A.58/10–1151).

A Department of State memorandum, dated December 11, reported that the first part of the advance group of officers who would advise the Saudi Arabian Government on construction facilities required for the United States Military Training Team were to leave for Saudi

Arabia in early January 1952. The Department of State told members of the group that for political reasons it would be glad to see the earliest action possible in fulfilling the training commitment to Saudi Arabia. (786A.58/12–1151)

The Director, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense, on December 15, 1951, informed the Director for Mutual Security, and Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State, that the Department of Defense had reviewed the Survey Team Report; found the recommendations with respect to selection, indoctrination, and support of the United States Mutual Defense Assistance Mission (Enclosure F) acceptable; and approved the military assistance program (in Enclosure G). He also informed him that, when the chief of the mission, expected to be a United States Air Force major general, had been designated, the Department of State would be advised.

786A.11/8–1451

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt), to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1951.

I called at General Graham's office at the White House this morning at 9:00 at his request in order to assist him in briefing the other members of the mission who are departing in the near future to Taif to attend King Ibn Saud.[1] Before joining the other officers in the conference room, General Graham told me that the President had a great personal interest in this mission and had expressed his hope that it could depart at the earliest moment possible. As a consequence every effort is being made, General Graham said, to advance their projected departure from Thursday evening to some time Wednesday, August 15. The General also remarked as a matter of confidential information that the President had refused to allow him to respond to requests from the Shah of Iran and three heads of state in Latin America to attend them. But when the request came from King Ibn Saud, he approved promptly.

After entering the conference room where the other officers were awaiting the General, the President entered and was introduced to everyone present by General Graham. The President told the group that they were going on an important mission to a great man. He is our friend, he said. He regretted sending them out over the Arabian Desert this time of year but said it was necessary and that he knew their efforts would be deeply appreciated by the King. He wished them every success on their mission . . . .

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[1] The Saudi Arabian Chargé d'Affaires called at the Department of State on August 7 to request the services of General Graham and a group of medical specialists to come to Saudi Arabia to examine the King. A memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, dated August 9, recommended that the President approve the mission. Telegram 54, August 9 to Jidda, advised the Embassy the President had approved the mission and General Graham's party would depart about August 15. Documentation is in Department of State file 786A.11. For documentation on a 1950 visit of General Graham and a medical mission to Saudi Arabia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1112 ff.

I was very much impressed, as I am sure the other officers present were also, at this clear indication of the President's deep and sincere interest in the welfare of King Ibn Saud.

After the President left the room the group sat down around the conference table for a general discussion of Saudi Arabia and its customs and the personalities the group would meet there. The discussion was entirely informal with questions raised around the table and answered by the General and myself as the case warranted. The members of the Medical Mission are as follows:

Major General Wallace H. Graham, USAF
Col. Edwin M. Coyette (MC) USA, O-20530
Capt. Charles L. Ferguson (MC) USN, 63682
Col. John W. Kemble (MC), 20398
Capt. Frances F. Foley (MC) USAF, 19543A
HMI James I. Myers, USN, 755-31-37
M/Sgt Thomas S. Stultz, USA, RA33217113
Sgt Edward E. Stultz, USA, RA16290432

Editorial Note

Prince Mansur, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense, left Saudi Arabia on April 21 for Paris, the first stop on a trip to the United States for medical treatment at the Mayo Clinic. Telegram 6668 from Paris, May 2, reported that Mansur had died on May 1 at an American hospital in Paris (786A.11/5-251). Telegram 680 from Jidda, May 20, reported that Prince Misha'al, 11th son of King Saud, had been appointed new Minister of Defense and head of Civil Aviation (786A.13/5-2051).

A letter from Burton Berry to Major James H. Burns, dated August 24, recommended that the Department of Defense invite the new Minister of Defense to visit the United States as the guest of the Secretary of Defense. The Department of State considered the visit timely in view of the recently concluded agreements with Saudi Arabia for military assistance and Dhahran Airfield and suggested it might be desirable for the Minister of Defense to see in action some of the equipment recommended for Saudi Arabia by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (786A.13/8-2451) A reply by Frank Nash, dated September 5, accepted the recommendation and requested the Department of State to invite Prince Misha'al on behalf of the Secretary of Defense (786A.13/9-551).

Telegram 177 from Jidda, October 1, advised the Department of State that the Minister of Defense accepted the invitation and would visit the United States in November (786A.13/10-131). A Department of the Air Force memorandum, dated November 6, contained a copy of the itinerary of the Saudi Arabian party and biographical information on its members. They were scheduled to arrive in the United States on November 12, and the official visit was scheduled to last until December 6. It included visits to numerous Air Force bases, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and tank and automobile factories in Detroit. (786A.11/11-651) Documentation on the visit is in Department of State files 786A.11, 786A.13, and 786A.58.

786A.5/11-1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1951.

Subject: Visit of Prince Misha'al, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense, with Mr. McGhee.

Participants: HRH Prince Misha'al, Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia
Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, Saudi Arabian Ambassador
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Kopper
Mr. Stabler
Mr. Awalt

Summary:

Mr. McGhee welcomed Prince Misha'al warmly to the State Department and expressed his hope that the Prince was enjoying his visit to the United States. He also informed him that the Department would be glad to be of any service possible to him. The Prince thanked Mr. McGhee for his kindness and assured him that he was thoroughly enjoying his first visit to this country. He added that he was not interested in political affairs but in defense matters and he emphasized strongly his interest and that of his Government in seeing the United States move rapidly on fulfilling its commitment regarding military training of the Saudi Arbian defense forces. He observed in this connection that the services of one training mission (*sic.* British) have been concluded leaving a gap which he is most eager to have filled as soon as possible. Mr. McGhee assured him that we were equally eager to implement our commitment re training and some officers had already been designated for early departure to Saudi Arabia to offer advice on the construction and other facilities required by the training forces and observed that the construction was a necessary prerequisite which the SAG was to provide. HRH agreed that this work was a Saudi responsibility. He also added that the SAG had full confidence of the good intentions and friendship of the United States but reiterated that an early demonstration of it by the training operations was highly desirable. Mr. McGhee pointed out that American friendship for Saudi Arabia was unique in the Near East and had been repeatedly demonstrated through the benevolent operations of Aramco; the establishment of DAF, which was a tremendous source of strength and security to Saudi Arabia; extension of financial assistance through Lend-Lease and Ex-Im Bank loans; the tripartite declaration of May 1950, which was arranged at the request of the King for assurances on Saudi Arabian security; and more recently by the MEC plan. He emphasized that under this plan the United States had no wish to interfere with or embarrass Saudi Arabian-Egyptian relations, but he suggested that blind support of the Egyptian position would serve no useful purpose to the SAG. He said MEC would help build up the forces of Saudi Arabia which had fine fighting instincts and had the use of an exceptionally fine airbase and a uniquely defensible area which would be most useful to Middle East defense. HRH expressed his appreciation of Mr. McGhee's comments and said that Saudi Arabia was not against the British but observed that the Egyptian position represented the demands of over sixteen million people which could not be ignored. He hoped that some satisfactory agreement could be reached but he was afraid that in the meantime clashes would occur which would cause the situation to deteriorate. In that case, he said, the canal, surrounded in a hostile area, would be indefensible in the long run. Mr. McGhee suggested that Saudi Arabia, as a friend to both sides, was in a most advantageous position to counsel moderation. In this connection, he said, it was his understanding that Saudi Arabia, owing to the prestige of His Majesty, King Ibn Saud, enjoyed the privilege of speaking last in Arab League Councils. This offered Saudi Arabia the opportunity of influencing its brother Arab states toward paths of reason and moderation. Prince Misha'al agreed that that was true but pointed out that the Arab states expected Saudi Arabia to carry US support with it. Mr. McGhee replied that we have no desire to impose our will on anyone and said that Saudi Arabian acquaintance with such outstanding Americans as Mr. Davies, General Day, Ambassador Hare, General Bradley, Secretary Finletter, General Collins and others was firm evidence of our good will. HRH said the King appreciated this fully and cited as a recent example of the King's preference for this country an offer from the British, when he was in London enroute to the United States, of various planes for Saudi Arabia. He said he referred the offer to his father, the King, who replied that he should refuse the offer with thanks because only American planes and equipment were wanted in Saudi Arabia. The Prince remarked that he had been instructed to negotiate for the purchase of one Constellation and ten two-motor planes, possibly Convairs, while he was in this country. He said he had accepted General Day's recommendation that the Constellation was too large and expensive for their needs and that ten Convairs were more than were required at the time. Accordingly, he was interested in purchasing only four Convairs and hoped that the Department of State could assist him in obtaining earlier delivery than seemed likely and also in obtaining a reduction in the unit price per plane in accordance with the DAF Agreement. Mr. McGhee told HRH that the Department would be very glad to render any appropriate assistance but added that the commercial policy of this Government might forbid interference in commercial relations between his Government and a private American firm. In regard to price discounts, he remarked that it was his understanding that the DAF Agreement provided for assistance in obtaining repair parts including engines, but did not envisage such assistance in regard to whole planes. The Prince agreed that this was true with respect to planes for the Saudi Arabian Airline but he said it was also his understanding that we would assist his Government in obtaining planes for defense purposes. Mr. McGhee agreed that this was true in respect to ten Super DC–3s or their equivalent or twelve fighter planes intended for the Defense establishment in Saudi Arabia. The Prince assured Mr. McGhee that there was no difference between transport facilities of the Defense establishment and the Saudi Arabian Airline and added that the latter operation was a responsibility of his Ministry. Mr. McGhee assured HRH that the Department would be very glad to confer with our Defense authorities and assist in any way possible.

786A.5/12-1751

Memorandum of Conversation Prepared in the Department of Defense

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, 17 December 1951.

Subject: Call by His Royal Highness, Prince Misha'al, Minister of Defense, Saudi Arabia

Participants: Secretary Lovett
Prince Misha'al, Minister of Defense
Saudi Arabia Ambassador, Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih
Mr. Akram Ojjeh, Personal Aide
Brigadier General Day, USAF, Escort Officer
Major Des Voigne, USAF, Interpreter
Lt Colonel Erwin, USAF, Foreign Liaison, Air Force
Captain G. Serpell Patrick, USN, Office of Foreign Military Affairs

At 3:30 p. m. Friday, 14 December 1951, His Royal Highness Prince Misha'al, Minister of Defense Saudi Arabia, called to take formal leave of Secretary of Defense prior to his departure for Saudi Arabia. As Prince Misha'al did not speak English, all conversation was conducted either through the interpreter or the Saudi Arabian Ambassador.

Prince Misha'al expressed his appreciation for the very many kindnesses extended to him during his visit here in the United States. Mr. Lovett inquired regarding the details that were observed on the tour of defense installations. General Day explained that they had seen a very good cross section of the armed forces training centers in which the Minister of Defense was especially interested. Mr. Lovett referred to the training films and training devices which had assisted immensely in reducing accidents, particularly, he recalled, in the operation of the B-26. He felt that the Saudi Arabian armed forces could profit immensely by the use of such aids prior to the arrival of actual equipment.

In regard to MDAP, it was pointed out that it was necessary that the United States military mission in Saudi Arabia should first assist in the reorganization of the army and secondly proceed with the replacement of equipment by those items which would be provided from the United States.

The Secretary asked Prince Misha'al if there was anything that he could do for him between now and his departure from the United States. Prince Misha'al thanked him and said that they were anxious to move ahead in equipping and training their army as rapidly as possible. The Secretary noted that the military mission would arrive in Saudi Arabia in January 1952. The Prince emphasized the fact that it was to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia's mutual benefit that Saudi

Arabia be better equipped to defend itself against Communist aggression.

General Day stated that on his recent visit with King Ibn Saud the King had told him that there were no Communists in Saudi Arabia. The King stated, "If you could find a Communist in Saudi Arabia, I will hand you his head."

Prince Misha'al, his party and Secretary Lovett, then went into the dining room where pictures were taken after which the visitors departed.

POINT FOUR GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA

[For text of Agreement signed at Jidda January 17, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1624.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA CONCERNING MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE

[For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Jidda and at Mecca June 18, 1951, entered into force June 18, 1951, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1460.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA CONCERNING THE AIR BASE AT DHAHRAN

[For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Mecca and at Jidda June 18, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1466.]

SYRIA

POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA; QUESTION INVOLVING DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION FOLLOWING A MILITARY *COUP D'ÉTAT*[1]

883.10/1-751: Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[2]

SECRET DAMASCUS, January 7, 1951—7 p. m.

314. Prime Minister[3] yesterday informed me he is about to put forward application for major loan from Export Import Bank. In conversation which then ensued he told me of serious difficulties in Parliament and even within own party in determining fundamental attitude and program of action in present critical world situation. He said whole range of problems has been brought to head by message from UN delegation forewarning government that Syria may suddenly be required to take important policy position for vote on resolution declaring Chinese Communists aggressor.[4]

Qudsi said that in series of secret meetings with political leaders and with Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee to review international situation he and his supporters were hard put to it to defend a policy sympathetic to democracies and were obliged to admit Syria's exposed situation today, her relative weakness if relying on own efforts, and uncertain prospects of practical and effective support from the West if situation deteriorates. Government's present program and projects would be adequate in less critical times but he is now being reproached for not facing up to crisis of world affairs. All leaders are agreed that drastic steps must be taken to build up public confidence, to invigorate defense organs, and above all to strengthen the economy. He said government was thinking of something like 100 million dollars. Under programs practicable with such credits Syria could pull herself together and steadily move forward with real contribution to stability and prosperity in ME.

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[1] For previous documentation on some of these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1201 ff. For documentation on Syrian involvement in U.S. security interests in the Near East and on U.S. participation in the development of petroleum resources of the Near East, see pp. 1 ff. and pp. 268 ff.

[2] Repeated to Paris, London, Cairo, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Jerusalem, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and Moscow.

[3] Nazim al-Qudsi.

[4] For documentation on the interest of the United States in securing a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly describing the Chinese Communists as aggressors in Korea, see vol. VII, pp. 1 ff.

He did not develop his ideas, if indeed they have as yet been formulated, on what projects would be undertaken and over period of time and what might be relationship to IBRD loan or whether decision had been reached as to the firmness of Syria's alignment with policies of democracies parallel with loan application. This was clearly his preliminary statement, to be amplified in further conversation tomorrow when, along with Norman Burns who is returning to Damascus for that purpose, I had in any case expected to see him on Point IV.[5]

Before seeing Qudsi I had called on Minister Finance explaining cold realities of Export Import Bank operations and had left with him formidable outline of requirements for even 10 million dollar proposition we then knew to be contemplated. I told Qudsi of this and suggested that he study these practical requirements before presenting any formal proposal.[6]

As general observation I noted Qudsi has intelligent and perceptive understanding of policy underlying credits to Greece, Turkey and Iran and he did not unduly press parallels. He made only passing reference to loans to Israeli (see Legtel 306 January 4).[7] He clearly wants Syrian application to appear to stand on own merits and not as counterbalance to aid to Israel. While giving him credit for this restraint we do not for a moment forget that Israeli question is close to surface in all this ferment and US policy must be shaped accordingly.

CANNON

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[5] A program of U.S. technical assistance to underdeveloped areas of the world, advanced by President Truman as the fourth foreign policy point of his inaugural address, January 20, 1949. For documentation on the program, see vol. I, pp. 1641 ff.

[6] The reservations referred to here concerning Syria's interest in an Export-Import Bank loan were supported in telegram 266 to Damascus, February 2, which instructed Cannon to inform Qudsi that such a loan application at the present time would complicate the current consideration of Syria's application for a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (883.10/2-251).

[7] Not printed.

683.00/2-951 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, February 9, 1951—6 p.m.

387. Prime Minister Qudsi last night spoke more openly than hitherto about Syria's relations with West. He said we need have no fear about where Syria will stand against Commie aggression. In case of invasion Syrian organized armed resistance might not last long

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, and Moscow.

or appear to help cause much at moment if invaders bring overwhelming forces but struggle would continue. Army is being strengthened in manpower and organization but must have correspondingly more and better equipment. "Nothing fancy and I do not care whether it comes from" a reference to fact that recent acquisitions are from France.

He does not worry about talk of neutralism for when time comes he is sure that Syria will fight for democracy. "But I cannot ask Syrian people to defend their misery. We must fulfill our promises for economic balance. Thus progress with problem of Palestine refugees, loans and Point IV (see separate telegram)[2] and military aid are all aspects of one question which is how fast we can move toward a clear-cut position. Syria will not fail cause of democracy in Middle East; she also will do utmost by own efforts."

Foregoing should be considered in context visit British General Robertson.[3] Latter's talk with me was largely exchange of views since he had not yet seen Qudsi or talked seriously with military. British Minister tells me Robertson talks were generally satisfactory but no promises were made and no commitments requested. Syrians put forward request for armament for four divisions of which three armored but did not demur when Robertson suggested they make start with one infantry division for which he would go on record as favoring supply of equipment from West. He told them bluntly not to expect much if any help in aviation. To him Syrians stressed familiar Palestine arguments more than in recent talks with me. Neutralism attitude was also noted but Robertson and British Minister consider this to be reasonably explained by factor of timing; namely that it will take some time for Syria to pull her forces together and in present weakness any firm public stand with West would put Syria too far out in front of other states hereabouts equally exposed and better able to meet threat. Robertson told them before any military aid could be considered West must know what material Syrians now have and how they proposed to utilize it. Syrians are therefore getting to work preparing lists. This explains Qudsi's remark to me when touching on military aid (see first paragraph) that maybe next week he would let us know results of review of military requirements now being made.

Indication of new policy trends suggested by foregoing will require further observation and analysis since Qudsi's forthright statements to me were made on eve my departure for Istanbul conference[4] which looms larger in light publicity given to attendance Admiral Carney and concurrent Finletter mission to Turkey.[5] They must also be viewed against background of requests for US and IBRD credits, not to speak of conversation with General Robertson earlier in day. For moment at least conjuncture all these factors has given Syrian Government sense of urgency in world situation.[6]

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[2] Telegram 388 from Damascus, February 9, reported progress on high-level discussion of economic assistance, made recommendations concerning the basic content of a Point Four agreement with Syria, and suggested a procedure for negotiating it (883.00 TA/2-951).

[3] Sir Brian H. Robertson, British Commander in Chief of Middle East Land Forces, was visiting various capitals in the Near East for conversations with the Defense Ministers.

CANNON

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[4] For documentation on a meeting of the Near East Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul, February 14 to 21, see pp 50 ff.

[5] Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter arrived in Turkey on February 12 on a visit at the invitation of the Turkish Government to observe the progress of Turkish armed forces under the Military Aid Program.

[6] Discussions in Syria concerning technical assistance continued after Cannon's return from the conference at Istanbul. Telegram 293, February 21, to Damascus, authorized him to proceed with the negotiation of a Point Four agreement (883.00 TA/2–2151). On March 11, in telegram 448, Cannon reported that Prime Minister Qudsi's resignation, handed to President Hashim al-Atasi on March 10, left negotiation of the agreement unsettled (883.00 TA/3–1351). Cannon added, in telegram 453, March 13, from Damascus, that he could obtain immediate signature of a Syrian note on the Point Four agreement by deleting certain points for later consideration but he preferred, in light of the general situation, to leave the next move to the Syrians (883.00 TA/3–1351).

883.00 TA/5–2851: Despatch

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

DAMASCUS, May 28, 1951.

No. 533

The Legation has not abandoned effort nor hope that a Point IV agreement may be signed with Syria. We hope that this despatch may soon be supplemented by the news that the general agreement has been signed. If the Syrians do sign the agreement, the present despatch will serve as an indication of problems which will continue to exist. If they do not sign the agreement, it will be an explanation for their failure to do so.

1. The failure of the Syrians to conclude a Point IV agreement is naturally owed to a complex of reasons, but the pervasive one is the Syrian suspicion of the United States because of its attitudes toward Israel. Every argument, every explanation is perverted by this suspicion: "Point IV is for Israel." "Point IV is a sop thrown to the Arab countries while the U.S. goes about its purpose of strengthening Israel." "Point IV is an effort to turn the Arab countries over to

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[1] Copies of the despatch were sent to the Office of the Treasury Representative at Cairo, to the Legation at Beirut, and to Ambassador John Blandford, the United States Representative to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWAP), at Beirut.

American firms and technicians so that they may pass information to the Jews." The Government officers concerned do not really believe these sayings entirely, but, exasperatingly enough, neither do they entirely reject them. The sophisticated Government servant assures you that the populace cherishes these beliefs and it is the populace whom he must face after signing such an agreement. Or, he may assure you that he is a rational man and believes in Point IV for the good it would do Syria in spite of the U.S. support of Israel, but this problem cannot be settled rationally in such times. Or, he may say, "You Americans are like the British who also sought to impose their will on the Arab world by making the countries dependent on their type of machines, their processes, their type of institution." Or he may say it is quite rational to refuse Point IV and suffer the consequences if thereby his purpose of enmity against Israel and its friends is served—and here he quotes the Old Testament story, well known in the Moslem world, of Samson who is willing to pull the temple down on his own head if he may thereby kill some Philistines.

2. Interwoven with this sentiment is the extreme economic nationalism made plausible for the time being by extraordinary agricultural prosperity. The Legation will be reporting more precisely some measures of the greater cotton boom in prospect for 1951. If cotton prices do not fall drastically and if the cotton crop is a good one, Syria may well earn LS 200 million more than last year on the cotton crop alone. Much of this will be in foreign exchange, since cotton is principally exported, and though the earnings accrue largely to the private sector, the Government may be able to share in the prosperity through an export tax. In relation to the usual level of economic activity, 1950 should be called nothing less than a boom and 1951 promises to be an expanded boom. This prosperity is Syrian managed, Syrian generated, Syrian achieved, without "Marshall Plan,[2] Point IV or any other foreign help." In volume, the prospective addition to national income is larger than the amount available under Point IV or even under the proposed Grant Aid Program. Under the impetus of nationalism and prosperity, the usually worthy spirit of national self-help has become a spirit of extreme economic isolationism, at least with regard to international economic aid programs. Technical assistance pokes its nose into problems of land ownership, financial institutions, customary ways of doing things. Established interest, economic and political, prefer an autonomous prosperity to the receipt of aid which requires changes in basic institutions.

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[2] The European Recovery Program, introduced by Secretary of State Marshall in his commencement address at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. The text of his remarks and documentation on the early development of this program are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. III, pp. 197 ff.

3. The rapid turnover of Governments[3] has been another impediment to the conclusion of a Point IV agreement. A general agreement was about to be signed when the Qudsi Government fell. With the present Government, the work of explanation and persuasion had to begin anew, not with the director-generals but with the Ministers who must make and take responsibility for the decisions.

4. The multiplicity of institutions proferring technical assistance has been another deterrent to the signing of a Point IV agreement. Syria is not a populous country. As an independent nation it is only a few years old. The civil service is small. Into this setting have come Point IV, UNRWA, WHO, FAO, British Middle East Office, the French, IBRD, the Near East Foundation, and others with offers of technical assistance/economic aid. Those who proffer aid outnumber those who have to make the decisions to receive it and the Syrians come to believe that technical assistance is easily to be had in a beneficiaries' market. As a consequence, they have little of the sense of urgency of those who offer aid.

5. The list of these causes began with the zeal against Israel which infects all thinking on Point IV. The list ends with a dead weight of inertia which hangs on the consideration of Point IV. The Syrians find it easier and more congenial to complain of the Ex-Im Bank loan to Israel than to prepare an application for a bank loan. In a day of presenting again the desire of the United States Government that Syria sign the general Point IV agreement, Legation officers have been told by responsible Syrian Government officials that the U.S. has refused to give Point IV aid to Syria![4]

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:
Paul Geren
Second Secretary of Legation

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[3] On March 10 it was announced that Prime Minister Qudsi and his Cabinet had resigned after several meetings with the President and Army leaders. After an unsuccessful effort by Khalid al-Azm to form a new government, Qudsi announced on March 23 that he had done so, only to resign a second time on March 24. On March 27, Azm announced formation of a new Cabinet, and on April 7 he weathered a Cabinet crisis with a 52–0 vote of confidence in Parliament with 42 abstentions.

[4] For further discussion of the reasons for the delay in negotiation of a Point Four agreement with Syria, see the memorandum of conversation between McGhee and Jacob Blaustein of June 11, 1951, p. 707.

783.56/7-1151 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

DAMASCUS, July 11, 1951—3 p. m.

19. Deptel 7079 June 25 to Paris.[2] As seen from here, fol factors seem important in determining US attitude on supply aircraft Syria.

1. We fully agree Syrians still have far to go in making best use of even conventional aircraft. Indeed their air force within period predominant in our mil thinking can hardly become serious element in defense of ME, however equipped.

2. It wld be great mistake, however, to ignore polit and psychological value of few planes. We must find way to counteract two pernicious beliefs: (*a*) That we hold Syrians incapable of using modern arms; and (*b*) That in case of war Western Powers have no serious intention of firm stand beyond shores of Mediterranean and Suez. Any talk of concept of security in Dept has thus far been taken with extreme skepticism.

3. Syrian Pri Min recently demanded with reference to General Robertson's visit in Feb, and Brit Min was authorized to give, assurances re defense of ME. These were built around concept Suez wld be "base not line of defense". Syrians expect this "guarantee" to be given concrete expression by early delivery mil equipment of kinds and quantities sufficient to demonstrate real intent to strengthen ME. Our hopes for favorable attitudes in Arab hinterland and possible bases here in event major conflict depend on concrete action which wld give grounds for confidence our intentions.

4. Syrians' favorite example of unreliability of Anglo-Saxons is Brit failure to deliver dozen Gloucester Meteor Jets ordered and paid for more than year ago and for which several pilots already given Jet raining in UK.

5. As in everything else, Israel question and problem of maintaining alance in arms supply cannot be ignored. We must anticipate bitter eaction here to denial of event token sales Jet aircraft to Syria when yrians learn of recent sale by France to Israel of 40 Mosquitos with ported 80 more to follow. They will, of course, assume this deal had rior US approval. Our Air Att thinks Israeli Air Force already has reater potential than North Arab States and shld soon be more than atch for all Arab Forces combined.

6. We may well deplore trend toward policy under which questions supply apportionment or withholding of Jet planes become yardck of internatl affections. Rationally we probably shld continue to ny Jets to NE States not ready for them but US has itself done much make other nations regard their security problems in terms of air

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Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Ankara, and Arab capitals.

Not printed.

power. Unless we are ready with substantial substitutes, we must expect this pressure to increase and can hope for little support from local mil for such programs as MSP if they get notion it contemplates supply only outmoded material.

7. Syrians know any major help from West means prior coordination but wld try to capitalize on special US–UK and French interest. Since French take advantage of every opportunity to build up their own special econ and polit position here, some partial fulfillment of prior Brit commitment shld be arranged if any Jets are to be made available to Syria.

8. Best of all wld be demonstration direct US interest. With improvement in our supply position and supposing easing of demand for combat use in Korea, US might venture few planes as primarily polit and morale proposition. Joint US–UK project might be easiest entry, MSP then to take over.

9. Amb Hare's reflections re SA (last para Jidda's 750 June 25)[3] highly pertinent with difference that in Syria material aid must be visible before training missions begin to arrive.[4]

CANNON

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[3] Not printed.

[4] In telegram 28 to Damascus, July 17, the Department thanked the Legation for the penetrating analysis in telegram 19 and assured it that no U.S. jets and, to its knowledge no French or British jets, had been released to Israel. It listed several reasons why the French supply of other combat aircraft to Israel should not be viewed with alarm by the Syrians. As regards U.S. supply, telegram 28 stated that the limited supply of U.S. jets, the present tension in the Near East, the high combat potential of jets, the lack of sufficiently experienced crews in either Israel or the Arab states, and the still inadequate mechanism for coordinating U.S., U.K., and French arms supply to the area, all argued for delay in considering Syrian requests for jet aircraft. (783.56/7–1151)

783.13/8–1251 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, August 12, 1951—5 p.m.

81. Legdes 427, April 9.[2] Formation Hakim Cabinet[3] has temporarily settled long-standing feud between army and Populists. In period since resignation Qudsi Cabinet last March, Populists had effectively discredited army-picked Azm Cabinet (Legdes 436 April 11[2]) and had clearly demonstrated that Azm could command neither real confidence nor cooperation from Parliament. Events of past few weeks had revealed that if army and Populists cld not come to agreement Syria was in danger of rigged elections (to reduce

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ankara, and Arab capitals.

[2] Not printed.

[3] On August 9, Hassan al-Hakim succeeded Khalid al-Azm as Prime Minister. The latter had resigned on July 31 following a strike of government employees

Populist membership in Parliament) or possible military dictatorship. Reliable Leg source had reported that Shishikli [4] had considered these as only alternative to "dictatorship by Populists".

We thus consider new cabinet as compromise arrangement which rids country of Azm who had become source of embarrassment to army and was "bete noire" of Populists. Populists are in strong agreement with PriMin Hakim's ideas on "economy in govt" (Hakim is reputed to have army permission to economize even in military expenditures) but at same time most of new Ministers known to be well-disposed toward army. Since five Populist Mins are "army friends" and are members of "Republican" wing of People's Party, army has some assurance there will be no moves toward Syro-Iraqi or other Hashemite Union plans. In general, cooler heads compose new cabinet, and this should make it easier to patch up army-Populist differences and move ahead with essential legislation.

Probably most encouraging aspect new cabinet is definitely pro-western disposition of PriMin and greater part of his cabinet (Legtel 72 August 7).[5] If Leg is correct in its analysis that it has been formed on sound basis, new cabinet [may be?] means of bettering US-Syrian relations and securing Syrian cooperation in matters of mutual interest. We anticipate that Hakim Govt will show more realistic attitude toward Point IV [6] and MSP. Re former I intend letting PriMin set pace because he will have much to undo; re latter we will be guided by Dept and Congressional action, though we can proceed at once with indoctrination of new personalities. At earliest opportunity I will reiterate invitation to Jap Peace Treaty Conference at San Francisco and ascertain PriMin's thinking re Syrian delegation.

CANNON

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[4] Col. Adib al-Shishakli, Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army after May 31.

[5] Not printed.

[6] United States technical aid under the Point Four Program had been rejected by Prime Minister Azm in an announcement on June 7.

783.56/10-1851 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, October 18, 1951—10 p. m.

224. Deptel 1592, Sept 14 to Paris,[2] Deptel 28 July 17 to Damascus,[3] and related correspondence. We believe arms aid with some portion of it on grant basis is a necessary part of US approach to Syria at

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1080.

present time. Record of last two years proves Syria will procure arms with whatever cost to constitutional ideals and development possibilities and that it will accord internal leadership to whoever can procure them and friendship to country which supplies them. It seems necessary for US to appropriate this necessity for whatever good can be gained for West and for whatever control can be exercised for good of Syria and ME.

We realize Syrian conception of purpose of arms is still primarily security against feared Israeli attack and only secondarily security against Communist aggression. But provision of arms will put US in position of influence which it does not now occupy and if we have the skill we may be able to use this position bring about an improvement in Syro-Israeli relations, not by frontal attack but by helping Syrians rescue themselves from inferiority feelings (Legtel 221 Oct 18[4]) and thereby nihilism through the remedy of security as envisaged in milit component MSP and constructive activity as envisaged in economic aid component. We can exact *quid pro quos* in the administration of such assistance. We can regulate flow in accordance with response elicited. Important thing is to show evidence quickly in form of milit equipment. There is in our view a risk greater than any other here in allowing the present nihilism to drift towards a culmination which will be pro-Communist as well as anti-Israel. In the absence of an ideal solution we believe it better to attempt the method which may free Syrian constructive energies than it is to do nothing. This strikes us as the more worthy attempt since the marginal demand for a single aircraft or anti-aircraft gun is probably higher than for countries already integrated into mutual defense programs. An immed token offer by US wld enable experiment without jeopardizing ME peace.

CLARK

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[4] Not printed.

783.00/11-1951

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Gnade) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1951.

Subject: Weekly Summary

Syria

After Prime Minister Hakim submitted his resignation last week amid the excitement caused by his open espousal of MEC, Independent Zaki Khatib was given the task of forming a cabinet. However, Khatib was unable to carry out the task, and the UP now reports that the neutralist populist Maruf Dawalibi is now trying the same job. This is bad news for the West, for Dawalibi is violently anti-Western. Many observers believe that the basic cause of the Hakim cabinet's fall was the Populist-Army struggle for control of the Government; Hakim's statements having afforded an excuse for an attempt at replacing him with a Populist prime minister.

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[1] Drafted by M. L. Smith (NE).

Hakim's ouster is not necessarily final, and there is a possibility that his views may prevail. He informed the British Minister that Shishikli had nothing to do with his resignation and that he believed Shishikli desires to cooperate with MEC and could bring strong influence to bear on the politicians, provided he could show concrete evidence of arms aid and/or a "gesture" by the West in its Palestine policy.

Dawalibi and Qudsi, who has also been considered for the Premiership, marched at the head of an orderly procession demonstrating in behalf of Egypt last Wednesday.

A committee of Secretaries General of the various ministries is meeting to study the economic aid features of MSP. Definite projects were discussed but it is hard to determine what the chances of Syrian participation will be pending the formation of a new cabinet.[2]

[Here follows a summary of the week's events in Lebanon and Iraq.]

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[2] In the days following Hakim's resignation on November 10, several individuals attempted to form a Cabinet. Dawalibi succeeded in doing so on the morning of November 28.

Editorial Note

A military *coup d'état* was effected by Colonel Shishakli during the night of November 28–29. On November 30, telegram 310 from Damascus described this coup as the latest evidence of a long-standing feud between the Army and the People's Party over the exercise of political power in Syria (783.13/11–3051). The pretext for the coup was said to be the Army's fear that, under Dawalibi, government policy would favor civilian control of the military, neutrality between the Western and Soviet blocs, and unification with Iraq, and possibly Jordan, under a "Greater Syria" plan, rather than sympathetic consideration of the four-power proposals for a Middle East Command. For documentation on Syria's participation in regional defense planning, see pages 1 ff.

783.00/12-351

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Gnade) to the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1951.

Subject: Weekly Summary

Syria

The immediate cause of Colonel Shishikli's seizure of power November 30 was apparently Dawalibi's plan to appoint a new chief of staff as the first act of his cabinet. Shishikli tried to preserve the appearance of constitutionality by securing Dawalibi's resignation but Dawalibi's obstinate refusal to back down forced Shishikli into the role of dictator, a position he has attempted to avoid.

Saturday President Al-Atassi announced that the Dawalibi Cabinet had resigned and that Hamid Al-Khudja, of the pro-army bloc in parliament, had been designated Premier. Evidently the Populists in Parliament refused to cooperate by giving a vote of confidence to any new cabinet; therefore no formation of a replacement government was possible. In order to solve the impasse, President Atassi resigned his office yesterday (December 2) and turned over authority to Colonel Shishikli to act as Chief of State. A French ticker from Damascus announced today that Colonel Selo, former Minister of Defense, would take executive and legislative charge, exercising the powers of Chief of State, President of the Council and Minister of Defense. Shishikli has dissolved Parliament and announced his intention of holding new elections.

Dr. Dawalibi, most of his cabinet and his supporters are still in jail following their arrest early Thursday morning.

The Legation is hopeful that Shishikli may be able to give Syria the decisive leadership lacking in the past and even in the long run to develop a climate in which political democracy can function. However, if he has to fall back upon Haurani for support, he may not be able to retain the reins of government and Western interests may suffer. (Haurani and his Arab Socialists advocate a radical land reform program, which has occasioned a strong reaction from the landlord class. Even though Haurani himself is not a Communist, there are reliable reports that Communists have penetrated the top echelons of his party and the party might easily fall into Communist hands were Haurani's influence removed. It is reported that Colonel Shishikli has been disturbed lest his close association with Haurani bring him harm).

Shishikli's coup was carried out quietly with no known disturbances, injuries or loss of life, by few junior officers under Shishikli's personal supervision. There has been no active opposition in carrying out the coup, despite some dissident factionalism within the Army.

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[1] Drafted by M. L. Smith (NE).

[Here follows a summary of the week's events in Iraq and Lebanon.]

783.00/12-351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

PRIORITY RESTRICTED DAMASCUS, December 3, 1951—5 p. m.

321. In note to Leg[2] today transmitting info contained in mil order No. 2 (Legtel 320, December 3)[3] naming Selo Chief of State and authorizing secys gen to exercise functions of mins, FonOff note asserted whole affair "purely internal," that elections will be held shortly, and that "this internal event will not lead to any change in Syria's foreign policy or its international relations." Note thus poses formal question of recognition.

CLARK

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Arab capitals, Moscow, and Tripoli.

[2] Foreign Office note S 90 dated December 3, not printed. A copy was transmitted to Washington in despatch 314 from Damascus, December 3; 783.02/12-351.

[3] Telegram 320 is not printed. A copy of Military Order No. 2 was transmitted to Washington on December 3 in despatch 309; 783.00/12-351.

783.00/12-351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, December 3, 1951—6 p. m.

322. Re Legtel 321, Dec 3.[2] In meeting this morning Brit, Fr, Turk Mins and I agreed recommend our respective govts coordinate in order present common front on recognition. We also agreed we would not reply to official note or accept official invitations nor seek meetings with new Syrian Govt leaders without instructions from our govt. Consensus was that Shishikli wld endeavor seek contacts with one or more representatives four powers and that in such event we or our reps might meet with him or his emissaries informally learn his views making clear we acting in our personal capacities.

Leg will be guided accordingly unless Dept instructs otherwise. Meanwhile we continue be guided by Deptel 125, April 1, 1949.[3]

CLARK

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Tripoli, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Arab capitals.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed; it instructed the Legation, pending clarification of the current situation, to avoid all formal contact and correspondence with the old or new regime except necessary consular correspondence pertaining to protection of American interests (890D.00/3-3049).

783.02/12-651 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 6, 1951—10:40 a. m.

212. Ref Legtel 322 Dec 3.[2] Dept believes you shld continue maintain close liaison with Brit, Fr, Turks Damascus on subj recognition new govt. Dept feels you shld be more forthcoming with new govt than was case at time Zaim coup when delayed action on recognition by great powers may have contributed downfall of govt with reform program.[3] Therefore you shld maintain informal contacts with members new govt. Syr Min was received informally by McGhee yesterday.[4]

Dept tentative thinking is if new regime capable maintaining self internally and honors Syr internatl obligations, little advantage gained by delaying recognition. Believe, however, Western powers probably shld not recognize new govt before an Arab State initiates such action. Precipitate recognition might alienate pro-West elements among Populists and convince chauvinist Syrian public Shishikli's action inspired by one or more Western powers as already alleged by USSR.

Dept feels quiet Western recognition such as by acknowledgment Syrian note re govt change cld be real support for Shishikli and subj Legs views and those of UK, France and Turkey is now inclined favor reasonably speedy action this regard. Comments Arab caps requested.

Pending decision on recognition you may continue routine visa and notarial services.

WEBB

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[1] Repeated to Arab capitals and Jerusalem, presumably for action; and to Ankara, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris for information. Drafted by Gnade (NE) and cleared by WE, BNA, GTI, and L.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For documentation on the recognition problem raised by the military coup *d'état* by Col. Husni al-Za'im on March 30, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 1630 ff.

[4] Assistant Secretary McGhee received Faiz el-Khouri at the latter's request at noon on December 4. The Minister said that he had been instructed to convey the assurances contained in his country's note S 90 (see telegram 321, December 3, p. 1085). He added that U.S. support of the new government would be helpful, especially if given without "show" or fanfare and if it followed recognition action by the Arab states. McGhee said he would be happy to continue to meet informally with the Syrian Minister. A memorandum of the conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Kopper, dated December 4, is in Department of State file 783.00/12-451.

783.02/12–651 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET DAMASCUS, December 6, 1951—3 p. m.

334. Today French, Turk, Brit Mins and I exchanged view informally re new regime. We are agreed it appears in complete control of situation throughout Syria and barring danger of assassination which most ME rulers share in common there is little prospect of its being overthrown. Yesterday French MilAtt saw Shishikli who referred to Syrian grievances against West, especially Palestine, but expressed desire coop with west and hinted he might even go along with MEC without Egypt if assured adequate supply of modern arms. (We wld treat this with reserve and raise question as to whether Syrian MEC membership wld be a good thing until new regime had some accomplishments to show Syrian people in other fields. It is, nevertheless, a significant indication of Shishikli's attitude.) He also wld have elections within two or three months and French MilAtt recd impression no new Cabinet wld be formed in meantime. Unless Shishikli can form Cabinet of moderates he wld have to rely on some extremist support which wld not be in our interest; perhaps absence of Cabinet not a bad thing for time being view qualifications all secys gen (Legtel 321, Dec 3)[2] except Secy Gen FonOff Jamal Farra who we understand may be replaced.

We agree adverse factors are continued imprisonment elected officials and position of influence Akram Hawrani still has. These are internal matters and we have found nonrecognition is not a useful instrument of policy. Moreover, efforts to influence Shishikli take internal steps he feels impracticable wld probably not serve useful purpose. We cld probably do more to influence him after recognition than before.

We concurred recognition by Western Powers shld probably not long be withheld after Arab States extend it. According present info only Iraq seems likely hold out and Brit Min suggested Iraq Govt might be advised futility of waging long fight if other Arab States ready recognize.

Leg attachés maintaining informal contact with lower echelons, including Shishikli's ADC and I have suggested asst army attaché hint to ADC army attaché he wld be glad have talk with Shishikli in private capacity learn his views.

If notwithstanding foregoing, Dept believes specific *quid pro quos* shld attach to recognition we wld appreciate guidance.

CLARK

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Ankara, and Moscow.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1085.

783.02/12–751 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 7, 1951—6:49 p. m.

512. Deptels 213[2] and 212 Dec 6.[3]

1. Dept met today again with reps Brit and Fr Emb Wash re recognition Shishikli govt Syria.

2. Brit rep without instr but Fr stated Fr Min Damascus instructed Syrian note as soon as US, Brit and Turk colleagues agree. This action Fr FonOff designed strengthen Shishikli since in its view speed important factor.

3. Dept while agreeing with Fr early action stated preference for letting Arab States recognize Shishikli before Western Powers. Jidda's 298 Dec 6[4] as well as press reports indicate Arab States except Iraq may already have given tacit recognition.

4. Consult with your Brit, Turk and Fr colleagues and when you reach agreement re timing you are authorized send simple ack Syrian note. This act wld constitute US recognition.

5. Dept favors "business as usual" attitude. Dept will not issue press statement but will answer affirmatively inquiries re recognition.

6. Re penul para Deptel 213[5] Turk rep here without info but expressed view Turks wld be pro-Shishikli as they were pro-Zaim.[6]

WEBB

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Paris, Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Drafted by Jones (NEA) and cleared by Matthews (G), Godley (WE), Coe (BNA), Moore (GTI), Tate (L), and Whiteman (L/ARA).

[2] Telegram 213 to Damascus was the information copy of a cable that went to London, Paris, and Ankara. It stated that the Department had discussed with the British and French Embassy representatives on December 4 the recognition question and the advisability of renewing offers of economic and military assistance to Syria. The telegram requested the views of the British, French, and Turkish Governments on these matters. (783.00/12–651)

[3] *Ante*, p. 1086.

[4] Not printed.

[5] Reference here is to that part of the telegram described in footnote 2 above which requested the Turkish Foreign Office views and stated that the Department would also raise the matter with the Turkish Embassy in Washington.

[6] Telegram 519 from Ankara, December 10, informed the Department that Turkey had instructed its Minister in Syria to consult with his French, U.S., and British colleagues and, if they agreed, proceed with the plan presented in this telegram 512. (783.02/12–1051)

783.02/12–851 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY DAMASCUS, December 8, 1951—1 p. m.

344. We appreciate Dept's instructions re recognition new Syrian regime (Deptel 312 [*212*], December 6)[2] and fully endorse line of action set forth. We believe acknowledgement of circular not best means effecting recognition, particularly because it can be easily concerted with other western powers and wld avoid previous situations when French tried steal show.

Today Asst Army Attaché talked briefly to Shishikli who after brief résumé recent events said "next move is up to you". With indications that Arab states may shortly act to recognize regime we think immed agreement with British, French and Turks on Dept's line of action including draft reply to FonOff note highly desirable.[3]

CLARK

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Ankara, Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Tripoli.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1086.

[3] In response, the Department of State in telegram 228 to Damascus, December 11, instructed the Legation, subject to agreement by the French, British, and Turkish Ministers in Damascus, to join with tnem in drafting a simple note acknowledging the Syrian note of December 3, which would constitute recognition of the new Syrian Government (783.02/12–851).

Editorial Note

The presentation to Syria of the note of acknowledgment referred to in telegrams 512 and 344, page 1088 and *supra*, was delayed by various complications. Legation talks in Damascus with Saudi Arabian and Egyptian diplomatic representatives seemed to indicate that the Arab countries would not be taking action on recognition for several days (telegram 349 from Damascus, December 10; 783.02/12–1051). Telegram 350 from Damascus, of the same date, stated that Clark and his French, British, and Turkish colleagues had decided to maintain only informal contacts with Syria for the time being while awaiting clarification of the Arab states attitude. The telegram further stated that the British and French representatives in Damascus were still awaiting instructions to proceed with recognition in concert with the United States and Turkish representatives (783.02/12–1051). Telegram 356 from Damascus, December 11, reported that, in the absence of an unforeseen development or instructions to the contrary, the four-power representatives would acknowledge receipt of the Syrian note on the morning of December 15 (783.02/12–1151). It was explained in telegram 360 from Damascus, December 13, that the decision to wait until December 15 was made in part because the British representative was still without instructions and it was thought preferable to deliver the note quietly on a Saturday rather than at the close of the day on the 13th or on the 14th which was a religious holiday (783.02/12–1351). On the 14th, the Legation received word from Washington that Lebanon had decided to recognize Syria (telegram 232 to Damascus, December 14; 783.02/12–1251).

The four powers presented their notes on December 15 (telegram 363 from Damascus, December 15; 783.02/12–1551). A copy of the United States note 421, dated December 15, was enclosed in despatch 335 from Damascus, December 17 (783.02/12–1751), and read as follows: "The Legation of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Syria and, pursuant to instructions from the Government of the United States, has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ministry's note number S–90, dated December 3, 1951, informing the Legation of the formation of the Government headed by H. E. Colonel Fawzi Silaw. The Legation avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration."

783.02/12–1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1951—8:17 p. m.

238. Re Depcirtel 512 Dec 7.[2]

1. Reps UK and Fr Embs met with Dept Dec 10 and discussed informally fol tentative p[ro]g[ra]m suggested by Dept. No conclusion reached but Dept explained it wld send pgm to you for ur comments and as basis for secret discussion with ur UK, Fr and Turk colleagues if and when they receive instrs. Brit and Fr reps reporting substance pgm FonOffs and Embs London and Paris may wish show this tel to FonOffs. Emb Ankara requested raise possibility pgm this kind with Turks with view eliciting instrs Turk Min Damascus. Turk Emb here generally informed but Ankara is action pt.

2. *Pgm begins.* First step now agreed US, UK, French and Turks is recognition new govt. This may take place (Depcirtel 512 of Dec 7) near future.[3]

3. It is in interest West aid Shishikli in efforts he may make to establish pro-West stable and progressive govt in Syria. Such aid

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut for Locke, and Jerusalem. Drafted by Gnade (NE) and cleared b Gardiner (NEA), Coe (BNA), Godley (WE), Moore (GTI), Ohly and Emer (S/MSA), and Bingham and Fryer (TCA). Cleared with the Department Defense by Jones (NEA).

[2] *Ante*, p. 1088.

[3] See editorial note, *supra*.

cld hurt as well as help him and consequently shld be adroit, unobtrusive and as substantial as possible but most importantly speedy. Informal comite four chiefs of mission Damascus is valuable instrumentality which cld assist in execution this aid pgm. Believe committee shld now, without revealing fact Syrs, study and report their conclusions re method, timing, type and amount aid (econ, technical, cultural, mil) which might help people of Syria.

4. Even though Shishikli proposes elections two or three months hence, assumed he will set up interim govt program which will doubtless (ref his conversation with Fr Mil Att)[4] involve some fon aid for which four reps will be approached individually sooner or later. Since important element decisions US, UK, Fr and Turks to give aid wld be on-the-spot joint evaluation Damascus comite we wld hope members wld pool informally requests received from Shishikli so that dimensions of his wants may be established, competition avoided and duplication of aid effort eliminated. While likely only fraction his needs promptly satisfiable it wld be in common interest for each of four powers assume according their ability appropriate share of burden. If Shishikli does not produce his own program in near future, comite might consider whether desirable stimulate its formulation. This connection comite might wish draft informally illustrative aid outline for study four govts but not for revelation to Syrs taking into account priority Syr needs and desires. Once agreed by Damascus comite and govts such outline might provide useful talking points for individual conversations each of four reps with Shishikli and other Syr leaders—and avoid possibility contradictions or appearance of rivalries. *Pgm ends.*

5. In various Shishikli conversations he has emphasized two difficult points: (*a*) supply modern arms and (*b*) assist improvement Syr-Israel rels. Major difficulties involved both problems but especially latter, and great care shld be taken not mislead Shishikli into idea much can be done re Israel. Believe emphasis shld be placed on getting underway econ aid projects for benefit first of Syr people and second Arab refugees. With emergence stronger and progressive Syria economically viable and politically stable, relations with Syr neighbors likely to adjust themselves gradually to Syr satisfaction.

6. FYI gen Fr attitude as expressed Fr Emb here is highly favorable to such pgm (Deptel 237 Dec 14[5]). UK much more reserved and inclined move slowly until it is apparent Shishikli regime deserves aid. Brits make pt regime must be "extra strong" to carry weight of

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[4] See telegram 334, December 6, from Damascus, p. 1087.

[5] Not printed; it summarized the views of a French Embassy representative concerning the ways in which France would like to contribute to the economic assistance of Syria and to the integration of Syrian refugees (783.02/12–1451).

charges that support evidence it is Western creation. Moreover UK not in good position to help re either finances or arms. Turk attitude appears satisfactory.

ACHESON

783.00/12-1751

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Gnade) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Subject: Weekly Summary

Syria

Representatives of the United States, Britain, France, Turkey, Italy, Belgium, and Saudi Arabia sent to the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs notes acknowledging receipt of the Syrian Government's notice to them that Colonel Fawzi Silu had become Chief of State. According to a US Legation spokesman, this formal contact was tantamount to recognition of the new Syrian Government. A few days ago the Lebanese Government made a similar gesture. According to a *New York Times* report of December 16, Jordan's delegate made his country's act of recognition directly to Colonel Shishikli.

This act of recognition by three Arab States allays fears that Egypt might attempt to obtain Syrian endorsement of the Egyptian position vis-à-vis MEC and the British as a price for Egyptian-sponsored recognition by the Arab States. Syria might have been forced to pay such a price if the Saudis had backed up the Egyptians. Now Syria remains unrecognized by only three of her fellow Arab States: Egypt, Iraq and Yemen.

The Egyptians are said in some quarters to be holding off until new elections were held in Syria. The Iraqi Minister to Egypt claimed that Egypt was waiting on Saudi Arabia before taking definite steps to recognize Shishikli's Government. The Saudi Arabian attaché in . . . , on the other hand, suggested that Egypt was hesitating because of the alleged anti-Egyptian influence of the PPS in the new Government.* He also reported that King Ibn Saud, being against Syria–Iraq union and following his policy of support to the strongest man in Syria, had been quite pleased by the recent events in Syria.

The Secretary General of the Foreign Office has assured the US Legation that the Populists arrested on November 28 are well-treated and that all their rights will be respected.

[Here follow the sections on Lebanon and Iraq.]

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[1] Memorandum drafted by M. L. Smith (NE).

*Egypt's position as leader among the Arab states might be challenged by a realization of the P.P.S.'s aspirations toward a Greater Syria. [Footnote in the source text.]

783.00/12-1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria-Iraq Affairs (Gnade)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1951.

Participants: Faiz El-Khouri—Minister of Syria
Mr. G. Lewis Jones—NE
Mr. R. E. Gnade—NE

Problem: Discussion of new elements in Syrian political situation.

Discussion:

The Syrian Minister came to make his first formal call at the Department since the change of Government at Damascus. Mr. Jones showed him the *New York Times* article which quoted an American Legation spokesman at Damascus as saying that the Legation's acknowledgment of Syria's note regarding the new Syrian Government was "tantamount to recognition". The Minister was puzzled by the meaning of tantamount, and was relieved to learn that it meant "equivalent", and that it had been used because no formal act of recognition was required for the new Government as would have been required had there been a new regime in Syria.

The Minister stated: In his opinion the dissolution of Parliament and the other recent acts of the new Government in Syria meant that the Syrian Constitution was no longer operating and that therefore, in fact, the new Government was not bound to hold elections in four months as required by the Constitution. He cited a parallel occasion in 1939 when the 'Azm Government resigned and Parliament was dissolved by the French authorities. Government by the Secretaries General of the various Ministries should be good for Syria. These technicians will be able to work free of outside pressure and without political influences bearing down on them. It is high time that decrees of past governments be put into effect and the debris of years of instability be cleared up. The members of the Dawalibi Government are not anxious to be freed, because in the opinion of many Syrian politicians it is dangerous to work either with or against a Government such as the present one. The old slogan, "no change in policy", which each government espoused, is no good. The Parliament prevented the government from progressing. Now is the time for a new straight-forward policy in Syria. The Minister hopes that the new Government will tell the American Minister that it has taken a clear decision to cooperate with the West. Details of the cooperation can be worked out as they arise.

Mr. Jones interposed that he hoped that the new policy would not necessarily be limited to a pro-US policy but would be a wider, pro-Western policy. He asked whether the new Government would not set up a forward-looking program with such items as land reform, cotton cultivation improvement, swamp drainage, land tenure reform, etc. He suggested that the Government should show such a program to the Western chiefs of mission and then ask, "How can you help us"? He explained that the West has long had the feeling of being rebuffed by Syria. The Western powers came with clean hands to help, but were not welcomed. The new Government can now reevaluate Syrian policy and then come to the West to ask for aid. A strong man like Shishikli must first make the decision and then approach us.

The Minister commented that in any case the Syrians were not ready to be satellites of any power. The Syrians considered themselves the prime bearers of the torch of independence in the Arab World. Their land has been the heart of the movement for freedom among the Arabs.

Mr. Jones answered that the US wants cooperation, not satellites. Turkey, for example, is no satellite but works closely with the US and the West. The Arabs must get over their fear of being satellites. It is up to the Syrian Government to take the initiative of cooperating. The West cannot step forward and offer help; it must be asked. Western initiative in the matter might be fatal for Shishikli, a kiss of death. It is up to Shishikli to set up a program and then ask for aid—not for satellite status, which neither he nor we want.

Minister Khouri expressed his firm conviction that the future of Syria cannot be separate from that of all the Arab States. He always feels it wrong to come to the Department as the Syrian Chief of Mission in Washington, because basically he speaks as an Arab, not as a Syrian. The fundamental cause of Arab instability is Israel and the lack of security which because of the Israeli threat hangs like a shadow over the Arabs. Continued American aid to Israel makes US sincerity and cooperativeness questionable to the Arabs. With this the Minister launched into a long diatribe against Israel and against American support of the new Israeli State.

Mr. Jones concluded by pointing out to the Minister that one way in which the Israeli danger, as the Arabs saw it, could be countered was by the development of a strong stable Arab State as a counter balance to Israel in the Middle East. Now was the time when Syria might have the opportunity to develop itself into such a counter force.

783.02/12–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, December 17, 1951—9 p. m.

3619. Deptel 238, December 14 to Damascus [2] rptd Paris 3505 and other addressees. Emb today discussed reftel with FonOff which makes fol comment:

1. FonOff has strong misgivings re creation comite of four chiefs mission in Damascus. It considers important that mins meet and discuss probs but that it wld be extremely unfortunate for Syrians to know that formal comite of four chiefs was mtg and making formal report. FonOff is of opinion that Syrians wld resent it and it wld be to detriment to interest of four powers.

2. FonOff agrees that speed is obviously of importance but considers that unobtrusiveness is even more important in connection with action taken.

3. FonOff is very favorable disposed to proposals in reftel but repeats its previous warning against advisability endeavoring obtain Syrian assurance re MEC too soon.

4. FonOff considers it regrettable that Turks are to be associated so closely in this program. It admits that association with Turks from time to time is desirable but points out that previous Turkish-Syrian tension shld never be forgotten and that it is unthinkable that Syrians wld be willing to receive Turkish assistance. FonOff recognizes that matter has gone too far to avoid Turkish association with action proposed but stresses undesirability creation of Four-Power Comite in Damascus.

BRUCE

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[1] Repeated to Damascus, London, and Ankara.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1090.

783.5 MSP/12–2051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 20, 1951—1:16 p. m.

247. Eyes Minister only. Deptel 209 Dec 1.[2]

1. Director Mutual Security in response Joint State–Defense recommendation with JCS concurrence has declared Syria eligible

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[1] Repeated, eyes Ambassador only, to London, Paris, and Ankara. Drafted by Gnade and cleared by him with Captain Patrick of the Department of Defense. Cleared also with Emery, Coe, Godley, Berry (NEA), Moore, and Ohly.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Legation that the Department of State was discussing with the Department of Defense the possibility of providing early cash reimbursable aid to Syria in token quantities and requested the Army Attaché at Damascus to provide through Defense channels an amplified and imaginative list of legitimate Syrian military supply needs. He was requested not to approach the Syrians in preparing the list. (783.5/12–151)

cash reimbursable aid under Sec 408*e* Mutual Defense Act 1949 as amended.[3]

2. Defense–JCS concurrence confined to limited amt selected equipment consisting of "non-competitive items under existing priority guidance formulated by JCS and which do not interfere with current US or MDA programs." Concurrence also stipulates all mil equipment of this kind which can be readily supplied shld not be committed Syr but portion earmarked other NE countries in anticipation arms requests.

3. Draft texts notes which might be exchanged between Leg and Syr Govt to form US–Syr agreement under 408*e*, being forwarded airmail to Leg.

4. Defense has worked out list items which might be made available Syr in modest amts on cash reimbursable basis within next six months. If certain these items wld fill needs Syr Army and supply wld advance US objectives without creating difficulties such as competition with Fr, Dept suggests Leg and Defense Attachés work out recommendations re items and quantities Syrs cld use so that prices and delivery date forecasts can be drawn up here for Legs info.

[Here follows a list of military equipment available from United States supplies, followed by comments of the Department of Defense concerning limitations on the speed with which it could be delivered and on the amount of spare parts available.]

9. After US–Syria exchange notes above action wld place Syria on equal footing Saudi Arabia; only these two NE states so far made eligible for any kind mil aid. Eligibility Syria designed make possible prompt substantive US participation any Western efforts assist Syria with arms equipment. Dept sets store by recommendations informal comite chiefs of mission (Deptel 238, Dec 14)[4] as coordinating channel potential US, UK, Fr and Turk aid. Dept will not reveal its internal steps toward eligibility Syria to UK, Fr, Turks, Syrians or any other state, preferring act on Syrian requests coordinated via comite which includes states pledged arms control under Tripartite Declaration.[5]

10. Above info must be limited within Leg those officers directly concerned with question, and in no instance alluded to in any way in discussions with diplomatic colleagues or Syrs.

ACHESON

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[3] For documentation on the Mutual Security Program, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.

[4] *Ante*, p. 1090.

[5] For documentation concerning the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. V, pp. 122 ff.; for the text of the Declaration, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886.

783.5 MSP/12-3151 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET DAMASCUS, December 31, 1951—8 p. m.

387. General policy outlined in Deptel 213, Dec 6,[2] and Deptel 238, Dec 14,[3] completely sound provided new Syrian regime continues to show disposition to cooperate with west. We suppose French hesitancy implied in their emphasis on necessity for unobtrusiveness (para 2 Paris tel 3619, Dec 17 to Dept),[4] is due to fact policies new regime not fully apparent and perhaps not fully formulated. French FonOff's arguments do not show, however, that speed, cooperation between missions, and reporting of conclusions can not be carried out unobtrusively. Moreover, coordination as envisaged in suggested informal comite wld not necessarily have to be exclusively in Damascus.

From para 4 Paris tel 3619 it wld seem French doubts spring chiefly from association Turks in program. We think Turks shld participate, but other three powers cld confer, at other levels if necessary, without Turks if that wld satisfy French.

We shld have thought French wld welcome chance to have full exchange info. Their arguments para 1 Paris tel 3619 seem to hide other reasons. We agree that Syrians might be uneasy about our pooling classified info about their country, but surely any disadvantages resulting from their finding out about comite wld be more than offset by advantages we all wld have when Syrians realize they can not succeed in playing four powers off against each other.

Ref is being made in separate tels re Dept's comments in para 5*b* Deptel 238 not to mislead Shishikli about what can be done re Israel.

I interpret my talk with Shishikli (Legtel 385, Dec 31)[5] as having conveyed good idea substance our aid program, particularly in econ field and fair idea our sense urgency. He showed no anxiety for special speed. We can form rounder judgment on regime's program after talk with Selo (last para Legtel 385). We shall then have more substantial info for informal comite consultations, especially since other chief of missions are equally anxious for more first hand info from new leaders.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 1088.

[3] *Ante*, p. 1090.

[4] *Ante*, p. 1095.

[5] Not printed; it summarized Cannon's comprehensive talk of that date during which Shishakli indicated that he was generally prepared to cooperate in a discreet manner in accepting Western assistance, with the realization that he must have American aid to carry out his planned economic reconstruction program. On other matters, the conversation revealed that Shishakli wanted genuine elections as soon as public interest and intelligent judgment about Syria's problems had been awakened, desired to release the political prisoners as soon as possible, favored progressive and relatively rapid but not revolutionary reform, was amenable to early and realistic measures concerning the refugee problem, and was realistic on the problems involving Syrian relations with Israel. (Memorandum from Worcester (NE) to Jones, January 7, 1952; 783.00/1-752)

I wld add as general comment that merit of comite idea must not blind us to fact that unless there has been more progress in forming unified great power policy than we have any inkling here, local chiefs of mission will continue to be guided by special and not always parallel national interest. Put bluntly and perhaps unkindly this may mean since aid program will be largely at US expense others stand to profit by cooperation while quietly pursuing their own ends. Comite may be check and deterrent to British, French and perhaps Turkish schemes, but not cure. Thus even if French and British are gradually coming to align their long term objectives in Middle East with ours they can make no comparable contribution while profiting from ours. As for Turkey, we here consider her increased prestige in Middle East added to her intransit strength to be a most beneficient element. Turkey can be real help, too, in promoting UNRWA program. But if Syrians are still skittish about foreign aid in general they may ponder on how they are better off if beholden to four powers all of whom they still mistrust for one reason or another than if beholden to only one against whom their one grief is clearly definable. We know there are intangibles of great weight to justify comite method as manifestation coordinated program. We enter this caveat only to point up appreciable differences between procedures essential to MEC and those practicable for aid program.

CANNON

783.5 MSP/12-3151 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET DAMASCUS, December 31, 1951—8 p. m.

386. Deptel 238, Dec 14.[2] Brit, French and Turk Mins having received their instructions coordinate, four power reps met at this Leg Dec 28 explore Damascus comite proposals.

Turk Min said his instruction urged concentration upon immed econ aid rather than long-term program. He recalled he had all along recommended mil aid which undeniably had highest priority with present regime. Accordingly he suggested comite of MilAtts of four Legs also meet draw up recommendations.

Brit Min said his instructions were to consider appropriate support provided Damascus comite was of opinion present Syrian regime was stable and "strong". Turk Min stated general consensus these were relative terms as regards Syria and Selo regime as stable and strong as any we cld expect. Brit Min said we had no concrete evidence yet present regime wld cooperate in econ cooperation or re-integration program and it was of first importance ascertain Selo govt's intentions this regard. He felt govt wld, however, accept any and all mil aid and it wld be undesirable stimulate requests for such aid which wld doubtless be inordinate.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, and Tripoli.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1090.

French Min did not discuss his instructs in detail but indicated French desired support present govt and considered comite useful. He thought Turk Min's idea of comite of MilAtts was sound and since France had been only supplier arms to Syria perhaps his MilAtt cld sound out Shishikli as to army's legitimate needs.

I observed this mtg was exploratory and believed specific recommendations shld await further study and views of our govts. We believed comite shld be maintained as useful means for four power reps exchange views. We left open date for next mtg but indicated it might be soon. I emphasized US aid program had long been in course of preparation and not tailored to present regime. It was designed help Syria strengthen itself especially in econ field and promote favorable atmosphere for other area program such as re-integration of refugees. In this context we hoped our program of support wld recommend itself to Syrian people and therefore to any govt which might be in power here in future.

Leg's gen views on Damascus comite are set forth in Legtel 387, Dec 31.[3] At some stage MilAtts of four power missions must consult together but wld appreciate Dept's views. We wld not object to French MilAtt approaching Syrian mil authorities when time becomes appropriate provide (1) there is no pretension he acts as spokesman for four powers and (2) it is clearly understood other atts have full freedom similar approach.

CANNON

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[3] *Supra.*

TURKEY

PRINCIPAL POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS WITH TURKEY[1]

882.181/1-1551 : Despatch

The First Secretary of the Embassy in Turkey (Baxter) to the Department of State

ANKARA, January 15, 1951.

No. 377

Ref: Department's A-114, December 27, 1950[2]

Subject: Turkish-Bulgarian Agreement on Resumption of Immigration

In the Grand National Assembly on January 5, 1951, Foreign Minister Köprülü, in reply to an interpellation, gave information which answers the questions in the Department's airgram No. A-114.

The Foreign Minister stated that, after the closing of the frontier on October 8, the Turkish Government informed the Bulgarian Government of its willingness to reopen the frontier and to accept all properly documented immigrants then waiting at the border on the following conditions:

(1) Bulgaria would issue exit visas only to those who were already provided with Turkish entry visas;
(2) Bulgaria would immediately accept those persons detained by Turkish frontier authorities because they had attempted to enter Turkey without Turkish entry visas.

After Sofia had accepted these conditions, the Turkish Chargé in Sofia informed the Bulgarian Foreign Office on November 29 that the Turkish Government was prepared to open the frontier to normal traffic on December 2. On the same day the terms of the agreement were made public.

"This agreement was not reached by an exchange of signed notes between the two countries," the Foreign Minister continued, "but following the delivery by our Chargé d'Affaires to the Bulgarian authorities, in response to the demand presented by Sofia for the opening of the frontier, of a text containing the terms previously published in the communiqué released to the press, and of the interview held the same day in the course of which the Deputy Minister of

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[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol v, pp. 1224 ff.

[2] Not printed.

Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Mr. Ivkof, orally and in his official capacity informed the Turkish Chargé in Sofia that the text had been accepted. This kind of verbal agreement, which in diplomatic language is called a 'gentlemen's agreement,' is as valid as a signed note."

Mr. Köprülü further stated that the agreement with the Bulgarian Government contained no stipulations with regard to the number of immigrants to be accepted by Turkey, the Turkish Government having reserved its right to limit the number of immigrants to the material resources of the country. Between the reopening of the frontier in early December and January 1, 1951, a total of 18,847 immigrants have arrived in Turkey from Bulgaria.

Pointing out that no machinery had ever been set up to implement the article in the 1925 Turkish-Bulgarian Convention providing for the transfer of property of Bulgarians of Turkish origin and Turks of Bulgarian origin who wished to emigrate, the Foreign Minister declared that the Turkish Government in all its recent communications to Sofia had repeated its desire to reach an agreement on this subject, and had, in addition, informed the Bulgarian Legation in Ankara of its readiness to enter into negotiations. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria has now informed the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia that technical preparations for the opening of such negotiations have been undertaken and that a definite reply to this question will shortly be given.

WILLIAM O. BAXTER

Conference Files : Lot 59 D 95 : CF57

Policy Review Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs[1]

SECRET

RPTD D–5/1*a*

[WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1951.

TURKISH STRAITS

ISSUE

Position of US in event that the USSR raises the question of revision of the 1936 Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits.[2]

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[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicated that this policy review paper had been drafted by Lucille Snyder, GTI, and by Harry N. Howard, United Nations Adviser, NEA. The cover sheet also indicated that this document had been revised in accordance with the suggestions of the ETS Steering Group advanced on January 20, 1951.

It should also be noted that this policy review paper had been prepared for the Four-Power Exploratory Talks in Paris (Conference at the Palais Marble Rose), March–June 1951. For documentation regarding these talks, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1086 ff.

[2] The Montreux Convention. For its text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213; also British Cmd. 5551, Treaty Series No. 30 (1937): *Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits [With Protocol,] Montreux, July 20, 1936.*

BACKGROUND

The control of the Straits is an old and persistent historical issue. The modern phase of the "Straits question" began in 1774 when, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, Russia won passage rights through the Straits for its merchant vessels. From then until 1917 there were innumerable diplomatic interchanges, agreements, and treaties defining and re-defining the rights of foreign merchantmen and warships to pass through that waterway. Although it has been Russia's primary objective to secure full political control of the Straits, in general the Ottoman Empire controlled the region of the Straits from 1453 to its collapse at the end of World War I. From 1923 until 1936 the status of the Straits was defined by the Lausanne Convention which demilitarized those waters and placed them under the supervision of an international Commission.[3]

The present convention regulating the use of the Turkish Straits (the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus) was signed at Montreux on July 20, 1936, by Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the USSR, and came into force on November 9 of that year. By that Convention the International "Straits Commission", which had been set up under the terms of the Lausanne Convention (1923), was abolished, and Turkey gained full control of the Straits with the right to fortify that waterway. At the final session of the Montreux Conference, the Soviet Foreign Minister[4] acknowledged the progress which had been made but pointed out that the conference had recognized "*although in an insufficient way*, the special rights of the riverain states of the Black Sea in the Black Sea in connection with the passage of the Straits, as well as the special geographical situation of the Black Sea in which the general conceptions of the absolute freedom of the seas could not be entirely applied."

In the years following the entry into force of the above Convention, the new regime of the Straits appeared to work well and in the interest of all parties concerned, but it was clear by 1939 and during the course of World War II that the Soviet Government was not satisfied with it. The USSR raised the problem of the Straits with the Germans both in August 1939 and in November 1940, indicating that "real" guarantees, in the form of air and naval bases in the Straits were vital to Soviet security in place of the mere "paper" guarantees of the Montreux Convention.

The question of a revision of the Montreux Straits Convention was discussed at Yalta in 1945 where it was agreed that at their next meeting the Foreign Ministers should consider proposals which the Soviet Government would put forward on this question and would report to their Governments as well as to Turkey.[5]

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[3] Signed July 24, 1923; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii, p. 115; also British Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series No. 16 (1923): *Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits*.

[4] Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1929–1939.

Shortly thereafter, on March 19, 1945—less than one month after Turkey's entry into the war—the USSR denounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925 and subsequently demanded that any substitute agreement must provide special privileges for the USSR in the Straits as well as territorial concessions in Northeastern Turkey (the Kars-Ardahan district)—conditions which Turkey was unwilling to accept.[6]

It was officially recognized at Potsdam in 1945 that the Montreux Convention required revision, but no agreement could be reached with respect to the principles on which the revision should be based. President Truman proposed a regime of freedom for the Straits, approved and guaranteed by the Three powers within the framework of the United Nations. Although the President was strongly supported by Churchill, Marshal Stalin again demanded bases on the Straits, declaring that they were essential for the security of the USSR and stating that passage rights for Black Sea Powers should be backed by force, just as the right for American and British ships to pass through the Panama and Suez Canals is backed by force.[7] The English text of the agreed protocol of that conference, dated August 1, 1945, states:

> "The three governments recognize that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present day conditions. It was agreed that, as the next step, the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish Government."[8]

However, the Soviet version of the last sentence of that portion of the protocol, as set forth in a note to the Turkish Government on August 7, 1946,[9] reads as follows (underscoring ours):

> "The three governments agreed that as the proper course the said question would be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish Government."[10]

It is apparent from Soviet actions that the Soviet Government regards the phraseology "direct negotiations" as implying negotiations leading to a bilateral arrangement between the Soviet Union and the Turkish Government rather than merely an exchange of views prior to the calling of an international conference for revision of the Montreux Convention, as indicated by the English phraseology.

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[5] See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 903 ff.

[6] For documentation, see *ibid.*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1219 ff.

[7] See *ibid.*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, 2 volumes.

[8] *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 1496–1497.

[9] *Ibid.*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 827–829.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 827.

On the basis of the Potsdam Protocol the United States, on November 2, 1945, sent a note to the Turkish Government which suggested the following principles as a basis for negotiating a revision of the Straits Convention:

a) the Straits should be open at all times to merchant vessels of all nations;
b) the Straits should be open at all times to warships of Black Sea Powers;
c) the Straits should be closed to warships of non-Black Sea Powers, within limitations to be agreed upon;
d) other changes to modernize the Convention, such as the substitution of the UN system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.[11]

Both the British and Turkish Governments indicated their agreement to the above U.S. proposals, Turkey adding that it would participate in an international conference on the Dardanelles and accept any decisions reached there, provided "Turkey's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are not infringed." [12]

The substantial exchange of views concerning a new regime for the Straits began on August 7, 1946, when the Soviet Government presented a detailed note to the Turkish Government. The note asserted that the regime established at Montreux "does not meet the interests of the Black Sea Powers and does not ensure conditions under which the use of these Straits for purposes inimical to the Black Sea Powers would be prevented." The note contained a list of alleged wartime incidents "when the Axis Powers directed their warships and auxiliary craft through the Straits into the Black Sea and out of the Black Sea". The note then proposed a "new regime" for the Straits on the basis of five principles, the first three of which were in general agreement with the first three principles of the U.S. note of November 2. In addition, however, it advanced proposals for a regime of the Straits under the competence of Turkey and the other Black Sea Powers exclusively and for a joint Turco-Soviet defense system of the Straits.[13] It is of interest to note that these proposals are almost identical to those made by the Soviet Government in the Hitler–Molotov talks of November 1940.

In its reply of August 22 the Turkish Government defended its wartime position in allowing passage of certain small and unarmed Axis vessels. Although expressing willingness to negotiate revision on an international basis of the Montreux Convention, the Turkish Government rejected the two new principles advanced in the Soviet note on the grounds that the first ignored the interests of other powers and that the latter was "not compatible with the inalienable rights of the sovereignty of Turkey." [14]

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[11] *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1265–1266.
[12] For documentation, see *ibid.*, pp. 1266 ff.
[13] *Ibid.*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 827–829.

The US and UK Governments on various occasions also expressed disagreement with the suggestion that the Straits regime should be established exclusively by the Black Sea Powers and defended Turkey's contention that that country should remain primarily responsible for defense of the Straits. The US stated that if the region of the Straits became subject to threat or attack, the situation should be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and asserted that the Potsdam agreement, by its very nature, envisaged the participation of Great Britain and the US along with other Powers in the creation of a new regime for the Straits.

The exchange of views continued until late 1946. On October 9 of that year the British expressed its view that direct discussions contemplated at Potsdam had been completed and suggested that an international conference should take place.[15] On October 26 the USSR stated that the conversations should not be regarded as completed and expressed its view that it was premature to consider the question of calling a conference to establish a new Straits regime.[16] Since that time the question has been more or less dormant.

The US is not a signatory of the Montreux Convention, nor has it been a party to any of the earlier treaties dealing with the Straits. However, our political, military and economic interest in the area has steadily increased since World War II and today we have a vital interest in the regime of the Straits. The US should, therefore, play an active role in any conference which may be called with respect thereto. Recognition of our right to do so is implicit in the Potsdam Protocol.

DISCUSSION

According to the terms of the Montreux Straits Convention, any revision thereof must be negotiated among *all* High Contracting Parties, either through diplomatic channels or at a conference called for the specific purpose and must, in effect, receive the approval of Turkey, which is, of course, one of the signatories. The Big Four could not, therefore, go farther than to agree to the principles on which, in their view, a revision of the Convention should be based and to cause such views to be notified tc the signatories in the manner stipulated in the Convention.

It is not considered desirable for the US to raise the question of a revision of the Montreux Straits Convention at this time, and there

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[14] *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 852–855; the full text of the note is published in Department of State, Near East Series No. 5: *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 50.

[15] *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, p. 876.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 897.

is no indication that the British or French will do so. I
however, that the USSR may raise the question, partic
under the terms of the Convention, revision will be pre
1956 unless a request for revision, supported by the requ
of signatories, is notified to all signatory Powers befo
1951.

Any recommendations advanced by the USSR would, w
embody renewed demands for a new Straits regime un
petence of the Black Sea Powers and for joint Turco-Sov
the Straits. The US could not, of course, accept such pro
would mean acceptance of the thesis that the regime of
the exclusive concern of Turkey, the USSR and othe
Powers and which would, in effect, mean Soviet dominati
Such proposals were rejected by the US, UK, and Turke
would be rejected today. Moreover, the French Governm
assurances to Turkey in 1946 that it would take no action
with this question which would be contrary to Turkey's i

If the issue of the Straits is raised by the USSR an
mentioned demands are not reiterated, the following alter
be open to the US (unless some more acceptable reco
should be advanced by one of the other Powers):

1) *Oppose* any suggestion that discussion of the questio
at this time and support a continuation, for the time bein
ent regime on the basis of the 1936 Convention, even tho
ences to the League, Japan, etc., are outmoded.

Comment: It is clear from the following comparison
vention now in force provides a somewhat better safe
interests of the Western Powers and of Turkey than w
Convention negotiated on the basis of the principles set fo
in 1945:[17]

Principles enunciated by U.S. in 1945	*Rights prevaili Montreux Con*
Straits to be open at all times to merchant vessels of all nations.	Freedom of pass time unless Turkey of war, in which of passage by day route specified b Turkey a belligere passage for countr with Turkey by by route specified
Straits to be open at all times to warships of Black Sea Powers	Restricted passag ships of both Bl

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[17] Presumably the principles of 1945 listed here are those p
Turkish Government on November 2, 1945. See *Foreign Relations*
pp. 1265–1266.

Straits to be closed to warships of non-Black Sea Powers, within certain limitations	non-littoral powers in time of peace and war. In latter case, Turkey being a belligerent, passage at discretion of Turkish Government. If Turkey under threat of war, passage at discretion of Turkish Government, subject to review of League of Nations.

In supporting a continuation of the present regime the US should explain that, although we consider the principles enunciated in 1945 as a sound and suitable basis for discussion if there is any genuine hope for a peaceful settlement with the USSR, it would now be necessary, in view of international tensions, to reconsider them in the light of progress which may be made on other outstanding issues between the USSR and the Western Powers. It is believed that British, French and Turkish support could be obtained.

2) *Stand* on the basis of the principles enunciated by us in 1945 which were accepted, in essence, by the UK and Turkey.

Comment: President Truman proposed at Potsdam that any new regime of the Straits be placed within the framework of the United Nations. If we at this time reiterate our willingness to negotiate on the basis of the principles which we set forth in 1945, we should insist, as we did in 1946 (Department's note of August 19, 1946 to Soviet Chargé at Washington), that "the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the United Nations and should function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations."[18] Specifically, any new Convention should deny the right of transit to warships of any nation which may take action contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations charter. UK and French support would doubtless be forthcoming. Although there is no indication that the Turkish Government, which accepted the principles enunciated by the US in 1945,[19] would now object to them, the US should not fail to make clear its recognition of Turkey's paramount interest in the question.

In either of the above cases, the US should inform the Turkish Government, on a Top Secret basis, of its position and keep it currently informed of developments.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the US not initiate any discussion of the question of a revision of the Straits Convention and that it endeavor to secure British and French agreement not to raise the issue. However, if the Russians should raise the question the US should:

1. Point out that, under the terms of the present Convention, all High Contracting Parties have a voice in any revision thereof and that Turkey has, in effect, a controlling voice since any revision must be approved by that country. Any discussion of the question at a quadripartite meeting must, therefore, be limited to an exchange of views

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[18] *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 847–848.

[19] *Ibid.*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1260.

as to the principles on which each of the four countries believes a revision of the Convention should be based.

2. Reject any Soviet proposals relating to a new regime for the Straits under the sole competence of the Black Sea Powers and/or joint Soviet-Turkish defense of that waterway.

3. (*a*) Favor a continuation of the present regime of the Straits pending some reconciliation of the East-West conflict; or

(*b*) As a somewhat less desirable alternative, stand on the principles enunciated by the US in 1945 on the understanding that any new convention drafted on that basis would be placed within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations in such a way that passage of the Straits would, in fact, be denied to the warships of any nation which might take action contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

4. If there is substantial identity of views on 3(*b*), recommend that the Turkish Government, in recognition of its paramount interest in the question, be informed thereof.[20]

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[20] For JCS comments on this paper, see Marshall's letter, June 1, p. 1166.

882.00 R/1–2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of Stat for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1951

Subject: Additional Economic Assistance to Turkey

Participants: Mr. Paul R. Porter—ECA
Mr. Henry Wiens—ECA Mission Ankara
Mr. George C. McGhee—Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. William M. Rountree—Director, GTI
Mr. C. Robert Moore—GTI

Problem: Turkey's need for additional economic assistance, n only to cover increased defense expenditures, but its investment p gram and other relatively essential needs.

Action Required: FMACC decision on financing the proposed creased defense expenditures and ECA and Department considerat of possible assistance to help meet other costs.

Action Assigned: GTI to work closely with ECA and S/ISA.

Mr. Wiens referred to recent telegrams from the ECA Missio Ankara regarding a gap of TL 491 million ($175 million) betw anticipated expenditures and resources in the public sector for Turkish fiscal year 1951. Conversations in Ankara between Mission and high Turkish officials with respect to increased ef which the Turks might make to close this gap, such as decrease penditures and increased taxes and other resources, have proved less, and it is apparent that the Turks are hoping that ECA will the problem by extending additional aid of approximately $10

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[1] Drafted by C. Robert Moore, GTI.

lion. In view of the desirability of reaching some agreement with the Turks with respect to additional Turkish measures of self-help as a condition for additional ECA aid before their budget for the new fiscal year, which is to come into effect on March 1, 1951, is enacted by the National Assembly, Mr. Dorr, with whom Mr. Wiens spoke by telephone this morning, suggested a new, coordinated approach to the Turks. Mr. Dorr's thought was that if we could determine within the next few weeks the amount of additional assistance, military and economic, that we would be prepared to extend Turkey to build up its military potential, we would be in a strong position to negotiate an agreement with the Turks which would call for greatly increased measures of self-help.

I pointed out that, from a practical standpoint, the question of a substantial strengthening of Turkey's military capabilities and the economic support which this would require could not be worked out in time to make possible the negotiation, before the new budget is enacted, of an agreement of the scope Mr. Dorr proposed. In the meantime, we are faced with the problem of helping the Turks meet a proposed increase in the national defense budget of some TL 88 million (approximately $32 million) to provide for an increase in the Turkish armed forces from 260,000 to 300,000 and for other military purposes apparently strongly recommended by the Turkish General Staff and JAMMAT. I felt certain that, if, subsequently, further economic support was required to enable Turkey to achieve the military strength which U.S. policy dictates, funds would be found.

With respect to the present estimated gap of TL 491 million, which takes into consideration the additional defense expenditures of TL 88 million, as well as the investment program from which most of the fat has been extracted, refugee expenditures, etc., Mr. Wiens indicated that Mr. Dorr had himself been thinking in terms of additional aid of perhaps $75 million. Should such an amount be possible, he felt that the Turks should find the means to close the remaining gap. Mr. Porter questioned whether he would support at this time any more than an additional $30 million to finance the proposed increased defense expenditures. As a telegram has just been received from the Ankara Embassy giving requested details on these increased expenditures, it was hoped that the FMACC would be able to act quickly on the question of additional U.S. aid to meet them. There would still remain the problem of the additional aid requested by the Turks (approximately $70 million) to cover the remaining gap.

In sum, it was agreed that we should seek to obtain an early FMACC decision on the question of the TL 88 million and, if favorable, should negotiate with Turkey the most satisfactory agreement possible under the circumstances in return for such assistance. I felt that the Department would agree with ECA on the desirability of maximizing Turkey's own contribution in meeting its increased internal expenditures but that we must not lose sight of the fact that our objective will probably be to build up Turkey's military capabilities, and that in the final analysis we will probably be willing to pay the cost of such a build-up, if that is the only way to get it.

George C. McGhee

740.5/1-2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

SECRET [Washington,] January 24, 1951.

Subject: Turkish Proposal that the U.S. Adhere to the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939.[2]

Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin—Ambassador of Turkey
Mr. George C. McGhee—Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. C. Robert Moore—GTI

Problem: Turkish Ambassador proposes that US extend security commitment to Turkey through adherence to British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939.

Action Required: To consider the feasibility of this proposal

Action Assigned: GTI

Ambassador Erkin stated that he had asked for this appointment in order to present to the Department a new proposal for extending a U.S. security commitment to Turkey. He briefly touched on the background of his proposal as follows:

1. In late 1948 and early 1949 he had made known to the Department the Turkish Government's desire to be included in the North Atlantic Pact which was then being formulated. However, Turkey was not included among the original participants in this Pact.[3]

2. Upon his return from Turkey in the summer of 1949 the Ambassador reached the conclusion that a broader regional grouping of Mediterranean countries such as Turkey, Greece, Spain and Italy with, of course, U.S. participation, was more logical than an extension of NATO, and he so informed his Government. However, he found that in Turkey the emphasis was on NATO and that the Foreign Minister preferred to concentrate on Turkey's inclusion in NATO, an organization already in existence, than to press for the creation of a new regional grouping in which Turkey would be included. This culmi-

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[1] Drafted by Moore, GTI.

[2] Signed on October 19, 1939. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167; also British Cmd. 6165, Treaty Series No. 4 (1940): *Treaty of Mutual Assistance Between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom, the President of the French Republic and the President of the Turkish Republic* (*With Special Agreement and Subsidiary Agreements*), *Angora, October 19, 1939.*

[3] For documentation regarding U.S. relations with Turkey, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. vi, pp. 1638 ff.; regarding U.S. participation in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see *ibid.*, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.

nated in Turkey's formal request for inclusion in NATO in August 1950, which was subsequently turned down.[4]

3. The Ambassador, recovering from his great disappointment at this development, thereupon began to give thought again to a security arrangement in a form which would be acceptable to the U.S. and in November 1950 proposed to his Government in Ankara a Mediterranean formula on a new basis which he felt eliminated many of the difficulties of the earlier NATO proposal. He had just received the agreement of his Government to make this proposal to us and understood also that President Bayar had raised the question during the visit to Ankara of Admiral Carney several weeks ago[5] and that Foreign Minister Koprulu had likewise discussed it with Ambassador Wadsworth. While the President and Foreign Minister understood the Ambassador's basic idea, he was afraid they had not grasped the nuances.

The Ambassador then advanced his proposal—that the United States adhere to the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939. He felt that this type of U.S. security commitment to Turkey had a number of advantages:

1. It would eliminate the protracted discussions which would be involved in extending full membership in NATO to Turkey or in setting up any new regional organization.
2. The arrangement would not be regional in the broad sense; therefore, no other country would feel entitled to ask for inclusion.
3. The scope and purpose of the arrangement would be limited; no new commitment would be involved except as regards the security of Turkey (and Greece).
4. While Greece would not be a party to the Treaty, Article 3 thereof would in effect guarantee the security of Greece. This Article provides that so long as guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece on April 13, 1939 remain in force, Turkey will lend them all aid and assistance in its power in the event they are engaged in hostilities in virtue of the said guarantees.
5. The framework would be created for a reciprocal agreement between Greece and Turkey.

The Ambassador recognized that the Treaty would have to be modified slightly—for example, protocol No. 2, which contains the reservation that Turkey is not called upon to take action which would involve armed conflict with the Soviet Union. This obviously had no meaning today. U.S. adherence to the Treaty could be accomplished by a protocol.

The Ambassador urged that earnest consideration be given to this proposal as soon as possible and he expressed the hope that I would be able to inform him, before my departure for Turkey in early February,[8] that, in principle, it was acceptable to us. He emphasized that recent developments necessitated extraordinary measures and that the Turkish proposal was not a selfish one but one which would contribute to European security.

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[4] For documentation regarding Turkey's request in 1950 for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff. and 1108 ff.; and *ibid.*, vol. V, pp. 1224 ff.

[5] January 10–12, 1951.

I informed Ambassador Erkin that, as I was sure he knew, Turkey's desire to be included in a security arrangement was very much in our minds. While his new proposal was a very interesting one I was afraid that many of the considerations which made it difficult for the North Atlantic Pact to be extended to Turkey would apply likewise to it. I felt that the United States had never shown a lack of interest in helping the Turks to develop their military strength and that a security commitment was, in effect, not of very practical importance. I informed him, however, that we would certainly give all appropriate consideration to his proposal. I questioned whether Greece would be well pleased with the Ambassador's formula but he expressed confidence that it would be satisfied. This led to some discussion as to the present status of the UK and French guarantees to Greece. With respect to the UK guarantee the Ambassador felt quite certain that it was still in effect.

As the Ambassador was leaving I asked him if, since our conversation of several weeks ago, he had changed his views as to the possibility of Turkey's entering into regional agreements in the absence of a U.S. commitment. The Ambassador very emphatically indicated that there was no change in his views and that he would strongly oppose Turkey's participation in such agreements.

Somewhat later in the day Ambassador Erkin telephoned Mr. Moore and asked him to tell me, with respect to my question on regional agreements, that he wanted to amplify his statement somewhat. It was his strong belief that, if Turkey and the United States were linked together in a security arrangement of the kind proposed by him, it would be easier and more feasible for Turkey, through its increased prestige, to align the other countries in that area in support of our common objectives. Turkey, strengthened by this concrete evidence of U.S. support, would constitute a center of attraction to the other neighboring countries.

Mr. Esenbel, at the request of the Ambassador, subsequently telephoned Mr. Moore regarding the UK guarantee to Greece. The Ambassador's view was that such a guarantee was in effect until repudiated and that there was no evidence that it had been repudiated. Mr. Esenbel himself had questioned one of his Greek colleagues on this point, without revealing the reason for his interest, and was told that Ambassador Politis considered the guarantee still in effect inasmuch as it had not been repudiated.

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[8] McGhee arrived in Istanbul on February 11, 1951, proceeded to Ankara for high-level discussions with Turkish officials there on February 12–13, and returned to Istanbul to conduct the Middle East Regional Conference, Februar 14–21. Regarding his trip, see the editorial note, p. 49.

GEORGE C. MCGHEE

Editorial Note

On January 27, 1951, the Turkish Cabinet approved the dispatch of replacement soldiers to Korea to reinforce the Turkish brigade fighting there under the auspices of the United Nations Command. For documentation regarding the Korean War and the treatment of United States–Turkish relations in the Korean context, see volume VII, pages 1 ff.

782.5/1-2651

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Burns)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1951.

MY DEAR GENERAL BURNS: The Turkish Government has under consideration a proposed plan for controlled mining of the Turkish Straits as part of a Bosphorus Sea defense project. It is probable that as a prerequisite to Turkish approval of the plan, the United States Government may have to indicate its strong support and, in addition, urge the British Government to indicate to the Turkish Government its concurrence in principle thereto.

It is understood that the mining project is strongly endorsed by the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, particularly by the Naval Group, and that it is of considerable interest to the United States Department of the Navy. While the competent Turkish military authorities agree on the desirability, from the military point of view, of this project, the Turkish Foreign Office is concerned over the very important political considerations which are involved. These considerations relate principally to Turkey's obligations under the Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, signed at Montreux in 1936, to which the United States is not a party, and to the general question of Soviet reaction in the event the Straits are mined. The following background relates to these considerations:

In April 1950 the Turkish Government informally requested the views of the Department as to whether the proposed mining of the Straits would be in violation of the Montreux Convention.[2] On the basis of information given to it regarding the project, the Department concluded that it would not constitute an infraction of the Convention. According to this information, the project involved mines laid at a depth of 20 to 30 fathoms near the Black Sea entrance to the Straits and controlled from a harbor entrance post. They would allegedly constitute no deterrent or danger to navigation, since when not energized the field could be crossed at any point without pilotage and since moored mines which broke loose would be sterile.

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[1] Drafted by Snyder and Moore, GTI, and cleared with George H. Emery, S/ISA, and Richard H. Davis, EE.

[2] For previous documentation regarding the proposal to mine the Turkish Straits, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1224 ff.

The British Government, which was a signatory to the Convention and which is also bound to Turkey through the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939, was likewise requested by the Turkish Government to indicate its views. On a strictly juridical basis, these views, expressed in an *aide-mémoire* dated June 19, 1950, corresponded to those of the Department, but the British discouraged implementation of the project on the ground that (1) it might involve the Turks in political and legal controversies since mere knowledge of the existence of the mines might be considered a deterrent to complete freedom of transit, and (2) mining of the Straits in advance of any imminent danger of war would appear impracticable because of constant maintenance requirements of underwater installations.

The Turkish Foreign Minister, on January 11, 1951, told our Ambassador that the Government's primary political interest in the matter was that such action as it might take be irrefutably correct and consistent with its obligations under the Montreaux Convention. He added that the British *aide-mémoire* was definitely, perhaps intentionally, equivocal and that this aspect should be forthrightly cleared up by the British. He indicated, however, that he would submit the matter to the Cabinet at its next meeting. At the same time he stated that if the project were implemented, the Soviets might be expected to charge a violation of the Convention with a view to reopening the question of its revision, so that there was strong reason for Turkey to be sure that it was clearly in the right. The Embassy advanced its own view that if the project were pushed by the United States the Turkish Government might well exploit any resulting Soviet hostility to urge the need for a United States security commitment.[3]

The American Embassy at Moscow in a telegram of December 22, 1950, expressed the view that the mining would be capitalized on to intensify the current war of nerves against Turkey and doubted that technical justification under the Montreux Convention on the basis of the harmlessness of the mines would be sufficient to counteract the public effect of Soviet protests against their presence. It strongly opposed implementation of the project unless it is considered a vital defense measure for which there is no feasible alternative.[4]

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[3] Presumably the reference is to telegram 422, January 12, 1951, from Ankara, which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1353.

It is the Department's understanding that while the mines would be relatively ineffective with respect to surface targets and would not, therefore, supplant other types of mines which would have to be laid in the event of hostilities, they would aid in the detection of submerged submarines which may endeavor to transit the Straits surreptitiously. However, since other detection systems are or will be installed in the Bosphorus area, the question arises whether the installation of the mines as an additional detection device or for the other purposes which they might serve will contribute sufficiently to United States security to justify the United States urging the Turkish Government to approve the project, despite the possible consequences.

Although the Turkish Government has not expressed an expectation of receiving a security commitment from the United States before proceeding with implementation of this project, pressure on our part might result in their asking for such a commitment. The minimum request which the Turkish Government is expected to make is that the United States Government actively support the Turkish Government in this project and also that the British give similar support (which the United States may have to take the initiative to obtain).

The Department would therefore appreciate receiving your views as to the importance of this project from the military standpoint, including an indication of the essentiality of the project to United States security.[5]

Sincerely yours,

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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[4] Presumably the reference is to telegram 1227, December 22, 1950, from Moscow, which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, p. 1281.

[5] General Burns acknowledged receipt of this letter on February 6 and informed Matthews that the Department of Defense was studying the question of controlled mining of the Turkish Straits (782.5/2-651).

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468 : "Turkey 1948—Memoranda"

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Acting Deputy Director for International Security Affairs (Ohly)[1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1951.

Subject: U.S. Support of Proposed Increase in Budget of Turkish Ministry of National Defense.

A recent telegram received from Ambassador Wadsworth with respect to the Turkish state budget for the fiscal year beginning March 1, 1951 indicates that the Turkish Government is seeking an appropri-

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[1] Drafted by Moore, GTI.

ation of TL 470 million for the Ministry of National Defense,
contrasted to TL 558 million which has been recommended by t
Turkish General Staff and the U.S. Joint Military Mission. It is pr
pared to include this additional TL 88 million (approximate
$31,500,000) in the budget only if the funds are provided by the U.
The Ambassador has stated that he believes that the U.S. shou
meet this figure *in toto* "effectively to prepare Turkey to resist p
sible aggression within the year".[2]

The TL 88 million will make possible an increase in the Turki
Armed Forces from 260,000 men and 24,000 officers to 300,000 m
and 24,000 officers, which is considered the minimum force for 19
It will also provide slightly improved support for this force.

Turkey is faced with a serious budgetary problem for the comi
fiscal year. At present, the uncovered deficit is estimated at TL 4
million, assuming that the national defense budget is increased by T
88 million, and the Turks are looking to the U.S. not only to meet t
latter amount, as indicated above, but to help meet a much lar
portion of this deficit. Heavy defense expenditures, a hard core
vestment program, and extraordinary expenditures arising from
resettlement of the Turkish refugees from Bulgaria have been c
tributing factors in this deficit.

For over 10 years Turkey has been devoting between 30 and 5
of its budget expenditures to national defense, carrying a hea
burden than perhaps any other country to which we have been exte
ing aid. It has proved itself to be one of our staunchest allies, on
battlefield as well as in the UN. If, by an expenditure of some
million, we can help Turkey build up still further its military stren
I strongly recommend that every effort be made to find the mean
provide this additional assistance, as it seems clear that the Turk
Government, despite its realization that the national defense bu
should be increased, considers that it is not in a position to autho
such an increase unless the U.S. is prepared to finance it. I an
the opinion that $30 million spent for this purpose in Turkey will
more security for the U.S. than $30 million spent either in this cou
or elsewhere.

I therefore urge the FMACC to take early and favorable actio
this problem. If this assistance is to be extended, it is desirable
the Turkish Government be informed as soon as possible so that
necessary adjustments can be made in its budget bill which mus
acted on by the Turkish National Assembly before March 1, 1951,
so that the proposed increase in the Turkish Armed Forces ca
carried out with a minimum of delay.

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[2] Presumably the reference is to telegram 441 from Ankara, January 21,
is not printed (782.5 MAP/1–2151).

PPS Files : Lot 64 D 563 : Record Copies, Jan.–April 1951

Memorandum by Henry S. Villard to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1951.

Subject: Security Commitment to Turkey

1. Consideration of the role Turkey might play in the event of war, and the ways and means by which we might strengthen the defense of the Mediterranean sector, raises the question of a U.S. security commitment to Turkey. For the last three years the Turks have indicated their desire for assurances in one form or another that the U.S. would come to their aid in the event of attack. At the present time the Turkish Ambassador is pressing the Department to give such assurances by accepting a proposal that the U.S. adhere to the British-French-Turkish Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1939.

2. The 1939 Treaty involves a commitment by France and Great Britain to go to the aid of Turkey in the event that country is subjected to aggression. Article 3 of the Treaty provides an indirect guarantee by all three powers to Greece if the latter were attacked. The Greeks, however, apparently do not consider this portion of the Treaty to be still valid and if the U.S. adhered to the British-French-Turkish Treaty they would be certain to insist upon a similar fresh guarantee from the U.S.[2]

3. Since we have found that the "Security of Turkey is vital to the security of the U.S." it would seem logical to give effect to this decision by some sort of formal commitment. Furthermore, we have staked so much on our program of military aid for Turkey and our prestige has been so much involved in the process that it would be unthinkable if we should fail to act in case of Soviet aggression against Turkey. If we should fail to help, not only would Turkish morale be shattered but the Turks would feel that they had been falsely encouraged by the U.S. to set up a front-line defense against the Soviet Union, without any intention on our part to afford them support in a final showdown. Deep-seated and lasting resentment against the U.S. would be the result.

4. Actually, to obtain the maximum cooperation from the Turks in bolstering the defense of the Mediterranean today, it seems essen-

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[1] Villard was also a member of the Policy Planning Staff.

[2] Presumably the information contained in this paragraph came from telegram 2438 from Athens, January 31, which is not here printed. Ambassador Peurifoy informed the Department in this cable that the formula proposed by the Turkish Ambassador in Washington was probably unsatisfactory to Greece because the Greeks had not referred to the Anglo-French guarantee in any recent discussions of collective security measures. Moreover, Peurifoy reported that British officials in Athens were surprised at the idea that the 1939 guarantee was still considered to be valid by Turkey, and they believed that the British Foreign Office and the government would be ill-disposed to consider the commitment still binding. (681.82/1–3151)

tial to offer Turkey some form of written guarantee. A security commitment from the U.S. would act as an immediate spur to the Turks in further developing their defenses and raising their morale. A written undertaking of U.S. support would be an essential prerequisite if we wished to encourage Turkey to enter into mutual, or regional defense arrangements with Greece, Yugoslavia or any other country in the Mediterranean area. Such a commitment would confirm Turkey's faith in the United States and would assure the U.S. of a strong fighting ally on the vital Eastern Mediterranean flank.

5. The JCS attitude, of course, is adverse to any agreement that might even faintly imply the commitment of U.S. forces to the area in the event of hostilities. However, the Turks would be satisfied with a limited guarantee of U.S. or allied air and perhaps naval support. This would seem to be the minimum action we could take in any case and it stands to reason that we would have at least some such forces available in the Mediterranean at the time hostilities broke out.

6. From the negative side, Turkey fears that U.S. unwillingness to make any written security commitment indicates that we do not consider Turkey to be in a primary defense area. This naturally has its effect on Turkish morale as well as on its attitude toward our own planning. For example, the Navy desires to mine the Straits and the Air Force desires far-reaching Turkish commitments on airfields, which the Turks have been slow to agree to in the absence of assurance of any U.S. assistance in the event of attack.

7. Turkey would be fully satisfied if it were permitted to join the NATO. It accepted associated membership in that organization in the hope that this would be a half-way stop to full partnership. While the difficulties of including Turkey in NATO are obvious, the time may be approaching when we should take another look at the possibilities. If Turkey were admitted, it would, of course, be necessary also to include Greece. In fact, any commitment made to Turkey would have to apply to Greece as well. In the case of Iran, present indications are that it would not expect to join a European organization like NATO and would be willing to accept treatment in a separate category.

8. Turkey would consider it acceptable to be a member of a regional Mediterranean defense pact on the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty. Such a regional pact might include any or all of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean from Gibralter to Suez. It would have to include the U.S. as a member or at least have U.S. backing, and could be linked with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through the common membership of some country like Italy.

9. There would seem to be four possibilities for a security commitment to Turkey:

(*a*) U.S. adherence to the British-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939;

(*b*) admitting Turkey (and Greece) to membership in NATO;

(*c*) developing a Mediterranean security pact, with U.S. backing, to include Turkey, and

(*d*) a direct mutual defense aid agreement between Turkey and the U.S. (negotiating a similar agreement simultaneously with Greece).

It is recommended that the Staff discuss the subject with a view to exploring the possibilities in appropriate quarters.[3]

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[3] For documentation regarding U.S. efforts to develop a Mediterranean security pact which would include Turkey, see pp. 1 ff.

For documentation on the successful U.S. efforts to gain the admittance of Greece and Turkey to NATO, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.

INR Files

National Intelligence Estimate[1]

SECRET
NIE-9

[WASHINGTON,] 26 February 1951.

TURKEY'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the will and ability of Turkey to maintain its alignment with the West, and the courses of action Turkey might follow in the event of war.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Turkey is determined to resist Soviet expansion. It is solidly aligned with the West because this alignment offers Turkey its only

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[1] The cover sheet attached to the source text indicated that the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate; that all members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) had concurred with its conclusions; and that this paper was based on information available on February 23.

The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was one of a series of high-level interdepartmental reports first published in the fall of 1950 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Each Estimate was intended to be the most authoritative interpretation and appraisal of a situation available to policy makers and to present the coordinated expression of the best intelligence opinion from among several departments and agencies. The priorities and frames of reference for a proposed Estimate were set by the IAC. This Committee was composed of the Director of Central Intelligence, who served as Chairman; the Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State; and the Chiefs of Intelligence of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The organizations represented on the IAC drafted sections of an Estimate in accordance with their respective fields of responsibility; the Department of State provided all political and some economic sections. An integrated draft paper was discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups under the coordination of the CIA's Office of National Estimates, then submitted to the IAC for final revision and approval. Provision was made for the notation of dissent where unanimity did not exist. Immediately upon approval, a National Intelligence Estimate was published by the CIA and forwarded to the President, the appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the National Security Council.

hope of effectively resisting Soviet pressures. At present one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy is to secure a clear-cut US commitment to come to Turkey's defense in the event of an attack.

2. New Soviet or Soviet-Satellite successes in expanding the Communist sphere of control outside the Near East (even in Yugoslavia) would not significantly affect Turkey's pro-US alignment as long as the US demonstrated that its fundamental aim was to continue the struggle against the USSR. A shift in US policy to one of hemispheric defense would oblige Turkey to abandon its pro-US alignment and fall back on a policy of neutrality.

3. We believe that Turkey is capable of halting at the Straits an invasion by Bulgarian forces. Against a Soviet attack, the Turks could probably maintain organized resistance for two or three months and—with substantial Western assistance—could hold for some time a redoubt area in southern Turkey against Soviet forces.

4. Short of general war, Turkey will continue to support concerted Western action under UN auspices in opposition to Soviet or Satellite aggression elsewhere. The commitment of Turkish troops or the provision of Turkish bases would, however, be contingent upon a firm assurance of US armed support in event of Soviet attack.

5. If the USSR were, without precipitating a general war, to secure control of Iran, Iraq, and Syria on one flank of Turkey and/or of Greece on the other, Turkey would probably react as follows:

a. Even if Turkey were partially cut off from the West by Soviet conquest or absorption of Iran, Iraq, and Syria, it would probably not alter its pro-US alignment, although in this event the Turks would probably be obliged to adopt a more cautious policy toward the USSR;

b. If the USSR or its Satellites were to attack Greece and if the US failed to oppose militarily Satellite occupation of Greece or refused to consider an attack on Greece by Soviet forces sufficient justification for military action against the USSR, Turkey's attitude would then depend on broader considerations. If the US left no doubt of its determination to support and supply Turkey to the utmost of its ability, Turkey would probably still maintain its pro-US alignment. If, on the other hand, Turkey were unable to obtain assurances of such support, Turkey would probably attempt to adopt a policy of neutrality;

c. In the event that Turkey's land communications with the West were completely cut off by Soviet control of Greece in the west, and of Iran, Iraq, and Syria in the east and south, the Turks, lacking firm assurances of US armed support in the event of Soviet attack on Turkey, would probably shift to a policy of neutrality and might eventually make substantial concessions to Soviet demands. If, on the other hand, Turkey were able to obtain firm assurances of US armed support in the event of a Soviet or Satellite attack on Turkey, it would probably still maintain its pro-US alignment.

6. We estimate that under any circumstances Turkey will resist aggression against itself.

7. In the event of general war, Turkey, if not itself attacked, probably would initially maintain its status of non-belligerency but would do everything compatible with that status to facilitate a Western victory.

DISCUSSION

The Solidity of Turkey's Pro-Western Alignment.

1. The Turks are determined to resist Soviet expansion and to preserve their independence. They consider that alignment with the US and its allies offers Turkey its only hope of effectively resisting Soviet pressures, which since the end of World War II have been unremitting. In 1946 the USSR demanded a share in control of the Straits and the right to station Soviet troops there. It has unofficially claimed the Kars plateau area in northeastern Turkey. Moreover, the USSR has permitted its propagandists to denounce the Turkish regime, vilify Turkish leaders, attack Turkey's close association with the US, and attempt to incite revolt against the Turkish Government.

2. The Turks have stood firm against Soviet and Satellite pressure. They have avoided hasty or provocative actions against the USSR, and have indicated a willingness to discuss points at issue with the USSR. At the same time, however, they have made it clear that they are strongly averse to a policy of appeasement and are determined to resist any Soviet attempts to encroach on Turkey's independence or territorial integrity. Moreover, they have sought to ally themselves with the power or combination of powers most capable of resisting the USSR.

3. One of the main objectives of Turkey's foreign policy is to obtain a US commitment to come to Turkey's defense in event of a Soviet or Soviet-Satellite attack. Pronouncements of US interest in Turkey's security and the extension of US military and economic assistance have given the Turks a large measure of assurance, but they are still deeply concerned by the lack of a formal guarantee of prompt and effective aid in the event of war. The Turks would almost certainly provide base facilities to the US in return for a definite US commitment to come to Turkey's defense. Having failed to obtain a firm US commitment to date, the Turks have sought to obtain indirect US guarantees by seeking membership in NATO or by advocating an Eastern Mediterranean security pact with direct US participation. To the Turks, limited association with the NATO for Mediterranean defense planning represents only a slight improvement over their previous situation. They consider that the formation of a Mediterranean bloc without US participation or the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements with their neighbors without a US guarantee might actually be disadvantageous and they have, there-

fore, firmly opposed them. While they have reaffirmed their adherence to the 1939 Tripartite Treaty of mutual assistance with France and the UK, they clearly value it less as a direct guarantee of British and French assistance than as potentially an indirect way of getting US assistance. Turkey's participation in the UN is animated to some extent by the same motives. Turkey is more willing than most members to make the UN effective but has little confidence in its present effectiveness to check Soviet aggression.

Possibilities of a Shift in Turkey's Alignment

4. The Turks expect that the West may suffer further diplomatic or military reverses but believe that the US and its allies will be able ultimately to contain Soviet imperialism or defeat the USSR in event of war. A reduction in the US power position as a result of further reverses in the cold war would not alter Turkey's basic alignment as long as the US offered firm assurance of US armed support in the event of Soviet attack on Turkey.

5. Even if Turkey were partially cut off from the West by Soviet conquest or absorption of Iran, Iraq, and Syria, it would probably not alter its alignment with the West. In this event, however, Turkey would be obliged to adopt a more cautious policy toward the USSR. A number of individuals not unacceptable to the USSR might be brought into the government, and internal security measures would be tightened. It is unlikely, however, that Turkey would agree to territorial concessions, request the US military mission to leave Turkey, or otherwise appease the USSR.

6. If the USSR or its Satellites were to attack Greece and if the US failed to oppose militarily Satellite occupation of Greece or refused to consider a Soviet attack on Greece as sufficient justification for military action against the USSR, Turkey's attitude would depend on broader strategic considerations. These considerations would include: (*a*) the degree of military preparedness in Western Europe; (*b*) Western military strength in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean; (*c*) the attitude of the US toward Turkey and US strategic plans concerning Turkey; and (*d*) the attitude of the Western Powers in general and of the US in particular toward Soviet aggression. We believe, however, that Turkey would probably still maintain its pro-US alignment, provided the US left no doubt of its determination to support and supply Turkey to the utmost of its ability. If, on the other hand, Turkey were unable to obtain assurances of such support, it would probably attempt to adopt a policy of neutrality.

7. In the event that Turkey were outflanked completely by Soviet control both of Greece in the west, and of Iran, Iraq, and Syria in the east and south, the Turks, lacking firm assurances of US armed support in the event of Soviet attack on Turkey would probably shift

to a policy of neutrality and might eventually make substantial concessions to Soviet demands. If, on the other hand, Turkey were able to obtain firm assurances of US armed support in event of a Soviet or Satellite attack upon Turkey, it would probably still maintain its pro-US alignment.

8. The adoption by the US of a policy of hemispheric isolation would cause Turkey automatically to abandon its pro-US alignment. However, even if Turkey were isolated from the West in this way, the Turks would continue to resist Soviet pressure and would attempt to maintain a policy of neutrality. In time, a body of opinion favoring appeasement and accommodation with the USSR would probably grow up and might eventually dominate Turkish policy, but at present it appears more likely that the Turks would—if necessary—fight for their independence, no matter how suicidal such a course might be.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Turkey's Position.

9. Turkey is one of the strongest anti-Communist countries on the periphery of the USSR and the only one in the Near East capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression.

a. Turkey's strength derives to a considerable extent from the national unity and homogeneity of its population. In spite of Turkey's low standard of living and occasional bitter controversy over internal issues, the great majority of the Turkish people are united in their opposition to the USSR and fully support the government's policy of aligning Turkey with the Western Powers. The basic and long-standing antagonism of the Turks toward the Russians remains strong. Elements of the Kurdish, Greek, and Armenian minorities and even some Turks might be susceptible to Communist subversion if internal security broke down, but such a development is likely to occur only as a result of a Soviet invasion. Turkey's political institutions and relatively free press constitute sufficient outlets for what little disaffection exists, and subversion is effectively controlled by the Turkish security services. At the same time the extension of democratic procedures is building a stronger base for Turkish national power.

b. Another major source of Turkish strength is its army. With US aid the Turkish Army has recently developed into a compact, modern force of about 280,000 men. It has a theoretical mobilization potential of 1,500,000 men, although it could not equip or provide logistic support for this number. Although the full-scale reorganization of Turkey's defense establishment envisaged in the US military aid program is not yet completed, the combat effectiveness of the armed forces has already increased considerably despite the temporary dislocations inherent in converting from old to new methods, weapons, and equipment.

10. Turkey's position is weak in the following respects:

a. Despite major improvements made possible by the US military and economic aid programs, the Turkish armed forces have inadequate supply services, are critically short of technically qualified NCO's, and still lack an effective air force.

b. Turkey's economy is unable to support a heavy defense burden. Because the economy is largely agricultural, Turkey is heavily dependent on outside supplies both for consumer goods and military matériel. The necessity of maintaining large defense forces is a strain on Turkey's resources. Because of the lack of industrial development, the number of trained mechanics is limited.

c. Turkey is particularly exposed to Soviet pressure because of its geographical position. It is located on the Soviet periphery, far from Western centers of strength, and flanked on the east and south by weak and unstable countries that are themselves highly vulnerable to Soviet aggression. Large Soviet and/or Satellite forces could be hurled against Turkey with little or no warning. Because the avenues of Soviet/Satellite land attack from the Balkans and the Caucasus are widely separated, Turkey would, in the event of war, be obliged to divide its limited forces and fight on two fronts without good interconnecting transportation facilities.

11. Despite the shortcomings of its armed forces, its economic weaknesses, and its geographical vulnerability, Turkey is capable of putting up considerable resistance to Satellite or Soviet aggression. We believe it is capable of halting at the Straits and possibly even at the prepared defenses in eastern Thrace an invasion by Bulgarian forces. Against a Soviet attack, Turkey is believed capable of delaying Soviet advances into the interior of the country by stubborn defensive fighting. The Turkish armed forces could probably maintain some form of organized resistance for two or three months. A redoubt area in southern Turkey could be held for some time if the Turks received substantial assistance from the Western Powers. In any event, with outside support the Turks could probably maintain guerrilla warfare against Soviet lines of communication in Turkey.

Strategic Importance of Turkey.

12. The alignment of Turkey with the West is of primary strategic importance to the US because of Turkey's political and military strength and its geographical position. Turkey adjoins Soviet and Soviet Satellite territories and lies across one line of Soviet penetration into the weak and unstable countries of the Middle East. The Turkish Army would be a major obstacle to Soviet advances in the Middle East through Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey's pro-US alignment, in conjunction with its military strength, deters the USSR from attacking Turkey, because implicit in that alignment is the possibility that an assault on Turkey might lead the US to attack the USSR.

13. In the event of general war, Turkey might become a forward air base for US air forces, although construction of air facilities and their protection from Soviet air and ground attacks would be necessary before the US could use Turkey effectively as a base for air opera-

tions against the USSR and its Satellites. At present, Turkey is extremely vulnerable to air attack, and its air facilities are incapable of supporting medium bomber operations or sustaining fighter or light bomber operations. However, the US is currently engaged in reconstructing old and building new Turkish air facilities, a program which should result in considerable improvement within one year.

14. As long as Turkey controls the Straits, Turkey might be able to prevent the passage of Soviet submarines and surface ships from the Black Sea through the Straits to the Mediterranean.

15. In the unlikely event that Turkey should abandon its pro-US alignment, the effect on US interests in the Near East would be extremely serious. There is little doubt that pro-Western elements in most of the adjacent countries, who now hold a precarious balance of influence, would be seriously demoralized and their influence weakened if Turkey abandoned its present alignment.

Probable Turkish Courses of Action in the Event of War.

16. We believe Turkey will stubbornly resist any aggression upon its territory whether or not outside assistance is forthcoming. In case of attack, Turkey will almost certainly appeal to the US for military assistance, to the UK and France for aid under the Tripartite Treaty of 1939, and to the UN for such support as it can give.

17. In the event of a Satellite or Soviet attack against Yugoslavia, Iran, or even Greece, Turkey would not on its own intervene militarily. It would increase its frontier security and make every effort to avoid provoking a Soviet attack. If the UN or the US requested the use of Turkish bases from which to institute countermeasures, Turkey would probably comply if it received a definite US commitment of aid in the event of an attack on Turkey. In the event of further Soviet or Satellite attacks in other parts of Europe and Asia, Turkey would support UN collective security measures, short of commitment of Turkish troops, but would oppose large-scale expenditure of Western resources in "police" measures against the Soviet Satellites which would reduce Western potentialities against the USSR itself.

18. If the Korean conflict should lead to full-scale war between the US and Communist China the Turkish reaction would be ambivalent. On the one hand, Turkey would be impelled to support action against the Chinese Communists by its conviction that all nations threatened by Soviet imperialism must stand together and by its desire to demonstrate fully to the US its reliability as an ally. On the other hand, the Turks would become increasingly concerned with their own situation vis-à-vis the USSR and would view unfavorably any greater commitment of US military strength in the Far East, unless such commitment were matched or even exceeded by expansion of US strength in the Eastern Mediterranean and accompanied by US guarantees to Turkey. The line of action actually adopted by

Turkey would be determined largely by the Turkish Government's estimate of its security position at the moment. Turkey would, however, give diplomatic support to the US and might continue to provide the services of the Turkish Brigade.

19. In the event of a general war in which Turkey itself was not attacked, the Turks probably would initially adopt a non-belligerent status. Nevertheless, Turkish political leaders, both government and opposition, have frequently expressed the view that Turkish neutrality in the East-West struggle in war or peace is neither advisable nor possible. Consequently, even though Turkey were not attacked, the Turks would cooperate with the West and do everything compatible with a non-belligerent status to facilitate a Western victory.

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: "Turkey"

Memorandum by Henry S. Villard to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1951.

Subject: British-French-Turkish Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1939

1. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Great Britain, France and Turkey, signed October 19, 1939 and re-affirmed by the British and French in 1949, is primarily a guarantee on the part of Britain and France to lend Turkey "all aid and assistance in their power" in case of aggression against the latter by a European power. In the event of aggression by a European power leading to a *Mediterranean* war involving any of the three countries, Britain, France and Turkey will "collaborate effectively" and will lend "all aid and assistance in their power". In a sense, therefore, this assistance would be "mutual". But in point of fact it may be seriously doubted that either France or Britain would provide more than token military support if Turkey were attacked, or that Turkey would do anything to help Britain or France, unless the commitment were part of a larger arrangement such as NATO.

2. A "European power" could be interpreted to include Soviet Russia, but a protocol attached to the treaty stipulates that the obligations undertaken by Turkey cannot compel Turkey to take action "having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union." This would appear to give the Turks a wide-open escape door. However, they have indicated that they would be willing to revise the treaty so as to eliminate this protocol if the U.S. adhered to the treaty.

3. Article 3 of the treaty provides that Turkey will give France and Britain "all aid and assistance in her power" should France and

Britain, in fulfillment of their declarations of April 13, 1939 with respect to Rumania and Greece, be called upon to defend those countries against attack. The declarations by the British and French Governments were designed to offset the German occupation of Prague and the Italian occupation of Albania, and promised support if the independence of Greece or Rumania were threatened to such an extent that the Greek or Rumanian Governments considered it vital to resist with national forces. This guarantee to Greece cannot be considered valid today. The Greeks have been realistic enough not to place any reliance on the provisions of Article 3 and the British have just told us that they regard this portion of the treaty of 1939 as having lapsed.[1] There seems no likelihood therefore that the Turks would ever be called upon to give effect to this part of the treaty.

4. The other provisions of the treaty refer to "consultations" and "such common action as might be considered effective" in certain circumstances and do not specify direct assistance. On the whole the Treaty of 1939 would appear to be a rather weak reed to lean upon, if not largely obsolete, for defense of the Eastern Mediterranean. Rather than adhere to this treaty the United States would probably find it preferable to enter into some other form of commitment to Turkey (and to Greece), once it were decided to provide the guarantee which the Turks are seeking.

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[1] In telegram 4678 from London, February 28, not printed, Ambassador Gifford reported that officials in the British Foreign Office believed that the guarantee to Greece mentioned in Article 3 of the U.K.-French-Turkish treaty of 1939 was no longer valid and had therefore presumably lapsed (681.82/2-2851).

782.5/3-251

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Burns) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1951.

DEAR MR. MATTHEWS: Reference is made to your letter of 31 January 1951 on the Turkish Government's proposed plan for controlled mining of the Turkish Straits. The Department of State requested specifically the Department of Defense views as to the importance of this project from the military standpoint, including the essentiality of the project to United States security.

Positive control of the Turkish Straits is considered the key to the Mediterranean anti-submarine warfare problem and, from a strictly strategic standpoint, controlled mining of the Turkish Straits by Turkey, prior to D-Day, could insure the closure of the Black Sea during the initial stages of a war, and should be accomplished. It therefore follows that in event of war the denial to the USSR of an exit from the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles is in the United States security interest.

The procurement of mines for this operation was authorized in February 1951 from MDAP funds.[1] The details are being handled by the U.S. Navy. Since the procurement lead time for the type of mine required is approximately 18 months, resolution of the problem of obtaining agreement for installation of the mine field is unnecessary for the present.

With respect to the technical question on the subject of detection, the primary and essential purpose of the integrated detection system which is a part of the mine field is to insure that the operator makes a kill when he fires a mine. A separate detection installation in the approaches for warning is a necessary adjunct to the overall complex. Obviously, a warning system alone does not present the deterrent to clandestine exit that the mine field will provide.

Although it is recognized that there are a number of factors which would militate against a decision to implement the mine project under present conditions, the pertinency of certain of these should have disappeared by the time the mines become available. In the first place, if the mines were laid now it is evident that the impending meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers[2] would provide an excellent forum for the Soviets for heightened propaganda of "aggressive intent" with which threats of physical interference would probably be linked. Further, the Montreux Convention, by its terms, is subject to revision every five years and since 1951 is a revision year, the Soviets would have an excellent excuse to demand revision. In that connection the U.S. proposal of 1945 for modification of the Convention to provide that the Straits would be open at all times to warships of the Black Sea powers only, is highly undesirable now.

In view of the foregoing, it is considered that an acceptable current policy would be:

a. Exert no further pressure at this time on Turkey to persuade her to agree to implementation of the Bosphorus mining project.

b. Stockpile the mines and component equipment as they become available at an appropriate location in the Mediterranean area.

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[1] According to a memorandum of February 8 from Thomas D. Cabot, Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State, to Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, USA, Director, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense, the Department of State authorized the procurement of these mines subject to the understanding that if the project of mining the Straits eventually was disapproved, the mines would be used by the United States Navy, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program funds would be reimbursed (782.5/2–851).

[2] Presumably the reference is to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks in Paris (Conference Palais Marble Rose), March–June 1951. For documentation regarding this conference, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1086 ff.

c. When the necessary number of mines and the equipment are available, review the question of representations to the Turkish or British Governments in light of the then existing circumstances.[3]

Sincerely yours,

J. H. Burns

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[3] In a letter dated April 3, Mr. Matthews acknowledged receipt of General Burns' letter and informed him that in view of the fact that the procurement lead time for the proper type of mine was approximately 18 months, the Department of State agreed (1) that it was unnecessary at that time to obtain the agreement of the Turkish Government to install the mine field and (2) that the question of making representations to the Turkish or British Governments could be reviewed when the necessary mines and equipment became available (782.5/3-251).

882.00 R/3-551

Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] March 5, 1951.

Subject: Turkey's Request for Additional U.S. Economic Assistance as well as Assistance in Obtaining Wheat Supplies.

Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin—Ambassador of Turkey
Mr. James E. Webb—Acting Secretary
Mr. William Conrad—GTI
Mr. C. Robert Moore—GTI

Ambassador Erkin discussed with me the following two problems, on the instructions of his Government:

1. Turkey's need for additional U.S. economic assistance to help cover the budgetary deficit for the new Turkish fiscal year beginning March 1, 1951.

The Ambassador commented that Turkey's military expenditures have been absorbing almost 45% of national revenues, thus causing a constant drain on the budget and exhausting all available domestic resources. Consequently, the Turkish Government is confronted with a serious problem in this present fiscal year in covering a budget deficit in the proportions of $300 million. $180 million of this deficit will be met through the expansion of the tax program, through internal and external loans, and through the use of EPU quotas and ECA counterpart funds. The Turkish Government has requested additional aid from ECA to cover the remaining $120 million. It is appreciative, the Ambassador continued, of the understanding and spirit of cooperation shown by the Embassy and the ECA Mission in Ankara in their continuing consideration of the problem. The Government, however, considers it very important that an early favorable decision be reached and, therefore, has asked him to request my support in ensuring that appropriate action is taken to bring about the favorable conclusion of this problem.

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[1] Drafted by Moore, GTI.

I informed the Ambassador that we were well aware of the heavy burdens which the Turkish people had been bearing to keep their country militarily strong. The Embassy and ECA Mission in Ankara, as he knows, have been in constant touch with appropriate agencies in the Turkish Government to explore the means by which the particularly heavy deficit for this year can be covered. I assured the Ambassador that I was confident they were doing their best to work out a solution to this problem with the Turkish Government, that they were keeping us informed of developments, and that every consideration would be given, both in Ankara and here, to this problem.

2. Turkey's need for immediate shipments of wheat.

The Ambassador explained that there is a serious shortage of foodgrains in Turkey and that stocks presently at the disposal of the Soil Products Office are barely sufficient to meet the grain requirements of the country until the first of April. To provide for these requirements from then until the end of June, when the new harvest will become available, the Turkish Government urgently needs 100,000 tons of wheat and 25,000 tons of corn. The Ambassador, therefore, urged that the Department assist the Turks in obtaining grain in the U.S. for immediate shipment.

The Ambassador then adverted to the question of financing the purchase of the grain, suggesting one of several alternatives—1) that unused ECA allotments be made available and the funds thus spent be replaced later in the year when new ECA additional assistance is granted, 2) that an additional ECA allotment for this purpose be obtained now, or 3) that Turkey use its gold reserves and obtain reimbursement from ECA, if possible, when the amount of additional ECA aid to Turkey is determined.

I informed the Ambassador that the problem of meeting the wheat needs of the many countries which are calling on us for help is one of the most difficult that I have had to deal with during the past six months. We have rather suddenly found ourselves confronted with demands for very large quantities of wheat at a time when we are virtually without controls. There has been a progressive movement of controls, however, and we may soon be in a position to direct grain shipments to those countries which have the greatest need. Both ECA and the Department, as well as the Missions in Ankara, are keeping in very close touch with this problem and are trying to find ways to help the Turkish Government meet it. At the moment, no assurances can be given as to what it may be possible for us to do, although the Ambassador can be assured that the problem is receiving our sympathetic consideration.

The question of obtaining wheat supplies in the [illegible], I continued, is quite a different one from that of ECA financing [illegible] at the moment, the supply problem is the one that is most importa[illegible] solve.

The Ambassador stated that he had been asked to cable his Government by tomorrow on developments. He asked if a meeting could not be arranged for this afternoon, between representatives of the various departments concerned with this problem and his Financial Counselor,[2] to explore again the possibilities of assistance. It was agreed that a meeting would be arranged, following which I would communicate with the Ambassador.

(Later in the afternoon, following a meeting on the subject attended by Department, ECA and Turkish Embassy representatives, I called the Ambassador to tell him of the discussions and to let him know that it would perhaps be the month of April before we could get as much as 9,000 tons of wheat through. The Ambassador thanked me but requested that a new effort be made to send at least two shipments between the 15th and the end of March. He said that Turkey was in a very difficult situation and he was afraid it would be too late if nothing arrived until April.

I made no commitment but referred to the meeting of the abovementioned representatives to be held on March 12, by which time I hoped that more definite information could be given him about shipment possibilities.)

James E. Webb

GTI will keep in touch with these two problems.

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[2] Nahit Alpar.

782.13/3-1551

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State [1]

RESTRICTED [Washington,] March 15, 1951.

Subject: New Turkish Cabinet

The following analysis of the recent Turkish Cabinet change is furnished for your information:

The outgoing Cabinet had been formed hastily when the Democrat Party won its unexpected victory in May 1950 and was therefore somewhat of a patchwork of personalities. Its resignation on March 8, "to make possible the organization of a new Cabinet in keeping with present conditions . . . at the beginning of a new era", followed soon after the approval by the National Assembly of the Government budget for the fiscal year beginning March 1, 1951.

The new Cabinet, formed on March 9 by Mr. Menderes, who was also Prime Minister in the former Cabinet, is not conspicuously stronger than its predecessor and thus has produced general disappointment in Turkey. Only three new members entered the Government, the remaining fourteen posts being held by members of the previous Cabinet. The most significant change was the elimination of Mr. Karaosmanoglu, former Minister of State for Marshall Plan Affairs. While his relations with the ECA Mission had been cordial and constructive, there has been some suggestion that the Prime Minister was dissatisfied with his inability to obtain additional ECA aid for Turkey. His dismissal from the Cabinet is, however, probably more closely related to the rivalry between the two men, and leaves Mr. Menderes as the "strong man" of the present Government.

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[1] Drafted by Moore and Snyder, GTI.

No change in foreign policy is expected as a result of the recent Cabinet reshuffle in Turkey, and no significant change in domestic policy is foreseen.[2]

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[2] The Department was receiving telegraphic reports from Ankara regarding the cabinet change, and those cables may be found in file numbers 782.00 and 782.13.

882.00 R/3–1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Turkish Affairs (Moore)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1951.

Subject: Turkish Request for Additional ECA Aid

Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin—Ambassador of Turkey
Mr. Burton Y. Berry—Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. C. Robert Moore—GTI

Problem: Turkey's need for additional ECA assistance.

Action Required: Continued consultation with ECA on how this problem can be met.

Action Assigned: GTI

The Ambassador presented a detailed background of this problem referring to the counterpart release problem which had created so much difficulty at the time Turkey's FY 1950 budget was being considered, and the close collaboration which had taken place between Turkish officials, the ECA Mission and Ambassador Wadsworth with respect to the FY 1951 budget. He stated that the conclusion had been reached by all in early January that government expenditures, including thos for the investment program which would provide a healthy basis fo Turkey's military effort and strength, were at a minimum and tha revenues could not be increased. With a projected budget deficit of ove TL 400 million, it was expected that ECA would increase its aid

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[1] Drafted by Moore, GTI.

Turkey in the form of consumer goods which would generate Turkish liras and thus prevent this deficit from exercising a harmful inflationary impact on the economy, and it was assumed that the Turkish Government would be informed of this additional aid before the beginning of the new fiscal year on March 1. The Turkish Government was therefore surprised when Mr. Dorr, upon his return to Turkey in mid-February, reopened the question of the proposed budget. It felt that it could not agree, from the standpoint of the country's economy, to cut ordinary and investment expenditures still further and to reduce, as Mr. Dorr proposed, its request for additional ECA aid to one-half of the amount previously requested.

The new Turkish fiscal year has now begun and the matter of additional aid is still unsolved. The Ambassador urged that this Government reach an early decision and added that the Prime Minister would welcome whatever additional aid can be given, although he believes that the full amount requested is the minimum required.

Mr. Berry told the Ambassador that the Department and ECA have been following this problem and have been kept informed of the discussions going on in Ankara. Translating dollar funds into goods which will generate Turkish liras to cover the budgetary gap presents many difficulties and we have not yet received word that such difficulties have been ironed out on the ECA allotment of $4 million which was made in January to help finance the NCO program. Mr. Berry expressed the hope that an early decision could be reached and stated that we would keep in touch with ECA on the problem and inform it of the Ambassador's call.

782.022/3-2051

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1951.

Subject: Turkish Straits Issue

In a conversation with Mr. McGhee last December, the Turkish Ambassador referred to the possibility of Soviet proposals in the Big Four Conference with respect to the Turkish Straits and stated that the Turkish Government would not consider itself bound by any decision concerning Turkey which might be taken at a Conference at which it was not represented.

Last Friday (March 16), in a conversation with me, the Ambassador referred to recent press reports indicating that the USSR might raise this question in Paris.[2] He asked that I inform you of his Government's request that no Turkish question, including that of the Straits, be discussed in a Big Four Conference without Turkey's consent or the participation of a Turkish delegation.

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[1] Drafted by Snyder, GTI.

NEA is initiating a telegram to the U.S. delegation at Paris instructing it to make every endeavor to avoid inclusion of the Straits question on the agenda in the event the Russians raise the issue.[3]

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[2] Berry's memorandum of conversation with Turkish Ambassador Erkin on March 16 is not printed here.

Presumably the reference to press reports originating from Paris was in connection with the Four-Power Exploratory Talks in Paris (Conference Palais Marble Rose), March–June 1951. For documentation regarding this conference, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 1086 ff.

[3] The telegram was sent to Ambassador Jessup in Paris as 4956 on March 22. Jessup was instructed that every effort was to be made to avoid inclusion of the Straits question on the agenda because current policy dictated that the prevailing Straits regime be continued. (396.1 PA/3–2251)

ECA Telegram File : FRC Acc. No. 53A278 : Paris Torep : Telegram

The Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster) to the United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 30, 1951—8 p. m.

Torep 2145. Reference—Repto 1223 rptd Ankara Repto 159.

1. NAC consultation completed 28 March re utilization TL 164.8 million Turk cpt as proposed for period ending February 29, 1952. NAC Document #1116 and Action #458 being forwarded air pouch.[2]

2. If OSR concurs, please authorize Mission inform Turk gov. at its discretion approval of overall program (Step 1) and constituent projects (Step 2). This includes TL 10.64 million for special $4 million allotment.[3]

3. Proposed news release being cabled today.[4]

4. Re Istanbul hotel project, great pressure here for issuance PA for $210,000 Code 930 which awaits formal notification of Step 2 this project to Turk Gov. View this situation, appreciate prompt decision and action by OSR to notify Mission. Mission pls inform by priority cable when we may issue PA.

5. N.A.C. Action No. 458 dated March 28 reads as follows: The National Advisory Council advises the Administrator for Economic Coöperation that it does not object to the release of up to TL 165 million (approximately $59 million) of additional counterpart funds

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[1] Drafted by William M. Blaisdell, EPD/ECA, and cleared with Daniel K. Hopkinson, EPD/ECA; repeated to Ankara.

[2] Neither printed.

[3] The reference was to a special program to increase greatly the number of noncommissioned officers in the Turkish Army.

[4] Not printed.

to the Government of Turkey to finance a portion of the 1951–52 Turkish investment program, it being understood that actual releases will be made on a quarterly basis and that further consultation will take place in case of significant change in the Turkish financial situation.[5]

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[5] The complete record of National Advisory Council discussions and documents regarding this issue is in the NAC Files: Lot 60 D 137.

782.5/3-3151

Memorandum by George H. Emery to the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Increase in Turkish Forces.

The Turkish Government has offered to increase its armed forces by 40,000 men if the U.S. will finance the cost and provide improved support by furnishing certain items of equipment. The amount involved is estimated to be 88,000,000 Turkish lira, or approximately $31,500,000.

At the ISAC meeting on March 9, 1951, the Department of Defense expressed the view that the proposed increase would be highly desirable in that it would make the Turkish armed forces combat effective. After discussion ISAC agreed that the technical problems relating to the financing of the proposed increase should be referred to the Foreign Aid Committee for study and that ISAC would give further consideration to the problem based on the FAC's findings.

An endeavor has been made to obtain from Ankara a detailed import program which could be financed by ECA so that the Turkish lira thereby generated could be used to meet the internal costs of the program. To date we have been unsuccessful. However, a report from our Ambassador in Ankara, concurred in by JAMMAT[2] and the ECA Mission, included information which may provide a basis for judgment as to whether ISAC can proceed without waiting for further details.[3]

This report indicates that the approved Turkish military budget for the current Turkish fiscal year provides for an expenditure of 470,000,000 Turkish lira including 62,100,000 TL ($22,200,000) of imported items which are not included in American aid programs. There is also a proposed larger budget totalling 558,000,000 TL which will be adopted if the U.S. agrees to finance the increase. This larger budget includes proposed additional imports totalling some 38,900,000 TL ($13,800,000) but financing of this amount will have to be undertaken by the U.S. Therefore, if the proposed increase in forces is approved the Turkish military budget will amount to 558,000,000 TL including imports totalling 101,000,000 TL or $36,000,000. In no sense is this a forced import program because the items involved are required to meet what we are told are serious deficiencies. It has been necessary to take certain liberties with the figures because of vagueness in parts of the report, but in terms of broad categories the imports are as follows:

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[1] Emery was also a member of the International Security Affairs staff.

[2] Maj. Gen. W. H. Arnold, USA.

[3] Presumably the documents referred to are telegram 571 from Ankara, March 21 (782.5 MAP/3-2151), and despatch 454 from Ankara, February 16 (782.5 MAP/2-1651), both not printed.

(Column A includes the amounts in each category which will be imported with Turkish foreign exchange whether or not the increase in forces is approved, Column B indicates the increased amounts in the respective categories that will be imported if the increase in forces is approved and financing is provided by the U.S., and Column C indicates the totals in each category.)

	Col. A	Col. B	Col. C
	(Millions of Turkish Lira)		
POL	19.9	4.7	24.6
Pre-fab buildings	2.5		2.5
British Aircraft spares	2.7		2.7
Medical Supplies	1.2	1.0	2.2
Tools, etc.	1.8	3.1	4.9
Boots, Shoes, etc.	13.0	7.5	20.5
Cloth, tents and blankets	12.5	12.5	25.0
Cement, asphalt, etc.	1.0	1.6	2.6
Animals and equipment	3.0	8.0	11.0
Materials for ship repair	2.5	0.5	3.0
Rope, paint, etc.	2.0		2.0
	62.1	38.9	101.0
	($22.2)	($13.8)	($36.0)

The above import program, if financed by the U.S., will enable the Turks to generate 101,000,000 TL, or enough to take care of the proposed army expansion and to meet a portion of the second year's increment of the NCO program. The Turkish foreign exchange position would be affected in that it would not decrease by the amount of imports listed under Column A above. However, it would not increase. On the other hand, if the U.S. financed the total imports, the use of the Turkish foreign exchange so released should be the subject of a question, the answer to which we do not have.

Proposals for American Economic aid in support of the Turkish military total some $51½ million including $31½ million for the proposed increase in forces, $13 million for the NCO program and $7 million for raw materials to increase production in Turkish arsenals. If all three measures are to be undertaken, imports totalling some $151½ million over and above those listed in Column C above will have to be found

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782.5/4-351

Memorandum by George H. Emery to the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Increase in Turkish Forces.

Col. Ofsthun and I met with Mr. Halaby and his associates yesterday to discuss further the problems involved in the proposed increase of the Turkish armed forces. There seem to be two difficulties involved which caused some doubt in the minds of those in ECA as to the desirability of the suggested program. These are: (*a*) the use of ECA money to "hire" foreign soldiers, and (*b*) the possibility that ECA funds might be used indirectly to increase a foreign country's reserves.

As a result of the many discussions which have been held on this subject, I believe that perhaps our approach has been faulty. The emphasis has been placed too strongly on additional soldiers and not strongly enough on essential imports. Our missions in Ankara first proposed that the U.S. finance an increase in the Turkish armed forces by making imports available which would generate local currency to pay for those forces. On the other hand, our missions also have said that serious deficiencies exist in certain importable items that back up the Turkish military effort, such as uniform cloth, POL, medical supplies, etc.

I suggest, therefore, that the proposal might be more palatable to all concerned if we agree that semi-military import deficiencies, in fact, do exist and that ECA funds should be made available to meet those deficiencies. The local currency thereby generated could be used by the Turkish Government for any purpose, but in negotiating the additional aid we could "suggest" to the Turks that it might be desirable to use these funds for additional non commissioned officers or additional recruits for the armed forces. It seems to me that this puts the shoe on the proper foot if, as we are told, serious deficiencies in terms of imports to back up the military effort do exist. Furthermore, I believe that a very good case can be made for the use of ECA funds to supply items needed by the military forces of any country as distinct from the use of ECA funds to "hire" soldiers.

In my memorandum of March 31, it was pointed out that there are two categories of imports involved in the Turkish proposal. In the first, amounting to $22,200,000 and listed under Column A, are those items which the Turks propose to import with free Turkish foreign exchange regardless of any action taken by the U.S. with respect to increase aid. In the second category, amounting to $13,800,000 and listed under Column B, are those items which will be imported to meet major deficiencies if the U.S. will supply the financing.

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It was agreed yesterday in ECA that financing by the U.S. of the $13,800,000 of imports under Column B will not affect the Turkish reserve position in any way because the foreign exchange to meet those imports is not available. Therefore, if it is found to be necessary to compromise with ECA's point of view, it might be possible to agree that the Turks should finance the imports listed under Column A as originally planned in their budget and that ECA finance the imports listed in Column B. Under this procedure some 40,000,000 TL would be generated through American aid. This, of course, is substantially less than the 88,000,000 TL requested by the Turks. However, it must be remembered that the total cost of keeping 40,000 additional men under arms for a year is estimated to be 23,200,000 TL. The balance of the 88,000,000 TL requested was designed for improved support of the army as a whole through services such as maintenance of air fields, local construction work, etc. If eventually it is determined that these services are of such importance that they deserve a higher priority than some of the projects now being carried out under MDA in Turkey, ways and means could be found to schedule them through a revision of present priorities.

782.5 MSP/4-351

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) to the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1951.

Subject: ECA Assistance to Turkey for FY 1952

Attached hereto is a paper prepared in GTI which discusses th problems involved if ECA maintains its projection of $66 million o economic aid for Turkey during the next fiscal year.

As indicated in the conclusion, GTI hopes that ECA will meet th position formulated by its representative in Ankara. If ECA is agree able, this formula would involve additional ECA aid of $42 million o a total for FY 1952 of $108 million.

[Attachment][2]

ECA ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY FOR FY 1952

1. ECA assistance to Turkey, as presently projected for FY 195 amounts to $66 million. Assuming incremental Turkish military effor to the extent of $40 million are met in full from this $66 million, on

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[1] Drafted by Edmund J. Dorsz, GTI.

[2] Drafted by Moore, GTI, on April 2.

$26 million of economic, as distinct from military, aid would result. Only two-thirds of this amount, or approximately $18 million, would be applicable to the non-military internal budget gap of approximately $120 million for the Turkish fiscal year 1951 (March 1, 1951 to February 28, 1952).

2. In the absence of additional ECA aid Turkey will not be able to cover in full the gap of $120 million, without inflationary financing or damaging cut-backs in expenditures. The U.S. would strongly oppose any cutback in military expenditures; therefore the cutback would have to be primarily in investment expenditures which, according to the ECA Mission in Turkey, are already at virtually a minimum level consistent with the maintenance of a sound economy. Even at present and contemplated levels, gross investment in Turkey as a percentage GNP (Gross National Product) is below that of virtually all participating countries.

3. Up to the present ECA aid to Turkey has been granted to finance a capital development program (which otherwise would not have been undertaken) rather than to finance a balance of payments deficit. In the present projection, ECA indicates that the import forecast has not been specifically developed to allow for the possible requirements of a relatively poor economy whose historic imports have often been shaped by foreign exchange limitations rather than need. Increased imports designed to increase internal resources in order to help cover the budgetary gap would have relatively little effect on per capita consumption which would still remain at a bare subsistence level. Additional ECA aid would not result in an increase in Turkey's monetary reserves and it would not be difficult to obtain the Turkish Government's concurrence to measures that would prevent such a development.

4. In order to retain Turkey's confidence in the sincerity of our interest in helping it become strong militarily, economically, and politically, it is essential for us to give support in the economic as well as military field. This is particularly important inasmuch as Turkey, for many years, has been willing to bear a heavy defense burden which has limited the funds available for financing its investment program—a program which aims at raising the very low standard of living of the Turkish people and which will enable them better to support their military establishment.

A drastic cutback in the investment program would affect the internal position of the new Government of the Democrat Party in Turkey, which was elected in the first free and fair elections held in that country.[3] Local reaction would undoubtedly extend to the U.S. and make it more difficult for the Government to cooperate as fully with the U.S. as in the past. The Turks are very conscious of their military contribution to the free world forces and consider that they have received relatively limited amounts of economic assistance from the U.S. in relation to other countries whose standard of living is higher and whose devotion to the common cause has been less effectively demonstrated. While this can be countered with the explanation of what ECA was established to accomplish, the explanation is not one that is understood by the large mass of relatively uninformed Turks whose views must be taken into consideration in the new democratic Turkey.

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[3] See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1224 ff.

5. We feel that ECA should endeavor to meet the position formulated by Russell Dorr who requested that ECA finance $60 million, or approximately one-half, of the $120 million gap (exclusive of the military support program). This formula would involve additional ECA aid of $42 million ($60 million minus $18 million already projected) or a total for FY 1952 of $108 million. As a minimum, we should seek an additional $20 million, or approximately half of that balance.

ECA Telegram File : FRC Acc. No. 53A278 : Ankara Ecato : Telegram

The Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell) to the ECA Mission in Turkey[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 12, 1951—8 p. m.

Ecato 241. 1. This is joint State–ECA–Def cable re level US fin support for Turkey during US FY 51 and FY 52 apart from mil end-item programs.

2. Conclusions outlined below reflect agreement of interested agencies after extensive study and discussion against background your messages, reports and recommendations. Have endeavored go as far as possible along lines your recommendations but our approach strictly limited within confines national policy which permits support for mil effort and for investment programs related to def. Cannot justify dollar aid for purpose of financing PC budgetary gaps.

3. Conclusions of interested agencies are that US fin support shld be made available to permit Turkey to:

(*a*) Increase Turk armed forces by 40,000 men and provide improved support for those forces along lines of JAMMAT "final report" Sec N.[2]

(*b*) Continue NCO program along lines of JAMMAT "final report" Sec H.

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[1] Authorized by Hopkinson, EPD/ECA; drafted by Blaisdell, EPD/ECA; and cleared with Carter N. de Paul, Jr., EPD/ECA; Norman S. Paul, ECA; John O. Bell, Department of State; Paul R. Porter, ECA; Richard M. Bissell, Jr., ECA; and Col. Sidney A. Ofsthun, USAF, Department of Defense. It was repeated to Paris.

[2] Not printed; JAMMAT's "final report" was enclosed with despatch 454 from Ankara, February 16 (782.5 MAP/2–1651).

(*c*) Continue minimal investment program by completing projects already under way.

4. In order carry out programs in Para 3 above it has been agreed that ECA will make available $140 million for US FY 51 and 52 including EPU initial position for both years and including amts already allotted current US FY. Obviously US FY 52 portion depends on favorable BOB and Cong action.

5. Ceiling of $140 million in Para 4 above is absolute, but implied ceiling of $70 million each year is not inflexible. To date ECA has allotted for US FY 51 $42.6 million as fol: (*a*) $13.6 million grant aid, (*b*) $25 million EPU initial position and (*c*) $4 million for NCOs. Therefore remainder available for allotment current FY is $27.4 million on grant basis. Under agreement priority must be given programs in Para 3 (*a*) and (*b*) above in allotting this amt which must be paid by June 30, 1951. In this connection EPU initial position can be used for mil support. Also if deemed essential allotment of portion of recommended US FY 52 funds to extent of perhaps $5 million will be considered if such portion can be paid by June 30, 1951 and on understanding US FY 52 funds will be reduced by like amt.

6. Additional aid outlined Para 4 above being made available on understanding that Turks will:

(*a*) Continue mil expenditures in line with current budget and that such budget will not be reduced in next Turk FY.

(*b*) Carry out program in Para 3 above.

(*c*) Continue efforts to reduce non-mil expenditures (including administrative expenditures and public investment).

(*d*) Continue and extend efforts to increase revenues thru taxation.

7. Aid figure for US FY 52 cannot be discussed with Turks at this stage but US support for programs in Para 3 above can be disclosed.

8. Imports outlined Para 3 Toeca 299 rptd Torep 374, Apr 7 under study.[3]

9. Suggest coordinated Amb, ECA, JAMMAT approach to Turks in outlining above plans. Important that Turks be impressed with fact that US endeavoring every possible way to aid Turks and that above reflects maximum effort consistent with our global commitments and national policy.

10. Re additional allotments. Await Mission recommendations for (*a*) informing Turk Amb here and (*b*) processing and public announcement.

11. Pass copies Amb and JAMMAT.

Bissell

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[3] Not printed.

782.58/4–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY ANKARA, April 19, 1951—6 p. m.

662. Re Ecato 241[1] and Deptel 528 April 12[2] and Deptel 534 April 14.[2] (1) After consulting ECA and JAMMAT I have informed FonMin orally that decision has now been taken by US Govt on highest level which allocates necessary dollars from ECA/W funds for generation of sufficient Turk liras to defray cost of 40,000 additional men and related expenses envisaged by Turk supplementary military budget. I said this was in addition to $4 million already allocated from ECA funds to defray cost of NCO program for current Turk FY.

FonMin expressed high appreciation and, at my suggestion, agreed to communicate this info to Cabinet to end that Natl Defense Minister[3] might immediately commence program.

I avoided any mention of time when Turk Govt might expect lira funds to be made available; nor did I mention exact amounts; but it was clear from our brief discussion that he expected substantially full amount of TL 80 million, as specified in supplementary budget voted by GNA, would be made available within next few months. I venture urge this be assured before end of summer when budgeting for Turk FY beginning March 1952 must begin.

(2) It is General Arnold's and my understanding that these new dollar funds are to be made available during current US FY 1951 from ECA funds made available for MDAP requirements. We note however from Ecato 241 that only $27.4 million are available for allocation in FY 1951, whereas equivalent of TL 80 million is $28.57 million.

We are not concerned at this discrepancy, because six weeks of current Turk FY have already passed, and Gen Arnold is confident he will be able reach ready agreement with Turk general staff for paring program for balance of year to equivalent of $27.4 million figure. We request authority proceed on this latter basis.

WADSWORTH

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[1] *Supra.*
[2] Not printed.
[3] Hulusi Köymen.

782.58/4-1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY ANKARA, April 19, 1951—7 p. m.

663. Fol is my preliminary comment in partial explanation of request made in Embtel 656 Apr 18.[1] Dorsy [*Dorr?*] and Arnold are preparing fuller comment.

Situation created by ISAC decision which was basis Ecato 241 Apr 12[2] appears briefly to be as fols:

1. Turk Govt requested additional military aid to meet necessary expenses of 40,000 man increase and NCO programs. I read Ecato 241 to mean that sufficient funds for these two programs have been allocated from FY 51 ECA funds made available for MDAP requirements.

2. Turk Govt has been proceeding on uncontradicted assumption that, in line Snoy–Marjolin formula,[3] it wld receive at least $27,000,000 as reg FY 51 ECA econ aid; and ECA/T has been programming jointly with high Turk officials on that basis. Of this amount only $13.6 has been allocated. Ecato 241 appears in fact make no provision for allocation of remaining $13.4 million, because all of unallocated $27.4 million will be needed for 40,000 man military program.

3. Turk Govt for many months (i.e. during and since last winter budgeting for Turk FY 51–52) has requested additional econ aid to assist in meeting cost of investment development program which it has consistently insisted is approx minimum necessary effectively to support defense effort. Ecato 241 provides nothing on this score.

In short, decision in question as I understand it (*a*) provides sufficient new FY 51 funds to meet only supplementary military expenditures which, in absence such funds, Turks would not make; (*b*) in effect cuts expected FY 51 regular program econ aid by half; and (*c*) provides no military aid from FY 51 funds.

If foregoing exposition is correct, we shall be faced with very difficult public relations problem. I feel it may well have serious adverse effect on overall Turk-US relations.

In thought that shock to Turks might be softened, I have already (in conversation with FonMin reported in Embtel 662 Apr 19[4] and in a brief word had by chance immed thereafter with Pri Min) made point that in face increasingly threatening world situation we must all expect that not only primary, but overriding emphasis in US aid programs will henceforth be placed on military-defense rather than econ development.

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[1] In telegram 656 from Ankara, April 18, Ambassador Wadsworth requested hat a meeting scheduled by the Department and ECA with Ambassador Erkin o inform him of the overall program and dollar amounts outlined in Ecato 241 e postponed until the Department had received additional information and bservations from the Embassy regarding this program (782.58/4-1851).

[2] *Ante*, p. 1140.

[3] The Snoy-Marjolin formula was a plan for allocating economic aid through e Organization for European Economic Cooperation. It was created to silence mplaints brought by various members of the Council of the Organization for uropean Cooperation in August 1949 that the distribution of Marshall Plan aid nds among the participating European nations was inequitable. See *Foreign elations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 427.

[4] *Supra.*

WADSWORTH

601.8211/4-2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1951.

Subject: Conversation with Turkish Ambassador

Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin—Ambassador of Turkey
Mr. Dean Acheson—Secretary
Mr. C. Robert Moore—GTI

Ambassador Erkin stated that he had been called back to Turkey for consultation and that he wanted to discuss with me two problems of considerable importance to Turkey on which he would be questioned.

1. *The status of Turkey's request for a U.S. security commitment.*

Ambassador Erkin pointed out that in view of developments in Iran [1] and elsewhere the Turkish people are becoming increasingly disturbed and confused over the fact that Turkey's proposals to the U.S. with respect to reciprocal security arrangements have received no definite reply. He stated that it would be most helpful, in clarifying the atmosphere, if such a reply could be given, even though it may be negative.

I assured the Ambassador that the Turkish position on this security problem has been ably and forcefully presented by him and by Ambassador Wadsworth and that we fully appreciate its importance to Turkey. We recognize that it is a problem to which we must find a solution and developments since 1947, when we initiated our program of military aid to Turkey,[2] are helpful to us in our efforts to find this solution. We in this country have a much greater awareness now than in 1947 of the Soviet menace and of the efforts that are required of the free world to meet it. Turkey itself enjoys a much different position in the U.S. than it did in 1947. The decision of the Turkish Government to send troops to Korea and their fine performance there have greatly increased the favorable atmosphere in this country towards Turkey. Developments such as these are very useful in preparing Congress and the American people for new policy measures that it may be considered desirable to take.

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[1] Regarding events in Iran, see p. 544.

[2] For documentation regarding the initiation of U.S. economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 1 ff.

A decision to extend a security commitment to Turkey (and to Greece, as we assume that similar arrangements would be made for both countries) has many aspects, I continued. In addition to the Turkish aspect, there are the following:

1) The attitude of our European allies.
2) The problems that may be created with respect to Iran and Egypt who might desire similar arrangements.
3) The problems that might be created with respect to a possible Conference of Foreign Ministers.
4) The general problem of obtaining acceptance at home of a new policy decision. In this connection, I commented that I believed the furor created by General MacArthur's return would die down and that we would soon be able to forge ahead in developing and carrying out our policies.

At this point the Ambassador asked if my reference to the Conference of Foreign Ministers meant that no decision on a security commitment to Turkey could be given until after such a Conference. My reply was that we want to think carefully before taking any action which might have some bearing on such a Conference, in the event hat the USSR should really desire an "honest" conference. That loes not mean, however, that our study of the security problem will ot go forward or that a decision will not be reached until after the onference has been held.

The Ambassador then asked if we have taken up the security com- itment problem with any of the other members of the North Atlantic ouncil. I replied that I had not done so personally, although it was ossible that some of my colleagues may have had informal conversa- ons with representatives of other governments. I added, in reply the Ambassador's question, that I did not know the present atti- de of the other governments towards the problem. I did feel, how- er, that Foreign Offices generally were aware that conditions had anged considerably since September 1950, when the question of rkey's inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty was last discussed.[3] the present time, I continued, we are trying to clarify this problem our own minds and to think through all of the various aspects. nen this has been done we will undoubtedly consult with our allies ore reaching any final decision. If the consultations reveal diffi- ties with respect to any one approach to the problem, we will have onsider the problem in the light of those difficulties and the alterna- s that may be available.

o sum up, I said that we understand the problem and its impor- ce to Turkey. We are sympathetic in our desire to find a solution t and this is one of our major preoccupations at present. I stated

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or documentation regarding Turkey's request in 1950 for membership in the h Atlantic Treaty Organization, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff. 108 ff., and *ibid.*, vol. V, pp. 1224 ff.

that, while no definite decision can be given now, I did not consider the situation unencouraging.

2. *Financial Assistance to Turkey.*

The Ambassador referred briefly to his several representations to the Department and to ECA regarding the Turkish Government's request for additional financial aid. He stressed the serious financial problem facing Turkey because of its heavy defense expenditures and urged that an early and favorable reply be given.

I pointed out that informal discussions on the Foreign Assistance Bill for FY 1952 would soon be underway and that it was too early to indicate what aid Turkey might expect to receive in the coming fiscal year. I added that I did not know whether any decision had been reached on the question of additional aid for the present fiscal year but that I would be glad to inquire into the matter.

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Turkey 1948—Memoranda"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1951.

Subject: Ambassador Erkin's Appointment on April 30.

Ambassador Erkin will probably bring up the following subjects:

1. *Economic aid.*

The Ambassador is particularly interested to learn what amounts of additional economic aid can be expected for the remaining part of FY 1951. He has an appointment with Mr. Bissell of ECA this afternoon at 4:00 o'clock, and it is contemplated that either Ed Dorsz or I will be present at that time. Mr. Bissell plans to hand the Ambassador an ECA memorandum along the lines of the attached draft.[2]

For your own information, Turkey will receive a total of $70 million in ECA aid in FY 1951, approximately $17.2 million more than was originally contemplated at the beginning of the fiscal year. According to present estimates, this entire increase will be absorbed by imports included in the two military programs approved by ISAC—the increase in forces program and the NCO program. Projected ECA aid for FY 1952 likewise amounts to $70 million out of which the balance of the two military programs must be financed as well as a minimal investment program. We cannot give the Turks any information on our plans for FY 1952 as the figures have not yet been submitted to Congress and Congressional action is, at present, quite uncertain.

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[1] Drafted by Moore, GTI.

[2] Not printed.

I would strongly urge that you seek to avoid discussion of this problem, in view of the explanations the Ambassador will receive from Mr. Bissell. You can emphasize, however, that the matter has been discussed at some length between the interested agencies and that the amount of additional aid for FY 1951 is the maximum that can be made available. You should also emphasize to the Ambassador that under present circumstances we are obliged to place increasing emphasis on economic aid in support of military programs and that in the case of almost all countries, aid for purely economic development has had to be curtailed.

. . . .

ECA Telegram File : FRC Acc. No. 53A278 : Ankara Ecato : Telegram

The Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster) to the ECA Mission in Turkey[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 2, 1951—7 p. m.

Ecato 292. 1. Bissell–Erkin conference held 30 April. Erkin disappointed at level of aid but Bissell emphasized increase above expected $52.2 million and urged that Erkin impress on his Gov importance of prompt action so that entire $70 million might be used prior to 30 June. Bissell also emphasized general policy statements set forth in memo. (Ref Ecato 263 rptd Paris Torep 2541)[2] After conference Erkin telephoned to inquire whether special $4 million NCO allotment included in $70 million. Arithmetic set forth in para 1 of memo was further elaborated for him, indicating inclusion of $4 million.

2. Erkin handed to Bissell short memo urging that U.S. take favorable position on Turk request for additional EPU initial position for current year.[2] Bissell replied that he was not in a position to give Erkin any encouragement on this item and emphasized that $70 million level was established as upper limit of assistance to Turkey from current U.S. FY funds. However, Bissell suggested that Turk Gov might be interested in shifting some direct dollar assistance to EPU assistance, without increasing total level of aid.

3. Bissell indicated to Erkin that ECA aid to Turkey from U.S. FY 52 funds would be projected as of same order of magnitude as current year's aid but that greater portion of aid through EPU and smaller portion in form of direct dollars. No figures mentioned by Bissell in this connection.

4. State Department representative present at meeting.

FOSTER

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[1] Authorized by Hopkinson, EPD/ECA; drafted by Blaisdell, EPD/ECA; and cleared with Clarence S. Gulick, EPD/ECA; de Paul, EPD/ECA; and Bissell, ECA. It was repeated to Paris.

[2] Not printed.

S/S–NSC Files : Lot 63 D 351 : NSC 109 Series

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

[NSC 109]

TURKEY

1. Turkey is the strongest anti-Communist country on the periphery of the USSR and the only one in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression. It can and does contribute to the security interests of the

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[1] The source text and the NSC Staff Study (*infra*), along with a cover sheet and a covering note dated May 11 from James S. Lay, Jr., the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, were circulated to members of the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization for their consideration as NSC 109 of May 11, "The Position of the United States With Respect to Turkey."

Lay explained in the covering note that the enclosed draft statement of policy had been prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 366–*c* of October 12, 1950, in which the Council had agreed that the NSC Staff should prepare a new report on U.S. policy toward Turkey (NSC–S/S (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95: Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1950; for excerpts from NSC 42/1, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 410 and 1317.). Moreover, it was proposed in the covering note to revise the approved statement of policy in NSC 103/1, "The Position of the United States With Respect to Greece" (p. 463) to include a statement along the lines of paragraph 3 in the source text in order that, if approved, the recommendations advanced regarding security arrangements in both statements of policy would conform with one another.

The draft statement of policy on Turkey had been completed by the NSC Staff Assistants on May 8 for consideration by the Senior Staff on May 10. Prior to this meeting, general agreement had been reached regarding its contents, except for the recommendations advanced in the subparagraphs of paragraph 3. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives disliked these subparagraphs and were advancing substitutions. At the Senior Staff session on May 10, the Department of State withdrew its objections to the Defense–JCS versions of the subparagraphs; the JCS representative then countered with a redraft of the JCS wording of subparagraph 3*b*.; and the Senior Staff proceeded to adopt them, after further revision, with the recommendation that the revised draft statement of policy be submitted to the Council for approval as NSC 109. The differences between the subparagraphs in the draft of May 8 and the final version of them circulated as NSC 109 on May 11 are indicated in a subsequent footnote.

At its 92d meeting on May 23, the Council considered NSC 109. The members also noted a memorandum of concurrence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense dated May 22 in which the JCS had approved the source text and the proposed revisions to the statement of policy in NSC 103/1 as they had been circulated on May 11. Executive Secretary Lay had, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, sent this additional paper, along with a covering memorandum, to the members of the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization on May 22. In it, the JCS expressed again their opinion:

"that United States security interests demand that Turkey and Greece be admitted as full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Joint Chiefs of Staff attach such great importance to insuring that Turkey and Greece are on the side of the Western Powers at the outset of a general war that they are willing to agree to an alternative mutual security arrangement for Turkey and Greece if their inclusion in NATO would be delayed to such an extent that orientation with the West in the event of a general war would be jeopardized. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, would not regard

United States, and therefore it continues to be in the interest of the United States that Turkey remain an ally of the free world in the struggle against international communism.

a. Turkey's military strength-in-being, and firm determination to maintain its political independence and territorial integrity, continue to be effective deterrents to Soviet or satellite aggression directed against Turkey.

b. Turkey's alignment with the free world furnishes a protective screen behind which the defensive strength of the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area can be developed.

c. Turkey controls the strategically important Turkish Straits, the denial of which the Soviet control is vital to the security interests of the United States.

d. Turkey is a bulwark on one flank of the area now embraced by the North Atlantic Treaty.

e. Military and other resources of Turkey, including base areas, would be of great value to the United States in the event of war with the USSR.

f. Soviet domination of Turkey would enhance the relative Soviet power position, seriously damage United States prestige which is heavily committed in Turkey, and weaken the will to resist in other countries threatened with Soviet domination.

g. Soviet domination of Turkey or even a neutral Turkey would protect the Soviet right flank in a Soviet attack against Iran and the Arab States.

h. Seizure of Turkey by force of arms could only be viewed as one phase of the Soviet plan of conquest, undertaken in full recognition of the risk of precipitating global war.

2. Accordingly, the United States should:

a. Continue to manifest publicly its active interest in the maintenance of the political independence and territorial integrity of Turkey and its continued support of the Truman doctrine.

b. Continue to provide appropriate international political support to Turkey.

c. Continue to exercise a constructive influence, without interference in Turkey's internal affairs, on Turkey's efforts to strengthen itself economically, militarily and politically.

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either bilateral security arrangements between the United States and Turkey or Greece as an adequate solution."

The Council then adopted the statement of policy on Turkey and the proposed revisions to the statement of policy on Greece contained in NSC 103/1, which had been presented in the covering note of May 11, and, finally, the NSC formally submitted NSC 109 to the President for consideration. (NSC Action No. 480, May 23, 1951, NSC–S/S (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95: Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1951)

The following day, May 24, Executive Secretary Lay informed the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that the President had that day approved the Statement of Policy on Turkey contained in NSC 109 and had directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State. For the revisions to NSC 103/1, see pp. 461 ff.

d. Encourage Turkey to develop closer relations with the other countries of the Middle East, particularly Iran.

e. Continue to provide economic and technical assistance which, when combined with the maximum Turkish efforts of self-help, will permit the development of Turkey's economy to the extent required to avoid social unrest, which will demonstrate United States interest in Turkey's economic as well as military well-being, and which will assist the United States in securing from Turkey resources needed for the defense of the free world.

f. Lend appropriate support to the Turkish military establishment to give it the capability of:

(1) Maintaining internal security.
(2) Repelling a satellite attack on Turkey.
(3) Resisting to the maximum practicable extent an attack on Turkey involving direct or indirect Soviet participation.
(4) . . .

g. Within the limits of priorities and availabilities, provide Turkey military matériel, supplies, and guidance necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives in *f.* above.

3. In order to assure Turkey's full cooperation in international security measures and, in the event of war, its cobelligerency, the use of Turkish bases and other facilities, and the closure of the Straits to the USSR, the United States should:

a. Press now for the inclusion of Turkey as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement.

b. If full membership of Turkey in NATO would be unacceptably delayed, conclude alternative security arrangements which would include Turkey and would not prejudice Turkish membership in NATO at the earliest practicable date.[2]

4. A Soviet or satellite attack against Turkey would so increase the danger of global war that the United States in common prudence, pending the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements including the United States and Turkey, should assist in opposition to the attack in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of circumstances then existing, including the following general courses of action.

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[2] In the original May 8 draft of the statement of policy, the varying versions of the subparagraphs to paragraph 3 of the source text appeared as follows:

State	*Defense, JCS*
a. Enter into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey in such form as may be most feasible.	*a.* Press now for the inclusion of Turkey as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement.
b. Approve in principle, as the most feasible form of reciprocal security arrangements, the inclusion of Turkey as a full member in NATO.	*b.* If full inclusion of Turkey in NATO proves to be politically impossible, enter into some alternative form of reciprocal security commitment of a form most feasible in the circumstances.
c. If full inclusion of Turkey in NATO proves to be politically impossible determine what alternative form of a security commitment would be more feasible in the circumstances.	

a. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the imminence of global war.

b. Seek, by political measures, to stop the aggression, localize the action, and restore the *status quo*.

c. Provide such military matériel and deploy such forces to the general area as can appropriately be made available in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

d. Urge other nations to take similar action, including appropriate measures in the United Nations and NATO and the implementation of the United Kingdom–France–Turkey Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

5. After the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements including the United States and Turkey, the United States should respond to a Soviet or satellite attack against Turkey in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of the recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the circumstances then existing, and within the framework of the obligations of the United States under those arrangements.

S/S–NSC Files : Lot 63 D 351 : NSC 109 Series

National Security Council Staff Study [1]

TOP SECRET

[NSC 109] [WASHINGTON, undated.]

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO TURKEY

PROBLEM

1. To determine the position of the United States with respect to Turkey.

ANALYSIS

2. Turkey is the strongest anti-communist country on the periphery of the USSR and the only one in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area having the determination and capability of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression. Aligned with the free world, Turkey has stood firm against Soviet and satellite pressures, having as their ultimate objective Soviet domination of Turkey.

3. Turkey's geographic position makes its continued alignment with the free world of primary strategic importance to the United States. It not only controls important air, land and sea routes (including the Turkish Straits, which Russia has coveted for some two hun-

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[1] The source text, together with the cover sheet, the covering note dated May 11 from Executive Secretary Lay, and the Statement of Policy, were circulated as the final part of NSC 109 on May 11. The problems encountered with the subparagraphs of paragraph 3 in the Statement of Policy, as noted in footnote 1, *supra*, were reflected as well in the subparagraphs of paragraph 40 in the source text. However, when the difficulties with the subparagraphs outlined in footnote 1, *supra*, were resolved on May 10, the same changes were made with reference to the subparagraphs of paragraph 40 of this Staff study.

dred years) from the USSR to the Cairo–Suez area and to the Middle East oil fields, but it offers bases from which the USSR could launch operations against the Islands of Crete, Rhodes and Cyprus and against communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in their comments on NSC 73/1,[2] that "denial of Soviet control of the Dardanelles is vital to the security interests of the United States. Therefore, direct USSR attack on Turkey would precipitate global War". Attainment by the USSR of its objectives in Turkey would thus have grave consequences on the security of the United States, not only through the loss of the Turkish Straits to the Soviets but through the elimination of Turkey as an effective barrier to Soviet penetration in the Middle East area. The United States, therefore, seeks the preservation of a stable, strong, independent and democratic Turkey, aligned with the free world, and, to this end, it has been extending political, military and economic assistance to that country.

5. There have been relatively few important international issues on which Turkey has required United States political support. The most serious of such issues arose in 1946 over the question of revising the Montreux Convention of 1936 governing the Turkish Straits. It had been agreed by the United States, British, and Soviet Governments at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 that the Convention should be revised as failing to meet present day conditions, and it was further agreed that the matter should be taken up with the Turkish Government by each of the three Governments. The British and United States views on the basis for an equitable solution of the Straits question were subsequently communicated to the Turkish Government. They were followed, in August 1946, by Soviet proposals for a "new regime" for the Straits. These proposals included two which Turkey rejected as unacceptable—(1) only Turkey and other Black Sea powers should establish the regime of the Straits and (2) Turkey and the USSR should organize joint means of defense of the Straits. In the diplomatic exchanges that followed, Turkey was strongly supported in its position by the United States as well as the United Kingdom. While not accepting the Turkish position, the USSR has allowed the issue to remain relatively dormant. Unless it is raised again before August 9, 1951, or unless the Convention is denounced by one of the signatories, the present Convention will remain in force without revision until its expiration in 1956.

6. The United States has endeavored to strengthen Turkey's international position in various other ways, such as the following:

a. It initiated a program of military aid to Turkey in 1947 under the Truman Doctrine to assist Turkey in maintaining its political independence and territorial integrity.

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[2] Not printed, but for text of NSC 73/4, August 25, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 375.

b. It included Turkey as a participating country in the European Recovery Plan.

c. It strongly supported Turkey's candidacy for a seat on the Security Council in October 1950.[3]

d. It sponsored the proposal through the North Atlantic Council, in the endeavor to meet constructively Turkey's demands for full membership in NATO, that Turkey associate itself with such appropriate phases of the military planning work of the NATO as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean.

. . . .

9. The long-term military objectives of the United States in Turkey have been defined as follows: development of sufficient military power to prevent Turkey from capitulating to communism during the ideological conflict; in event of war, to retain for the United States and its allies base areas in Turkey, to delay materially any USSR advance, and with allied support, to assure control by the Western powers of the Eastern Mediterranean and the security of base areas in Egypt.

10. The United States military aid program which has been in effect since 1947 has been directed to the attainment of these objectives. Through the supply of up-to-date military equipment and training in its use, the Turkish armed forces are being modernized and thus strengthened. Without United States or other foreign assistance, this modernization program could not have been undertaken by Turkey on an adequate scale as its defense expenditures were already absorbing 40–50% of its budgetary revenues. In the absence of such assistance, the defensive capabilities of the Turkish armed forces would have steadily deteriorated in relation to the offensive capabilities of its Soviet and satellite neighbors.

11. By the end of FY 1950, United States military aid to Turkey amounted to about $271 million, of which $105 million was authorized during FY 1950. The FY 1951 program envisages an allotment for Turkey of $67.4 million from the regular MDAP appropriation plus $87 million from the supplemental appropriation.

12. Since the inauguration of the military aid program, the peacetime strength of the Turkish Armed Forces has been reduced in numbers by almost 50 percent. However, with the modern equipment provided under the Aid Program and the complementary training system sponsored and supervised by the American Military Mission, the combat potential and capabilities of the present Turkish Military Establishment are considerably greater than when the Armed Forces were double their present size. Further United States assistance is, nevertheless, necessary in order to arrive at the goal of a Turkish

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[3] For documentation regarding Turkey's election to a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 87 ff.

Military Establishment that is considered adequate (for our intended purposes), effective, and self-supporting, as far as is practicable.

13. A measure of great importance in arriving at this goal is the enlistment and training of an adequate Non-Commissioned Officers Corps. The Turks are endeavoring, within the limits of their already strained budget, to implement the recommendations of the Military Mission to correct this major deficiency. An adequate NCO program in Turkey, however, can only be assured if the United States is prepared to extend dollar aid to support it. In recognition of this, ECA has recently allotted $4 million to Turkey for the purchase of common use items to provide the funds to help finance such a program.

14. While Turkey suffered no destruction during World War II, its economy was disrupted through the loss of normal markets and the burden of maintaining a large mobilized army. The unsettled international situation, particularly the continuing Soviet pressures to which Turkey was subjected, and Turkey's conviction that its most effective safeguard was a strong army, prevented a curtailment in military expenditures in the years following the end of World War II. As a consequence, foreign assistance has been required to help finance a program of economic development, which could no longer be delayed, designed to raise the country's very low standard of living.

15. Although the Export-Import Bank established a $25,000,000 credit for Turkey in 1946 for economic development projects, Turkey, as a participating country in the European Recovery Program, has received the bulk of its post-war external economic assistance from ECA. The principal projects which have been financed by ECA are long-term in nature, are strengthening Turkey's basic economy, and are increasing its ability to support its military burden. Ultimately they should provide Turkey with the means of assuring itself a gradually expanding economy without extraordinary financial assistance.

16. United States economic assistance extended to Turkey since World War II has been primarily related to the foreign exchange or external costs of Turkey's economic development program. Henceforth economic assistance may also be required for other purposes, viz. to meet a portion of the internal costs of this development program and such additional internal defense expenditures as the United States may consider desirable. Turkey, which is already devoting over 30% of its budgetary expenditures to national defense (and has done so for more than 10 years), feels that it is unable to increase defense expenditures above present levels at the expense of its development program which it considers the minimum required to maintain a sound economy. Thus, as mentioned in paragraph 13 above, it has sought United States assistance to finance an adequate NCO program, one of the major deficiencies of its Military Establishment which otherwise would have been deferred indefinitely. It is understood that the financing of for-

eign budget deficits is not the general policy of this Government. Any exception in the case of the Turkish NCO program would not be a precedent for other cases.

17. A curtailment in Turkey's investment program would result in a corresponding reduction in Turkey's need for United States economic assistance. However, a steady, even if modest, improvement in the country's very low standard of living is needed to ensure internal stability, political as well as economic. Accordingly, United States economic aid should be continued (1) to assure the completion of the economic development projects already initiated with United States assistance; (2) to support, if warranted by Turkey's own self-help efforts, an investment program which will satisfy minimum internal economic and political requirements; and (3) to assist the United States in securing from Turkey resources, such as chromite and opium, needed for the defense of the free world.

18. The primary objective of Turkey's foreign policy, at present, is to obtain a United States security commitment. Its efforts to this end have been largely concentrated on seeking full membership in the NATO, although it has indicated its willingness to participate in some other form of security arrangement in which the United States is a party. Turkey is already linked with two members of NATO—the UK and France—in a Treaty of Mutual Assistance which was signed in 1939 and reaffirmed in 1949. In the view of the Turks, the principal value of this Treaty lies in its usefulness as a potential means of assuring United States intervention in the event of a Soviet or satellite aggression against Turkey. Turkey is also a signatory of the Saadabad Pact of 1937 with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. This Pact is merely a passive treaty of good relations without any provision for positive common defense.

19. In August 1950 the Turkish Government formally requested that it be invited to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States position at that time was that inclusion of Turkey and Greece (it was recognized that any decision on this issue should also apply to Greece) as full members in the NATO might adversely affect the progress then evident in North Atlantic Treaty arrangements. In view of prior United States military commitments elsewhere, the JCS expressed doubt that the United States could, at any time in the near future, provide substantially more military aid to those countries than was then planned. However, it was felt that maximum benefit would be obtained and disadvantages minimized by according the two countries a special status in the NATO short of membership which would permit participation in coordinated planning against Soviet aggression. After discussion in the Foreign Ministers' meeting in September, the matter was taken up in the North Atlantic Council which thereupon proposed to Turkey (and subsequently to Greece) that it associate itself with

such appropriate phases of the military planning work of the NATO as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean.

20. The Turkish Government accepted the proposal of the North Atlantic Council but the "association" relationship has not satisfied Turkey for several reasons:

a. Some progress has been made in preliminary preparation for Mediterranean planning but planning discussions have not yet begun.

b. Despite its steadfast support of United States efforts, within the UN and outside, to contain Soviet imperialism, support which has shown Turkey to be one of the most reliable allies of the free world, no assurances have been given to the Turkish Government that the planning association will lead to eventual full membership in the NATO.

c. Despite public statements as to United States interest in Turkey's security, the Turks fear that the unwillingness of the United States to extend a security commitment to Turkey indicates that the United States does not consider Turkey in its primary area of defense.

21. Public statements and programs of military and economic assistance are no longer considered by the Turkish Government or the Turkish people as a substitute for a specific security commitment. Turkey's demands for such a commitment on a reciprocal basis have been renewed and are again under study in the light of present day conditions. A favorable decision would play an important role in assuring Turkey's continued alignment with the free world, and its co-belligerency if thought desirable in the event of war, and in obtaining its cooperation in security measures of considerable value to the anti-Soviet coalition as a whole but of less direct benefit to Turkey's security.

22. In the absence of subversive elements within Turkey that could be expected to organize and carry out either a seizure of power in the provinces or a seizure of the central government, the principal threats to Turkey's security lie in a Soviet/satellite aggression or encirclement of Turkey as a result of Soviet and/or satellite advances through Iran or southeastern Europe.

23. The most likely satellite thrust would be directed against European Turkey (Thrace) by Bulgarian forces which are estimated to be the best trained, best equipped and most reliable among the satellite forces in Eastern Europe. A Bulgarian attack on Turkey, without overt Soviet participation, might accomplish the occupation of Turkish Thrace, with the exception of the Gallipoli peninsula which commands the Dardanelles area of the Straits, but a further advance into Asiatic Turkey would be unlikely. The occupation of Thrace would not appear to bring advantages to the Bulgarians or Soviets that would compensate for the risk of inviting a major war. Hence, such an attack does not appear likely unless it is one phase of the

Soviet plan of conquest which is undertaken in full recognition of the risk of a general war.

24. It is believed that the USSR would attack Turkey only if it were prepared to face the likelihood of global war. In view of the United Kingdom–France–Turkey Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the deep interest and heavy moral commitment of the United States in Turkey, this likelihood would have to be faced, regardless of whether the United States and Turkey conclude reciprocal security arrangements. Turkey would not be able to repel a Soviet attack in strength without outside assistance nor would it be able to carry on organized resistance for very long without such assistance. Further, its determination to resist, while very strong, would undoubtedly be influenced by the outlook for allied assistance, and in the event the war were not localized, by Turkey's estimate of the ability of the allied powers to defeat the USSR.

25. Another threat to Turkey's security is the possibility of Soviet encirclement. This could be accomplished by Soviet occupation of Iran, Iraq, and Syria and/or Soviet/satellite occupation of Greece. It is unlikely that Turkey would oppose such occupation militarily unless its intervention were part of a defense plan formulated within the framework of security arrangements to which the United States were a party.

26. Turkey's reaction to the fact of encirclement would depend on a number of factors, including (1) the determination of the United States to oppose the USSR globally and to support and supply Turkey to the utmost of its ability, and (2) its ability to defend itself in the light of the new situation which might preclude the possibility of effective allied assistance. Although Turkey's sympathies would continue to lie with the anti-Soviet forces, its alignment with the free world, in the absence of a United States security commitment, might be weakened with the result that it would be unwilling to expose itself to the risks involved in overt cooperation with those forces.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

27. Any visible lessening of United States interest in the political independence and territorial integrity of Turkey would have such far-reaching consequences on the security of the United States that continued United States assistance to Turkey, on an adequate scale, in the political, economic, and military fields is imperative. Within these fields certain basic alternative courses of action present themselves.

a. Political.

(1) *Continue present policy.* The present policy of United States friendship and political support in international councils has been reciprocated by Turkey. With respect to Turkey's internal policies and practices a wholesome development is already taking place. The in-

direct influence which the United States can exercise in assuring the continuance of such development will undoubtedly be more effective than direct intervention to this end by the United States. In its exposed position to direct Soviet attack, Turkey is not satisfied with the present United States policy because it does not provide an unequivocal United States commitment to come to Turkey's support in the event of attack. On the other hand the present policy does not insure any assistance from Turkey in case of Soviet attack in other portions of the world. Without a reciprocal security arrangement which includes the United States, the exposed position of Turkey may lead it toward a policy of neutralism, thus losing to the free world the assistance of a powerful ally.

(2) *The conclusion of a reciprocal security arrangement with Turkey.* The most significant step that the United States could take in the politico-military field would be the conclusion of a reciprocal security arrangement with Turkey. Turkey's international position would be enhanced thereby, through recognition that it had become a full partner with the United States in the common struggle to contain Soviet imperialism. More than any other political measure, a reciprocal security arrangement would assure Turkey's continued alignment with the free world and its full cooperation with the United States and the latter's allies in international security measures, and its co-belligerency in the event of war. Of the various alternative forms of reciprocal security arrangements, the most desirable would be Turkey's membership in NATO, and the least desirable would be a bilateral arrangement between the United States and Turkey. Regardless of what form the security arrangement takes, the USSR would probably react by exerting increased pressure, through measures short of war, upon the countries of the Middle East.

b. Economic.

(1) *Discontinue economic assistance to Turkey.* While the Turkish economy would not collapse if United States economic aid were entirely discontinued, adjustment to this circumstance would entail a very substantial curtailment in Turkey's investment and military expenditures, the latter already being at a level lower than consistent with its defense requirements. The political consequences, in the short run, would probably be of more significance than the economic. Such a decision by the United States on economic aid would be interpreted as indicating a lack of interest in Turkey's economic well-being and a lack of appreciation of the heavy burden which the Turkish people are bearing to maintain their military strength. It would tend to negate the favorable effect which the extension of a United States security commitment would otherwise have on Turkish-American relations.

(2) *Continue economic assistance.* In the light of the foregoing, continued economic assistance to Turkey appears desirable to the extent required to assure the completion of economic development projects already initiated with United States assistance and, if warranted by Turkish measures of self-help, to support a short-range economic development program which will at least satisfy minimum internal political and economic requirements. In the long run, unless Turkey is able to carry on its development program, which is directed towards a substantial increase in its national product, its internal economic stability will be jeopardized.

c. Military.

(1) *Continue present program.* Continuance of the United States program of military aid to Turkey is essential to indicate that there is no lessening of United States interest in Turkey and to permit steady progress to be made in developing the military capabilities of the Turkish armed forces. To the extent that such progress is dependent upon further increase in internal defense expenditures, consideration should be given to extending United States aid in the form of common use items or consumer goods to generate part or all of the internal resources required.

(2) *Provide expanded military support.* The closer military and political relationships between the United States and Turkey which would result from reciprocal security arrangements, either direct or indirect between the two countries, would provide a basis for an even more rapid development of Turkey's military strength, if this were desired and were supported by a substantial step-up in United States programs of military and economic assistance.

28. In the event of an attack against Turkey prior to the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements including Turkey and the United States, failure of the United States to provide support to prevent Turkey from falling under Soviet domination would produce political and military consequences which would vitally affect the security interests of the United States. The USSR would acquire the strategic advantages to be derived from the control of Turkey and the Turkish Straits. In addition, the USSR might conclude that the United States would not respond to subsequent direct Soviet or satellite action against other countries in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean areas, and that the governments of those countries would in time be forced to seek accomodation with the USSR with inevitable repercussions in Western Europe. In the light of the vital interest of the United States in Turkey and the deep commitment of United States prestige in that country, the more valid alternative open to the United States in the event of an attack by Soviet and/or satellite forces would be to provide matériel and if so recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time to deploy United States forces to the extent necessary and available without jeopardizing the security of the United States or of areas of the world of greater strategic importance to the United States, and to urge all other nations to take similar action.

29. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Turkey remain an ally of the free world in the struggle against communism.

30. Turkey is the strongest anti-communist country on the periphery of the USSR and the only one in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression.

31. The actions taken by the United States with respect to Turkey have increased Turkey's ability as well as determination to resist Soviet

pressures and have thus made an important contribution in preventing Turkey from falling under Soviet domination, and in preventing Soviet expansion into the Middle East area.

32. Turkey continues to be a target of Soviet ambition. A Soviet or satellite attack on Turkey, however, is not likely unless the USSR is prepared to risk a general war. The USSR may, nevertheless, attempt to encircle Turkey in the expectation that it can thus weaken Turkey's alignment with the free world and make it less defensible.

33. Turkey would probably not oppose militarily Soviet or satellite efforts to occupy Iran, Iraq and Syria, or Greece or Yugoslavia or NATO countries unless its intervention were part of a defense plan formulated within the framework of security arrangements to which the United States were a party.

34. Turkey is not satisfied with its present "association" relationship with NATO and attaches the highest importance to entering into reciprocal security arrangements with the United States, either directly or indirectly.

35. Any change in United States policy with respect to political, military and economic assistance to Turkey which could be interpreted as a lessening of United States interest in the political independence and territorial integrity of Turkey might weaken Turkey's alignment with the free world and lead it to adopt a more neutral policy. It would also remove one of the important deterrents to Soviet or satellite aggression.

36. The United States should continue publicly to manifest deep interest in the independence and integrity of Turkey in order to deter the USSR and/or its satellites from initiating aggressive action against Turkey, and in any case, to prevent them from acting on the assumption that the United States would not provide determined support to Turkey in the event of an aggression.

37. The United States should continue to provide economic and technical assistance to Turkey which, when combined with maximum Turkish efforts, will make possible the carrying out of an economic development program designed to meet minimum internal political and economic requirements with minimum inflationary impact. It should also be prepared to consider providing economic assistance to help Turkey build up still further its military strength, as well as to assist Turkey in providing resources, such as chromite and opium, needed for the defense of the free world.

38. The United States should lend appropriate support to the Turkish military establishment to give it the capability of:

a. Maintaining internal security.
b. Repelling a satellite attack on Turkey.
c. Causing maximum practicable resistance to an attack on Turkey involving direct or indirect Soviet participation.

d. Conducting guerrilla warfare in Turkey and contiguous areas in the event portions of Turkey are overrun by an enemy.

39. Within the limits of priorities and availabilities, the United States should provide Turkey with military matériel, supplies and guidance necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives outlined in paragraph 38 above.

40. In order to assure Turkey's full cooperation in international security measures and, in the event of war its co-belligerency, the use of Turkish bases and other facilities, and the closure of the Straits to the USSR, the United States should:

a. Press now for the inclusion of Turkey as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement.

b. If full membership of Turkey in NATO would be unacceptably delayed, conclude alternative security arrangements which would include Turkey and would not prejudice Turkish membership in NATO at the earliest practicable date.

41. Pending the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements between the United States and Turkey:

a. The United States should develop plans to assist Turkey in the event of an attack by Soviet or satellite forces. In this connection the United States should:

(1) Consult with the United Kingdom (and as appropriate with France) on action it would propose to take in this event, in carrying out its commitments under the United Kingdom–France–Turkey Treaty of Mutual Assistance and in recognition of its primary responsibility for the defense of this area.

(2) Urge at the appropriate time, military planning by the NATO to cover such a contingency.

(3) Consider, at an appropriate time, the possibility and desirability for close military cooperation between Turkey and its neighbors.

b. In the event of an attack against Turkey by Soviet or satellite forces, the United States should:

(1) Make every effort to stop the aggression, localize the action and restore the *status quo* by political measures, through the UN, jointly with the United Kingdom and France and unilaterally.

(2) Accelerate and increase military assistance to Turkey to the extent appropriate and feasible.

(3) If necessary, and to the extent consistent with other security requirements, mobilize available military support to Turkey through United Nations action, through implementation of North Atlantic Treaty plans, through joint United States–United Kingdom arrangements, and through unilateral United States support, as appropriate.

(4) In participating in any military support action for Turkey as envisaged in (3) above, deploy, to the extent necessary, such

forces as can appropriately be made available in the light of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

(5) Take the action listed above in full knowledge that a general war may nevertheless be unavoidable.

42. After the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements including the United States and Turkey, the United States should respond to a Soviet or satellite attack against Turkey in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, circumstances then existing, and within the framework of the obligations of the United States under those arrangements.

782.5 MAP/5-1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY ANKARA, May 15, 1951—noon.

733. Toisa. For Cabot from Emery. Amb, Arnold and Dorr concur in and recommend that the fol course of action be adhered to in implementing Turk military support programs for US FY '51 and US FY '52:

1. For US FY '51 counterpart generated by imports totaling $31.4 million (including $4 million for NCO's) will be made available to and will be used for military support programs covered in section H and section N of JAMMAT final report.[1] Such counterpart will carry these programs thru Feb 29, 1952.

2. Assuming Turks prefer this, imports in para 1 above will consist of military "common use items" (such as POL, cloth for uniforms, and leather for shoes) and civilian type goods which will generate real counterpart. 202's should be ready by end of month.

3. For US FY '52 have taken into consideration priority position of military support programs (Ecato 241[2]) and also necessity of continuation investment program. Believe formula in fol paras meets first criterion fully and second insofar as available resources permit.

4. In reality there are three military support programs as fols: (*a*) NCO's, (*b*) 40,000 troop increase and (*c*) provision of articles to Turk military to meet essential deficiencies not covered by end-item program.

5. For Turk FY ending Feb 28, 1953, funds required for imports to finance programs in para 4 above are as fols: (*a*) $12.1 million, (*b*) $8.3 million and (*c*) $19 million (now estimated).

6. In view of fact that NCO and 40,000 troop programs involve men as distinct from "things" and that commitments must be given

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[1] Not printed; JAMMAT's final report was enclosed with despatch 454 from Ankara, February 16, 1951 (782.5 MAP/2-1651).

[2] Dated April 12, p. 1140.

to feed clothe and train those men for a 12-month period. Amb and JAMMAT feel that full amount of required funds covered in para 5 (*a*) and (*b*) above shld be made available from US FY '52 funds. The counterpart equivalent of this $20.4 million will carry these two programs from March 1, 1952 to Feb 28, '53.

7. With respect to program covered in paras 4 and 5 (*c*) above, both Amb and Gen Arnold feel that it wld be desirable to allot full amt required to carry program forward from US FY '52 funds, but they recognize problem this wld create in carrying forward investment program. Therefore they agree that only one-third of required amt (i.e., $6.3 million) need be allotted from US FY '52 funds to carry program from March 1, 1952 to June 30, 1952. The balance of the required $19 million (i.e., $12.7 million) would come from US FY '53 funds assuming of course favorable appropriation action.

8. Therefore from the planned $70 million available for US FY '52 the military support programs would require $26.7 million as outlined in paras 6 and 7 above leaving $43.3 million for the investment program.

9. Under above formula out of $140 million available for US FY '51 and '52 approx $58 million would be applied to military support and approx $82 million to the investment program. JAMMAT can then proceed with essential elements their program with only qualification being changing world conditions.

10. Dorr greatly appreciates suggestion in Ecato 324 [3] apparently designed obviate difficulties arising from sudden curtailment econ program. However Amb and Gen Arnold feel strongly that it would be unwise to jeopardize prompt implementation supplemental military programs by requesting deferment any counterpart generating purchases. Dorr understands this point of view and feels it desirable defer to their convictions in this regard on understanding it will be possible anticipate US FY '52 allocation up to $5 million if desired.

11. Wld appreciate your favorable reaction these "ground rules" soonest so that planning on this basis can go forward without delay. [Emery.]

WADSWORTH

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[3] Not printed; in Ecato telegram 324 to Ankara, May 11, it was suggested that all direct aid for Turkey above the Snoy–Marjolin formula that had already been allocated should be used for the military support program and that the balance of the funds plus a substantial amount for a substantial portion of the funds alloted for the special military programs for the Turkish fiscal year 1952/53 would come out of the American appropriations for fiscal 1952. (782.5 MAP/5-1151)

ECA Telegram File : FRC Acc. No. 53A278 : Ankara Toeca : Telegram

The Chief of the ECA Mission in Turkey (Dorr) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster)[1]

SECRET ANKARA, May 18, 1951—6 p. m.

Toeca 402. 1. Discussions Min FonAffs yesterday revealed apparent misunderstanding of info transmitted on April 30 to Erkin on level aid 1950–51. Turks stated expectation they to receive $70 million exclusive of IP and $30 million for mil assistance. They professed ignorance note handed by Bissell to Erkin April 30, stating it had never been transmitted to Fon Office. They translated cable sent from Wash (presumably by Erkin) which showed complete misunderstanding of explanations made by Bissell on April 31.

2. When actual level of aid explained, Turks expressed surprise and keen disappointment as they said this represented real cut instead of constituting additional assistance. I shall cable next week in more detail reaction of Turks.

3. I am today writing Min FonAffs letter confirming detail info transmitted in note and portions of Ecato 241, rptd Torep 2396 dealing with level aid 1950–51 plus para 6.[2]

4. Para 1 Ecato 279, rptd Torep 279, states note delivered Erkin in approx form set forth Ecato 263, rptd Torep 2541.[3] Please cable earliest any changes in final note.[4]

5. . . .

DORR

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Dated April 12, p. 1140.

[3] Neither printed.

[4] In Ecato 343 to Ankara, May 21, which is not printed, Dorr was informed again that the text of the memorandum handed to Ambassador Erkin on April 30 was substantially the same as the text cabled to him in Ecato 263 (ECA Telegram File : FRC Acc. No. 53A278 : Ankara Ecato : Telegram 343).

782.5 MAP/5–1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 18, 1951—7 p. m.

615. Toisa. For Amb, Dorr and Arnold from State, ECA and Defense. Re Embtel 733 May 15.[2]

1. In view fol factors, and particularly on assumption full and immed implementation by Turks of supplementary mil programs wld

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[1] Drafted by Moore, GTI, and Gulick, EPD/ECA; cleared with Warren A. Silver, S/ISA, Blaisdell, EPD/ECA, and Major Waddell, Office of the Secretary of Defense; and approved by William M. Rountree, GTI.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1162.

not be jeopardized thereby (see para 1*b*) we feel suggestion contained Ecato 324 Para 2 has merit.[3]

(*a*) Ecato 241, Apr 12,[4] Para 5, stated that under ISAC agreement priority must be given programs in Ecato 241 Para 3*a* and *b* in allotting $27.4 million from 1951 funds. In our view this does not mean that entire $27.4 million must be devoted to mil support programs, which wld leave no additional FY 51 funds for investment program. A lesser amt can be allocated from FY 51 funds, with the balance to be met from FY 52 funds if such lesser amt will assure full and immed implementation of supplemental mil programs mentioned Ecato 241 Para 3*a* and *b*.

(*b*) We note from Embtel 634 Apr 10 [5] Para 5 that TGS promised Gen Arnold that supplementary mil programs wld be undertaken as soon as Turks notified of US agreement to provide eventual financing.

(*c*) We note that both Ankara and Washington are in agreement (subj to qualification in Para 8) that $58 and 82 million are to be applied to mil support and investment programs respectively from planned $140 million available for US FY 51 to FY 52. The only question is how much of the mil support program must be met from FY 51 funds (balance having first priority on FY 52 funds) to assure full and immed implementation these supplementary mil programs.

(*d*) We are impressed with arguments advanced by Amb in Embtel 663, Apr 19,[6] and by Dorr in Toeca 345 Apr 22 [5] that serious public relations problem may result if entire amt unallocated FY 51 aid is devoted to mil support programs at apparent expense minimum anticipated aid for investment program for balance FY 51.

(*e*) From viewpoint declining ECA Turk investment program as well as Cong reaction, we wld favor larger investment imports from FY 51 funds than from FY 52 funds.

2. We recognize and appreciate careful consideration reflected in Embtel 733. Suggestion contained Ecato 324 designed not only to further total Turk mil and econ contribution all within priority requirements of ISAC discussions but to permit phasing of both mil and econ programs for FY 51 and 52. However, if after consideration this telegram Amb in consultation with ECA and JAMMAT continues consider recommendations Embtel 733 shld not be changed you may consider that recommendations Embtel 733 have our approval, as we feel final decision this particular case shld rest with you. Request ur decision be implemented immed by submission 202's.

3. If additional $13.6 million used for investment program FY 51, mil program wld absorb $17.8. Now understand that wld leave for US FY 52 (*a*) balance Turk FY 51 mil program of $13.6, (*b*) about $26.7 for Turk FY 52 mil support programs, and (*c*) $40.3 for investment program. We note Turk FY 51 supplemental mil

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[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1163.

[4] *Ante*, p. 1140.

[5] Not printed.

[6] *Ante*, p. 1143.

programs now $31.4 and not $34.1. We presume programs pared per Embtel 662 Apr 19.

4. In principle, for US internal planning purposes, concur in formula outlined Para 5, 6, 7 Embtel 733 for support Turk FY 52 supplementary mil programs. However, no commitment can or shld be made to Turks at this time and we expect them make real effort to increase support their mil programs next year.

5. Recent BOB discussions indicated extreme skepticism need for commitment even final $27.4 million FY 51 funds (now assured) for Turkey. This plus increased tightness ECA funds make it doubtful whether it is now possible to allot $5 million from FY 51 funds as outlined Para 5 Ecato 241. Request wld require strongest polit mil justification. Wld have to be fully paid by 30 June 51.

ACHESON

782.5/6–151

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 1, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to the letter to Mr. Matthews from Major General J. H. Burns of this office, dated 23 March 1951, pertaining to the position paper entitled "Turkish Straits" (RPTS D–5/1*a*, dated 22 January 1951).[1]

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[1] The letter of March 23 is not printed. For text of the position paper, see p. 1101.

Asked to comment on the paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 2, 1951, advised the Secretary of Defense that, from the military point of view, they perceived no objection to the recommendations contained in the position paper subject to (1) changing the recommendation in subparagraph 3(*a*) (see p. 1108) to read: "Favor a continuation of the present regime of the Straits"; (2) deleting subparagraph 3(*b*); and (3) deleting paragraph 4. Secretary of Defense Marshall concurred in these views and sent them to the Secretary of State on February 12, 1951 (782.022/3–1551).

Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, in a letter to Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, USA (retired), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, dated March 15, 1951, advised that the Department of State concurred in the deletion of paragraph 4 but did not concur in the deletion of subparagraph 3(*b*). To delete subparagraph 3(*b*), he explained, would require the United States to adhere firmly to its preferred position that the current Straits regime should be continued. He offered four reasons why the Department of State did not believe the United States should maintain an inflexible stand on the question: (1) the United States was not a signatory to the Convention, while the Soviet Union was; (2) a valid request for revision of the Convention could be advanced by any signatory power before August 9, 1951, and a revision could be negotiated without consent of the United States despite the fact that such action would not conform to the intent of the Potsdam Protocol; (3) the recommendation in subparagraph 3(*b*) envisaged little more than a modern

There is enclosed herewith a memorandum setting forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning this subject. In this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that they are willing to withdraw their objection to Recommendation 3(*b*) of the position paper on Turkish Straits, subject to the acceptance by the Department of State of certain qualifications and the inclusion of these qualifications in the position paper.[2]

In connection with the qualification considered necessary by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"6*a*. That the United States would participate in any conference convened for the purpose of revising the Montreux Convention;", the following amplifying statement is offered.

The position paper prepared by the Department of State on the Turkish Straits in part states:

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version of the Convention and would not obligate the United States to anything more than respect for its provisions. Participation by the United States in negotiation of, and adherence to, a new convention would, however, give the United States an incontestable right to participate in any revision of the new convention; (4) with respect to JCS objection to United Nations consideration of the question of revision of the Montreux Convention, the United Nations was not expected to participate in any way in the negotiations, which would be confined to the signatory powers and the United States, and the stipulation in subparagraph 3(*b*) that the new convention be placed within the framework of the United Nations did not envisage action by the United Nations for the specific purpose of enforcing provisions of the convention. It should be interpreted as meaning merely that "any revised convention should be so framed as to permit the Turkish Government to deny transit of the Straits to warships of any nation which may be charged by the UN with a violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter." Mr. Matthews asked the Department of Defense to reconsider its position (782.022/3-1551).

General Burns acknowledged Matthews' letter on March 23 and informed the Deputy Under Secretary of State that the Department of Defense would inform the Department of State in future if the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented any additional views on the subject of the Turkish Straits (782.5/3-2351).

[2] Not printed. This memorandum was transmitted from General Bradley on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Marshall on April 30. Two of the six major qualifications presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this document appear *in toto* in the source text as numbered paragraphs 6*a*. and 6*d*. The other four conditions which the Joint Chiefs wished to have included in RPTS D-5/1*a* were as follows:

"[6]*b*. That the United States in concert with Turkey and other appropriate friendly powers, take action, in the contingency that such a conference must be convened, to limit the extent of any revision of the Convention to modernization of its terms and to prevent substantive changes thereof;

"[6]*c*. That the United States give maximum support to Turkey to insure that no part of the sovereignty of the latter is yielded to the USSR;

"[6]*e*. That any revision of the Montreux Convention be based on the Turkish Straits problem as such, and not be directly related to other problems, many of which are non-military, which are symptomatic of world tensions; and

"[6]*f*. That, in any event, the United States take action leading to early membership of Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." (782.5/6-151)

[3] Brackets appear in the source text.

> "The U.S. is not a signatory of the Montreux Convention, nor has it been a party to any of the earlier treaties dealing with the Straits. However, our political, military and economic interest in the area has steadily increased since World War II and today we have a vital interest in the regime of the Straits. The U.S. should, therefore, play an active role in any conference which may be called with respect thereto. Recognition of our right to do so is implicit in the Potsdam Protocol."

and further states:

> "Any recommendation [for revision of the Montreux Straits Convention] [3] advanced by the USSR would, without doubt, embody renewed demands for a new Straits regime under the competence of the Black Sea Powers and for joint Turco-Soviet defense of the Straits. The U.S. could not, of course, accept such proposals which would mean acceptance of the thesis that the regime of the Straits is the exclusive concern of Turkey, the USSR and other Black Sea Powers and which would, in effect, mean Soviet domination of Turkey. Such proposals were rejected by the U.S., U.K., and Turkey in 1946 and would be rejected today. . . ."

If the United States cannot obtain acceptance of its preferred position that the present regime of the Straits be continued, and if subsequently the United States is unable to arrange for its participation in a conference to revise the Montreux Convention, it is considered essential, from the military point of view, that the United States participate in any conference to draft a new Convention to replace the Montreux Convention.

Among other qualifications deemed necessary by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is their proposed:

> "6*d*. That the United States, in concert with Turkey and other appropriate friendly powers, take action to prevent abrogation of the rights prevailing under the Montreux Convention. This should include full support to Turkey in the exercise of the veto power granted to it by the terms of the Convention;"

In further elaboration of this, we consider that the rights in question are: first, those which are accorded to Turkey and which, among other things, involve its sovereignty; and second, those which are accorded to the United States as a "non-Black Sea power" relative to navigation and transit of the Straits. Attempted abrogation of those rights by action of the USSR should be opposed by such measures as:

a. Action to obtain, with other friendly nations, political support for Turkey;

b. Appropriate support to Turkey so as to maintain the full sovereignty of that nation and to enforce the integrity of Turkish rights under the Montreux Convention regardless of the actions of the USSR; and

c. Appropriate action by the United States to exercise and maintain its existing rights under the Montreux Convention. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated, and I concur, that they cannot accept any concept of the Black Sea as a closed area, regardless of the actions of the USSR.

In the event you find it possible, from a political viewpoint, to accept the qualifications set forth in paragraph 6 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as amplified in the immediately preceding paragraphs, the Department of Defense will withdraw its objection to Recommendation 3(*b*) of the position paper on the Turkish Straits. If you agree to this proposal, I would like to suggest the desirability of amending the position paper appropriately in order that the foregoing military considerations will be brought to the attention of all officials concerned with this subject.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

782.5/6–451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Turkish Affairs (Moore) [1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1951.

Subject: Conversation with Ambassador Erkin.

Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, Turkish Ambassador.
Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA.
Mr. C. Robert Moore, GTI.

Problem: Report by Ambassador Erkin of his conversations in Ankara on security and other problems of mutual interest.

Action Required: None.

Ambassador Erkin, having returned several days ago from Turkey, called on Mr. McGhee to tell him of his conversations in Ankara with the Turkish President [2] and others on several subjects of mutual interest.

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[1] Drafted by Moore, GTI.

[2] Celâl Bayar.

1. *Security Commitment Question:*

The Ambassador mentioned that his conferences in Ankara had been concluded and he had left for Istanbul before the Turkish Government had been informed that the US Government favored additional security arrangements for Turkey. He expressed pleasure at the development and at the timing inasmuch as he had been predicting such a development to his colleagues only a few days before.[3]

The Ambassador commented that on the day of his arrival in Ankara he had been received by President Bayar. The President had asked him to relate the international developments which had taken place since 1945 with particular emphasis on security arrangements. This the Ambassador had done in an expose which the President found very satisfactory but which led the latter to the principal point—despite all of these developments Turkey did not have any contractual assurances to protect its own security. The President had then shown the Ambassador a letter he had received from Zekeriya Sertel, who with his wife is very well known for his pro-Communist sympathies. In this letter, which advanced very strong arguments in favor of a policy of neutrality by Turkey, Sertel cleverly avoided an approach to the problem that could be clearly identified with the Communist line. His was the approach of a Turkish patriot, an approach that would inevitably appeal to many segments of public opinion, emphasis being placed on the inability of Turkey to count on its Western allies to protect its security. The President expressed the fear that, unless some definite action were taken soon to remove Turkish suspicions as to the support of the US and the other countries, Turkish public opinion would become more and more susceptible to the Sertel type of propaganda, particularly as it would be propounded on a nationalist basis and not on a pro-Communist basis. The Ambassador reiterated that official government circles would not be swayed by this type of propaganda but that less well informed elements might be impressed by it. The President had thus wanted him, upon his return to Washington, to inform us of this situation and to stress the importance of an early decision being reached on the security commitment question.

The Ambassador, adverting to this Government's favorable decision on further security arrangements, referred to the unfortunate impression that has been created in Turkey during the past several weeks by press reports from London and particularly by a BBC broadcast to Bulgaria which indicated that the British do not favor the further extension of the North Atlantic Pact. Mr. McGhee warned against drawing conclusions from such reports, stressing that the final governmental decision is the important factor. The Ambassador commented that even though the decision should be favorable. the Turkish people had lost a great deal of their earlier enthusiasm for inclusion in NATO and emphasized that the longer the uncertainty of inclusion continued the less satisfied they would be with the final outcome. He attributed this to several factors—one, the Turks have no confidence in the strength or determination of the European NATO countries, and, second, their national pride is being wounded by the indications that the other NATO countries are unwilling to admit the Turks to equal partnership in the NATO. He therefore expressed the hope that some decision would be forthcoming very soon and sought at some length to obtain an indication of the present views of the other NATO countries. Mr. McGhee commented that he was very hopeful of the outcome and that he knew the problem was being discussed in the Council of Deputies, although he did not know just where matters stood at the moment. He indicated in addition that it would not be appropriate for him to comment on the views of the other countries. The Ambassador could be assured, however, that we, too, were desirous of an early decision.

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[3] For documentation regarding the admission of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. III, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.

2. *US Economic and Military Aid:*

The Ambassador made clear that the ECA–Turkish Government relationship was not on a very satisfactory basis at the present time. He cited several examples, presumably quoting President Bayar, of ECA actions that had created a very bad impression: (*a*) a cut in ECA aid to Turkey because the Turkish Government had not imposed taxes on agricultural incomes, (*b*) ECA insistence that interest rates of Turkish banks not be lowered, a move which President Bayar had favored as a former banker and economist whose views should carry some weight, (*c*) a demand made by an ECA official that control of the Water Works Organization be transferred to the Eti Bank or ECA funds for irrigation projects would not be forthcoming. When asked by Mr. McGhee if the criticism had been directed at Mr. Dorr specifically or was directed primarily at ECA, the Ambassador said that no names had been mentioned. He had told the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that Mr. Dorr enjoyed the confidence of the State Department and ECA, and the Prime Minister indicated that the Turkish Government would of course work with him. The Ambassador implied, however, that the Government was very much concerned over the control which relatively minor ECA officials appeared to have over the economic life of Turkey and the fact that ECA had the final decision on matters where there was a difference in view between the Turkish Government and ECA.

Mr. McGhee said that he was of course disturbed to learn of this situation, that a program such as the ECA program should produce good relations between our two countries, rather than have the opposite effect. He would want to look into the matter further. He made quite clear, however, with respect to the volume of ECA aid, that there were many factors that led to the determination of the amount of ECA aid that could be made available to Turkey this year. There was no cut in aid because of the tax situation. There was, naturally, a real concern that all appropriate measures should be taken to avoid a harmful inflation in Turkey. This was a problem which ECA, consistent with its responsibilities under the ECA Act, would undoubtedly feel it should try to work out with the Turkish Government.

The Ambassador then commented on the inadequacy of our military aid to Turkey. Mr. McGhee expressed surprise, indicating he felt that we had been supplying a very substantial amount of equipment to Turkey and that the program had been a very satisfactory one. The Ambassador left with him a report by General Yamut, Turkish Chief of Staff, showing in chart form some of the major deficiencies which Mr. McGhee said he would study with interest.[4] The Ambassador referred to a comment by Ambassador Wadsworth that a limiting factor in the volume of military aid to Turkey was Turkey's ability to absorb the equipment. Turkey, in the event of an aggression, would need to have available the maximum amount of equipment, not just equipment which it was able to put to effective use during the "cold war" period, and Ambassador Erkin urged that we increase and speed up our aid.

In taking his leave, the Ambassador stated that military aid matters had also come under the competence of the Foreign Minister and that he might therefore be discussing various aspects of this program with Mr. McGhee in the future.

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[4] Not printed.

S/S–NSC Files : Lot 63 D 351 : NSC 111 Series

Draft Report by the National Security Council[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 18, 195

TRADE BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE SOVIET BLOC IN THE LIGHT OF SE TION 1302 OF THE THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION ACT, 1951

I. BACKGROUND

1. Section 1302 of the Third Supplemental Appropriation A 1951 (Public Law 45, approved June 2, 1951),[2] directs that no e

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[1] Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Executive Secretary of July 18 that recommended that this draft report on trade between Tur and the Soviet bloc be approved by the Council members.

[2] 65 Stat. 52. For further documentation regarding the implementation of tion 1302 of the Third Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951, see vol. I, pp. 99

nomic or financial assistance shall be provided to any foreign country which, after 15 days following the enactment of the Act, exports or knowingly permits the export of certain named categories of commodities to the Soviet Bloc during any period in which the Armed Forces of the United States are actively engaged in hostilities in carrying out a decision of the Security Council of the United Nations. In order to be eligible for economic or financial assistance each country must certify that after the prescribed period it has not exported or knowingly permitted the export of the prohibited items to the Soviet Bloc.

2. The Act requires that the Secretary of Defense certify to the Economic Cooperation Administrator a list of specified articles or commodities. The list in question was certified on June 5, 1951.[*]

3. The Act authorizes the National Security Council to make exceptions to the several provisions of Section 1302. Such exceptions are to be made only upon an official determination by the National Security Council that they are in the security interest of the United States.

4. Turkey received approximately $230 million under the ECA program through June, 1951. The foreign aid program for fiscal year 1952, currently before the Congress, contemplates the continuance of economic and financial aid to Turkey in support of its economic development and defense program.

5. Turkey's trade with the USSR and the satellite countries during the post-war years ranged between 8 and 12 percent of the total trade in each direction. In 1950 exports to the Bloc amounted to $18 million or approximately 7% of Turkey's total exports; imports from the Bloc were valued at $23 million or approximately 8% of the total imports. During 1950, trade with Czechoslovakia accounted for roughly half of these exports and imports, whereas trade with the USSR was negligible. Raw cotton, leaf tobacco, hides and skins, copper and valonia (tanning extract) were the principal exports. Smaller quantities of scrap iron, of manganese ore (of relatively low manganese content) and of chrome ore, both of which ores are in ample supply in the USSR, were also exported to the Bloc, chiefly to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. Some of these exports are among the items certified by the Secretary of Defense as falling within the categories set forth in Section 1302. In return for these commodities, Turkey received steel products, machinery, textiles and paper manufactures, all of which Turkey considers essential to its economy. Turkey does not permit the export of arms, ammunition, implements of war or atomic materials to the Bloc.

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[*] NSC Determination No. 1, June 14, 1951. [Footnote in the source text.]

II. PROBLEM

6. In the circumstances, therefore, the National Security Council has been faced with the choice of deciding that all economic and financial assistance to Turkey should be discontinued or of deciding that aid to Turkey should be continued in the security interest of the United States by making an exception to the provisions of Section 1302.

III. DISCUSSION

7. It is the policy of Turkey to develop closer ties with the Western democracies. Turkey is already linked to the United Kingdom and France by a Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded in 1939 and reaffirmed in 1949. Its relations with the United States have been traditionally friendly. Turkey is a strong supporter of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and has cooperated fully with the United Nations in its efforts to stop Communist aggression, sending a combat brigade to Korea which has been cited for heroism. Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now under consideration.

8. The objective of Section 1302 was favorably received by the Turkish Government. For an extended period, Turkey has limited trade relations with the Soviet Bloc to a minimal basis.

9. Discontinuation of economic and financial aid to Turkey would diminish the resources with which Turkey could pay for goods bought from the West, might necessitate increased trade with the Soviet Bloc and might force Turkey to increase shipments of strategic materials to the Bloc. This would result in a decrease of the shipment of important minerals to the Western countries, which now receive over 95% of Turkey's mineral exports.

10. U.S. assistance to date has been primarily concerned with capital development, projects designed to strengthen Turkey's domestic economy, and to enable Turkey to participate more fully in collective security. Therefore, over and above the specific trade involvements are the contingent dangers of inducing dependence on the Soviet Bloc of a strategically located sovereign state with recognized defensive capabilities.

11. The security interest of the United States has been repeatedly recognized by the Congress, since its enactment of the Greece-Turkey Aid Program in early 1947, to require the maintenance of Turkish independence and territorial integrity.[3] Turkey has traditionally opposed Russian efforts to expand southward. Continued economic and financial assistance to Turkey is essential in order to further positively Turkey's ability both to resist Communist imperialism and to

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[3] Greece and Turkey, An Act to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey, approved on May 22, 1947, as Public Law 75, 61 Stat. 103.

continue its participation in the United Nations system of collective security.

IV. DETERMINATION

12. The National Security Council, in view of the considerations in Section III above, determines that it would be to the security interest of the United States to make an exception from the provisions of Section 1302 for Turkey.

V. INSTRUCTIONS

13. The National Security Council directs its Special Committee on East-West Trade to:

a. Continue its examination of trade between Turkey and the Soviet Bloc.

b. Seek additional cooperative measures, consistent with over-all U.S. national security interests, to prevent the movement of strategic commodities, particularly those in short supply in the free world, from Turkey to the Soviet Bloc with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the National Security Council.

14. The National Security Council directs its Executive Secretary to declassify this Council document.[4] This declassified document will be submitted as a National Security Council report to the Committees in Congress named in Section 1302 together with the trade analysis called for by that Section.[5]

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[4] In NSC Action No. 521, August 2, 1951, the National Security Council approved the report on trade between Turkey and the Soviet bloc, ordered that it be circulated for Council information and recorded as NSC Determination No. 5, and recommended that it be transmitted to the proper congressional committees (NSC-S/S (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95: Record of Actions by the NSC, 1951).

According to telegram 84 to Ankara, August 3, 1951, the Department informed Ambassador Wadsworth that the NSC decision had been made public that day and that the Department had already informed the Turkish Embassy of this decision (461.829/8–351).

[5] Presumably the attachment to the source text entitled "Supplement to NSC Determination Number 5 Under Section 1302 of the Third Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951," which is not printed, was the trade analysis under reference.

Editorial Note

Turkey and the United States on August 16, 1951, in an exchange of notes, amended the Economic Cooperation Agreement of July 4, 1948, as previously amended. For the texts of these notes which entered into force upon signature, see TIAS No. 2392, printed in 3 UST (pt. 1) 54.

ECA Telegram Files: FRC Acc. No. 53A278: Ankara Toeca: Telegram

The Deputy Chief of the ECA Mission in Turkey (McJunkins) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster)[1]

ANKARA, August 17, 1951.

Toeca 699. 1. Matter international interest mission agreed 16 August with Turkish Government release agreement 30 million TL counterpart funds for resettlement program Bulgarian refugees of Turkish origin expelled from Bulgaria. Turk Government providing additional 40 million TL.

2. Program calls for furnishing government owned land each farming family. Total program calls for resettlement 32,000 families at estimated total cost 70 million TL.

3. 30 million TL from counterpart funds will provide houses, barns, sheds, shops, farm tools and animals, seeds, clothing, bedding, medical care, fuel and lighting for refugee families, thereby protecting refugees until they become agricultural producers. Much new land will be put into cultivation by these people.

4. Mission considers this release unique type assistance to meet serious humanitarian and economic problem created by expulsion from Bulgaria large number individuals Turkish origin.

5. Excellent publicity given Marshall Plan Turkey for this assistance. Hope ECA/W can arrange same Stateside.

McJUNKINS

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[1] Sent to Paris as Torep 941.

394.31/9–1451: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA, September 14, 1951—6 p. m.

251. Embtel 234, Sept 10.[1] Re proposed termination 1939 US-Turk trade agreement[2] ranking FonOff official now states termination agreement cannot be executed without prior consent Parl because orig instrument ratified by it. Also states Torquay protocol[3] not yet signed by Sarper but will be shortly under provision Turk law

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[1] In telegram 234 from Ankara, September 10, which is not printed, Ambassador Wadsworth informed the Department that the draft agreement which had been sent to him terminating the United States–Turkey Reciprocal Trade Agreement had been presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that he anticipated that the Turks would sign it soon (394.31/9–1051).

[2] The reference is to the United States–Turkey Reciprocal Trade Agreement of April 1, 1939, the text of which is in EAS No. 163 or 54 Stat. 1870.

[3] For documentation regarding the negotiation of the Torquay Protocol, see vol. I, pp. 1319 ff.

whereby internatl instruments may be signed by Exec Dept subj submission for ratification within 90 days fol signature.

As Parl will not convene until Nov 1 FonOff inquires whether US executive procedure exists whereunder provisions 1939 agreement cld simply be suspended rather than terminated. Emb also gathered from FonOff discussion that aside from seeking temporary suspension owing this purely procedural hitch FonOff wld prefer indefinite suspension during life of GATT. Apparently Turk Govt harbors some apprehension re longevity GATT.

Pls instruct.

WADSWORTH

Ankara Embassy Files : Lot 58 F 33 : 501 Financial Matters General 1950

The Assistant Treasury Representative in Cairo (Ghiardi) to Judd Polk[1]

SECRET

CAIRO, September 15, 1951.

DEAR JUDD: The Ankara conference on military and ECA assistance, at which ECA/W, State, and OSR were represented, covered almost the entire range of problems encountered in administering the present ECA–Defense aid to Turkey and the contemplated step-up in the program of military support.[2] The agenda included everything from a discussion of U.S. defense and economic objectives in Turkey to procedural problems in creation and use of counterpart funds; in addition, the external financial and internal monetary and fiscal situation was very thoroughly discussed and some thought was given to the probable implication of Turkey's admittance to NATO.

At the close of the meeting, we attempted to put down on paper very briefly the main areas of agreement on the major topics discussed. When I left Ankara, this paper was still in the process of being cleared by Ambassador Wadsworth and Russ Dorr. I shall send you a copy as soon as I receive it.[3] In general, ECA's immediate objective has been, and will continue to be, the direct support of an expansion of the Turkish military program within the limitations of existing legislation. For some time, the Mission has already sought, wherever possible, to favor those economic projects which would also have useful byproducts in regard to the military program. The supplementary military program, which involves the training of career and specialist NCO's, the expansion of the Turkish army by 40,000 men, and provision of certain capital improvements to the Turkish military establishment, is estimated to require an expenditure of roughly TL 100 million annually, which should be supplied from the counterpart to be deposited against U.S. fiscal year 1951–52 grant aid. As you know, ECA undertook to finance these programs in April of this year. If a lower level of aid results from the bill now before Congress, then some reduction of the materials component will be possible.

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[1] Chief of the British Commonwealth and Middle East Division of the Office of International Finance in the Department of the Treasury.

[2] The conference was held in Ankara, August 28–31, 1951.

[3] Not printed; a preliminary draft of the paper, entitled "Conclusions Reached At Joint Conference, August 28–31, 1951," may be found in the Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58 F 33 : 501 Financial Matters General 1950.

In addition to the present military program, JAMMAT representatives outlined other possible areas where, with U.S. financial assistance, the Turkish military effort could be further increased. I am enclosing a memorandum from General Arnold which summarizes these points.[4] Throughout the meetings, in the background and perhaps in the minds and sometimes implicitly in the discussions, there hovered the prospect that the U.S. Government would seek to secure additional military effort from the Turks, specifically possibly another brigade for use abroad and a step-up in manpower requirements under NATO. Inasmuch as the specifics as to number of men and equipment required are not yet known, it was practically impossible to assess the amount of aid which would be necessary to maintain stability in Turkey under such an expanded program.

One concrete result of these meetings was that the Mission was to make a genuine effort to get the Turkish Government to develop and implement a realistic total import program. As a matter of fact, the Turks have already been working on what they call an overall import program for the remainder of this U.S. fiscal year. Whether this new program represents any basic improvement over the "cooked up" program presented to the Mission last spring by Zorlu remains to be seen. The Turks, of course, maintain that their recent deficits under EPU are largely due to the trade liberalization provisions. I shall postpone discussion of EPU until my next letter, in which I will try to cover Turkish external and internal situation.

A large part of the Ankara discussions centered around the problem of counterpart, particularly as it affects the program in Turkey during the remainder of this US fiscal year. A complication in all discussions, of course, is the fact that present Turkish fiscal year ends February 29, 1952; hence, the lag in depositing counterpart is of extreme importance. The Mission stated that anticipated deposits and anticipated releases indicated that there might well be a deficit of roughly TL 40 million by the end of the Turkish fiscal year. Accordingly, the Mission explored with us the possible lines of action to overcome this deficit. Lines of action suggested were the following:

(1) The Turks should be urged to speed up procurement and speed up presentation of documents for reimbursement.

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[4] Not printed.

(2) To the extent that the Turks are on a reimbursable basis, they should be urged to switch to direct-payment procurement.

(3) Acceleration of counterpart deposits could be achieved by making retroactive allotments in the EPU during the surplus months to cover deficits incurred during the earlier months of the fiscal year. Allotments could be made during the surplus months and the Turkish account credited retroactively upon express instructions from ECA for any uncovered deficits during the earlier months of the fiscal year, these requiring the immediate deposit of counterpart. Since the approximate gap between anticipated deposits and suggested releases of counterpart is estimated at around TL 40 million, of which the release of TL 10 million could be somewhat postponed, the allotment of roughly 10–12 million in the EPU before the end of the Turkish fiscal year would appear sufficient to cover the shortfall in counterpart gener-
ation prior to February 29, 1952.

(4) Although the Turks have been willing in the past to proceed
ith various programs on the basis of a commitment that counterpart
ould eventually be released, both the Mission and the Embassy be-
eve that they would be unwilling to have such obligations carry
ver the end of their fiscal year.

At the conclusion of the meetings it was agreed that ECA/W would
ok into the question of how counterpart deposit procedures could
improved in order to reduce the time lag in deposits; in addition,
th ECA/W and the Mission will make a study of PA's to determine
hether the problem was actually as serious as the Mission had
ticipated.

The Mission estimated that roughly TL 440 million will be gen-
ted by the end of June 1952, of which only TL 363 million have
n programmed for release. Furthermore, an additional TL 40
llion is anticipated to be generated after June 1952 which have
yet been programmed. It is anticipated that the total program,
uding the balance of counterpart generated by U.S. aid but not
programmed, would be developed for the entire Turkish fiscal
r 1952–53, ending February 28, 1953.

mong the other interesting points which were discussed at the
-long meetings were general questions of strategy which might
ollowed to secure the maximum self-help by Turkey, a cursory
iination of the Turkish dollar and EPU program, as well as some
ysis of the investment program and methods for achieving maxi-
mobilization of Turkish resources consistent with the main-
ice of internal financial stability. This last item was considerably
ed over after meetings by Ivor Olsen, Ted Hadraba and myself.
ssador Wadsworth, in particular, is extremely concerned that
aid be forthcoming to support the heavy Turkish military pro-
to the utmost in order to avoid a disastrous inflation in Turkey.
uch as the shortfall in the Turkish budgetary situation is now
ed largely by Central Bank credit, any appreciable expansion

in the Turkish military budget would have to be met largely fro recourse to further deficit financing. The Turkish internal situatio will have to be watched rather carefully in the ensuing months. I particular, it will be important to assess the inflationary impact c financing the deficit for Turkish fiscal year 1951–52, this deficit bein estimated variously from TL 450 million up to TL 730 million. The is a large element of uncertainty in the Turkish budgetary estimat for TFY 1951–52, inasmuch as it appears improbable that the budge as drawn up, includes expenditures for financing the governme purchase of wheat and other items.

For your information, I append some information on the 95 p cent counterpart funds[5] and General Arnold's memorandum.

Sincerely, JOHN F. L. GHIAR

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[5] Not printed.

Editorial Note

The North Atlantic Council, at the conclusion of its seventh sessio held in Ottawa, Canada, September 15–20, 1951, agreed to the in clusion of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treat Organization.

For documentation regarding the inclusion of Greece and Turke see volume III, part 1, pages 460 ff. and 616 ff.

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty admitting Greece an Turkey to membership in the Organization was signed on October 1 1951. It is printed in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1951, page 65.

394.31/9–1451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 20, 1951—9 p. m

216. Urtel 251, Sept 14.[2]

1. Inasmuch as no US tariff rate increases will result directly fron termination existing US-Turkish TA, not essential that this be same date as Turkey's accession GATT. Consequently we prepared agre temporary delay pending approval Turkish Parliament but would hope action wld be taken as soon as possible after Nov 1. However desire termination instead suspension because US policy since Annecy negots 1949 has been terminate bilateral TAs with countries acceding

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[1] Drafted and approved by Vernon L. Phelps, E/CP, and cleared with John J. Czyzak, L/E, and Francis F. Lincoln, GTI.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1176.

GATT.[3] US TAs fol countries terminated connection their accession GATT after Annecy: Finland; Haiti; Nicaragua; Sweden.

2. FYI and possible use, US bilateral TAs with govts which became original GATT contracting parties fol 1947 Geneva GATT negots were suspended instead terminated since that time future GATT less certain.[4] In light growth GATT since then, however, expected it will continue in force indefinitely as basic internatl instrument field commercial policy.

3. US concessions initially negotiated with Turkey at Torquay will become effective Oct 17.[5]

WEBB

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[3] For documentation regarding the Annecy negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. I, pp. 651 ff.

[4] For documentation regarding the Geneva negotiations, see *ibid.*, 1947, vol. I, pp. 909 ff.

[5] In telegram 512 from Ankara, December 7, not printed, Ambassador Wadsworth reported that the documents requesting the consent of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to terminate the trade agreement of 1939 had finally been approved by the Turkish Cabinet and were under committee discussion in the Grand National Assembly (394.31/12–751).

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468 : "Turkey 1948—Memoranda"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1951.

Subject: Your Appointment with Russell Dorr, ECA Mission Chief in Turkey.

I understand that Mr. Dorr is coming to see you at 4:30 this afternoon. He will probably touch upon a problem which has very considerably disturbed the Turks, but which appears to be resolved by virtue of action being taken today by ECA. Briefly, the factors are the following:

1. Turkey has been running very substantial deficits with the EPU during the first quarter of fiscal year 1952. ECA Ankara had been vigorously pressing for the Turks to draw up an import program for the year, which would include necessary military and other priority imports and which would give a clearer idea of the EPU deficit which was likely to result for the year as a whole. The Mission was also seeking to get the Turks to take vigorous measures to control this balance of payments problem.

2. ECA made available $12.5 million in July 1952 as an advance against the amount which Turkey would expect to get through EPU

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[1] Drafted by Moore, GTI.

during fiscal year 1952. This advance was exhausted in July. In August the deficit was $9.8 million, which the Turks had to settle in gold (or dollars). In September the deficit was approximately $9.5 million. The Turkish Government made vigorous appeals to ECA for an advance of this amount so that it would not have to sell gold to balance the account.

3. The settlement date for the September deficit was October 22. As a result of somewhat encouraging evidences of Turkey's willingness to cooperate in drawing up a satisfactory import program and controlling payments, ECA Washington took an increasingly favorable view of the Turkish request. However, by the time all of the facts of the situation had been laid before OSR Paris, which had previously objected strenuously to the advance, the deadline had been reached and ECA was forced to tell the Turks that they could not make the advance.

4. Russell Dorr arrived in Washington yesterday. Further factors that have subsequently become known to OSR Paris and to Washington have resulted in ECA agreement to make an additional allotment of $9.5 million for EPU purposes. The Turkish Financial Counselor[2] is being informed this afternoon and Dorr may see Ambassador Erkin at three o'clock at some ceremony and may have the opportunity to inform him of the news. A letter is going to the Ambassador from Bissell, officially informing him of the allotment and, by implication, giving Dorr a great deal of the credit for the change in the ECA position.[3] The letter comments on Dorr's report of the vigorous measures now being taken by the Turkish Government to adjust its expenditures to its resources and to the inclusion of military and other priority imports in their import program. ECA Washington is rather pleased at the outcome of this exercise as they feel it will give Dorr a great deal of credit with the Turks for accomplishing the change in its position and it will also indicate fairly clearly the importance of Mission recommendations in these problems which should be primarly fought out between the Missions and the local Government.

5. Ambassador Erkin is quite bitter against ECA at the moment as a result of the ECA turn-down several days ago and commented to Bob Moore yesterday that if he ever wanted to be sure of having something unfavorably considered, he had only to take it up with ECA. At that time he admitted that he had expressed his displeasure about ECA to Constantine Brown, which led to the latter's article in the *Washington Star* regarding "Turks Resent ECA Interference". Erkin expressed his regrets to Moore that Brown had written such an article.

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[2] Nahit Alpar.

[3] Not printed.

Secretary's Letters : Lot 56 D 459 : "Defense"

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 10 November 1951.

MY DEAR MR. MATTHEWS: Reference is made to your letter of 28 August 1951, and to the inclosure thereto, requesting Department of Defense views regarding a proposed six-division increase in the size of the Turkish Army, contingent upon conclusion of a reciprocal security agreement with the United States and upon U.S. supply of the requisite equipment for the proposed increase in the size of the Turkish Army.[1]

The Department of Defense, after careful consideration of the Turkish proposal from a military standpoint, considers that it would be inadvisable for the United States to accept the Turkish proposal at the present time. Acceptance of the Turkish proposal at this time would necessitate placing Turkish grant military aid requirements in a position of higher priority than that accorded North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, an action which would be inconsistent with current U.S. strategic concepts. In addition, the admittance of Turkey to NATO membership is still subject to ratification by certain NATO governments, after which the establishment of Turkish force requirements can be accomplished under NATO procedures, and the scale of U.S. grant aid support of Turkish forces can be assessed accordingly. Hence it is deemed appropriate for Turkey to make the offer of the proposed increase in the Turkish Army as a contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, following Turkish admission to membership.

In summary, pending establishment of Turkish force requirements under NATO procedures, or the development of a more critical military situation in the Middle East area, the Department of Defense takes the position that U.S. assistance to the Turkish armed forces should be limited to the support of Turkish armed forces currently in being.

Sincerely yours, WILLIAM C. FOSTER

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[1] Neither printed.

664.82/11–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

RESTRICTED ANKARA, November 19, 1951—4 p. m.

464. Turkish FonOff yesterday released texts of notes exchanged between Turkish and Bulgarian Govts re closing of Turkish-Bulgarian frontier Nov 8, by Turkish auths.

Bulgarian note, dated Nov 14, protest "unilateral" closing of Turkish-Bulgarian frontier "in evident violation of the contractual obligations existing between the two countries" and demands opening of frontier. Note concludes that if frontier is not immed reopened, it is only Turkish Govt which will bear responsibility for "the grave consequences" which the unilateral acts of Turkish auths will have causes.

Turkish reply delivered Bulgarian FonOff Nov 17, asserts Bulgarian auths have frequently tried to incl among Turk immigrants persons not of Turkish origin, particularly gypsies, furnished with false visas and that it is on these grounds that Turkey has again been obliged close frontier. Reply reviews previous exchs of notes and conversations concerning similar acts, characterizes charges made in Bulgarian note as false and formally rejects them. Reply concludes by protesting uncooperative attitude of Bulgarian auths and states frontier will remain closed until Bulgarian Govt agrees to take back those persons who recently arrived Turkey with false visas and also agrees to reiterate formally that all necessary measures will be taken to prevent repetition of such acts.[1]

Full texts being pouched.[2]

WADSWORTH

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[1] In telegram 392 from Istanbul, December 20, Consul General Mathews reported that the Turkish Foreign Minister told the Grand National Assembly that the Bulgars had stopped further emigration of Turk-Bulgars because they had discovered that it was a great mistake economically (882.181/12-2051).

[2] Not printed.

NAC Files : Lot 60 D 137

Memorandum by the National Advisory Council Staff Committee to the National Advisory Council

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1951.

NAC Document No. 1227

Subject: Proposed Additional Release of TL 81.5 Million in Turkish Counterpart Funds and Reprogramming of TL 71.4 Million from Previously Approved Programs.

Problem

It is proposed to release an additional TL 81.5 million for military production, construction, equipment, and matériel and to shift TL 71.4 million to this purpose within previously approved programs for the period ending 29 February 1952.

Discussion

Explanation of Proposal

The most recent NAC action with respect to Turkish counterpart was taken March 28, 1951,[1] when a program was approved for the release of TL 165 million to finance Turkish investments through the close of Turkey's FY 1951–52. ECA has however considered it essential to cover out of counterpart during this Turkish fiscal year certain supplementary extra-budgetary military programs, totalling TL 72.9 million. Moreover, the Turkish Government has now requested the use of an additional TL 80.0 million in counterpart to finance military production, construction, equipment and matériel included in the current Turkish budget. It has proposed, however, that this latter amount be obtained in part by changing the composition of the previously approved counterpart program for the current Turkish fiscal year, of which a substantial portion has not yet been carried out.

The following plan has accordingly been developed.

a) The existing TL 165 million counterpart program will be scaled down to TL 93.6 million. The TL 71.4 million thus released would be applied to the TL 80.0 million program for military production, construction, etc. in the current Turkish budget.

b) The balance needed for the TL 80.0 million budgeted military program (TL 8.6 million) and the sum needed for completing the supplementary military program (TL 72.9 million) would be covered by an additional counterpart release of TL 81.5 million. This release would bring total releases for the present Turkish fiscal year to TL 246.5 million, and would substantially exhaust anticipated counterpart deposits.

Allotments of grant assistance requiring counterpart plus drawing rights requiring counterpart amounted to $155.9 million through 30 October 1951 (95% counterpart equivalent would be TL 414.7 million). If the presently planned minimum of $45 million ECA aid were provided this year entirely in the form of grant, total cumulative U.S. aid requiring counterpart would amount to $178.9 million (excluding Technical Assistance) of which the 95% counterpart would total about TL 476 million. The total of the first release approved by the National Advisory Council (TL 125.4 million) and the presently proposed amended release (TL 246.3 million) is TL 371.7 million. There will thus be accruals, additional to the total actual and proposed releases, from expected grant aid through June 1952, of TL 104.3 million. TL 100 million has been tentatively earmarked for supplementary military programs for the Turkish fiscal year 1952–53. NAC approval of this tentative release is not however being requested at this time.

The Turkish Government will give assurances that the most essential projects eliminated from the counterpart program previously approved for FY 1951–52, will be provided for from other funds. The

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[1] See telegram Torep 2145 to the U.S. Special Representative in Europe, March 30, p. 1134.

Turkish Government will also agree to include in its budget for Turkish FY 1952–53 an additional TL 30 million for military production.

Table 1 shows the changes which will be made by this proposal, Table 2 shows the cumulative total of proposed counterpart uses before and after this change, and Table 3 shows the cumulative total of expected specific releases through 29 February 1952.[2]

Financial Situation

Public financial operations during this Turk fiscal year will unquestionably involve a substantial excess of expenditure over tax revenue and other receipts from the public, though the precise amount is somewhat obscure. One approach to appraisal of public financial operations relates estimated consolidated General budget and Annexed budget expenditures plus counterpart releases not reflected in these budgets to known receipts from the public, including the surplus of the State pension funds and net borrowing from the public but excluding counterpart releases. This estimate indicates an uncovered deficit of about TL 470 million for the Turkish fiscal year ending February 29, 1952.* This balance is expected to be financed by use of loan and grant counterpart and central bank advances resulting in increased money circulation. It is clearly a major inflationary influence. The comparable figure for the previous year would be about TL 280 million.*

However, it appears that up to the present the inflationary influence of the public account deficit has been offset. Prices in Turkey have been astonishingly stable (see Table 4). Internal price indexes have risen very moderately over the last year and materially less than import and export price indexes.

It is not possible to determine precisely the relative importance of the factors making for this result, but it seems probable that the chief items are, first, the surplus of imports of current goods and services financed by foreign aid and by the use of foreign exchange reserves and, second, the increase in production and business activity in the country. There is no indication that there has been any private disinvestment, or reduction of the rate of private investment, though no comprehensive information as to this rate is available.

The Government of Turkey has furnished figures which would indicate that, during U.S. FY 1951, the import surplus as measured by the current payments deficit may have been about TL 165 million and estimates that in US fiscal 1952 it will be about TL 220 million. Turkish deficits with EPU this year from July to October totaled about TL 102 million compared to a cumulative surplus of almost TL 30 million for the same months last year, but this striking shift is certainly at least partly the result of the fact that seasonal exports moved very early last year and have tended to lag this year.

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[2] Tables not printed.

*Debt service for Turkey's fiscal year 1951/52 is given as TL 215 million as contrasted with TL 117 million in 1950/51. Under the assumption that the TL 98 million difference between these figures represents refinancing as opposed to interest payments, the TL 98 million has been added to the 1950/51 figure for comparability. [Footnote in the source text.]

The increase in production and business activity has been substantial. All-time Turkish records were established this year by grain and cotton production, and output of coal, chromite, copper and iron and steel will probably also reach new highs. The principal increase was in grain production which rose in value by about TL 350 million at present prices. Quite aside from this large increase in national production, there is probably a secular increase in the amount of money required in Turkey as the peasant subsistence farmers are more and more drawn into the market economy.

It seems likely that those two stabilizing factors have between them offset the inflationary pressure of the public financial deficit. It may be noted, however that no basis for complacency exists, for a recent joint study by the U.S. Embassy, ECA Mission and JAMMAT indicates that the prospect is that financial pressures are likely to increase somewhat in the next two years. Nevertheless, for the current Turk fiscal year it does not seem that the expenditures for which the additional counterpart releases are now proposed will produce important inflationary consequences.

Conclusion

Release of additional TL 81.5 million for military production, construction, equipment and matériel and a shift of TL 71.4 million to this purpose within the previously approved programs should be approved. This subject has been considered by a working group which concurs with this conclusion.[3]

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[3] According to the NAC Files, in Action No. 506, December 4, the NAC had unanimously approved, via a telephone poll, the proposed release of LT81.5 million in Turkish counterpart funds and the reprogramming of LT71.4 million from previously approved programs. According to the records, the action occurred 2 days prior to the promulgation of Document No. 1227. The text of Action No. 506 was as follows:

"The National Advisory Council advises the Administrator for Economic Cooperation that it perceives no objection to the release of an additional TL 81.5 million for military production, construction, equipment, and matériel and a shift of TL 71.4 million to this purpose within previously approved programs for the period ending February 29, 1952." (NAC Files: Lot 60 D 137)

782.5 MSP/12-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA, December 11, 1951—3 p. m.

521. ReDeptel 494, December 10.[1] I had suitable opportunity to discuss MSA agreement with FonMin December 10 at which time it was arranged that Ustun, Acting Secy Gen FonOff, shld receive Keith today.

Draft text was given to Ustun and Asst Secy Gen Fatin Zorlu this morning. Ustun made open, quick, off-hand comment to effect that they cld not agree to second sentence para 5[2] which referred to expenditures for encouragement of immigration. Zorlu added that immigration problem for Turkey was very special one because of numbers of Turks coming out of Bulgaria. He thought wording of note was elaboration of wording given to Section 523 of Act.

Ustun said they wld wish to study text carefully and wld communicate with Emb. Zorlu remarked that there wld be ample time before January 8 to deal with problem.

WADSWORTH

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[1] In telegram 494 to Ankara, December 10, not printed, Ambassador Wadsworth was instructed to report on the progress of the negotiations concerning the proposed exchange of notes between the United States and Turkey to amend the existing ECA and Mutual Security Defense Assistance Program agreements. (780.5 MSP/12-1051)

To enable Turkey to continue to receive aid from these programs, the existing accords had to be amended to bring them into line with the new requirements for aid eligibility drawn up by Congress and approved by the President on October 10, 1951, in the Mutual Security Act; 65 Stat. 373.

In an airgram of November 21, not printed, the Department had informed Wadsworth of these facts and had included a draft agreement for his use as the basis for an exchange of notes with the Turkish Government to obtain Turkey's compliance with the provisions of the Mutual Security Act (781.5 MSP/11-2151).

[2] Paragraph 5 of the draft text in the airgram of November 21 is as follows:

"5. Paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Economic Cooperation Agreement shall include expenditures for military production, construction, equipment and material. It shall also include expenditures for the encouragement of emigration from participating countries having permanent surplus manpower to areas, particularly the undeveloped and dependent areas, where such manpower can be effectively utilized." (781.5 MSP/11-2151)

782.5 MSP/12-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY ANKARA, December 21, 1951—6 p. m.

560. Re Deptel 527, Dec. 17.[1] Necessity completing exchange MSA notes by Jan 8 stressed at FonOff Dec 21. FonOff feels strongly,

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[1] Not printed.

despite explanation as per para two reftel,[2] that GNA wld raise serious objection to draft note para five concerning emigration and inquires whether any possibility deletion this para exists (Emb query: if not is there any possibility giving Turks formal statement along lines numbered para two reftel?).

FonOff also takes exception draft note para four [3] it points out Turk currency not exportable under basic foreign exchange regulations and that utilizations 5 percent counterpart to purchase export commodities and international services wld be tantamount to maintaining counterpart fund in foreign exchange terms. Their attitude regarding assurance non-retroactivity as concerns 5 percent funds deposited prior July 1, 1951 is that prior July 1, 1950 substantial assistance to Turks has been in loan form and therefore more advantageous to certain other countries than to Turkey which only since July 1, 1950 has been on full grant dollar basis.

WADSWORTH

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[2] In paragraph two of telegram 527 to Ankara, December 17, not printed, the Department explained to Wadsworth the intent of paragraph five in the draft note:

"2. Ref in Para 5 note (Ankara refer urtel 521, Dec 11) to use 95 percent counterpart for emigration not intended to compel other govt use of counterpart for that purpose but merely indicate expressly that it is one of purposes for which 95 percent counterpart may be released by agrmt in usual manner within terms of Bilateral. Pls note emigration purpose is broad enough to include use 95 percent funds to cover resettlement expenditures of emigrants." (781.5–MSP/12–1751)

[3] The text of paragraph four of the draft note in the airgram of November 21 is as follows:

"4. Sums allocated to the use of the Government of the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Economic Cooperation Agreement may be used by the Government of the United States of America for its expenditures in any area." (781.5 MSP/11–2151)

782.5 MSA/12–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1951—6:51 p. m.

552. Re Embtel 560 Dec 21. Paras four [2] and five MSA [3] notes not absolutely required by Act of Cong but as they are being incorporated in agreements with other countries appears necessary for sake of uniformity of treatment to include in agreement with Turk. Failure to include wld greatly increase difficulties in negots in future years.

Re Para five concerning emigration wld Turk objection be met by inserting phrase in second sentence "for the resettlement of refugees within Turk and for" after "include expenditures". No objection giving Turks formal statement in supplementary *aide-mémoire* along lines Para 2 Deptel 527 Dec 17.[4]

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[1] Drafted by Lincoln, GTI; approved by Dorsz, GTI; and cleared with Dorothy Imlay, L/E, Raphael Dondero, MSA, and Morse, ECA.

[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

[3] See footnote 2, p. 1188, and footnote 2, *supra*.

Re Para 4 MSA note, exchange of notes can be accomplished by *aide-mémoire* in which US states:

(*a*) Turk lira will not be converted into dollars

(*b*) No conversion without prior consultation Turk Govt and Turk fon exchange position will be taken into account

(*c*) Use of counterpart for conversions into other currencies will be carried out in Turk and will be limited in magnitude.

ACHESON

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[4] See footnote 2, *supra*.

782.5 MSP/12-2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT ANKARA, December 28, 1951—7 p. m.

578. Re Deptel 552, Dec 26.[1] Asst Secy Gen for Econ Affs FonOff[2] stated this afternoon that GNA has given FonOff auth conclude negots and sign exchange MSA notes. As result discussions today with Zorlu full agrmt with one exception now reached on text Emb note and supplementary *aide-mémoire*. Exception concerns (*b*) of last para Deptel 552. FonOff expresses strong preference for substitution "agreement" for "consultation". Unless important reasons exist against this substitution, would Dept please instruct urgently whether it wld agree to have (*b*) read: "No conversion into other currencies will occur without taking the Turk foreign exchange position into acct and with prior agreement of the Turk Govt". If this change cannot be made please supply Embassy with such argument as there may be in order that the necessity of using the word "consultation" can be explained in full and satisfactory detail to FonOff.

Turk objection re para 5 of draft note has been met by insertion phrase reading "for the resettlement of refugees within Turk and for" after "include expenditure" as was suggested in second para reftel.

WADSWORTH

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[1] *Supra*.

[2] Fatin Zorlu.

782.5 MSP/12–2851: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 28, 1951—7:20 p. m.
NIACT

560. We will accept and urge you make strong effort obtain Turk acceptance fol wording as substitute (*b*) last para Deptel 552 Dec 26[2] "No conversions into other currencies will occur without taking the Turk foreign exchange position into acct nor will they be made except pursuant to mutually satisfactory arrangements". (Embtel 578 Dec 28.)

As last resort and if you believe deadlock wld otherwise result you may add "to be agreed upon" following "satisfactory arrangements".

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Lincoln and Moore, GTI, and cleared with Morse, ECA, and Gray, L/E.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1189.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY AMENDING THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT OF JULY 4, 1948, AS AMENDED

[For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Ankara August 16, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 3 UST (pt. 1) 54.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY CONCERNING ECONOMIC COOPERATION

[For text of Agreement, effected by exchange of notes signed at Ankara November 15, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 3 UST (pt. 3) 3720.]

YEMEN

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD YEMEN[1]

611.86H/2-851

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State[2]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 8, 1951.

YEMEN

A. OBJECTIVES

Yemen only recently began to emerge from its traditional isolation and to assume a normal place in the family of nations. It is an objective of the US Government to encourage this process and to establish a firm and lasting foundation for friendship between the two Governments. Since Yemen is a primitive country which needs development of all kinds, we desire to encourage its progressive and orderly advancement politically, economically and socially. The geographical position of Yemen, situated at the southern narrows of the Red Sea, gives it a certain strategic value which we wish to remain in friendly hands. It is in our interest that the independence of Yemen be preserved, but we should like to see rigid autocracy give way in time to a rising political consciousness among the people. We believe that: 1) education should be developed on a broader basis; 2) the standards of living should be improved; 3) Yemen's trade should be open to friendly western nations and its hard currency earnings should be available to Yemen rather than to Aden for use in dollar markets; 4) native industries should be improved; and 5) new industries should be started as Yemen's resources and potentialities become known. We should continue to encourage sound American enterprise to interest itself in Yemen and should seek to maintain equality of opportunity for such enterprise with firms of other friendly nations.

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1355 ff.

[2] Department of State Policy (Information) Statements were concise documents summarizing the current U.S. policy toward, the relations of principal powers with, and the issues and trends in a particular country or region. The statements were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. They were generally prepared by *ad hoc* working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State and were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions abroad, under cover of formal instructions from the Secretary of State, for comment and criticism. The Policy Statements were periodically revised.

B. POLICIES

US policy has been criticized by some Arab countries during the past three years because of our attitude on the Palestine question. Yemen has never actively participated in these criticisms, but has remained reserved and generally friendly toward the United States. It is our policy to retain and cultivate this friendship by: 1) preventing where possible the spread of Communistic influences in Yemen and the Near East generally and promoting the stability of the area; 2) assisting in the orderly development of the economy and public welfare of Yemen; 3) giving friendly counsel as the occasion may warrant to all parties to any dispute involving Yemen and encouraging prompt solution of the controversy; 4) observing the utmost respect for Yemen's sovereignty, independence and local customs; 5) promoting the modernization of the country through Point IV assistance;[3] 6) encouraging sound American enterprise to establish business and developmental interests in Yemen; 7) extending loan assistance on the basis of normal banking procedures; 8) disseminating American cultural media in Yemen and inviting Yemeni students and leaders to the United States; and 9) fostering philanthropic (but non-religious) enterprise of public interest. In all our efforts to carry out our policies in Yemen, we should be very careful to serve as a guide or partner and avoid injuring Yemeni sensibilities by appearing to dominate them.

1. *Political*

The assassination of the late Imam Yahya on February 17, 1948 and the brief usurpation of power by the rebel leader interrupted our recognition of Yemen accorded on March 4, 1946. The rebellion was suppressed, however, and the legitimate successor assumed the throne in March 1948 as Imam Ahmed. The United States offered recognition in return for his assurances that he would respect international obligations, including the US-Yemeni Agreement of Commerce and Friendship of May 1946. Oral assurances were given in Washington in January 1950 and recognition was accorded. A rapid improvement in our ties with Yemen has resulted. The Imam has asked for Point IV assistance and American medical aid.[4] A Chargé d'Affaires has just been accredited to the United States, and we intend to establish a resident Legation in Yemen when the location can be determined satisfactorily.

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[3] For the initiation of negotiations for a Point Four Agreement between the United States and Yemen, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1360. Negotiations continued throughout 1951, but no Agreement was signed in that year. Information on this topic is in Department of State files 886H.00 and 886H.00 TA.

[4] Documentation on U.S. relations with Yemen in 1948, recognition of Yemen in 1950, and Yemeni requests for economic and medical aid, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v. pp. 1355 ff.

We have attempted to assist Yemen whenever possible, because of its lack of experience in international affairs and trained technicians, in much the same manner in which we have given our services to Saudi Arabia in this respect. We also wish to encourage Yemen's more active participation in UN affairs.

Yemen has been involved with the British over boundary disputes with the Aden Protectorate. The United States has remained impartial toward the settlement of these conflicting claims, but has encouraged their early solution in order to promote the peace and orderly development of the area.

2. *Economic*

Our economic policy towards Yemen is to encourage the general improvement of economic conditions in that country through development of its natural resources, improvement of the methods and means of agricultural and industrial production with a view to increasing production, and expansion of foreign trade. Hitherto Yemeni world trade has been small except for the export of coffee, hides and skins, some foodstuffs, and the importation of textiles and petroleum products. We should in general encourage Yemen to become an active member of the world community and in doing so to follow a liberal and non-discriminatory trade policy.

Although prospects of oil discoveries in Yemen appear to be remote, there has been much Yemen speculation, fed by persistent rumor, about the existence of significant oil fields in that country and in the adjacent Shabwa area of the Aden protectorate. While probably not of serious consequence, the conviction that Yemen, including the territory claimed by it, holds important petroleum resources serves to complicate Yemen's external relations, chiefly with Britain. Despite assurances to the contrary, the Yemeni are strongly suspicious that British interests in the disputed Shabwa area stem from prospects of exploiting oil resources there.

A survey of the area by an impartial (American) company would be likely to end speculation on the oil resources of both areas and contribute to the improvement of Anglo-Yemeni relations. Some thought might therefore be given to encouraging both the Yemen and British Governments to open these areas for exploration by any interested company as soon as this is possible. This would be consistent with both political and economic objectives of United States policy if it tended to encourage a rapid solution of border controversies and to the establishment of American business and developmental enterprise in Yemen.

The US policy on economic development assistance to Yemen is aimed at improvement of living standards as a means of providing political and economic stability. Yemen needs supplies and equipment for road building, harbor development, telecommunications, agricultural machinery such as pumps and tractors, and modern medical supplies and facilities. Yemen should be able to earn sufficient foreign exchange to make minimum purchases of these items by increasing its exports and by opening its mineral resources to possible exploitation.

Yemen's primitive culture and its elementary stage of economic development will allow only small amounts of investment capital to be absorbed initially. The United States should, therefore, encourage the Yemeni to undertake modest developments, such as improvement of agricultural techniques, highway construction, small irrigation projects, promotion of small industries, and expansion of public health and educational activities.

We are particularly interested in developing proper arrangements for facilitating Yemeni exports to hard-currency areas and thus enabling Yemen to increase its purchases of essentials from those areas. At present most exports go through Aden, and re-exports to the dollar area have resulted in dollar exchange for the sterling area rather than for Yemen itself which is allowed only 25% of its hard currency earnings through Aden.

If the country's exports can be further developed and if the Yemeni Government became willing to divulge the exact extent of their gold and silver holdings (sometimes estimated to be over 600,000,000 Maria Theresa thalers—about $300,000,000.00) and use it for loan security purposes, the United States may be in a position to support requests from Yemen for small development loans by the Export-Import Bank for projects or programs of economic merit, especially those which have been prepared by means of Point IV technical assistance. Yemen should be urged to put its holdings to work.

Under present circumstances it is hardly possible to negotiate with Yemen a more comprehensive commercial treaty than the very simple and limited Treaty of Friendship and Commerce which was signed at Sana'a on May 4, 1946.[5] However, if the hoped-for economic development in Yemen should occur and, in consequence, our trade relations with that country should develop, we should point out to the Yemeni officials, at the appropriate time, the advantage and desirability of negotiating a more comprehensive treaty.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

United Kingdom

Since Yemen achieved its independence from Turkey in 1918, it has been dominated by British influence from nearby Aden which has controlled the bulk of Yemen's trade, a situation which has been distasteful to Yemen. Border conflicts have added to Yemen's distrust of the United Kingdom. The last serious incident occurred in September 1949 and resulted in a decision to confer in London in August 1950 to settle the boundary differences. The meeting was held August–October 1950 but was indecisive regarding boundary settlements since it provided only for setting up a fact-finding commission and did little to allay Yemeni cynicism toward British sincerity. An attempt was also made to end the diplomatic stalemate between the two countries. Yemen has refused to accept the credentials of the Governor of Aden as Minister to Yemen because it would exemplify to the latter the domination of its foreign trade by Aden, and the United Kingdom has thus far refused to accredit another minister. A Yemeni Chargé has now been named to establish a Legation in London and the UK is considering naming a new minister to Yemen.

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[5] For the text of the treaty, see TIAS No. 1535; United Nations Treaty Series, vol. IV, p. 165; or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1782.

Italy

In order to counter British influence Yemen sought close relations with Italy, its neighbor in Eritrea and Ethiopia across the Red Sea, before World War II. Italian political influence, trade, and cultural relations were strongly established. The defeat of Italy by the Allies, however, destroyed Italy's position and prestige in Yemen.

France

France has never enjoyed high esteem in Yemen, but its relations are satisfactory and are conducted by the French Minister to Saudi Arabia who is also accredited to Yemen. Saif Al Islam Abdulla, the titular Minister of Foreign Affairs, has spent considerable time in Paris and on the South coast and may personally be friendly disposed toward France. The French Banque de l'Indo-China at Hodeida is the only western banking institution in Yemen.

Israel

Yemen has had a substantial Jewish population for hundreds of years. They have lived as a segregated community in Yemen where they were allowed to follow a mode of life dictated by their religious beliefs and with a minimum of interference from the Yemen Government. Following the establishment of Israel as a sovereign state and as a result of the urging of Zionist organizations most of the Yemeni Jews elected to go to Israel. The Jews were allowed to emigrate from Yemen to Aden and thence to Israel, and the operation was virtually completed in September 1950 with the transfer of nearly forty-two thousand Yemeni Jews. Only about fifteen hundred Jews remain in Yemen.

USSR

Yemen maintains no relations with Russia.

Saudi Arabia

Yemen's relations with Saudi Arabia are very cordial. A firm basis for friendship was established by Ibn Saud in 1934 when he defeated the Imam but offered very generous terms for a peace settlement. The bonds then established were further strengthened in 1948 when King Ibn Saud supported Crown Prince Ahmed of Yemen when he was fighting to recover the throne from his father's assassin. Yemen accepts considerable guidance from Saudi Arabia regarding military affairs, the United Nations and in the Arab League.

Other Arab States

Yemen is an admirer of Lebanon, one of the most advanced Arab states, and has utilized the services of Lebanese in furthering its commercial relations with the outside world. It has similar sentiments toward Syria and enlisted the services of a Syrian to assist its delegation at the United Nations during the first session of Yemen's membership. It is reported that Yemen objects to Egypt's superior attitude in Arab circles.

Arab League

Although a full member of the Arab League, Yemen has taken little active part to date.

United Nations

Yemen became a member of the United Nations in September 1947. Its delegations have never participated in an outstanding manner in UN affairs, but have remained quietly in the background, largely due to inexperience, the language barrier and lack of instructions from home. Yemen usually votes with the other Arab states.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

Our position vis-à-vis Yemen has until the present time been almost consistently that of being "pursued" rather than "pursuing." Repeated overtures by Yemen from 1918 to 1945 for recognition were finally acknowledged and recognition extended in 1946. In deference to Yemen's isolation and general suspicion of the outside world, further development of our relations was left to Yemeni initiative. The resumption of US-Yemen relations in 1950 marked a notable development in closer ties. Yemen is now seeking development and medical assistance and better commercial relations, and has established resident diplomatic representation in Washington for the first time.

We desire to work as closely as possible with Yemen and to take every appropriate step to fulfill its requests. Care must be taken, however, to avoid too rapid advancement lest Yemen be frightened back into its traditional isolation.

Yemen, a primitive country without outstanding resources, has a long way to go to meet the economic and social standards and responsibilities of other nations, but it seems to have made its decision to do so. It also appears to look primarily to the United States for assistance in its efforts and we are anxious to give it every possible encouragement without urging it to overextend or overexpand itself.

Yemen lacks modern education facilities. Its educational system should be broadened to send students abroad for higher education in more advanced Arab countries and to invite teachers to Yemen from modern Arab institutions. Above all, the children of the Royal Family should be offered the benefits of western education to fit them for their later responsibilities.

Yemen is climatically the most favored part of Arabia. It has good rainfall, fertile valleys and plateaus, and a large and industrious population. It attained a high degree of culture and industry in ancient times and the same resources which supported that civilization are still available for modern development.

AFRICA

GENERAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD AFRICA[1]

780.00/10–1750

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs[2]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1950.

REGIONAL POLICY STATEMENT ON AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

1. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

General

A. Today "Black" Africa is oriented toward the non-Communist world. Communism has made no real progress in the area, but continuation of this state of affairs cannot be taken for granted. French West Africa is the weakest spot. Conditions exist throughout "Black" Africa which would play into the hands of Communist agitators. The low standards of living of the natives, the attitude of white supremacy struck by some colonial officials and white settlers, and the disintegration of tribal authority are examples of these vulnerable areas. Nationalist Government policies have created serious tensions between natives, Asiatics, and whites in the Union of South Africa. These tensions could lead to passive resistance, violence or Communism and spread to other parts of the African continent.

B. The rise of nationalism, particularly in British West Africa, has made collaboration between metropolitan governments and their African colonies more difficult by undermining the confidence of the former in the security of their position. The metropolitan powers are making efforts to cope with this desire for autonomy. The United Kingdom is committed to a colonial policy designed to grant eventual self-government to its colonies, preferably within the British Commonwealth. France follows a policy of assimilation as Frenchmen and strives for development within the French Union. Belgium proceeds systematically with measures which eventually will raise the native standard of living to a level which in turn will generate a desire for successful self-government. Portugal maintains strict control from Lisbon over Mozambique and Angola, and apparently entertains no thought of anything but colonial status for these territories in the foreseeable future. Spain's colonies south of the Sahara are unimportant and this fact is reflected in a *laissez-faire* policy which concerns itself little with native welfare.

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1503 ff.

[2] This is one of series of regional policy statements prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs during 1950. They were prepared by officers within the Bureau and were intended for the guidance of the Bureau and not for further distribution or use. A note attached to the source text indicates that this paper, marked "Fourth Draft," was given to Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Berry, and African Affairs Director Bourgerie.

C. The Colonial powers are sensitive to any interest which the United States shows in their African territories. This sensitiveness stems from pronouncements made by American officials, especially, in recent times, and by our representatives in the United Nations, to the effect that we support the goal of self-determination and self-rule of all people. The metropolitan powers need reassurance from the United States that we are not purposefully working to bring about a premature according of political independence to the peoples of Africa. The position taken by the United States in recent UN debates on their African trusteeships has exacerbated the feelings of the colonial powers to the extent that this has become a source of irritation in their relations with us.

D. "Black" Africa is an important source of raw materials, particularly in time of war or even now when other sources in the Far East are diminishing. Manganese, cobalt, columbite, industrial diamonds, chrome ore, uranium, rubber, palm oil, asbestos, graphite, vanadium, mica, copper, tin, and many other materials of considerable importance to the United States are produced there.

E. For the masses in "Black" Africa agriculture consists of a low type of subsistence farming which precludes a decent standard of living and ruins the land. Improved methods are needed on this lowest level to increase production per man and to conserve the soil. The native needs more technical assistance from governmental and private sources before his standard of living can be improved through money crops. Notwithstanding the plight of the native, African farm products, such as sisal, wool, coffee, cocoa, palm oil and palm kernels, already play an important part in our everyday life. Those products are important not only to the United States, but also to the economy of Western Europe.

F. In many parts of the area inadequate transportation facilities and lack of skilled labor are factors which retard economic development.

G. American and other foreign capital is also required to develop Africa. While the climate for the investment of American capital is favorable in some areas there are other parts of Africa where investors find barriers raised, such as (1) rigid exchange controls which preclude repatriation of dividends or of the original investment; (2) suspicion of American motives; and (3) the feeling that American businessmen seek to supplant European business interests. A shortage of risk capital in the United States has also been a contributing factor in hampering further investment in Africa. At present total U.S. investments in Africa South of the Sahara are estimated to be at least $250,000,000, most of which is invested in South Africa and Liberia.

H. As has already been indicated, "Black" Africa is important for the supplies of strategic materials that may have to be obtained there in the event of war or where other sources of supply are denied to us. These strategic materials must not only be made available to the United States but must be denied the enemy. Thus the strategic value of Africa is increasing. In the event of war, an air route across Central Africa to the Middle and Far East would become very important as an alternate for the North African route. In addition our Navy would no doubt require bases and/or ship repair and supply facilities at such ports as Dakar, Monrovia, Freetown, Cape Town, Durban and Kilindini, most of which were of considerable strategic importance during the last war.

I. The gradual weakening of the economic ties of the European powers with their Far Eastern possessions and the need for rehabilitating their domestic economy has led these nations to look to the development of Africa as a means of strengthening their over-all economic and strategic position in the world. The United States supports this objective through ECA assistance and Point Four aid. However, in seeking to attain this objective there is a growing tendency for some European colonial powers to endeavor to monopolize colonial trade to the detriment of U.S. commercial interests.

U.S. Attitudes Affecting Implementation of Our Objectives

The American people interested in the future of Africa South of the Sahara have certain basic attitudes which influence United States policy:

(1) A realization of the contributions made by the administering powers in the development of Africa.

(2) A humanitarian interest on the part of religious and philanthropic groups in assisting in the religious and social advancement of the African people.

(3) Faith in the concept that the dependent peoples of the world can be assisted in progress towards ultimate self-government or independence by setting an example of the practical application of technology and American ideals of democracy.

(4) Belief that Africa has considerable resources, both existing and potential, which will be important to us in any future world conflict.

(5) A realization of the strategic importance of Africa in any future war, and consequently of the necessity for maintaining the friendship of the government and the peoples of Africa.

(6) Interest on the part of U.S. commercial enterprises in assisting in the development of Africa and in maintaining an "open door" for American trade and investment in the area.

(7) Sympathy on the part of the American Negroes for the aspirations of the native peoples of Africa.

(8) A strong desire to assume as few additional world responsibilities as possible.

2. AREA OBJECTIVES IN TERMS OF AMERICAN INTERESTS

It is in the national interest of the United States to achieve the following objectives in Africa:

(1) Social, political, and economic advancement of the people of Africa as rapidly as practicable to convince them that their individual and national aspirations can best be achieved through continued association with the free nations of the world.

(2) Political and economic stability sufficient to resist domination by unfriendly movements or powers through subversion or aggression.

(3) Development of mutual understanding and cooperation by the United States and the colonial powers on questions relating to colonial policy.

(4) Maintenance of our strategic interests, including access to strategic raw materials.

(5) Advancement of U.S. business interests, including the securing of nondiscriminatory treatment for U.S. nationals.

3. U.S. POLICIES

In the light of the foregoing objectives, U.S. policy towards Africa South of the Sahara should be:

(1) To cooperate with the responsible governments in the political, economic and social advancement of the people of Africa at the maximum practicable rate.

(2) To encourage, within the political context existing at the time, maximum tolerance and respect for the human rights and dignity of the African and Asiatic peoples in areas of white domination, and of white people in areas of black domination to the end that a harmonious pattern of coexistence between the races can be developed.

(3) To promote understanding on the part of the non-colonial powers of U.S. objectives and policies in the colonial field in Africa, as well as an understanding of the problems, responsibilities, and achievements of the colonial powers in Africa.

(4) To take all possible steps, in cooperation with the governing powers, to prevent militant Communism from gaining ascendance or control in any part of Africa.

(5) To lend our support, whenever appropriate, to the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in Africa.

(6) To maintain and seek adherence to our rights under the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye and the Trusteeship Agreements.

(7) To seek the removal of import, exchange, and other controls not specifically approved by the United States, which act in restraint of normal trade; and to secure nondiscriminatory treatment for U.S. business interests in Africa.

4. GENERAL LINES OF ACTION

A. Political

(1) The conversations held in Washington in July 1950 with representatives of the United Kingdom, France and Belgium[3] demonstrated the benefits to be derived from an informal exchange of views on dependent area problems at the working level. The American Embassies at London, Paris and Brussels should indicate to the respective Governments that we regard favorably the calling of similar informal meetings in the future whenever there is a need to discuss dependent area problems of common interest.

(2) Procedures should be established with the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium for consultation between the delegations of the respective Governments before each session of the Trusteeship Council, the Special Committee, and the General Assembly.

(3) Informal efforts should be made to induce the anti-colonial powers outside the Soviet bloc to adopt a more temperate attitude in discussing dependent area problems, since continued misinformed criticism endangers the orderly development of these dependent areas.

(4) As conditions warrant discussions should be held with the appropriate colonial authorities to ensure that security measures in the dependent area are adequate to prevent interruptions in the procurement by the United States and its allies of supplies of strategic materials in time of war or other emergency. The Consulates in these areas should be instructed to follow closely the situation and to keep the Department promptly and fully informed of conditions which may directly or indirectly affect the production and shipment of strategic materials from the dependent areas.

(5) Make clear to officials of the Metropolitan Governments that as a corollary to our efforts in strengthening the countries of Western Europe we wish to cooperate with them in the orderly and progressive development of their African dependent territories and in maintaining the present political stability in those areas.

Consular officers stationed in the dependent areas should also be instructed to take similar action with respect to the local colonial officials.

(6) Make every effort to dispel whatever suspicion the Metropolitan Governments might have that our actions are designed to bring about indiscriminate self-government in the African dependent areas.

(7) Encourage the Metropolitan Governments to collaborate with each other in solving problems of mutual concern in Africa.

(8) Continue to encourage and support the administering authorities in their efforts to curb Communist and subversive activities.

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[3] For documentation on the conversations under reference here, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 434 ff.

(9) Endeavor to bring about in the Department and other agencies of the Government a greater realization of the strategic and economic importance of the dependent areas of Africa to the United States.

B. *Economic*

(1) Instruct our offices in the area to be on the alert for violations of our treaty rights (St. Germain-en-Laye and the Trusteeship Agreements) and to make every effort locally to remove or minimize such violations. Unsuccessful efforts should be fully reported to the Department with a view to determining whether representations should be made to the appropriate metropolitan government.

(2) Continue to seek the removal or liberalization of such policies and practices of the colonial governments which discriminate against American trade and investment, and to make representations in instances where they tend to seriously hamper our trade and investment in the African dependent areas.

(3) Inform the appropriate authorities in both the Metropolitan countries and in the D.O.T.'s that restrictive economic and financial policies may give rise to unfavorable public reaction in the U.S., and that a more liberal policy would seem advisable if U.S. financial aid is to be continued.

(4) A realistic appraisal should be made by the Department of Commerce of the possibilities for and obstacles to American investment in the dependent African territories.

(5) Urge the colonial powers to liberalize their investment and exchange control policies in the African territories with a view to encouraging the flow of American investment capital to these areas to aid in their development.

(6) The Department of Commerce should continue its efforts to expand the U.S. market for commodities in which the African dependent areas are actual or potential producers.

(7) Continue to take all necessary steps, with the assistance of the ECA, to assure the continuance of the flow of strategic materials from the dependent areas to the U.S.

(8) Cooperate with the ECA, within the limits of the Point IV–ECA Joint Agreement of September 20, 1950 concerning bilateral technical assistance during fiscal 1951, in developing technical assistance programs for the dependent areas so as to avoid overlapping or duplication of effort, and so as to coordinate such programs with the development plans of the areas in order that they may contribute to the attainment of the broad economic and social objectives of the Metropolitan Governments.

(9) To do everything possible to insure the cordial reception of Point IV assistance in Africa South of the Sahara.

(10) The Department should explore the possibility of having private American philanthropic institutions (e.g., the Rockefeller, Car-

negie and Ford Foundations) assume responsibility for supplying technical assistance to supplement U.S. Government development projects in Africa under the Point IV and ECA programs.

. . . .

D. *Military*

None

E. *Informational and Cultural*

(1) Our information program should endeavor to reach the following groups (listed according to priority):

a. The local administering authorities.
b. The educated African elite.
c. The illiterate and semi-literate Africans.

(2) Endeavor to create in the minds of the officials and literate Africans a better understanding of American culture, techniques, viewpoints and policies. We should also provide both the administrative officials and the Africans with access to informational, educational, and technological facilities which can assist in the task of developing African countries.

(3) Explain more fully our policies with regard to ECA and Point IV as they affect the development of dependent areas, as well as the relations of United States technical assistance to UN programs and objectives in non-self-governing areas.

(4) Allay any suspicions the local authorities may have concerning the informational programs and convince them that our concern for the orderly social, political and economic progress of the peoples of Africa is consistent with our desire for the increased strength and stability of the metropolitan governments, and that any United States Government information program will be carried out only with the prior consultation of the responsible authorities.

(5) Expose, wherever possible, the methods, practices and deceptive propaganda of Communism and describe both clearly and simply the truth about the Soviet-dominated areas of the world, and convince non-Communist fence-sitting elements that they should belong to and actively participate in the true democratic world community.

(6) Correct misconceptions and misrepresentations regarding the United States, planted by Communists in their cold war of vilification of the United States and its so-called "imperialistic motives" regarding Africa.

(7) Work in close cooperation with the local information services. We must, however, maintain our identity and freedom of action.

(8) Explain the nature of United States economic and strategic interests, activities and policies in Africa and indicate ways and

means by which these activities can operate to the mutual advantag of the United States, the various Metropolitan Governments, and the people of these African areas.

(9) Whenever possible we should develop an educational and informational exchange program with Africa—by arranging for visit to the United States of officials, educators, businessmen, and technicians and by assisting American educators, technicians and specialists to go to Africa.

(10) The information program should continue to utilize all the usual informational and cultural media, such as radio, press features, books, magazines, exchange of students and leaders, films and filmstrips, the emphasis varying in each area depending on the political climate. In general, however, films and radio are the best suited for reaching the mass of illiterate Africans while published material is most successful in influencing the two primary groups.

(11) An effort should be made to institute an exchange of students program in the French, Belgian and Portuguese areas and to expand this program in British areas.

F. *Administrative*

(1) A more careful selection of consular officers to serve in Africa should be exercised than in the past.

(2) Whenever possible a Principal Officer assigned to one of the dependent areas should spend a short period of time at the capital of the Metropolitan country, before proceeding to his post, to enable him to become acquainted with officials in the Colonial Office and with officers in our Embassy who are working on colonial problems.

(3) A Principal Officer assigned to the French and Belgian areas should have a fluent knowledge of French.

(4) Whenever practicable, a junior officer, after having served a tour of duty in a dependent area, should be assigned to the American Embassy located in the capital of the Metropolitan Government administering that dependent area. In similar manner, a junior officer having served in the Embassy at the capital of the Metropolitan Government should be assigned to a consular establishment in one of the dependent areas of that country.

(5) Officers stationed in dependent areas in Africa should be encouraged to travel as much as possible within the territory under their jurisdiction.

(6) Consular staffs in the dependent areas in Africa should be augmented in order to meet the increasing demands for information on political, economic and social developments by the Department and other Government agencies and by the US representatives in UN bodies considering problems relating to the dependent areas.

5. COUNTRY LINES OF ACTION—LIBERIA [6]

A. *Political*

(1) Continue to render advice to the Liberian Government, upon request and voluntarily when deemed necessary, to assist it in building a sound democratic government.

(2) Continue to offer guidance to the Liberian Government in its political relations with other states. In this connection, we should continue to make known to other powers, when necessary, our intention to intercede in Liberia's behalf to protect her independence.

(3) Endeavor to bring about in the Department and other agencies of the Government a greater realization of Liberia's political, economic and strategic importance to the United States.

B. *Economic*

(1) Continue to offer our help to further Liberia's economic development in a balanced and orderly manner.

(2) Continue to work for the expansion of the activities of our Economic Mission in order that it can achieve the maximum results in the development of Liberia's natural resources.

(3) While we favor increased private investment and commercial activity in Liberia by Americans, we should strongly impress upon those connected with new ventures the desirability of concentrating on a relatively small number of projects which directly relate to the economic development of Liberia, and are within their capacity to finance and to carry forward to a successful conclusion.

(4) Assist the Liberian Government, in whatever way possible, to build and maintain a sound fiscal structure. The assignment of American financial experts to counsel the Liberians from time to time should be regularly pursued. The training of Liberian fiscal officials in our financial institutions, such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System, should also be encouraged.

(5) Further the development of an effective national health service in Liberia by expanding our Public Health Mission to Liberia, and by making greater efforts to bring Liberian students to the United States for technical training in the field of Public Health.

(6) Assist the Liberian Government in its efforts to improve the present poor state of education throughout Liberia. Increased numbers of American teachers at all levels of instruction should, if possible, be made available to Liberia.

(7) Encourage and assist where possible additional numbers of Liberian students to come to the United States for training.

(8) Emphasize to private American business operating in Liberia the importance of providing larger and better educational facilities

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[6] For additional documentation on the principal policies and problems in relations with Liberia, see pp. 1274 ff.

for the children of their employees. Strong emphasis should be pl
on the need for vocational schools at the sites of industrial operat

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D. *Military*

(1) Assist the Liberian Government in its efforts to correct
shocking condition of its present military force. Our interest
Roberts Field, the newly-constructed Monrovia Port, Liberia's
rubber and high-grade iron ore are ample justifications for assi
Liberia to build an efficient military force for internal security.

(2) In addition to providing Liberia with a small military trai
mission we should endeavor to secure for Liberia small quantiti
military equipment on a grant basis; continue to maintain Ro
Field, presently financed by the Department of the Air Force; pre
any type of activity or construction within the Port of Mon
which would hinder in any way the use of the Port for Naval
poses; and continue to work with Pan American Airways an
Department of the Air Force to reconstruct (macadamize) the
connecting Roberts Field with the Port of Monrovia.

E. *Informational and Cultural*

(1) Explain fully and clearly to the Liberians the nature of A
can cultural activities, and devise ways and means by which the
tivities can operate within the framework of Liberia's indepen
to the mutual advantage of the Liberians and us.

(2) Encourage and assist American private interests engag
educational and scientific activities in coordinating and strength
their programs for development of progressive leadership in Li

(3) Assist the Liberian Government in the screening and sel
of Liberians for study and training in the United States.

(4) Render assistance in selecting responsible and competent A
ican professional personnel for general educational work in Libe

(5) Investigate the feasibility of establishing a compara
strong radio station in Monrovia, for the purpose of expandin
broadcasting activities in West, Central and East Africa.

F. *Administrative*

(1) Continue the new policy of making our staff in Monrovia
representative of the American people, i.e., both Colored and W
personnel.

5. COUNTRY LINES OF ACTION—BRITISH WEST, CENTRAL AND EAST A

A. *Political*

B. *Economic*

(1) Urge Southern Rhodesia to consider the early constructi
a railroad to Lourenco Marques thus providing an alternate rou

the sea for the shipment of strategic minerals from Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia.

C. *Intelligence*

D. *Military*

(1) In consultation with the Department of Defense give consideration to the assignment of a Military Liaison Officer for Intelligence to Accra, Gold Coast.

E. *Informational and Cultural*

F. *Administrative*

(1) Consideration should be given to the assignment of more officers of the Negro race to Consulates in British West Africa in an effort to offset the widespread and growing African criticism of racial practices in the United States and to encourage greater confidence among Africans to discuss matters freely with our Consular officers.

(2) NEA should reconsider its decision regarding the raising of the status of the Consulate at Accra to that of Consulate General.

(3) A separate USIE office should be established at Salisbury to provide for more intensive USIE coverage of British Central Africa which is presently covered from Nairobi.

3. COUNTRY LINES OF ACTION—FRENCH WEST AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA

A. *Political*

B. *Economic*

C. *Intelligence*

D. *Military*

(1) Continue our efforts to obtain the concurrence of the French authorities to the establishment of an Army liaison office at Dakar.

E. *Informational and Cultural*

F. *Administrative*

(1) A consular establishment should be opened at Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

(2) A Consulate General should be opened at Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa.

5. COUNTRY LINES OF ACTION—ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

A. *Political*

(1) Urge the Portuguese, whenever the opportunity arises, to adopt more progressive policies for the political, economic and social advancement of the native inhabitants.

B. *Economic*

(1) Assist in any way possible in the development of the harbor at Lobito, Angola and with the improvement of the railroad running

from Lobito to the Katanga area of the Belgian Congo, thus providing for an alternative outlet for the strategically important minerals of the Congo and Northern Rhodesia.

(2) Continue to stress to the Portuguese the advantages which would accrue to Portugal through an acceleration in the economic development of these colonies.

C. *Intelligence*

D. *Military*

E. *Informational and Cultural*

F. *Administrative*

(1) A USIE clerk should be assigned to Luanda as soon as possible

5. COUNTRY LINES OF ACTION—BELGIAN CONGO AND RUANDA URUNDI

A. *Political*

(1) Urge the Belgians, whenever the opportunity arises, to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the native inhabitants with a view to advancing them along the road to self-government.

B. *Economic*

C. *Intelligence*

D. *Military*

E. *Informational and Cultural*

F. *Administrative*

(1) A Public Affairs Officer should be assigned to Leopoldville as soon as possible, to service the Congo, French Equatorial Africa and Angola.

800.062 ICFTU/1-1651 :Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 16, 1951—5 p. m

Circular 389. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) sending del to West Africa. Main object will be to lay ground for eventual West African Regional Trade Union org to be affiliated with ICFTU. Del expected to leave sometime before end of Jan, probably from London and will split up in two groups. Tentative itinerary is for first group to cover Nigeria and Gold Coast Second group will concentrate on French West Africa, Sierra Leone

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[1] This telegram was sent to the Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia, and to the Consulates in Accra, Gold Coast; Lagos, Nigeria; Leopoldville, Belgian Congo and Dakar, French West Africa. It was drafted by Handley (NEA) and was cleared by Lavallee (AF), Swayzee (E/L), and by the Department of Labor.

Liberia and Gambia. Both groups will meet in Nigeria preparatory to convening in Cameroons in Feb. for regional conference of all West and Central African states. Del will be composed of la Fond (French Force Ouvriere); Dalley (British); Marcos Grant (Sierra Leone); L. White, National Organizer of Navigators and Engineer Officers Union, Great Britain, (representing Internatl Transport Workers Federation); Sercu, (Belgium Textile Union); H. D. Snell, American Negro, Assistant to President, United Transport Service Employees, CIO, (Red Caps Union). Two secretaries, Hood (British TUC internatl department) and Liniger (Swiss) will accompany del.

ICFTU is resolute, anti-Commie internatl trade union org comprising most of world's non-Commie trade unions and with the AFL, CIO and Brit Trade Union Congress as its backbone. View del will try block WFTU attempts gain control trade unions of West Africa, Dept attaches great importance to its Mission and requests you furnish appropriate assistance to del if sought. Since ICFTU is independent internatl trade union org and US rep acting in internatl capacity you shld of course avoid giving impression we are sponsoring or in any way directing activities del. State and Labor Depts expect brief Snell before his departure.

ACHESON

851T.00 R/1-1951 :Despatch

The Consul General at Dakar (Plakias) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL DAKAR, January 19, 1951.

No. 156

Subject: Notes of the Consul General on ECA Inspection Trip to French West Africa, December 6–19, 1950

As the Department is aware, at the invitation of the ECA Mission to France, the Consul General accompanied a four-man ECA inspection party* from December 6 to 19, 1950 over some 5,000 kilometers of their trip through French West Africa. The principal points of interest visited included the capital and principal port of French Guinea, Conakry, its environs and a trip inland by rail to Kindia and return by road; the new port of Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast, with side trips to Dabou, the ports of Bouet and Grande Bassam; Bobo-Dioulasso in Upper Volta from where we motored through Koutiala to Segou for a visit to the Office of the Niger. We returned to Dakar through Bamako, the capital of the Soudan. In effect, the trip described a circle which took us from Dakar southwest to French Guinea and the Ivory Coast, North to Upper Volta and the Soudan, and Westward to Dakar.

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*The ECA party was composed of Messrs Gordon, Head of Mission, and Saxe of ECA/F, and Messrs Clemens and Hendricks of OSR. There were attached to the group Mr. Combier, of the Ministère d'Outre Mer in Paris, Mr. Bolle, Diplomatic Counselor to the High Commissioner of French West Africa, and the Consul General. [Footnote in the source text.]

Commercial air transport was used between distant points such as Conakry, Abidjan, Bobo-Dioulasso, and from Bamako to Dakar; while the shorter distances, side trips and local visits were often effected by American pick-up trucks.

The ECA aspects of the trip were interesting and instructive but as the ECA group will submit a report on these phases, this occasion was taken by the Consul General to pay particular attention, during the brief and cursory visits, to the following points:

1) Gain a general impression of the area visited,
2) Establish contact with the governors and ranking officials in the territories, and
3) The political scene.

I *General Impressions*

The newcomer on a short visit cannot fail to be impressed by the vastness of French West Africa; the distances between population centers; the primitiveness of the bulk of the native population; the variety of areas, ranging from the desert brush to tropical forests and vegetation; and the amount of effort, time and investment which it will take to develop this area in a material sense. FWA is, and for some time to come will continue to be, an area dependent upon agriculture. Mineral resources discovered to date are limited. Water power is generally at a distance from points of use and requires development; and the distances and terrain make transport an ever-present problem.

Despite these handicaps, developmental projects are in evidence, plans are being implemented and FWA is on the march. The present emphasis is, for the most part, on agricultural development and improvement of cultivation methods; the enlarging of certain ports such as Dakar, Conakry and Abidjan; road building; and the development of some mineral resources such as iron and bauxite in French Guinea. Progress is being made, though at times slowly, but then the financial and material resources and skilled manpower are also limited, and the physical and climatic difficulties are great. It will also be recalled that the beginning of the development of French West Africa dates from only the turn of the century, and that in 1946 the status of French West Africa changed from a colony to that of a member of the French Union with the rights of French citizenship conferred on the native African. Political consciousness is therefore scarcely five years old, and the rights, privileges and responsibilities which citizenship entail are new to the African people.

Building was in evidence in all the capitals visited and the number of schools and public buildings under construction was impressive.

II *Contacts Established*

This trip gave the Consul General an opportunity to meet the governors of three territories, the ranking members of their cabinets and services, and to meet the directors and other officials of governmental and private organizations which are responsible for much of the important administrative and developmental work which is taking place in the territories visited. These personal contacts can but lead to better understanding and valuable sources of information with which to follow the development, progress and events in French West Africa.

III *Political Scene*

In each capital occasion was taken to have private visits with the respective governors and/or their chief subordinates for discussions of the political situation in their territories. Specific questions were raised on the importance, activity and danger of Communism which in French West Africa is carried on primarily through the RDA Party. In general it can be stated that all officials with whom these questions were discussed reported that the political scene was quiet. The RDA is said to have been losing members and strength for some time. The governors of Guinea, Ivory Coast and the Soudan indicated that in their territories the situation was under control; but that they were maintaining a careful watch over developments. They were unprepared to express opinions as to the manner in which the publicly announced disassociation of the RDA with the Communist Party in France would affect the local political scene, or whether this break was real or a political manoeuver. The situation as to the *rapprochement* between the RDA and the IOM was too fluid and uncertain to be judged, with no definite results having as yet become evident.

The distinct impression was gained that the governors are alive to the danger of Communism and are prepared to deal with the situation. Their efforts and manipulations appear to have been effective in reducing the predominance of the RDA in their territories in the last two years. While their methods have varied somewhat they have, in the main, encouraged opposition parties to the RDA which have shown membership gains and grown in importance and activity.

In summary, the political scene is quiet, with the authorities watchful and prepared to institute counter-measures to combat Communist activities.

The net influence of Communism in the territories visited appears to have decreased in the last year and Communist activity is quiescent.

The travel and other arrangements made by the French West African and the Territorial Governments for the group to inspect points of interest were on the whole well done and permitted the group to see the maximum in the limited time at their disposal at each place. The receptions accorded us everywhere were cordial and every effort was made for the comfort and convenience of the party, within the means available to the local authorities.

From the standpoint of this Consulate General, it was most useful for the Consul General to have the opportunity to visit and obtain first-hand knowledge of a part of the vast territory which is included in this Consular district. It was of great benefit to have the occasion to meet personally the governors and ranking officials in the areas which were visited. There is no question that more frequent and personal contacts should be effected between officers of this Consulate General and the governors and officials in the territories within its jurisdiction.

JOHN N. PLAKIAS

870.00 TA/2-1451

Mary McLeod Bethune of the National Council of Negro Women to the Acting Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East African Affairs (Sims)[1]

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SIMS: I would like to suggest to you that a small commission be established to study the participation of Liberia and Nigeria in the Point Four program—to look into the condition of the women and children of these areas.

I would like to see, in that commission, a person of some vision—who could readily visualize what is needed; a person of humane experience who would know what to look for in order to point up situations needing adjustment—expansion, correction or elimination—in the program now being administered.

With the view of stimulating the participation of women and children, and the development of their possibilities, commission personnel would need, of course, to work very diplomatically and with insight and understanding, with the native governments, themselves, evaluating their policies and concepts for our own information, and offering helpful but unobtrusive suggestion where the time and place seemed propitious. Such friendly and informal contacts should enable us to discover how our own government may help to strengthen the efforts of these native governments.

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[1] This letter was prepared on the stationery of the National Council of Negro Women, Inc., 1318 Vermont Avenue, Washington, D.C.

There would need to be a real spirit of inspiration given out through the commission—a spirit of real friendship and real kinship. With the kind of discovery and interpretation that should result from the work of such a commission, we feel that we can greatly strengthen our own government in its vigorous program among the African people, by returning to this country and dramatizing significant findings, with due regard for the restraints of security and diplomacy.

In order to do this, a group of possibly three people would be needed; one who has had experience and has vision and the confidence of the mass of the American people, and spiritual understanding and undergirding that will find its way through to the bottom levels of the peoples in the countries visited; a second member of the commission should be a good writer and research person who knows the important from the unimportant and who could set up the commission's findings fully and clearly, and with the accurate interpretation and documentation that is needed; there should also be, attached to the commission, a good photographer to provide skillful pictorial documentation that would give life and vigor to the findings.

Now, Mr. Sims, I may be dreaming, but I have always been a great dreamer, whose dreams have, fortunately, materialized in constructive ways. It may be that they develop into useful action because they have, as their goal, the opportunities through which all mankind may live a fuller life.

If my country, because of my record, could use me, some time, in such a capacity, I should be very happy to serve.[2]

Sincerely yours,

Mary McLeod Bethune
Founder, President-Emeritus
National Council of Negro Women
Founder, President-Emeritus
Bethune-Cookman College

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[2] In a letter of March 12, Director of the Office of African Affairs Bourgerie replied to Mrs. Bethune as follows:

"Mr. Sims of my office has brought your letter addressed to him on February 14 to my attention. I have purposely delayed replying to your letter until such time as I could consult with the various Officers here in the Department concerning your proposal to send a commission to Africa to appraise the assistance which we are rendering to certain African territories under the Point Four Program.

"It is the consensus here in the Department that it would not be wise to send such a commission to Africa at this time, due to the fact that the Point Four Program is not sufficiently advanced to determine its benefits to the African peoples. I believe you will agree that it would be better to wait until such time as the Program has had an opportunity to achieve some concrete results before consideration is given to a commission of the type which you suggest.

"However, please be assured that we appreciate the ideas which you have advanced and we will be glad to consider them at a later date." (870.00 TA/2-1451)

870.00 TA/3-2051 : Despatch

The Attaché at the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Tibbetts) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, March 20, 1951.

No. 4456

Subject: Recommendations of the Recent Session of the CCTA (Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara).

An officer of the Embassy has been given a summary of the recommendations adopted at the recent session of the CCTA which was held in Lisbon during the end of January.[2] The recommendations have not yet been approved by any of the member Governments of the Commission nor by the Colonial Office. It is necessary, therefore, that the fact that the Embassy has been informed of the nature of these recommendations be held in strict confidence.

Of particular interest were the recommendations on the following points:

1. *Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara.* The Commission recommended that a meeting should be convened in London of representatives of the Governments who sponsored the establishment of the Scientific Council for Africa to discuss the form and content of the instrument establishing the Council and to clarify the relationship between the Council and the Commission. It was suggested that this meeting should also consider the question of correspondence by the Scientific Council with other organizations and agencies and with the United States Scientific Attaché in South Africa, when appointed.

2. *Inter-African Labor Bureau.* It was noted that the member Governments agreed in principle to the establishment under the auspices of the CCTA of an Inter-African Labor Bureau. A working party of representatives of member Governments is to meet in London next week to draw up proposals for terms of reference, budget and location of the bureau.

3. *African region of the World Health Organization.* The Commission recommended that the South African Government be invited to instruct its representatives at the World Health Assembly to be guided in discussion concerning the establishment of an African Regional Office by a memorandum, the text of which is enclosed.[3]

4. *Inter-African Malaria Bureau.* Note was taken of a proposal by the French Delegation for the establishment of a Malaria Bureau. The appointment of a working party to draw up detailed proposals is to be considered by the member Governments. In this connection a sug-

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[1] This despatch was approved by First Secretary of Embassy William C. Trimble.

[2] In January 1950 the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Portugal, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia agreed to establish a Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA).

[3] The enclosed memorandum is not printed here.

gestion of the Portuguese delegation for the establishment of an African Health Bureau under which would be grouped the present and future activities of the Commission relating to trypanosomiasis, malaria and other endemic diseases was also noted by the Commission and the Portuguese delegation was invited to elaborate its suggestions in a memorandum for future consideration.

5. The adoption of a unified procedure in connection with the submission and examination of the budgets of the technical bureaus was recommended. (The Foreign Office states that throughout the entire meeting the United Kingdom pressed consistently for economy in each technical bureau.)

6. The draft budget of the permanent Inter-African Bureau for tsetse and the trypanosomiasis was considered and suggestions made for a reduction. The need for economy was stressed by all delegations except the Belgian and French delegations who expressed doubts as to whether the Bureau would be able to function usefully if further reductions were made in its establishment. The next session of the Commission is to consider a statement showing the effects on the functions and operations of the Bureau of possible further reductions in the present budget of 1,650,000 francs (Belgian).

There is also enclosed a copy of the report by the Transport Committee to the CCTA on the question of continuing collaboration among the Governments concerned in the field of inland transport in Central and Southern Africa.[4] It will be noted that the Transport Committee recommends a further transport conference in about two years time and the establishment of a Secretariat charged with preparing the work of the next conference. It will be further noted that Mr. Marshall Clarke, the Secretary General of the existing interim organization, is to be invited to be Secretary General of the new Secretariat. The Foreign Office doubts, however, whether Mr. Clarke will be willing to accept this post since the new Secretariat has very limited powers.

The discussion on the question of Italian-Ethiopian-Liberian membership was not incorporated in the records of the conference since if any of these Governments ever does become a member it would be highly embarrassing for their representatives to read the minutes of the discussion which preceded their joining the Commission. As the Department has already been informed, no progress was made towards inviting any of these Governments to become members of the Commission.[5]

MARGARET JOY TIBBETTS

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[4] The enclosed report under reference here is not printed.

[5] In despatch 3804, February 14, from London, Attaché Tibbetts reported having been given a hurried report on the recent meeting of the CCTA by an official of the African Department of the British Foreign Office. Tibbetts was informed that no progress was made at the meeting towards getting Liberia, Ethiopia, or Italy into the CCTA. The British would not agree to Italian membership with Ethiopia, and the other members, particularly South Africa, would not consent to Ethiopia joining. (870.00/2-1451)

751T.00/4-2351

The Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to William D. Moreland, Consul in the Consulate General at Dakar[1]

SECRET OFFICIAL WASHINGTON, April 23, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. MORELAND: In pursuance of our responsibility for maintaining and building sound relations with Africa, we have been engaged in a study to determine what additional assistance might be rendered by your office to help keep us currently informed on general conditions in French West Africa, which, in the event of war, will help to guide us in creating or altering our policy toward FWA. In embarking upon this approach we would like to pass on to you our concept of Africa's position in the present world picture, and submit some suggestions for reporting on local conditions which govern the economic progress and political stability of your district.

Africa today is fundamentally identified economically and politically with the Free World Democracies—countries aligned against Communism. As a member country of this bloc, our immediate and long-range policy is *how* may we perpetuate this fundamental relationship and prevent any deterioration thereof which would lead to a conflict between the African peoples and the Free World, be it ideological or physical. It is imperative that the individual and collective efforts of the anti-Communist countries be so organized as to insure that Africa will remain firmly fixed in the political orbit of the Free World.

Today, the American people, particularly responsible officials of Government and industry, have a greater appreciation of Africa than at any time in our history. The American public is becoming increasingly aware that Africa provides a sizable proportion of the critical commodities now required by the Free World, including such products as uranium, copper, chrome, cobalt, manganese, iron ore, tin, industrial diamonds, bauxite, asbestos, rubber, fats and oils, sisal, hides, and hardwoods. As a result of the last war, more Americans than ever before now realize the strategic military importance of Africa to the Free World. Africa's geographic position in relation to Europe and the Near East and in relation to the Americas and Southern Asia places it in the category of one of the most important strategic areas in the world. Because of its geographic relation to European and Near Eastern defense, the North Africa region is militarily the most important of the African areas. The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area, the

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[1] This letter was drafted by Harold Sims, Acting Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East African Affairs. Identical letters, *mutatis mutandis*, were sent to Consul General Angus Ward at Nairobi, Kenya (611.70/4-2351), Consul General A. W. Childs at Lagos, Nigeria (745H.00/4-2351), Consul Hyman Bloom at Accra, Gold Coast, West Africa. (611.45K/4-2351)

East Africa Zone, the southern tip of the continent and the West Africa bulge above the Gulf of Guinea each bear an important relationship to vital transportation and supply routes and systems of defense. Each of these regions also serves as a shield for the protection of the inland area where the bulk of the strategic commodities are produced.

The European Colonial Governments, as you so well know, regard their African territories as essential to their military security, economic well-being and political position in the world community. Since these Governments have lost most of their Asiatic possessions, Africa is more important to them than ever before. Three-fourths of Africa's inhabitants are under their control, while the sovereign countries of Africa are largely dependent upon Western Europe and the United States for their security and advancement.

No one should doubt for a moment that the Soviet directorate is unaware of the importance of Africa to the Free World. Since an aggressor usually gains advantages by initiative, we must constantly be on the lookout for the Soviets to accelerate their efforts to weaken Free World prestige and control in Africa, with the objective of ultimately including African territories and countries in the Soviet bloc. We must never forget that the anti-colonial feeling in certain African territories constitutes a formidable problem for the Free World because all of the Colonial Governments are aligned on the side of the Free World. Such a condition facilitates rather than militates against Soviet encroachment. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that the Colonial Governments exert efforts greater than heretofore to weld a loyal link between the African peoples and themselves. Our own position in this vitally important matter, stemming from our leadership role in the Free World, must be one of encouragement. This encouragement must not be in the sense of weak or strong support of African Nationalist aspirations, but encouragement in the sense of convincing both colonial and native that the road to survival is one of well-balanced economic and political development with emphasis on the rights and privileges due the dignity of man. It is the defects in the last condition governing rights and privileges which the Soviets have exploited so successfully in other world areas. In our opinion the challenge that faces the Free World in Africa is what can be done to insure the unwavering loyalty of the African to the cause of Freedom as we perceive it.

Proceeding on the premise that it may not be possible to avert a general war with Russia, we would like for you to submit a report which would serve as a synthesis of the current economic, social and political conditions in your district. Such a report should not be voluminous, but should contain pertinent data sufficient in detail to enable the Department to have ready access to reliable information on the most salient economic, social and political features of the FWA.

This report should in no way supplant the schedule of required reports established for your office. The following outline is offered as guidance for points of focus in preparing a current synopsis on the economic, social and political conditions in your district, with emphasis on measures which would help to create African loyalty toward the Free World. We know that you have already submitted reports on some of the topics listed below, and in preparing your synthesis you may refer to such reports or preferably give a brief summary of the report.

Economic

An assessment of the French West Africa's economic war potential such as:

a) best estimates of mineral resources
b) best estimates of timber resources
c) best estimates of industrial capacity
d) agricultural development, both for food and industrial use
e) hydro-electric development
f) transport facilities—lines of communication

Basic reporting on individual products should be continued, and if at all possible should be accelerated. But what we have in mind when we speak of assessment is a concise report or series of reports showing the best estimates of FWA's resources, with the Consulate General's own description of specific difficulties and problems now prevalent against expanding present mineral, agricultural and industrial production. For example, what conditions facilitate or hinder the supply and training of labor? Are the food requirements adequate for native consumers? Are consumer goods an important factor in increasing native production? What is the attitude of the local government and private companies toward FWA's economic war potentials? Both official and private industry opinions are highly important. Does the major portion of local official opinion follow the Home Government's present attitude toward economic development? If not, what are the principal differences?

Social

What is the French Government's present policy toward improving social conditions of the natives?

a) Trends toward urbanization, detribalization and the assimilation by Africans of Western living standards.

b) To what degree is social unrest accentuated by adoption of Western living standards?

c) Describe efforts, if any, being made by both the French West African Government and private enterprises to improve housing in urban and industrial centers.

d) What is being done to meet the health, recreation and welfare needs of enlarged urban and industrial populations? What could be done?

e) How can the social unrest normally attendant upon the dislocation and mobility of native populations be offset or contained?

f) Are local government and private enterprise leaders alert to the possibility of riots and disturbances arising out of labor difficulties, such as detribalization and increased contacts and competition among ethnic and racial groups?

g) Based on the best local advice, both official and private, what measures and procedures would be best to cope with ill-adjusted social conditions?

Political

An analysis of present political conditions with emphasis on issues likely to be created by a war situation.

a) Description of present political policies as practiced by the French Government in FWA.

b) What is the present political mood of the urban and rural African in FWA?

c) Description of local parties and movements, with biographic sketch and your best appraisal of leaders.

d) What would be the impact on the local government and the native population if France were overrun by an enemy?

e) Description of subversive activities or potentially subversive individuals, organizations, or movements.

f) What is Soviet influence, if any on native or European groups?

As stated at the outset of this letter, the foregoing are only suggestive subjects. If you so desire you may revise the outline to conform more appropriately with conditions peculiar to your district. If, in your opinion, a subject warrants extensive treatment, you may find it desirable to handle it as a separate report.

The formulation of a sensible policy toward your district can be done only in conjunction with your assessments and appraisals. With or without a general war, our main objective in FWA is to secure the maximum use of its resources and keep the territory firmly within the political orbit of the Free World.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

E. H. Bourgerie

870.062/4-3051

Memorandum by the Acting Labor Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Handley), to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1951.

The following is a summary of a memorandum (attached) I prepared on a meeting held with Mr. Harold Snell, Assistant to the President, United Transportation Service Employees, CIO, about his observations as a member of the ICFTU West African Mission:[2]

1. The trade unions in West Africa are in general weak and immature. With assistance from the ICFTU, however, they can become very important factors in West African affairs.

2. The British have done the best job in encouraging trade union development. This was particularly true in Nigeria where the trade unions were the most promising of all in West Africa. British labor officers, taken from the British trade union movement and working through the various labor departments, were actively assisting the infant trade union movement.

3. In the Belgian Congo, only Europeans were at present permitted to establish trade unions. Despite this, the Belgian Socialist trade unions were planning to carry out an organizational drive among native workers. The Belgian Government, while strongly opposed to native trade union organization, was at the same time carrying out and fostering commendable social schemes, particularly in the way of workers' housing.

4. Trade union development in the French territories were along ideological and religious lines, similar to those followed in metro-

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[1] This memorandum was also addressed and seen by Deputy Assistant Secretary Berry and African Affairs Director Bourgerie. The source text bears McGhee's handwritten notation "Good—thanks—GCM."

[2] The five-page memorandum attached to the source text is not printed. Paragraph one of that memorandum read as follows:

"A meeting was held on Friday, April 13, 1951, in the NEA Conference Room to hear from Harold D. Snell, Assistant to the President, United Transport Service Employees, CIO, about his experiences and observations on his trip to West Africa as an American member on the ICTFU Mission. Representatives from NEA, NEA/P, AF, E, P, UND, DRN, ECA, and the Labor Department were present. Mr. Snell first of all traced the itinerary of the ICFTU Mission through West Africa. The Mission, which was divided into two groups, traveled through French West Africa, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa, and the Belgian Congo. The two groups rejoined each other, and together with representatives from the countries visited, held a regional trade union conference in Douala, French Cameroons, from March 5 to March 7. This conference, the first of its kind ever held in Africa, was considered by Mr. Snell to have been a success. Based on it he had every hope that the ICFTU Executive Committee would approve the idea of establishing a regional center for West Africa. The locus of this center was undetermined at the moment, however, and would be left to the judgment of the Executive Committee."

Regarding the ICFTU mission to West Africa, see also the circular telegram of January 16, p. 1210.

politan France. The communist-controlled CGT was the strongest and was probably doing the best job.

5. There were no trade unions in Liberia. Wages paid by Firestone were, with the exception of the French Cameroons, the lowest paid in Africa, beginning at 25 cents a day. Firestone was, however, carrying out very elaborate social programs. There was no device whereby Firestone workers could discuss their grievances or working conditions with management. In view of the belief in West Africa that Liberia was an American colony, he recommended that the United States Government exert its influence on Firestone and the Liberian Government to raise wages and permit trade union organization.

6. He had high hopes that the influence of the WFTU in West Africa, although strong, could be dissipated by the ICFTU. He thought that West Africa offered a unique opportunity for the ICFTU to take the initiative.

7. The USIS program has been good but could be made more effective if greater contact were made with African intellectuals and trade union leaders.

8. Our diplomatic and consular people were not circulating sufficiently among Africans.

9. He was strongly critical of the invitation that had been extended to Mr. Couzens, the Commissioner of Labor in Nigeria and a British civil servant, to visit the United States on a leader specialist grant.

10. He recommended that a small, carefully designed program to bring prominent West African trade unionists to the United States be developed.

11. He recommended that, as a minimum, the United States station a labor attaché in Lagos, with regional coverage, and preferably assign labor reporting officers at Dakar and Accra as well.

Editorial Note

In an address delivered on June 27 before the Institute on Contemporary Africa at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, discussed Africa's role in the "free world." McGhee spoke of the Communist threat to Africa, the preparations for self-government by African peoples, recent political developments in British West Africa, economic development programs sponsored by the European powers, Economic Cooperation Administration aid to the African dependencies, and American assistance through the Point Four program. McGhee said in part:

"Immediate independence is, however, not the cure for all colonial problems. The United States Government has always maintained that premature independence for primitive, uneducated peoples can do them more harm than good and subject them to an exploitation by indigenous leaders, unrestrained by the civil standards that come with widespread education, that can be just as ruthless as that of aliens. Also, giving full independence to peoples unprepared to meet aggression or subversion can endanger not only the peoples themselves but the security of the free world.

"It is, however, the traditional policy of the United States to support orderly movements toward self-government. We have followed with interest, therefore, the efforts of the various European governments over the years to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the peoples in African territories and the spread of genuine African nationalism. African nationalism derives in part from the acute nationalism prevalent in other parts of the world and, in part, is a reaction to foreign propaganda against colonialism. It is also derived, however, from an emerging belief that Africans as such must stand together."

For the full text of McGhee's address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 16, 1951, pages 97–101.

770.5/7–1151

The Ambassador of the Union of South Africa (Jooste) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, 11th July, 1951.

The Ambassador of the Union of South Africa presents his compliments to the Honourable the Secretary of State and has the honour, by direction, to inform him of the following.

In the event that the security of the African Continent is threatened by aggression from the North, it will be necessary to move troops and military supplies on the lines of communication between the Middle East and the south of Africa. During the late war certain difficulties arose over such movement and it is therefore most desirable to ensure that in any future emergency the facilities for the movement of troops and military supplies throughout that area are kept at the highest level of efficiency and that any unnecessary obstacles are eliminated. With this object in view, the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Government of the United Kingdom believe that it would be of value to take steps now to facilitate communications in time of war between the following states and territories situated in or near the east and central parts of the continent:—

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[1] This note was delivered at the Department of State on July 11 by South African Embassy Counselor Basil Jarvie. Jarvie, accompanied by British Embassy First Secretary R. H. Belcher, called upon Messrs. Raynor and Shullaw of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs to extend an invitation on behalf of their governments for the United States to be represented in an observer capacity at the forthcoming African Defence Facilities Conference at Nairobi. Jarvie, who confined himself to a discussion of arrangements for the conference, indicated that the United States was the only country invited to send an observer to the conference. (Memorandum of conversation by Raynor, July 11, 1951: 770.5/7–1151) The text of the invitation to governments participating in the conference was sent to the Embassy in the United Kingdom under cover of a brief explanatory *aide-mémoire* from the South African High Commissioner in London on July 10; copies of those documents were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch 190, July 11, from London. (770.5/7–1151)

In a note dated July 17, the Secretary of State informed the South African Ambassador that the United States accepted the invitation to attend the conference scheduled to be held at Nairobi (770.5/7–1151).

Regarding the conference, see the editorial note, p. 1227; and telegram 14, August 25, from Nairobi, p. 1228.

South Africa
Egypt
Ethiopia
Southern Rhodesia
The Sudan
French Somaliland
French Equatorial Africa
Madagascar
Angola
Mozambique
Belgian Congo
Somalia
Northern Rhodesia
Nyasaland
Tanganyika
Kenya
Uganda
Zanzibar
Somaliland Protectorate

The Governments of the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom have therefore decided jointly to convene a conference of African Powers, which, they believe, will share the view that the closest understanding should exist between them regarding the practical problems involved in the movement of military forces and supplies in the circumstances visualised. They propose that the conference should be known as the "African Defence Facilities Conference" and that through the hospitality of the Government of Kenya it should be held in Nairobi, beginning on the 20th August, 1951.

The Governments of the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom have considered in detail the problems which might arise in the event of war and they have prepared the attached list of subjects which they propose should form the agenda of the conference. As will be seen, most of the subjects listed are predominantly technical and such as to give rise to problems largely of a practical nature, and will be of equal interest to the civil and military authorities of the Governments and Administrations concerned. The purpose of the conference will be to secure agreement in principle on the matters under discussion, leaving the detailed implementation of its recommendations to be worked out later by the authorities of the various countries concerned.

The Governments of the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom have pleasure in extending an invitation to the United States Government to send an observer, or observers, to the proposed conference, to which they are jointly inviting the Governments concerned.

The two Governments feel that the conference, if successful, will make an important contribution to the security of the African continent.

If the United States Government wish to send an observer, or observers, to the conference, the Governments of the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom would be glad to be informed as soon as possible in order to enable accommodation arrangements to be made in good time. Owing to the restricted nature of the accommodation available at Nairobi, the participants are being requested that the number of delegates and advisers be kept as small as possible.

[Enclosure]

AGENDA

CONFERENCE ON DEFENCE FACILITIES IN AFRICA

1. *Movement of Service Personnel*
    - (*a*) Acceptance of Military Identity Cards and Movement Orders in place of passports and visas.
    - (*b*) Standardisation of Health Certificates, inoculation Regulations, etc.
    - (*c*) Customs facilities for service personnel in uniform.
    - (*d*) Wearing of Uniform.
    - (*e*) Wearing of Arms.
    - (*f*) Liaison between Movement Staffs.

2. *Movement of Military Stores*
    - (*a*) Definition of "Military Stores".
    - (*b*) Rail priorities.
    - (*c*) Customs: Clearance facilities, etc.
    - (*d*) Guarding in transit.
    - (*e*) Regulations for special categories, e.g. explosives, arms, ammunition, etc.

3. *Transportation etc. of Service Personnel and Supplies*
    - (*a*) Registration of military vehicles (exemption from triptyques, etc.)
    - (*b*) Driving Licenses.
    - (*c*) Customs franchise for military stores, etc.
    - (*d*) Recovery and repair facilities.
    - (*e*) Use of Inland Waterways.

4. *Road and Rail Transport* (*General*)
    - (*a*) Use of road and rail facilities.
    - (*b*) Maintenance of roads.

5. *Ai[illegible] Transport*
    - ([illegible]irfield facilities for military aircraft.
    - ([illegible]nding and Navigational Aids.
    - ([illegible]ilities for continued operation of civil aircraft.

[6.] A. *Merchant Shipping*

- (*a*) Use of harbours and anchorages.
- (*b*) Normal Navigational Facilities—
  - (i) Lightships and Lighthouses.
  - (ii) Buoys.
  - (iii) Pilots.
  - (iv) Radar Aids.
- (*c*) Tug and Lighter Facilities.
- (*d*) Ships' Supplies—Watering, Bunkering, Ships' Stores, etc.
- (*e*) Repair Facilities.
- (*f*) Shore Facilities—Living accommodation and storage.
- (*g*) Medical and Hospital Facilities.
- (*h*) Recruitment of Crew.
- (*i*) Salvage.

B. *Naval Vessels*

Facilities for Naval Vessels—on the lines of "A" above.

7. *Meteorological Services*

8. *Telecommunications*

- (*a*) Telecommunications (Telegraph, Telephones, Cables, Wireless).
- (*b*) Use of Codes.
- (*c*) Common Signalling Procedure.

9. *Protection From Sabotage*

- (*a*) Land installations, Living Accommodation and Stores.
- (*b*) Aerodromes, Ports and Telecommunications.

10. *Liaison With International Bodies*

11. *Miscellaneous*

- (*a*) Mail Facilities for—
  - (i) Service Personnel.
  - (ii) Official Correspondence.
  - (iii) Gifts and Comforts—Service Personnel.
- (*b*) Accommodation—Service Personnel and stores.

12. *Control of Movement of Non-service Personnel*

- (*a*) Refugees.
- (*b*) Civilians travelling on defence or other vital business.

Editorial Note

Representatives of the Governments and African administrations of Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom met in Nairobi, Kenya, August 21–31, for the African Defence Facilities Conference. The Conference, convened by the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom, sought to reach agreement in principle on the facilities required for the movement of troops and supplies on the lines of communications between the south of Africa and the Middle East in time of war or emergency. The United States accepted an invitation to send observers to the Conference (see note of July 11 from Ambassador Jooste to the Secretary of State, page 1224). The United States observers were Angus Ward, Consul General at Nairobi; Colonel John J. Davis, Army Attaché at the Embassy in South Africa; and Colonel Edwin A. Bland, Air Attaché at the Embassy in South Africa. Egypt declined an invitation to participate in the Conference, presumably because Egypt was not prepared to participate in any conference with the United Kingdom unless British troops were withdrawn from Egyptian soil. For Consul General Ward's report on the opening session of the Conference on August 21, see telegram 14, August 25, from Nairobi, *infra*. Ward's 12-page despatch 69, September 5, from Nairobi constituted a summary account of the work of the Conference and its Land Transport, Steering, and Sea Transport Committees which Ward observed. (770.5/9–551) Ward assumed that Colonels Davis and Bland would report to the Department of Defense on the work of the other Committees (Air Transport, Telecommunications and Mail Facilities, and Movement of Personnel and Supplies). Copies of the official Report of the African Defence Facilities Conference, document ADF(51) 13, August 30, 1951, and the attached recommendations of the six Conference Committees, comprising 26 pages in the source text, were transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 68, September 3, from Nairobi. (770.5/9–351) A copy of the official report was formally delivered to the Department of State under cover of a note of November 19 from South African Ambassador Jooste to the Acting Secretary of State. (770.5/11–1951)

Joint Weeka No. 10, September 7 from Pretoria, reported that the Nairobi Conference ended with all the participating countries in unanimous agreement on the points discussed. The Conference's recommendations were to be put before the various participating governments for approval and implementation. The facilities for implementation were to be discussed at a subsequent conference. South African Defense Minister Erasmus expressed high hopes for the future of Africa through the conference, and he informed the American attachés who served as observers at the conference that he was most pleased with progress and results reached. (745A.00(W)/9–751)

770.5/8–2551 : Telegram

The Consul General at Nairobi (Ward) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NAIROBI, August 25, 1951—8 a. m.

14. Pass to Defense. From Ward, Bland and Davis. African defense facilities conf opened formally August 21.[1] At instance Portuguese,

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[1] Regarding the Conference under reference, see the editorial note, *supra*.

acts limited to making recommendations to respective govts. Scope limited to need for interchange info on existing and projected transportation and telecommunication facilities and to principles governing reciprocal use these facilities for northward movement supplies and personnel in time of war. Adjournment on or before September 1 possible.

Belgians realistic regarding possibility military need these facilities, but passive except in air transport and telecommunications.

Ethiopians completely passive and mute.

French realistic like Belgians and constantly advocate suppression all other considerations in time war to that of furthering war effort. Are somewhat active in sea transport affecting Madagascar, and more active in land and air transport, and telecommunications on African continent. They indicate anticipation that any unrealistic Nairobi recommendations on use African facilities may and probably will be set aside in time war by major power decisions at high level.

Italians passive other than in movement of supplies and personnel, and occasionally infer NATO and other high level bodies will in end establish principles governing use African facilities.

Portuguese strongly indicate anticipation their belligerency or benevolent neutrality in case war. They anticipate slight wartime use by selves of their African facilities but extensive use these facilities by other powers. They are exerting every effort to avoid escapable financial obligations and to obviate economic disturbance by others. They evidently want no foreign troops or avoidable foreign installations in their African dependencies and repeatedly indicate expectation full compensation for use their facilities, etc., by others.

Southern Rhodesians not subservient to either South Africa [or] UK.

They indicate aversion having their civil administration or internal economy domineered by military in time war. Beyond any wartime manpower obligation, they anticipate their primary wartime role being that of supplier raw materials and of transit channels of troops and military supplies.

East Africans and Northern Rhodesians are integral part of UK delegation in thinking and actions. UK actively interested in having all seaports, anchorages and airports being made reciprocally available on most favorable basis. UK constantly endeavors take safeguards looking toward minimum disturbance trade and internal economy by wartime activities. There has been almost complete reciprocal support between UK and SA.

South Africans are prime mover in conference and use every opportunity to influence it toward facilitating northward movement their troops and supplies with maximum cooperation by others. They vigorously oppose any attempt by others to bring mention of NATO agreements into discussions. [Ward, Bland, and Davis.]

WARD

870.00R/9-1051 : Despatch

The Consul at Salisbury (Roberts) to the Department of State

RESTRICTED SALISBURY, September 10, 1951.

No. 43

Subject: Local Attitudes and Reactions to ECA Aid Programs in Central Africa.

ECA aid to Central Africa has been limited to the following principal projects: £5,000,000 loan to the United Kingdom and Government of Southern Rhodesia from counterpart funds for purchase of additional rolling stock and equipment for the Rhodesia Railways; £3,000,000 loan to the Chibuluma Mines Ltd. to develop high grade copper-cobalt ore deposit near Kitwe; £500,000 grant to the Northern Rhodesia Government to improve the Great North Road from Broken Hill to Tunduma. Aid in smaller amounts has been granted for technical assistance programs in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and to Rhodesian Copper Ventures Ltd. for exploratory work in the newly discovered Southern Rhodesia copper fields.

The communiqués announcing the three major projects were published in the two leading Southern Rhodesian newspapers, "The Rhodesia Herald" and "The Bulawayo Chronicle", which reach the greater part of the European population in the three Central African territories, and also reach the greater part of the native population which has sufficient education and understanding to appreciate what ECA aid is. Publicity to these projects was also given in smaller newspapers and journals and over Radio Salisbury.

In general the announcement that these funds were being made available for development purposes was well received; however, there has been some criticism of the use of funds from the United States for development purposes. Despatch No. 271, May 23, 1951 [1] enclosed an editorial from the *Rhodesia Herald*, May 22, 1951, which commented on the announcement that OEEC was preparing a ten-year development program for British, French, Belgian and Portuguese territories in Africa. It frankly states that with the lack of understanding of the situation in Africa by those living outside Africa and the strings that will more than likely be attached to any dollar loan, a country such as Southern Rhodesia might be compelled to think twice before accepting it.

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[1] Not printed.

Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, and the Hon. G. A. Davenport, Southern Rhodesia Minister for Mines and Transport, have both commented on the strings or conditions attached to American loans, especially for Railway development. Because of these strings a proposed ECA Railway survey in Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa was cancelled and the two Governments have employed an independent United States engineering firm to make the required survey.

There is enclosed [2] an editorial published in the *Rhodesia Herald* of July 21, 1951 with respect to obtaining the necessary money to proceed with the Kariba Gorge hydro-electric project. The editorial quotes Mr. Whitehead, Minister of Finance, as saying: "It would be sad to see the financing of development in the Commonwealth pass across the Atlantic to any considerable degree." The editorial also comments on the article which appeared in the English journal "Truth" which describes the ECA loan of £5,000,000 as the start of "taking over the Empire" because of provisions attached to the loan which it felt implied a detailed supervision of the Central African economy by ECA.

While this criticism is not generally held, there is a small school of thought which believes all money for development of Central Africa should come from British sources and that ECA loans or even the investment of private American capital in Central Africa is a means of American penetration into this part of the world, and eventually Central Africa will be lost as an integral part of the Empire.

There is another and more general school which believes that Central Africa must be developed, regardless of where the funds come from. They would prefer it if the funds did come from United Kingdom sources but if they are not forthcoming they welcome American capital, whether from Government or private sources.

There is also transmitted as enclosure No. 2 [2] an editorial which appeared in the *Rhodesia Herald* on July 7, 1951 which demonstrates the point just made. It underlines the fact that American investment in Central Africa is not being supplied on a strictly charitable basis, but that the United States will benefit from such investments by obtaining increased raw materials which are in short supply in the United States.

In summary, press, radio and unofficial sources approve of ECA Aid for the development of Central Africa. As indicated above, Southern Rhodesia official opinion is somewhat reserved in its desire to have large-scale American investments in Central Africa. For reasons set out in this despatch it is not believed that a general publicity campaign with respect to ECA aims and projects would be of any value; in fact it might have just the reverse effect and would possibly increase th number of people who look on American investments in this part o the world as being made for ulterior purposes.

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[2] Not printed.

Randolph Robert

870.00 TA/9-1451

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State [1]

[Washington, undated.]

U.S. Assistance to Agricultural Development in Africa

As is the case in other areas of the free world, the United States i interested in and has been helping to facilitate the economic development of Africa. The United States believes that the sound developmen of Africa is in the interest of all other areas of the free world in a much as the strengthening of the African economy will necessaril contribute to the welfare of the entire community of free nations. Th United States is cooperating in the economic development of dependent overseas territories of European countries in Africa through th Technical Assistance Program and the Overseas Development Program administered by the Economic Cooperation Administration.

A number of the Overseas Development projects in Africa are fo road building and land reclamation. The first objective of these projects is to raise the standard of living of the local populations, and only at a later stage of development will products move into export in competition with products from established sources. Specific mention is made in the projects of the Overseas Development Program of plans for increasing the production of meat, rice and sugar, but no mention is made of coffee or cocoa. Officials of ECA with whom the matter has been discussed state that assistance to agricultural projects is being limited, increasingly, to those which contribute directly to the defense program by developing local food supplies for workers engaged in strategic materials production in isolated areas.

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[1] The source text bears no indication of authorship, but the memorandum wa probably prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, possibly by Assistant Secretary of State Edward G. Miller. The source text appears in the files as an attachment to a letter of September 14 from Miller to Brazilian Minister o Finance Horacio Lafer then visiting Washington. Miller's letter, which he personally drafted, read as follows:

"In accordance with our conversations, I have the honor of transmitting t you herewith a memorandum with regard to United States programs of technical and economic cooperation in Africa and other areas of the world outside of the Western Hemisphere, with particular regard to the possible effect of such programs on Brazil.

"The enclosed memorandum has been approved by the appropriate officials of the Department of State, including the Technical Cooperation Administration, and of the Economic Cooperation Administration so that the Memorandum may be taken by you as representing the policy of the United States Government."

Miller's letter indicates the memorandum printed here was cleared with TCA, NEA, and ECA.

Brazilian criticism of United States aid to colonial African territories had been the subject of a conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Willard L. Thorp and Brazilian Ambassador Mauricio Nabuco on April 20, 1950. During that conversation, Nabuco "implied that the United States was being both shortsighted and unfair in neglecting Latin America while giving aid to African dependent territories which are competitors of Brazil in the export of raw materials." Thorp's reply to Nabuco was that Brazil seemed to have "an exaggerated and mistaken idea of our aid to Africa and pointed out that the metropolitan countries do not welcome any direct participation of the United States in their territories. Direct aid can go only to Liberia, the Union of South Africa and Ethiopia." (Memorandum of conversation by Randolph A. Kidder, Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs, April 20, 1950: 870.00.4-2050)

The United States has given no financial assistance, either through the Technical Assistance Program or the Overseas Development Program, to any project designed primarily to increase the production of coffee in areas outside the Western Hemisphere. Should projects looking to such assistance be proposed by non-Western Hemisphere countries they will, of course, be considered on their merits. It is the intention of the Government of the United States, however, in the administration of its programs of economic and technical cooperation in the different areas of the world to coordinate the administration of these programs with the objective, among others, of giving full consideration to the interests of established producers of specific commodities and avoiding excessive production of such commodities.

876.00 TA/11-851

The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley)[1]

OFFICIAL INFORMAL [WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1951.
PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL

DEAR ED: I am sure that by the time you receive this letter your buoyant spirit will have rebounded from the rather low point it had reached when you wrote to me on September 26.[2]

[Here follows a paragraph dealing with personnel matters at the Embassy in Liberia.]

While I feel that we should constantly strive to do a better and better job in all parts of the world, I cannot agree with the sentiment expressed in your letter that Africa is being neglected, and especially Liberia. Few countries in the NEA area, regardless of size and importance, have received more of our attention than has Liberia. I am sure that when you stop to think about it further, you will realize the great amount of personal attention which the problems of Liberia have received from the level of the Secretary right on down through the Department.[3]

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[1] This letter was drafted by Bourgerie and Meier of NEA/AF and approved by Ford (NEA).

[2] The letter under reference here has not been found.

It is true, as you say, that it has often been difficult to interest good people in assignment to Africa, but any generalization overlooks the fact that we have succeeded in getting many first-rate people to accept assignments in this area. We consider it quite a feather in our cap that we have you as one of our representatives in Africa. Sam Sims, fortunately, is not lost to us but goes to Salisbury to strengthen our field force. In Nicholas Feld, we feel we have a most capable replacement for Sam on the regional desk here in Washington. On the Liberian desk, I would certainly not hesitate to measure Garland Farmer against any of the capable young political desk officers in the Department. Al Bourgerie, in spite of the difficult problems of North Africa, has still found time to give a great deal of his attention to the affairs of Africa South of the Sahara.

For a long time NEA has realized the need for strengthening our posts in Africa South of the Sahara. Unfortunately, the Budget Bureau and Congress, faced with demands for decreasing Government expenditures, have not seen fit to meet our requests for additional personnel. As a matter of fact, we have taken a heavy cut this year. During the past year Al Bourgerie has made strenuous efforts to improve the quality of the personnel assigned to African posts, but many difficulties were encountered. Our North African posts are now well staffed, but we are still not completely satisfied with the situation in your part of the world. You must appreciate, however, that there simply are not a sufficient number of top-notch FSO's, FSR's and Staff Corps to meet all the demands of the Service.

I agree that our experience with Consul Generals in Dakar has been unfortunate, but I believe we now have a capable and experienced officer at this post. Bloom is on his way home and the Department is assigning William E. Cole, Jr., a senior FSO-4 with a very good record, to Accra as Consul.

The TCA program, like any new operation, has had its growing pains, but you can rest assured that whenever the Liberian program was involved, Oscar Meier and his people have been on the job to see that Liberia got her share of attention. As a result of this effort, the Liberian TCA program is at this time the most advanced of any in the NEA area.

As you probably know, NEA was given a comparatively small sum of money in 1951 for Point IV assistance to Africa. Since certain ECA funds were available to the DOT's (See attached statement of ECA Contributions to African Development[4]), we felt that it was desirable

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[3] For documentation on the policies and problems in relations with Liberia, see pp. 1274 ff.

[4] Not found attached to the source text.

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to allocate the major portion of available funds to the countries of Africa which received no ECA aid, namely, Liberia, Ethiopia, Libya and Eritrea. Small allocations were made to the DOT's, but only the British evinced any real interest in this program. Belgium, Portugal and France have never concluded a Point IV agreement with this country. In the absence of an agreement no Point IV funds can be made available. As you can appreciate, we cannot force a country to accept Point IV assistance. Under the new arrangement for 1952 all technical assistance to the DOT's will be handled by ECA.

We have just sent you a cable (Deptel 139, Nov. 2 [5]) asking for your recommendations on the 1953 foreign aid program. I am particularly interested in having your views on the last paragraph of this cable. As you know, we tried unsuccessfully last year to get Congress to allow us to use the balance of the harbor funds for replacing the inadequate bridges on the Monrovia–Ganta road. Oscar Meier has suggested that we include the high-type road between the harbor at Monrovia and Roberts Field but I am skeptical of our ability to justify it against other more pressing needs. However, I would be interested in having your suggestions on this or any other projects of this nature.

You speak of the need for a Truslow in Africa. As you know, we have recently enlisted the help of the Budget Bureau in supplying or securing an expert to come to Liberia to set up appropriate budget controls in accordance with the plan communicated to you.

Information selected for inclusion in the "Current Foreign Relations" [6] is selected by the Executive Secretariat on the basis of timeliness and current interest. Several articles on North Africa have appeared in this publication, but the volume of "hot news" from Africa South of the Sahara is somewhat limited.

Here in the States we are endeavoring to stimulate more interest in African affairs. This summer a very successful course on Africa was held at Northwestern University. I delivered the opening address [7] which has been given wide publicity, and Departmental officers participated in the program. Recently Al Bourgerie and Oscar Meier assisted the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University to set up a two-day Executive Conference on Africa South of the Sahara. About thirty businessmen and some twenty Government officers took part in the meeting which was very

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[5] Not printed. It requested the Embassy in Liberia to cable a summary of its current recommendations on the 1953 Liberian economic development program. The concluding paragraph of the telegram asked the Embassy's judgment of Liberia's ability to sustain the costs of technical assistance. (876.00–TA/11–251)

[6] *Current Foreign Relations* is a weekly classified journal-type report, prepared in the Policy Reports Staff of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, and designed to present articles highlighting current foreign policy problems under consideration in the Department. *Current Foreign Relations* is widely circulated within the Department of State and to missions abroad.

[7] Regarding the address, delivered on June 27, see the editorial note, p. 1223.

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successful. A summary of the Conference is enclosed.[8] In addition, AF officers have been participating in round table discussions on Africa in Washington and in other parts of the country.

These examples, I am sure you will agree, prove that we are not neglecting Africa South of the Sahara and the A in NEA remains a capital A in our efforts here.

We are still trying to persuade the Air Force to agree to permit Aero Services to send their Shoran equipment to Liberia. I will write you again on this subject when I have more definite information on the views of the Air Force.

With best personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

George C. McGhee

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[8] The summary under reference here was not found attached to the source text.

ETHIOPIA

PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH ETHIOPIA; THE QUESTION OF PROVIDING UNITED STATES MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ETHIOPIA; INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMER ITALIAN COLONY OF ERITREA[1]

775.56/1-1151

Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Director, International Security Affairs (Ohly) to the Director, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Scott)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 11, 1951.

Subject: Ethiopia and Military Assistance.

Our Embassy in Addis Ababa has been approached repeatedly in recent months by the Emperor of Ethiopia and his representatives concerning the possibility of military assistance.[2] Little encouragement has been given to such requests because of the question regarding eligibility of Ethiopia under Section 408(*e*) and the doubtful value of that country's contribution to the over-all effort even though arrangements could be made for a modest program. However, it is important that we retain the good will of the Emperor who always has been a good friend of the United States.

As a means to that end, the Office of African Affairs of the Department of State has concurred in a recommendation from the Embassy that a high ranking American General arrange to visit Addis Ababa in the near future. In addition to displaying American interest in Ethiopia it is felt he could explain to the Emperor our conception of Ethiopia's role in the defense of the non-Communist world and particularly to dissuade him from military expenditures beyond the capacity of his country. It is hoped that such a visit might ward off a repetition of pleas for military assistance which would be embarrassing to both countries.

I should appreciate the views of the Department of Defense concerning the desirability of the proposed visit and what might be involved in making necessary arrangements.

JOHN H. OHLY

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[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1691 ff.

[2] For previous documentation on Ethiopian requests for military assistance, see *ibid.*

611.75/3-151

Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 1, 1951.

ETHIOPIA

A. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of United States policy toward Ethiopia are: (1) the maintenance and improvement of friendly, cooperative relations between the United States and Ethiopia; (2) the prevention of Soviet or Communist influence over Ethiopia, and the maintenance of Ethiopia's orientation toward the United States and western Europe; (3) the effective establishment of stable administration in the areas under Ethiopian sovereignty; (4) continued support by Ethiopia of the principles of collective security and international cooperation with respect to the United Nations; (5) the settlement of differences and the establishment of cooperative working relations between Ethiopia and adjacent territories, especially with respect to tribal migrations, undemarcated boundaries and the development of natural resources; (6) the balanced and orderly development of the economy of Ethiopia; and (7) the progressive development on an entirely cooperative and voluntary basis of United States and other foreign economic enterprises and cultural, missionary and political influences of benefit to the long-term interests of the people of Ethiopia.

B. POLICIES

The friendly relations which existed between the United States and Ethiopia prior to the Italian occupation were greatly strengthened as a result of our policy of nonrecognition of the Fascist conquest and have continued since the restoration of the Emperor in 1941. Relations between the United States and Ethiopia were improved also when, by mutual agreement in 1949, the two governments raised the status of their respective missions in Addis Ababa and Washington from Legation to Embassy.

Since the end of the war there has been a tendency on the part of certain Ethiopian officials to base much of their thinking on international questions on their claims to two former Italian colonies, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Since Ethiopia will have access to the sea as a result of the decision by the General Assembly of the United Nations to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia, it may be considerably easier in the future to reach amicable understandings with Ethiopia in regard to other matters.

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[1] Department of State Policy (Information) Statements were concise documents summarizing the current U.S. policy toward, the relations of the principal powers with, and the issues and trends in a particular country or region. The statements were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. They were generally prepared by *ad hoc* working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State and were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions abroad, under cover of formal instructions from the Secretary of State, for comment and criticism. The Policy Statements were periodically revised.

In Ethiopia today, the foremost political and economic problems include governmental inefficiency and corruption, an undercurrent of opposition to certain key members of the government, the practical implementation of the UN decision to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia,[2] strong opposition to and fear of Italian trusteeship over Italian Somaliland,[3] irredentist demands, and French control of the Djibouti–Addis Ababa Railroad.

Political. The most immediate problems confronting Ethiopia in the field of foreign relations concern the resumption of diplomatic relations and the settlement of outstanding problems with Italy, the resolution of certain frontier questions, and the improvement of Ethiopia's production for international trade, which may involve some foreign assistance. Ethiopia's claim to both Eritrea and Italian Somaliland was considered by the Deputies of the Council of Foreign Ministers and on September 15, 1948, the question, as part of the Italian Colonies problem, was referred to the UN General Assembly in accordance with the Treaty of Peace with Italy. When the General Assembly was unable to reach a decision in May 1949, the matter was postponed until the next session which, on November 21, 1949, decided to place Italian Somaliland under Italian trusteeship for ten years after which it is to become independent. At the same time the General Assembly postponed the final decision on Eritrea by establishing a UN Commission to investigate the territory and report to its 1950 session. On December 2, 1950, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution providing that "Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown."

The UN Trusteeship Council unanimously approved a draft trusteeship agreement for former Italian Somaliland at its Geneva session in January 1950, and the Italians assumed provisional administration of the territory on April 1, 1950. The UN General Assembly finally approved the trusteeship agreement on December 2, 1950.

Ethiopia's border and jurisdictional difficulties with British and French Somalilands are under negotiation among those governments. An important interest of the United States in these negotiations is to see that the rights of the Sinclair Petroleum Company to develop petroleum in Ethiopia are not infringed by territorial adjustments among those powers.[4] The British have assured us that if agreement is reached on a proposal to cede to Ethiopia a corridor to Zeila in British Somaliland in exchange for a considerable section of southeastern Ogaden, to be annexed to British Somaliland, the rights of Ethiopia and the Sinclair Company to the sub-soil resources in that part of the Ogaden transferred to British Somaliland will remain in effect. It is understood that the French have withdrawn their objection to this proposed exchange on condition that any proposal to build a railroad in the area ceded by the British will require the consent of the French. The three governments will probably reach no immediate decisions on the matter, which may await the conclusion of new treaties between the governments concerned. The most serious boundary problem is Ethiopia's undemarcated frontier with Italian Somaliland. The Ethiopians had refused to recognize Italian trusteeship of Somaliland and to participate in the settlement of that boundary until their claims to Eritrea had been satisfied. However, both Ethiopia and Italy accepted a resolution adopted on December 15, 1950, by the UN General Assembly calling for the delimitation of this boundary by direct negotiations between Ethiopia and Italy or, at the request of either party, by mediation with a UN Mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN.

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[2] For documentation on the United Nations decision to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1640 ff. For the text of the final decision of the General Assembly on Eritrea, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 529 ff.

[3] For documentation on the United Nations decision on Italian Somaliland, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1689 ff.

When the British Army began the reconquest of Ethiopia in 1941 a modified form of military government, set up in agreement with the Emperor, was introduced in each Province as it was retaken. In 1942 this administration was brought to an end but a number of British troops remained in the country. Under a treaty arrangement of 1944 the British continued to occupy part of the Ogaden Province in southeastern Ethiopia. In September 1948, by agreement with the British, the Ethiopians reoccupied part of the Ogaden Province. This agreement was followed in October by a resumption of operations in the vicinity of Wardere by the Sinclair Petroleum Company, but to date their drillings have not struck oil and the company is not sure what the prospects for finding oil may be in that area. The reentry of Ethiopian troops into the Ogaden Province was successful. There have been no acts of hostility on the part of the Somalis against either the company or the Ethiopians. The United States will continue to take the position that the Emperor should make and carry out satisfactory arrangements for an adequate division with the Somali leaders and people of any royalties on petroleum which may be obtained from the Ogaden. Coupled with an increased supply of water provided from wells drilled by Sinclair, such an income is needed by the Somalis as well as the Ethiopians if that area is to make any appreciable progress.

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[4] Documentation on Sinclair Petroleum Company operations in Ethiopia is in Department of State file 875.2553.

Military. For the past few years Ethiopia has been desirous of obtaining from United States military or surplus stocks a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. This material is desired to strengthen internal order and to standardize the equipment of its armed forces. Also, the Ethiopians are apprehensive because an Italian administration has been reinstalled in Somaliland and because the Italian armed forces there are using considerable quantities of American equipment and have even paraded tanks and jet fighters along the border of Ethiopia. Thus far Ethiopian efforts to obtain United States equipment have not met with success.

One result of Ethiopia's disappointment in this regard was that it turned to European sources to satisfy its military needs. In 1948 the Ethiopian Government contracted with Czechoslovakia for the purchase of a small arms factory and certain other equipment. Recent reports indicate that the factory is now under construction and that a number of Czechoslovak technicians are in Ethiopia supervising its construction and operation. Early in 1949 the Ethiopians also made an arrangement with the UK whereby the British supplied 10,000 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition from their Middle East stocks. Munition supplies were also sought from Sweden, Canada and Belgium.

Early in 1950 the Ethiopian Government requested the Department's assistance in procuring military aircraft for the use of its Air Force.[5] Despite repeated efforts made to meet this request, it did not prove possible to do so. The Ethiopians are still interested in obtaining aircraft and we are continuing to keep them informed whenever planes of the type or types in which they are primarily interested become available through the Department of Defense.

The Ethiopian Government has strongly supported the United Nations in the war in Korea. In July it contributed 100,000 Ethiopian dollars (approximately US $40,000) to the United Nations for medical supplies and in November offered a contingent of 1,069 officers and men for use in Korea. This offer has been accepted by the Unified Command and discussions are being held regarding the supplies and equipment for these troops. The Department feels that the use of Ethiopian troops in Korea is highly desirable politically because: (1) this would help the Ethiopians obtain United States arms and military equipment which, by mitigating their previous disappointments, should assist the United States in negotiations with Ethiopia for the continued use of certain military facilities in Eritrea; (2) of the great propaganda value of including among the UN armed forces a contingent of troops from an independent, colored nation in Africa, which would help to offset the Soviet claim that the Korean war is white imperialist aggression against the colored races of the world; as well as (3) for the contribution to international collective security which the use of troops of another Member of the UN would provide.

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[5] For documentation on the Ethiopian request for military aircraft, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1691 ff.

At the time the Ethiopians expressed the desire to send troops to Korea, they also requested the United States to furnish the necessary supplies to arm and equip two or three divisions. This equipment, they maintained, would enable them to participate actively in the defense of their area and in collective security measures. Since Ethiopia is eligible to obtain this equipment only under Section 408(*e*) of Public Law 329, as amended, the Department is endeavoring to ascertain whether Ethiopia can meet the political and strategic prerequisites.

Economic. United States economic policy toward Ethiopia is to encourage and assist Ethiopia to achieve a sound, balanced and orderly development of its economic potentialities through development of its natural resources, improvement of the methods and means of agricultural and industrial production, and expansion of multilateral trade.

The Fellows Mission (FEA) of 1944 drew up a ten-year economic development plan on the basis of which Ethiopia in 1948 requested financial assistance from the US Government, which referred the request to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Fellows development plan, totaling $153 million, is conceived from an engineering viewpoint without regard to what is economically possible in Ethiopia, and appears to be too ambitious for the Ethiopians to undertake in its entirety, even over a ten-year period. Selected projects in the plan, however, are worthy of consideration by this Government and international agencies for such financing and technical assistance as may be needed and available.

Recently the Ethiopian Government submitted a request for a loan to the IBRD. In the spring of 1950, the Bank sent a mission to Ethiopia to investigate the suitability of such a loan. On its return the mission indicated that lending to Ethiopia would be limited more by Ethiopia's ability to absorb and use capital effectively than by its ability to service a loan. As a result of the mission's findings, the IBRD in September made two loans to Ethiopia: one loan for five million dollars will be used for the rehabilitation and maintenance of the country's road system; the other for two million dollars will provide foreign exchange for projects to be financed by a new Ethiopian development bank. A third loan of one million dollars for the improvement of communication facilities has been recommended and an agreement for it is expected to be concluded in the near future.

One of the basic obstacles to the industrial development of Ethiopia is its lack of educated and trained technicians. A similar lack is apparent in the Government, although before the war the country had a good start in developing industrial technicians. Until Ethiopia can develop its own managerial skills we should support its efforts to secure competent American advisers and technicians. The Ethiopian Government has been informed that certain funds have been allocated to it under the Point IV Program, and discussions are proceeding toward the establishment of a technical assistance agreement between the two countries and the development of projects to be included in the program.

One important objective of encouraging and assisting Ethiopia in developing its natural resources and otherwise increasing its agricultural and industrial production is to increase the volume of its foreign trade, as a means of satisfying its foreign exchange requirements. In line with that objective we should encourage Ethiopia to follow liberal and non-discriminatory trade policies.

Specific policies to promote Ethiopia's economic development within the framework of our traditional economic foreign policy include: (1) encouragement of private foreign investments and commercial enterprises and the expansion of trade without encroachment on the sovereignty of Ethiopia; (2) support of efforts on the part of the UN specialized agencies to decrease illiteracy and improve educational facilities, improve agricultural and industrial productivity, to improve public health, and to develop aviation facilities; (3) support for the extension of additional loans by the IBRD for development projects.

We should continue to encourage the Ethiopian Government to utilize whatever technical assistance may be available from the United Nations and related international organizations that will be instrumental in contributing to the development of the country's economy. We should emphasize the necessity of extending fullest cooperation to such organizations, and indicate our interest in seeing the successful conclusion of projects undertaken. Thus far, the projects conducted by the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization have been helpful to the over-all economy. For example, the FAO has been inoculating cattle against rinderpest at the rate of 10,000 cattle per month. Thus for a cost of a few cents per head of cattle, it is possible to save Ethiopian farmers thousands of dollars and greatly improve the diet of the people.

We should continue to encourage exploration for petroleum and the development of such petroleum resources as may be discovered both as an alternative source of supply for the US and for the benefit of the local population. We will assist in any appropriate way the development of such resources by American concerns. The Sinclair Petroleum Company holds a concession to explore for and produce petroleum throughout all Ethiopia, and has begun drilling operations. There is some indication that other independent American companies may desire to participate with the Sinclair Company in Ethiopian concessions, and, as far as possible, they should be encouraged and assisted in so doing.

Foreign private interests have thus far been extremely wary about investing capital in Ethiopia. With a view to creating a more favorable investment climate the Ethiopian Government in August 1950 embarked on a new policy designed to encourage the flow of foreign private capital into the country. The new policy containing the following inducements should serve as a stimulus to investment by foreign enterprises: (1) exemption from certain types of taxes; (2) exemption from customs duties on machinery imported for installation in factories; (3) relaxation of the requirement for the participation of Ethiopian capital investment in new enterprises; (4) permission to repatriate invested capital and a fixed percentage of profits earned.

The development of adequate transportation is a prime factor in the economic development of the country. Road, rail and air transport are all essential elements in the total transport system. In extending assistance and advice to Ethiopia the importance of the role which each mode of transport can best fulfill must be borne in mind.

The Franco-Ethiopian Railway has been the chief means of transporting Ethiopia's foreign trade: sixty percent of the country's exports and seventy-five percent of its imports are transported by the railway to and from the port of Djibouti in French Somaliland. The policy and operations of the company have long been a source of friction between France and Ethiopia which culminated in the Diredawa affair in August of 1949 and the subsequent strike of railway workers. The strike plus successful Ethiopan use of an alternative truck route to the port of Assab in Eritrea has forced the French to lower freight rates on the railway and grant other concessions in continuing negotiations with the Ethiopians. The US views with sympathy Ethiopia's desire to have greater control over its only rail outlet to the sea.

The operation of Ethiopian Air Lines (EAL), under management contract with Trans-World Airlines, provides Ethiopia with a means of transport for commercial and government passengers, mail, and freight to points which are either inaccessible, or which cannot be speedily served by surface transport. These services are essential to the economy of the country, to the efficient administration of government, and to the east African air transport network. The success of EAL is an example of what can be accomplished in bringing the benefits of American managerial and technical ability to an underdeveloped area through a cooperative arrangement. The Export-Import Bank in June 1950 authorized an extension of credit to the Ethiopian Government of $1,000,000 to assist in financing the purchase of two modern aircraft (Convair) which have been obtained by the Ethiopian Air Lines.

The 1914 commercial treaty between the United States and Ethiopia is inadequate. It lacks modern provisions covering rights to do business, import and export restrictions, exchange control, monopolies, and Government contracts. It also lacks the exactness and comprehensiveness of a present-day treaty. A draft of a modern treaty of amity and economic relations has been submitted to the Ethiopian Government which is shorter and more succinct than the standard Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties negotiated by the United States since the war. Realizing that special assurances are needed in Ethiopia regarding the administration of justice which it is not appropriate to include in a modern treaty, it is planned to retain the 1914 treaty in force with its provisions of most-favored-nation treatment on jurisdiction, and to reach further understandings in an exchange of notes at the time the treaty is signed.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia were reestablished in 1944, after a lapse of some 27 years. There has been active Soviet interest in the cultural and informational fields, which has taken the form of Soviet exhibitions in Addis Ababa, public showings of Soviet propaganda films, the exertion of pressure on the Ethiopian Government for the inclusion of favorable articles in government-controlled newspapers, and the establishment in Addis Ababa of a fully equipped hospital, staffed by Soviet nurses and doctors who have distributed pamphlets and newspapers in Armenian and English extolling Soviet medical progress. There has been evidence of Soviet pressure on the Armenian commercial community to adopt Soviet nationality, and some Armenians have emigrated to the Armenian SSR.

Soviet prestige in Ethiopia suffered a set-back when the USSR announced prior to the 1948 elections in Italy that it favored Italian trusteeship for the former Italian colonies. On September 14, 1948, in the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris, the Soviet representative reversed his position and advocated placing under direct United Nations administration all of the territories except for an outlet to the sea for Ethiopia through Eritrea. In the third and fourth sessions of the General Assembly the USSR and its satellites advocated the same proposal coupled with support for independence in the near future. These same states, however, in the fifth session of the General Assembly voted against the proposal sponsored by the United States and thirteen other nations that all of Eritrea be federated with Ethiopia.

The primary interest of the UK in Ethiopia is to assure peace and security in the Red Sea area and on the borders of the territories which it occupies or possesses. The British and Ethiopian Governments are now negotiating a new treaty of establishment and a consular convention. Negotiations relating to the proposed cession to Ethiopia of the Zeila corridor in British Somaliland in return for part of the Ogaden Province have been pending since Ethiopia was primarily concerned with obtaining a favorable decision on Eritrea before proceeding on other territorial questions. The UK has been extremely active in the information and cultural field. The British Legation in Addis Ababa was the first diplomatic mission to be raised to an Embassy. The British exercise predominant influence in Ethiopia, a position to which we have no objection.

Although the Ethiopian Government continues to be interested in the possibility of developing the Lake Tana project as part of the overall development program for the Nile River, the discussions proposed for early 1950 with Great Britain and Egypt were not held due to the intervention of various political considerations which were linked to the Tana dam project. Recent reports indicate that Ethiopia and Egypt have reached an understanding on the Lake Tana project but the results are not yet evident.

France's policy toward Ethiopia is part and parcel of its desire to reassert its position as a great power and to maintain intact its colonial empire throughout Africa and the world. Ethiopia's attitude toward France, in the main, has been determined by French control of the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway. Although France is disliked and distrusted in Ethiopia, the French language and culture continue to have considerable influence in the country. France's policy toward Ethiopia at the present time may be said to include: (1) pursuit of those actions that will tend to secure France's position on the Red Sea, along her lifeline to the Indo-China area; (2) strengthening, where possible, the position of the Compagnie de Chemin de Fer Franco-Ethiopien; (3) concluding a satisfactory treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with Ethiopia; (4) continuation of the highly successful cultural program, namely, the French Lyceum, the Cercle Francais, and the Alliance Francaise; (5) cooperation with Ethiopian officials with regard to the settlement of the French Somaliland-Ethiopian border delineation problem; (6) containment of the importance and growth of German influence in Ethiopia. In the summer of 1950 the respective missions in Addis Ababa and Paris were raised to the rank of Embassy.

Since the war Sweden has taken an active interest in Ethiopia, primarily on Ethiopian initiative. Sweden extended loans to Ethiopia totaling 7,000,000 kronor and assisted in obtaining several hundred doctors, nurses, engineers, geologists, teachers, police administrators, military advisers, and other personnel for the Ethiopian Government. Swedish prestige has been high. It is reported that the Adviser on Civil Air Matters in Ethiopia, a Swedish national, may become the head of the Ethiopian Air Lines when the present management contract with TWA expires.

The interests of Italy and Ethiopia clash on the issues of the former Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Although Italy has professed a desire for the resumption of friendly relations, the Ethiopians cannot forget the repeated Italian attacks against them and the recent Fascist occupation of their country. Consequently, although individual Italians are not particularly disliked, Italy has no prestige in Ethiopia and the future pattern of relations between the two countries will be determined largely by the way the Italians administer their trusteeship of Italian Somaliland and whether the Ethiopians obtain a measure of satisfaction through having Eritrea politically connected with Ethiopia.

The Netherlands has shown renewed interest in Ethiopia. A goodwill mission was sent to Ethiopia in 1948, and a Legation was opened in Addis Ababa in October 1950. As a result of the goodwill mission, the Ethiopian Government engaged the services of several Dutch advisers. The Dutch apparently are not only interested in increasing trade between the two countries but also in making capital investments in Ethiopia.

With the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, no other states have shown an active interest in Ethiopia, apart from trade prospects. The interest shown by Czechoslovakia stems largely from its sale of a small arms factory to Ethiopia in 1948 and the resulting presence of a number of Czechoslovak technicians in Ethiopia.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

US policy with respect to Ethiopia must reflect the problem which Ethiopia itself presents. The progressive development of stable government and economy in Ethiopia, including Eritrea, would strengthen another weak area exposed to Communist penetration and subversion and thus contribute to the stability of the Near East and Red Sea area.

Our general policy of helping the Ethiopian Government whenever circumstances permit has been successful in many directions. The day-to-day relations between the United States and Ethiopia are amicable; the Ethiopian Government has shown a preference for American advisers as compared with those of other countries; and United States trade with Ethiopia has increased many fold. The active support which the United States gave to Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea in the General Assembly is deeply appreciated by the Emperor and has gone a long way in assuring the Ethiopians of the sincerity of our intentions toward that country. The activities in Ethiopia of two American concerns, Trans-World Airlines and the Sinclair Petroleum Company, are viewed with considerable satisfaction by the Ethiopian Government. The Point IV Program, if adequately administered, should increase the cordiality of US-Ethiopian friendship.

Our policy has not been completely successful, however, in breaking down the suspicions with which the Ethiopians tend to view most western countries. Having been subjected to "spheres of influence" and even to invasion from certain European countries, this suspicion is deep-seated and will take a long time to erase. It is hoped that this can be overcome by greatly expanded educational and informational programs, by assistance programs, and by increased contacts with the western world for a much greater proportion of the people.

711.5875/3-1651

The Secretary of the Army (Pace) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 16, 1951.

DEAR MR. MCGHEE: In accordance with a request from the Department of State[1] the Department of Defense has instructed the Department of the Army to designate a general officer to visit Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In addition to displaying American interest in Ethiopia, the purpose of this visit is to explain to the Emperor the United States' concept of Ethiopia's role in defense of the non-Communist countries and, particularly, to dissuade him from military expenditures beyond the capacity of his country.

As you may know, the Department of the Army has a further interest in Ethiopia inasmuch as we desire to retain the Army radio station in Eritrea which will be federated with Ethiopia by September 1952. Since this will require base rights negotiations with Ethiopia, we propose to have this visit coincide with the opening of negotiations by our Ambassador in order that he may have the necessary technical advice. With this in mind, Brigadier General Rex V. D. Corput, Chief Signal Officer, European Command, has been selected for the purpose of advising the Ambassador as well as for the principal mission as outlined in the opening paragraph.

Mr. J. Rives Childs of your Department, who I understand has been nominated for Ambassador to Ethiopia,[2] informally indicated that Brigadier General Richard J. O'Keefe of the Air Force might be of additional assistance in negotiations. Mr. Childs pointed out that General O'Keefe was of great assistance to him in negotiations with

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[1] See the memorandum of January 11, p. 1237.

[2] Childs was Ambassador in Saudi Arabia until July 1950. He was appointed Ambassador to Ethiopia in April and presented his credentials on May 14, 1951.

King Ibn Saud when he was Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.[3] In this connection, I am requesting the advice of the Secretary of the Air Force as to the availability of General O'Keefe for this mission.

I would appreciate your comments and recommendations on this proposed arrangement.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK PACE, JR.

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[3] In 1949 General O'Keefe was the head of the Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia, which studied that country's security requirements. For the group's report, better known as the O'Keefe Report, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1112.

711.5875/4-1151

The Acting Secretary of the Army (Alexander) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1951.

DEAR MR. BERRY: I am pleased to reply to your letter of 30 March 1951[1] in which you requested that consideration be given to the visit of a well-known and high-ranking general officer to Ethiopia.

In keeping with your feelings on the importance of the matter, I have selected an officer who in my opinion is eminently qualified for this mission. I propose to send Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, United States Army.

General Bolte has had a long and distinguished record in the Army. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College. He has held such important positions as Chief of Staff of Army Ground Forces, Director of the Special Joint Planning Group, and Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. He was recently appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. In addition to this, General Bolte is the Army Member of the Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board.

General Bolte participated in World War I as a company grade officer and was wounded in action. He commanded the 34th Infantry Division in the Italian Theater in World War II. For gallantry in action and for meritorious service to his country, General Bolte has been awarded the following decorations: Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit and the Purple Heart as well as many foreign decorations.

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[1] On March 30 Berry replied to Pace's letter of March 16 to McGhee. He informed Pace the Department of State believed American objectives required a well-known U.S. general with imposing credentials, who could explain to the Emperor the U.S. conception of Ethiopia's role in the defense of the non-Communist world, and dissuade the Emperor from military expenditures beyond Ethiopia's needs and capacity to pay. (711.5875/3-1651)

I am sure you will agree that General Bolte will be recognized by the Emperor as a distinguished soldier and highly important member of the General Staff. Because of General Bolte's closeness to General Collins, the Emperor will undoubtedly regard him as the logical representative of the Chief of Staff.

General Bolte will leave for Europe in May and will be in Frankfurt about 10 June from which point he can depart for Ethiopia by air. I would appreciate your comments on the selection of General Bolte and whether or not the time of his visit will be suitable.

Sincerely yours, ARCHIBALD S. ALEXANDER

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Italian Colonies"

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 30, 1951.

Subject: Final Progress Report on NSC 19/5, "Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies"[2]

NSC 19/5 was approved as Governmental policy on August 5, 1949. It is requested that this Progress Report, as of March 20, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

Important Action and Developments

The situation with respect to the disposition of the former Italian colonies has progressed materially from that described in the First Progress Report on this subject dated May 11, 1950.[3] The resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 21, 1949, is being implemented successfully with regard to independence for Libya and Italian trusteeship for former Italian Somaliland. A decision on the future of Eritrea, which was postponed last year by the General Assembly pending the report and recommendations of a UN Commission which investigated Eritrea, was made in a resolution adopted by the fifth session of the General Assembly on December 2, 1950, under which Eritrea is to be federated with Ethiopia. United States policy with respect to all three of the former Italian colonies has been met in most respects.

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[1] The source text was attached to a cover sheet entitled "National Security Council Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the Implementation of U.S. Position on the Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies (NSC 19/5)." At its 92d meeting, on May 23, 1951, in NSC Action No. 482, the National Security Council noted the progress report on the Italian colonies. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95: Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1951)

A copy of this progress report in the McGhee Files was attached to a memorandum by McGhee to Webb, dated April 23, drafted by Wellons. The McGhee memorandum recommended that Webb sign the report indicating that United States policy on the disposition of the former Italian colonies had been substantially carried out. He added that the remaining problems of reaching agreement with the Governments of Libya and Ethiopia regarding the right of the United States to use certain strategic facilities in Tripolitania and Eritrea were being resolved by the Department of State in conjunction with the Department of Defense, although the agreements could not become effective until 1952. (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Italian Colonies")

[2] For text of NSC 19/5, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, p. 571.

[3] The May 11, 1950, progress report, not printed, noted that while the United States still believed its proposed solution for the disposition of Eritrea (i.e., cession of the central plateau with Asmara and Massawa to Ethiopia and the annexation of the Western province to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) was the best solution, U.S. policy might have to be reconsidered in the light of the report of the Committee of Investigation, and/or extent to which Ethiopia and Italy agreed on a common policy for the disposition of Eritrea before the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. (S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Italian Colonies")

General Implementation

I. *Libya*

[Here follows the section of the report dealing with Libya; for text, see page 1318.]

II. *Italian Somaliland*

The draft trusteeship agreement for Italian Somaliland negotiated with Italy and approved unanimously by the Trusteeship Council in January 1950 was finally approved by the UN General Assembly on December 2, 1950, without change. No particular problems have arisen with respect to Italian Somaliland, which is apparently being administered satisfactorily by the Italian Administration which was installed provisionally on April 1, 1950. Italy, as an administering authority, was granted the right to participate, without vote, in the UN Trusteeship Council in February 1951.

III. *Eritrea*

The report of the UN Commission established by the fourth session of the General Assembly of its investigation of Eritrea did not submit any agreed recommendation but, rather, presented three different proposals espoused by different members of the Commission. One member (Norway) favored the annexation of all of Eritrea by Ethiopia. Two members (South Africa and Burma) favored the federation of all of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Two other members (Guatemala and Pakistan) favored UN trusteeship for 10 years leading to independence. Under the circumstances . . . , the Department of State decided to give strong support to the proposal for the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. It was felt that this was in line with our basic policy and our security interests in Eritrea, and that it stood the best chance of meeting the views of the various interested parties and of obtaining the approval of two-thirds of the members of the UN.

A federation formula was developed by our delegation to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly when the report of the UN Commission for Eritrea was considered during July, August and September of 1950. The formula obtained the support of the British, Ethiopian and several leading Latin American delegations. It was further elaborated in private negotiations during the General Assembly and was accepted by both the Italian and Ethiopian delegations. Then fourteen sponsors, including the United States, introduced the resolution in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee where it was eventually approved without change and was adopted by the General Assembly on December 2, 1950. The chief provisions of the resolution are that:

1. Eritrea shall be an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.
2. The Eritrean Government shall possess legislative, executive and judicial powers in the field of domestic affairs.
3. The jurisdiction of the federal government shall extend to the following matters: defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, foreign and interstate commerce and external and interstate communications, including ports.
4. The area of the federation shall constitute a single area for customs purposes and there shall be free movement of goods and persons.
5. A single nationality shall prevail throughout the federation.
6. The federal government, as well as Eritrea, shall ensure to residents of Eritrea without distinction of nationality, race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental liberties.
7. There shall be a transition period which shall not extend beyond September 15, 1952, during which the Eritrean Government will be organized and the Eritrean Constitution prepared and put into effect. There will be a United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea appointed by the General Assembly to assist on these matters.
8. During the transition period, the present British Administering Authority shall continue to conduct the affairs of Eritrea and shall, in consultation with the United Nations Commissioner, implement certain specified provisions of the resolution.
9. The Federal Act, which consists of the first seven paragraphs of the resolution, and the Constitution of Eritrea shall enter into effect after the Constitution has been approved by the Commissioner and adopted by the Eritrean Assembly and after both documents have been ratified by the Emperor of Ethiopia. Then the transfer of power from the British Administration shall take place by September 15, 1952.

The resolution recognizes that the disposal of Eritrea should be based on its close political and economic association with Ethiopia and assures the inhabitants of Eritrea of the fullest respect and safeguards for their institutions, traditions, religions and languages, as well as the widest possible measure of self-government. At the same time the resolution respects the constitution, institutions, traditions and the international status and identity of the Empire of Ethiopia.

The principal strategic interest of the United States in Eritrea is in having the right to use certain military facilities in that territory. As stated in NSC 19/3, United States strategic requirements call for the operational availability of the following bases as essential: "Asmara, Eritrea, as a telecommunications base facility"; and "In the event of an emergency, Massawa, Eritrea, as an air and naval base facility." In view of the decision taken by the United Nations on Eritrea it will be necessary for this Government to negotiate with Ethiopia for the desired rights. In preparation for the negotiation of such an agreement preliminary steps have been taken as follows: (1) the Ethiopian Foreign Minister has been informed orally and in general terms of United States interest in concluding an agreement regarding such military facilities; (2) the British and the United Nations Commissioner for Eritrea (a Bolivian diplomat, Eduardo Anze Matienzo, who is pro-American and anti-Communist) have also been informed that the United States might want to use such facilities in the future; and (3) the Department of State in conjunction with the Department of Defense is drafting an agreement covering the use of the facilities we desire in Eritrea to be used as a basis for negotiation with the Ethiopian Government. These negotiations may be involved and protracted but it should be possible to come to an adequate understanding with the Ethiopians in view of the excellent relations we now have with them and the support we rendered in the solution of the Eritrean problem.

Evaluation of Policy

1. United States policy objectives have been accomplished with respect to the disposition of the former Italian colonies.

2. Future United States strategic military requirements in Libya and Eritrea will have to be provided for in agreements with the governments of Libya and Ethiopia respectively. Preliminary planning for the negotiation of these agreements is progressing satisfactorily. The agreement with Libya should be officially concluded after that country becomes independent (scheduled for January 1, 1952). The agreement with Ethiopia can not become effective until after Eritrea is officially federated with Ethiopia (scheduled for September 15, 1952).

3. Unless unforeseen difficulties arise, no further question regarding the disposition of the former Italian colonies is anticipated. Accordingly, no further progress report on this subject is contemplated.

James E. Webb

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Eritrea through Ethiopia"

Memorandum of Conversations, by Alfred Wellons of the Office of African Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1951.

Subject: Lieutenant General Bolte's Mission to Ethiopia

Participants:
- Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S.A.
- Lt. Col. William J. Gallagher, Executive to Lt. Gen. Bolte
- Lt. Col. Thomas R. Davis, Mediterranean & Middle East Branch, Op. Div. G–3
- Mr. George C. McGhee, Assist. Sec. State, Near Eastern, South Asian & Af. Aff.
- Ambassador George Merrell, Former Ambassador to Ethiopia
- Mr. Elmer H. Bourgerie, Director, Office of African Affairs
- Mr. Leo G. Cyr, Officer in Charge, Northern African Affairs
- Mr. Alfred E. Wellons, AF

General Bolte visited Mr. McGhee by appointment this afternoon to discuss the subjects to be covered in his conversation with the Emperor during his forthcoming visit to Ethiopia. Mr. McGhee gave the General a copy of the draft instructions, prepared by the Department in consultation with the Department of the Army, which he read.[1] The chief matters discussed are summarized below.

The General commented that in view of the fact that Ethiopian troops will soon arrive in Korea, the Emperor will have a good case for requesting military assistance from the United States. Since Ethiopia has suffered greatly from aggression and is now contributing a significant proportion of the national army for the cause of collective security, the general felt that the Ethiopian government would be justified in expecting some further assistance. He thought this assistance should probably be limited to the training of replacements for the casualties suffered by the Ethiopian forces in Korea. General Bolte expected that this would involve providing certain types of equipment for training purposes and perhaps several officers and men from the United States Army to assist in training the Ethiopian replacements in the handling of certain modern weapons.

General Bolte wondered whether it would be wise to give a completely negative answer if the Ethiopians should request a military mission. Mr. McGhee mentioned that the British military mission had just been withdrawn after some unfortunate experiences when their advice had not been taken or acted upon and he thought that in such circumstances an American military mission would be confronted with serious difficulties. Mr. Bourgerie concurred and expressed the view that it would be best not to send a mission but to assign any men that would be needed for training the Ethiopian replacements to the office of the Military Attaché in Addis Ababa. General Bolte thought this would be a good way to handle the immediate problem. However, he foresaw the possibility that the Ethiopians might need some equipment to maintain internal security, particularly in Eritrea where important American military facilities are located. Mr. McGhee agreed and added that the Emperor required armed forces for maintaining law and order within Ethiopia itself since some of the tribal chiefs in some of the remote areas were inclined to be rebellious. Therefore, Mr. McGhee suggested that after the completion of his mission, General Bolte might wish to make further recommendations on what, if any, further military assistance should be granted to that country by the United States. The General said that in other low priority cases such items as armored cars and tear gas grenades had been made available and he thought similar arrangements might be made for Ethiopia.

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[1] Not printed, but the final copy of the instructions is on p. 1258.

With regard to military equipment for training replacements for Korea, General Bolte was confident that authority existed for providing equipment for such purposes. Mr. McGhee agreed that General Bolte should give the Ethiopians assurances in regard to whatever he thought could be provided within the framework of present legislation and regulations. General Bolte said that his staff would draft an additional paragraph for the instructions on this matter and would inform the Department within two or three days. The instructions otherwise are acceptable to the General, who hoped he would not have to give a definite no to the Emperor's request to visit the United States.

MAY 7, 1951

Colonel Davis telephoned Mr. Cyr this morning that they had decided not to draft an additional paragraph, but to leave the instructions unchanged. Colonel Davis explained that on further consideration in the Department of the Army it was thought best to obtain the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question of providing any training equipment or other assistance to Ethiopia. He said that they would present this problem to the JCS immediately with the hope of getting a decision prior to the General's visit to Ethiopia. Mr. Cyr stated that this would be agreeable to the Department and that we would proceed with some minor modifications on other points before sending the official instructions to General Bolte.

775.56/5-1651

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 16, 1951.

Subject: Mission to Ethiopia Concerning Military Assistance

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia has sought military assistance from the United States sufficient to equip two or three divisions. He has also sought a limited number of combat planes.

The Department has considered the possibility of assisting Ethiopia, but under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as amended, Ethiopia is not eligible for grant assistance. Moreover, even if a Presidential determination indicated the advisability of extending reimbursable aid to Ethiopia, which existing circumstances would hardly justify, our present requirements and prior commitments might preclude delivery within the foreseeable future. With respect to combat planes, other requirements have also precluded their sale to Ethiopia.

An American adviser to the Ethiopian Foreign Office has indicated that the Emperor intends to renew his plea for military assistance. The Emperor feels keenly the criticism by the younger elements of his country regarding Ethiopia's military deficiencies. Despite the limited and underdeveloped resources of his country, the Emperor has carried out his strong belief in collective security by sending to Korea an Ethiopian expeditionary force of 1,158 officers and men, which departed on April 15, 1951.

In order to forestall this renewed plea by the Emperor in a manner which will not embarass him vis-à-vis his domestic critics, I recommend that Lieutenant General Charles Lawrence Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army, be sent to Addis Ababa, as your personal representative, to: (1) explain to the Emperor why the United States cannot provide Ethiopia with military equipment; (2) encourage the Emperor to avoid large disbursements for military purposes of funds needed for economic development; (3) assure the Emperor, if the question is raised, that the United States takes seriously its obligations under the UN Charter to support the United Nations in effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression; and (4) explain, if the question is raised, why the United States would be unable to send a military mission to Ethiopia. The Secretary of Defense concurs in this recommendation. Attached is a draft of a personal letter from you to the Emperor which General Bolte could deliver.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Cyr and Hemba between April 10 and May 9. It was attached to a memorandum from McGhee to the Secretary, dated May 2, drafted by Cyr and Hemba. McGhee recommended that the Secretary sign the memorandum to the President, and noted that S/S-PR, S/ISA, UNA/UNP, A/PER, and the Department of Defense concurred. (775.56/5-1651)

If you approve the foregoing recommendation, a carbine equipped with a telescopic sight will be provided General Bolte to be given to the Emperor as a gift from the President of the United States.

DEAN ACHESON

[Attachment]

President Truman to the Emperor of Ethiopia (Haile Selassie)[2]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 17, 1951.[3]

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: Recently I received with considerable satisfaction and appreciation reports of the departure for Korea of nearly 1,200 officers and men of the Ethiopian Expeditionary Force in accordance with the pledge of Your Imperial Majesty to support by acts, as well as words, the principle of collective security through the United Nations. As stated by Your Imperial Majesty in the address to the troops departing for Korea, we are engaged in a "crusade in defense of that very principle for which we have so long fought—freedom and respect for the freedom of others."

This message of friendship is being carried by my personal representative, Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolte, who has had a long and distinguished career and who now holds the important position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, United States Army. General Bolte participated in World War I as a company grade officer and was wounded in action. He commanded an infantry division in World War II and has been awarded several decorations for gallantry in action and for meritorious service to his country.

General Bolte is authorized to discuss with Your Imperial Majesty general matters involving the defense of the free world of concern to your Government and to the Government of the United States, as well as related problems of military assistance. General Bolte carries the best wishes of the Government of the United States on this mission and, on my behalf, a small token of regard for Your Imperial Majesty.

With the most sincere desire for the continuation of the excellent relations existing between our countries, I remain with great respect,

Your Good Friend, HARRY S. TRUMAN

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[2] This letter was drafted by Cyr on April 26.

[3] A memorandum to the Secretary of State from William D. Hassett, Secretary to President Truman, dated May 17, reported that the President had approved his memorandum of May 16 regarding a military mission to Ethiopia and had addressed the source text for delivery to the Emperor by General Bolté. General Bolté presented the letter to the Emperor on June 13. (Report by General Bolté to the Secretary of State of his Activities on his Visit to Ethiopia, July 5, 1951, 711.5875/7–551)

775.5/5–2351

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1951.

INSTRUCTIONS TO HEAD OF MISSION TO ETHIOPIA (Lieutenant General Bolte)

1. *Purpose of Mission*

During recent years, Emperor Haile Selassie has been desirous of obtaining military equipment from the United States, but has been unsuccessful. According to Ambassador Merrell, the Emperor is greatly concerned over this lack of military assistance from the United States. Despite the limited and underdeveloped resources of his country, the Emperor has carried out his strong belief in collective security by sending to Korea an Ethiopian expeditionary force of 1,158 officers and men, which arrived in Pusan on May 6, 1951. The supplies and equipment which the Ethiopian troops in Korea receive from American sources are provided on a reimbursable basis.

It is understood that the Emperor intends to renew his plea for military assistance. The purpose of your mission, as stated in the memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State is:

> "In order to forestall this renewed plea by the Emperor in a manner which will not embarrass him vis-à-vis his domestic critics, I recommend that Lieutenant General Charles Lawrence Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army, be sent to Addis Ababa, as your personal representative, to: (1) explain to the Emperor why the United States cannot provide Ethiopia with military equipment: (2) encourage the Emperor to avoid large disbursements for military purposes of funds needed for economic development; (3) assure the Emperor, if the question is raised, that the United States takes seriously its obligations under the UN Charter to support the United Nations in effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression; and (4) explain, if the question is raised, why the United States would be unable to send a military mission to Ethiopia. The Secretary of Defense concurs in this recommendation. Attached is a draft of a personal letter from you to the Emperor which General Bolte could deliver."

2. *Presentation of President's Letter, Gift and Decorations*

On your arrival in Addis Ababa you will be met by the Ambassador and members of his staff. As soon as possible after your arrival it is suggested that you consult with Ambassador Childs regarding your mission and your instructions, and seek his advice as to the manner in which the following should be presented to the Emperor:

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Alfred Wellons on May 22, and cleared by Cyr, Bourgerie, McGhee, Bolté, and Davis.

(*a*) The letter from the President to His Imperial Majesty.[2]
(*b*) The President's gift of a carbine with a telescopic sight.
(*c*) The decoration of the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander.
(*d*) The set of large scale maps of Korea.

3. *Conversations With Emperor*

It is suggested that in your conversations with the Emperor of Ethiopia you may find it desirable to comment along the following lines on the matters which are likely to be discussed. Should Ambassador Childs suggest any change, however, you should feel free to accept his counsel and modify the following accordingly.

(*a*) By referring to the letter from the President, you could speak of the fine example of the Ethiopian contribution to the cause of collective security and the UN effort in the war of Korea. (By the time you see the Emperor, the Embassy in Addis Ababa should have received reports of the duties to which the Ethiopian troops in Korea have been assigned. It would be helpful to explain to the Emperor as graphically as possible the specific tasks which they are undertaking.)

(*b*) By referring to Korea, you could assure the Emperor that the United States takes seriously its obligations under the UN charter to support the UN in effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression. In other words the United States, through the UN, will do what it can to resist Communist aggression wherever it may occur. If further evidence is necessary you could point to the areas most directly affected by the Soviet menace where the United States has made tremendous efforts to strengthen and protect those members of the free world: such as, Western Europe, Greece, Turkey and the countries of South Asia.

(*c*) You may wish to emphasize the world-wide extent of the obligations assumed by the United States in its efforts to contain the spread of Soviet imperialism. As an example of the huge effort being made by this country you might wish to point out the cost of the current defense program in the United States. On the basis of the last request of the President to Congress for $60,000,000,000 for the fiscal year 1952 for the defense effort, the annual cost per each American taxpayer is $1,138.00. When our total effort is so great, you could emphasize to the Emperor, it is extremely important that this government not undertake additional commitments unless they are absolutely vital to the common defense of the free world.

(*d*) Ethiopia, fortunately, is not exposed to aggression. Certainly the United States government foresees no aggression against Ethiopia by any of its immediate neighbors. Also, and you might ask the Emperor if he agrees, the possibility of Communist inspired uprisings by minority groups within Ethiopia is considered most unlikely. The geographical position of Ethiopia makes direct Soviet aggression a remote possibility. Even in the event of a general war Ethiopia has good natural defenses in the vast expanse of desert on the Arabian peninsula and most of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, not to mention the formidable mountain barriers within Ethiopia itself. For these reasons and also because priorities in military assistance are accorded to the nations who are considered to be the most likely victims of Soviet aggression, the United States is unable at present to provide further military assistance to Ethiopia.

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[2] *Supra.*

(*e*) The facts of present international relations and of Ethiopia's position which make it impracticable for the United States to equip Ethiopia's armed forces in Ethiopia also work to Ethiopia's advantage. Thus you will wish to emphasize to the Emperor that because of the relatively secure position of his country he should find it unnecessary to undertake large disbursements by the Ethiopian government for military forces. Furthermore, this situation places Ethiopia in the enviable position of being able to use its resources for the development of its economy rather than for the unproductive machines of war. Since the cost of a modern military machine is so great Ethiopia could contribute most to the common cause of defense of the free world by maintaining a balanced economy and by developing for export those resources, such as food, hides and skins, which would be essential in the Near and Middle East in the event of a general conflagration.

(*f*) While emphasizing the point of view in the preceding paragraph you may wish to say that of course Ethiopia should have whatever armed forces are necessary to maintain internal security and which can be supported by the Ethiopian economy. In addition, and as mentioned previously, this government considers Ethiopia's contribution to the UN armies in Korea as indicative of her part in the common defense of the non-Communist world.

(*g*) The Ethiopians may ask what military plans we have for Eritrea, in view of the important army radio station located in Asmara. Even if this question is not raised by them, it would be desirable for you to make at least passing reference to our interest in the military facilities in Eritrea, particularly the radio station at Asmara. In this connection you could refer to the conversation in December, 1950 between the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ato Aklilou, and Assistant Secretary of State, George McGhee, when this matter was discussed. As Mr. McGhee indicated, the United States desires to negotiate an agreement with Ethiopia on the continued use of certain military facilities in Eritrea. Ambassador Childs and the Military Attaché will conduct these negotiations during the coming months.

4. *Matters To Be Discussed Only if Raised by the Emperor*

Our Embassy in Addis Ababa has suggested several questions which may be raised by the Emperor or members of his government, and the Departments of State and Defense have considered several other points which might arise. These questions, and replies you may wish to give, are outlined as follows:

(*a*) The Ethiopians may wish to be assured specifically that there is absolutely no threat, actual or potential, from the Italian forces in the Trust Territory of Somaliland. Our general view is that there is no danger of aggression from any of the territories contiguous to Ethiopia. Specifically the United States government believes fully the statements made by leaders of the Italian government that they would never again embark on a course of colonialism and empire-building in Africa. Such statements have been made repeatedly before the General Assembly of the UN. In addition this government has been assured privately many times by representatives of the Italian government that they have no such intentions.

(*b*) The Ethiopians may ask about the desirability of their re-establishing diplomatic relations with Italy. As the Ethiopian Foreign Minister knows very well, the Department of State has urged for some time that diplomatic relations be established between the Italians and Ethiopians and has provided its good offices to facilitate the re-establishment of such relations. We are prepared to take whatever steps we consider appropriate to see harmonious, friendly and confident relations between the two countries. In addition, we view the great desire of the Italians to conclude such an arrangement as soon as possible as further evidence of their good faith and friendly intentions, vis-à-vis the danger of aggression from Italian Somaliland mentioned above. If appropriate in the conversation, you might add that the necessary next step is up to the Ethiopian government in the renewal of relations with Italy.

(*c*) The Ethiopians may seek a commitment that the United States is interested in assuring that the Ethiopians will not be treated unfairly in the settlement of the boundary between Somaliland and Ethiopia. (They might try to involve American interest in this matter on the grounds that the Sinclair Oil Company is prospecting for oil in the area of the Ogaden where the boundary has long been disputed.) The position of the United States is that the solution of this boundary problem was provided in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in December, 1950. This resolution provides that settlement should be reached by direct negotiation between the parties involved (Ethiopia and Italy), or, if this is unsuccessful, by specified procedures of mediation or arbitration.

(*d*) The Ethiopians may ask if an American military mission could be sent to replace the British military mission which was recently withdrawn. Our Embassy in Addis Ababa has recommended strongly, and the Departments of State and Defense concur, that no mention of a military mission be made unless and until the Ethiopians propose it. If raised, our general position is that it is not practicable for the United States to send such a military mission, for the reasons given in the previous section regarding our inability to supply military assistance. If pressed, you could add that if the Ethiopians desire a military mission, one from Western Europe might be better suited, by tradition and training methods, to meet Ethiopian requirements than would an American mission. Furthermore, if our Embassy considers it advisable, you might mention that we understand the Ethiopian government is planning to train its army by engaging Belgian officers under private contract on the same basis that Swedish officers are now training the Imperial Guards.

(*e*) A high ranking member of the Ethiopian government may inquire about the possibility of the Emperor visiting the United States during the coming year. If raised, you may wish to appear surprised as though the question presented a new idea. You might add, as vaguely and tactfully as possible, that the President, due to a very full calendar of events, might not be able to receive the Emperor during 1952, in view of the fact that it is an election year in the United States. However, you could state that when you return to Washington you will ask the State Department to take this matter up with the President at the appropriate time.

(*f*) The Ethiopians may mention the new Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations which is about to be concluded between the United States and Ethiopia. Negotiations have been proceeding satisfactorily and the Treaty may be signed or ready for signature by the time of your arrival.[3]

(*g*) If the Ethiopians raise the question of the Point Four agreement between the United States and Ethiopia you can simply say that this matter, like the foregoing problem of the Treaty, is being handled by Ambassador Childs.[4]

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[3] Telegram 120 from Addis Ababa, September 7, advised the Department of State that the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations had been signed at noon that day by the Foreign Minister for Ethiopia and Ambassador Childs for the United States (611.754/9-751). The text of the treaty is in 4 UST (pt. 2) 2134, TIAS No. 2864.

[4] Telegram 347 from Addis Ababa, June 16, advised the Department of State that The General Agreement on Point IV Technical Assistance with Ethiopia had been signed that day (775.00-TA/6-1651). The text of the treaty is in 2 UST (pt. 2) 1227, TIAS No. 2271.

711.5875/7-551

Report by the Head of the Mission to Ethiopia (Bolté) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 5, 1951.

Subject: Report of Activities on Visit to Ethiopia

1. On 11 June, I departed from Paris for Addis Ababa in accordance with the wishes of the President of the United States (Tab A).[1] As his personal representative, I had the following mission as outlined in the Letter of Instructions:[2]

> "In order to forestall this renewed plea (for military equipment) by the Emperor in a manner which will not embarrass him vis-à-vis his domestic critics, I recommend that Lieutenant General Charles Lawrence Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, United States Army, be sent to Addis Ababa, as your personal representative, to: (1) explain to the Emperor why the United States cannot provide Ethiopia with military equipment; (2) encourage the Emperor to avoid large disbursements for military purposes of funds needed for economic development; (3) assure the Emperor, if the question is raised, that the United States takes seriously its obligations under the UN Charter to support the United Nations in effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression; and (4) explain, if the question is raised, why the United States would be unable to send a military mission to Ethiopia. The Secretary of Defense concurs in this recommendation. Attached is a draft of a personal letter from you to the Emperor which General Bolte could deliver."

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[1] Letter from the President, dated May 17, p. 1257.

[2] *Supra.*

2. I arrived in Addis Ababa at noon 12 June together with my party. We were met at the Airport by the American Ambassador and Ethiopian dignitaries. The Guard of Honor, a Company from the Ethiopian 1st Division, presented a well-drilled and well-turned out appearance. On the afternoon of the 12th, I conferred with the Ambassador for orientation and on questions of protocol.

3. On the morning of 13 June, the Emperor received me and members of my party. I presented him with a letter from the President (Tab A) and the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander (Tab B).[3] I also presented him with a sporting rifle from the President, with a suitably inscribed plate, and a pair of binoculars from the U.S. Government, similarly inscribed, an album containing photographs of the Ethiopian troops in Korea, and a set of Korean maps. The Emperor expressed himself as highly pleased and grateful for these expressions of the United States' regard for him. Following this, the Emperor and I had a private conversation in which he outlined Ethiopia's present status and need for military aid (Tab C).[3] The Emperor realized that the question of aid was largely one of priorities and urged a practical solution to this problem. On the afternoon of the 13th, I met with the Minister of War and other Cabinet Members. The Minister of War outlined Ethiopia's status, paralleling his Majesty's conversation, and asked for equipment for two Motorized Divisions (Tab D),[3] and for about two groups of aircraft (Tab E).[4] I replied to the effect that I would submit such requests to the appropriate U.S. authorities, and assured the Minister of War of a sympathetic understanding of their problems. I pointed out, however, that the Korean situation has produced a tremendous drain on our resources which, contrary to popular belief, were not unlimited. At this time, I stressed the fact that the effort in Korea or anywhere else was a joint one and not a U.S. venture.

4. On the morning of 14 June, I visited the Ethiopian Air Force Station at Bishoftu. A demonstration there included landings and take-off by primary students, and dive-bombing and formation flying by advanced students. I was taken on a tour of the field by officers of the Swedish Mission and visited cadet classes in engineering and communications. I was also shown supply and maintenance installations. On the whole, I thought the entire program was extremely progressive, sensible and modest, and within the economy of the country.

5. On the morning of 15 June, I again met with the Minister of War. I again stressed the question of priorities and outlined the order in which I thought Ethiopia should meet this problem, i.e., first, the

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[3] Not printed.

[4] Not found attached to copy in Department of State files.

equipping and maintaining of their troops in Korea; secondly, development of forces to maintain internal security; thirdly, the development of communications; and finally, purely military forces. I further outlined world-wide priorities, pointing out that the United States considered Korea a first priority with Western Europe, Far East and Southeast Asia, Middle East and Western Hemisphere following in that order. I commented on the air force training and suggested that the approach to that problem was on a practical basis. I assured the Ethiopian representatives that their problem would receive thorough consideration in Washigtnon. I also assured them that any aggression against Ethiopia would be considered gravely by the United States.

6. On the afternoon of the 15th, I had a final audience with the Emperor. At this time, he gave me a letter to the President from him (Tab F).[5] I received a decoration in the form of a Grand Cordon of the Order of the Most Blessed Trinity with Plaque. The three military members of my party received the Order of the Star of Ethiopia, Degree of Commander, and the State Department representative, a commemorative medallion. At a luncheon at the British Embassy, I explained my visit to the British Ambassador and assured him the United States has no desire to establish a military mission or, in any other way, "move in" to Ethiopia. On the evening of the 15th, I was a guest of the American Ambassador at a dinner at the Embassy. At this time, he expressed extreme satisfaction with the results of my visit. It was my impression that the mission was successful. From a somewhat reserved attitude, the Ethiopians appeared to thaw steadily and, on our departure, gave us a very warm send-off. In a cable, dated 22 June, the Ambassador noted that an Ethiopian communiqué had been issued after my departure which ended with the statement that the discussions demonstrated solidarity and community of views shared by both Governments and that I had taken with me the best wishes of the Ethiopian people for success of the great undertaking of the United Nations in which the United States had such an important role. The Ambassador commented that this alone signified the success of the mission (Tab G).[6]

7. Prior to departure, Mr. Spencer, the American Advisor to the Emperor, assured me informally that the Government of Ethiopia would welcome a continuance of the US Army Radio Station at Asmara, Eritrea, when the two countries were federated.

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[5] Not found attached to copy in Department of State files.

[6] Not found attached to copy in Department of State files, but in telegram 346 from Addis Ababa, June 16, Ambassador Childs advised the Department that the visit of the Bolté party had measured up to his fullest expectations. He reported also that the Bolté party had left Addis Ababa on June 16 and, after a short stop at Asmara, was expected to arrive in Cairo that night, and leave Cairo on June 18 to return to Washington. (711.551/6–1651)

8. As a result of my visit, I recommend the following in relative order of priority:

a. A training program in Ethiopia for the training of replacements for the Ethiopian contingent in Korea. This program would necessarily include the use of American equipment.
b. An assurance to Ethiopia of US protection of our Radio Station at Asmara.
c. US Assistance for the development of the Ports of Massawa and Assab.
d. Modest assistance for Ethiopia's Armed Forces in the form of reimbursable aid.

Charles L. Bolté
Lt. General, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans

Editorial Note

A United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea, Eduardo Anze Matienzo of Bolivia, was elected by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1950 and given the task of drafting a Constitution for Eritrea in consultation with the groups concerned—the Government of Ethiopia, the inhabitants of Eritrea, and local officials of the Administering Authority, the United Kingdom. The Commissioner spent most of the year in Eritrea and submitted a progress report, dated November 16, 1951, to the sixth session of the General Assembly. Documentation on United Nations actions on Eritrea during the sixth session of the General Assembly is in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1951.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ETHIOPIA CONCERNING A HIGHWAY PROJECT

[For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Addis Ababa February 26 and 27 and May 2, 1951, entered into force February 27, 1951, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1704.]

POINT FOUR GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ETHIOPIA

[For text of Agreement signed at Addis Ababa June 16, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1227.]

GOLD COAST

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GOLD COAST

125.115H/1-2351

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to the Executive Director of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jago)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1951.

Subject: Proposal to raise the status of the Consulate at Accra, Gold Coast, to that of Consulate General.

Referring to NEA's memorandum of November 29, 1950,[2] on the above subject, it is strongly urged that reconsideration be given the matter in the light of the information contained in despatch No. 130 of November 16 from Lagos[3] and despatch No. 142 of November 25 from Accra.[3] There is additional evidence which supports a reconsideration of AF's proposal, and this will be made available upon request. It will be noted that these despatches, which were received in the Department subsequent to the date of your memorandum, present several reasons in support of AF's proposal to raise the status of the Consulate at Accra to that of a Consulate General. Among the reasons given are enhancement of the prestige of the United States, strengthened relations with Gold Coast officials, and strategic importance of the territory to the United States. It will be noted also that France considers the territory of sufficient importance to maintain a Consulate General at Accra.

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[1] Drafted by Sims and Durnan (NEA/AF).

[2] In despatch 128, August 30, 1950, from Lagos, Nigeria, Consul General Willard Quincy Stanton suggested that the Department of State consider the advisability of elevating the status of the office at Accra, Gold Coast, to that of Consulate General. (125.115H/8-3050) In response to a request from the Department for comments on the proposal, the Embassy in London indicated general support for the measure (despatch 2191, November 8, 1950, from London: 125.115H/11-850). Consul General Stanton reaffirmed his views on the need for a consulate general at Accra (despatch 130, November 16, 1950, from Lagos: 125.115H/11-1650), and Consul Hyman Bloom in Accra confirmed the need and advantages of elevating the Consulate (despatch 142, November 25, 1950, from Accra: 125.115H/11-2550). The memorandum of November 29, 1950, under reference here has not been found. It apparently contained a rejection of a proposal for the elevation of the Consulate at Accra made in a memorandum of October 10, 1950, from Cyr (AF) to Jago (NEA). (125.115H/10-1050)

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, above.

In reconsideration of the proposal to raise the rank of our Office at Accra, we should like to make the following comments on the enclosure to NEA's memorandum:

The conclusion reached that the present is not a propitious time for raising the status of the Consulate is apparently based on the premise that the Gold Coast is less advanced economically and politically than Nigeria. This, of course, is not the case.

It is difficult to make a comparison of the natural wealth or the potentialities of the two territories. No complete survey of the resources of either area has ever been made, and development schemes which are underway will quite likely change the entire economy of the two territories in the course of the next few years. We do know, however, that the Gold Coast presently enjoys a per capita income far in excess of that of Nigeria, despite its smaller area and population.

Strategically, the Gold Coast is very important to the United States, both as a potential military base and as a source of supply for strategic materials. During the last war, the United States Army Forces maintained a base in the Gold Coast which served as a key link in the only air-route connecting the West with the Middle East. Headquarters were also maintained at Accra by The Central West African Office of the Foreign Economic Administration and the West African Office of Strategic Services. The Gold Coast may play an equally, if not more important, part, should there be another outbreak of war in Europe.

We should like to emphasize again that since the last war, Accra has come to be regarded by the British as the administrative center of the four British West African colonies. It now serves as the headquarters of the British Commander-in-Chief (with rank of Major General) of West Africa, the Chief Secretary of the British West African Council, the British West African Court of Appeals, British Intelligence, and the British West African Currency Board. The Gold Coast is also becoming more and more important as the meeting place for various national and international bodies. In recent months, for example, Accra has witnessed a Conference of Directors of Medical Services and an International Conference on West African Education (the latter attended by delegates from British and French territories and from Liberia). Next month, the Eucharistic Congress, at which it is estimated 30,000 Catholics from all parts of the world will attend, will meet at Kumasi.

The most important single reason why we should alter the rank of our representative at Accra is political. The Gold Coast is, and always has been, more advanced constitutionally than Nigeria. Its present constitutional status in British Africa, is, in fact, second only to that of Southern Rhodesia, a territory which enjoys a political status midway between a self-governing colony and a dominion. The new Gold

Coast constitution of January 1, 1951, advances the territory to the last rung of the ladder of self-government by establishing a ministerial system in which all but three of eleven ministers comprising the Executive Council will be Africans. The constitutional progress made in the Gold Coast in the recent years has been phenomenal, and is, in fact, a cause of envy and dissatisfaction among many of the leading Nationalists of Nigeria. It is incorrect to say that Nigeria enjoys by tradition and precedence a preferred position for eventual self-government. No one can predict, of course, when full self-government will materialize in either the Gold Coast or Nigeria. There seems little reason to doubt, however, that the Gold Coast will achieve self-government before Nigeria, and that it will be in the not-too-distant future.

The increasing awareness by the Gold Coast peoples of the difference between their social, economic and political status as compared with that of the rest of the world is one of our major problems and one which challenges our very best talent, provided we intend to keep these peoples on our side. Today, the free nations are working to imbue the world with democratic ideals, and so long as the United States supports this policy we cannot help but encourage the desire of peoples under political domination or control to fashion their own destiny. Because the United States, as a member of the modern democratic world, does welcome stable independent governments for all peoples, it is committed to help in reducing the political dependence of other peoples and raising their social and economic standards to a level commensurate with their own efforts and resources. This calls for a great effort in assisting, in any way we can, the people of the Gold Coast along the road to solid social and economic development in order that we can be assured that they will be aligned with the Western world. To do this, abundant understanding and sympathy on the part of our official representative abroad are required. AF does not believe that United States objectives as aforementioned can be accomplished in the Gold Coast by inadequate representation. At this juncture in the development of the Gold Coast, we should maintain, as a minimum, a Consul General of proven ability to carry out the important task of building United States confidence with the new political leaders who are emerging daily in this territory. Also, our representative must win the respect of the local British leaders, and induce them to discuss problems of mutual interest and make available to our government political and economic information on this important region.

Until we elevate our Office in Accra to the rank commensurate with the political advancement being made in that territory and compatible with the level of high caliber British officialdom now administering the territory, the Department will not obtain the cooperation necessary to build and secure the economic and political position it needs in this important area of the world.[4]

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[4] The proposal set forth in this memorandum was apparently not accepted by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and the Consulate in Accra was not elevated during 1951.

945K.541/2-551 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Accra[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, February 20, 1951.

A-30. Reference Consulate's despatch No. 206, February 5, 1951.[2] ECA London has evaluated a preliminary list of projects submitted by the Colonial Office as illustrative of the types for which assistance is desired. The list included the following two Gold Coast projects: (1) A request for $7,000,000 ECA assistance for the building of roads and a new port and (2) an application for $3,000,000 for building a railroad extension from Awaso in the direction of Berekum.

ECA London has given top priority to the first project but indicated that support would be contingent very largely on whether the proposed new aluminum industry is established on the Volta River. ECA considers that the second project falls into a lower priority group for which information will have to be developed in greater detail by the Colonial Office before a final determination can be made.[3]

In order to allocate funds remaining in the Overseas Development Pool, ECA would be receptive to projects falling within the limits of the criteria established for the Overseas Territories. The Colonial Office is the required channel for the submission of such projects, which must be fully documented to qualify for favorable consideration.

ACHESON

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[1] This airgram, which was repeated to the Consulate General at Lagos, Nigeria, was drafted by J. W. McBride (NEA/AF), was cleared by ECA, and was signed by Bourgerie (NEA/AF).

[2] Not printed.

[3] Airgram A-34, March 5, to Accra, reported that the British Colonial Office had decided not to include the $7 million item for roads and a new harbor in the list of projects for priority consideration in view of the unsettled political situation in the Gold Coast. The latest listing of ECA projects on which the Colonial Office agreed included $3 million for enlargement of the Takoradi harbor and $1.1 million for improvement of the Achiasi-Newasan railroad. (945K.541/3-551)

Editorial Note

Kwame Nkrumah, Leader of Government Business of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly (Prime Minister), visited Washington unofficially on June 7 and 8 at the invitation of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee. The proposal to invite Nkrumah to Washington was set forth in a memorandum of April 18 from Bourgerie to McGhee:

> "Nkrumah (see attached biography [1]), who occupies a position similar to Prime Minister in the newly-constituted Government of the Gold Coast, plans to visit the United States to deliver the Commencement Address at Lincoln University on June 5, 1951.
>
> "Nkrumah is the leader of the Nationalist Movement in the Gold Coast, and to the complete surprise of the British, his political party, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), won the recent general election. The British regard this election as the 'most daring political experiment yet carried out in Africa . . .' Immediately after the elections the Secretary of State of the Colonies released the following statement, 'It lies with Africans themselves to prove their capacity for self-government, and it is by their performance above everything else that the future course of advancement towards full self-government will be determined, not only in the Gold Coast but elsewhere in Africa'.
>
> "In view of Nkrumah's position as the new national political leader in the Gold Coast, AF believes it would be desirable to accord him some form of recognition during his unofficial visit to the United States and suggests that you act as host at an official luncheon in his honor at Prospect House on Friday, June 8, 1951." (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: File—"Africa")

A formal invitation was subsequently extended to Nkrumah who accepted and arrived in Washington on June 7. Arrangements for Nkrumah's visit are documented in files 611.45K, 110.15 McG, 945K.52, and McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: File—"Africa". Nkrumah and Gold Coast Minister of Education and Social Welfare Kojo Botsio arrived in Washington on the afternoon of June 7. That afternoon they made a courtesy visit to Assistant Secretary McGhee and met with officers of the Department of State and other government departments. The following morning, Nkrumah visited Mount Vernon and the Lincoln Memorial and then attended a luncheon hosted by Assistant Secretary McGhee. Nkrumah was also scheduled to meet with members of the Senate and House of Representatives. No record has been found of any of the substantive discussions between American officials and Nkrumah during this informal visit. For the text of McGhee's remarks at the luncheon of June 8, see *infra*. On June 11 Nkrumah sent the following telegram to Assistant Secretary McGhee from New York:

> "On the eve of my departure for the Gold Coast via London I wish to express to you on behalf of myself and Mr. Botsio our grateful thanks for your kind reception and hospitality and for the sympathetic hearing you gave to my appeal for technical assistance in the development of our country. Please extend our thanks also to all the officers of your Department for their cordial cooperation." (110.15 McG/6–1151)

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[1] Not printed.

Following his return to the Gold Coast, Nkrumah sent the following letter to McGhee on August 8:

> "Words of adequate terms are not within my reach to express my heartfelt thanks for the cordial reception accorded me during my short visit to the United States.
>
> "I also want to thank you for the courtesy and attention shown to myself and the Honourable Kojo Botsio, Gold Coast Minister of Education and Social Welfare.
>
> "The exceptional air of gesture coupled with everything that is worthy of appreciation was characteristic of your making my visit to the United States most comfortable." (745K.13/8–851)

McGhee replied to Nkrumah's letter on August 31 as follows:

> "It was a great pleasure for me to have seen you during your stay in the United States. We here are most interested in the important developments now taking place in the Gold Coast. We are always ready to cooperate with you and your Government in every appropriate manner." (745K.13/8–851)

Assistant Secretary McGhee commented on his luncheon meeting with Nkrumah during his conversation on September 25 with French Embassy Minister Counselor Daridan; see Bourgerie's memorandum of conversation, page 1414.

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468 : File—"Africa"

Remarks Made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) at an Official Luncheon in Honor of the Gold Coast Leader of Government Business (Nkrumah), Washington, June 8, 1951[1]

On behalf of my Government I should like to extend a most cordial welcome to the United States to our distinguished visitors from the Gold Coast, Mr. Nkrumah the Leader of Government Business and Mr. Botsio, the Minister of Education and Social Welfare. Mr. Nkrumah is, of course, no stranger to these shores, having done graduate and post-graduate work in American educational institutions, one of which so signally honored him a few days ago. During this formative period of his life in the United States he came to know us well. He came to know that faith in freedom and progress is a dominant trait in the American character.

Freedom and progress are as indissolubly bound to each other as air is to life. The only limitation we have put on freedom is that it be exercised in such a way as not to interfere with the freedom of others.

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[1] The source text is part of dossier for the visit of Nkrumah to Washington, June 7–8, included in the McGhee Files. Regarding the Nkrumah visit, see the editorial note, *supra*. These remarks were drafted by Durnan of NEA/AF.

This concept of freedom has underlain the development of the United States since its very foundation. It is because of this freedom that we have never been primarily concerned with keeping things as they are. Our main interest is making things better by peaceful means and by the exercise of free choice.

It is the traditional policy of the United States to support orderly movements towards self government. We have followed with keen interest, therefore, the efforts of the British Government over the years to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples in British African territories. January 1, 1951 marks a historical day in the Gold Coast. It may well mark a historical day in Africa. It was on this day that a new Constitution became effective in the Gold Coast, establishing popular elections and granting the African himself broad competence over his own affairs for the first time in African colonial history.

This far-reaching development in British colonial policy has produced misgivings in certain quarters. We, ourselves, have no such misgivings. We have observed the competent and efficient manner with which the preliminary stages of this bold experiment have been worked out cooperatively by British officials and Africans, and the moderation and sense of responsibility shown by the African leaders since the Constitution became operative. We are confident that this experiment in African administration will succeed. It must succeed. The eyes of the world will be focused on the Gold Coast. They will watch with the hope that this first British experiment in African administration will prove beyond doubt that the African is capable of governing himself. They will watch with some degree of anxiety knowing that their many serious obstacles must be overcome. Foremost among these is the difficulty of unifying a diverse people, a people differing in language and customs and varying markedly in degree of political consciousness and economic development. The boldness of the British experiment should be measured in the light of these difficulties. Excuses could have been offered with some reason for instituting less liberal political concessions to the people of the Gold Coast in the management of their own affairs. The decision to go forward in the face of these obstacles can be attributed only to a sincerity of purpose in carrying out the long avowed objectives of British colonial policy of advancing the dependent peoples to self government as rapidly as conditions permit. It represents an incontestable denial of the oft repeated charges of the Kremlin that the British and other Western Nations are intent on keeping dependent peoples in permanent subjection. It is a fitting answer to the Kremlin which falsely sets itself up as the champion of dependent peoples—the same Kremlin which since 1945 has taken over more than 7-½ million square miles of new territory, an area approximately equivalent to the combined area of the colonial territories in Southern Africa, and it is even now intent on further expansion in Asia.

The deepening division between the Soviet Government and the Free World is not, as is sometimes incorrectly thought, a conflict between capitalism and communism. Among the nations of the Free World, in fact, there are some that have chosen a Socialist system. Rather the conflict is between a power-hungry government that is bent on imposing its system on others by force, terror, and every other means, and the community of Free Nations which refuses to be conquered or dominated, or to stand by and see its members swallowed up.

In so far as Africa is concerned it is a major objective of United States policy to assist the African peoples in any way we can in their political, social and economic advancement in accordance with the United Nations Charter. We know, and I feel sure they know, that the Soviets do not offer them the goal to which they aspire, but utter and complete subordination, many times more onerous than any restriction they have known in the past.

Your Government, Mr. Nkrumah, is embarking on a new, untried course. Its success or failure will measure the rapidity with which constitutional advancement is made in other colonial territories in Africa. We appreciate the numerous and formidable obstacles which must be overcome but are supremely confident that your Government will successfully solve them. We wish you success and trust that you will carry back with you the knowledge that the United States Government and its people wish always to remain the friend of the Gold Coast Government and its people.

As a memento of this very happy occasion I should like to present to you, Mr. Nkrumah, a copy of the United States Government Organization Manual, and to you, Mr. Botsio, a copy of a book on the American Educational System.

LIBERIA

PRINCIPAL POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS WITH LIBERIA[1]

Editorial Note

A Liberian Commission, composed of Liberian Secretary of State Gabriel L. Dennis, Liberian Attorney General C. Abayomi Cassell, and Liberian Treasury Economist Charles B. Sherman (later joined by Liberian Secretary of Public Works and Utilities Henry B. Duncan) visited Washington from October 1950 to February 1951. The Commission carried on negotiations during this period with United States officials in seeking American assistance for a Liberian long-range development program. The Liberian Commission also sought to obtain some form of military assistance from the United States.

The negotiations between the Liberian Commission and officials of the United States Government resulted in the conclusion in Washington on December 22, 1950, of a general agreement with Liberia for technical cooperation under the Point Four Program and a memorandum of understanding providing for the establishment of a Joint Commission on Economic Development to survey the resources of Liberia and plan and advise on the Point Four Program for Liberia. In announcing the agreements, the Department of State explained that the Liberian Government would contribute 20 percent of its national revenue toward the cost of the program. It was estimated that the contribution would average about $1 million per year. The annual rate of spending by the United States for the program of technical assistance was expected to reach $850,000 by June 1951. For the lengthy statement issued by the Department of State at the time of the signing of the agreements, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1, 1951, page 27. The Joint Commission met for the first time on March 1, 1951 in Monrovia and frequently thereafter. It was chaired by Liberian Secretary of the Treasury William E. Dennis and included the following Liberian Government officials: Attorney General, Secretary of Public Instruction, Secretary of Public Works and Utilities, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, Economic Adviser (Charles Sherman), and the Director of Public Health and Sanitation. The United States representation on the Joint Commission was headed by the Officer in Charge of the United States Embassy and also included C. Reed Hill, the Technical Cooperation Officer in Liberia, James H. Rives, Public Works Adviser, Frank E. Pinder, Agricultural Adviser, and Colonel Hildrus A. Poindexter, Adviser to the Bureau of Public Health and Sanitation. Documentation on the technical cooperation program in Liberia, including records of the meetings of the Joint Commission, is included in file 876.00–TA.

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[1] For previous documentation on these matters, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1706 ff.

An agreement to provide a United States Military Training Mission to serve in Liberia was signed by Secretary of State Acheson and Liberian Secretary of State Dennis on January 11, 1951. The purpose of the mission was to assist the military authorities of Liberia in the training and organization of the Liberian armed forces in order to increase the internal security of Liberia. For a statement issued to the press in connection with the signing of the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 22, 1951, page 151. For the text of the agreement, see 2 UST (pt. 1) 1. The United States Military Training Mission for Liberia reached Monrovia on August 27, 1951. It was composed of Lieutenant Colonel Raymond E. Contee, Major Leo W. Gibbons, and Major Henry T. Morgan and a staff of noncommissioned officers. Documentation on the Military Mission is included in file 776.58.

For documentation on the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the December 21, 1950 and January 11, 1951 agreements, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume V, pages 1706 ff.

611.76/1–1051

Department of State Policy Statement[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, January 10, 1951.]

LIBERIA

A. OBJECTIVES

The long-range objectives of US policy toward Liberia encompass three principal aims: (1) to assist Liberia to achieve orderly progress in political, economic and social development; (2) resolutely to support Liberia's political independence and territorial integrity; and (3) to maintain our strategic and commercial positions in Liberia.

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[1] Department of State Policy Statements were concise summaries of current U.S. policy toward a country or region prepared by *ad hoc* working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department. These policy statements, which were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad, were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions for comment and criticism. The statements were periodically revised.

B. POLICIES

While our Liberia policy is in some respects similar to our policy toward other underdeveloped territories, our relationship with Liberia requires special treatment and consideration. In 1822 Congress aided in the establishment of Liberia, and since that date we have continued to give an unusual amount of attention to the welfare and progress of this Negro republic, the only one in Africa. Today, in the battle of ideologies between the West and the East, this attention becomes increasingly important as Liberia is the only independent Negro democracy in Africa.

Political. The achievement of our political objectives in Liberia is being advanced by (1) stimulating, through our resident economic and public health missions, much-needed economic and social reforms; (2) encouraging the development by private US enterprise of Liberia's natural resources; and (3) continuing to render upon request appropriate advice to the Liberian Government to assist it in building a sounder government, thereby reducing the possibility of foreign intervention. We will always make it clear that unprovoked interference or intervention in the internal affairs of Liberia would be firmly resisted by the US.

The kind of public utility, economic and public health assistance which we have furnished and are continuing to furnish Liberia is designed to raise the living standards of its people, and to enable the country to reach as rapidly as possible a stage of development at least comparable to neighboring British and French colonial territories. To this extent we regard Liberia as a proving ground for President Truman's Point IV program[2] to show that underdeveloped areas are capable of rapid economic progress.

The location of Liberia, on the coast of Africa nearest to South America and adjacent to the South Atlantic narrows, is of strategic importance in time of war to US lines of communication, both surface and air, to South Africa and South America. The fact that it is the only territory in West Africa not dependent upon a European nation increases Liberia's strategic significance for us.

Our present military, air and naval rights in Liberia are defined in two agreements. One agreement grants to the US certain military air rights until six months after the official termination of World War II.[3] Under this agreement, we are currently subsidizing the maintenance and operation of Roberts Field, which is being operated by an American company under contract to the Department of the Air Force. In view of the temporary nature of our present military air rights, it would be desirable to conclude a new and more permanent agreement with Liberia. It is expected that this will be done shortly.

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[2] Regarding the December 22, 1950, agreement with Liberia for technical cooperation under the Point Four Program, see the editorial note, *supra*.

[3] The reference here is to the U.S.-Liberian agreement of March 31, 1942, covering the use of airports and defense areas in Liberia. For the text of the agreement, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 275 or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1621. For documentation on the negotiations leading to the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. IV, pp. 355 ff.

The other existing agreement provides for the construction (now completed) and operation of a port and port works at Monrovia.[4] Under this agreement, the US upon its own request can exercise certain military and naval rights inside the port or in the vicinity thereof. By virtue of our extraordinarily close relationship with Liberia, we can be confident of obtaining, if necessary, additional military, air and naval rights.

Upon the request of the Liberian Government, President Truman approved on October 19, 1950 a small US military training mission for Liberia.[5] This mission, details of which are now being worked out by the Department of Defense, will undertake to reorganize and train the present poorly organized and ill-equipped Liberian militia for internal security.[6] Apart from the desire of the Liberian Government for national prestige reasons, to build up some semblance of a military force at least comparable to those of her British and French colonial neighbors, we believe our own expanding interests in Liberia justify the formation of an efficient internal security force for general police duty.

Economic. It is US policy to encourage and assist Liberia, within the framework of its independence, to further its economic development in a balanced and orderly manner. To assure the best possible development of Liberia's natural resources, US as well as other foreign investment and commercial activity in the Liberian economy should be encouraged on a freely competitive basis. Such a policy will also provide a basis for obtaining "equal treatment" for US commercial interests in other African areas.

Economic development in Liberia should in general be undertaken only by those enterprises which are prepared to operate in accordance with business practices that do not restrain competition, limit access to markets or otherwise foster monopolistic control. We maintain an impartial position towards US companies, avoiding becoming identified with any one group. While we do not favor cancellation of existing concessions, we are urging progressive modification of those privileges not in conformity with declared US policy.

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[4] The reference here is to the U.S.-Liberian agreement of December 31, 1943, relating to the construction of a port and port works at Monrovia. For the text of the agreement, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 411, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1357. For documentation on the negotiations leading to the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 678 ff.

[5] For documentation on President Truman's action under reference here, see *ibid.*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1706 ff.

[6] Regarding the agreement of January 11, forecast in this sentence, see the editorial note, *supra*.

Our policy is implemented through public statements of US approval of progressive measures undertaken by Liberia to improve its economy and strengthen its government; advice to the Liberian Government on financial and political matters; agricultural, economic and public health surveys and development programs now being undertaken by US economic and public health missions; and suggestions, both formal and informal, about reforms which should be made in the Liberian political, economic and social structures.

The port of Monrovia, which was constructed through the expenditure of over $20,000,000 of lend-lease funds, is now operating as a free port facility, the only one of its kind in West Africa, under the Monrovia Port Management Company. This company was organized at the instance of the Department of State by a group of American business interests operating in Liberia. Its functions are set forth in a detailed contract with the Liberian Government, as contemplated in the original Lend-Lease Agreement between the US and Liberia.

So long as the Management Company is composed of primary users of the port, it is our policy to have the firms participating in the Management Company represent a cross-section of commercial activity in Liberia. To that end, we would not oppose participation of other American interests not presently included in the management of the port or participation by foreign interest provided that majority control of the Management Company remains American. The port should be operated at all times in accordance with the criteria of the best interest of Liberia, non-discriminatory practices, and maximum repayment of the funds expended by the US for the construction of the port, consistent with our other general objectives in Liberia. The Management group should grant port concessions only on the basis of a sound utilization survey; leases and concessions granted during the initial period of operation should either be limited to short periods or should be made renewable periodically with rates subject to renegotiation in the light of port traffic and revenues. Because of US interest in obtaining the quickest return on its investment, the Department and other agencies of the Government such as the Treasury Department and the General Accounting Office will have to examine the effectiveness of the operations by means of periodic audits or other examinations of the Management Company's over-all performance of its duties and responsibilities.

While we favor increased private investment and commercial activity, experience with The Liberia Company, organized by Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., indicates that when the views of the Department are sought we should strongly impress upon those connected with new ventures the desirability of concentrating on projects which directly relate to the economic development of Liberia, and which are within their capacity to finance and to carry forward to a successful conclusion.

In view of increasing private investment and commercial activity in Liberia and because of the large US commitments in other areas, the Liberian Government should not be encouraged to expect large-scale financial assistance from the US. However, in cases where Liberia is unable to finance appropriate development projects from its own or private resources, we will consider, as we are doing at the present time, the advisability of US financial assistance. These considerations apply to Liberia's request for a $10,000,000 Export-Import Bank loan to finance a hydro-electric plant and transmission system, water and sewage disposal systems, and a highway improvement and construction project. The Export-Import Bank is in the process of studying these projects.[7]

The US Economic and Public Health Missions to Liberia have been of great assistance to the Liberian Government in helping to promote the economic development of the country and to improve living standards. Plans are now being worked out to expand the activities of these two missions under the Point IV Technical Cooperation program. Tentatively, $850,000 has been allotted to finance these activities, and the two missions as presently constituted will be merged into the operating facility for Point IV Technical Assistance to Liberia.

It is US policy to encourage the development of the Liberian mineral and other resources in ways that will ensure American consumers free and equal access to any newly-discovered sources and permit acquisition of any available supplies for US Government stockpiles. We oppose any arrangement which would allow production or distribution of Liberian products to be controlled by an enterprise participating in a cartel.

On the labor front we are fully aware of the importance of good relations between US-owned firms and Liberian workers in promoting the development of that country and maintaining friendly relations between the two governments. While we do not instruct US firms as to their labor policies, we believe it important that these firms should follow a labor relations policy which would make for a progressively higher standard of living.

We should continue to make available to Liberia technical counsel to facilitate the development of sound financial institutions and fiscal policies.

The importance that Liberia attaches to its participation in an expanding multilateral world trading system is attested by the fact that Liberia was the only country to accept unconditionally the Charter for an ITO. Liberia participated in the Annecy tariff negotiations and acceded to the GATT. Liberia also belongs to the Rubber Study Group. Although we recognize the fact that Liberia is handicapped by the lack of personnel, we should encourage Liberia to attend sessions of the Contracting Parties and Rubber Study Group.

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[7] Regarding the proposed Export-Import Bank credits to Liberia, see NAC Document 1090, January 15, *infra*.

The Department is of the opinion that a direct American-controlled air service between the US and Liberia is highly desirable. We do not, however, consider it advisable to require an uneconomic service to be operated by Pan American Airways so long as a connecting service to Monrovia is available which will permit passengers to obtain through passage without delays between New York and Liberia. A connecting service with Pan American's trunk route at Dakar would have certain advantages over a connecting service at Accra, although it is of course desirable to have connecting services into Roberts Field from both Dakar and Accra.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

The proximity of British and French colonial territories and the general political weakness of Liberia have in the past created problems between Liberia and her more powerful neighbors. The resulting differences have from time to time required US intercession with the British and French to support Liberia's independence and territorial integrity. Today, with the United Nations and the various mutual assistance programs now in operation, the danger of political intervention in Liberia by either of those countries is considerably reduced. However, there are at present active Communist elements in French Guinea and the Ivory Coast, which if permitted to develop and expand, might emerge as a dangerous threat to the Liberian democratic process of government. Any drastic change in the Metropolitan Government of France which might bring the Communists into control of that government would, of course, affect conditions in the French territories surrounding Liberia. Under such circumstances it is almost certain that these colonial territories would change over to communist control.

We approve increased friendly foreign commercial activity in Liberia providing it carries no undesirable political implications. Both Great Britain and France are endeavoring to expand their political influence in Liberia through increased economic activity. Any sign of disinclination on our part to continue any US-sponsored activities, such as the operation of American-built Roberts Field, has been followed immediately by an offer to do so from the British or the French.

Liberia and the USSR do not maintain diplomatic relations and there is no Soviet influence in Liberia.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

The success of our present policy toward Liberia is publicly attested to by President Tubman's frequent re-affirmation of Liberia's wholehearted acceptance of the US as its "next friend". Accelerated American-sponsored economic development in Liberia, with the full support of the Liberian Government, is another example of successful US influence. Success of our policy in the field of positive assistance is reflected in the construction of a port and port works with American funds and personnel, in partial financing by the Export–Import Bank of the Bomi Hills iron ore project, and in financial support by the Department of the Air Force of American-built Roberts Field. Then there are the important benefits to Liberia's economic and social development brought about by the US economic and Public Health missions, financed by the US Government and staffed with American technical personnel. The regular support given the United States in the UN is further evidence of the success of our policy toward Liberia.

While there are no unresolved current policy problems of any consequence between the US and Liberia, there remains much to be done in the improvement of Liberia's economic and political structure, which can be achieved only through the continuation of our present assistance.

There are few obstacles within Liberia which could prevent or seriously hamper the attainment of our objectives. On the contrary, our efforts are made easier by the traditional willingness of Liberia to accept US advice. Failures in the attainment of our objectives in Liberia have in the past resulted from our own lack of perseverance, rather than from any Liberian opposition. These failures have comprised inconsistencies in financial assistance to Liberia in its periods of need, and, from time to time, failure effectively to resist foreign encroachment on the territorial integrity of Liberia. Since 1942, however, we have displayed greater initiative in our policy toward Liberia, and our programs of direct aid and assistance have concretely demonstrated our awareness of our unique role as Liberia's "next friend". Additional assistance-type measures now under active consideration will further strengthen our position in Liberia. These include tentative allocation of $850,000 for a Point IV Technical Assistance program, furnishing Liberia a military training mission, and a possible Export–Import loan for public utility-type projects.

NAC Files : Lot 60 D 137 : NAC Documents

Memorandum by the National Advisory Council Staff Committee to the National Advisory Council

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 15, 1951.

NAC Document No. 1090

Subject: Proposed Export-Import Bank Credits to Liberia [1]

Problem

The Export-Import Bank has requested the National Advisory Council to approve consideration by it of credits not in excess of $5 million to the Republic of Liberia for financing the cost of approved highway improvement and construction projects directly related thereto (NAC Document No. 1084 [2]), including expenditures for technical personnel other than those to be furnished by the Liberian Government or the Technical Assistance Program.

Background

The Republic of Liberia has applied to the Export-Import Bank for credits totalling $10,046,000 to assist in financing:

(*a*) a hydro-electric plant (including transmission and distribution systems);
(*b*) a water supply and distribution system and a sewage disposal system for the capital city of Monrovia; and
(*c*) a highway development program and related construction projects.

This application is an outgrowth of discussions initiated by Liberia as far back as 1944, of subsequent studies by the United States Economic Mission to Liberia, and of State Department discussions with the Export-Import Bank over a year ago. The Bank is of the opinion that the hydro-electric, water, and sewage projects require more detailed engineering and economic investigation by Liberia before they can be properly appraised.

At this time the Export-Import Bank is prepared to consider financing up to $5 million of projects selected from the over-all road expansion program, as well as services required for study of the other projects. This program has been prepared in close cooperation with the United States Economic Mission. Liberian plans for use of the proposed loan are being coordinated with the program for providing surveying, planning, and supervisory services being projected for Liberia under the Technical Assistance Program. Also, it is understood that the Export–Import Bank would be prepared to permit utilization of a portion of the loan funds to defray the cost of providing additional technical personnel if this should be necessary for the successful execution of the highway projects. The proposed loan is to be used to cover local as well as foreign costs of the proposed projects. It should be noted, however, that these road projects are part of a total development program to be undertaken in Liberia, which will involve substantial expenditures on the part of the Liberian Government for maintenance and feeder roads.

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[1] Negotiations in Washington regarding the proposed Export-Import Bank credits to Liberia were being conducted on the Liberian side by the Liberian Commission (described in the editorial note, p. 1274). For previous documentation on negotiations regarding the proposed loan to Liberia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1706 ff.

[2] Not printed.

The only possible source of private financing for the Liberian Government would be under the terms of a loan contract which was negotiated with the Firestone Rubber Company in 1936. Under this contract Liberia was entitled to borrow a further $2.5 million from the company, but the conditions of this contract included a provision that Liberia would not borrow from any other source without Firestone's consent. For a variety of reasons, which appear to be valid, Liberia does not desire to borrow under this contract. Instead, an agreement has been made to liquidate the outstanding balance of something less than $600,000 before the end of 1953, and Firestone is understood to have waived its control over borrowing from other sources.

Discussion

It is believed that the financing of highway construction represents perhaps the best possible utilization of loan funds for development of the Liberian economy. It is expected that such highways will contribute both to expanded production and exports of such important commodities as rubber, timber, cocoa and oil kernels and to the supply of consumption goods needed by workers employed in these industries, as well as contributing in a more general way to accelerated development of the Liberian economy from the longer-run point of view.

It is roughly estimated that at least $1 million but not more than $2 million out of the $5 million total cost of the projects will represent direct purchases of equipment or materials, such as highway construction equipment, steel and cement, in the United States or Europe. It is hoped that a substantial but unknown portion of the needs for road building equipment can in fact be supplied out of such equipment available from other completed construction projects either in Liberia or French Africa.

Ability to Repay

The ability of Liberia to repay a dollar loan is determined by the balance of payments of Liberia and by the budgetary position of the Liberian Government. Given the fact that the U.S. dollar is the circulating currency in Liberia, and the complete absence of a capital market in the country, this becomes a question of the revenues and expenditures of the Liberian Government.

The total revenues of the Liberian Government for calendar 1950 are estimated at $3.8 million, of which $2 million was from duties on imports. These receipts are expected to be increased, perhaps by as much as $3 million during the next two years, as a result of new arrangements for the payment of an income tax by the Firestone Company and increases already experienced in the price of rubber on world markets. Even over the longer-run, it is probable that Liberia's public revenue annually will be at least $1.5 to $2 million more than at present. On the expenditure side, it should be noted that the Technical Assistance Program which the United States Technical Cooperation Administration is currently working out with the Liberian Government involves the annual allocation of 20 percent of its revenues for the duration of the program beginning with fiscal 1950–51 to finance other development programs out of its own resources. This will involve an allocation of $1.0–$1.3 million of the 1950–51 revenues to the Technical Assistance Program, and the agreed loan repayments to the Firestone Company will amount to approximately $200,000 during each of the next three years.

Since a substantial budgetary surplus has been realized in recent years, it seems reasonable to anticipate that the Liberian Government can carry the debt service burden of this loan.

Proposed Terms

The terms envisaged for this loan by the Export–Import Bank are 18 years maturity and 3-½ percent interest. Although interest will accrue from the date of disbursement, it is anticipated that there will be a six to twelve months grace period before payments covering interest and amortization of principal begin.

Conclusion

Consideration by the Export–Import Bank of the proposed loan to the Republic of Liberia would appear to be desirable. It would, of course, be understood that extending the loan would carry no commitment concerning the granting of licenses for equipment and materials from United States sources.[3]

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[3] Attached to the source text was an "Action Sheet" containing the following "Recommended Action":

"The National Advisory Council advises the Export–Import Bank that it approves consideration by the Bank of credits not in excess of $5 million to the Republic of Liberia for financing the cost of approved highway improvement and construction projects. It is understood that these credits will bear interest of about 3-½ percent, with maturities in the neighborhood of 18 years." National Advisory Council Action No. 449, January 16, indicates that the quoted recommendation was unanimously adopted by the Council through a telephone poll completed on January 16. (NAC Files: Lot 60 D 137: NAC Actions)

Editorial Note

On January 22, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington authorized a credit of $5 million to Liberia for road construction and improvement. The credit was to bear interest at the rate of 3½ percent per annum and to be amortized over a period of 18 years. The Board of Directors also decided the proposed Liberian electric power, water, and sewerage projects required further study before consideration for financing was justified. The views of the National Advisory Council are set forth in NAC Document 1090, *supra.*

A draft text of a credit agreement was soon negotiated between the Bank and the Liberian Commission and forwarded to Liberia for approval. Regarding Liberian President Tubman's concern over the action of the Export-Import Bank and some specific aspects of the draft agreement, see the immediately following pages. The formal agreement between the Export-Import Bank and Liberia for the $5 million highway improvement and construction credit was signed in Washington on February 21. Liberian Secretary of State Dennis, the head of the Liberian Commission in Washington, signed on behalf of Liberia. The Liberian legislature, convened in special session, approved the agreement on August 16.

Basic documentation on the negotiation of the agreement of February 21, including the text of the agreement itself, is included in Department of State file 876.10. Other important documentation on the credit is included in file 103 XMB.

876.00 TA/1-2551 : Despatch

The Chargé in Liberia (Richardson) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA, January 25, 1951.

No. 249

Subject: Point IV Program in Liberia [2]

The statement by President Tubman yesterday morning that he has instructed the Liberian Mission now in Washington to defer any action on the Export-Import Bank loan application [3] seems to jeopardize a large part of the projected Point IV program for Liberia. This decision of the President's is admittedly not economic but political, as was pointed out in the Embassy's despatch No. 193 of December 8, 1950;[4] but it is nevertheless a firm decision, based on the realities of local Liberian politics, as seen by Tubman. Yesterday morning he reiterated strongly that it would be political suicide for him to borrow money for road construction before making definite provisions for a water supply for Monrovia. He considers the water supply even more important than the hydroelectric plant, which is another pet of the politicians. The opening of the Free Port has exacerbated the situation, for the Port sells water to ships calling at Monrovia and also to local residents who are able to haul it away. These residents are principally foreigners, which increases the dissatisfaction of the Liberians and raises further political problems for the President.

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[1] Ambassador Edward Dudley was on leave in the United States from November 1950 until the beginning of April 1951. In his absence, Embassy First Secretary W. Garland Richardson served as Chargé.

[2] Regarding the agreement of December 22, 1950, on U.S. technical assistance to Liberia under the Point Four Program, see the editorial note, p. 1274.

[3] Regarding the January 22 Export-Import Bank decision on a credit to Liberia, see the editorial note, *supra*. Presumably the statement by President Tubman referred to here was that reported upon in telegram 156, January 24, from Monrovia, which is summarized in footnote 2, p. 1287.

With reference to the last paragraph of the Department's instruction No. 19 of January 13, 1951,[4] I have already conferred with President Tubman as to the steps being taken to appropriate twenty percent of Liberian Government revenues for the economic development program, and he stated that this will be provided in the budget.

The final sentence of the Department's instruction, however, shows what I believe to be a miscomprehension on the part of the Department. President Tubman agrees to apply these funds not exclusively toward the implementation of projects and programs recommended by the Joint Commission, but toward the economic development plan in general as outlined in the application for assistance. In other words, development projects which he considers essential but for which he cannot obtain funds elsewhere, will be financed from the twenty percent. This is apt to be the case with the water-works project for Monrovia, which will of course result in there being less money available for Liberia's contribution to other projects.

A somewhat similar miscomprehension is shown in the final paragraph of the Department's instruction No. 17 of January 10.[4] The Liberian Government has not agreed, and in all probability will not agree, to establishing the agricultural laboratory in the immediate vicinity of Booker Washington Institute at Kakata. Although the Liberian Government contributes to the support of the Institute, the Institute is considered a private school, not a Government school. It is true that there is a long-range plan for taking over the Institute and integrating it into the Liberian national school system, but so long as the control of the school remains outside the Government, even though the Government might be represented on the governing board, the Government will not consent to having a governmental institution such as an agricultural laboratory attached to the Institute.

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[4] Not printed.

If any cooperation is to be obtained from the Liberian Government, the agricultural laboratory will probably have to be established in the vicinity of Suakoko, where the Government is showing great interest in the Central Agricultural Station. Mr. Frank Pinder of the Economic Mission concurs in the view that the agricultural laboratory should be planned for Suakoko rather than Kakata.

Finally, I consider it highly advisable that personnel under Point IV not be sent in advance of the conclusion of specific project agreements setting forth in detail the duties and responsibilities of the American personnel sent out. Colonel Poindexter of the United States Public Health Mission and Mr. Pinder and Mr. Rives of the United States Economic Mission concur in this view. All feel strongly, a feeling which I share, that any attempt to force our views on the Liberians will be met either by a blank refusal or by covert sabotage of any plans which they may feel themselves to have been compelled to accept.

W. Garland Richardson

876.10/1-2751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 31, 1951—6 p.m.

102. Pres Tubman's instrs defer Eximbank application and negots Fr interests appear based on unrealistic premises (Embtel 156, Jan 24 and 159 Jan 27[2]). You shld emphasize Bank has not rejected either water or hydro project. Dept considers Bank request for additional data perfectly reasonable and Tubman shld understand door remains open awaiting this info. Additional data required establish soundness water and sewerage project can be collected in short time by Pirnie engineers. Tubman's apparent effort pressure decision by proposed withdrawal road projects and enter negots with Fr interests creating unfavorable impression here.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Meier (NEA/AF) and was approved by Sims (NEA/AF), Bourgerie (NEA/AF), by the Investment and Economic Development Staff, and by the Export–Import Bank.

[2] Telegram 156 reported that President Tubman had informed Chargé Richardson that the Liberian Commission in Washington had been instructed to defer the application for an Export–Import Bank credit in part because Tubman felt that the Monrovia water and sewerage project was politically essential and more important than the road construction project. (876.10/1-2451) Telegram 159 reported that Tubman indicated to Chargé Richardson that the Liberian Government was inclining towards approval to a French banking syndicate for opening a bank in Monrovia. The French group appeared prepared to advance money for the construction of the Monrovia water and sewerage system. (876.10/1-2751) Regarding Liberia's applications to the Export–Import Bank for credits for a number of economic development projects and the negotiations by the Liberian Commission in Washington on behalf of those applications, see the editorial note, p. 1285.

Implied tying acceptance road project loans to contingency that water project must be accepted same time creates impression here LibGovt more concerned with benefits to small group in Monrovia than country-wide development.

Assumption road construction not immed profitable, not valid. On contrary, US Govt believes road projects are ones from which quickest returns may be expected. Each mile new or improved road begins at once yield returns whereas hydro or water system must be wholly completed before returns begin. Advances on road loan, except for revolving fund, will be made as expenditures incurred. These will be small at first increasing in size as work accelerates with largest advances toward end construction period. Since each note is separate obligation, interest and amortization during first three years will be small and no serious burden LibGovt's revenues.

Cancellation clause (art VIII of draft loan agreement [3]) makes clear no cancellation contemplated except for cause. Such clause in all Eximbank loan contracts. If wording unsatis Bank advises suggested changes may be offered for consideration.

While Dept doubts benefits will accrue Liberia from establishment Fr Bank, this matter for Lib to decide. Dept also doubts Fr will finance water system on more favorable terms than now under consideration. Pres Tubman shld, if Fr financing accepted, make sure commitments will not interfere with other loans or assistance for projects not included in Fr financing.

In ur discussion with Tubman you may use any or all foregoing pts as you deem necessary. You shld again remind him Liberia's request for tech assistance is one of largest, and US Govt has endeavored provide assistance most desired by Liberia. Likewise Lib's loan application has recd most sympathetic consideration by Eximbank.

Dept understands Lib Comm has forwarded loan agreement to Pres with recommendation agreement be approved.

ACHESON

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[3] Regarding the completed Export-Import Bank credit agreement with Liberia concluded on February 21, see the editorial note, p. 1285.

876.10/2-351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Liberia (Richardson) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA, February 3, 1951—noon.

160. In frank conversation this morning Tubman emphatically expressed views on proposed loan (Deptel 102, January 31 [1]). He states he emphasized to Meier before his departure waterworks and hydro plant had first priority and Tappita–Tchien road second, that

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[1] *Supra.*

Meier insisted on building other roads first and Tubman regards present projects, particularly road to forests proposal, as effort to force him adopt undesired plan for benefit US economic interests. Malcolm Pirnie[2] has informed Liberian mission Washington reluctant undertake survey unless reasonable assurances (1) critical construction materials will be obtainable and (2) project can be financed near future. Tubman willing postpone hydro and understands Export Import Bank has not definitely rejected waterworks but political considerations (Embdesp 249, January 25[3]) make impossible any road unless preceded or accompanied by waterworks.

I corrected forest road misapprehension and emphasized economic advantages present proposal. Tubman recognizes them but political considerations emphatically dominant.

French offer construct waterworks for $950,000. Detailed offer not yet presented and Tubman refuses see French representatives prior receipt and study of offer.

Revised loan agreement probably satisfactory with clarifying amendments to be given me by Tubman Tuesday but no agreement will be concluded prior waterworks.

RICHARDSON

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[2] American engineering firm.
[3] Not printed.

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103 XMB/2-751

The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the President of Liberia (Tubman)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is with deep concern that I write to you personally concerning the present stage of negotiations between our two Governments for loans to undertake certain developmental projects in Liberia.

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[1] This letter was drafted by Sims (NEA/AF) and was cleared by Gorlitz (ED). Telegram 106, February 7, to Monrovia, explained that the letter was to be delivered the following day to President Tubman by Liberian Treasury official Charles Sherman, a member of the Liberian Commission in Washington, who was scheduled to fly to Monrovia to confer with Tubman. (876.10/2-351) In telegram 169, February 13, from Monrovia, Chargé Richardson reported as follows on Tubman's reaction to the McGhee letter:

"President Tubman very appreciative of letter of Secretary McGhee and of his personal interest. Tubman agrees with everything McGhee says and is answering letter immediately, but he feels US Government approaches matter solely from economic viewpoint while Liberian Government must consider both economic and political viewpoints. He has authorized Liberian Mission sign loan agreement subject to amendments. . . ."

Richardson concluded his report as follows: "Tubman strongly emphasized he does not want nor expect loan difficulties to affect good relations between US and Liberia." (876.10/2-1351)

You are, of course, conversant with the fact that the Export–Import Bank has approved a $5,000,000 line of credit for road development in Liberia. The Bank has also indicated that it will give careful consideration to your Government's request for additional loans to finance a water and sewage project for Monrovia, and a hydro-electric project at such time as more detailed technical data is presented to determine more definitely the nature and type of such projects, and their economic feasibility.[2]

I believe you will agree that this action, together with the results we have achieved with the Technical Assistance Program and Military Training Mission, reflects a spirit of good will on our part, and an honest desire to be of all possible aid to your country consistent with the laws which govern our Executive Departments. As an individual, I can readily appreciate your concern over Monrovia's need for a water and sewage system. However, when these projects are reviewed by the United States Government, represented in this instance by the Export–Import Bank, the provisions of law laid down by Congress in the granting of financial assistance to another country must be applied. The Export–Import Bank must, therefore, adhere to proper banking principles and must judge each loan application on the basis of adequate technical and economic data to prove the soundness of each project.

In order to do this a wealth of information is required, particularly in cases where highly technical construction is involved. It is solely because of the absence of complete technical and economic data that the Bank is not able, at this time, to render a definite answer on whether or not it will grant loans for the water and sewage and hydro-electric projects.

Finally, let me say that in this matter the United States has only one purpose, namely, to render all possible assistance to help advance the economic welfare of your country. Liberia has a host of good and faithful friends throughout the United States, both official and private, and during my tenure as Assistant Secretary of State, I have not found another example to match the unanimity which your friends display in working for the good of Liberia. For me, as I said in my recent letter to you, it is a source of genuine satisfaction to be able to participate in developments designed to bring about greater progress in Liberia, and I want to reassure you that I will continue to pursue this course.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE C. MCGHEE

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[2] Regarding the Export–Import Bank credit to Liberia, see the editorial note, p. 1285.

876.00 TA/1-2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 13, 1951—7 p. m.

112. Dept considers 20% to be set aside by LibGovt to be Libs fair share contribution toward overall technical and financial assistance programs. Interest payments on loans obtained to fin overall program wld be considered by US Govt as legitimate charge against Lib 20% fair share contribution. Ex-Im Bank Loan Agreement not appropriate document in which to spell out items which US Govt considers acceptable developmental expenditures.

Dept suggests Joint Comm make recommendations items which it considers legitimate credits against Lib 20%. Emb Desp 249, Jan 25,[2] causes Dept concern because implication Joint Comm recommendations may be ignored or lightly brushed aside. While Dept appreciates Joint Comm role advisory unless otherwise specifically provided its views and recommendations shld carry great weight with both LibGovt and US Govt. You may assure Pres Tubman substantial majority Joint Comm recommendations crediting interest payments against Lib 20% will encounter no objection US Govt.[3]

In absence Amb (Embtel 150, Jan 22[4]) Chargé d'Affaires will assume ex-officio role on Joint Comm. Dept understands Hill, Poindexter, Pinder, and Reeves [*Rives?*] will serve as US Reps on Joint Comm. Dept approves these designations, and you authorized inform LibGovt accordingly.

Meier and Hill arriving Lib Feb 16.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Sims (NEA/AF), was cleared by Meier (NEA/AF) and Gorlitz (ED), and was approved also by Cyr and Bourgerie (NEA/AF).

[2] *Ante*, p. 1285.

[3] Telegram 171, February 16, from Monrovia, reported that President Tubman was completely satisfied with the Department of State's assurance regarding the 20 percent. (876.00–TA/2–1651)

[4] Not printed. In it the Embassy requested information regarding the American members of the Joint Commission envisaged in the December 22, 1950, U.S.-Liberian agreement on technical assistance. (876.00 TA/1–2251) Regarding the technical assistance agreements, see the editorial note, p. 1274.

110.15 MCG/2-1551

The President of Liberia (Tubman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

[MONROVIA,] 14 February 1951.

MY DEAR SECRETARY McGHEE: Your very interesting letter of 7th instant[2] has been received; and I am exceedingly happy to have been the recipient of it.

The Five Million Dollars line of credit which the Export/Import Bank has approved for road development in Liberia, the granting of which you and several other sincere and genuine friends of this country have lent aid and assistance in obtaining, is well known to me, and I wish here to express the appreciation of the Government and myself to Export/Import Bank and the State Department and other officials of your Government who have been instrumental in affording us this opportunity of development which is so essentially necessary and desirable at this time.

That the Bank has given indications that it will give careful consideration to the Government's request for additional loans to finance a water and sewage project for Monrovia, and a hydro-electric project at such time as more detailed technical data is presented to determine more definitely the nature and type of such projects, and their economic feasibility, I consider a sympathetic and kindly attitude and I am profoundly grateful for this.

I am sure that you can readily appreciate, as you have stated in your letter, my concern over Monrovia's need for a water and sewage system and I can understand and appreciate the fact that the provisions of law laid down by Congress in the granting of financial assistance to other countries must be applied by the Export/Import Bank, and that they must adhere to proper banking principles and must judge each application from the basis of adequate, technical and economic data to prove the soundness of each project, etc., as mentioned in the third paragraph of the letter which you were very graciously thoughtful enough to have written to me.

I am satisfied with the assurance given to me by you that it is solely because of the absence of complete technical and economic data that the Bank is not able, at this time, to render a definite answer on whether or not it will grant loans for the water and sewage and hydro-electric projects, and since Malcolm Pirnie engineers are expected to soon be here, I am hopeful that the complete data required will be available within the next few weeks.

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[1] The source text was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 277, February 15, from Monrovia.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1289.

The Bankers, as financiers, are primarily and almost generally concerned with only the economic phase of any proposition presented to them, but I am sure as a statesman you can appreciate the political aspect of this development program, particularly so when in the Five Year Plan there is hardly anything provided for the improvement and development of our principal cities and towns, and I assure you that if my contention were referred to a plebiscite or referendum in Liberia more than ninety-five per cent of the entire populations of the country, from the remotest interior to the seacoast, would support the position that I have taken.

If I did not believe, in very truth, that the United States were desirous of giving all possible assistance to help advance the economic welfare of this country, I never would have made the approach.

Besides this, the contributions that have and are being made by the United States Government and a number of her citizens and private enterprizes toward the development of Liberia, economically, religiously and socially verify what I have written.

I have striven to the best of my ability, with my whole heart, mind and strength, to develop the closest possible friendly relationship between our two countries because Liberia is the outgrowth of American philanthropy and benevolence, and I assure you that there is nothing that can estrange that relationship so far as the Government and people of Liberia are concerned, not even if the loans for road, water and sewage and hydro-electric fail.

I presume by now the Liberian Mission has informed you that the Legislature will adjourn on the 15th instant and that should the data required by Export/Import Bank be ready against the end of March or April they will be called in Extraordinary Session to consider all loan projects.

Thank you again, dear Secretary McGhee, for the interest manifested in the development of my country, and I most earnestly appeal to you for your continued interest and assistance, for which I assure you of the unswerving gratitude of me personally and of the Liberian Government and people.

With every good wish for your personal welfare and that of your Great Country, I remain now and always,

Very sincerely yours,

WM. V. S. TUBMAN

123 Dudley, Edward R.

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East African Affairs (Sims)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1951.

Subject: Transfer of Edward R. Dudley,[1] American Ambassador to Liberia.

Participants: Ambassador Edward R. Dudley
Mr. Berry—NEA
Mr. Sims—AF

In a meeting this afternoon Ambassador Dudley referred to the conversations he has had with Mr. McGhee, Mr. Peurifoy, Mr. Humelsine, and Mr. Butrick concerning a possible transfer for him. He explained that when Mr. Peurifoy first mentioned such a proposal last June he was, of course, highly pleased, but stated at that time that he preferred to remain in Liberia and complete some of the work in which he was currently engaged. The Ambassador discussed this matter with Mr. McGhee at that time, who agreed that it would be desirable for him to remain in Liberia for a few more months.

The question of Ambassador Dudley's transfer again arose in December 1950, at which time the Ambassador told Mr. Humelsine he would like to review the matter during his period of home leave, and discuss it with him prior to his scheduled return to Monrovia in March. The Ambassador told Mr. Berry that since such good success has recently been achieved in developing: 1) an Embassy building program; 2) a Point Four Program for Liberia; 3) the assignment of a Military Training Mission to the country; and 4) the granting of an Export-Import loan to Liberia, he believes he has made his most important contributions to United States-Liberian relations. Ambassador Dudley offered the opinion that henceforth the work of the American Ambassador to Liberia will be principally confined to supervision of the aforementioned developments. Therefore, he said, after very careful thought he has decided that if the Department wishes to use him in some other area, he is willing and anxious to serve. He made it quite clear, however, that he was not seeking a transfer. But he personally believes that in view of the great problems facing our country in winning the Colored peoples of the world to our side, particularly in Asia, now is the time for our government to demonstrate that it does more than assign only one of its Negro citizens to another Negro country. The Ambassador referred to his conversation with Mr. Butrick earlier in the day, and said Mr. Butrick had discussed the matter in detail and mentioned Burma as a possible assignment.

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[1] Ambassador Dudley was in the United States on home leave; he returned to Liberia at the beginning of April 1951.

Mr. Butrick had explained to him that an opening might develop there soon.

Mr. Berry said that the transfer of a Chief of Mission was decided at a level above where he worked but that he would bring Ambassador Dudley's thoughts immediately to the attention of Mr. Humelsine, and to Mr. McGhee's attention upon his return from abroad. He went on to say that on several occasions he had discussed with Mr. McGhee the eventual transfer of Ambassador Dudley. When the subject first arose, he and Mr. McGhee thought of Burma as a possibility, but shortly thereafter Burma was transferred to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and NEA no longer exercises jurisdictional responsibility for that country. At the time Burma was transferred to FE, Mr. Berry said Mr. McGhee suggested that they keep attention focused on some other post in the NEA area where Ambassador Dudley might serve, but thus far no suitable openings have developed in NEA. Mr. Berry said that Burma would certainly offer great opportunities for the Ambassador's talents. Mr. Berry spoke highly of the Ambassador's ability and his outstanding record in Liberia, and said that all of the Officers in the Department who have dealt with the Ambassador had only praise for the very effective manner in which he conducts our affairs with the Liberians. He said that Liberia is a "show-case" for us, and thus stands as a notable example of what can be achieved in building good friendly relations with other countries. On the subject of opening a second post in the Foreign Service for Negro Ambassadors, which Ambassador Dudley also raised, Mr. Berry said that he and Mr. McGhee had discussed this subject in general terms many times. There would be obvious political merit in such a move but if action along such lines were decided by the higher authorities, it would be Mr. Humelsine's, or Mr. Butrick's office which would initiate action.

776.00/5-1551 :Despatch

The Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 380

Monrovia, May 15, 1951.

Subject: Political Parties and the General Election of 1951

The election of May 1, 1951, continues the control of the Liberian government by the True Whig Party. The party was organized in 1869, won its first election in 1877. It has not lost an election since that time. Heretofore the perpetual domination of the political scene by the True Whig Party has been accounted for by several factors, the most significant of which are:

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[1] This despatch was drafted by Vice Consul David B. Bolen.

1. The organization of a close-knit group of literate Americo-Liberians who have controlled the illiterate 95 per cent aboriginal element.
2. Election laws and methods of administration have effectively precluded full participation of all citizens in government.
3. Low level of economic development of the Republic over a period of years; thus the traditional dependence of the literate group on government jobs as a source of employment which has prevented the organization of effective opposition drawn from the ranks of the literate elements. This factor has forestalled the social and educational progress of the aboriginal population and has generally accounted for their passive disposition toward government.

Though some of these factors have been mitigated by the Tubman administration, the elections on May 1, 1951, marked a new phenomenon in Liberian politics; namely the lack of participation of a contesting candidate in a presidential election. From 1923 to 1943 three minority parties appeared. Between them they contested each of the presidential elections held during that epoch. In 1923 Thomas J. R. Faulkner sought nomination with the True Whig Party as Vice Presidential candidate but was ruled out by traditional methods. Mr. Faulkner then organized the Peoples Party and opposed C. D. B. King, the True Whig presidential candidate, in the presidential elections of 1923 and 1927. Mr. King resigned in 1930 as a result of a trade–labor scandal. Edwin Barclay became Acting President following King's resignation and in 1931 was elected President of the Republic for a four year term over Thomas J. R. Faulkner. C. D. B. King organized the Unit Whig Party and in 1935 attempted to stage a comeback but was defeated at the polls by Barclay, the True Whig candidate. Barclay secured an amendment to the constitution extending the life of his office from four to eight years and in 1943 "virtually selected Tubman to succeed him."* Mr. Tubman was opposed by James F. Cooper of the Democratic Party.

At least four significant factors emerge from even a cursory perusal of the history of political parties and elections in Liberia. In the first instance all organized opposition to the True Whig Party has been instituted by men who were financially independent of the government. Yet their financial resources have been inadequate to compete with the True Whig Party which employs such devices as enforced contributions which simply means that at least once a year all government employees endorse their monthly checks payable to the True Whig Party. (Excludes foreign personnel employed by the Government). Secondly, only one basic split has occurred within the

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*Buell, Raymond Leslie, *Liberia a Century of Survival*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

ranks of the True Whig Party since 1923. Thirdly, there has been no effective organization of the aboriginal population into effective political opposition parties. Finally, previous election returns have shown evidence of corruption and unfairness.

In recent years opposition parties have appeared which have been effectively controlled. In the spring of 1949 Richard Nathaniel Holder, former Secretary of the Interior under the Barclay administration, organized the Reformation Party and became its eccentric Presidential candidate. At that time Mr. Holder had the support of several high government officials who remained behind the scene. It is also evident that Holder and his better qualified supporters were depending on and worked through the Porro society which has a considerable number of members in Liberia's Hinterland. Through public doles, Tubman succeeded to a degree in reconciling the differences which existed among the malcontents of the True Whig Party or former True Whig partisans. This left Holder and the smaller fry to carry the "war ax" and at infrequent intervals Holder published articles attacking the Tubman administration.

Early in February of 1951 Holder announced that the Reformation Party would hold its national convention on February 27. On February 24, 1951, Holder met President Tubman at Marshall and informed him that he had "grounded arms" which meant that he would not oppose him at the presidential election. Holder's withdrawal from the political campaign was no doubt due to a merger between the United Peoples Party and the Reformation Party which was later to occur.

The second source of opposition to the True Whig Party is of some significance since its organization was based on aboriginal support and found expression through Didwo Twe who organized the United People's Party. The party submitted its application for certification as a political party in July of 1950 to the Elections Commission, which was not accepted on the grounds that Twe did not have the required number of members to register the party. Twe was arrested by police authorities in August of 1950 for alleged seditious activities. He was subsequently released from the force of Ne Exeat proceedings by the Government for the purpose of going to the United States for a prostatectomy. He departed on October 22, 1950, had a successful operation and, as stated by True Whig partisans, disseminated critical propaganda concerning the Liberian Government in the United States. Twe returned to Liberia about April 7, 1951, and was instrumental in effecting a merger between the United Peoples Party and the Reformation Party under the name of the latter. This party held its national convention on April 10, 1951, and nominated Twe as its presidential candidate to oppose William V. S. Tubman of the True Whig Party. Twe was estopped from participation in the presidential elections of

May 1, 1951, on the legal ground that the Reformation Party did not register Twe as presidential candidate more than 60 days prior to the election. Thus the True Whig Party carried the name of William V. S. Tubman to the polls on May 1, 1951, unchallenged.

Despite the tendency of the present administration to treat all opposition as inimical to the best interest of the Government, it became increasingly apparent during the recent political campaign that President Tubman and other significant True Whig partisans are desirous of a multi-party or bi-party system of politics. C. D. B. King, Liberian Ambassador to the United States, stated to partisans on April 25 that "loyal, sincere, constructive and patriotic opposition must be encouraged." President Tubman has stated unofficially that he will have two political parties in Liberia before he relinquishes control of the Government.

True Whig Partisans, through implication and direct statements during the political campaign, indicated that the superior culture of the Americo-Liberian has gradually assimilated the tribal groups within the Republic. More important, they intimated in substance that the socio-political metamorphosis of the aboriginal population will occur simultaneously with economic development. Throughout the campaign there were expressions of ethnocentrism: Unity, loyalty, patriotism were emphasized. True Whig partisans contended that the type of political opposition which found expression through Twe was not constructive and with this view most foreigners in Liberia concur. It must be remembered that qualified men in Liberia are few and a change in presidency would only result in a reshuffle of present leaders. It is also significant that when aborigines become civilized through social contacts and interactions with the civilized elements, their political concepts are conditioned by that group of which they become a part. Thus, such aborigines have become loyal True Whig Partisans due to their dependence on the Government as a source of employment. The precise course this type of social and political cohesion will follow in the future will depend on the tempo of economic development and will be conditioned by the personality of the "Standard Bearer" of the True Whig Party. As mentioned previously President Tubman has expressed interest in a bi-party system of politics. As President of the Republic for the past eight years he has been distinctly more progressive than his predecessors. This is somewhat manifested in a review of the election laws of the Republic.

Prior to 1945 the organic law governing elections and qualification of voters provided that "all elections shall be by ballot, and every male citizen of twenty-one years of age possessing real estate shall have the right of suffrage." This provision and similar provisions under revised statutes perpetuated the ruling oligarchy of True Whigs. It provided a legal basis to exclude the aboriginal population from the exercise of the right of suffrage because of the existing system of land tenure.

Despite the limitations imposed on the aboriginal population prior to 1945 previous election returns have shown evidence of unfairness. Aggregate votes cast at the general elections on May 4, 1943, as evidenced by official returns was 248,471 of which 245, 364 were cast for William V. S. Tubman, the True Whig presidential candidate, and 3,107 for James F. Cooper, presidential candidate of the Democratic Party. The pertinent provisions of the election laws in effect at that time provided that every male citizen of the age of twenty-one years and upwards residing and owning land in the voting precinct in which he offers to register, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter. (Chapter LXVI, Section 1312 of Revised Statutes.) "Every aboriginal inhabitant, who shall receive a deed in fee simple as provided by law, shall be entitled to vote under the provisions of law relating to registration of voters and elections." (Section 12 of Revised Statutes.) These provisions represent an improvement over the basic law, and appear to broaden the foundation of rule. Their effectiveness in extension of franchise is rather insignificant considered in relation to the communal possessions of land and the fact that few if any aborigines who had not integrated themselves with the Americo-Liberians held land in fee simple. Considering the Communal possession of land and the fact that Americo-Liberians were estimated at 20,000 and assimilated aborigines were even less, it appears highly improbable therefore that 248,471 votes were cast in the general election of 1943.

In President Tubman's annual message of November 1, 1944, he recommended a constitutional amendment providing for tribesmen of the provinces to be represented in the legislature, which during the 1950–51 session of the legislature was extended to the counties and territories. In December of 1945, an act to regulate elections in the Republic was promulgated. The Liberian constitution and this enactment grant the right of suffrage to all citizens of 21 years of age and over who own real estate in fee simple or own a hut in case of hinterland or tribal areas. This enactment prescribes methods for registration of voters, maintenance of rolls, voting, nomination of candidates, and sets up other machinery which theoretically insure fair elections.

A significant aspect of the elections on May 1, 1951, was the fact that it marked the first time in the history of the Republic that women exercised their franchise in accordance with the new law. It was also the first time that aborigines participated in the election of a President.

The unofficial tabulations of the election returns indicated that 155,792 votes were cast in the general elections on May 1, 1951, for William V. S. Tubman and his running mate William Tolbert. On May 10, 1951, the True Whig party had its victory celebration. Approximately 4,000 representatives from all sections of the country par-

ticipated in a rather impressive parade through the streets of Monrovia
displaying a pageantry of bright colors and banners upon which were
recorded the election returns. These returns indicated that between 75
and 80 percent of the potential voters in the various political sub-
divisions actually voted for Tubman. It is significant in this connection
that a number of persons voted who did not comply with the voting
prerequisites with respect to age or property.

The lack of an opposing candidate precludes an accurate apprais
of the returns as compared with previous elections. The returns tend
however, to indicate one characteristic which was not common to pre
vious elections; namely, they bore some reasonable relationship t
estimated population in the political sub-divisions and were somewh
consistent with the probable qualified voters in the area concerned.

EDWARD R. DUDL

876.2614/5-3151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of
African Affairs (Bourgerie)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] May 31, 19

Subject: Liberian Request for an Ex-Im Bank Loan for a W
and Sewerage System for Monrovia.

Participants: Mr. Henry B. Duncan, Secretary for Public W
and Utilities Liberian Government.
Mr. Charles Sherman, Liberian Government E
omist.
Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA
Mr. E. H. Bourgerie—AF
Mr. Oscar Meier—AF

Mr. Duncan and Mr. Sherman called on Mr. McGhee, at th
quest of President Tubman, to ask his assistance in expeditin
request of the Liberian Government for an Export-Import Bank
for a water and sewerage system for the City of Monrovia.[1]

Mr. McGhee stated that he understood that Mr. Oscar Meie
talked to officials of the Ex-Im Bank and they had assured hi
the request of the Liberian Government for a loan was schedu
be discussed at the Ex-Im Bank Directors' meeting on June 5.

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[1] During April 1951 a revised Liberian application for a credit for a wa
sewerage system for Monrovia was presented to the Export-Import Ban
can and Sherman were in the United States on behalf of the Liberian
tion. On March 19 President Tubman had written to Assistant Secretary
requesting McGhee's "sympathetic assistance" to Sherman in his
(876.2615/3-1951) McGhee's reply of April 13 promised careful study
U.S. Government of the Liberian request. (876.2615/3-1951) For a descr
the Liberian request for a credit, see NAC Document 1160, June 22, *infra*.

fore, he thought that no intervention on his part would be necessary at this time.

Mr. Duncan said that President Tubman had also requested that he ask Mr. McGhee whether the Liberian Government could proceed to sign a contract with a French company for the construction of a water and sewerage system for Monrovia prior to approval of the loan by the Ex-Im Bank. Mr. McGhee said that he thought it would not be advisable to do this especially since action on the loan application would no doubt be completed in the very near future. Mr. Sherman pointed out that prices on materials had increased substantially since the Liberian Government first started negotiations with the Export-Import Bank for this loan and that the Liberian Government was becoming very concerned about the increased cost of materials as well as their availability.

Mr. McGhee told Mr. Sherman and Mr. Duncan that he was always glad to see them and that they could assure President Tubman that the Department had the best interests of Liberia in mind, and that we would continue to assist Liberia in its development plans.

NAC Files: Lot 60 D 137: NAC Documents

Memorandum by the National Advisory Council Staff Committee to the National Advisory Council

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1951.

NAC Document No. 1160

Subject: Request by Republic of Liberia for Additional Export-Import Bank Credits

Problem

The Export-Import Bank has requested the advice of the National Advisory Council as to whether the Council perceives any objections to consideration by the Bank of further credits, not in excess of $1,350,000, to the Republic of Liberia for financing a water supply and distribution and sewerage disposal system for Monrovia (NAC Document No. 1152).[1]

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[1] NAC Document 1152, June 8, was a letter from the Secretary of the Export-Import Bank to the Secretary of the National Advisory Council. The letter is summarized here. (NAC Files: Lot 60 D 137: NAC Documents) The Liberian application called for a credit of $2.348 million to finance the construction of a water system and a sewerage system in Monrovia. The Staff Committee of the Export-Import Bank recommended approval of a credit of $1.35 million covering a sewerage system and the first stage of a water system and suspension of action on the remaining portion of the proposed credit pending the accumulation of further information about the project. Responsible officers in the Department of State hoped that the Bank could make more of a commitment to the second stage of the project. Documentation on the position of the Bank and the Department is included in file 103 XMB for May and June 1951.

Discussion

The National Advisory Council in January 1951 approved consideration by the Export-Import Bank of a loan not in excess of $5 million to the Republic of Liberia for financing the cost of approved highway improvement and construction projects. (See NAC Action No. 449 [2]). NAC Document No. 1090,[3] which was prepared in support of this Action, contains the background information pertinent to consideration of additional credits at this time.

Originally the Republic of Liberia had applied to the Export-Import Bank for credits totaling $10,046,000 to assist in financing (*a*) a hydro-electric plant (including transmission and distribution system), (*b*) a water supply and distribution system for the capital city of Monrovia and (*c*) a highway development program and related construction projects. The Bank, however, was of the opinion then that the hydro-electric, water and sewerage projects required more detailed engineering and economic investigation by Liberia before they could be properly appraised. The Bank has now received additional information on the proposed water supply and distribution system and the proposed sewerage disposal system for Monrovia, and is prepared to act on credits for these projects.

Immediate action with regard to this request for additional credits has been urged by the State Department in view of the desirability of having the matter settled before the departure of the Liberian Delegation.

Liberia is one of the countries for which the National Security Council has made a general interim exception from the provisions of Section 1302 of Public Law No. 45 (82nd Congress).[4]

Proposed Terms

The terms envisaged for this loan by the Export-Import Bank (as in the case of the previous loan) are interest of about 3-½% with maturity in the neighborhood of 18 years.

Conclusion

There would appear to be no objection to consideration by the Export-Import Bank of the proposed additional credits to the

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[2] See footnote 3, p. 1284.

[3] Dated January 15, p. 1282.

[4] The legislation under reference here, the so-called "Kem Amendment," provided that nations which wished to be eligible for financial or economic aid from the United States had to certify that they had not exported or knowingly permitted the exportation of arms, armaments, military matériel, or other controlled articles or commodities to the countries of the Soviet bloc. For documentation on the enforcement of the "Kem Amendment" by the National Security Council, see vol. I, pp. 993 ff.

Republic of Liberia, subject of course to availabilities of any equipment and materials required from United States sources.[5]

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[5] The memorandum printed here was circulated under cover of an "Action Sheet" containing the following "Recommended Action":

"The National Advisory Council advises the Export-Import Bank that it approves consideration by the Bank of additional credits, not in excess of $1,350,000, to the Republic of Liberia for financing the cost of the water supply and distribution and sewerage disposal system for Monrovia. It is understood that these credits will bear interest of about 3½%, with maturity in the neighborhood of 18 years."

According to Action No. 472, June 22, this was obtained unanimously by the National Advisory Council through a telephone poll on June 22. (NAC Files: Lot 60 D 137: NAC Actions)

Editorial Note

In June the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank authorized a credit of $1,350,000 in favor of the Republic of Liberia for the construction of a water supply distribution and sewerage system for the city of Monrovia. The credit bore interest at the rate of 3½ percent per annum and was repayable in 36 semiannual installments, the first of which fell due one year after the date of the note. Allocations under the credit were conditioned on Liberia's entering into a contract with a United States engineering firm to provide for the engineering and supervision needed for the construction of the projects. Both the engineering firm and its contract of employment were to be satisfactory to the Bank. Liberia would also employ a contractor on the advice of the engineering firm selected and subject to the approval of the Bank, to perform all construction work necessary for the completion of the projects. A formal agreement covering the credit was concluded between the Export-Import Bank and Liberian Government in Washington on July 11, and was approved by the Liberian legislature, convened in special session, on August 16; for documentation, see Department of State files 876.10 and 103 XMB. For the decision of the National Advisory Council with respect to the credit, see NAC Document 1160, June 22, *supra*.

776.00/7-2351

The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to Eleanor Roosevelt[1]

[WASHINGTON,] August 9, 1951.

MY DEAR MRS. ROOSEVELT: With reference to your note of July 23,

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[1] This letter, which was addressed to Val-Kill Cottage at Hyde Park, New York, was drafted by Farmer (NEA/AF) and was initialed by Sims and Bourgerie of NEA/AF.

1951, and the attachments thereto,[2] I hope the following information may be of some use to you.

Mr. Didwo Twe announced his candidacy for the Liberian Presidency in July 1950 on the United Peoples Party ticket. He then left Liberia in October 1950 for the United States. On returning to Liberia in April 1951, he engineered the merger of the United Peoples Party with the Reformation Party. Then, under the Reformation Party name, he filed his candidacy a second time on April 5, 1951. This application for a place on the ballot was filed only three weeks before election day, May 1, and not sixty days before as required by Liberian law. Consequently, Mr. Twe was refused a place on the ballot. This aspect of the case was apparently handled in conformance with Liberian electoral laws.

Following the denial of a place on the ballot to Mr. Twe, he apparently called upon friends and organizations outside of Liberia to help him obtain redress from what he considered an act of injustice. These actions led him and other members of his party to be charged with sedition, under the rather inclusive Liberian sedition laws. He and the leaders of the Reformation Party were indicted by a grand jury and warrants for their arrest were issued. Mr. Twe went into hiding and has not as yet been found. Some reports indicate he may have left Liberia.

In any case, the Department has received no indication from Liberia that the lives of Mr. Twe and his followers are in any way endangered. However, resentment against Mr. Twe and his party has grown in Liberia as a result of the unfavorable publicity that Liberia has received in the American press during the past few weeks. Responsible Liberian Government officials have been particularly outspoken against what they consider "outside interference" in Liberian domestic affairs. Because of this resentment, Mr. Twe is certainly not in good standing among the members of the Liberian administration, but there is no reason at present to fear that this resentment could take the form of a danger to his life.

With respect to the charges that the present Liberian administration is "anti-native," the history of Liberia in the past ten years is quite to the contrary. The recent Presidential election was, for example, the first in which the native was allowed to vote, suffrage having been granted the native in 1947 by the same President who is now in office.

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[2] Mrs. Roosevelt's one-sentence letter simply asked Hickerson for information about the situation in Liberia. Attached to her letter were (1) a letter of July 5 by a Liberian citizen to John Collier, President of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs in Washington, D.C., complaining of the oppression of oppositionist forces within Liberia, and (2) Collier's letter of July 13 to Mrs. Roosevelt (an honorary Vice President of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs) asking if the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the Department of State, or the President could do anything to protect Liberian oppositionist forces.

Furthermore, many of the high Liberian Government officials are of tribal descent. Among these are the Attorney General, the Secretary of War, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Finally, the present administration has bent its every effort to the betterment of the economic conditions of the tribal peoples. It has worked closely with a health mission and economic mission sent by the United States to Liberia. The main benefits of both these missions accrue principally to the tribal peoples.[3]

Sincerely yours, JOHN D. HICKERSON

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[3] In response to a letter of inquiry of August 21 from Roger N. Baldwin, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the International League for the Rights of Man, Director of African Affairs Bourgerie addressed a letter of September 20 very similar to the letter printed here.

876.10/9-1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley) to the Department of State

SECRET MONROVIA, September 18, 1951—10 a. m.

121. Emb believes Dept's proposal budgetary advice Lib Govt[1] very sound. Agrees authoritative advice needed this stage development. Lib willingness accept such advice hinges on personality of individual and Tubman's learning by extended experience to understand wisdom of accepting expert opinion on fiscal matters. One present source of fiscal mismanagement lies in the supplemental budget provided for under the loan agreement. Under this system annual revenues have been consistently underestimated. The basic budget is based on estimated revenues. This leaves a substantial sum of money each year which is expended unwisely and approved by the legis as a supplemental budget after expenditure.

Therefore part of Dept's recommendation shld include the abolishing of the present system of budgeting funds. This method was all right twenty years ago[2] to protect the loan and allow govt some discretion. It is useless now and leads to abuse by Tubman and others concerned, particularly since the legis is a rubber stamp.

Emb understands Larabee due here this week. Undoubtedly Tubman will discuss loan agreement. Dept's advice solicited soonest.

DUDLEY

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[1] The proposal under reference was first broached in telegram 87, September 15, to Monrovia, not printed. (876.10/8-3151)

[2] The reference here is presumably to the loan agreement of September 1926 between the Government of Liberia and the Finance Corporation of America (the Firestone loan agreement). For documentation on the negotiation of the 1926 loan agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1926, vol. II, pp. 503 ff.

876.10/9-1851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—6:40 p. m.

109. Dept considers it advisable you proceed discuss new proposal to estab fiscal management function suggested Deptel 87 Sept 15[2] and Embtel 121 Sept 18[3] despite Marvey no longer factor FA picture (Embtel 127 Sept 21[2]). Dept believes may be advantageous offer US Govt assistance in getting Firestone cancel clause calling for FA[4] at same time as present proposal made. If you believe such move cld help you sell this idea to LibGovt, suggest you consult with Larabee with whom Dept has already discussed this problem.

As aid to you in presenting this plan to Tubman Dept envisages Special Asst wld assist President in three ways: first in marshalling facts needed for his informed decision on annual appropriations, second in developing long range fiscal program and third in acting as watchdog to see that appropriations are properly expended by govt depts. Emphasis shld be placed on pt new officer wld be in advising capacity to Pres. He wld work closely with Govt Economist and Joint Comm in planning long range program of expenditures consistent with Lib's continuing econ development. This wld provide positive approach Lib's growing needs rather than negative emphasis old FA set up.

Budget agrees secure expert to send Lib for one to three months study LibGovt's fiscal management needs and recommend procedures for establishing function suggested Deptel 87 Sept 15. TCA will provide funds meet all or any part cost this assistance.

Subsequent above study and precise definition of function, Dept will suggest names several persons fill post of "Counselor" or "Special Asst to Pres on Fiscal Affairs". This post wld incorporate functions FA but Dept believes title FA has undesirable connotation and shld not be used for new function. You might stress to Tubman that new function wld complement post econ Adviser held by Sherman, in same sense that Truman has both econ and fiscal budgetary advisers.

First expert can be provided in short time thus giving opportunity prepare any necessary legis for submission to Dec session. While this expert's salary and expenses provided by TCA, the Special Asst appointed later wld be paid wholly by LibGovt.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Meier (NEA/AF) and was cleared by Gorlitz (ED), for the NEA/AF by Feld, Farmer, and Bourgerie, and by the Bureau of the Budget.

[2] Not printed.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] The Loan Agreement of 1926 (see footnote 2, *supra*) included a clause providing for the appointment of a Financial Adviser to the President of Liberia.

As Larabee has cooperated closely with Dept re this problem, Emb shld discuss above with him before approaching LibGovt, even informally. If he has serious objections, consult Dept before acting.[5]

WEBB

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[5] In his telegram 158, October 12, from Monrovia, Ambassador Dudley reported that President Tubman expressed appreciation at the Department's offer of a fiscal expert to study Liberia's needs followed by the recommendation of a highly qualified person attached to the Liberian Government. Tubman indicated he looked with favor on the suggestion but desired to discuss it with his cabinet and key legislators before giving a positive answer. Tubman also expressed the wish for the cancellation of the 1926 Loan Agreement clause requiring the appointment of a financial adviser to the Liberian Government. (876110/10–1251)

776.00/10–1851 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1951.

A–90. The Department believes that recent developments regarding the trial of certain Liberians for sedition[2] necessitate steps to inform the Liberian Government of the United States Government's concern over this matter. Realizing President Tubman's sensitiveness on this subject and the harm done the Embassy's previous actions by independent approaches to the President, the Department leaves to the Embassy's discretion the time and manner in which the following information is given to the President. However, it is believed that fairly quick action should be taken to put this information before the President before considerable harm is done to Liberia's reputation as a democracy.

As the Embassy is aware, the recent Liberian elections[3] have aroused considerable criticism in the United States, particularly in the press. The Department has received protests from various groups and individuals. Some of these protests sprang from self-interest and old grudges against the Tubman Administration. Others were obviously rooted in sincere concern at apparent signs of undemocratic election practices in Liberia.

The Department has defended the legality of the Liberian Government's action in not placing Didhwo Twe's name on the ballot. On the

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[1] This airgram was drafted by Farmer (NEA/AF), was cleared by TCA and L/NEA, and Bourgerie (NEA/AF) signed for the Secretary of State.

[2] In August, approximately 20 members of the Liberian Reformation Party, which had opposed President Tubman during the May general election, were arrested by Liberian authorities and charged with alleged sedition. Reformation Party leader Didwo Twe, one of those indicted for sedition, fled to Freetown, Sierra Leone. The trial of the other Reformation Party leaders was eventually postponed and those charged were gradually released. It was reported that at least one of the prisoners was slain in jail by a fellow prisoner. Documentation on the detention and indictment of the Reformation Party members is included in file 776.00.

[3] Regarding the Liberian general election of 1951, see despatch 380, May 15, from Monrovia, p. 1295.

strength of information received from the Embassy, the D
has also denied recurring rumors that Mr. Twe's life has been

The Department is, furthermore, convinced of President
sincere intention to further Liberia's economic, social anc
progress. It has repeatedly pointed to the progress made und
ministration as evidence refuting many of the arguments us
the President by his critics in the United States.

However, the President's reported insistence on pursuin
tion trial of Reformation Party officials and members is arou
round of protests. Letters and inquiries are already arriving
sons who had formerly been unaroused by protests conce
elections or who had been satisfied with the Department's ex
of the legalities involved. Among these persons is Mrs. Elea
velt,[4] whose position on the United Nations Commission f
Rights makes her particularly important. The Departmen
difficult to justify either to these persons or to itself the pres
tion of what amounts to vengeance for political opposition.

The Department is now trying to form an impressive del
prominent Americans to represent the United States at
Tubman's inauguration.[5] Steps have been taken to have Uni
Air Force and Navy units participate in the ceremonies. Lib
of the nations receiving most Point 4 aid, and is beng point
model of the type of progress achieved under Point 4 type

In view of these facts, it is most difficult to maintain
actions as the proposed trials should be considered as a strictl
Liberian affair. The trial of political opponents is an act rep
most Americans and to most of the peoples associated with t
States in the present fight to protect the free world. The tria
dent Tubman's opponents would reflect upon the United Sta
has evidenced and is evidencing in many ways its frien
Liberia and the present Liberian Government. Rightly or w
political trial of the sort proposed would be considered p
evidence of the lack of real democracy in Liberia. This could
the entire American program in Liberia because of the obviou
reaction on the part of the American public and the Congres

For these reasons, the Department earnestly hopes that the
Government can be persuaded to reconsider or modify its

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[4] See Hickerson's letter of August 9 to Mrs. Roosevelt, p. 1303.

[5] A formal invitation to attend President Tubman's Second Inau
mony in Monrovia, January 5–14, 1952, was delivered to the Departm
by the Liberian Embassy on July 9, 1951. During the remainder
arrangements were worked out by the Department for an America
to the inauguration. Initially the Department considered a delegatio
of Nelson Rockefeller, Mrs. Mary Bethune, Col. Harry McBride, a
Farmer. Eventually a delegation headed by Ambassador Dudley an
Mrs. Bethune, Gen. James Stowell, and Carl Murphy was approved b
Truman and announced on January 1, 1952. For the text of the an
regarding the delegation, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Janu
p. 13. Documentation on the naming of the delegation is included in f

action regarding the Reformation Party. In so doing, it would not only justify the faith and defense of its friends, it would also give the lie to those critics who question the existence of democracy in Liberia.

Please keep the Department informed.[6]

ACHESON

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[6] In his telegram 180, November 3, from Monrovia, Ambassador Dudley replied as follows:

"Tubman position slightly changed in Twe sedition matter. Twe will not be tried *in absentia* (he is now in Freetown). All others indicted for sedition are now out of jail. They will not be tried this term court. Tubman's reason is that a relative of his (Judge Bond from Cape Palmas) has been assigned to this jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. It is now possible all except Twe may never be tried. No softening of attitude toward Twe can be expected this administration, because of Twe's long history of agitation. Feeling generally high: if indictment keeps him out of the country so much the better." (776.00/11-351)

Telegram 219, December 7, from Monrovia, reported that Twe had applied for political asylum in the United States. The telegram observed that Twe was in no danger in Freetown and his presence in the United States might adversely affect U.S.-Liberian relations. The Embassy proposed to refuse Twe's request on technical visa grounds. (776.00/12-751) Telegram 179, December 18, to Monrovia replied as follows:

"Dept concurs ur decision refuse visa Twe without reference polit appeal. Emb shld note Section III-4 Regs (July 1939) which forbids dipl reps US from granting asylum. Also, Hackworth Digest Internatl Law, Vol. II, p. 622 which shows right of asylum never recognized by US as principle of Internatl law, although on occasion there has been sanctioned the granting of temporary refuge to Amer dipl and con missions when necessary for the preservation of human life." (776.00/12-751)

776.5/11-2851: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 28, 1951—7:26 p. m.

160. For Amb Dudley's eyes only. After three weeks feverish effort obtain priority for Lib request mil supplies,[2] Amb King today notified

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Farmer (NEA/AF) and Bourgerie (EUR/AF) signed for the Secretary of State.

[2] In telegram 234, May 5, from Monrovia, Ambassador Dudley reported that President Tubman had instructed the Liberian Embassy in Washington to approach the Department of State for assistance in purchasing small arms for the Liberian Frontier Force. The arms were needed for security and in order to have troops fully armed in time for the Liberian Presidential inauguration in January 1952. Dudley observed that a major portion of the Liberian frontier force currently used wooden guns on parade. (776.5614/5-551) Telegram 204, June 15, to Monrovia, replied that Liberia was not eligible to receive military assistance under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act and the Department was reluctant to take any steps until the United States Military Training Mission for Liberia had reported. (776.5614/5-1551) In October 1951, Lt. Col. Raymond Contee, senior member of the Military Training Mission, was asked by President Tubman to go to the United States to purchase certain small arms and equipment for the Liberian Frontier Force in advance of the Presidential inauguration. (Letter from Ambassador King to Secretary of State Acheson, November 1, 1951: 776.56/11-151) In an exchange of notes on November 16 and 19 in Washington, the Liberian Government agreed to the assurances and undertakings required under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as Amended. For texts of the notes, see 3 UST (pt. 2) 2805; TIAS No. 2450; 167 UNTS 141.

Dept Pres Tubman cancelling order because supplies cld not arrive well before inauguration date. Although shipment has been delayed beyond orig hoped-for shipping date, Lib has received quicker action its request than any other nation requesting mil aid except Canada. There is still strong possibility most items requested cld reach Lib Dec 29–30, which still allows brief training time before later inauguration ceremonies. However, since delivery dependent on several branches of Defense you will appreciate Dept can not give absolute guarantee deadline will be met, but will make every effort do so. This may be disappointing but in view world-wide demand arms in areas more immed threatened, it is better than cld be expected. By suddenly cancelling order and belying all statements made to mil in effort expedite shipment these supplies, Lib seriously damaging strength any future demands mil assistance. This not effort force Lib take any supplies not actually needed. If, however, need for them that which has been presented here by Col. Contee and others, refusal accept supplies on which priority delivery now promised is extremely ill-advised.

FYI this matter handled in poorest possible manner by Contee who did not contact Dept re necessary authorizations until five weeks after his arrival US. Within one week his contacting Dept, Lib declared eligible receive reimbursable aid. In two weeks mil had approved Lib request and procurement begun. Had Contee contacted Dept earlier, shipment cld have been made in time. Present problem is complete negation all Dept's insistence urgency Lib request by Tubman's cancellation.

Emb shld make strongest possible approach Tubman re reconsideration cancellation, which Amb King recommending in tel to his govt.[3]

Emb shld make clear LibGovt fol items not available under any conditions before fiscal 1953: carbines, carbine ammunition, weapons carriers.

WEBB

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[3] In his telegram 212, December 3, from Monrovia, Ambassador Dudley reported that President Tubman had advised Liberian Ambassador King in Washington to disregard the cancellation of the Liberian military order. Tubman explained that he acted previously because of his impression that the order probably would not be approved. (776.5/12–351)

876.00 TA/12-2951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 29, 1951—5 : 20 p. m.

197. Totec. Dept views seriously inclination LibGovt (Embtel 240 Dec 26, 1951[2]) magnify apparent trivialities into major issues. In conference Amb King yesterday Dept made clear this not US concept Mutual Coop envisaged Pt 4 program. Dept suggested and King agreed have heart to heart talk on his return with Pres Tubman convince latter this not best way improve US-Lib friendship.

While Dept concurs Hill's trans probably desirable his interest and programs it unwilling do this summarily. If LibGovt withdraws note and shows, in your judgment, sufficient evidence its sincere desire minimize rather than maximize other personality and operating difficulties, Dept will offer Hill new position he can accept gracefully. Suggest you discuss with Hill.

If Hill and you agree above suggestion you may, in your discretion, advise LibGovt he considering new assignment. Pending his acceptance new assignment, however, Dept thinks he shld remain in charge and LibGovt shld understand its attitude prior Hill's departure will influence extent future TCA coop.

Under above procedure Rives appt acting TCO shld be deferred until Hill departs. In view recent home leave orders, is Rives agreeable remaining until new TCO assigned?

Advise.[3]

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Meier (NEA/AF), was cleared by Feld and Bourgerie (NEA/AF), Gordon (TCA), and Berry (NEA).

[2] Not printed. It reported that the Embassy had received a note from the Liberian Government stating that Liberia was unable to execute the joint technical cooperation program so long as C. Reed Hill remained U.S. Technical Cooperation Officer in Liberia. Ambassador Dudley observed that a series of incidents involving Hill had created an "atmosphere of distrust among Lib officials." In view of the likelihood that no further Liberian cooperation would be forthcoming from Liberian officials on the technical cooperation program as long as Hill remained, Dudley recommended his transfer and the appointment of James H. Rives, Public Works Adviser, to act in Hill's stead temporarily. (876.00 TA/12-2651)

[3] In his telegram 245, December 29, from Monrovia, Ambassador Dudley reported as follows:

> "In lengthy discussion with Tubman today I strongly outlined type of cooperation nec from his govt to insure success of TCA program. Tubman admitted several of his ministers were not lending full cooperation but that after inauguration he wld personally lend time to strengthening his side of the program. He repeated his desire have our continued assistance." (876.00 TA/12-2951)

Telegram 266, January 16, 1952, from Monrovia, reported that the Liberian note of December 26 had been withdrawn and C. Reed Hill planned shortly to leave for the United States. (876.00 TA/1-1652)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LIBERIA CONCERNING RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

[For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Monrovia November 9, 1950, and January 8, 9, and 10, 1951, entered into force January 11, 1951, 12:01 Greenwich mean time, see 2 UST (pt. 1) 683.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LIBERIA CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT OF A UNITED STATES ARMY MISSION TO LIBERIA

[For text of Agreement signed at Washington January 11, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 2 UST (pt. 1) 1.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LIBERIA CONCERNING MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE

[For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington November 16 and 19, 1951, entered into force November 19, 1951, see 3 UST (pt. 2) 2805.]

LIBYA

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT KINGDOM OF LIBYA[1]

Secretary's Letters : Lot 56 D 459

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 9, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of 5 December 1950[2] which raises the question of the manner in which this Government should proceed to obtain base rights from the Libyan Government.

In his letter of 4 April 1950,[3] the Secretary of Defense pointed out that he concurred in the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a multilateral approach to the problem of base rights in Libya might be made by the Governments of the United States, France, and United Kingdom. He further stated that he considered that it would be in our military interest, if political conditions permit, for this Government to approach the Governments of France and the United Kingdom concerning this matter.

It remains the viewpoint of this Department that it would be desirable to adopt a multilateral approach to the problem of base rights in Libya. I feel that the answer to your question of whether this Government should seek base rights from the Libyan Government directly or by way of a sub-lease from the British can better be made after a tripartite discussion of this subject. This Department is prepared to assist you in any appropriate manner in such discussions.

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[1] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1601 ff.

[2] Secretary Acheson, in his letter of December 5 to the Secretary of Defense, noted that the U.S. Air Force was using Wheelus Field in Tripolitania under permission from the British Government, which would stay in force so long as the British remained responsible for the administration of the territory. Since the Department of State understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Wheelus Field a long-term strategic requirement of the United States, a policy recommended by the National Security Council in NSC 19/5 (printed *ibid.*, 1949, vol. IV, p. 571) and approved by the President on August 5, 1949, it was considered necessary to determine how to proceed to obtain base rights from the Government of Libya when it became independent.

Acheson asked the Secretary of Defense whether, from the military point of view, the U.S. Government should seek rights from the Libyan Government directly or by way of a sublease from the British. He also requested a current indication of the locations in Libya for which rights were desired and a precise statement of such rights for use in negotiations.

[3] Not printed.

Your letter expresses the thought that the Libyan Government would undoubtedly require, in return for base rights granted at Wheelus Field, a payment comparable to the deficit in the Tripolitanian balance of payments, estimated at $1,500,000 per annum. It is my understanding that at the time of the London Foreign Ministers Meeting of last May there was general agreement between the two Departments that, as a matter of principle the U.S. officials in any negotiations would maintain a distinction between arrangements for military facilities and the supplying of financial assistance to Libya. Such a procedure is considered particularly desirable from the military point of view because it is consistent with current world-wide practice and because the U.S. might want to use base facilities in Libya over a longer period than it might be necessary to provide financial assistance to the Libyan Government.

With regard to the suggestion that this department would have the primary burden of justifying before the Congress the funds required for the base rights over a long-term period, the Department of Defense cannot agree that the subvention of the Tripolitanian balance of payments should be justified primarily in terms of our strategic base requirements in the area. It might well be preferable for this government to recognize its obligation to participate with like-minded members of the U.N. in supporting financially the future Libyan government until such time as it is self-sustaining. The funds which this department must expend in the improvements and operation of these bases will contribute to reduction of deficit in the Tripolitanian balance of payments. The total amount of this U.S. expenditure is not known at this time, but will be provided the Department of State as soon as it can be estimated.

The locations in Libya for which negotiations are required at this time are for military operating air bases at Wheelus and Castel Benito, details for which have already been presented to the Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have very recently informed me in general terms of rights required for a military base at Tripoli and communication facilities in the vicinity of Tripoli and Tobruk. Information on these bases and facilities will be covered in a later letter.[4]

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

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[4] On January 27, 1951, Secretary of Defense Marshall, in a letter to the Secretary of State, furnished the information that planned expenditures for further development of bases in Libya, based on the assumption that major construction would commence in fiscal year 1952, were estimated to be $1,882,900 in fiscal year 1952; $1,896,900 in fiscal year 1953; and $846,900 in fiscal year 1954. A maintenance expenditure, after completion of construction, was estimated as netting $150,000 annually for the Libyan economy.

The Secretary of Defense stated that it appeared that sufficient benefit to the Tripolitanian economy would result from the planned U.S. expenditures to obviate the necessity of renting the land on which the bases were to be operated, but that, if the Department of State considered that the U.S. Government was obliged to rent the land, an equitable annual rental was estimated at from $20 per acre to as high as $50 per acre where a populated area had been cleared. Subject to on-the-site surveys and selection of base areas, it was estimated that the land requirements would total approximately 2,600 acres. In negotiation for these military rights it was to be understood that when they were no longer required, all permanent improvements were to be relinquished to the Libyan Government without giving rise to cost, compensation, or continuation of any maintenance or rents. The Secretary emphasized that the figures were indicative only and in advance of actual surveys for the purpose of assisting in the necessary negotiations.

On April 3, 1951, Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, USA (retired), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, informed Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews that a firmer set of figures for planned expenditures of funds in Libya for base rights, exclusive of military pay and allowances, that could be expected to benefit the Libyan economy were estimated to be, by calendar year: $2,530,000 in 1951; $4,261,000 in 1952; $4,043,000 in 1953; and $1,012,000 in 1954. Land requirements had been reestimated and amounted to 2,800 acres for the U.S. Air Force and 250 acres for the U.S. Navy, a total of 3,050 acres. Burns noted that the new figures remained planning estimates for the purpose of negotiations for base rights.

On July 2, 1951, Burns furnished Matthews with new estimates for planned expenditures and land requirements in Libya by calendar year: $2,530,000 for 1951; $4,200,000 for 1952; $4,200,000 for 1953; and $1,020,000 for 1954. Land requirements amounted to 2,500 acres for the U.S. Air Force and 600 acres for the U.S. Navy, a total of 3,100 acres for early use. At a future undetermined date land requirements would be increased by 5,000 acres plus three large areas, one of 100 square miles with beach frontage for an amphibious training area, and two circular areas with 3-mile radius for live bombing training.

711.56373/2-1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 15, 1951—7 p. m.

3824. In absence new circumstances requiring change, Dept will take fol course of action in negotiating base agreement covering US strategic requirements Libya:

1. Negots will be initiated probably through Emir soon as Provisional Govt Libya established, it being understood there will be no

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[1] Drafted by Cyr; cleared by AF, USAF, S/S–CR, RA, NEA, BNA, and WE.

public announcement or any promulgation of anything in nature of interim agreement until after independence achieved:

2. US will make direct unilateral approach to Provisional Govt Libya, making every effort coordinate in advance with UK and Fr, so that all advantages of multilateral approach will accrue in addition to retention freedom of action:

3. In negots distinction will be maintained between arrangements for strategic requirements and gen question financial assistance for Libya:

4. During negots US will concede, if necessary, that US will pay equitable land rental, which Defense Dept presently estimates might be from $20 per acre possibly as high as $50 where populated area has been cleared. US requirements Tripolitania involve approx 2600 acres;

5. Until negots demonstrate that precise *quid pro quo* in form of land rental is essential, Dept wld argue that gen welfare Libya wld be served by gen consequences of concluding base agreement, which wld include (*a*) mil expenditures in Libya of approx four and one-half million dols in 1952–4, plus mil pay and allowances spent there in considerable amts, (*b*) enlarged technical assistance program for Libya totalling one and one-half million dols for FY 1952 alone, and (*c*) subsequent to 1954 maintenance expenditures wld net Libyan economy $150,000 annually. Note that above amounts subject to future appropriations by Cong.

6. Upon receipt from Defense Dept of specifics re requirements in Libya, Dept will draft proposed agreement as basis for initiating negots.

Suggest Emb London inform FonOff (re London's Tel 4374 Feb 10).[2] Dept will inform Fr here in general terms of foregoing course of action. Dept will make draft agreement available Brit and Fr soonest and wld be pleased see any drafts they may prepare on this subj.

Defense Dept concurs.

Re Lidel 148 [3] and Tripoli tel 253 Feb 10.[4]

If provisional Tripolitanian Govt is actually established before negots initiated with provisional Govt Libya Clark and ConGen Tripoli are requested to report as of then whether their recommendation that exploratory discussions shld be held with provisional Tripoli Govt is still considered good idea. Meanwhile we shld try be fully prepared discuss problem USAF requirements Tripoli soonest with provisional Tripolitanian and/or Libyan Govts.

ACHESON

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[2] Not printed. (711.56373/2–1051)

[3] Also identified as telegram 257, from Tripoli, February 12. Clark reported that he concurred with the conclusions of telegram 253, from Tripoli, on Wheelus Field. (711.56373/2–1251)

[4] Lynch strongly recommended direct negotiations between the United States and the Libyan Government as the best method of securing base rights. He also believed there should be no direct connection between economic aid or technical assistance to Libya and money the United States would be expected to pay for base rights. (711.56373/2–1051)

711.56373/2-2151 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET TRIPOLI, February 21, 1951—11 a. m.

265. Re Deptel 3824 to London dated February 15[2] and mytel 253, February 9 [*10*] to Department.[3] I have these observations re negotiation of base rights agreement:

(1) As I have repeatedly stated, I believe that economic and technical assistance should not be confused with base rights. Therefore, while I wholly concur with principle enunciated paragraph 3, Deptel under reference I find that principle contradicted by paragraph 5. I perceive no objection to talking in general terms along lines mentioned paragraph 5 in order create atmosphere favorable to satisfactory negotiations. Even here, however, I believe we should avoid linking enlarged technical assistance program contemplated for fiscal year 1952 with base agreement. I think Libyans who have been told so often of high moral principles underlying Point IV assistance to underdeveloped countries might find this approach somewhat surprising.

(2) With respect Point IV I believe US should divest itself of real estate problems in Libya at earliest possible moment. As Department is aware we are now paying rent on land through British to Arab landowners. We should in my opinion suggest to the new Libyan Government that it immediately take over all obligations re land we now use or may need in future. This would go long way toward eliminating source of constant friction in future between US authorities on one hand and Arab population and Libyan Government on other. After voluntary increase in rent payments some months ago actual landowners are probably now receiving equitable compensation for use of their land but to talk of $20 or $50 or any other sum per acre seems to me to miss the point and confuse the issue. What Libyan Government will undoubtedly demand is annual payment in return for which it will allow foreign government to operate military bases with ancillary facilities and rights in this country. . . .

I concur generally with rest Department telegram. After conversation February 17 with Secretary Air Force Finletter I believe he is personally interested this problem and I would appreciate if this telegram could be brought to his attention.

LYNCH

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed; but see footnote 4, *supra.*

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Italian Colonies"

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 30, 1951.

Subject: Final Progress Report on NSC 19/5, "Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies"[2]

NSC 19/5 was approved as Governmental policy on August 5, 1949. It is requested that this Progress Report, as of March 20, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

Important Action and Developments

The situation with respect to the disposition of the former Italian colonies has progressed materially from that described in the First Progress Report on this subject dated May 11, 1950.[3] The resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 21, 1949,[4] is being implemented successfully with regard to independence for Libya and Italian trusteeship for former Italian Somaliland. A decision on the future of Eritrea, which was postponed last year by the General Assembly pending the report and recommendations of a UN Commission which investigated Eritrea, was made in a resolution adopted by the fifth session of the General Assembly on December 2, 1950,[5] under which Eritrea is to be federated with Ethiopia. United States policy with respect to all three of the former Italian colonies has been met in most respects.

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[1] The source text was attached to a cover sheet entitled "National Security Council Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the Implementation of U.S. Position on the Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies (NSC 19/5)." At its 92d meeting, May 23, in NSC Action No. 482, the National Security Council noted the progress report on the Italian colonies. (NSC–S/S (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95: Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1951)

A copy of this progress report in the McGhee Files was attached to a memorandum by McGhee to Webb, dated April 23, drafted by Wellons. The McGhee memorandum recommended that Webb sign the report indicating that U.S. policy on the disposition of the former Italian colonies had been substantially carried out. He added that the remaining problems of reaching agreement with the Governments of Libya and Ethiopia regarding the right of the United States to use certain strategic facilities in Tripolitania and Eritrea were being resolved by the Department of State in conjunction with the Department of Defense, although the agreements could not become effective until 1952. (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: "Italian Colonies")

[2] For text of NSC 19/5, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, p. 571.

[3] The May 11, 1950, progress report, not printed, noted that the implementation of U.S. policy on Libya was affected by a number of factors. Among them were the fact that the local population had not yet agreed on the form of unity or form of government they desired, and the fact that since the Libyans regarded the leasing of military bases as one of their most valuable invisible exports it was probable that the United States would have to negotiate directly with a Libyan or Tripolitanian government and pay a substantial subvention for the continued use of Wheelus Field. (S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: "Italian Colonies")

[4] Resolution 289 (IV).

[5] Resolution 390 (V).

General Implementation

I. *Libya*

A. The UN Commissioner for Libya reported to the fifth session of the General Assembly that he is convinced that the goal of an independent State of Libya will be realized by January 1, 1952, the date set by the General Assembly resolution of November 21, 1949. He has warned, however, that, while the political forms of government may be set up within the prescribed time, Libya will require a large measure of assistance, both technical and financial, to enable it to survive economically and to stand by itself as an independent country. The Department of State concurs with these views.

B. The policy set forth in NSC 19/5 called for the establishment of a united Libya which would "in effect be so tied to the United Kingdom as to assure enjoyment of adequate strategic rights to the United Kingdom and, therefore, also to the United States." This objective is being realized by the following developments:

1. The Arab leaders of Libya agreed on the composition of a National Constituent Assembly which is formulating the constitution for the government of an independent Libya. The membership of the National Assembly (with equal representation of 20 members each from Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan) should assure that the Emir of Cyrenaica will wield a preponderant influence in the formation of the new government. The first acts of the National Assembly were to declare that Libya should have a federal form of government and to invite the Emir Sayed Idriss of Cyrenaica to become the "constitutional king of United Libya". The Emir said he would accept the kingship at the appropriate time, presumably after the establishment of a provisional government of Libya in which he would be able to exercise certain powers.

2. The British, who will continue to administer both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica until Libya becomes independent, have retained their influence with the Emir and, we understand, are planning to negotiate a treaty with his goverment as soon as practicable during 1951. It is likely that this British treaty will be applicable to Tripolitania as well as to Cyrenaica and, perhaps, to all of Libya. The Emir, and his leading supporters, have indicated that they are ready and willing to reach suitable agreements with the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the continued use of military facilities by our respective armed forces. The Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, is now working out the kind of an agreement we would want to have regarding our military facilities in Libya and will commence negotiations as soon as warranted.

3. The linking of Libya with the United Kingdom should be facilitated if, as is expected, the new currency of Libya is tied to the pound sterling. Some economic assistance is being provided to the British Administration through the UN Technical Assistance Program and the United States Point IV Program, both of which are now getting started. In addition, significant financial assistance will probably have to be made available by the United States, presumably

through funds provided for the right to use Wheelus Field and through the money actually spent by our armed forces in Libya.

C. The General Assembly passed a resolution on November 17, 1950, directing that further steps be taken to implement the basic resolution adopted in 1949. This resolution notes in particular the confidence expressed by the UN Commissioner that the aim of the General Assembly that Libya should become an independent and sovereign state will be attained within the time limit. The resolution also:

> 1. *Recommends* (*a*) that a national assembly, duly representative of the inhabitants of Libya, be convened before January 1, 1951; (*b*) that this national assembly establish a provisional government by April 1, 1951, if possible; (*c*) that powers be progressively transferred to the provisional government by the administering powers so that by January 1, 1952, all powers will have been transferred to the duly constituted Libyan Government; (*d*) that the UN Commissioner, aided and guided by the Council for Libya, shall draw up immediately a program in cooperation with the administering powers for the transfer of power as provided in (*c*) above; and
> 2. *Urges* UN organs to extend technical and financial assistance to Libya; and
> 3. *Reaffirms* its recommendation that, upon its establishment as an independent state, Libya be admitted to the United Nations.

D. The UN General Assembly in December 1950 also adopted other resolutions affecting Libya, which are not of immediate concern to the United States, as follows: (1) setting forth the economic and financial provisions relating to Libya, which had not been settled in the Treaty of Peace with Italy, and establishing a three-member tribunal to be appointed by the UN Secretary General which will administer the provisions and settle disputes; (2) providing for Libya to receive technical assistance from the UN after it becomes independent; (3) providing for undelimited boundaries to be delimited by direct negotiation between the states concerned or by arbitration; and (4) deferring discussion of the adjustment of the frontier between Egypt and Libya until the sixth session of the General Assembly.

[Here follow the sections of the report on Italian Somaliland and Eritrea; for text, see page 1250.]

711.56373/5–451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, May 4, 1951—6 p. m.

5764. FonOff anxious learn Dept's latest views on problem of timing defense negots with Libya and possible GA discussion of defense agreements. For this purpose, it wld be helpful to know, if possible by early next week, Dept thinking on following questions:

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[1] Repeated to Paris and Tripoli.

1. Does Dept expect question US and UK base agreements will be raised at next session GA and if so, what line is US prepared take?
2. Does Dept envisage necessity submitting text agreement or showing any other paper covering negots to GA and, if so, what wld it propose nature of such document be? (In this connection, see Embtel 5365 April 10.)[2]
3. Does Dept consider it possible or desirable avert GA discussion by postponing negots, or perhaps limiting them to informal prelim talks with Emir, until after GA session?

FonOff obviously concerned probability GA examination of plans for treaty arrangements, and in timing and tactics wishes keep in close step with US.

Re Deptel 5000, May 2,[3] Stewart has apologized for delay in furnishing info. Delay due largely to continued uncertainties about form and extent aid, in view differences with France, Pelt, etc. Stewart promised ask UK Treas again for such info, which he thought wld for present have be in form of alternatives depending on extent acceptance UK proposals.

GIFFORD

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[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; it reported the Department of State hoped the British were ready to provide further information on a program of financial aid to Libya. (873.10/4–1751)

711.56373/5–451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 15, 1951—5 p. m.

5234. Re Question nr 1 London's tel 5764 May 4:[2] In light experience past GA's, of recent Sov attempts place bases question on CFM agenda and known attitude Egypt and other Arab states, Dept believes question US and UK bases in Libya almost certain be raised next GA. In our view subj will be raised irrespective whether permanent agreements with Libya are in effect by that time. If Libyan independence proclaimed Oct–Nov and Libya makes prompt application for admission UN, question cld also arise in SC.

In Dept's view we must be prepared meet issue squarely, without apology or defensive tactics, stressing increased threat to peace and security free nations and necessity that latter leave no stone unturned to strengthen system of collective security. Base agreements have proved necessary part of that system.

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[1] Drafted by Cyr and Mangano; cleared by AF, UNP, BNA, NEA, WE, USAF, Defense, and S/S–CR.

[2] *Supra*

We feel agreement with Libya shld contain language making clear parties will exercise rights obtained in full conformity with principles and obligations of Charter. Furthermore we are giving consideration to including language in our agreement stating that facilities in question cld be used in support UN collective measures for maintenance or restoration peace and security (perhaps with reference to Uniting For Peace Res). Believe this wld put US and Libyans on strongest possible ground since challenge to base agreements from whatever source wld then involve opposition to UN collective security program which, we assume, will be at center of GA deliberations. Finally, we think Libyan reps, who shld participate in comite discussion Commissioner's report if Libya independence has been proclaimed, will wish point out they convinced such agreements in Libya's interests and are contribution Libya can make toward maintenance internatl security.

Re Question 2 reftel: Dept does not envisage necessity submitting text agreement or showing any other paper covering negots to GA. Conduct Libya's fon relations will be normal and exclusive function Libyan Govt. Conclusion of base rights agreement wld be legitimate act of govt. Early timing negots does not alter this fact. Pelt will have no responsibility for or control over acts of established govt. His mission is confined to assisting Libyan people formulate constitution and establish machinery of govt. His legitimate interest in assisting Libyans devise ways and means for support of Libyan Govt gives neither Pelt nor GA any jurisdiction over base rights agreement which may become a source of such financial support. Of course we wld in due course register agreement with UN Secretariat as UN Charter requires. Experience has shown registration procedure itself, once initiated, consumes several months. By then permanent Libyan Govt wld be estabd and existence of agreement cld be announced much as Den-US agreement re Green has been.

Re Question 3 reftel: Dept believes postponement negots wld not avert GA discussion. By next Nov we sincerely hope considerable mil construction work will have been done in Libya. This work cannot be delayed even though it may provoke GA discussion. Conclusion of agreement shld not lag behind construction any more than necessary. Present indications are that we will try negotiate interim agreement to be signed on behalf US and Provisional Libyan Govt and to remain in force until superseded by subsequent agreement, which wld be negotiated with permanent govt soon as possible. Re para one Tripoli's 378 May 11:[3] Brit and Fr Administrators have powers now it is true, but Dept hopes obtain their assurance power necessary to sign agreement will be transferred Provisional Libyan Govt in time for early signing of agreement. Embs London and Paris are requested approach Brit and Fr FonOffs immed to ascertain whether early trans this power practicable. If not practicable, Libyans cld still negotiate agreement but its signing wld have to await trans of powers. Re para 2 reftel we wld probably have to fall back on exchange of notes procedure if full agreement cannot be reached prior independence, but Dept wishes make every effort reach full agreement prior independence.

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[3] Lynch advised the Department of State that an interim agreement to be signed by the U.S. Government with the Provisional Libyan Government was considered unsatisfactory. Such an agreement would have no legal status prior to independence because foreign affairs were reserved powers of Britain and France as the administering authorities. (711.56373/5-1151)

Progress has been made drafting Libya agreement but now apparent from Tripoli's 378 negots cannot commence before July 9. Plans will be revised accordingly. Meanwhile mil services working on complete and expanded restatement mil requirements Libya. Next step is approach to Cong to obtain assurance US negotiator can offer direct payment for base rights. FYI only, this approach considered necessary because USAF and Dept convinced correctness of Tripoli's view that US will not be able obtain base rights as consequence of US technical assistance or because Libyan trade balance wld be aided by dols from mil construction in Libya but will have to make direct payment. Course of action outlined in Deptel 3824 Feb 15 [4] to London, 148 to Tripoli still contempated, with realization that in last analysis direct payment probably will be necessary as additional and final step. Probable need for direct payments on part of US, UK and Fr may be discussed generally with UK and Fr but, to protect US bargaining position, no indication shld be given whether US ready make such payment.

Prelim discussion with mil indicates mil believes three and probably four necessary on negotiating team. Mil lawyer and one requirements officer each from Air Force, Navy and Army. Dept appreciates views you have expressed and will take them into consideration in making final decision.

ACHESON

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[4] *Ante*, p. 1315.

711.56373/5-1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, May 19, 1951—5 p. m.

6030. Points contained Deptel 5234 May 15[2] discussed at some length with Allen, African Dept, yesterday. Fol is synthesis his tentative views:

1. He agreed question US-UK bases Libya almost certain be raised next GA. While acknowledging neither GA nor Pelt shld legitimately concern themselves this question, he thought fact of matter was that considerable number of members wld insist on seeing drafts or texts any agrmts on pretext GA had insure they presented no impediment effective Libyan independence. It might well be impossible or undesirable refuse submit agrmts. If this done while agrmts still in draft stage, "sixty academic lawyers" wld tear them to pieces, which UK anxious avoid. If, on other hand, agrmts were negotiated and signed with independent Libyan Govt before GA had chance look at them, then GA's only recourse, if it did not like agrmts, wld be nullify Libyan independence and demand extension preparatory period. Doubtful this wld command two-thirds majority.

2. Re earlier independence, Allen doubted it wld be mechanically possible for Libya to proclaim independence before mid Nov, citing slowness constituent assembly, delays involved in organizing elections and difficulties getting together integrated govt team. Allen said he frankly did not think much of earlier independence as a GA tactic. It might backfire on us and arouse much criticism that we had presented GA with *fait accompli*. He indicated that nevertheless it might have advantages outweighing this danger and said UK has not closed its mind on subj.

3. He thought it shld be possible, however, delay consideration Libyan matter sufficiently long by placing it low on agenda and said Pelt had undertaken cooperate in this. Allen felt that with other crucial issues due to come up in forthcoming mtg, there wld be little interest in Libya.

4. Allen did not feel it wld be practicable negotiate interim agrmt with provisional Libyan Govt since he did not see how UK and Fr cld possibly turn over treaty making power. In first place, it wld be difficult relinquish this power in isolation and secondly it is by no means apparent that provisional Libyan Govt in its present embryonic stage cld prudently exercise it. In short, he thought there were far-reaching legal and practical objections to this course.

5. He said present FonOff thinking is merely to show text of proposed UK agrmt to few Libyans (he mentioned Emir, Jerbi and Mahmud Muntassir) before Libyan independence, leaving negots as well as signing until after independence. No hard and fast decision reached however and it is possible sufficient progress might be made thru these informal conversations before independence that agrmt cld be reached within matter of days thereafter. If any considerable delay

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[1] Repeated to Tripoli.

[2] *Supra.*

in signing entailed, UK wld probably regularize presence Brit troops by exchange ltrs or notes.

6. Work continuing on UK draft agrmt. Present thinking is that it shld be as short and simple as possible, covering alliance, bases in gen terms, and payment therefore along similar lines to Jordan and Iraqi treaties. More complicated mil aspects, including schedules of required facilities, wld be contained in supplementary agrmt which might be negotiated after signature of treaty, but it wld also be registered with UN.

7. Allen felt it wld be highly desirable if US, UK and Fr exchanged draft agrmts for mutual comments before discussions with Libyans.

8. In response our question, Allen doubted UK wld ask for precedence for UK dipl rep.

Comment: Emb is furnishing Allen with informal written summary Dept's views as contained Dept reftel with exception last two paras and plans discuss matter further with FonOff at early date. Re negot treaties, we are somewhat disturbed by indications UK may not undertake any negots in more formal sense of word until after independence, whereas Dept wishes make every effort reach full agrmt before independence. Emb feels it essential all three powers concerned shld so coordinate their plans that activities of one do not prejudice objectives of others. Emb feels it wld be highly desirably for same reason that three powers exchange texts before discussion with Libyans, as we assume Dept for its part still intends to do.

GIFFORD

711.56373/6-251 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TRIPOLI, June 2, 1951—6 p. m.

407. In audience with King designate May 29 both he and FonMin expressed conviction that complete accord on strategic facilities agreement cld be reached prior to independence and agrmt signed immed upon independence being established. Neither sees any objection opening informal conversations after July 8 (end of ramadan). Blackley, Brit Resident, in conversation previous to my audience voiced certain reservations to holding of conversations early date. He fears (and with considerable justification) that secrecy wld be non-existent once full scale negots entered into and resultant loose talk locally which wld be encouraged and exploited by local opposition. Also, he fears internatl repercussions. There is little doubt Egypt and Soviet press and radio wld play matter up in worst possible light.

Both King designate and FonMin shy away from idea of any Amer group of experts (see mytel 378, May 19)[1] and cannot understand why one man shld not be able to protect all Amer interests. As Ali Bey Jerbi put it, Libya has no apparatus which wld permit it to set up corresponding group. While I did not specifically refer to "team" or "group" mere idea of more than 2 or 3 persons at most is upsetting to them. It might be advisable keep certain number technical experts in background at Wheelus Field in advisory capacity during conversations.

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[1] Presumably this refers to telegram 378, from Tripoli, May 11, in which Lynch reported that Mitchell of the Air Force informed him of plans to send a negotiating team to assist when talks started with the Foreign Minister. (711.56373/5-1151)

King designate and FonMin emphasized Libya's lack of experience in matters of this kind and FonMin suggested that we might give them advance draft and adequate time to study it before opening conversations. I do not know whether this procedure practicable. In last analysis provincial govt (which will almost certainly mean FonMin Ali Bey Jerbi, PriMin Mahmoud Muntasser, FinMin Mansour Gerdara and Defense Min Amar Shennaib) will probably be advised by Brit experts.

Throughout conversation it was apparent that King designate and FonMin fully expect receive money payments for strategic facilities. I talked of benefit to economy of base expansion, housing projects, runway extension, money spent by Amer personnel and Departmental studies of possible econ aid et cetera other than Point Four and my remarks were recd with complete and obvious lack of interest. I suggest time now ripe to abandon make-believe of obtaining facilities in return for anything but annual cash payments.

Lynch

McGhee Files : Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) and the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie)[1]

SECRET

[Washington,] June 8, 1951.

[Subject:] Questions Affecting Libya Which Pelt is Likely to Raise During His Visit to the Department

As you know, we have acceded to Pelt's insistent desire to come to Washington in the near future for direct talks with the Department on various aspects of the Libyan question. It is expected that Pelt, accompanied by Tom Power, will reach Washington by the first of next week and that talks between the Commissioner and Department officers will take place between June 12 and 14. It is quite likely that Pelt will seek an opportunity to meet with each of you personally. We believe that, for purposes of maintaining a united front in handling the Pelt visit, it is advisable that you meet jointly with the Commissioner. We have arranged that Ambassador Clark extend his stay a few days extra, so that he can take part in the discussions during the Pelt visit. We cannot encourage Pelt to believe that he can persuade the Department to accept proposals or ideas over Clark's head.

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[1] Drafted by Mangano and addressed to Hickerson and McGhee.

The topics which Pelt is likely to raise, together with a brief summary of the Department's position on such topics, are given below.

(1) *Pelt's desire to participate in base rights negotiations with Libya:*

Since Pelt first went to Libya he has taken an understanding attitude toward our contemplated base rights agreements with the new state, but has spoken perhaps too freely on the subject with Libyan leaders; he has also nourished the idea that sizeable payments for such rights would be made by the U.S. (and possibly by the UK and France), and that the United Nations would or should have a voice in supervising the expenditure in Libya of such funds. Of late he has been maintaining that he should be brought into the picture during our forthcoming negotiations with the Libyans on the ground that he will be called upon to defend the base arrangements at the next General Assembly. He will advance the view (in talks here) that unless he is given a suitable role in these negotiations he will not be able to give us strong support on this question at the General Assembly in the face of probable Soviet, Middle-Eastern and Arab State charges that the proposed base agreements will compromise Libyan independence.

Department's Position

The Department's position is that base rights matters are not the direct concern of the United Nations Commissioner nor of the United Nations itself, though we recognize that the subject is likely to be raised in one form or another at the next General Assembly. We see no possible way in which Pelt could participate in our negotiations with Libya, and assume that the British and French (with whom we intend to coordinate our negotiations) feel the same. We have already indicated to the British that we think our agreement with the Libyans should contain language showing full consistency with the United Nations Charter and even suggesting that the base rights obtained could, under appropriate circumstances be used in support of collective measures which may be taken by the United Nations. We do not wish to antagonize Pelt, but we will have to reassert firmly to him the position described above. Of course, we can assure him that it is our intention to register the Libyan base rights agreement with the United Nations at the proper time.

We urge avoidance of discussion with Pelt and Power of possible payments by the U.S. to Libya for base rights. If he presses the subject, no indication should be given that the U.S. intends to make such payments. As you know, although the Department expects that a lump sum annual payment to Libya will be required, the expenditure (by the Defense Department) of funds for that purpose has not yet been approved by Congress. When our direct negotiations begin, it is intended that our representatives will initially point out the substantial benefits to Libya of improvements and expenditures to be made in connection with Wheelus Air Field as well as the contribution being made through technical assistance. We are not yet committed to offering payments for the right to use military facilities in Libya and the Department wishes to retain a free hand on this for bargaining purposes. Therefore, if Pelt raises the question, a direct answer might be avoided by simply saying that U.S. plans are still under consideration. (*For* *your information only*, the question whether or not we should publicly admit that the U.S. will have agreed to pay Libya for base rights is about to be given high-level review in the State Department).

(2) *Future United Nations Machinery in Libya:* While there is no evidence that Pelt himself wishes to find a new job for himself in Libya, he has indicated the belief that continuing United Nations machinery for that country would be advisable after independence. He apparently intends, in his report to the General Assembly, to suggest a United Nations technical and financial commission which would supervise technical assistance and exercise a controlling or supervisory role over financial contributions made in support of the Libyan economy by foreign countries. He argues that only by "inter-nationalizing" such programs can they escape the curse of being branded as a "new colonialism". If Pelt pursues this idea in his report, the members of the Council for Libya can express their views on the matter in footnotes to the report, but Pelt has the means of getting the proposal before the Assembly if he chooses.

Department's Position

The Department has made it known, through Clark and others, that we do not favor any additional United Nations supervisory machinery for Libya after independence, which is to take place at the latest by January 1, 1952. Our position is that once Libya is independent outside supervision of any kind, whether by the United Nations or otherwise, is no longer appropriate *unless Libya specifically requests such supervision*, which does not seem likely. We also feel that establishment of any new United Nations commission would inevitably have the effect of bringing a wide range of Libyan affairs annually to the General Assembly agenda, and we think that most undesirable. On the other hand we see no reason why Libya cannot, at its request, be provided with technical advisers (United Nations and otherwise) who could provide their skills in the necessary fields under the authority of the Libyan government. We would hope to persuade Pelt not to suggest further United Nations machinery in his report to the General Assembly.

(3) *Libyan Currency and Financial Arrangements:* Pelt will come here fresh from the most recent meetings on Libyan currency and budget in which representatives of the U.S., U.K., France, Italy and Egypt have participated and in which Libya has been represented by an observer. He will doubtless give us his ideas on the effectiveness of the arrangements which may have been concluded at the Geneva meetings, and may seek to tie into such discussion his ideas on United Nations supervision of Libya's budget, mentioned in (2) above. While the Geneva meetings have not yet ended, it appears that the French and the Italians (though not the Egyptians) are moving toward acceptance of the more conciliatory British proposals which we have been instrumental in eliciting. If accepted, these proposals would bring Libya into the sterling bloc, but would insure Libyan access to other foreign currencies (including dollars) as needed, and would preserve adequate opportunity for the maintenance of French and Italian commercial and cultural ties with Tripolitania and the Fezzan.

Department's Position

The present trend of discussions at the Geneva meetings is entirely acceptable to the Department and our representatives at Geneva have helped to bring the British on the one hand and the French and Italians on the other hand closer together. We maintain that on this, as on other matters, the final decision and choice must rest with the Libyans.

(4) *Technical Assistance:* Sometime ago Pelt indicated that he hoped to discuss technical assistance in Libya with the Department. We do not have recent details as to particular aspects of the program which he wishes to raise. However, we assume that his main object will be to secure our support for continuing momentum both of the United Nations program and our Point Four projects, and for some method of tying in our program with an internationally-backed Libyan economic development board.

Department's Position

There should be no extraordinary element of controversy in dealing with Pelt on this question except insofar as he may seek to relate it to his idea on some continuing, formal United Nations machinery of a supervisory nature in Libya. Our Point Four agreement with the British (as administering power) for Libya has not yet been signed owing, apparently, to lethargy at some level in the British Government. In a recent meeting with our Point Four people Mr. Clark stressed the urgency of getting this thing going as a matter of keeping faith with the Libyans. Mr. Bourgerie of AF pointed out that the agreement must be concluded before the end of June so that the $150,000 available for this fiscal year can be committed. A cable to London has been sent urging that the British cut through any further delay so that the agreement can be signed in the next two or three weeks. We are, of course, prepared to listen with interest to any progress report which Pelt may wish to give us on United Nations technical assistance in Libya to date. You might advise Pelt that we fully intend that our Point Four program complement, and be coordinated with, the United Nations program, and that conflict or duplication between the two be avoided. However, it will be necessary that the control of our Point Four projects remain in the hands of our own Technical Assistance officials.

(5) *Date of Libyan Independence:* Pelt is understood to feel that Libyan independence (after complete transfer of power by the U.K. and France) probably cannot be proclaimed until very shortly before the January 1 deadline. He cites "technical difficulties". He also believes the Libyan question should be placed far down on the General Assembly agenda, so that it would not be considered until well into January or later.

Department's Position

We feel that Libya will be as ready for independence in late October or November as in December. Egypt (and possibly other states such as Pakistan) may challenge the legality of Libya's constitutional development, since they want a unitary rather than federal state. Our position is that the whole course of development has been entirely legal and correct. Therefore, if the Libyans desire it, we have no objection to Libyan independence by the time the Assembly convenes.

N.B. Ambassador Clark has seen and concurs in the above statement.

357.AG/6-1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tripoli[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 15, 1951—3 p. m.

238. FYI McGhee recd Pelt and Power June 13, Clark participating. Pelt reviewed comprehensively Libyan constitutional development and econ problems. Expressed hope for constitution by mid-Aug and parliamentary elections in Nov followed by estab duly constituted Fed Govt. He expects transfer of powers will coincide with estab of Govt. Unable predict what elections may bring in way of change, if any. Pelt estimates Fed Govt budget at 100,000 pounds. In this connection, uncertainty re sources and coordination of financial support is Pelt's reason for Washington trip.

Re Geneva mtg, Pelt disappointed over Libya's intention adhere sterling area. He described decision as virtually eliminating possibility multi-national participation in budget deficit. Said UK control over Libyan currency plus probable preponderance Brit advisers wld lead to criticism in UNGA that UN res re Libya not being properly implemented. He is not certain Egypts will attack implementation in UNGA. While in Cairo he found evidence that Egypt policy is principally that of Salaheddin and Assam [*Azzam*] Pasha and disliked in some influential quarters. (On Clark's recommendation, Dept planning circulate soon in certain LA and Arab FonOffs plus Rome and possibly others, statement of US views on implementation of UN res re Libya to lay groundwork for later enlisting support if Egypts create issue in UNGA.)

In reply McGhee referred to US support of UN res and to our interest in stable Libya which wld not become cause of internatl friction. He pointed out, however, that it was for Libyans to decide whether join sterling area and to select own advisers. He said we are pleased see UK willing stabilize currency, assume deficits and provide advisers. Pelt agreed test will be how UK uses her influence in Libya. If other nations discriminated against, Libya will become source of friction. Pelt said Libyan use of advisers of various nations wld greatly relieve situation.

After expressing appreciation of Pelt's understanding of our base requirements in Libya, McGhee told Pelt that $1,500,000 has been included in mutual security program for FY 1952 (Pres's msg on this program being forwarded) now before Cong and expressed view that, in light of this though not as *quid pro quo*, Libyans shld see way clear conclude base agreement without additional compensation. (He did not tell Pelt, of course, that we hope have auth in negots to make a direct payment to Libya of an amt yet to be determined in lieu full amt contemplated under mil security program if such proves necessary to obtaining base rights). He also mentioned benefits Libyan economy will derive from increased mil expenditures. Power attempted point out that Point Four program supposed be altruistic and therefore unsuitable as *quid pro quo* for base rights in Libya when gratuitous elsewhere. McGhee stated old Point Four concept must be forgotten in connection with mutual security program. He said its greater flexibility shld make it possible to present at least part of $1,500,000 as available for relieving Libyan budget deficit by being earmarked for projects which might fall within scope of Libyan budget. Pelt and Power agreed that such an arrangement wld probably be palatable to Libyans and preferable to describing $1,500,000 as available generally for technical assistance under Point Four, which to Libyans has come to mean available for payment of US experts' salaries. McGhee emphasized that only small part of mutual security program funds will be used to pay US technicians. Pelt agreeably surprised this new info and felt Libyan budget problem will be considerably eased if Cong takes favorable action on mutual security program. It was made clear to Pelt that projects contained in Pres's budget presentation to Cong are illustrative and that, in final analysis, Libyan-approved projects will be ones supported by mutual security program within terms of enabling Legis. McGhee emphasized mutual security program is not, in its application to Libya, to be considered price for bases. Two matters need not necessarily be tied together, but Libyans shld be able see that if they denied US bases, application of mutual security program to Libya might be affected. From foregoing, it will be clear suggested change in tactics in base negots in last para of Tripoli's 407 of June 2[2] is disapproved by Dept.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Cairo, Tripoli, and New York. This telegram was drafted by Cyr; and cleared by AF, NE, UNP, and S/S–CR.

Throughout conversation McGhee made it clear US opposed to contd UN control Libya after independence. Said UN res does not contemplate continuation control, vehicle for which wld have been UN trusteeship. Majority in UN by its vote declared Libya capable of sovereignty and now estopped from contending that UN must continue control on grounds Libya incapable. Pelt mentioned need for taking wind out of Arab criticism that new type of colonialism or imperialism is developing in Libya. McGhee defended Brit subvention of Libya, comparing case to Jordan, which is not criticized. He said attacks on our bases and charges of imperialism are straight Commie line which must not be permitted to deter us from our objective.

In summary Dept sanguine that conversation has helped Pelt considerably and that prospects of avoiding his opposition in any UN debate greatly enhanced.

ACHESON

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[2] *Ante*, p. 1325.

711.56373/7-2051 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TRIPOLI, July 20, 1951—2 p. m.

21. I am informed by CO Wheelus Field that negotiating team representing three services will arrive here Aug first. Libyan Govt has not been informed of these impending arrivals, and I wish to emphasize: (1) Libyan Govt shld be given ample notice of such a group and (2) number of negotiators shld be held to absolute minimum. In my view draft agreement shld now be presented Libyan Govt for study. After two or three weeks informal discussions cld be entered into with FonMin and whoever else Emir designates.

Both Emir and FonMin expressed considerable apprehension to me when I mentioned possible "team of experts" in my audience with Emir last month. Both emphasized that they had no corresponding experts to meet with such a group and took the line that two or three Americans might sit down with FonMin in a friendly way to work situation out.

Emir and FonMin also urged that we give them a draft of proposed agreement and time to study it. While I have grave doubts about security aspect of giving them advance draft, I see no way out of it and feel that accurate Arabic translation shld be prepared in Washington as neither Libyan Govt nor this office has translators competent to perform a technical job of this sort. At present time, translators attached to UN Comm for Libya are understood to be doing some of this work for Provisional Libyan Govt. I think it wld be most undesirable to have any draft agreement exposed to UN employees of various nationalities and sympathies.

I think we must be extremely careful not give impression of coming into Libya in high-powered manner. These negots are going to be delicate operation and more informal they can be kept more success I think we shall have. It must be remembered that even the FonMin has no great experience in the conduct of fon relations or in international negotiation. While it is probable that he will be advised by the Brit, he is approaching the problem with some timidity in the full knowledge that no matter what arrangement is reached it will one day be the subject of attack by polit opponents in Libya. It is therefore greatest importance that we do not frighten the skittish Libyans by an imposing array of special talent. Hope, therefore, it will be possible keep military team in background at Wheelus Field in advisory capacity.

CO Wheelus also informs me that Prof. A. James Casner, Harvard Law School arriving late July as Secy Finletter's special rep for negots strategic facilities. Wld appreciate info from Dept on subjects Casner proposes discuss and whether notification shld be given Provisional Libyan Govt.

LYNCH

357.AG/9–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, September 25, 1951—4 p. m.

1662. 1. In principle Dept favors acceleration declaration Libyan independence (re London's tel 1442 Sep 19)[2] so it will precede GA Polit Comite discussion of Libya agenda item. Consequently Dept favors necessary acceleration all prelim arrangements, including transfer of powers, and wld support administering powers this connection. Re Nov 1 date, Dept wld point out that the later independence is declared, the more unwarranted will be the inevitable charges of rigging; and urges maximum flexibility be retained re date, as Dept not as worried as FonOff that Libyan item cannot be put lower on polit comite agenda. In other words, Dept agrees acceleration process shld be set in motion now but urges retention as long as possible of discretion in setting independence date. Of course working target date such as latter part Nov wld appear desirable from all points of view.

2. In Dept's view timing of Libyan elections is matter for Provisional Libyan Govt to determine. Dept fully concurs in Clark's view that govt established in accordance Constitution approved by Natl Assembly is "duly constituted."

3. Dept wld prefer avoid even consultative role for Pelt after independence but wld agree this if proves necessary to obtain his acceptance acceleration plan and provided Provisional Govt Libya agrees. In view serious consequences which wld follow Pelt rejection of proposed consultative role after independence, Dept hopes every effort will be made convince Pelt of merits this course action. If Pelt adamant, Dept wld make decision in light situation that time.

4. Dept concerned over probable complications which will arise out of UK effort insert in transfer of powers proclamation their proposed clause permitting Provisional Libyan Govt conclude interim agreements (re London's tel 1462 Sep 21).[2] Dept concurs entirely in Clark's views in Lidel 180 Sep 23, rptd London tel 51, Tripoli 18.[2] Dept also inclined agree clause proposed by Pelt (para two urtel 1462) is sufficient. Dept's concern increased by such reports as United Press desp Alexandria Sep 19 in which Azzam Pasha announced Arab League opposition to any Anglo-Libyan agreement by which Brit force wld

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[1] Drafted by Cyr; cleared by UNP; repeated for information to Geneva (for Clark) and to Tripoli.

[2] Not printed.

remain Libya after independence. This report cited here merely to indicate extent to which Arab League position this subject cld cause trouble if such UK-Libyan arrangements publicly formalized prematurely.

ACHESON

IO Files: Lot 71 D 440

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1951.
SD/A/C.1/374

UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONER FOR LIBYA

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to (*a*) secure formal General Assembly approval of the way in which the steps leading to Libyan independence have been taken; (*b*) repel charges from any quarter that the process of implementing General Assembly resolutions of November 21, 1949 and November 17, 1950 has been attended by a number of illegal steps; (*c*) elicit recognition by the Assembly of the outstanding achievement by the United Nations, the Administering Powers (United Kingdom and France) and the people and political leaders of Libya, jointly, in making possible the completion of the constitution and the establishment of a "duly constituted government" to which all powers have been transferred within the schedule prescribed by the General Assembly; (*d*) stimulate action to carry out the pledge that Libya will be admitted to United Nations membership after achievement of independence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should maintain that remarkable success has been achieved by the UN Commissioner and the UN Council, by the Administering Powers (United Kingdom and France), and most important of all, by the Libyans in carrying out the terms of the General Assembly resolutions of November 21, 1949, and November 17, 1950.

2. The United States should mobilize maximum support for the broad content of the UN Commissioner's Report, and for the way in which he has sought and utilized the advice of the UN Council on particular questions. The United States should strongly advocate General Assembly approval of the fact of Libyan independence, assuming

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[1] Prepared as a briefing paper for the U.S. Delegation to the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was held in Paris from November 6, 1951, to February 5, 1952. Consideration of the Libyan question by the General Assembly began at the 48th to 54th meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on January 23–28, 1952.

that it will have been proclaimed before Assembly discussion of the Libyan item. Where the Commissioner, in his report advances views divergent from those expressed by the United States Representative in the Council for Libya, the United States should support the positions taken by that United States Representative.

3. The United States should take the following specific positions on particular aspects of the question which will arise:

(*a*) The Libyan National Assembly, which prepared the constitution, is "duly representative" of the inhabitants of Libya; the method of choosing representatives to that National Assembly (equal representation for the three parts of Libya) and its membership (*selected* rather than *elected*) was accepted by the United Nations Commissioner with the concurrence of the Council for Libya, after full consultation with responsible Libyan political figures and the local British and French administrations; the basis on which the National Assembly was formed was also accepted implicitly by the General Assembly when that body rejected (November 17, 1950) an Egyptian amendment calling for an elected National Assembly.

(*b*) The idea of federation was not imposed upon the Libyans but was freely chosen by the Libyan National Assembly as the only feasible basis on which unity and independence could be established.

(*c*) The powers of government have been transferred to the Provisional Government by the Administering Powers in orderly fashion, according to a schedule which the United Nations Commissioner helped to prepare. This assured that the "duly constituted Libyan Government" would be established on an independent basis on or before the time limit of January 1, 1952 set by the General Assembly.

(*d*) In accordance with paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution on Libya of November 21, 1949, the Libyan constitution has been determined by the representatives of the inhabitants of the three parts of Libya in their National Assembly, and it is not desirable for the General Assembly to debate the intent of specific elements or decisions embodied in that constitution since it is a matter for the Libyans.

(*e*) The Government of Libya which will have assumed all sovereign powers in accordance with the provisions of the Libyan constitution (whether this takes place before or after elections) is the "duly constituted Libyan Government" foreseen by the General Assembly in paragraph 3(*c*) of its resolution of November 17, 1950.

(*f*) The suggestion made by Mr. Pelt in the General Assembly on November 16, 1950, that the Libyan constitution be considered as a draft to be enacted in provisional form and be made subject to final approval and possibly amendment by the elected Libyan parliament, was not concurred in by the Council and was in effect rejected by the Libyans through their decision to make the constitution a final document, subject to amendment by normal constitutional process.

4. When Libya's independence has been proclaimed and a membership application submitted, the United States should press vigorously for Libya's admission; this position should be made clear in discussions of the present item.

5. The United States should vigorously resist any efforts to have the Assembly call into question the presence of foreign military personnel in Libya or question the existence of military bases in that country. (A separate paper on this subject will be provided).

6. The United States should show sympathetic interest in the proposals, worked out by the UN Commissioner and interested states, recommending to Libya a plan for currency arrangements, for a possible Libyan Development and Stabilization Authority, and for a Libyan Finance Corporation.

[Problems of technical assistance to Libya and monetary and development problems are dealt with in detail in a Committee 2 position paper.] [2]

COMMENT

1. The Delegation should stress the fact that, in the face of numerous difficulties and the shortness of time allowed, the method laid down by the General Assembly for the achievement of Libyan independence has been faithfully and successfully pursued by the Commissioner and the Council, the Administering Powers, and by the Libyans. This achievement is a striking example of the effectiveness of the United Nations in action on a problem for which it assumed responsibility at the end of 1948 and which it has brought to successful solution in just two years since the original General Assembly resolution of November 21, 1949. By emphasizing the very competent performance of the United Nations Commissioner, Mr. Pelt, the Delegation should find it easier to dissuade him from pressing his own ideas on two or three aspects of the problem in which the United States is unable to agree with him. (See Section 2 below).

2. The primary objective of the United States in dealing with the Libyan problem is to have the General Assembly accept and enthusiastically endorse the Commissioner's report and acknowledge with satisfaction the achievement of Libyan independence on schedule. It follows that, when the reports to the Assembly of the Administering Powers (United Kingdom and France) are available, they should also be accepted by the Assembly with some expression of appreciation and commendation to the Administering Powers for the way in which they have discharged their responsibilities in Libya under the General Assembly decisions. The important steps which the Administering Powers have taken (particularly under Paragraph 10 of the 1949 resolution and under paragraphs 3(*c*) and 3(*d*) of the 1950 resolution) have been taken in consultation and agreement with the Commissioner. It is also of importance to give wholehearted support to the way in which the Commissioner has sought and utilized the advice of the Council on particular questions at appropriate stages of his work.

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[2] Brackets in this document are in source text.

While strong general support should be given to the Commissioner, the Delegation should retain sufficient flexibility of position on details to permit the expression of the United States view on two matters on which the Commissioner has a somewhat different approach. The first point involves the view expressed by Pelt on November 16, 1950 in the General Assembly that he would wish to advise the Libyan National Assembly that the constitution, when completed, should be regarded as a provisional one subject to approval and possible amendment by the elected parliament. The United States view on this point is covered in Section 3(*f*) below. The second point of difference rises out of Pelt's idea (paragraphs 126 and 127 of the Commissioner's report) "that the Libyan Government should request the appointment of a [United Nations] resident technical assistance expert who would have advisory powers in the expenditure of foreign aid" extended to Libya. The United States attitude on the role and scope of authority of a United Nations technical assistance resident expert for Libya is given in the position paper on technical assistance for use in Committee II. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to say that the U.S. does not wish to see any form of international supervision or control over Libyan affairs after independence.

3. (*a*) The Libyan National Assembly first met on November 25, 1949, to begin its work on the constitution. The basis on which the National Assembly was to be formed had been decided by the Libyans in the Preparatory Committee (Committee of Twenty-one) which had been established, at the initiative of the Commissioner and the Council, to prepare a plan for the organization of the National Assembly. On October 23, 1949, the Committee of Twenty-one made two fundamental decisions: *first*, that the National Assembly should be composed of twenty representatives each from the territories of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan; and *second*, that the members of the National Assembly from each territory should be *selected* rather than *elected*. These decisions of the Committee of Twenty-One were brought to the attention of the General Assembly during its discussion of the Libyan question on October 30, 1950.

It is to be noted that Paragraph 3(*a*) of the General Assembly resolution of November 17, 1950, (adopted after the General Assembly was informed of the decision of the Committee of 21), does not specify that the National Assembly must be an elected body. In fact, Egypt attempted to amend Paragraph 3(*a*) of the resolution in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on November 17, 1950. Egypt proposed that the text should read "that a National Assembly duly elected and representative of the inhabitants of Libya . . ., etc." The amendment failed, with twenty-four votes in favor, twenty against, and fifteen abstentions. The United States Delegation should point out that the U.S. has consistently maintained, both in the Council for

Libya and in the General Assembly, that the basis on which the National Assembly would be established should be determined by the Libyans. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that had the General Assembly wished to insist that the Libyan National Assembly must be elected, it would certainly have adopted the Egyptian amendment. However, that would have amounted to imposing a particular procedure on the Libyans, thus limiting their freedom of action.

3(*b*) As pointed out in Chapter 1 of the Commissioner's report, the Libyan National Assembly made two decisions, on December 2. 1950: that the form of the Libyan State should be federal, and that the Emir of Cyrenaica, Mohammed Idris el Senussi, should become the King of Libya. It was therefore a *Libyan* decision, whereby the National Assembly itself recognized that a federal system was the only feasible basis on which unity and independence could be established. Any idea of a tighter, unitary form of government (which incidentally would have given Tripolitania the dominant position in the Libyan state because of its greater population) was entirely unacceptable to Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, without whose agreement no unity whatever could be achieved in Libya. Charges by Arab states or the Soviet bloc that federation was forced on the Libyans by the Commissioner and the Administering Powers in order to cover up imperialistic designs or to prevent true unity should be vigorously rejected. The Delegation can conveniently recall the section of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's report to the General Assembly on Libya last fall, in which the Committee stated that:

> "The form of state to be created and whether it would be a unitary or a federal state, must be left entirely to the representatives of the Libyan people, meeting and consulting in a national assembly."

In speaking on this issue, the United States Delegation should assert that the Federal plan was freely chosen by the Representatives of Libya and that any attempt by the General Assembly to impose or demand a tighter, unitary form of government would have destroyed the only basis on which Libyan unity can possibly be achieved. In private discussions with other friendly delegations, the United States should remind them that all members of the free world have a vital interest in the sound and stable development of an independent and unified Libya. We are convinced that anything which would disrupt the federal plan now established could plunge Libya into political chaos, open the way to political agitation and violence, have a harmful effect on the stability of the entire area, and give the Soviets further avenues for penetration of the Near East.

3(*c*). In accordance with Paragraph 3(*c*) of the 1950 General Assembly resolution, powers are being progressively transferred to the Provisional Government of Libya by the Administering Powers in such fashion as to ensure that all powers exercised by them will, by January 1, 1952, have been transferred to the duly constituted Libyan Government. As required by the 1950 resolution, the Commissioner—in cooperation with the Administering Powers—drew up last summer a detailed plan according to which governmental powers would be transferred in three stages beginning in September 1950, so that the process would end just prior to the establishment of the duly constituted government. The Commissioner held preliminary consultation with the Council on this transfer of powers plan late in July, 1951; in September he presented the more fully developed plan together with pertinent decisions by the Libyan National Assembly determining the powers of the Federal Government and of the provincial administrations.

The Council studied the Commissioner's plan and advised him that, in its view, the program for the transfer of powers conformed to the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 387 (V), Paragraph 3. The United States Representative in the Council actively advocated the expression of such advice to the Commissioner. Thus the requirement of having a detailed program worked out between the Commissioner and the Administering Powers, and on which the Council has given its advice, has been fully met. In accordance with that plan the United Kingdom and France have been transferring governmental powers according to the stages prescribed.

If Egypt, other Arab States, or the Soviet bloc charge that the method and timing of the transfer of powers (like other steps in Libyan constitutional development) were improper or illegal, the United States should firmly resist such charges and point out that only those who have some reason to wish to undermine Libyan unity and independence could object to the speedy and orderly transfer of powers which is a central point in the General Assembly resolutions of 1949 and 1950.

3(*d*) Efforts will doubtless be made, by Egypt and others, to insist that the General Assembly should scrutinize the Libyan constitution minutely seeking elements in it to which a number of Member states might take exception. Since it is expected that the Libyan constitution will already be in effect when the Libyan item is considered in the General Assembly, the Delegation can, of course, point out that any attempt by the General Assembly to review or pass upon the Libyan constitution is both out of order and unnecessary. In addition, however, the Delegation should maintain that the Libyan constitution is based squarely on democratic principles, with guarantees for the observance of human rights and the protection of minorities, and with an appropriate distribution of powers as between the federal government and the provincial governments, and between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the federal government itself.

The constitution provides for a parliament consisting of two houses, the senate and the house of representatives. The senate will be composed of 12 members appointed by the King, and of 12 members elected by the legislative councils of the three provinces. Members of the house of representatives will be elected on the basis of one member for twenty thousand inhabitants. (Thus Tripolitania will have 35 representatives, as compared with 15 for Cyrenaica and 5 for the Fezzan). Laws adopted by both houses are to be sanctioned and promulgated by the King. The ministers are responsible as a cabinet and *individually* to the house of representatives, and provision is made for interpellation of cabinet ministers by members of parliament.

3(*e*) Both the 1949 and 1950 General Assembly resolutions specify that powers should be transferred to the "duly constituted" independent government of Libya. The Commissioner and the Council carefully considered the question whether a "duly constituted", sovereign government would have to be one which included an elected parliament. In other words, the question arose whether the General Assembly resolutions would be properly carried out if Libyan independence were proclaimed and exercised by a Libyan government before parliamentary elections had been held. It is the United States view that this was an issue for the Libyans themselves to decide. In addition the United States has maintained in the Libyan Council that that government of Libya which is established in accordance with the provisions of the constitution is the "duly constituted" government which meets the requirements of the General Assembly resolutions. A United States-sponsored resolution embodying this position was adopted by the Council for Libya at the end of September. The Commissioner has acted generally in accordance with the advice to that effect from the Council.

Furthermore the Libyan constitution, which was completed by the Libyan National Assembly on October 7, 1951, includes specific, transitional provisions for the period between promulgation of the constitution and the time when other chapters of the constitution will come into effect when independence is proclaimed: (Article 202, ff.) During the transitional period the provisional government will exercise the powers transferred to it by the administering states. When independence is proclaimed the King will appoint a "duly constituted" government. The provisional government will prepare the electoral law for the first parliamentary elections and that law is subject to approval by the national assembly. This law must be in force twenty days after promulgation of the constitution which will be in force when Libya becomes independent. Elsewhere it is provided that the elections will take place not later than three and a half months after announcement of the electoral law, and parliament is to convene within twenty days after elections. In the light of the above facts the Delegation should urge unhesitating acceptance by the General Assembly of that Libyan government established at the time of independence as the "duly constituted" government of Libya.

3(*f*) On November 16, 1950, the day before adoption by the General Assembly of Resolution 387(V), Mr. Pelt made an extended statement in plenary meeting of the General Assembly. He indicated that, while he had felt it necessary to go along with an appointed rather than an elected national assembly, he had had grave doubts as to whether it would have "the necessary moral and political authority to elaborate a final and definite constitution for Libya". He then declared that, on his return to Libya, he intended to ask the Council for its advice on the following proposals which he might make to the Libyan National Assembly:

(1) That the constitution as prepared by the National Assembly should be considered as a draft, to be enacted in a provisional form and subject to final approval and if necessary to amendment by the elected Libyan parliament;

(2) That the legislative branch should consist of two chambers—a small upper house whose members would be elected from the three territories on a basis of equality, and a popular chamber to be elected by the people as a whole;

(3) That the Libyan Government (Cabinet) should be responsible to the popular chamber.

In March, 1950, the Commissioner took up this matter with the Council. The dominant view in the Council, actively shared by the United States Representative, was that the Commissioner should not attempt to give such specific advice on details to the national assembly, unless, at least, that body specifically requested the advice. The United States Representative introduced a resolution in the Council which would advise the Commissioner that "he might appropriately offer suggestions to the National Assembly with the idea that these suggestions, modified as the National Assembly may deem necessary to care for the particular needs of Libya, may prove to be acceptable to the majority of the Libyan people". The United States draft resolution eliminated the thought of having the constitution considered as a provisional one. With respect to the method of naming the members of the upper house, the United States draft suggested that, while the three territories should be represented therein on a basis of equality, the representatives could either be elected or designated by the government of each territory and appointed by the King. Alternatively the National Assembly might choose to have a portion of such representatives in the upper house named by the King on his own initiative, the others being designated by the government of each territory and appointed by the King. Finally, the United States draft pointed out that the constitution itself might contain provisions for its eventual amendment by the Libyan parliament, and that the constitution as a whole might be reviewed by the parliament in the light of experience after perhaps five years. In other respects the United States draft resolution essentially covered points which the Commissioner had had in mind.

On March 13, 1951 the Council adopted the United States resolution, Cyrenaica, the Fezzan, France, the United Kingdom and the United States voted in favor; Egypt, Pakistan and Tripolitania voted against; Italy and the representative of the Minorities in Libya abstained. The Commissioner transmitted the Council's advice to the Libyan National Assembly along with his own comments. (United Nations Press Release LIB/47, March 14, 1951.) In effect, the National Assembly pursued the line advocated by the Council in dealing with such matters in the constitution. Thus the constitution now adopted is a final document which can, of course, be amended by due constitutional process in the future. The United States Delegation should confirm the position taken by Ambassador Clark in the Libyan Council since that time, namely that the United States did not agree at the last General Assembly to support the ideas which Mr. Pelt expressed in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on November 16, 1950. While the United States, like other free nations, is devoted to democratic principles and practices, the United States has not felt that it could support any moves which would appear to violate the freedom of decision on such matters guaranteed to the Libyans in Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution on Libya of 1949. As Mr. Pelt himself stated the issue on November 17, 1950:

> "The General Assembly has granted the Libyan people the right to determine their own fate. We want them to behave democratically but charity begins at home. If we want them to behave democratically, let the General Assembly behave democratically toward the Libyans."

4. If, as expected, Libyan independence has been proclaimed prior to General Assembly consideration of the Libyan item, it can also be expected that Libya would immediately make an application for membership in the United Nations. It would be politically advantageous for the United States at an early stage of the General Assembly discussion of the Libyan question to draw attention to the fact of Libyan independence and the pending Libyan application for membership, recalling the pledge of the General Assembly that Libya should be admitted to membership after independence. Depending upon the circumstances at the time, it may be useful for the United States to urge the Assembly to take note that a Libyan application for membership has been made and to urge early consideration of the matter by the Security Council. Such a move could be without prejudice to the full and necessary discussion of the Commissioner's report; it would

have the advantage of confronting those who intend to challenge the whole course of Libyan constitutional development with the necessity of taking a public stand on the question of whether they would favor Libya's admission. It will, of course, be necessary to consult the Department on any preliminary move of this nature. The utility of any such move would depend on the timing of General Assembly discussion of the Pelt report and on the submission of Libya's application for membership.

5. At the Fourth and Fifth General Assemblies, the Soviets advanced draft resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel in Libya and the dismantling of military bases in that territory. Both times the Soviet resolutions were decisively voted down. However, at the Fifth Assembly, the clause in the Soviet draft calling for withdrawal of foreign military personnel received disturbingly significant support in the paragraph by paragraph vote in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, from Arab States and some Asiatic and even Latin American states. It is of importance vigorously to counteract any tendency among non-Soviet states to dwell on this issue at the Sixth Assembly. This theme may well be pressed not only by the Soviets but by Egypt whose policy in that respect is in sharp conflict with that of both the United Kingdom and the United States. A supplementary position paper[3] containing guidance on the handling of this issue, and on a possible challenge to the exercise by the United States of base rights in Libya, should be used in conjunction with Recommendation Five of this position paper.

6. On September 29, 1951 the meeting of financial experts under the auspices of Mr. Pelt (including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Egypt) completed proposals to be made to the Libyan Government for the creation of the following bodies under Libyan law: A Libyan Development and Stabilization Authority, and a Libyan Finance Corporation. Egypt has not agreed to the proposals, since it favored another arrangement involving a certain amount of international control over Libyan finances and development. Membership on these bodies would be open to representatives of states contributing to the short-term and long-term development and stabilization programs for which those bodies would be responsible. Detailed plans for the operation and activities of the two bodies are given in Chapter IV of the Commissioner's report. While the United States has reserved its position on the matter of contributing directly to the funds to be used by these bodies, the United States has participated in the discussions leading to the proposals made, which are subject to acceptance by the Libyan Government. Furthermore, the United States has repeatedly indicated its intention of making a suitable contribution to the development of the Libyan economy through technical assistance

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[3] SD/A/C.1/374/Add 1/Rev. 1, dated November 6, p. 1359.

programs. For further details on the United States position on Libyan monetary, development and technical assistance questions, the Delegation should consult the position paper prepared on these matters for use in Committee II.

357.AG/10-1751 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Ward) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET GENEVA, October 17, 1951—noon.

319. Lidel 192. From Clark. In conversation Pelt other matters question date independence arose and prospective date mentioned by Pelt was Nov 8, London's 1853.[2] Opposition expressed to me was based on impracticality effecting realistic transfer powers by that date and on his belief proclamation independence under such circumstances prior debate GA wld have adverse effect on debate. Pelt is reacting favorably to congratulatory remarks regarding miracle he has accomplished and inclined believe he cld be brought on side early independence provided he is convinced practicality effective transfer powers. His objection is to transfer that would be in name only. There is evidence that Saadawi realizes elections impracticable prior independence and will devote all his energy assure free elections which he convinced he can win. In light this possibility, discussions in Geneva have indicated desirability seeking means bring Saadawi and Muntasir into some form *détente* until elections. From both UK and Libyan sources here, gather that not deemed impossible and if achieved, would result in only one Libyan voice sixth UNGA. Libya would thereby become less contentious subject and Pakistan desire achieved. Also it would leave Egypt alone in opposition to development Libya.

Idea early independence was not "in order to forestall any criticism in GA", but rather tactical move by which it was hoped to lessen violence and effectiveness criticism, thus avoiding abortion Libyan independence and increasing likelihood GA would approve action taken as in conformity its directives. Once independence declared, GA would in fact be confronted with *fait accompli*, as could not be turned back. Yet in light GA direction that independence should be proclaimed "as soon as possible" difficult perceive how such action could justifiably be characterized as Machiavellian. No Libyan, including Saadawi, would dare suggest reopening issue once independence proclaimed. Pakistan representative council insist original GA idea was that GA would have two looks at Libya prior independence and that, therefore, independence should not take place until after consideration subject sixth UNGA. Nothing however in record substantiate this claim. Re question strategic negotiations, believe best ground refusal discuss is that they represent negotiations between sovereign states which will at proper time be registered with UN.

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[1] Repeated to London and Tripoli.

[2] Dated October 16, not printed.

In view above, still believe Dept's previous position, Deptel 1662, Sept 25,[3] sound and should be followed with flexible date. November 1 may be early but December 31 is too late. [Clark.]

WARD

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[3] *Ante*, p. 1333.

357.AG/10–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 17, 1951—5:56 p. m.

2063. Dept has reconsidered views contained Deptel 1662 Sep 25[2] in light of Pelt's query and recent NE developments (urtel 1853 Oct 16)[3] and believes no change necessary. In fact foregoing seem reinforce Dept view that Brit shld accelerate Libyan independence no more than is necessary to have proclamation precede discussion Libya in Sixth UNGA. Reasons for insisting on such precedence well stated Lidel 192.[4] Re para three urtel: while Dept admits charges of rigging are inevitable if independence proclaimed before Dec 31, fact remains that proclamation any time between now and Dec 31 clearly authorized by UN res. Re para four, Dept does not wish be drawn into UNGA discussion of mil arrangements with Libya and will endeavor minimize any such discussion which may arise. However, we wld indicate intention register any agreements as requested by UN Charter.

You are authorized in your discretion reiterate to FonOff views expressed para four Deptel 1662 for reasons stated Lidel 193.[5]

ACHESON

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[1] Repeated to Tripoli and to Geneva for Clark.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1333.

[3] Not printed.

[4] *Supra*.

[5] Also identified as telegram 320, from Geneva, October 17. Ward claimed the United Kingdom was courting trouble and weakening the position of the provisional Libyan Government by seeking, through agreements with it, to "commit irrevocably duly constituted Libyan Government after independence and until April 1953." (357.AG/10–1751)

Secretary's Memoranda : Lot 53 D 444

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1951.

Subject: Elevation to Legation Status of United States Consulate General at Tripoli, Libya.

I believe that it would be in the interest of the United States to change the rank of our representation in Libya from a Consulate General at Tripoli to a Legation as soon as Libya becomes independent.

An American Consulate was established at Tripoli in 1948. The Consulate was raised to a Consulate General in 1949. Another Consulate was opened at Benghazi in 1950.

The United Nations General Assembly decided on November 21, 1949 that Libya should become independent as soon as possible and in any case not later than January 1, 1952. The Libyan National Assembly has almost completed the formulation of the constitution of the new state. A program for the transfer of governmental powers from the British and French Administering Authorities to the Provisional Government of Libya is now being put into effect. This conveyance of authority may be completed by the end of November.

The United States exercised leadership in the disposition of Libya as one of the former Italian colonies and played an important role in the adoption of the General Assembly decisions that Libya should be independent and should be admitted to membership in the United Nations. In addition to our general interests in Libya, this Government has important strategic interests in our air base (Wheelus Field) near Tripoli as well as in other extensive military requirements. The right to continue to use these facilities after Libya becomes independent is being negotiated secretly with the Provisional Government of Libya. That Government is friendly toward the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Libya who visited Washington last November and with whom our representatives have established excellent working relations, has expressed hope of receiving diplomatic representatives of other countries in Tripoli. The United Kingdom plans to establish a Legation in Libya. I believe that an American Legation would prove of considerable assistance in developing firm, friendly relations between the United States and Libya and would facilitate the continued use of those military facilities which are important to our national security.

If you approve, the Department of State will undertake arrangements to elevate the Consulate General at Tripoli to the rank of Legation as soon as Libya becomes independent. If you agree, I also recommend that Mr. Henry S. Villard, a Foreign Service Officer of Class I, who has been associated for many years with Near Eastern and African affairs, be appointed as the first American Minister to Libya. Enclosed for your convenience is a summary of biographic information on Mr. Villard.[2]

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[1] Drafted by Messrs. Rose and Wellons (NEA). The source text bears the notation "Approved by President 11/2/51."

Dean Acheson

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[2] Not printed.

711.56373/12-451

Draft Agreement Prepared in the Department of State [1]

[Washington,] October 19, 1951.

Agreement Between The Government of Libya and The Government of the United States of America

PREAMBLE

The Government of Libya and the Government of the United States of America, desiring to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and being of the opinion that the development of certain areas and facilities in the territory of Libya would promote that objective, do hereby, in a spirit of friendly collaboration, enter into the present Agreement.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article I

The Government of Libya grants permission to the Government of the United States of America to occupy and use for military and related purposes such areas and facilities as shall be agreed upon from time to time by the two Governments, for the duration of the present Agreement and in accordance with its terms and conditions.

Article II

The Government of the United States may make arrangements for and carry out directly or through its contractors the installation, construction and removal of facilities within the agreed areas to improve and adapt such areas for military and related purposes and to provide for the internal security of such areas.

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[1] Accompanying technical schedules not printed. This draft agreement replaced an earlier draft of July 6, not printed.

Article III

(1) The Government of the United States of America may exercise full control over aircraft, ships and water-borne craft, and vehicles entering, leaving and while within the agreed areas.

(2) The Government of the United States of America may exercise, with or without a representative of the Government of Libya as the Government of Libya may determine, such controls over non-United States aircraft, ships and water-borne craft, and vehicles entering, leaving and while within areas near the agreed areas as shall be agreed upon by the two Governments are necessary to carry out the purposes of the present Agreement and to insure the security of the United States forces in Libya.

Article IV

The Government of the United States of America may construct and maintain such wire communication and pipeline facilities outside of the agreed areas as the two Governments agree are necessary to carry out the purposes of the present Agreement.

Article V

The Government of the United States of America may employ and use such public utilities, services and transportation and communication facilities in Libya as the two Governments agree are necessary to carry out the purposes of the present Agreement. The Government of the United States of America shall pay for any employment or usage of the public facilities referred to in the preceding sentence at the same rates charged others who employ and use such public facilities.

Article VI

(1) The agreed areas shall be used and occupied exclusively by the Government of the United States of America unless otherwise agreed by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Libya. Agreed areas used exclusively by the Government of the United States of America will be maintained at its expense.

(2) The two Governments, as an element in collective military measures to maintain or restore international security, may agree to a joint use and occupancy of an agreed area by the two Governments, or by the United States of America and other nations or persons. The cost of maintenance of an agreed area which is used jointly by the two Governments, or by the United States of America and other nations or persons, shall be apportioned on the basis of usage, at rates and charges which are mutually satisfactory to the users.

Article VII[3]

The Government of Libya will make all acquisitions of land and other arrangements required to permit occupation and use of the agreed areas in accordance with the provisions of the present Agreement, and the Government of the United States of America shall not be obliged to compensate the Government of Libya or any Libyan national or other person for such occupation or use.

Article VIII

The Government of Libya will grant to the United States public vessels, aircraft, forces and vehicles, including armor, the right of free access to and movement through Libya, including territorial waters, by land, air and sea. This right shall include freedom from compulsory pilotage and all toll charges. United States aircraft may fly over, land, and take off in any of the territory of Libya, including the territorial waters thereof, without restriction, except as agreed between the two Governments.

Article IX

The Government of the United States of America may, in agreement with the Government of Libya, construct and maintain necessary roads and bridges, and improve and deepen harbors, channels, entrances, and anchorages, affording access to the agreed areas.

Article X

When the Government of the United States of America permanently vacates an agreed area, permanent constructions thereon shall not be removed and the Government of the United States of America shall not be entitled to any compensation for such constructions. Except as provided in the preceding sentence, all property constructed, installed, brought into or procured in Libya under or prior to the present Agreement by the Government of the United States of America shall remain its property and may be removed from Libya, free of any restrictions, or disposed of in Libya by the Government of the United States as agreed with the Government of Libya, at any time before the termination of the present Agreement or within a reasonable time thereafter. Any such property not so removed or so disposed of before the termination of the present Agreement or within a reasonable time thereafter shall become the property of the Government of Libya and the Government of Libya shall not be obligated to compensate the Government of the United States of America for such property.

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[3] This article was rewritten in the Department of Defense to make it acceptable to the Government of Libya, and the text of the changed article was sent to the Department of State as enclosure 6 to a letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, dated December 4, p. 1364. The final version read:

"The Government of Libya will make all acquisitions of land and other arrangements required to permit occupation and use of agreed areas in accordance with the provisions of the present agreement. The Government of the United States of America shall not be obliged to compensate any Libyan national or other person for such occupation or use, but it agrees to pay to the Government of Libya annually an equitable rental for such occupation or use. The two Governments agree that once the equitable annual rental for an agreed area has been determined, the amount of the rental for such agreed area shall not be changed for the duration of this agreement without the consent of both Governments. Furthermore, the two Governments agree that the annual rental being paid by the United States on the date of this agreement for agreed areas in occupation or use by the United States of America on the date of this agreement shall be the equitable annual rental for such agreed areas." (711.56373/12-451)

Article XI

The Government of the United States of America is not obliged to turn over the agreed areas to the Government of Libya at the expiration of the present Agreement in the condition in which they were at the time of their occupation by the Government of the United States of America.

Article XII

Nothing in the present Agreement shall be construed to conflict with the obligations assumed by the Government of the United States of America under the Charter of the United Nations. The Government of Libya hereby recognizes that it also shall be governed by such obligations pending its admission to membership in the United Nations.

ADMINISTRATION

Article XIII

The Government of Libya authorizes the Government of the United States of America to employ and supervise military and civilian personnel as required in connection with operations under the present Agreement.

Article XIV

The Government of the United States of America may make topographic, hydrographic, and coast and geodetic surveys and aerial photographs in any part of Libya and waters adjacent thereto. Copies with title and triangulation data of any such surveys or photomaps shall be furnished to the Government of Libya.

Article XV

The Government of the United States of America may establish, maintain and operate United States post offices in the agreed areas for the exclusive use of members of the United States forces and United States authorities, including their staffs and dependents, for domestic use between United States post offices in the agreed areas and between such post offices and other United States post offices.

Article XVI

(1) The Government of the United States of America may bring into Libya members of the United States forces in connection with

carrying out the purposes of the present Agreement. The Government of the United States of America shall furnish to the Government of Libya a list of the names and nationalities of members of the United States forces who are brought into Libya and who are not nationals of the United States and any individual on such list whose presence in Libya is considered to be undesirable by the Government of Libya shall be removed from Libya within a reasonable time.

(2) The laws of the Government of Libya shall not operate or apply so as to prevent admission or departure into or from Libya of members of the United States forces. Passport and visa requirements shall not be applicable to military members of United States forces, but they shall be furnished with appropriate identification cards or tags and samples of said identification cards or tags shall be filed with the Government of Libya. Passport and visa requirements shall be applicable to non-military members of the United States forces.

(3) If the status of any member of the United States forces brought into Libya by the Government of the United States of America is altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the Government of the United States of America shall notify the Government of Libya and shall, if such person be required to leave Libya by the Government of Libya, be responsible for providing him with a passage from Libya within a reasonable time, and shall in the meantime prevent his becoming a public responsibility of Libya.

Article XVII

The Government of the United States of America may establish agencies in the agreed areas, including concessions such as sales commissaries, military service exchanges, messes and social clubs for the exclusive use of the United States military forces and authorized civilian personnel and their families; and such agencies shall be free of all licenses, fees, excise, sales or other taxes or imposts. The merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such Government agencies shall be free of all taxes, duties, imposts and inspection by the Government of Libya. Administrative measures shall be taken by United States military authorities to prevent the resale of goods which are sold under the provisions of this article to persons not entitled to buy goods at such agencies and, generally to prevent abuse of the privileges granted under this article. There shall be cooperation between such authorities and the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya to this end.

Article XVIII

The appropriate authorities of the two Governments will cooperate in making arrangements in the interest of sanitation and health.

Article XIX

The Government of the United States of America may make engineering and other technical surveys in any part of Libya and waters adjacent thereto. The Government of the United States of America shall notify the Government of Libya when any such survey is to be made and the Government of Libya may, if it so desires, designate an official representative to accompany the survey team.

STATUS OF UNITED STATES PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY

Article XX

(1) Members of the United States forces shall respect the sovereign rights and the laws of Libya and abstain from any activities inconsistent with the spirit of the present Agreement, and in particular from any political activities in Libya. The Government of the United States of America will take appropriate measures to this end.

(2) United States military personnel and their dependents and United States nationals and their dependents, who are members of the United States forces and who are subject to United States military law, shall be immune from the criminal jurisdiction of Libyan courts and in matters arising from the performance of their official duties from the civil jurisdiction of the courts of Libya, provided that in particular cases the United States authorities may waive such immunity. In all other matters they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of Libyan courts.

(3) The United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within Libya all jurisdiction and control conferred on them by the laws of the United States of America over all members of the United States forces except civilian members thereof who are nationals of Libya.

(4) Whenever United States military authorities may exercise jurisdiction over an alleged offender pursuant to Section (3) of this article, the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya will assist in the collection of evidence and the carrying out of all necessary investigations, including the seizure and in proper cases the handing over of exhibits and all objects connected with the offense.

(5) (*a*) Where an offense involves the person or property of a member of the United States forces, the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya and the United States military authorities will render mutual assistance in the necessary investigation into the offense and trial of the offender.

(*b*) If the case is one within the jurisdiction of the United States military authorities, the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya will themselves carry out the necessary arrangements to secure the presence of and obtain evidence from Libyan nationals and other persons in Libya (except members of the United States forces) outside the agreed areas. Interrogations of Libyan nationals which may, under the laws of the United States of America, be necessary in connection with the investigation of an offense will, when outside the agreed areas, be conducted by the appropriate United States authorities only at such places as may be designated by the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya who shall be present at all times during such interrogation.

(*c*) The United States military authorities will, in a similar manner, carry out the collection of evidence from members of the United States forces in the case of an offense to be tried in the Libyan courts.

(*d*) The appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya shall render assistance to protect the dignity and integrity of United States military courts. Witnesses not subject to United States military law who commit perjury or contempt of court will be turned over to the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya for appropriate punishment.

(6) (*a*) The Government of the United States of America shall have the right to police the agreed areas and to take all appropriate measures to insure the maintenance of discipline, order and security in such areas.

(*b*) Outside the agreed areas, members of the United States forces may be employed for police duties by arrangement with the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya insofar as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among the members of the United States forces. In such cases, Libyan police with whom members of the United States forces may be serving on police duty shall have paramount authority with respect to the person or property of Libyan nationals.

Article XXI

The Government of Libya either shall honor, without driving test or fee, driving permits issued by the Government of the United States of America or a subdivision thereof to members of the United States forces; or issue its own driving permits without test or fee to such persons who hold such United States permits. Members of the United States forces who do not hold driving permits issued by the Government of the United States of America or a subdivision thereof shall be required to comply with whatever regulations Libya may establish with regard to driving permits.

Article XXII

Military members of the United States forces in Libya may possess and carry arms as required in the performance of official duties.

Article XXIII

(1) Members of the United States forces may purchase locally goods necessary for their own consumption and such services as they need under the same conditions as Libyan nationals.

(2) The Government of the United States of America may purchase locally goods required for the subsistence of the United States forces and it shall be the policy of the Government of the United States of America to purchase such goods locally if they are available and of the standard required by United States authorities. In order to avoid any such purchases having an adverse effect on the Libyan economy, the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya will indicate, when necessary, any articles the purchase of which should be restricted or forbidden. Such Libyan authorities, at the request of the appropriate United States authorities, will aid and assist in the placement of orders.

(3) The Government of Libya consents to the employment of Libyan civilians by the Government of the United States of America, or its contractors, and it shall be the policy of the Government of the United States of America and its contractors to prefer the employment of Libyan civilians when they are available and qualified to do the work involved. Upon request of the appropriate United States authorities, the Government of Libya will aid and assist in the employment of Libyan civilians. The conditions of employment for Libyan nationals and persons normally resident in Libya, particularly in respect to wages, supplementary payments, insurance and conditions for the protection of workers, shall be exclusively those laid down by Libyan law.

(4) Upon request of the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya, the United States military authorities will withhold and pay over to the Government of Libya all income tax or other deductions from the wages of Libyan nationals and persons normally resident in Libya employed by the Government of the United States, as required by Libyan law in the same manner and to the same extent as any other employer.

Article XXIV

(1) The temporary presence in Libya of a member of the United States forces shall constitute neither residence nor domicile therein and shall not of itself subject him to taxation in Libya, either on his income or on his property the presence of which in Libya is due to his temporary presence there, nor, in the event of his death, shall it subject his estate to a levy of death duties. Land and permanent structures thereon located in Libya which are purchased by a member of the United States forces shall be subject to the laws of Libya as to taxation based on the ownership of such property.

(2) No national of the United States of America or corporation organized under the laws of the United States of America, resident in the United States of America, shall be liable to pay the Govern-

ment of Libya any tax in respect of any income derived under a contract with the Government of the United States of America in connection with operations under the present Agreement.

(3) No tax, duty or other charge of any nature shall be levied or assessed on material, equipment, supplies, or goods, including personal effects, household goods, privately owned automobiles and clothing, brought into Libya in connection with operations under the present Agreement. No such tax, duty or charge shall be levied or assessed on property procured in Libya by United States authorities for the use of the Government of the United States of America or its agents or for the use of personnel present in Libya only in connection with operations under the present Agreement.

Article XXV

(1) The laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of Libya, including the right to inspect and seize, shall have no application to:

(*a*) Service and construction material, equipment, supplies, provisions and other goods, imported into Libya by the Government of the United States of America or its contractors in connection with operations under the present Agreement for the exclusive use of the United States forces.

(*b*) Personal effects, household goods, including privately owned automobiles and furniture, and other goods imported into Libya by the authorities of the Government of the United States of America or through the customary civil channels of Libya for the personal use of members of the United States forces at the time of or during the service of such persons in Libya, provided that, where such property is imported through civil channels, the United States military authorities shall execute a certificate to be presented to the customs officials of Libya certifying that such imports are necessary for the personal use of such member of the United States forces. The United States military authorities will provide the Libyan customs authorities with a list of the officials authorized to execute the certificates as well as specimens of their signatures and the stamps, if any are used.

(*c*) Official documents under seal.

(2) Property falling within the provisions of Section (1) of this article may be exported from Libya, without regard to the customs laws and regulations of Libya.

(3) Property imported into Libya under the provisions of Section (1) of this article may not be disposed of in Libya to Libyan nationals or to persons normally resident in Libya by way of sale, gift, or barter unless disposal thereof to such persons is authorized on conditions imposed by the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya. Such property, however, may be disposed of to members of the United States forces or to other persons or governments who are entitled to

make use of agreed areas. The United States military authorities will prescribe and enforce to the extent possible regulations designed to prevent the sale or supply to individual members of the United States forces of quantities of goods imported into Libya free of charge which would be in excess of personal requirements of such personnel and which, in consultation with the appropriate authorities of the Government of Libya, are determined to be most likely to become items of gift, barter or sale in the free market in Libya.

(4) Goods purchased in Libya can only be exported therefrom in accordance with Libyan regulations, or as otherwise provided in the present Agreement.

Article XXVI

(1) The Government of the United States of America agrees to pay just and reasonable compensation for valid claims of the Government of Libya for damage, loss or destruction of its property caused by a public vessel of the Government of the United States or by members of the United States forces who are in Libya in connection with operations under the present Agreement. All such claims will be processed and paid in accordance with the applicable provisions of United States law.

(2) The Government of the United States of America agrees to pay just and reasonable compensation for all valid claims of persons who are nationals of Libya, or inhabitants of that country, for damage, loss, or destruction of property, or for injury or death, caused by members of United States forces in connection with operations under the present Agreement. All such claims will be processed and paid in accordance with the applicable provisions of United States law.

OPERATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT

Article XXVII

The present Agreement shall come into force on signature and shall continue in force for the period of twenty (20) years and thereafter the Agreement shall continue in force until either of the two Governments gives to the other notice of termination, in which event, the Agreement shall cease to be effective one year after the date of the receipt of such notice.

INTERPRETATION

Article XXVIII

In the present Agreement the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them:

"The two Governments" means the Government of Libya and the Government of the United States of America.

"The Government of Libya" means the federal Government of the United Kingdom of Libya, including all administering bodies and authorities within the Territories which form the United Kingdom of Libya.

"United States forces" includes personnel belonging to the armed services of the United States of America and accompanying civilian personnel who are employed by or serving with such services directly or through their contractors (including the dependents of such military and civilian personnel), who are not nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in Libya; and who are in the territory of Libya in connection with operations under the present Agreement.

"Agreed areas" means those areas which the two Governments shall agree may be occupied and used by the Government of the United States under the terms and conditions of the present Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned duly authorized representatives of the Government of Libya and the Government of the United States of America have signed the present Agreement.

Done in duplicate at Tripoli, in English and Arabic languages, the ——— day of ——————— 1951.

357.AG/10–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 19, 1951—8 p. m.

1940. In course conversation with Allen today, we took opportunity stress Dept's and Clark's views re desirability early Libyan independence with flexible date. Allen said Blackley's views not yet recd this point, but he felt in any event previously suggested dates Nov 1 and Nov 8 were out of question. Perhaps later on in Nov might be possible.

Allen confirmed FonOff very hesitant re desirability proceeding with early independence if Pelt cannot be brought into the line. He felt we wld find ourselves in most difficult position in GA if we presented it with *fait accompli* in opposition to UN commissioner. If Pelt cld be brought into line (and Allen was not sure how this cld be done) he felt that it wld be different matter and that we cld then proceed with less likelihood heavy censure which he otherwise fears. We took occasion thruout conversation stress views set forth Deptel 2063[2] and Lidel 192,[3] but it is clear that FonOff feels decision must ultimately depend on Pelt's attitude.

Allen agreed it wld be desirable if Saadawi cld be brought into line so that Libya cld speak with one voice at sixth UNGA, but was extremely doubtful this cld be done on other terms than offering Saadawi Prime Ministership, which UK wld strenuously oppose.

GIFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Tripoli and Geneva for Clark.
[2] Dated October 17, p. 1345.
[3] Telegram 319, from Geneva, October 17, p. 1344.

711.56373/10-3051 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TRIPOLI, October 30, 1951—7 p. m.

170. Commanding Officer Wheelus Field has informed me that some 2000 USAF troops are expected to arrive in Tripoli over one month period beginning early December, by sea rather than by air and spread over considerably longer period than ConGen had been led to expect.

Their arrival will coincide almost exactly with achievement of Libyan independence and will undoubtedly cause serious local polit repercussions. US now undergoing serious propaganda attacks in local anti-govt Arabic press. We are being accused of being new imperialists who plan to take over all of Libya. This move will also be used attack present govt which is very friendly to us and which will be exposed to elections soon after independence. Opposition to govt is strong and antiforeign line popular one. Also UNGA will be in session and will be considering Libyan question probably Dec or early Jan. This troop movement which will be quite impossible conceal (all roads from port lead through crowded sections Tripoli), seems to be singularly unfortunate from political point of view, particularly at this time. It seems play into hands Soviet bloc and Arab League in GA and might be polit disastrous our friends here. It might also adversely affect chances ratification Libyan American defense agreement now under negotiation which will come before Parliament early 1952.

Plan shld I believe be given urgent further thought in light of above polit considerations.[1]

LYNCH

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[1] Telegram 2287, from London, November 10, advised the Department of State that the British Foreign Office had expressed grave concern that morning over the fact that 2,000 American troops were expected to begin arriving at Wheelus Field in early December. The Foreign Office indicated that the United Kingdom, as the power still responsible for Libya's defense, would be unable to sanction such a move at that time, and considered it absolutely necessary to wait at least until Libya was independent. The Embassy agreed it seemed unwise to enlarge U.S. forces in Libya to such an extent at that particular time. (711.56373/11-1051)

Telegram 2476, from Washington to London, repeated to Tripoli, November 13, reported that the bulk of the 2,700 troops of the 580th ARC Wing would not be in Libya until late December or early January; and the view of the Departments of State and Defense was that the arrivals should be staggered so that they would not have an adverse effect on the political situation in Libya if the Consul General in Tripoli was able to obtain the concurrence of the appropriate authorities. (711.56373/11-1351)

A letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense advised the Secretary of State on December 13, however, that "in view of the present tense political situation in Libya, the scheduled deployment of the 580th Air Resupply and Communica tions Wing of the United States Air Force to that area has been postponed," and personnel of its advance echelon were being returned to the Zone of Interior Defense asked to be informed when the political situation in Libya would permi the movement of the wing, as its early deployment remained a military require ment of high priority. (711.56373/12-1351)

357.AG/10-3151 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET TRIPOLI, October 31, 1951—4 p. m.

174. Pelt in discussing with me, since his return, question of advancing Libyan independence has made one particularly valid point in favor of delaying such action until early mid-Dec. He states program of coordination comite for transfer powers in four stages, two of which are completed, was a formal recommendation to Libyans and admin powers, junking of which wld raise storm of questions in UNGA.

However, he states that Libya question will probably not be discussed until early or mid-Dec citing as one reason that his annual report will not be delivered from printer and put into Assembly's hands before then. He further assures me that he perceives no objection to 15 Dec date or even as early as 10th. Date of 15th was in fact proposed in original transfer powers plan. This move will satisfy both Blackley and Muntasser. Furthermore, it will provide time for Ital Govt to conclude property agreement with Libyans.

If GA can through parliamentary delays such as reference to successive comites and through US lobbying particularly among NATO and Latins (assuming Ital support for latter group) to convince substantial bloc nations to delay action until early or mid-Dec on Libyan question our position will be much sounder.

Essential point in all this maneuvering on advancement independence is to avoid situation whereby resolution wld be passed by GA which might imperil continued use and development US-UK strategic facilities Libya.

Believe US shld begin lobbying for this point of view immed.

LYNCH

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Benghazi.

IO Files : Lot 71 D 440

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1951.

SD/A/C.1/374/Add 1/Rev. 1

UNITED STATES POSITION ON PROBABLE SOVIET AND ARAB CHALLENGES REGARDING US AND UK MILITARY BASES IN LIBYA

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the manner in which the United States can most effectively combat Soviet and perhaps Arab accusations in the General Assembly that the Americans and British are establishing military bases in Libya which threaten the independence of that country and which are intended to be used for "imperialistic aggression". At the 1950 Session of the GA the Soviet Union introduced a resolution which provided that all foreign troops and military personnel be withdrawn from Libya within three months and that military bases be dismantled. This resolution received the support of several Arab States but was rejected by a vote of 38–13 with 8 abstentions. The problem in the Sixth GA will be to reject any such Soviet proposal and explain to the satisfaction of most Members the reasons for the presence of American military bases in Libya and the defensive purposes for which they might be used.

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[1] Prepared as a briefing paper for the U.S. Delegation to the sixth regular session of the General Assembly.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The US delegation should vigorously reject any charges (from Soviet, Arab or other sources) against or attempt to eliminate the existence of our military facilities in Libya.

2. The delegation should emphasize that during the period of British Administration of Libya, our arrangements with the British governing our use of Wheelus Field were legal and fully within the authority of the British to make.

3. The delegation should state, if necessary, that the US Government has arranged for the use of certain military facilities in Libya through an exchange of notes on December 24, 1951, with the new government of Independent Libya and that eventually an agreement will be concluded on this matter. The delegation should maintain that any such agreement between the US and Libya concerns only the two sovereign states involved and is, therefore, not a matter in which the GA should intervene. However, the agreement will be in conformity with the UN Charter and the text of the agreement will be registered with the UN as required by the Charter.

4. The delegation may indicate that, in line with the purposes of such military arrangements, namely to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, the facilities in question could if Libya and the US agree, be used as an element in support of collective measures taken or adopted by the United Nations in the event of aggression.

COMMENT

The delegation could state that the American Airbase, Wheelus Field, was built and used by American Forces during the last war and has been in operation since then as a transportation and communications base to other areas in the Near East (e.g. Greece, Turkey, Dhahran). It also serves our forces in Germany and other parts of Western Europe.

If the debate in the GA should require an affirmative American statement regarding the use to which such a base might be put in the future, the delegation should pursue the following course:

a. Emphasize that the US has contributed heavily to the maintenance of collective security in many parts of the world.

b. Emphasize that the US intends to contribute to the implementation of the "uniting for peace" resolution adopted by the GA last year. In order to do this the US will, of course, use whatever facilities are available to it and are considered necessary in the future. In this connection statements in line with Recommendation 4 could be made.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

The situation in respect to US military requirements in Libya is so fluid at the present time that it may be necessary to submit a supplement to this position paper at a later date containing any further guidance or information that may be available at that time.

711.56373/11–951 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET TRIPOLI, November 9, 1951—2 p. m.

193. Concurrently with mytel 191 [2] reporting reaction of Council of Mins to US offer $750,000 per year for 20 years Libya to be responsible for rentals without reimbursement, I desire earnestly and urgently to emphasize to Dept certain polit aspects present problem which have played part in leading me to conclusion that Libyan offer shld be accepted by US.

With possible exception of Saudi Arabia, Libya was only govt in Arab world sincerely friendly to United States. In the course of time it will become member of Arab League. Libya can be our bridge to rest of Arab world and, if we handle present situation wisely, gaining its friendship might well be step in retrieving our position in Middle East. To lose this opportunity by refusing pay equitable rentals desired by Libyans wld I believe be serious polit error.

I wld not push this viewpoint if I thought we were getting a bad bargain otherwise. However, it is my belief that we have achieved as good if not considerably better agreement than in other parts of the world.

We must recognize some of the very serious problems confronting this govt and why they deem it essential that they receive a substantial round sum which they can use free of deductions and that they can not be charged with selling their country down the river. There is a spreading belief, fed by Egypt propaganda, that without presence in area of Americans and Brit they cld somehow escape holocaust of war and that presence of Americans and Brit will bring war to them. It is the same sort of unrealistic unsound reasoning that was so fatal to small European countries such as Holland and Belgium during last war. Nevertheless, no matter how wrong idea may be it has popular appeal and is difficult to combat. In order help them combat it we must give them ammunition in the shape of concrete evidence that their future welfare is bound up with ours.

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[1] Repeated to USAF, AFOAB, OSAF, CNO, and Army.

[2] Dated November 8; not printed. It advised the Department of State the Council of Ministers had unanimously rejected the U.S. offer of November 5 and felt compelled to stand by their previous proposal that they would accept $1 million per year for 20 years with the United States additionally reimbursing Libya with equitable rentals for lands acquired on its behalf. (711.56373/11–851)

Neither in conversation Nov 5 nor this morning did I make mention of possible suspension of negots because I feel such action wld inject an entirely new and discordant note into discussions which up to now have been on most friendly basis. When negots opened PriMin and FonMin stated that they trusted us completely. They have comported themselves in that manner throughout and have not even carried through their not unreasonable suggestion that they obtain a Moslem legal adviser. It is obvious, however, that if they wished to do so they cld produce an Egypt or Iraqi adviser who wld not view certain provisions of agreement with sympathetic eye, particularly those having to do with personal status of US forces in Libya.

3. Seems to me to be every reason why negots shld not be discontinued. Libyan Govt feels we are its friend. It is about to launch forth as an independent sovereign state. Our mutual relations for years to come will be affected by the result of these negots and the manner in which they are conducted. I fear that if we ourselves introduce note of haggling whole atmosphere will undergo undesirable alteration.

Day of independence is approaching and it may be expected within next 6 weeks, actual date depending upon whether or not Libyan question is high or low on UNGA agenda. Libyans will not sign any agreement prior to convening and approval of elected Parliament. They are prepared exchange notes. If those notes can use present draft agreement for governing interim period we shall be in much sounder position than by exchange making reference to "status quo". The "status quo" is extremely nebulous and in fact has been a matter of day to day decisions made by Brit after consultation with us. We can do that sort of thing with Brit but with Libyans who will be constantly subject to polit pressures it will be far more difficult.

In our note of Feb 3, 1948, to USSR we stated "that the continuation of the arrangement with regard to the use of Mellaha Airfield For Communication Purposes extends only for the period during which the present administration remains responsible for the territory." (Mellaha Airfield is Wheelus AFB). In the exchange of notes between Brit FonOff and London Emb we refer repeatedly to mil air transit and landing rights in Tripolitania. Sound and sight jet fighters engaged training operations is too continuous to be concealed. It appears, therefore, that if we find ourselves without an agreement on independence day, or without prepared notes which Libyans and ourselves are ready to sign we may be placed in embarrassing position internationally.

Finally, $1 million per year plus equitable rentals for 20 years does not seem unreasonable in view of the fact that we are thinking in terms of 7 additional airfields, Navy communications facility near Derna, ARC Akins project outside Tripoli, and 500 square miles for an amphibious and divisional training area for Army and Marine Corps. Certainly not when it is compared with what we have paid for much small areas in other countries. Here we have not been able obtain comparable privileges for American forces. It is not, however, the actual areas which may be involved which disturbs me most but the fact that in order for the agreement to be any good to us it must also be good for the Libyans and one which they can sell to their people. I trust that this is apparent to the Dept as it is to us on the spot.

Negotiating team concurs with views set forth in this tel.

LYNCH

773.02/11-2451 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TRIPOLI, November 24, 1951—4 p. m.

223. ReDeptel 156, Nov. 20.[2] Held conference this morning with Brit Resident, French ConGen, Ital rep, re independence and recognition. Target date for indepen is Dec 15, but there is still some apprehension here regarding possibility discussion Libyan question by *ad hoc* polit comite before that time and consequent reluctance to fix definite date as yet. Brit finan and mil agreements in fairly good shape, but not yet finalized with Libyans. Discussions over French finan and mil agreements now under way. In my view delay in opening these discussions by French a serious mistake. Ital states property agreement not yet concluded as property losses not yet agreed upon. Ital rep says his govt cannot recognize independent Libya until this agreement concluded. With great efforts on all sides, I believe it possible, although not certain, that all of these agreements can be successfully concluded

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and Benghazi.

[2] The Department of State agreed the November 15 date of Libyan independence should be changed to about December 1 if the General Assembly *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was likely to discuss Libya in early December. Since the Department considered it unlikely that Libya would be debated before January, however, it preferred December 15. (773.02/11-1551)

by Dec 15. Picture now complicated by hesitations of King-designate and illness PriMin.

It is envisaged that indepen will come about upon proclamations by administering powers UK and France handing over final powers to Libya whereupon King will declare independence. At this point FonMin will send msgs to members UN and certain other countries, such as Italy and Spain. At this moment and on date independence, we agreed that it wld be appropriate to deliver msgs recognized heads of state to King and from FonMins to Libyan FonMin. I recommend therefore that msg from President to King be given more for appropriate use and that msg from SecState to FonMin be given me. These msgs wld be congratulatory in nature. At same time I wld address note to FonMin advising him that I had been designated Chargé d'Affaires at interim in addition to my duties as ConGen and instructed to enter into relations with his govt. Presumably, any one of these three acts wld constitute *de jure* recognition of new state. I shld appreciate Dept's early comments and instrs with regard to above.[3]

LYNCH

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[3] Telegram 167, from Washington, November 28, replied that the information in the source text had been very helpful in planning Libyan independence. Washington advised Lynch that if he considered it appropriate he might mention to the Libyan Foreign Minister that the President had appointed Henry S. Villard as the first U.S. Minister to Libya, and, if feasible, it would appreciate advance assurance that the Libyan Government would agree to Villard's appointment immediately after independence so that a public announcement could be made at that time. (773.02/11-2451)

711.56373/12-451

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 4 December 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to Mr. Lovett's letters of 9 and 17 August 1951[1] and subsequent correspondence relating to the negotiation of an Agreement with the Provisional Government of Libya for military operating rights and facilities in that country required by the United States military services.

The terms of the Draft Agreement dated 19 October 1951, Inclosure 1,[2] are acceptable to this Department. However, I am advised by the Secretary of the Air Force that to have this Agreement acceptable to the Provisional Libyan Government, provision must be made therein for the payment of an equitable rental for whatever base areas may become available to the United States. While the payment of rental for military operating facilities of the type contemplated in this

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[1] Neither printed.
[2] *Ante*, p. 1347.

Agreement has been avoided in recent years as a matter of policy, the Department of Defense, in view of the special importance of our military requirements in this area, is prepared in this instance to make an exception. Therefore, it is proposed that Article VII of the subject draft be revised to read as indicated in Inclosure 6.[3]

With regard to the economic aid to be provided for Libya, which Mr. Matthews mentioned in his letter of 31 August 1951[4] to Secretary Marshall, this Department is prepared to include in its budget the sum of $1,000,000 on a yearly basis for the twenty-year term of the agreement, in addition to any technical and economic assistance which may be provided by the Department of State under the Mutual Security Act. In this respect, the proposed exchange of notes concerning economic aid, attached hereto as Inclosures 4 and 5[4] which I understand were drafted in your Department, are satisfactory to the Department of Defense.

I understand that a time lapse of several months may ensue before the new Libyan Parliament is constituted and able to act upon the proposed Agreement. It is, therefore, necessary to make provision for the interim period between the signing of the Agreement by the authorized representatives of the new United Kingdom of Libya and its ratification by the Parliament. The Secretary of the Air Force informs me that your representatives feel that this contingency can best be covered by the exchange of notes, attached hereto as Inclosures 2 and 3, with which I agree.

The information contained in Technical Schedule 1,[4] attached to the proposed Agreement, is of a highly classified nature and should not, of course, be made public without the prior approval of this Department. Whatever steps you take to insure that the information contained in this Technical Schedule is not made public by the Government of Libya will be acceptable to this Department.

In view of the foregoing, and if you agree herewith, it is requested that you institute the necessary action to consummate the proposed Agreement with the Government of Libya. I would appreciate being informed of the outcome of these negotiations.

Sincerely yours, WILLIAM C. FOSTER

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[3] See footnote 2, p. 1349.

[4] Not printed.

711.56373/12-1951 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TRIPOLI, December 19, 1951—4 p. m.

286. I intend to sign base rights agreement and exchange of notes on financial aid[1] with Muntasser, Prime Minister, on Independence Day rather than with new Foreign Minister because (1) this practice will conform with British and French intentions and (2) will avoid any hitches that might result from new Foreign Minister's unfamiliarity with agreement.

Regarding publicity for agreement and financial aid, Prime Minister is expected to make first campaign speech two days after independence at which time he will undoubtedly desire refer US-Libya financial agreement as example of his accomplishments.

We shld, it is believed, be prepared for simultaneous release of financial aid notes at this time when its use will be of most value to Libyan Govt.

On release of exchange of notes and agreement concerning military facilities, this might be delayed until agreement is presented for ratification. However, it is likely that opposition parties in Libya and also Arab bloc in GA may make it desirable to release the exchange of notes shortly after independence. It is obviously more advantageous for govt to make first move in release without being forced by opposition.

While it is desired to consult with Prime Minister before making final decision on release, I am of opinion that exchange of notes might be publicized at Foreign Minister's speech evening of second day after independence. Agreement itself might be held as restricted pending presentation for ratification after elections in order prevent 55 opposition candidates for Parliament renegotiating it from soapboxes.

LYNCH

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[1] Telegram 181, from Washington, December 6, advised the Consul General that the Departments of State and Defense had decided that the U.S. Government would contribute $1 million a year for 20 years to Libya for economic development, in addition to the rental payments for the agreed areas, in return for Libyan acceptance of the military agreement of October 19, amended in Article VII to meet earlier Libyan objections. The Consul General was advised to "remind Libyans that for publicity purposes we consider it most important that one million dollar annual econ aid commitment of US be kept separate matter from Mil Agreement and that we expect they will likewise in this publicity keep them as separate and unrelated arrangements. Despite foregoing position re publicity, it must be understood between us and Libyans that final ratification of Agreement will have to precede any implementation of financial aid program."

The telegram contained the text of notes to be exchanged on the Military Agreement and the Economic Agreement between the Consul General and the appropriate Libyan official. The notes were to be initialed at that time and then executed formally by the duly constituted Libyan authorities on independence day. (711.56373/12-651)

The formal exchange of notes took place on December 24, the date of Libyan independence; the texts of the notes as sent are enclosures to despatch 15 to Tripoli, April 12, 1952. (711.56373/4-1252)

711.56373/12–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tripoli[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 21, 1951—3:31 p. m.
PRIORITY

219. Reurtel 286 Dec 19:[2]

1) Your intention sign base rights agreement and exchange notes with PriMin approved.

2) Although we had preferred no publicity at this time re notes on financial aid US Govt reluctantly agrees, since newspaper stories already issued, PriMin may make announcement re exchange notes on financial aid in speech soon after independence.

3) PriMin shld understand that no payments of financial aid will begin until Libyan Parliament and King have finally ratified base agreement. This has been made clear previous Deptels this subj but US Govt wants be certain PriMin and King have no misunderstanding this matter.

4) Although no objection stating publicly that our mil facilities are being covered by exchange notes Dept and Defense do not want text note or base agreement released until presented for ratification. This particularly important to avoid text becoming, as you say, subj for 55 opposition candidates for Libyan Parliament to debate during election campaign. Since text note re mil facilities refers specifically to agreement both US and Libyan Govt wld be under heavy pressure to make public text of agreement if only note is released. Dept wishes avoid having details of agreement discussed when Libyan item brought up in UN. Texts note and agreement shld not be released until agreed to by US and Libyan govts at later date.

ACHESON

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris. This telegram was drafted by Wellons, and cleared by Defense, Army, Air Force, EUR, UNP, RA, AF, and S/S–CR.

[2] *Supra.*

Editorial Note

On December 24 the United Kingdom of Libya proclaimed its independence. The United States Government extended full recognition to the new Government, and elevated the American Consulate General to the status of a Legation. The Consul General was to serve as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim until a Minister arrived.President Truman sent a message of congratulations to King Idris I of Libya, and the Secretary of State sent a message to the Foreign Minister. Texts of the messages are in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 31, 1951, page 1057; and *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, volume V, pages 2302–2303.

MOROCCO

UNITED STATES POLICIES TOWARD THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE IN MOROCCO[1]

771.00/1-3151 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tangier (Plitt) to the Department of State[2]

SECRET PRIORITY TANGIER, January 31, 1951—5 p. m.

266. French Consul General Tangier confidentially confirmed Resident General[3] demanded Sultan[4] denounce Nationalists and dismiss certain court personnel inimical French interests. He denied story of ultimatum having been given and expressed belief Sultan would accede Juin's terms. As Consul General came to Legation tell me this, I naturally wonder how much left untold. Fact remains situation French Morocco becoming increasingly tense. Faiz [*French?*] protectorate authorities' intransigence towards Americans on import controls question leaves little doubt extent their intransigence towards Sultan.

Allegations that Juin has full support US his "crack-down" on Sultan not conducive calming excited Nationalists and likely leave mark on our relations with Morocco. Nationalist leaders maintain US accord with residency's policy being systematically spread throughout French Morocco by French agents. Sultan sent elder brother Moulay Hassan to Tangier yesterday get in touch Legation explain imperiled position Sultan and appeal US assistance. Allal el Fassi today told Legation officer French could not possibly take such strong stand against Sultan if they did not feel sure our support.

Sultan and Nationalists have undoubtedly seized present crisis invoke our effective support against French for their own ends and endeavoring involve us perhaps same extent as French are reported to be doing in claiming have our support. In these circumstances we must take into consideration that if Juin's demands met, onus of blame likely placed on us by Nationalists. If Sultan forced abdicate, we shall innocently inherit even more blame not only from Moroccans but other Arab countries too. If Juin returns Morocco enforce his demands, it will confirm in native mind that he has our full support as they convinced of connection between Juin's plans for Morocco and his trip Washington. While delicacy any interference between French and Sultan fully realized, protection our interests would seem prescribe employment our good offices prevail French moderate their demands and have Juin adopt more conciliatory attitude. Sultan then in turn, could make some concessions French which might lead to temporarily easing relations as stopgap preparatory possible reconciliation with Juin's eventual successor. According to Moulay Hassan Sultan prepared do this. A non-Spanish European source, usually well-informed opinions prevailing Spanish Zone, told Legation office Spanish officials there, exception Affaires Indigenes, feel Juin gone too far and reports Khalifa and entourage now very sympathetic Sultan.

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[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1787 ff.

[2] Repeated to Paris, Casablanca, and Rabat.

[3] Gen. Pierre Alphonse Juin.

[4] Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, Sultan V of Morocco.

No good envisaged present situation which if permitted worsen may seriously prejudice our position and military program Morocco. Efforts prevail on French change present attitude seem essential and I recommend them if not already undertaken result Legation and Rabat previous reports.

Plitt

651.71/2–151 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, February 1, 1951—8 p. m.

4553. As result of persistent questioning Foreign Office informed us that Juin before leaving for Washington had been rough with Sultan and had indeed threatened him with forced abdication or even deposition if Sultan not prepared to make declaration denouncing terrorist "Fascist" methods of Istiqlal, remove certain anti-French members of entourage and stop stalling on reforms which French wish to initiate with view to democratizing regime.

In defending Juin's use of threat to Sultan, La Tour du Pin referred to Resident General's original instructions on assuming office whereby he was given authority to consider eventual removal of Sultan if latter became too obstreperous. Former Resident Generals Puaux and Labonne had been forced out according to La Tour du Pin at instigation of Sultan and evidently Juin was unwilling to accept post without first being assured he would not suffer same fate. We were told that removal of Moulay Abdel Hafid by Lyautey in 1912 was precedent for any similar action which French might care to take. In case of present Sultan we were reminded that he had been Lyautey's choice and therefore French creation.

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[1] Repeated to Tangier.

After this explanation La Tour du Pin assured us that Juin's menacing attitude to Sultan was only intended to bring latter to reason and get him to fulfill those measures referred to in first paragraph which are deemed necessary by French. The Sultan is reported to have requested Juin's demands in writing from De Blesson day after General's departure and to have intimated that once received he would accede to them. This "astute move to permit Sultan to seek confirmation of Juin's requests from government in Paris" was refused. In this connection Embassy was informed by Lagxhaoui, expelled member of Moroccan Government Council, who is now in Paris that Sultan is nonetheless writing President Auriol for clarification. La Tour du Pin discounted possibility of Sultan's removal because:

(1) Sultan would probably accede to French requests;
(2) Removal would create even worse situation than deposing of Moncef Bey in Tunisia for Sultan still young man and could create turmoil many more years than aged Moncef did;
(3) French Government would have to decide question and Socialists, MRP's and other political parties would doubtless oppose (Embassy knows that certain Socialists have been critical of Juin's actions and government's handling of situation).

In any case no action will be taken according to Foreign Office until return of Juin who will consult with government in Paris before going to Rabat.

At his request Lagxhaoui gave Embassy account of situation closely paralleling accounts given Tangier and Rabat by nationalists and proposed following three points which he thought would restore calm in Morocco:

1. Official denial by Foreign Office that removal Sultan envisaged.
2. Naming new Resident General who would not as Juin have other functions. Juin's future connections with SHAPE he insisted implied to average Moroccan that his acts had full approval US.
3. New Resident General preferably civilian should be authorized institute immediate freedom of press and Moroccan trade unions.

Once crisis over Lagxhaoui believed French and Moroccans could proceed work out acceptable *modus vivendi*.

At Lagxhaoui's suggestion his views were reported to La Tour du Pin who found them to be reasonable. However, Foreign Office could not make communiqué he stated which would cause Juin lose face and would do nothing until General's return. He added that second point would be taken care of when Juin resigns post Morocco probably in June. Point three La Tour du Pin said was already favorably considered by Foreign Office.

We informed La Tour du Pin that we were following situation closely and with concern lest worsening of relations between Sultan and French administration lead to disorder and violence in Morocco.

While realizing that problem was one between French and Moroccans we expressed hope that conciliatory attitude would prevail and that good relations would be quickly re-established between French administration and Maghzen. La Tour du Pin was confident that difficulties would be ironed out within few weeks.

BONSAL

771.13/2-251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Tangier[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 2, 1951—2 p. m.

260. Ref Deptel 254, Jan 31, rptd Rabat 45, Paris 4002.[2] McGhee discussed Moroccan situation with General Juin and reps Fr Emb Jan 31.[3] Juin strongly defended Fr policy Morocco. Highly critical Sultan and particularly Istiqlal and said Sultan must denounce Istiqlal or go.

McGhee told Juin US concerned over Morocco situation and hopes stability can be maintained there. Also US concerned over Juin's demand Sultan renounce Istiqlal since demand places Sultan in untenable position. Juin replied firmly Sultan must condemn Istiqlal methods or people will throw him out.

McGhee expressed hope Sultan wld not be deposed. Referring to Arab League reps re Fr policy Morocco McGhee said US wld be greatly embarrassed if matter raised in UN because it cld not assure support for Fr if Fr takes arbitrary action. McGhee said US favors policy of evolutionary development of peoples in dependent areas and expressed hope Fr and Sultan cld reconcile their differences and collaborate to mutual advantage. Juin gave impression he is absolutely uncompromising towards Istiqlal party and Sultan. Mtg was friendly and McGhee endeavored to convey tactfully to Juin our views re Fr policy in Morocco.

To prevent misunderstanding however fol is Dept's position:

1. US does not fully subscribe Fr policies Morocco and Juin does not have our unqualified support on any action he may take there. If statements to contrary made to Sultan or others in North Africa US will be forced deny them.
2. US concerned over threat to stability if arbitrary action taken force Sultan's removal.
3. If action taken by Fr depose Sultan, US will disassociate itself from such action and may be forced so state publicly.

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Bourgerie and cleared by McGhee, Berry, Matthews, and Bonbright, was repeated to Paris, London, Rabat, and Casablanca.

[2] Not printed; it reported that McGhee would discuss Moroccan developments with General Juin on January 31. (771.00/1-3051)

[3] A memorandum of McGhee's conversation with General Juin is in file 771.00/1-3151.

4. If any such action taken by Fr results in matter being raised in UN the US will not support Fr.

5. Although US does not advocate immed independence for North Africans US favors policy evolutionary development peoples in dependent areas.

US hopes efforts will be made by Fr reconcile differences bet Fr and Sultan in order avoid open break resulting in trouble in Morocco and embarrassing Fr and US at critical time when unity bet NATO allies shld be promoted.

Emb Paris and Leg Tangier or at discretion Min, Consul at Rabat[4] instructed convey these points immed to FonOff and Residency respectively. Fr Emb here also being informed today this position.

Re question asylum see Hackworth, Vol II Sec 191 (particularly first Sec page 622) and Paras 192 and 193 for statement general US policy this subj.

Right of asylum or sanctuary never recognized by US as principle of internatl law. On contrary, US has strongly disapproved principle of asylum as such and declined recognize or subscribe to it as part of internatl law. It has, however, on occasion sanctioned granting temp refuge by Amer dipl and cons missions when affording such refuge seemed be necessary for preservation human life. Only when local govt becomes unable assure safety refugee, and his life consequently endangered through mob violence or other lawlessness, may protection be granted.

Dept examined ltrs addressed Sultan by Pres Roosevelt in 1943[5] and does not consider they constitute US commitment protect Sultan and family.

Dept suggests you convey fol to Sultan through whatever channels you consider appropriate:

1. Re Asylum: Explain gen US policy on right of asylum as set forth above and explain this Govt does not consider Roosevelt ltrs as guarantee protection or as having been intended guarantee protection Sultan and family. Such undertaking wld be contrary estab US Govt principle and policy throughout its history. Our ans to Sultan on this point shld be couched in terms calculated discourage him from requesting asylum from this Govt.

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[4] Robert McBride.

[5] The letters under reference here cannot be further identified. Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef dined with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Casablanca, Morocco on the evening of January 22, 1943 during the American-British wartime Casablanca Conference, January 14–24, 1943. No official record of the discussion at the dinner was found, but evidence indicates that President Roosevelt spoke of American sympathy for Moroccan independence and the expectation of postwar American-Moroccan economic cooperation. Aspects of the American attitude toward postwar Morocco were taken up in a January 23 meeting between Presidential adviser Harry Hopkins and Moroccan Grand Vizier Mohammed el Mokhri at Casablanca. Regarding these two meetings, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 692–693 and 702–704.

2. However, Dept genuinely concerned over recent reports from Morocco and therefore McGhee saw Juin and urged upon him necessity for moderation in dealing with Moroccan problem and expressed hope Fr will follow evolutionary policy there.

3. Re Rabat's tel 87 Jan 31.[6] At request McGhee, Juin indicated willingness inform Sultan USAF program Morocco, telling him US had requested this be done.

4. Dept was pleased learn Sultan plans take moderate line with Juin on his return Rabat. Dept hopes it will be possible for Sultan reconcile differences with Fr and thus avoid open break at this critical time. Course of moderation also being urged on Fr officials in Wash and Paris.

Acheson

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[6] Not printed; it reported *inter alia* that the Sultan would publicly offer the use of his country to the Atlantic Pact nations, but before making such a statement he wanted to be officially informed by the French of the initiation of a U.S. Air Force program for Morocco. (771.11/1–3151)

771.00/2–1451 : Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Department of State

SECRET RABAT, February 14, 1951.

95. Assistant Chief Civil Cabinet Soulie now unquestionably Juin's top political adviser requested see me February 10 for frank purpose explaining Juin's reasons for conviction we are mistaken in what he considers our policy towards Sultan. Visit was preceded by brief *aide-mêmoire* copy of which was sent to Tangier and text and translation of which follow by airmail. This document is in effect reply *démarche* made residency as instructed Deptel 47, February 2[1] though Soulie stressed it was informal. He indicated similar paper would be given Bruce in Paris. It is extreme statement French case and not overly convincing. However lengthy oral presentation made by Soulie exceptionally significant and will be covered in full by despatch. He said following represented entirely views Juin Moroccan situation and we must, I think, assume resident largely sincere therein.

It was stated Juin had come Morocco 1947 with specific authorization depose Sultan should he refuse cooperate. Since then despite French-inspired reforms such as establishment school administration and appointment Vizierial delegates to French Directorates Sultan has continually attacked French failure establish democracy Morocco. He has prevented establishment labor code, municipal organization and rural communal self government because refusal accept any provisions distasteful to him. Thus needed reforms which are 90% agreeable Moroccans stopped. Juin does not consider this negotiation. Recently sit down strike has been aggravated with much important legislation blocked including expropriation land needed US airbase program. This coupled with Sultan's open support Nationalist agitation led Juin on January 26 inform him French would no longer tolerate unjust denunciations French activity Morocco by Istiqlal and Nationalists must desist from troubling public order. Sultan further told unless he approved French sponsored reforms immediately, Juin would make public legislative log jam now existing and reasons therefor. Finally slight revamping Imperial Cabinet weed out outspoken anti-French elements required.

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[1] Same as telegram 260, *supra*.

Soulie concluded French hoped for conciliatory attitude Sultan but not optimistic because evidences outside support from Socialists and Left Wing or [*of?*] MPR in France and Arab League as well as possible from US and UK Governments would stiffen him. Furthermore if he believed Juin bluffing he would certainly fail cooperate. Soulie stressed Juin most definitely not bluffing though French hoped deposition unnecessary as French interests throughout Moslem world would suffer thereby. He concluded deposition however more than strong possibility and if carried out would be for sake ultimate stability Morocco. He said Juin preferred eliminate possible rear guard opposition now rather than during war and utterly refused follow any line which might antagonize seriously Berber elements which supplied 3 to 4 divisions for Atlantic Pact Army while entire Arab League incapable furnishing 1 effective division. Last mentioned key point French argument which is that 75% Moroccans oppose Sultan and French will not risk alienating this important military element because of political fulminations Arabs Morocco or elsewhere.

McBride

771.00/2-2351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Northern African Affairs (Cyr)[1]

SECRET [Washington,] February 23, 1951.

Subject: French Policies in Morocco.

Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, Counselor of the French Embassy
Mr. Jean-Pierre Benard, First Secretary, French Embassy
NEA—Mr. Berry
AF—Mr. Bourgerie
AF—Mr. Cyr
AF—Mr. Richey
WE—Mr. Godley

After the usual amenities, Mr. Daridan stated that "we" are most unhappy about the *New York Times* article of February 22, 1951 reporting the substance of a letter addressed to President Truman by El Abd Bouhafa, Secretary of the Abd El Krim Committee for Freedom of North Africa. The article reports that "in Cairo, Washington and Rabat 'spokesmen for the United States informed us that your Government has made clear its disapproval of General Juin's threats', and that the United States did not support French colonial policy in Morocco. These assurances, Mr. Bouhafa added, have not been publicly stated."

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[1] The memorandum was drafted on February 28.

Mr. Daridan was particularly unhappy over the allegation in the article that a State Department official had privately corroborated the foregoing statements. He referred to previous assurances from the Department that no public statement would be made concerning the Moroccan rift without first informing the French, and wondered, under the circumstances, whether the Department might not wish to put out some sort of denial.

Mr. Bourgerie replied that nobody in the Office of African Affairs had seen or talked with Mr. Bouhafa in this vein. As a matter of fact, Mr. Bouhafa has been consistently avoided during the past several weeks.

Mr. Berry expressed the view that any sort of denial put out by the Department would serve to dignify the Bouhafa story and would serve to keep alive a public discussion of a subject which both we and the French wished to see closed. He went on to say that he was concerned over the reports of recent developments in Morocco and recalled in this connection that Mr. Schuman had recently informed Ambassador Bruce that the French Government is as concerned as the United States Government over the direction of the trend of events in Morocco. As the direction is contrary to that which we here, and the French in Paris, anticipated, we wondered if there was anything to the newspaper stories that there was a difference of opinion within the French Government itself on Morocco.

Mr. Daridan indicated that there may be some difference of opinion on this subject within the French Government. He agreed that generally it is all right not to dignify such press reports with a reply but he wondered whether that would be the right approach in this case. He inferred that he thought the United States Government should deny the foregoing press report.

Mr. Berry thereupon reviewed the United States Government's traditional approach to dependent areas. He said that as a nation we liked to see the peoples in such areas progress. He wondered, "within the family", whether General Juin was not acting more as a soldier than a diplomat in dealing with the Moroccans. In this country, he said, we would dislike very much to see an outbreak in the Arab world against France; we do not like the prospect of airing the Moroccan problem in the UN; and we are sorry to see selfish groups, whoever they may be, try to use the United States to promote their selfish motives. Mr. Berry declared that it should be possible to find a solution to the Moroccan problem in Morocco.

Mr. Daridan agreed that General Juin may well be more of a soldier than a diplomat, but the Nationalists are the ones, he declared, who make reforms impossible. Mr. Daridan agreed with Mr. Berry that it should be possible to find a solution on the spot and he too hated to see the Istiqlal Party use the United States to promote its own ends.

Mr. Godley agreed with the views Mr. Berry had expressed. Mr. Bourgerie referred to the fact that the Moroccan imports problem had been aired in Congress; he hoped that the political problem could be settled without such an airing.

Mr. Benard expressed the view that we are all working for a solution of the Moroccan problem. The Istiqlal, however, are everywhere and at all times pretending that they have United States support of their position. He referred to the fact that a few years ago Azzam Pasha asserted in a press conference at the Shoreham Hotel that the late President Roosevelt had promised to help the Sultan of Morocco obtain independence. At that time, Mr. Loy Henderson had publicly denied Azzam Pasha's statement and by such public announcement had taken the wind out of it. Now, he declared, a United States spokesman is alleged to have made a statement in the above mentioned press report. Mr. Benard felt that again a public denial is needed.

Mr. Bourgerie stated that no United States spokesman had made such a statement, but that the statement does in fact happen to be the United States' view.

Mr. Benard replied that since the United States does not support France in this matter, does it support the Istiqlal. He indicated that unless we declare our neutrality publicly the Istiqlal will continue to claim that they have United States support.

Mr. Berry said that while it is true that the Istiqlal will likely repeat their claims, in his opinion we would be adding fuel to the fire by denying the claim.

Mr. Bourgerie added that if we say we do not support the Nationalists the State Department might thereby offend and get into an argument with the more liberal elements in the United States.

Mr. Benard felt that this was not the point; he insisted that there need only be a denial of the particular statement made in the foregoing press story. Mr. Berry compared this situation to the many charges which are leveled month after month at high officials of this Government who do not dignify all of these charges with answers. Mr. Berry said he would like to see the French make adjustments in Morocco in a way which would solve the problem.

Mr. Benard said that the French are worried by press stories such as the above when they appear in France or Morocco. In this case, however, Bouhafa is trying to draw the United States into an internal Moroccan problem. The French, he said, are familiar with these tactics on the part of the Arabs and feel that there is need of a United States denial to counteract the press story in question.

Mr. Berry said he felt that the Department's position would be not to dignify the press story with an answer but that if the French consider it important to make a denial we will think the matter over. Mr. Godley suggested that possibly something might be issued after a couple of weeks if the Nationalists continue to claim United States support.

Mr. Bourgerie indicated that our press guidance had been along the lines we previously mentioned to the French. He recalled that last Saturday it appeared that progress was being made in Morocco—then suddenly General Juin's demand on the Maghzen was made. He referred to the fact that the Moroccan Section of the Council of Government is the only forum which the Moroccans have since they have no legislature. He referred to the fact that El Glaoui is not too scrupulous and in fact is quite repressive in his measures toward his people in Marrakech.

Mr. Daridan expressed the view that a solution in Morocco would be more probable if it were made clear to the Istiqlal that they do not have American backing.

771.00/2-2851 : Despatch

The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET RABAT, February 28, 1951.

No. 325

Ref: Consulate's Telegram 122, February 27, 1951.[2]

Subject: Denouement of Moroccan Crisis

On Saturday night, February 24, the Moroccan crisis, which was then just two days less than a month old, appeared badly deadlocked. Negotiations between the French and the Palace had been broken off, and the tone of the press was threatening. According to the French-language newspapers, demonstrations against the Sultan and the Istiqlal were increasing with even Arab elements becoming restive and adding their complaints to those of the Berbers. It will be examined more in detail in a later despatch when complete evidence is available as to what percentage of the manifestations against the Sultan reported in the Residency-controlled press ever occurred. At that point the Sultan was still apparently standing firm though it was apparent that General Juin would eventually substantially get his way, if his own Government supported him, because of the Sultan's lack of military means to back his position.

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[1] Copies were also sent to Paris, Cairo, Tangier, Tunis, Algiers, and Casablanca.

[2] Not printed; it reported that all but two members of the Istiqlal Executive Committee had been arrested. (771.00/3-151)

On Sunday morning it was announced under banner headlines that the Imperial Cabinet had been dissolved and its functionaries as well as the Rector of the Karaouyine University in Fez, an ardent nationalist, had been "reintegrated" into other less controversial duties. Residency sources have pointed out to us that, since talks were still suspended, the French learned of this action by the Sultan, which he had promised earlier incidentally, by the press though it was confirmed by a note to the Residency on Sunday. The immediate reaction of the Residency was that this represented a first step by the Moroccan ruler toward a compromise but was insufficient in itself to meet Juin's demands even in the personnel field; since the original request regarding the dissolution of the cabinet had later been amplified by the French into insistence of elimination of all anti-French elements in the Maghzen.

The same day information began coming in from Moroccan sources that the French civil controllers in the Berber areas of the Middle Atlas had instructed the tribes under their jurisdiction each to despatch a quota of sixty or seventy armed horsemen to Rabat or Fez, depending on proximity, to demonstrate against the Sultan and the Arab population, and show their loyalty to France. Although we were most skeptical that such a movement would occur, a check by the British Consul General and myself around Rabat and by the British Consul in the environs of Fez indicated that the information we had received was correct. It later developed that perhaps as many as 8,000 men were set in motion, with about 3,000 destined for Rabat. Although the British and ourselves were told later, when this movement was discussed, that this represented merely the most serious of the spontaneous evidences of Berber disaffection with the Sultan and the Istiqlal, a British journalist, Mr. Wallis of the *Daily Telegraph*, told the Director of Press and Information, M. Mazoyer, that this tale was obvious nonsense since the Protectorate could have prevented the movement simply by not permitting the tribesmen to start out. This Residency official thereupon admitted first that the French had not opposed the descent on Rabat and Fez, and later that the Protectorate had actually encouraged it. Various British and American journalists at present in Morocco have mentioned their conclusion of this maneuver which my British colleague and I had already reached: that the French were playing an unusually dangerous game which might result even in European bloodshed should the demonstrations depart from plan in any respect.

On Monday morning press headlines reflected a totally different atmosphere, and indicated that agreement on outstanding differences had virtually been reached the previous afternoon. I was called in by the Diplomatic Counselor who reported that a compromise had been effected the day before. The details of this arrangement were reported in Rabat telegram 120 of February 26.[3] As an indication of why this sudden *volte face* had occurred, primarily on the part of the Sultan, who was made to appear to cede on most of the outstanding points, the Diplomatic Counselor stated that Deputy Resident deBlesson, who returned on Sunday morning from Paris, brought with him a message from President Auriol replying to the Sultan's direct appeal of February 21. Since this was thought to be a last effort on the Sultan's part to get out of his impasse with Juin, we were left to conclude that, when Auriol called for a return to the spirit of the October talks between the Sultan and himself in Paris, the Moroccan sovereign concluded that the game was up and he had best come to such terms as possible with the Residency quickly before new demands were made.

A further factor in the abrupt termination of the crisis, and perhaps the principal one, was the movement of the Berber tribesmen towards Rabat and Fez. In the French view, it is stated that this ominous and spontaneous development finally convinced the Sultan, when the forces planning to demonstrate against him were at the doors of the capital, that he had either lost or never had the support of the mass of his people in his political policy. Therefore, he concluded he could no longer hold out against the Moroccan population, and must succumb to their wishes by denouncing the Istiqlal and meeting the other French demands (which are now presented as Moroccan demands in the French press). Since no Moroccan now dares to be in contact with us, we don't have their side, but presumably when the Sultan realized the lengths to which the French were willing to go to coerce him, including even risking losing control of the situation in Rabat, he decided to surrender to the French terms, though he was able to gain some satisfaction on two points, and lost entirely only on the question of eliminating anti-French personnel from the Moroccan Government. Thus, the speedy arrangement of February 25 was concluded. It was not really so hasty because all of the points had been mulled over for so long that all possible combinations had been attempted, and the final accord was merely the putting together of the appropriate ones.

The compromise which was worked out on the question of denunciation of the Istiqlal was that the Sultan issued a long proclamation of the principles of Islam and calling for tranquillity in the country while the Grand Vizier was left the task of condemning the methods and activities of "a certain party". These declarations appeared on

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[3] Not printed.

February 24 to the sustained hoopla of the French press which, having called the Sultan every name in the book, now referred to "the renewed proof of the wisdom of His Majesty". Point one was thus taken care of, while, on the discharging or transferring of further personnel, announcements are expected momentarily, with the appointment of a new Pasha of Rabat in the person of a member of the pro-French Tazi family already mentioned in the February 28 *Echo du Maroc*. On the question of reforms, the Sultan has also of course promised speedy action, with the expectation that many pieces of French-sponsored and drafted legislation will be approved quickly, while others will be the subject of study by the Franco-Moroccan Mixed Commission discussed in Paris with the Sultan last year, and to the appointment of which he has heretofore been opposed.

This would seem, on the surface at least, to wash out the matter completely, and this office certainly hopes the crisis is finished because the Residency has been in a perfectly poisonous frame of mind during its duration. However, one slight ominous note is the continued harping of the press on demonstrations of loyalty to France, since the need for this propaganda would seem to be over. *Le Petit Marocain* of the Mas family, a strongly anti-Moroccan sheet, this morning headlined a report to the effect that the religious brotherhoods, who are leading French supporters, felt that the condemnation of "a certain party" was insufficient and were still worrying the old bone of denouncing the Istiqlal by name. It is fervently hoped that the French will drop the matter and let Morocco get on about its business, but the possibility of using artificial respiration on the "crisis" exists. It is hoped when all of the data available can be assembled to present a report which will show that the so-called crisis was largely invented for motives which are not entirely clear as yet. In any event this unproductive political squabble completely dominated Moroccan life during the period from its birth on January 26 to what we cordially hope was its demise on February 27.

ROBERT H. MCBRIDE

771.00/4-2351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Northern African Affairs (Cyr)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1951.

Subject: Morocco.

Participants: French Ambassador Henri Bonnet
Mr. Gabriel van Laethem, Secretary of the French Embassy
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Funkhouser
AF—Mr. Bourgerie
Mr. Cyr

Mr. Bonnet opened the conversation by stating that Iran and the rest of the area which Mr. McGhee has just visited,[2] like the rest of the world, have many problems. He said that in most instances of political unrest, nationalism is found in the vanguard, closely followed by Communism.

Mr. McGhee stated that the NEA area does, indeed, have its share of troubles these days. He referred specifically to the British difficulties in Egypt,[3] to the nationalization of oil in Iran,[4] and to the Syrian-Israeli dispute.[5] He suggested that part of the problem in Iran is to convince the people that the oil companies are for the people; the main issue everywhere is to decide who can capture nationalism and whether nationalism can be channeled in the right direction.

The Ambassador agreed that nationalism is a good force but that it must be properly channeled. Mr. McGhee said that France has an excellent opportunity in Morocco to do just that, but that our information indicates that French policies have not gained the confidence of the Moroccan people.

Ambassador Bonnet stated that obviously there was a misunderstanding between us as to the facts in Morocco. He said that the recent trouble in Morocco is the result of a two-year delay on the part of the Sultan in signing dahirs for reforms which the people want. He described the Istiqlal Party as a representative of nothing but a few members of the privileged classes consisting of such people as Azzam Pasha. The French authorities in Morocco have made every effort to collaborate with the Sultan but the fact remains that he is advised by people like the Istiqlal, which makes successful cooperation impossible. He said it simply is not true that the French had incited the Berbers of Marrakech in the recent incidents in Morocco. The Istiqlal Party, he declared, represents an element that the West should not support. Its link with the Arab League is dangerous. The Istiqlal Party must be stopped so that there will be no repetition of the situations such as have developed in Asia.

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[1] Copies of this memorandum, which was drafted on April 25, were sent to Paris, Tangier, Casablanca, and Rabat.

[2] For documentation on McGhee's trip to the Near East and South Asia in February and March, see pp. 49 ff.

[3] For documentation on Egypt, see pp. 343 ff.

[4] Regarding the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy, see p. 544.

[5] For documentation on the Palestine situation, see pp. 559 ff.

The French Ambassador went on to say that the French are attempting to prepare the Moroccans for eventual self-government. They are not trying to do this in the way that the Istiqlal Party would like but they are trying to do it the right way. The Istiqlal are interested in nothing but an assumption of power and they are people who, once in power, would have no following and no interest in the common good. Under the French plan preparations for self-government would be gradual; dahirs must be signed for representative government to evolve in three stages: (1) tribal assemblies restricted to small areas must first be set up in a network throughout the country; (2) the authority and powers of these traditional assemblies would be gradually enlarged in geographic and substantive scope; and (3) finally elections would be held, thereby substituting elected assemblies for traditional assemblies once the people are prepared for such a step. The French plan is one of self-government from the grass roots and not one which springs from the minds of a few Istiqlal leaders for their own good. The French purpose is to forestall Communism by the introduction of democracy with a popular basis. The Istiqlal are not Communists but their activities lend themselves unwittingly to opening the door to Communism. The French Government needs the cooperation and understanding of the United States in its efforts to bring self-government to Morocco and such cooperation cannot exist so long as there is misunderstanding based on misinformation.

Mr. McGhee said that he was glad the Ambassador had come in to discuss this subject because as a result of his recent trip to Morocco he was greatly concerned over indications that the French do not have the confidence of the Moroccan people.[6] He pointed out that while the United States is not a party to this problem, it is necessarily interested in seeing the situation there develop in a manner which will be conducive to stability. He said that the United States wishes to see France succeed in Morocco because Morocco means a great deal to the French. He said he was frankly concerned over the trend of affairs in Morocco and over the great degree of embarrassment which could arise out of the introduction of the Moroccan dispute into the UN by the Arab League. While we or the French may not like the Arab League, the fact remains that it is a force which must be considered in North Africa. He compared the situation in Morocco to that in French Indo-China and agreed with the Ambassador that French action in French Indo-China was important to the United States as well as to France.

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[6] Prior to and in connection with his attendance at the North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, October 2–7, 1950, Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and a small party of advisers visited a number of cities in Europe and North Africa including Casablanca on September 29 and Rabat on September 30. For a record of McGhee's meeting with Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef in Rabat on September 30, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1747.

Mr. Bonnet indicated that the introduction of the Moroccan dispute into the UN would be embarrassing to the United States but that France was prepared to counter-attack if and when that happened. He said that Morocco was not comparable to French Indo-China. Mr. McGhee agreed that while they may not be identical there are certain broad elements which are similar in both cases.

Mr. McGhee said that we wish to support France in Morocco but that we were extremely concerned when General Juin indicated that the Sultan might be deposed. Our information indicates that the Moroccan people support the Sultan. The Ambassador expressed considerable amazement at this statement. Mr. McGhee indicated that the Moroccan incident has produced sympathetic reactions in Tunisia. Ambassador Bonnet stated that the trouble in Tunisia is being caused by the Arab League and he suggested that we should verify our reports to the effect that the Moroccan people support the Sultan. As a matter of fact, he said, the leaders other than the Istiqlal are against the Sultan. Mr. McGhee asked what other leaders there were in Morocco since political parties are not allowed. The Ambassador indicated that he had reference to the traditional leaders such as the caids and pashas. Mr. Bourgerie indicated that it has been reported that all anti-French caids and pashas are replaced by pro-French leaders as necessary.

In answer to the Ambassador's statement that only a few educated Istiqlal support the Sultan, Mr. McGhee observed that it seems to happen consistently as people are educated that they feel the nationalist urge. The Ambassador distinguished between legitimate nationalist aspirations and the tenets of the Istiqlal Party. The Istiqlal are not, he declared, in favor of French reforms; they are opposed. The Ambassador indicated that the situation in Morocco at the present time is calm. Mr. McGhee observed that calm based on repressive measures is not really calm. All we wish to see in Morocco is effective measures permitting such rights as freedom of the press, of thought, of political parties, and a comprehensive educational system. He said that the progress being made in Morocco is negligible compared to that in India and Pakistan. The Ambassador concluded his remarks on Morocco by stating that his observations should be studied carefully and that yielding to the Istiqlal opened the road not to democracy but to Communism.[7]

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[7] On May 9 the Department of State cabled Rabat, summarizing the substance of this memorandum and instructing the Consulate to tell de Blesson that the United States was disturbed over the divergence between the French and U.S. estimates of the situation in Morocco, which the Department of State believed arose principally from French failure to inform the United States fully on what they were contemplating in the way of reforms. (Telegram 72 to Rabat, May 9: 771.00/5-951)

Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 88

Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 29, 1951.

[WFM F-4*a*]

MOROCCO

PROBLEM

To harmonize French and US views on Morocco.

US OBJECTIVES

a) To maintain stability in Morocco so that Morocco can make the maximum contribution to Western security and our air bases may be utilized and protected.

b) To assist the French in making necessary economic and social reforms and in guiding Moroccan political evolution toward self-government at a sufficiently rapid rate to forestall nationalist uprisings.

c) To cooperate with France in the promotion of friendly relations with the Moroccan people.

FRENCH POSITION

a) Morocco should eventually become an associated state in the French Union and France alone is the power to guide Morocco to this status.

b) The present Moroccan nationalist movement is not representative of the mass of the people which have not yet achieved sufficient state of development to assume the responsibilities of self-government.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet, not printed, which indicated that this paper had been approved by NEA and EUR following a briefing session with Secretary Acheson on August 28. The cover sheet also indicated that it was circulated as WFM F-4*a* in the records of the Department of State. A previous draft, WFM F-4, dated August 27, which is the same in substance as the paper printed here, is in the Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 88. Papers designated WFM F were prepared for bilateral talks with the French during the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France held in Washington during September. For a record of the discussion on Morocco, see U.S.-Fr. Min-1, *infra*.

c) France is doing and will do everything within its power to hasten such evolution.

d) France desires to cooperate with the US militarily and economically in Morocco so that Morocco can make its maximum contribution to Western security.

SULTAN'S POSITION

a) Requests revision of the Protectorate Treaty of 1912.

b) Withholds approval of the French-sponsored decrees on the ground that they would institute reforms that are in derogation of his sovereignty.

c) Wishes to remain friendly with France, but would relinquish his sovereignty only to a purely Moroccan assembly.

d) Avoided French demand in January that he denounce the Istiqlal Party but, in the face of Berber demonstrations and a French threat of possible deposition, he compromised to the extent of denouncing all extremists.

e) Derived great satisfaction and encouragement from President Roosevelt's visit of 1943 but is somewhat disappointed over our present neutral policy in Morocco.

f) With Oriental patience he is capable of awaiting the preoccupation of France elsewhere in a world struggle.

ISTIQLAL POSITION

a) Supports the Sultan.

b) Seeks to gain Moroccan independence.

c) Solicits Arab League and other Moslem support, particularly in presenting the Moroccan problem to the United Nations.

d) Seeks the support or at least the neutrality of the United States in the dispute.

e) Believes the French Residency is bent on strengthening the legal foothold of France and Frenchmen in Morocco, rather than guiding the evolutionary development of the Moroccan people.

POSITION OF THE MOSLEM WORLD AND ARAB LEAGUE

a) The Arab League and Moslem world generally, support the Moroccan nationalists and in March five Arab countries asked France to grant independence to Morocco.

b) The possibility exists that the Arab countries might raise the Moroccan problem in the United Nations which would place the US and France in an embarrassing position.

US POSITION TO BE PRESENTED TO MR. SCHUMAN

a) Our objectives in Morocco are: (1) To maintain stability in Morocco so that Morocco can make the maximum contribution to Western security; (2) To assist the French in guiding Moroccan social, economic and political evolution. We desire to work with the French in achieving these objectives and want them to realize that we are not working against them in Morocco. By the same token, the French will appreciate that we have an interest in maintaining our traditional friendship with the Moroccan people as we have throughout the Arab world.

b) We are most appreciative of the assistance we have received from the French Government in obtaining certain military privileges in the Sheriffian Empire and fully recognize the importance of military collaboration in that area.

c) We do not believe Morocco is ready for independence. We are of the opinion that only by following an evolutionary policy in that country can France bring that area of the world to make its maximum contribution to the security of the West. We recognize that reforms have already been instituted in Morocco and hope that this policy will continue to develop under the new Resident General. While we recognize the different situations existing in Morocco and Tunisia, due largely to French influence in the latter area since 1883, we are looking forward to evolution in Morocco along lines similar to those followed in Tunisia.

d) In our view this policy must be accompanied by restraint and moderation on the part of not only the Moroccan nationalists and Arab League but also of the responsible French officials in Morocco. We are prepared to use our influence to this end.

e) As Mr. Schuman will recall, when the question of deposition of the Sultan was under consideration early in this year we expressed our concern over such action. Our view remains the same due to the unfortunate effect that such action would have on French relations with the Moslem world and that it might lead to Arab League action before the United Nations which would be embarrassing.

f) In refuting charges raised particularly by Moslem countries that French policy in Morocco is repressive rather than evolutionary we are in a difficult position in that at present we are not familiar with French policy nor even with the scope of the decrees (dahirs) proposed to the Sultan. We hope that it might be possible for the French Government to inform us of its plans in that area and would be glad to discuss them at the convenience of the French Government. We are certain that such discussions would permit us to support French policy more effectively.

CFM Files : Lot M 88 : Box 158 : WFM Sept 1951, US–FR MIN

United States Minutes of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and France, Washington, 3:30 p. m., September 11, 1951

[Extract] [1]

SECRET

U.S.–Fr. Min–1

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
M. Schuman (Fr)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	FRANCE
Mr. Harriman	M. Bonnet
Mr. Jessup	M. Alphand
Mr. Perkins	M. de Margerie
Mr. Bruce	

. . . .

Morocco

11. Noting that the Resident-General in Morocco was directly under the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. SCHUMAN emphasized his direct interest and responsibility for Morocco. He had been concerned in early 1951 when he received a note from the U.S. to the effect that it would be difficult, or even impossible, to support France if the Moroccan question were raised before the U.N.[2] He thought that it would be best to have a frank, friendly discussion before the Moroccan question became an issue of open debate. He would not, however, discuss the legal status of U.S. citizens in Morocco, since that question was presently before the Hague Tribunal and France would of course loyally adhere to any decision which was reached.[3]

12. He was pleased to recognize and emphasize the important role that Marshall Plan aid had played in Morocco and to note that the relations between the Moroccans, the French and the Americans with respect to the military bases were very good.

13. He did not need to discuss in detail the content of the two memoranda of September 6 in which the French Government had set forth

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[1] For the complete text of U.S.–Fr. Min–1, see vol. III, pt. 1, p. 1249.

[2] The note under reference here has not been identified further; however in circular telegram 532, dated March 7, the Department of State informed Embassy Paris, *inter alia*, that subsequent to General Juin's visit to Washington (see telegram 260, February 2, p. 1371) it had been made clear to the French in Washington, Paris, and Rabat, that the United States would not be able to support France if the Arab League brought the Moroccan issue before the United Nations. (771.00/3–751)

[3] The Franco-American dispute over licensing practices in French Morocco had been referred by France to the International Court of Justice on October 28, 1950.

its attitude with respect to communism and nationalism in Morocco and the political evolution of Morocco (WFM F–4/1, September 8, 1951[4]). Instead he wished to describe present French policy which was opposite to the old colonial concept of the pre-1914 period. France would make a modern democratic state of Morocco. This was the purpose of the reforms of General Juin and of the new Resident-General, General Guillaume. The latter had received specific instructions to undertake additional reforms. France, however, could not impose these reforms but had to persuade the Sultan to accept them. Unfortunately the Sultan did not favor democracy, and since he was an absolute sovereign, he did not renounce his prerogatives easily. Moreover, the Berbers were also feudal and medieval in their point of view and were opposed to democracy. In addition, the European and Jewish colonies needed to be brought into a cohesive whole of Moroccan life. The Istiqlal, the anti-French opposition, was not interested in democracy and sought a representative assembly only in the hope of eliminating the French from Morocco. In undertaking necessary reorganization of the social structure, the reforms were directed to municipal improvement. They had evoked resistance but he hoped soon to get results.

14. In this policy France should not be isolated from the U.S. Neither the Sultan nor the Istiqlal should find a difference between the two countries. There was of course freedom for journalists to come to Morocco and freedom for Moroccans to travel abroad. Events of relative unimportance, such as a broadcast by Bourghiba from London, could be greatly exaggerated in Morocco. As to the communists in Morocco, they should not be confused with the nationalists. The two elements were entirely separate, but they could form a temporary alliance for their own purposes. Thus, the nationalists might try to use communist labor unions to create disorder.

15. As to the possibility that the Moroccan question might be placed before the U.N. by a member of the Arab League, M. Schuman asked the U.S. to discourage such action. Such a public discussion would not aid the situation in Morocco. Passions would be inflamed and it would be more difficult to make progress with the proposed reforms. At present there was no great difficulty in Morocco. General Guillaume was close to the Sultan and it was hoped that he would be able to influence him. If a debate did develop in the U.N., France and the U.S. should discuss their common attitude. At this point he had no specific ideas concerning exactly what should be done. France recognized its responsibility to lead Morocco forward toward independence in the French Union. This would be done in the same spirit as it had been done in Indochina. He appreciated the opportunity to explore

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[4] Not printed. WFM F–4/1 consists of copies of the two memoranda referred to by Schuman. (Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 88)

this problem which was of common strategic interest and in which the two countries had a common stake in an ordered, democratic regime.

16. Mr. Acheson said that the interests of France and the U.S. in Morocco were identical and that the two countries should work in close relationship. He appreciated the French assistance in making military facilities available. He would not want to hurt the position of France. He agreed that Morocco was not ready for independence and that it was the role of France to guide these people toward independence. In this effort he wished to be helpful. He also agreed that no useful purpose would be served by bringing the question before the U.N. and he would use such limited influence as he had to discourage such a step. He would study what had been said and would try to work out a common attitude if the question of Morocco came before the U.N. He observed that nationalist agitation merited careful consideration, as indeed the French were giving it, since such agitation was often used to direct attention away from local problems. He welcomed the offer of M. Schuman for further discussion of this question and thought perhaps this should be worked out.

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771.00/10-951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] October 9, 1951.

Subject: Moroccan Situation
Participants: The Secretary of State
M. Bonnet
Also present: Mr. Bonbright, EUR
Mr. Van Laethem, French Embassy

M. Bonnet began by stating that he had received several messages from M. Schuman and was under instructions to discuss with us the North African situation with particular reference to the action of the Egyptian Government on October 6 in placing the subject on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly. He left with me the attached note setting forth the French position.[2]

The Ambassador began with a brief reference to the very strong feeling which existed in France on the Moroccan question and said that M. Schuman himself was surprised by the depth of this feeling which had been brought to a head by the Egyptian action. He referred to the Bourghiba episode [3] and to the question of the exchange of communications between the French and American Governments suggested by M. Schuman in September.[4]

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Bonbright; copies of it were sent to Paris, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunis, Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

[2] There was no attachment to the source text; however, a memorandum from Bonbright to Perkins, also dated October 9, has attached to it both a French and an English text of the note under reference. (771.00/10-951)

With regard to the UN matter, M. Bonnet said that the French Government had decided to fight the placing of this item on the agenda on the grounds that this was an internal matter under the UN Charter. He was instructed to emphasize the very great importance which the French Government attached to obtaining our full support.

In reply I stated that we were in accord with the view that the United Nations was not competent to deal with this question in the sense of passing any condemnatory resolution or setting up a commission of investigation, etc. We would want to work with the French and talk over with them the best means of reaching the desired end. With respect to tactics however, I wished to throw out some suggestions which I hoped the French Government would take under consideration. I pointed to the difficulty of keeping any question off the agenda and inquired whether, unless we were sure of a favorable vote, it would be wise to put up a fight on this issue. If we lost, the result would be two debates instead of one, first on the question of procedure and then on the substance. In this connection I referred to the manner in which we had handled the Formosan issue when the Communists introduced a resolution branding us as aggressors there. Instead of fighting it we had welcomed the opportunity to present our side. We had then gone quietly to work and succeeded in getting the resolution placed at the bottom of the agenda and in the end, due to the pressure of other business, the item was never reached. I thought that it might be useful for the French Government to consider this precedent and see whether from their own point of view it would not be best for them to take the attitude that they were proud of their record in Morocco and glad of the opportunity to tell the world about it. If the French would give us some material, we could occasionally "chime in". I said that our minds had not been fully made up on this but I thought the idea was worth their consideration.

I then threw out the suggestion that if the negotiations with the Egyptians on defense matters [5] went well, it might be possible to persuade them to withdraw their request for a debate on Morocco.

M. Bonnet replied that if the Egyptians were to withdraw, this would, of course, be very satisfactory. He doubted if they would do so, however, and he also understood that although the Egyptians took the lead on Saturday some of the other Arab states intended to take identical action. With regard to my suggestion on tactics he was sure that his government had already considered the possibility of proceeding along those lines. He agreed that two debates were undesirable. On the other hand, the French Government doubted that their public opinion would stand for failure to meet the issue squarely. Moreover, in the light of the Iranian situation and the Egyptian abrogation of the British Treaty of 1936, the French felt that the line had to be drawn somewhere in order to halt the deterioration of the Western position. He felt sure his government would wish to draw the line on the Moroccan question and adopt a very stiff attitude toward it. He also referred to the serious effect in the Middle East if the US were to show hesitancy in backing up the French position. Finally, if the UN agreed to have the Moroccan question on the agenda the French foresaw the possibility of Egyptian-inspired disorders in Morocco to back up the Arab case.

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[3] Regarding Habib Bourguiba's visit to the United States in September and the events and incidents connected therewith, see pp. 1405–1418, *passim*.

[4] According to a memorandum from Bourgerie to McGhee, dated September 21, Schuman had asked Acheson during the NATO Council meeting at Ottawa, September 15–20, to exchange letters in which the United States would point out that it supported the French position in Morocco and had no interest in the internal political affairs there. (771.00/9–2151)

[5] For documentation on proposed Egyptian accession to a Middle East Command system, see pp. 1 ff.

As for the present situation in Morocco itself, the Ambassador characterized it as "good" and he thought that General Guillaume, the new Resident General, had got off to an excellent start with the Sultan. He then read me what the Sultan had recently said to the General which was along the following lines: "You will always find me at your side in defense of the common interests of our two countries. The erection of the edifice has been too rapid. Only the roof is missing. If difficulties remain, we will find means together to meet them. There shall be no division between France and Morocco and we will work together hand in hand."

The Ambassador seemed personally to share my views concerning the unfortunate effects of fighting a losing battle on the procedural question and agreed that we should go over together the prospects for the individual country votes. It would be particularly important to find what position the Latin Americans will take.

Turning to M. Schuman's proposal for an exchange of notes, I indicated that I had just returned to the office and had not yet had an opportunity to go deeply into the question. I asked him outright however what M. Schuman wanted to do with the notes. Did he wish to make them public? Just what purpose would they serve?

M. Bonnet stated that he had no specific information on the question of publication although he assumed that his government probably would wish to publish the notes. Certainly M. Schuman would wish to show them to the Cabinet. As for their purpose he thought that M. Schuman wanted them to show that the US approves the policy which France is following in Morocco.

As he was leaving, the Ambassador stated that he would report our conversation and wanted to make certain that he understood the extent of our support on the UN matter. I repeated to him that we were in accord with the French with respect to substance, namely, that we would oppose any commission of investigation or resolution denouncing the French. On the matter of tactics I had not made up my mind but had merely offered some suggestions for the consideration of his government.[6]

DEAN ACHESON

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[6] The question of Morocco was considered by the Steering Committee of the General Assembly following the application by Egypt for inclusion on the agenda. On November 9 the Steering Committee decided to postpone indefinitely the application and on December 13 the General Assembly concurred with that decision. For documentation on the question of putting the Moroccan case before the United Nations, see vol. II, pp. 135 ff.

771.00/11-2151

Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1951.

UNITED STATES POLICY IN MOROCCO

Recent developments in the Near East and North Africa have served to aggravate the dilemma which this Government faces in determining what United States policy should be in Morocco. With the development of United States air and naval bases in Morocco, the strategic importance of this area to this Government has been greatly enhanced. Thus political stability in Morocco is of even greater importance to the United States than it has been in the past. At the same time, recent developments in Iran and Egypt, coupled with the growing strength of Nationalists movements throughout North Africa serve to point up the fact that the threat of political instability in Morocco has increased almost in direct ratio to the increase in our strategic interest in the area. From these two factors,—the increase of U.S. strategic interest in the area and the threat to political stability which is posed by the rising tide of nationalism—the present dilemma regarding United States policy is created.

Unless the present Nationalist effervesence can be kept in check and guided toward its legitimate objectives by the Western powers, our strategic interest in Morocco (coupled as they are with NATO objectives) and the resultant necessity for political stability would appear to dictate that this Government support French policy in Morocco regardless of the damage which such a course of action would have on our interests in the Arab world and particularly on our relations with the Moroccans. Alternatively, we could pursue a policy in Morocco which would conform to our basic belief in the right of dependent peoples to evolve toward self-government under the United Nations Charter and protect our interests and objectives in the Moslem World. In effect, this would mean that we support the Moroccans vis-à-vis the French. This could be calculated to maintain friendship and prestige for the United States in the Middle East and Africa, but only at the probable cost of jeopardizing our strategic interests in the area and our friendship with France. Neither of these policies (or courses of action) is desirable or in the best interests of the United States.

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[1] This paper was drafted by Richey and Bourgerie.

If one takes into account the immediate objectives of NATO and the objectives of this Government in Western Europe on the one hand, and our long term objectives and interests in the Moslem World on the other, the present situation in Morocco would appear to require that we continue to pursue a middle-of-the-road policy toward that area. Such a policy is calculated to protect the strategic interests of the United States in Morocco while at the same time protecting our interests and prestige in the Moslem World.

The Country Policy Statement for Morocco (1950)[2] contains the following statement regarding United States policy in Morocco:

> "Our policy has been to encourage the French on all appropriate occasions to put forward a program of political, economic and social reforms which would lessen the resentment of the natives toward France and would assure their gradual evolution toward self-government. We believe, however, that the strength of France depends in no small measure on the peaceful and voluntary integration of Morocco into the French Union, and that France is the country best suited to have international responsibility for Morocco. We have therefore avoided putting pressure on France by giving aid and comfort to the natives directly, although we maintain open contact with them and consider their friendship and good will very important."

The substance of this policy has been brought to the attention of French officials on several occasions, but no positive steps have been taken by the French which would enable this Government to give greater support to French policies in Morocco. AF believes that our present policy towards Morocco should be continued and that these views should be made clear to the French Government. Based on past experience, we are not sanguine as to the degree of success which can be expected from such efforts. The only other practical alternative, under present day circumstances, is abandonment of our traditional policy towards dependent peoples, and full support of the French position in North Africa—a course of action which the French are striving hard to attain.

As AF sees the situation, the present threat to political stability in Morocco will continue to exist as long as present differences between the French and the Moroccans remain unreconciled. If these differences are not reconciled and should open revolt ensue, the United States would have to support France for the same reasons that we are supporting the United Kingdom in the Suez Canal dispute. Such a course of action would probably result in far-reaching and damaging repercussions to United States interest in Morocco and the Moslem World. Therefore, the immediate objective of United States policy in Morocco should be to effect a *rapprochement* between the French and the Moroccans which will ease present political tensions and create an atmosphere which will permit us to safely pursue a middle-of-the-road policy.

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[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1737.

To this end we must redouble our efforts to get the French to adopt a program of political reforms in Morocco which will meet the legitimate demands of the Moroccans and which will permit this Government to conscientiously support French policy. This would require some frank discussions between United States and French officials at a high level. In our approach to the French we would state that we do not believe that political stability in Morocco is possible as long as the French continue to attempt to suppress the Nationalist movement. We believe that such stability can be achieved only if a *rapprochement* is effected between the French and the Moroccans which will meet the reasonable demands of the Nationalists and thus permit France to guide the Nationalist movement along constructive lines toward legitimate ends. We should emphasize our belief that the Moroccans are not prepared to assume the responsibilities which would result from immediate independence and our belief that France is the nation best suited to guide Morocco toward self-government and to exercise international responsibility for the area. We should state that if a program for Morocco, which is acceptable to the United States is adopted by the French, we will give appropriate support to the French program and will use all of our influence with the Moroccans to insure Moroccan cooperation in the implementation of such a program. To this end, we would be prepared to state the position of this Government clearly and forcefully to the Sultan and to nationalist leaders, making it clear to them that we believe such a program is in their best interests and in the best interests of the Western powers and that unless they cooperate with the French in such a program, the United States will have no alternative, because of our strategic interests and the importance of Western solidarity in the present fight against Communism, but to support France in the present situation in Morocco.

Following the Acheson–Schuman talks on Morocco on September 11, 1951,[3] the French endeavored to secure our agreement to an exchange of notes on North Africa, the acceptance of which would have involved several dangers in so far as the United States is concerned. After thorough consideration of this matter in the Department, including a meeting with the Secretary, it was decided that any exchange of notes with the French should take into consideration the following three "pitfalls":

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[3] See U.S.–Fr. Min–1, p. 1387.

1. The United States cannot be bound completely to support French policy in North Africa in regard to future unforeseen developments.
2. With reference to United States treaty rights in Morocco and the case pending before the International Court of Justice, the United States cannot undermine its position in any degree with respect thereto.
3. The United States cannot bind its hands in the United Nations and renounce its responsibilities and obligations as contained in various articles of the United Nations Charter, including Article 73.

The United States then submitted to the French a proposed note which avoided these "pitfalls". This, however, was not acceptable to M. Schuman and he stated that the matter would be taken up directly with Mr. Acheson.

If it is ultimately decided that, in the interests of our strategic requirements in North Africa, we will accede to the French demands for underwriting their policies in North Africa, then we must make every effort to salvage what we can of United States prestige in Morocco. To do this we should take advantage of all appropriate occasions to make clear to the Sultan and nationalist leaders why we are pursuing such a course of action and candidly explain the dilemma created for us in Morocco by the conflict between our strategic interests and our basic and traditional policy toward dependent peoples. We should exploit all contacts between the Sultan and United States officials to get this point across. The visits of high-ranking United States military officials to Morocco (such as visits by Eisenhower, General Norstadt as well as high-ranking civilian officials) should be utilized in presenting the United States position to the Sultan. At the same time our own officials in Morocco would explain our position to appropriate nationalist contacts. In such an approach we would emphasize to the Moroccans that the very objectives they wish to achieve are dependent entirely upon the successful conclusion of the present conflict between the West and the Soviet East.

Concurrently with these approaches we should implement lines of action calculated to convince the Moroccans of our interest in their welfare and our genuine friendship for them. The attached outline of a program for the American School at Tangier[4] illustrates one line of action which might be undertaken to achieve this objective.

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[4] Not printed.

TUNISIA

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVOLUTION OF TUNISIA TOWARD SELF-GOVERNMENT[1]

772.00/2-751 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State[2]

SECRET PARIS, February 7, 1951—7 p. m.

4681. Reviewing present situation North Africa, La Tour du Pin, FonOff, deplored paradox in government's policy toward protectorates: "Front populaire in Tunisia and action Francaise in Morocco." He said Tunisians are treated as equals while Moroccans receive strong arm methods. He apparently disapproves of both extremes.

Perillier is submitting final draft Tunisian reforms today for approval Council of Ministers. Concessions made by French in negotiations with Beys ministers said to include abandonment visa Secretary General on decrees, assuring chairmanship Council of Ministers to Prime Minister and adopting immediate measures to increase Tunisians in administration. Secretary General Vimont is reported to have opposed certain changes and has tendered resignation. We were told that he will go to Rio de Janeric as counselor of Embassy. If present reforms accepted both by French and Tunisians, La Tour du Pin particularly apprehensive that situation country will worsen in view of virtual abandonment budgetary control by French.

Moroccan question being discussed by Juin and FonOff. We were told that Juin consulting President Auriol and problem would undoubtedly be thrashed out in Council of Ministers. We reiterated hope that solution would be found to reconcile differences between France and Sultan. La Tour du Pin intimated that events in Morocco itself might decide issues. He stated that reports received by FonOff indicate large majority Moroccans backing Glaoui and quoted figures that among 300 Pashas, Caids and notables wielding power, some 200 sided with Glaoui. This he added might lead to schism and eventual replacement of Sultan by Moroccans themselves.[3]

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[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1774 ff.

[2] Repeated for information to Tangier, Rabat, and Tunis.

[3] For additional documentation on the U.S. attitude toward the situation in Morocco, see pp. 1368 ff.

In conclusion, La Tour du Pin rather gloomily predicted that North Africa would be chronic headache for many months to come and stated that he would not be its doctor for he had asked for transfer and was being given another post in FonOff.

BONSAL

772.00/2-1351 : Despatch

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 286

TUNIS, February 13, 1951.

Subject: At Last, the Reforms

On February 8, the Bey of Tunis affixed his seal to the new reforms agreed upon by the Resident General and the Tunisian Cabinet of Ministers, thus ending a six month period of rumors concerning the resignation of the entire cabinet of ministers, threats by the Neo Destour Party to withdraw from the Government, a "political pause" by the Resident General, a "counter pause" by the Ministers, protests by the Rassemblement Français, and accusations of inactivity by both French and Tunisian authorities. A translation of the official communiqué announcing the approval by the Bey of the reforms is forwarded as enclosure 1 to this despatch.[2]

Reforms

The official texts of the reforms appeared as decrees in the *Journal Officiel Tunisien* for February 9.[3] The complete French texts of these decrees as well as their English translations will be forwarded in a separate despatch.

The reforms may be summarized as follows:

(1) *Cabinet of the Sovereign:* A Cabinet of the Sovereign is instituted to examine everything relating to the Palace and to maintain close liaison with the Prime Minister in matters concerning protocol and the ceremony of the court. The Cabinet is composed of a Director and his assistants, as well as an interpreter, a clerk, and a stenographer.

(2) *Council of Ministers:* The Council of Ministers "defines the orientation and directs the general action of the Government" and is the meeting ground for ministers, directors, and the commissioner (of Reconstruction and Housing). The Council of Ministers is presided over by the Prime Minister and has as its members the Secretary General, the Assistant Secretary General, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of State, the Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, the Minister of Public Health, the Minister of Agriculture, the Director of Finance, the Director of Public Works,

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[1] This despatch was prepared by Consul Dorman.

[2] The brief one-paragraph communiqué under reference is not printed here.

[3] The decrees of February 8 are printed in *L'Année politique, 1951*, pp. 581–584.

the Director of Education, the Director of the Post Office, and the Commissioner of Reconstruction. The decree establishing the Council of Cabinet is abrogated.

(3) *Creation of High Committee for Critical Situations:* Under exceptional circumstances the Resident General and the Tunisian Government shall convene in a High Committee to determine measures justified by the critical situation. The High Committee shall be convoked by the Resident General, who will preside at meetings.

(4) *Budgetary Matters:* Disagreements relating to the budget are submitted to a Superior Budgetary Committee presided over by the Resident General and having as its other members the Prime Minister, the President of each of the two Sections of the Grand Council, and the President and Recorder of the Commission of Finance of each of the two Sections. A simple majority carries a motion, with the Resident General having the deciding vote in the event of a deadlock.

(5) *General Administration of Tunisia:* The general administration is controlled, under the authority of the Prime Minister, by: (*a*) a central Administration (having substantially the same membership as the Council of Ministers but without the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General), and (*b*) a corps of caids to whom the powers of the sovereign have been delegated.

(6) *Functions of Prime Minister:* The Prime Minister prepares acts and decrees for the seal of the Bey, presides over the Council of Ministers, and coordinates the actions of the ministers, the directors, and the commissioner. The Prime Minister also has responsibility for matters concerning: Court protocol and the interests of the Beylical family, submission of decrees for the Bey's seal, the direction and control of the activities of the Bey's agents (caids, kahias, khalifats, and sheikhs), preservation of the state archives.

(7) *Functions of Secretary General:* The Secretary General is named by the Bey on the presentation of the Resident General. He assures, with the Prime Minister, the centralization of civil and administrative matters including the decrees and *arretes* to be sealed, general inspection of administrative services, control of personnel and public expenses of the civil administrations, the administration of the Tunisian Statistical Service, and the elaboration and execution of the economic plan after it has received the approval of the Council of Ministers.

(8) *Ministries, Directorates, and the Commission:* The ministers, directors, and the commissioner who are members of the Council of Ministers are named by decree. Each minister, director, or commissioner names, by *arrete*, the personnel recruited by his administration and controls the expenses of his services according to provisions laid down in regulations concerning public accounting.

(9) *General Conditions:* Unless special legislative provisions are made, every member of the Council of Ministers has the authority to issue *arretes* within the scope of his functions. These *arretes* are submitted through the Secretary General to the Resident General who approves them or, if necessary, returns them, with his observations, for further drafting. The *arretes* are then published in the *Journal Officiel Tunisien* and thus become law.

(10) ***Participation in Government*** **(*"Fonction Publique"*): Government positions are divided into four categories based on the following salary indices:**

Category A:	index	225–800
Category B:	index	185–360
Category C:	index	130–250
Category D:	index	100–195

When new employees are recruited, 50% of the positions in Categories A and B will be filled by Tunisians and 50% by Frenchmen; two-thirds of the positions in Category C will be filled by Tunisians and one-third by Frenchmen; three quarters of the positions in Category D will be filled by Tunisians and one quarter by Frenchmen. Everyone filling positions in Categories C and D must pass an examination in the Arabic language or must be able to hold a conversation in Arabic.

Speech of Resident General

On his return to Tunis from Paris, the Resident General spoke over the radio on the night of February 9.

The signing of the new agreements, the Resident General stated, gave a new impetus to Franco-Tunisian cooperation. The reforms represent the fulfillment of a promise. If they satisfy the demands of the Tunisians, he continued, they at the same time guarantee French interests. Who, the Resident General asked, can doubt that Tunisia has need of the presence of France? The spirit of mutual comprehension which marked the negotiations must continue if the reforms are to be successfully applied. The Tunisians, he said, must demonstrate increasingly greater aptitude commensurate with their greater responsibilities in governing themselves. He called for continued peace and order. "To work!" he concluded, "To work in mutual understanding!"

A translation of the complete text of the Resident General's speech is forwarded as enclosure 2 to this despatch.[4]

Nationalist Press Reaction

The reaction of the nationalist press, with the exception of *Irada* and *Independance* of the Old Destour, has been favorable although guardedly optimistic.

An Nahda for February 9 receives the news of the reforms enthusiastically, thanking God that the obstructionists of the Rassemblement were over-ruled. Now let the French members of the Grand Council resign, *An Nahda* suggests, thus making the application of future reforms more easy. The paper congratulates the Bey, the Resident General, and the Prime Minister for their part in the negotiations which led to the reforms.

Az Zohra draws a comparison between the British and French attitudes toward their colonies. England gave India its complete independence without fanfare, while France accords Tunisia minor reforms amid much shouting and protests from the Rassemblement opposition.

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[4] Not printed here.

The newly-founded *As-Sabah*, said to be the mouthpiece of Salah Ben Youssef, commented that it was a long period of labor, the reforms, though imperfect, were finally born, and the mother (Tunisian Cabinet) miraculously survived the ordeal.

The Neo Destour organ *Mission* admits that although the reforms are insufficient, they are a step in the right direction. *Mission* reserves its judgment until the reforms are applied and until the Government indicates its willingness to proceed with further reforms which will lead to internal autonomy. *Mission* deplores the fact that in spite of the reforms the Government has not yet recognized the Neo Destour Party nor has it lifted the state of siege in Tunisia.

Other Nationalist Reaction

Habib Bourguiba, now attending the Moslem Congress in Karachi, is reported by the press to have stated that the reforms constitute a very timid but significant step. The Neo Destour, he explained, accepts these reforms as a promise of other reforms to come. The second stage must consist in replacing the French directors by Tunisian ministers. A Tunisian Ministry of the Interior must be established, Bourguiba continued, to control the services of the police and security. Finally, he stated, a strictly Tunisian National Assembly must be constituted whose members are to be elected by universal suffrage, the French interest to be represented by the Resident General. In conclusion he hoped that the second stage of reforms would be reached before the Bey's trip to Paris next spring so the visit could take place in a spirit of mutual comprehension and understanding.

Nouri Boudali, Assistant Secretary General of the UGTT, expressed guarded optimism on the reforms (reference Tunis confidential despatch No. 285 of February 13, 1951[5]). The reforms were inadequate, he stated, but they did represent progress and therefore were accepted by the Neo Destour. Had the Neo Destour refused the reforms, Boudali stated, the Cabinet would have resigned and the political situation would have deteriorated rapidly. Such an eventuality seemed a probability ten days ago, he said, but fortunately the crisis has now passed.

Mourad Cherif, close to nationalist circles, stated that the reaction of the nationalists to the reforms was one of general disappointment. He asserted that the reforms changed little: although the Prime Minister would preside over the Council of Ministers, matters relating to the budget had been removed from the Council's jurisdiction (this is not strictly true); the participation of Tunisians in the Government according to the specifications laid down under *Fonction Publique* would not be implemented for twenty years unless steps were taken to oust French officials now in the Government.

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[5] Not printed.

Old Destour Reaction

The weekly French-language Old Destour organ *Independance*, commenting on the reforms, stated that Colonna could cry "Fire!" till he was blue in the face, Karila could go to the Wailing Wall, and the bells could ring out in Paris, Cairo, and Tunis—but actually the reforms changed nothing. The results of the difficult and laborious negotiations, *Independance* concludes, are nothing but air: the mountain (which the Neo Destour had previously referred to as bringing forth a mouse) was not even pregnant!

French Rassemblement Reaction

The delegation of the French Section of the Grand Council, headed by Marcel Casabianca, returned from Paris on February 11, disillusioned and irritated that it had not been informed of the exact status of the reforms at the time they were being approved by the Council of Ministers in Paris. Before leaving Paris Casabianca stated: "The French colony of the Regency is wounded but not defeated. It remains on the alert and in the battle."

Jean Casanova of the Rassemblement Français said that the reforms marked the passing of French control in Tunisia, that they were humiliating for the French, and that they were contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaties. "For the French of this Country", he remarked, "the reforms constitute an unhappy ending of a policy of abandonment and renunciation."

The reaction of Secretary General Jacques Vimont to the reforms was submission of his resignation. Unsubstantiated reports indicate that he will shortly be transferred to the French Embassy at Rio de Janeiro, to be replaced by a "high functionary" from Paris.

Communist Reaction

Communist reaction to the reforms, which are referred to as a "patching up" of the Protectorate regime, has been reported in Tunis restricted despatch 282 of February 12.[6]

Conclusions

There has been a general feeling of relief and an easing in the political atmosphere following the acceptance of the reforms. French and Tunisian Government officials, who were a few days ago regarding each other suspiciously, are temporarily enjoying a period of mutual admiration. Mr. Schuman himself paid tribute to the "comprehension" of the Tunisian ministers. Three days after the seal had been affixed to the reforms the Bey bestowed his highest decoration, the Ahed el Amane, on the Resident General. Rumblings of discontent at the inadequacy of the reforms are in the background but for the moment are drowned out by the sighs of relief that a crisis has been safely averted.

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[6] Not printed.

The position of the Tunisian Cabinet is strengthened and rumors concerning its resignation should now subside.

Perhaps the one man who deserves more credit than any other person in putting over the reforms is the Resident General himself. Apparently deserted by the Secretary General when he most needed his support, attacked continously by the Rassemblement Français, and not being able to rely on his own cabinet for wise counsel, Mr. Perillier carried through on his own initiative. But after the difficult preliminary bickerings in Tunis, Perillier received help where he most needed it, the support of the French Foreign Minister in Paris.

JOHN D. JERNEGAN

772.00/5-2251 : Despatch

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, May 22, 1951.
No. 442

Subject: A New Political Crisis Builds Up

The past week has produced in Tunisia the essential elements of a major political crisis similar to that which hit Morocco recently. Both sides have hardened their attitude and a test of strength between the Bey (with the Neo-Destour pushing him on) and the Resident General has already begun. This situation has developed out of:

1. The insistence of the Tunisian cabinet, controlled by the Neo-Destour, upon ever greater reforms and its utilization of whatever tactical weapons come to hand;
2. The success of the Neo-Destour in persuading the Bey to support its program;
3. The firm determination of the Resident General not to go beyond the very limited reforms he has repeatedly proclaimed as his program.

The state of affairs at this moment is that the Resident General has served notice on the Bey that he must dismiss his present Prime Minister and two other Ministers if he expects to make any more progress toward internal autonomy, and the Bey has protested to the President of France against the delivery of this ultimatum.

The Resident General's objective is to get rid of Salah Ben Youssef, Minister of Justice and Secretary General of the Neo-Destour, whom he charges with sabotaging the French program of orderly evolution and who undoubtedly dominates the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet.

The Bey's objective, presumably, is to maintain his support in Nationalist circles and, perhaps, provoke a change of Resident General.

Mr. Perillier told me on May 19 that he wants very much to continue the reform program, as he has laid it down, but that he cannot accept the premature demands of the Cabinet for still greater powers and the institution of a national representative legislative assembly. He has now become convinced that Ben Youssef will not, or cannot, negotiate in good faith on the only basis acceptable to France. Furthermore, he charges the cabinet with neglecting its ordinary administrative duties. Consequently, he wants a change in cabinet leadership. He is sure he can find good men who will work with him. However, he does not propose to force a change. If the Bey remains obdurate, he will merely mark time and wait for the Bey or the Neo-Destour to give up. Whether the Nationalists will allow him to mark time is another question; I think it likely that they will stir up so much fuss that he will be driven to some action to get rid of the Cabinet.

It appears that the Bey's message of May 15 (mytel 117 [1]) was the last straw which decided Perillier to take his stand. (An English translation of the message from French is enclosed, together with a single copy of the original Arabic.[2]) As reported by telegram, this message was drawn up without consultation with the Resident General, who did not even know the Bey intended to issue a statement. However, this was only the latest of a series of grievances, all of which were mentioned in Perillier's bill of complaints delivered to the Bey on May 19.[3] They included the general strike of March 10, the boycott by the Tunisian Ministers of the Grand Council sessions and the generally uncooperative attitude of the Cabinet's leading triumvirate: Prime Minister Chenik, Ben Youssef and Minister of Social Affairs Badra.

On the other side of the picture, the Neo-Destour, and all other nationalist groups as well, continue to accuse the French of dragging their feet. While some of the Ministers, even Ben Youssef himself, might be willing to go slowly, they seem to be driven ahead by the pressure of their followers. Accordingly, they have adopted "democratic representation" as the new keynote and are hammering it for all it is worth. (See my despatches No. 430 of May 15 and No. 441 of May 22.[4]) This is a line having great popular appeal and one which would also give them an excellent propaganda basis for appeals to other countries and the United Nations if matters come to that.

In addition to the question of a cabinet change, a showdown may arise out of the new budget. After being approved in general by the two sections of the Grand Council (though with reservations by the

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[1] Not printed. It reported that the Bey had issued a message to the people of Tunisia supporting the Tunisian Cabinet of Prime Minister Chenik and calling for a further reform of the Tunisian executive. (772.00/5-1751)

[2] The enclosures are not printed here.

[3] Telegram 119, May 19, from Tunis, reported that French Resident General Perillier intended to inform the Bey that he was free to retain the present Cabinet but that the French would conduct no further negotiations with it. Perillier presumably asked that Chenik, Ben Youssef, and Badra be eliminated from the Cabinet. (772.00/5-1951)

[4] Neither printed.

Tunisian Section) it was supposed to be considered by the "Mixed Delegation" to reconcile various minor differences between the versions approved by the two sections. This is a standard procedure corresponding to the system of conference committees in our own Congress. However, the Tunisian members took the position that they would not participate in the work of the Delegation unless they were assured of satisfaction regarding the two conditions their section had attached to the budget. (See my despatch No. 429 of May 15.[5]) Communications to and from the Residency failed to produce such assurances. The French members of the Delegation therefore met alone and gave their blessing to the document, whereupon it was referred to the Higher Budget Committee established by the reform decrees of February 8. This Committee met May 19 (without its Tunisian members) and is understood to have approved a budget based on that presented but with minor changes.

The next step is to get the approval of the French Ministry of Finance in Paris, after which the budget is supposed to be presented to the Bey, by the Prime Minister, for his seal.

What will happen when it comes back from Paris is the big question. The Nationalists say publicly that the Prime Minister will refuse to present it for the Bey's seal and that His Highness will refuse his approval in any case. If this occurs, drastic French action of some sort seems possible. The Resident General has told me that he cannot and will not permit the country to be without a budget; the administration must be carried on. One of his chief subordinates, Director General of Political and Administrative Service Jacquet, admitted to me that, theoretically, there is no way to promulgate a budget without the Bey's approval, but he added: "In practice, there is the French Army."[6]

This whole budgetary dispute is public knowledge, and the Resident General's demand for a new cabinet is rapidly becoming so. At least two newspapers have already reported it as more than a rumor. Furthermore, Perillier publicly reiterated his opposition to new reforms at present in a speech before a conference of Reserve Officers at Tunis on May 20, when he said:

> "Progress can be made only with order and balance; those who want to skip the (intermediate) stages and who always try to go beyond the agreements reached render very poor service to the country."

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[5] Not printed.

[6] The Bey approved the Tunisian budget on June 1. Despatch 463, June 12, from Tunis, observed that with the advent of the religious holiday of Ramadan and the approval of the budget "a relative calm seems to have descended on the Tunisian scene." The despatch also observed that the approval of the budget removed one of the most serious immediate difficulties in Franco-Tunisian relations and apparently greatly relieved French officials who "will not now be faced with the ungrateful task of using force to impose a budget." (772.00/6-1251)

He added that French policy was to build democracy from the bottom up, beginning with municipal governments and using them as training schools for eventual democratic representation on the national scale.

This has, of course, been taken as a reply to the Bey's message of May 15.

It is obvious that the Bey and the Neo-Destour cannot back down at this stage without great loss of prestige and popular following. It is also obvious that the Resident General cannot back down if he is to stay in Tunisia.

I think it probable that matters will drag along, with mutual recriminations but without a real showdown, until after the French elections of June 17 and the formation of a new French Government. What happens then will depend on the amount of support the new government is willing to give Perillier. (He may even find himself out of a job.) If the French stand firm, my guess is that the Bey will find a way to save face, after a suitable lapse of time, and that a new cabinet will be formed and the budget approved, perhaps with some slight French concessions with respect to form. There is, however, the other possibility that the Nationalists will get the Arab and South Asian states to make a world issue of the whole dispute. I need not point out to the Department the difficulties this would cause the United States.

JOHN D. JERNEGAN

772.00/9-1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by Earle J. Richey of the Office of African Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1951.

Subject: Political Situation in Tunisia

Participants: Mr. Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisian Neo Destour Party
AF—Mr. Elmer H. Bourgerie
WE—Mr. J. M. Godley
AF—Mr. E. J. Richey

Mr. Bourguiba opened the conversation by referring to his recent travels throughout the Arab world and mentioned that he had talked to Ambassador Henderson in India and to Ambassador Cochran in Indonesia.[1] He stated that he had talked to Ambassador Henderson

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[1] Bourguiba visited Karachi, New Delhi, and Jakarta during March 1951. Bourguiba met with Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi on March 14. According to Henderson's memorandum of the conversations, transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 2183, March 15, from New Delhi, Bourguiba presented his view

Footnote continued on following page.

regarding the Tunisian situation and that the Ambassador had suggested that when he came to the United States he present the position of the Tunisian Nationalists to the Department. In this connection Mr. Bourguiba mentioned a letter which he had written to Mr. McGhee requesting a meeting with him while he was in the Near East in the Spring of this year.[2]

Mr. Bourguiba stated that there had always been a conflict between the Tunisian Nationalists and the French in Tunisia but that this conflict had been largely resolved in August of 1950 when M. Schuman had stated publicly that Tunisia must be developed toward self-government and that direct French control in Tunisia must be tapered off. On the basis of the program proposed by Schuman through Resident General Perillier the Neo Destour had elected to collaborate with the French and was participating in the present Tunisian Government which, operating as M. Schuman had envisaged it, marked the end of direct French rule in Tunisia. However, he said, the Tunisian Resident General was being prevented from carrying out the program of reforms which had been agreed to by the Neo Destour, and which formed the basis for French-Neo Destour collaboration. Opposition to this reform program, Mr. Bourguiba said, came from French Colons in Tunisia and from irresponsible elements in France, as well as from selfish French office holders in the Protectorate. He

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

of the reform program in Tunisia which was not essentially dissimilar to the presentation recorded in his memorandum of conversation. Henderson spoke to Bourguiba as follows:

"I told Mr. Bourghiba that I had received him only in a personal capacity; that as a representative of the American Government I could not receive him or his associates; that I was not qualified to discuss matters pertaining to relations between the United States and countries other than India; but that I would, nevertheless, pass along what he had to say to me to my friends in Washington.

"I added that although I had no authorization to discuss American policies with him, I could, nevertheless, tell him personally what I understood to be the general attitude of the United States towards colonialism. I described our general attitude and then told him that in my opinion resort to violence by Tunisian Nationalists at this stage would not be likely to serve any good purpose but might well bring great harm to the people of Tunisia and might impede the development of Tunisia into a prosperous, healthy, self-respecting state. Only the Communists and those forces which thrive in chaos would benefit by civil war in Tunisia."

Henderson ended his memorandum of conversation as follows:

"I asked Mr. Bourghiba if he was acquainted with Mr. Jernegan, our Consul General in Tunis, whom I knew personally as an exceptionally able diplomat. Mr. Bourghiba said that it had been his policy to hold somewhat aloof from the American Consulate General in Tunis since he was afraid that visits or gestures of friendship on his part might prove embarrassing to the consular representatives of the United States in Tunisia." (772.00/3-1551)

[2] In an undated letter addressed to McGhee from Karachi, received in the Department of State in early April 1951, Bourguiba requested a meeting with McGhee in Colombo or Washington in order to discuss the situation in Tunisia. McGhee, who had been in Ceylon in late February and early March 1951 in connection with a meeting of South Asian Chiefs of Mission, never met with Bourguiba, and in a letter of reply of April 13 McGhee did not make any effort to invite Bourguiba to Washington for a meeting. (772.00/4-551)

said that these elements were sabotaging Schuman's plan for Tunisia, and he pointed out that Resident General Perillier had admitted to a correspondent of the London *Times* that the reason for the present stalemate in the Tunisian reform program was opposition from the Colons and French office holders in Tunisia. He stated that the present impasse would lead to real trouble in Tunisia unless corrected. He mentioned the massacres of 1938 and stated that with conditions growing steadily worse at the present time, violence might again be the result if the situation were not remedied. He referred to the criticism which had been directed at the Neo Destour party by the Old Destour and the Communists as a result of the party's present policy of collaboration with the French and the resulting difficult position the Neo Destour was placed in when the French failed to live up to the agreement which formed the basis for such collaboration. He stressed the fact that Schuman's plan was being blocked, that conditions in Tunisia were growing steadily worse and that trouble was brewing. He stated that during his recent tours he had been explaining this situation trying to bring pressure on the French to continue Schuman's program in order to avoid trouble and massacres and that if trouble did come the responsibility would rest with the French.

Mr. Bourguiba stated that the Neo Destour was truly democratic. He stressed the democratic nature of the Nationalist movement in Tunisia and pointed to the withdrawal of the UGTT from the WFTU and its recent affiliation with the ICFTU. He mentioned that the Secretary General of the UGTT was an officer in the ICFTU thus substantiating that the labor movement in Tunisia was democratic in the same way that the ICFTU is democratic. He mentioned that Tunisia had no Jewish problem and stressed that Nationalism in Tunisia was basically a national movement supported by all the Tunisians. He referred to the presence of United States troops in Tunisia during World War II at which time they were fighting for liberty—the same thing for which Tunisians were fighting today. The United States, he said, owed the Tunisians their liberty. He then stressed that Tunisians were not against France, but only against those elements within France which were blocking Schuman's program for Tunisia. He stated that under the present French yoke, Tunisians could not make their contribution to the Western world during the present fight against the Soviet East. He recognized the interests which the U.S. and France had in common in the present world struggle and stressed that he did not ask the United States to support Tunisia as against France; that the only thing he asked was that we support Schuman's policy for Tunisia. He emphasized that we must find the means to support this policy in order to avoid trouble in Tunisia.

Mr. Bourgerie replied by stating that the Department was grateful to have this opportunity of hearing Mr. Bourguiba's views. He referred to Mr. McGhee's visit to Tunisia in the fall of 1950[3] and stated that at that time both he and Mr. McGhee had talked at length with Resident General Perillier about the reform program and about political conditions in Tunisia. He also referred to the meeting which Mr. McGhee had with Bey of Tunis. He said that the United States was interested in North African problems and was fairly familiar with recent developments in Tunisia. This Government, he said, hoped that the French and the Tunisians could work their problems out in a spirit of cooperation and moderation; that such a spirit was necessary and most essential at the present time.

Mr. Bourguiba replied by stating that no policy could be more moderate than the one presently being pursued by the Neo Destour. He repeated that this policy was so moderate that the Neo Destour was being severely criticised by the Old Destour for collaborating with the French and that to date such moderation had only proved that it did not bring results. It had only resulted in both the Neo Destour and M. Schuman being attacked by their own people for pursuing such a policy. He repeated that no policy could be more moderate than the one now being pursued, and that since August 1950, no progress had been made in the reform program, which was a long time.

Mr. Godley stated that he knew that Mr. Bourguiba appreciated the number of problems facing Mr. Schuman both nationally and internationally and the number of other axes Mr. Schuman had to grind in addition to the problems in Tunisia. He stated that while the period from August 1950 to date seemed like a long time, it was infinitely short in relation to the history of the development of nation. He stated that the very fact that Mr. Schuman was able to present and have approved by his Cabinet the program which he proposed for Tunisia illustrated the evolution in French politica thinking. The fact that Mr. Schuman was still in office was furthe evidence of evolution in French political thought. Mr. Godley emphasized that the present situation required patience on both side and an understanding of the problems and difficulties facin Mr. Schuman.

Mr. Bourguiba replied by stating that there was a distinction between what France said and what France practiced. He referre again to the selfish actions of the Colons in Tunisia in blocking th reform program and reiterated that the present problem in Tunisi could only be solved by implementation of the reform program. H pointed out that Libya and the Gold Coast were approaching self-government while Tunisia was still under direct administration by the French. He observed that Tunisians could not understand such a situation. The Tunisians, Mr. Bourguiba said, were moderate and anxious to cooperate but also determined to progress from their present status.

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[3] For information on McGhee's visit to Tunisia in October 1950, see despatc 109 from Tunis, October 3, 1950, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1786.

Mr. Bourgerie closed the conversation by informing Mr. Bourguiba that he would study the documents left with him by Mr. Bourguiba.[4] He thanked Mr. Bourguiba again for giving the Department the opportunity to hear his views and expressed the hope that his visit in the United States would be a most pleasant one.[5] He urged Mr. Bourguiba to use moderation in his statements to the public while in the United States, since such a course would facilitate the entry into the U.S. of other North Africans who might wish to visit this country.

Before departing Mr. Bourguiba asked if it would be possible for him to see Mr. McGhee after he (Bourguiba) returned from San Francisco.[6] Mr. Bourgerie explained how busy Mr. McGhee is and that it was not possible to say whether Mr. McGhee would be in Washington at that time.

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[4] The documents referred to here cannot be further identified. No documents were found attached to the source text.

[5] Bourguiba met with NEA Deputy Director Kopper on September 17 and again reviewed the situation in Tunisia. Kopper's memorandum of that conversation concluded with the observation that Bourguiba had taken a somewhat stronger and more pessimistic line than he had in his conversation with Bourgerie and Godley. (772.00/9-1751)

[6] Bourguiba was scheduled to make an address to the A.F. of L. conference in San Francisco. The address, scheduled for September 21, was not made; see Kopper's memorandum of conversations, October 9-10, p. 1416.

772.00/9-1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. McMurtrie Godley II, Office of Western European Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1951

Subject: French Protest Regarding Bourghiba

Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, Minister-Counselor, French Embassy

Mr. Jean-Pierre Benard, First Secretary, French Embassy

Mr. Godley—WE

Mr. Daridan and Mr. Benard called this morning to say that they had been instructed by their government to inform us that the French Government considers Bourghiba's broadcast over the Voice of America and his reception by ranking officials of the Department to be an unfriendly act.[1] I remonstrated pointing out that Mr. Bourghiba is a prominent member of the Neo-Destour party which is presently participating in the Tunisian Government and that he traveled to the US on a passport issued by the French authorities. I also called their attention to the fact that the labor organization in Tunisia affiliated with the Neo-Destour had broken with the WFTU, that a prominent member of the Neo-Destour occupies a position of importance in the anti-Communist ICFTU, and that Bourghiba himself had attended the Milan conference of this organization.

Mr. Daridan replied that notwithstanding these facts the Neo-Destour is known in Tunisia and North Africa to be a Nationalist party and as such is opposed to the continuation of the French position in Tunisia. He added that even were Bourghiba's conversations in the Department politically innocuous, Bourghiba or his Nationalist colleagues in Tunisia and North Africa generally would interpret his reception by an important officer as U.S. support for a movement opposed to the French in an area that France considers vital to its own security.

Mr. Daridan also said that the timing of the events was so unfortunate that it need not be commented upon.

He then inquired whether the Department was taking any action to forestall a repetition of such occurences. I said that as far as I knew no instructions as yet had been given to the Voice of America to clear with us future appearances of North African Nationalists. Mr. Daridan then said that Mr. Schuman had spoken to the Secretary on the matter and the Secretary had said that such instructions would be given to New York.[2] I remarked that I was not aware of the conversation between Mr. Schuman and the Secretary.

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[1] Telegram 10, September 19, to Tunis, repeated to Paris, Tangier, and Rabat, explained the Bourguiba statement over VOA as follows:

"*New York Times* art of Sept 14 by intermingling part of statement made by Bourghiba over VOA [on September 12] with statements made to *NY Times* reporter gives mistaken impression Bourghiba's remarks on VOA constituted plea for Freedom Moslem nations. Dept takes view that study text his remarks . . . clearly shows moderate nature his statement which essentially greeting to Moslem world on occasion Feast of Great Bairam." (511.724/9–1951)

Telegram Actel 4, September 19, from Ottawa, reported that Secretary Acheson had discussed the Bourguiba VOA broadcast with Foreign Minister Schuman, and he had "apologized for what he understood happened, expressed hope it would not happen again, but did not make any reference or commitment re clearance procedure of any kind." (611.72/9–1951) Telegram 1853, September 25, from Paris, transmitted the text of a personal letter to Secretary Acheson in which Foreign Minister Schuman drew attention to the serious danger he saw in any further contacts of Department of State officials with Bourguiba. Telegram 12, September 28, to Tunis, transmitted the following information about the VOA incident and its aftermath:

"Secy informed Schuman Bourghiba will not be recd by competent officers Dept upon his return from San Francisco and that Bourghiba will not be afforded facilities VOA. Bourghiba has previously been recd in Dept only by Bourgerie and by Kopper Deputy Director NE. Bourghiba did not address AFL Convention San Francisco." (511.723/9–2851)

[2] Secretary Acheson and Foreign Minister Schuman were in Ottawa for the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, September 15–20.

With regard to Mr. Bourghiba's discussions in the Department, I told Mr. Daridan that in his conversations Mr. Bourghiba had strongly supported Mr. Schuman's plans for the evolution of Tunisia and that the Neo-Destour only feared that the plans might be modified. Mr. Daridan replied that political evolution in North Africa cannot be achieved overnight and certainly the recent manifestations of Near and Middle Eastern nationalism have not facilitated the task of those in Paris who are advocating a continuation of evolutionary developments in Tunisia.

611.72/9–1851 : Despatch

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State

SECRET
No. 107 Tunis, September 18, 1951.

Subject: Comments on Policy Statement on Tunisia

I regret that, through an oversight, this office has not previously commented on the revised policy statement on Tunisia dated October 5, 1950.[1] The following observations may be of some use to the Department in its consideration of the next revision.

In general, I concur fully in the statement as it stands. It is succinct yet covers all the essential elements. The one serious weakness, which probably cannot be corrected at the present time, is that it does not set forth any means of persuading the French Government to take the action we consider necessary if the Tunisian situation is to be stabilized. My specific comments are:

Page 1, Paragraph 2: I think it has become unrealistic to set as an objective the incorporation of Tunisia into the French Union as an associated state. Those terms have very definite meanings to the French and Tunisians, and the Tunisian nationalists seem bitterly opposed to the specific relationship which they imply. However, the dominant nationalist group, the Neo-Destour, does appear willing to accept a special (as yet only vaguely defined) relationship with France provided it is not accompanied by the labels "French Union" or "associated state". Perhaps the statement could read as follows: "We believe that our objectives can be most satisfactorily achieved by agreement between the French and the Tunisian nationalists on a long-term *modus vivendi* which will assure the evolution of Tunisia toward self-government as an autonomous state managing its internal affairs but retaining a special relationship with France in the fields of foreign relations and defense and continuing to receive French assistance in economic and technical fields."

Page 2, Paragraph 4: It seems highly improbable to me that the French would consider negotiating a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the United States on behalf of Tunisia unless and until a similar treaty had been concluded between the United States and France. To do so would, in the French mind, be conceding to Tunisia too independent a personality. I agree, however, that efforts should be made to include Tunisia in the treaty with France or, failing that, to persuade the French to make a separate treaty after their own has been signed.

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[1] For text of the policy statement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1792.

Page 3, Paragraph 2: Since the current policy statement was drafted, the French authorities have invoked the state of seige on a number of occasions to restrain what they considered improper nationalist activities. While it is true that French policy is more lenient than it was during and immediately after World War II, the change has not been sufficient to allay nationalist resentment.

Page 3, Paragraph 3: Except for municipal reforms, which are still under study, all the specific changes mentioned in this paragraph have been put into effect. In addition, the veto power of the Secretary General has been abolished, although in practice it has simply been transferred to the Resident General. Other minor changes, of which the Department is aware, have also been made. These reforms, however, have had little effect in satisfying the nationalists, who claim with much reason that they are mostly window-dressing and do not even go so far as the French originally proposed.

Page 3, Paragraph 4: The current Tunisian communist line calls for a united front not only for the "triumph of liberty and peace" but also for the achievement of "true national independence". The local communist party is hammering hard at the latter theme, with the double objective of causing trouble for the French Government and embarrassing the moderate nationalists who are willing to negotiate for something less than complete independence.

Page 4, Paragraph 1: I do not think it can be said that during the past year the French have "indicated increasing concern" over communist activities in Tunisia. Rather to the contrary, the Resident General and his subordinates have repeatedly asserted to me that the communist threat is negligible. This is not to say that the French ignore the communists; I am sure they maintain surveillance, but they do not appear worried and they are obviously much more interested in nationalist activities.

Page 4, Pargraph 5: The possibility of a United Nations debate on the Tunisian question remains ever with us, though it seems no more imminent today than in past years. Just why the nationalists have not made a more determined drive to bring their case before this international forum is a mystery to me. It is true that Habib Bourguiba has been touring the world for months to arouse sympathy for Tunisia, with an eventual UN debate in mind, but there are no indications of plans for concrete action. Nationalist policy seems always to be one of waiting for something to turn up, hoping that French concessions will be forthcoming or that some *deus ex machina* will intervene. On the other hand, it may be that the Tunisians have simply been unable to persuade any UN member to take the plunge of raising the question formally.

Page 4, Paragraph 6: The French have not yet granted any substantial degree of greater responsibility to the Tunisians. The reforms so far enacted, since August, 1950, do not really change the power of the French authorities to control every aspect of the Tunisian administration; at the same time, they do provide a possibility of considerably more operating leeway for the Tunisian ministers, provided the French follow a hands-off policy. The French claim they have prodded the Tunisians to assume greater operating responsibilities and that the latter have been uninterested, unwilling or incapable, in most instances. As exceptions, they cite two or three ministers who have shown energy and initiative but who are not nationalist leaders. On the opposite side, the nationalists assert that they are controlled and blocked at every turn by the French, given no freedom of action, and that nothing can be accomplished under such circumstances.

My present feeling is that the French have been too cautious and have not gone nearly far enough in their concessions to accomplish their avowed purpose of establishing a firm basis for friendly Franco-Tunisian cooperation. Even if we admit, as I suspect we must, that the Tunisians would not run the country as efficiently as the French, there remains the overriding political consideration that nationalism is a powerful force in the world and paternalism is largely outmoded. It is not good enough to repeat the eternal French argument that Egypt was better-off under British control, that Syria has gone to pieces since France was forced out, that the Philippines are a mess since American rule ceased, that independent India has become a liability rather than an asset to the free world. Those countries did not become independent simply because the colonial power in each case decided they had reached a state of perfection and could manage their own affairs better than anyone could do it for them. They were emancipated because it was politically and economically unfeasible to continue their dependent status. The same situation is eventually going to confront France in Tunisia unless she can first achieve a new relationship based on free Tunisian consent. Her present rate of progress is too slow, her tactics too dilatory and too exasperating to the nationalists, to accomplish this.

Page 5, Paragraphs 1 and 2: It is certainly true that if the question of French rule in North Africa is raised in the UN, the United States will be faced with a serious question of policy determination. If we support France, we shall incur the bitter resentment and distrust of the Moslem world and, probably, of all formerly dependent nations. It would be, it seems to me, practically impossible to argue convincingly that France is really pursuing the policy best suited to the interests of the Tunisian people and that Tunisia should remain indefinitely in dependent status. Whatever the hard merits of that argument, it would sound very weak in opposition to the cries of "self-determination", "freedom for all peoples", "down with imperialism", which would undoubtedly be raised on every side, especially since there are a number of independent peoples no better fitted to run themselves than are the Tunisians. Furthermore, France's record in Tunisia is weak with regard to civil and political liberties, democratic processes, etc. It is difficult to defend, before an emotional public assembly, a regime which has on occasion arbitrarily suspended opposition newspapers, prosecutes political agitators before military courts applying martial law in time of peace, and refuses to permit the establishment of elective legislative bodies.

On the other hand, the difficulties of opposing France in the UN are obvious, and the results of a French defeat before the assembled representatives of the world could not but be harmful to over-all

American interests. If, to take the extreme case, Tunisia should become independent overnight, we might find that a highly vulnerable and highly strategic piece of territory had slipped outside the orbit of western defense and become a potential bridgehead for the Soviet bloc. Or, as a lesser evil, the United States might be forced to assume yet another burden in supporting the Tunisian economy and endeavoring to replace French political guidance. Even if the outcome of the debate merely amounted to a moral condemnation of France, it would weaken the position of the whole western group of nations.

A French policy of really progressive political reform in Tunisia seems to me to be the only means of avoiding the dilemma. If it did not prevent the case from being raised in the UN, it would at least give France and her friends, including the United States, a plausible basis for arguing that things were going very well and there was no need to interfere. Our policy, of course, has been and is to encourage the French in this direction. Unfortunately, our representations seem to have had little effect. So far as I can judge from this restricted viewpoint, they are likely to continue without effect unless something occurs which gives the United States a clear, direct reason for intervening in what the French continue to regard as strictly an internal affair. That something might be the immediate threat of a UN debate. If we were about to be called upon by France to back her up in the General Assembly, we would have good grounds for insisting that she must do something concrete to provide us with ammunition.

John D. Jernegan

772.00/9-2551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie)

SECRET [Washington,] September 25, 1951.

Subject: French Protest regarding Bourghiba

Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor of the French Embassy.
Mr. Gabriel Van Laethem, Second Secretary of the French Embassy.
Mr. McGhee, NEA.
Mr. Bourgerie, AF.

Mr. McGhee opened the conversation by stating that he had heard the French Government was quite exercised over rumors to the effect that he was going to receive Mr. Bourghiba on his return to Washington from San Francisco.

Mr. Daridan stated that the Embassy had received instructions from the Foreign Office in Paris to call on Mr. McGhee and ascertain whether there was any truth to the rumors that he was going to see Mr. Bourghiba and to urge him not to see him on his return to Washington. He pointed out that it was not so much what was said by

Mr. Bourghiba or what was said by Department officials that mattered but the mere fact that officials of the United States Government did grant him a hearing provided the Nationalists with a basis for anti-French propaganda since they would imply that their claims were receiving U.S. support. Mr. Daridan also went on to point out that he understood that Mr. Bourghiba had delivered a speech at San Francisco before the American Federation of Labor Convention which was not only abusive toward the United States but had also stirred up deep feeling in France and Tunisia.[1]

Mr. McGhee said that before commenting specifically on the points raised by Mr. Daridan he would like to make certain observations regarding Mr. Bourghiba's reception by officials of the Department of State. He then pointed out to Mr. Daridan that Mr. Bourghiba had travelled to the United States on a passport issued by French authorities; that when it became known that he planned to visit the United States no objection to giving him a visitor's visa was raised by the French; and that about six hours before Mr. Bourghiba was received in the Department the French Embassy was notified and no objections were raised. Mr. Daridan said that he was aware of these facts but nevertheless his Government was extremely concerned over this incident and hoped that Mr. Bourghiba would not be given a further reception by Departmental officers.

Mr. McGhee responded by stating that he hoped Mr. Daridan was not asking him not to receive Mr. Bourghiba, but he added "You may inform Mr. Schuman that I have no intention of seeing Mr. Bourghiba."

Mr. Daridan thanked Mr. McGhee and said he would convey this information to his Government.

Mr. Daridan and Mr. Van Laethem then described at some length the difficulties they have in dealing with the Nationalists in North Africa. Mr. McGhee suggested that possibly greater effort should be made to find a common ground for understanding as between the interests of the French and the Nationalists in North Africa. He referred to the fact that only recently he had had the pleasure of giving a luncheon for Mr. Kwami Nkrumah, the Leader of Government Business of the Gold Coast.[2] Mr. McGhee said that British authorities had expressed their pleasure over this gesture of friendship toward Mr. Nkrumah. He then went on to point out that only a few months ago Mr. Nkrumah, a rabid Nationalist in the Gold Coast, had been in jail there for seditious activities and after his election by the people of the Gold Coast, the British had released him from jail and had permitted him to take office. Relations between the British and Mr. Nkrumah had improved markedly as a result of this gesture. Mr. Daridan hastened to add that of course, the British approached their colonial problems from a somewhat different view from the French.

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[1] Bourguiba was scheduled to give an address before the A.F. of L. Conference in San Francisco on September 21, but he did not actually give the address; see Kopper's memorandum of conversations of October 9–10, *infra*.

[2] Regarding the luncheon for Nkrumah on June 8, see p. 1271.

Mr. Daridan observed that public opinion in France was quite worked up over the activities of the Nationalists and that we should try to understand the difficulties that the French Government was facing on this score. He added that there were many people in France who felt that the French should not have granted us bases in Morocco without some political consideration being granted on the part of the United States.

In closing Mr. McGhee suggested that if the French Government was so worried over the consequences of visits to the United States of prominent North African political figures, it should take the initiative to prevent them from coming to the United States by denying them passports rather than placing the onus on this Government to deny them visas or placing this Government in a position of acting unfriendly to important visitors by refusing to receive them once they are here. Mr. Daridan did not comment on this suggestion.

772.00/10-951

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 9-10, 1951.

Subject: Aspirations of Tunisia

Participants: Habib Bourguiba, President, Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia
Farhat Hached, Secretary General of the UGTT, Tunisia
Samuel K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director of NE

As had been anticipated, I encountered Habib Bourguiba at the Saudi Arabian Embassy last night. Farhat Hached was with him. I said that I was sorry that I had not been able to attend the luncheon given in Bourguiba's honor by the Egyptian Ambassador last week, but I had been out of town.

Without my mentioning the question, Bourguiba brought up the matter of the speech which it was reported he would give at San Francisco on September 21. He emphatically said that the speech, advance copies of which Abed Bouhafa had given me, did not represent his views. He disclaimed responsibility for the extreme pronouncements contained in the statement. He said that he had not seen the English translation and was surprised when informed of the substance. He said he was sorry that the speech had gained any circulation for he was afraid it had an effect on whether he would be able to see Assistant Secretary McGhee or not. He wished very much to see Mr. McGhee before he returned to Tunisia.

I told Mr. Bourguiba I was glad to hear that he had not given the speech at San Francisco for we in the Department did not think that it would have helped the Franco-Tunisian situation any. As long as he had mentioned it we told him quite frankly that the speech had caused considerable concern. The French had been particularly perturbed by it. I explained that Mr. McGhee had been out of town and was exceedingly busy at the present time with the Iranian question. I then asked Bourguiba and Farhat Hached to lunch with me the next day. (It had been previously arranged with EUR that if it seemed satisfactory I might invite Bourguiba to lunch privately. I had informed Jean-Pierre Benard Saturday afternoon, October 6, that this might take place. The latter conversation is the subject of a separate memorandum.[1])

At lunch today Habib Bourguiba commenced by referring to his speech again. He described Bouhafa as silly and irresponsible. He said that he and Farhat Hached had heavy responsibilities, whereas Bouhafa, although an idealist, did not understand the difficult task of those in responsible positions. He then showed me a press clipping from *Le Monde* of October 6,[2] in which he denied having given the speech attributed to him.

Bourguiba then gave me a number of press clippings which he felt demonstrated that he and Farhat Hached were moderate in their approach. He said their position was exceedingly difficult because the Communists were continually attacking them for being collaborationists with the Imperialists. He cited an article from *L'Avenir de la Tunisie* (organ of the Tunisian Communists) dated July 27, the headline of which was "Le Peuple Tunisian ne Veut ni Collaboration ni Marchandages Avec les Imperialistes". This article was in response to a statement Mr. Bourguiba had made favoring cooperation between the Tunisian Nationalists and the non-Communist powers, including France, to defend the free world against the totalitarian danger.

Another clipping from *L'Avenir* dated September 15 accused Farhat Hached and the UGTT of being associated with the Imperialists.

Mr. Bourguiba said that the Neo Destour Party was in an increasingly difficult position. If it were not able to show that it was making progress toward bringing self-government to Tunisia, it would lose support. The people might then turn to the Communist Party. The

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[1] The memorandum under reference here has not been found in the Department of State files.

[2] This and other clippings mentioned in this memorandum are attached to the source text.

Neo Destour Party had to have some encouragement. He hoped that he could see Mr. McGhee. If he returned to Tunisia without seeing him it would constitute a loss of face; the Communists would say that he was not a very strong figure. They would ask whether his advocacy of moderation and cooperation with the Western nations was paying off. I repeated Mr. McGhee was very busy and Bourguiba had already seen a number of American officials.[3]

Bourguiba also repeated that he wished to work things out in a peaceful and moderate way with France, but he must be able to show progress. He referred to the coming independence of Libya and the Gold Coast.

Referring to the Anglo-Egyptian question, he felt that the Egyptians had taken unwise and precipitate action in abrogating their treaty with Britain.

I did not make any extensive comments on what Bourguiba and his colleague said. I simply expressed the hope that they would continue to exercise moderation. I said I thought that some progress had been made over the past couple of years. He was well aware of the relation between France and the United States.

Both Bourguiba and Farhat Hached seemed pleased with the luncheon. They took the occasion to show me a number of pictures (for the second time) of their activities in Tunisia.

Mr. Bourguiba gave me a copy of the attached statement he was planning to give the press at the end of the week.[4] The statement is certainly quite moderate compared with the speech which he did not give at San Francisco.

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[3] Regarding Bourguiba's meeting with Bourgerie and other Department officers on September 14, see Richey's memorandum of conservation, p. 1405. On October 3, Irving Brown, the European Representative of the A.F. of L., called on Daniel L. Horowitz, the Labor Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs; the operative portion of Horowitz' memorandum of conversation reads as follows:

"Brown said that he was concerned with the American Government's policy toward North Africa and the reluctance to do anything other than what he described as going along with the French policy. He said that if Mr. Bourghiba did not succeed in seeing Mr. McGhee this would have undesirable repercussions. He said that Mr. McGhee had given the impression in the Middle East that the U.S. was interested in developing positive policy toward the Arab world and that failing to see Bourghiba in Washington would negate that impression. In addition, Bourghiba himself would make much of the slight and Brown said that unless there was some appearance of change in U.S. policy he himself would be impelled to criticize publicly the unwillingness of the U.S. to do other than accept the French position." (611.515/10-351)

[4] Not printed.

651.72/11-2351 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS, November 23, 1951—noon.

33. Request Dept and Emb Paris consider whether state our relations with Fr Govt will not permit informal expression of hope that France will go far as possible meet current Tunisian nationalist request.[2] (Paris tel 2934, Nov 16 [3]) Believe we cld take position this seems moment conciliatory tactics to prevent future troubles, prove Western good faith toward dependent peoples and help counteract growing impression Western states always oppose Arab aspirations. Progressive step at this time may save us embarrassment of another UN debate re North Africa or even more awkward situation.

Since Tunisian case not before UN and since most Tunisian nationalists showing restraint pending outcome present conversations Paris, France cld give ground without appearing to act under pressure or giving impression weakness.

Of course Fr shld not relinquish essential elements of control but there is still long way to go in polit reforms before that point is reached.

Suggest it appropriate and possibly most effective for Secy Acheson say few words Schuman in course contacts arising out of UNGA session,[4] possibly referring prior conversation Washington re Morocco.

For latest background see my desps 182, Nov 14 and 189, Nov 21.[5]

JERNEGAN

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[1] Repeated to Paris and to the United States Delegation at the United Nations.

[2] In mid-October Tunisian Prime Minister Chenik and French Resident General Perillier travelled to Paris where they engaged in negotiations with officials of the French Government regarding Tunisian nationalist aspirations and possible reforms in French-Tunisian relations. In his despatch 189, November 21, from Tunis, Jernegan reported in some detail on the current status of these Franco-Tunisian political negotiations. Jernegan observed that the negotiations were seemingly approaching the critical point when the French Government would have to make some reply to the Tunisian proposals for reforms. Jernegan reported that Neo-Destour leader Nouri Boudali had approached him with the proposal that the United States undertake some sort of informal *démarche* to induce France to grant satisfactory concessions to the Tunisians. Jernegan concluded his despatch with the following recommendation:

"I recommend that the Department consider carefully whether the present situation does not justify an informal approach to the French government with a definite expression of hope that it will go as far as possible in granting Tunisian desires. We could base our remarks on the undeniable interest of the United States in preserving tranquility not only in North Africa but in the whole Moslem world. We do not want to be confronted with another Moroccan case in the UN, to embarrass our relations with the Near East and South Asia. We need not, and probably should not, make specific suggestions, but we can let it be known that we are most anxious to avoid the building up of any more trouble spots." (651.72/11-2151)

[3] Not printed.

[4] Secretary Acheson and Foreign Minister Schuman headed their respective delegations to the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly which opened in Paris on November 6.

[5] Neither printed.

772.00/11–2751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 29, 1951—2:40 p. m.

3239. Tunis tel 39 Nov 27 rptd Paris 24[2] and previous tels from Tunis and Paris re Franco–Chenik negots. Present developments Tunisia wld appear clearly indicate Tunisian nationalists attempting take advantage present situation Mid East and Morocco to pressure Fr into mtg demands presented Tunisian Note Oct 31.[3] While, for same reasons stated Tunis tel 33 Nov 23 (rptd Paris 21),[4] we hope, and in fact believe it essential, that Fr grant Tunisians maximum concessions possible, we have little sympathy for pressure tactics now being employed by Tunisians achieve immed objectives. We think Tunisian action calling gen strike Nov 29 most untimely as was pub text Note Oct 31. However, since immed objective is keep situation in Tunisia quiet we believe US is in position help Fr (and Tunisians) at this juncture by expressing US position on present situation to appropriate Tunisian leaders. Accordingly, in your discretion, Emb shld approach FonOff along fol lines:

US believes Fr is on right track in Tunisia in pursuing policy collaboration with New Destour. We hope this policy will continue and (for reasons set forth Tunis tel 33 Nov 23) we hope Fr will make maximum possible concessions to Tunisia as result present negots. We fully appreciate Tunisians trying take advantage present Mid East–North African situation pressure France into making greater concessions than cld normally be expected. We disapprove Tunisian pressure tactics and realize these tactics may disrupt existing cordial atmosphere negots and create situation precluding any favorable action by Fr on Tunisian demands. This in turn cld lead to further unrest and trouble Tunisia which nobody wants. Therefore, in interests helping Fr, Emb authorized inform Chenik and/or Ben Youseff that (1) US firmly believes present policy moderation and collaboration with Fr being pursued by Tunisians is in their best interests and we hope see this policy continued. (2) US has no sympathy for present pressure tactics being used against Fr by Tunisians. Such tactics can only serve stiffen Fr public opinion against Tunisians and thus make position Schuman and Council Ministers more difficult re granting concessions. In short, these tactics are against best interests Tunisians, France and whole Western world. (3) We are satisfied Fr will grant maximum concessions possible. (4) We strongly urge Tunisians reconsider matter and pursue course moderation and cooperation.

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[1] This telegram, which was also sent to Tunis as 27, was drafted by Richey (NEA/AF), cleared by Godley (WE), and Bourgerie approved transmission and signed for the Secretary of State.

[2] Not printed.

[3] On October 31 Prime Minister Chenik presented a note to the French Government in Paris setting forth the Tunisian case for reform. Chenik's note included three principal demands: (1) the creation of an elected, representative Tunisian legislative assembly; (2) the formation of a completely Tunisian cabinet; (3) the gradual replacement of all French civil servants in Tunisia with Tunisian subjects. For the text of the Chenik note of October 31, see *L'Année politique, 1951*, pp. 587–589.

[4] *Supra.*

View rapidly changing events Tunisia Emb requested take no action until ConGen Tunis comments this proposal. If feasible Tunis requested telephone views Paris. If Jernegan concurs proposed approach he may, in his discretion, and after initial approach made to Fr in Paris, take similar action vis-à-vis any appropriate Nationalist leader still in Tunisia.[5]

Webb

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[5] Telegram 3273, November 30, to Paris, repeated to Tunis, instructed as follows: "In view contents Paris tel 3218 Nov 29 rptd 38 [printed *infra*] action suggested Deptel 3239 Nov 29 rptd Tunis 27 wld appear be unnecessary." (772.00/11-2951)

772.00/11-2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, November 29, 1951—7 p. m.

3218. McBride discussed Tunisian sitn with FonOff today. Puaux who handles protectorates stated Fr Govt mtg Dec 1 prepare reply note[1] released to press by Tunisian del now Paris asking for control all ministries, elected assembly and fullest participation admin posts. He said govt embarassed presence Chenik and others Paris and confidentially Quai d'Orsay displeased ResGen[2] who had sent them up without consultation. He said impossible turn over ministeries to Tunisians now, especially Finance and Public Works which collect and spend respectively most of revenues over 75 per cent which come either from Paris or from Fr resident Tunisia. Likewise he said Fr protectorate cld not function with real elected assembly which voted budget for example and cld thus control admin. Insofar as Tunisian participation admin posts concerned Puaux stressed Fr Govt planning make even more extensive concessions than previously approved and believed substantial satisfaction Tunisians feasible though Fr colony Tunisia disapproved.

Points raised Tunis' tel 33, Nov 23 to Dept[3] discussed. Puaux said govt asked nothing better than to make some spectacular concession in Tunis but for above-cited reasons felt dates for elected assembly and turning over key ministerial posts to Tunisians cld not be set now. Fr well aware tension Arab world and for this reason proceeding cautiously reply to Chenik.

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[1] Regarding the Tunisian note of October 31 under reference here, see footnote 3, *supra*.

[2] French Resident General in Tunisia Perillier.

[3] *Ante*, p. 1419.

Puaux expressed thanks our friendly interest and appreciation our helpful attitude Moroccan question UN–GA.

Desp fols.[4]

BRUCE

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[4] Despatch 1607, December 15, from Paris, reported upon French local (mainly public) interest in the Tunisian situation. (772.00/12–1551) It appears to be the despatch under reference here.

772.00/11–3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, November 30, 1951—8 p. m.

3264. Deptel 3239[1] re Tunisian situation doubtless crossed Embtel 3218 Nov 29[2] reporting our most recent talk on subj with FonOff. Since Tunisian requesting exactly those major elements of control which Fr unwilling relinquish it seems inevitable Fr reply to Oct 31 note[3] will be largely unfavorable. FonOff states French anxious follow out reform program but Tunisians interested primarily such major polit questions as legislative assemb and control ministries. It believed our views on subj have been made adequately known to FonOff. We will plan of course continue policy reminding Fr periodically desirability following evolutionary policy N. Africa.

Re communicating our views to Chenik Emb feels present situation not entirely auspicious such approach by this Emb for variety reasons including fact it has come to our knowledge that Chenik has decided not approach us at this time.

Cabinet discussing Tunisia tomorrow (see Embtel 3218). *Le Monde* states press release from Fr Govt will follow session (FonOff confirms this).

In any event no action taken on Deptel 3239 since Tunis comments thereon not yet received.

BRUCE

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[1] Dated November 29, p. 1420.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Regarding the Tunisian note under reference here, see footnote 8, p. 1420.

772.00/12-351 : Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET TUNIS, December 3, 1951—10 a. m.

45. As Emb Paris was informed Dec 1,[2] I do not think approach suggested Deptel 27 Nov 30[3] desirable. My reasons are:

(1) Proffer of direct official Amer advice to Tunisians mins wld put US squarely in middle of dispute from here on out. Tunisians wld consider we had shown ourselves interested party and wld expect US continue intervene in debate on every future occasion. They wld attempt make my position here that of Amb to Neo-Destour.[4]

(2) I do not concur that Tunisians using improper pressure tactics on Fr. In first place, if world situation were not tense and if Tunisians did not agitate, they wld have no chance of getting any concessions whatsoever. In second place, such pressure tactics as pub Chenik note and calling strike adopted only after Fr colonists in Tunisia had exerted every possible pressure prevent reforms.[5] In third place, it is my understanding pub conf document is recognized right of govt which sends it and is frequently done by great powers. In fourth place, strikes and demonstrations are only means open to Tunisians to prove popular support of Natlist leaders.[6]

(3) In any case, it wld be absolutely futile attempt to convince Tunisian leaders they are wrong in using this kind of pressure. They consider they have shown great patience and moderation.[7]

(4) If we say we are satisfied Fr will grant maximum concessions possible, Tunisians will believe we have put real pressure on Fr and have concrete assurances of substantial concessions. When disillusionment comes, they will insist we do something to justify their having relied on our optimism.

(5) If we tell Fr we disapprove Tunisians pressure tactics, they may be encouraged resist demands and may throw our words back at us in future as evidence we recognize Tunisians do not negotiate in good faith.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris. The source text bears a number of handwritten comments on portions of the text. These comments, apparently written by Richey (NEA/AF), are noted in footnotes 4 through 9, below.

[2] Telegram 3274, December 1, from Paris, reported as follows:

"Jernegan phoned Emb this morning and stated he concurred recommendation Embtel 3264, November 30 [*supra*] that no approach be made by Emb to Tunisian del now in Paris. Jernegan asked Dept be informed he will convey his reasons for desiring no action Paris this time by tel as soon as his communications facilities permit." (772.00/12-151)

[3] Same as telegram 3239, November 29, to Paris, p. 1420.

[4] Handwritten marginal notation on source text opposite this paragraph reads: "Did they do this when Jernegan expressed U.S. views last year? We could hedge this point in our conversations."

[5] Handwritten marginal notation "Did we know this?" appears in connection with phrase beginning "only after Fr colonists . . ." in source text.

[6] The final sentence of this paragraph is underscored in the source text and is accompanied by the following handwritten marginal notation: "Strikes and demonstrations lead to incidents which negate their purposes."

[7] The last sentence of this paragraph is underscored in the source text and is accompanied by the following handwritten notation: "True and we want them to continue to do so also."

In sum, I believe it unwise for us to give direct formal[8] advice to Tunisians unless and until we are prepared intervene fully with sides in all-out effort resolve Tunisian problem.[9] McBride's talk with Puaux (Paris tel 3218 Nov 29[10]) seems far as we shld go at moment unless Secy or Amb Bruce has support unity talk on same lines with Fr at higher level.

JERNEGAN

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[8] In the source text the word "formal" is circled, and a handwritten notation reads: "Why is it not informal advice?"

[9] In the source text this sentence is underlined in pencil and an accompanying handwritten marginal notation reads: "Maybe by talking to both sides we can avoid this very situation."

[10] *Ante*, p. 1421.

651.72/12–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, December 17, 1951—9 p. m.

3618. French reply to Tunisian note which Chenik released to press (Embtel 3584, Dec 15) has given subj considerable comment.[2] In gen right-wing press defends govt note and claims Tunisian demands went much too far while left-wing attacks govt for failing take any conciliatory steps toward satisfying Tunisians.

Line of reasoning of Schuman note is that while Chenik letter of Oct 30 might form basis for conversations, account must be taken of 70 years of French work in Tunisia including continuing contribution of substantial portion of budget and carrying out of large public works prog. French residents in Tunisia, note continues, have played important role in development of country and govt cannot consider setting them aside insofar as participation in public life is concerned (i.e. French will continue to be represented in whatever Consultative Council may be evolved). Future relations between France and Tunisia can only be founded on recognition of "the definitive nature of the bond which unites them". Note adds that Bey shld now put into effect engagements which he has freely accepted regarding municipal reforms as prerequisite to any other reforms (i.e. creation of Tunisian Assembly). Finally Schuman states French Govt is ordering its rep Tunis to institute next month mixed Franco-Tunisian commission to study what type of rep institution might replace grand council whose mandate has expired.

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[1] Repeated for information to Tunis.

[2] The telegram under reference is not printed. Regarding the Tunisian note of October 31, see footnote 3, p. 1420. The text of Foreign Minister Schuman's reply of December 15 is printed in *L'Année politique, 1951*, pp. 591–592.

Concurrently with publication French note press reports appointment of Voizard now French Min to Monaco to replace Perillier. Text of reply is designed maintain intact French position Tunisia and not offer much hope any widespread reform; dismissal Perillier is considered further indication determination French Govt follow firm line inasmuch as he was considered apostle of concessions to Tunisians and as such anathema to French colony. Combination of Schuman reply and appointment Voizard who is rumored to be advocate firm line Tunisia shld satisfy restlessness French colony in protectorate.

Tunisian reaction to note (text of which is being airmailed) has been as expected unfavorable. Chenik announced to press he considered French document equivalent to refusing to acknowledge Tunisian note at all and was disturbed at ref to cosovereignty of France and Tunisia in ltr country. Tels of protest from Tunisian nationalists and labor groups have already been received in Paris, while Socialist *Populaire* and Independent *Combat* and *Franc-Tireur* are sharply critical of govt and predict difficulties in future. *Figaro* while approving French reply is rather pessimistic as to future tranquillity but expresses hope mixed commission (to which it is rumored Ramadier may be appointed) may find some way out of impasse. FonOff has little to add to above but officer in charge of protectorates seemed somewhat disappointed govt reply had offered Tunisians so little and omitted certain reforms Quai d'Orsay had suggested such as lifting state of siege.

Early reaction seems generally that French reply does not represent much progress and leaves Franco-Tunisian relations approximately where they were when Perillier went to Tunis.

Bruce

772.00/12–1951 : Despatch

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 213 Tunis, December 19, 1951.

Subject: The French Reply of December 15 [1] to Tunisian Demands for Political Reforms.

Foreign Minister Schuman's note of December 15 to Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Chenik seems to have brought to an abrupt close one stage of the Franco-Tunisian argument over political reforms. No matter how it is read, the note must be taken as a definite set-back for the moderate Tunisian nationalists. They have obtained virtually nothing from a *démarche* to which they had attached great importance. It is true that there is a slight apparent gain, since the French Government has agreed to discuss the creation of a new legislative body, but this decision had been taken even before the Tunisian ministers went to Paris. In any case, it is a concession so negligible by comparison with what the Tunisians asked that it hardly counts in the political picture, and it is more than offset by other portions of the note.

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[1] See telegram 3618, December 17, from Paris, *supra*.

Coupled with the replacement of Resident General Louis Perillier by M. Pierre Voizard, the French note seems to make clear that French policy toward Tunisia will be even more cautious in future than it has been during the past year and a half. France has not renounced the policy of negotiation nor the principle of reform, but it has indicated that changes must come very slowly and that there is a definite limit to their extent.

The big question which the note raises in its wake is: what policy will the nationalists now adopt?

[Here follow a detailed analysis of the French note of December 15 and the reaction in Tunisia thereto.]

Comment: It is hard to see how the French Government could have handled the situation in worse fashion. It would have been much better never to have let the Tunisian ministers go to Paris at all, and, once they had gotten there and presented their requests, it would have been better to give an immediate answer even if it said no more than that the Government was not prepared to discuss such questions at that moment.

Instead, the Tunisians were led to expect something, only to get worse than nothing. The Neo-Destour leaders, the only really influential people with whom the French can deal on a reasonable basis, have been exasperated and their prestige hurt. Any negotiations in future will certainly be more difficult.

It is easy to give explanations for the French. The Residency General says it was never expected that the Tunisians would present specific demands and attempt substantive negotiations. (I think any child would have known that Chenik and Co. could not and would not go to Paris merely to exchange polite words.) It is also obvious that the French cabinet had too many urgent things on its hands [illegible]ing the past two months to give proper attention to a relatively seco[illegible]ary problem like Tunisia. (All the more reason for not letting the Tun[illegible]ans come at all.) It seems, furthermore, clear that the French cabine[illegible]as divided among itself regarding the policy to adopt and that the [illegible]ajority might have been split if Schuman had forced the issue. Bu[illegible]all this merely adds up to a story of indecision and ineptitude which [illegible]y be explicable and excusable but does not alter the fact that the Tunis[illegible]n situation has become worse.

JOHN D. JERNEGAN

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

PRINCIPAL POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA[1]

Editorial Note

During conversations in Washington on October 5, 1950, between South African Defense Minister Erasmus and Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Marshall and in a note of October 9, 1950, to Secretary Acheson, the Government of the Union of South Africa stated that it had adopted a policy to regard any attack on the African continent as an attack upon South Africa. In implementation of the policy decision, the Government of South Africa expressed a willingness to send an expeditionary force of an armored division and air fighter group to North Africa on the outbreak of hostilities provided that South Africa was able to obtain the equipment required for the expeditionary force at the time the force went into action and on "the least onerous financial terms".

On December 15 the Secretary of State addressed letters to the appropriate chairmen of the committees of Congress as required under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, stating that the Government of the Union of South Africa had been determined eligible to receive military assistance in accordance with the terms of Section 408(*e*)(1)(*c*) of the act. Acheson explained that the decision had been reached because the Government of the Union of South Africa had stated that it would regard any Communist attack on the African continent as an attack upon South Africa, and that the port facilities and continued United States access to the manganese and other mineral deposits in South Africa contributed to the security of the United States.

For documentation on the United States-South African exchange of October 1950 and the subsequent discussions within the United States to assess the eligibility of the Union of South Africa to receive reimbursable military assistance under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume V, pages 1832 ff.

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[1] For previous documentation on these same subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1809 ff.

611.45A/1–3051

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Erhardt) to the Dominion Affairs Officer, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Shullaw)[1]

SECRET

CAPE TOWN, January 30, 1951.

DEAR HARRY: When first coming to South Africa we were very much interested in reading the very useful Policy Statement[2] as published in the Department's policy series. We have the impression that you have been pretty responsible for that publication. It seemed to contain all the necessary information in practical, concise form. It has always been a feeling of mine that no one in a Mission from the Chief down to the most junior officer can function efficiently unless he has a frankwork [*framework?*] upon which to build subsequent reports, and the Policy Statement on South Africa gives just that precise information.

Another practice which we endeavor to follow at successive posts is to put in outline form the objectives of American policy. With Joe Sweeney we have provisionally prepared such an outline and submit it to you for criticism. Here it is:

OBJECTIVES OF AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

1. To maintain and strengthen South Africa's support of the Western cause.
2. To expedite the utilization of South Africa's strategic raw materials in such a way as to strengthen the West and aid the Union's economy.
3. To maintain South African participation in the United Nations.
4. To encourage South African membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations *without* opposing the Afrikaner ideal of a Republic.
5. To exert American influence cautiously and without giving offense to achieve a broader outlook for Afrikaner nationalism that:
    a. Parochial nationalism is lessened.

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[1] Ambassador Erhardt, who arrived in South Africa and assumed charge of the Embassy in September 1950, died suddenly of coronary thrombosis on February 18, 1951. In response to the letter printed here, Shullaw wrote to Chargé Bernard C. Connelly in Capetown on March 1 as follows:

"In the Ambassador's letter dated January 30 he listed certain objectives of American policy in South Africa and asked for my comments. I have shown the letter to Hayden Raynor who you probably know has succeeded Harry Labouisse as Director of BNA. His reaction was that the objectives were very good. I agree and think that it is useful to have such a detailed list of points of interest in the implementation of our more general policy objectives. Many of the points listed, as I know all of you recognize, are matters of extreme delicacy in hypersensitive South Africa. They are not easy objectives to advance but I still agree that as occasion and opportunity permit we should do what we can along these lines." (611.45A/1–3051)

[2] The reference here is presumably to the Department of State Policy Statement on the Union of South Africa, November 1, 1948, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, pt. 1, p. 524. For the text of the revised Policy Statement of March 28, 1951, see p. 1433.

b. Better feeling is brought about between the English and Afrikaans-speaking segments of the population.

c. Native policy is brought closer to the general standards of Western democracies.

d. South African leadership of the African Continent becomes a positive force.

6. To observe and, if possible, to influence African (Native) nationalism so that:

a. Communist penetration is forestalled.

b. Anti-white hatred is lessened.

c. This dynamic force becomes pro-Western.

d. A harmonious formula is evoked for the co-existence of the white and black peoples in the Union.

Sincerely yours, **JOHN G. ERHARDT**

745A.5/10-950

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Union of South Africa (Jooste)[1]

SECRET

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of South Africa and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's note dated October 9, 1950,[2] confirming in broad outline the policy of the Union Government with regard to the defense of Africa, and furnishing certain information concerning the Union Government's military equipment requirements. These requirements were classified into two groups: equipment required immediately for the training of normal, peacetime forces, and that required for an expeditionary force. It was stated that the equipment for the expeditionary force would not be needed until the force arrived in the theatre of operations, and the hope was expressed that the United States would find it possible to extend the least onerous financial terms for this equipment.

In the conversations which the South African Minister of Defense, the Hon. F. C. Erasmus, had with the Secretary of State and with the Secretary of Defense during his visit to the United States in October, 1950, he was informed that there was no existing legislative authority which would permit the United States to extend military assistance to South Africa on a grant basis. However, the provisions of Section 408(*e*) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, which would, under certain conditions, permit the United

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[1] This note was drafted by Shullaw (EUR/BNA) and was cleared by S/ISA and L/E.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1841.

States to extend to the Union of South Africa military assistance on a reimbursable basis, were explained to Mr. Erasmus.[3]

It has now been determined,[4] in accordance with the terms of Section 408(*e*) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as amended, that the Union of South Africa is eligible to receive reimbursable military assistance from the United States. Consequently the Government of the United States, upon receipt of the assurances from the South African Government required in the administration of the Act, will be able to extend reimbursable military assistance to South Africa. The assurances required in order to give effect to this determination will be the subject of a separate communication to the Ambassador.[5]

With respect to the observations contained in the Ambassador's note concerning the hope of the South African Government that the Government of the United States would find it possible to extend the least onerous financial terms possible, the method by which the fair value of equipment or material transferred is determined, is set forth in Sections 403(*c*) and 408(*e*)(2) of the Act, as amended. In extending reimbursable military assistance to a nation determined to be eligible for such assistance, the Government of the United States has only such discretion in the fixing of the terms of reimbursement as is afforded by the terms of the Act, and specifically the provisions of the sections cited.

In the Ambassador's note it was further stated that informal discussions were taking place between the Service Attachés of the Embassy and representatives of the Department of Defense concerning the availability and costs of equipment required by the South African Armed Forces. It was the understanding of the Department of State that on the basis of these conversations, the Union Government would determine the specific items it would seek to obtain in the United States, and would forward to the Department of State its requests for the assistance of the Government of the United States in obtaining this equipment. It should be noted, however, that eligibility for reimbursable military assistance does not in itself assure in any way that equipment desired can be made available. Competing and urgent demands for limited quantities of equipment and materials necessitate

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[3] For records of the conversations described here, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1832 ff.

[4] Regarding the determination under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 1427.

[5] An approved draft of the note under reference here was given to South African Ambassador Jooste by Assistant Secretary of State Perkins on December 26, 1950. (Memorandum of conversation by Satterthwaite (BNA), December 26, 1950: 745A.5 MAP/12–2650) On February 12, 1951, Jooste sent an informal letter to Perkins requesting clarification of certain of the assurances called for in the draft note of December 26. (745A.5/3–1551) Raynor discussed the requested clarifications with Jooste on March 15 and March 20. (Memoranda of conversation, March 15 and March 20, 1951: 745A.5/3-1551 and 745A.5/3–2051) Jooste discussed the matter with Secretary Acheson on April 20; see the Secretary's memorandum of conversation, p. 1446.

READEX FICHE

an examination and determination in the case of each item of equipment. In view of this situation it is apparent that this Government is unable to give any general commitment or assurances regarding the equipping of the proposed South African expeditionary force even though, as pointed out in the Ambassador's note, such equipment would not be required until the force arrived in the theatre of operations. The Government of the United States recognizes and appreciates the initiative of the South African Government in deciding, as a part of its defense policy, that it will regard any military attack by a communistic power or powers on the continent of Africa as a direct attack on South Africa to be resisted with all the force at the Union's disposal. This Government has also noted with appreciation the references in Prime Minister Malan's statement in Parliament on January 25 to the importance of armed strength in the free world as a deterrent to Communist aggression. It is the sincere hope of this Government that the eligibility of the Union Government for reimbursable aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act will assist South Africa in carrying out its training programs and in implementing its defense policy. Within the limits imposed by the Act and the availability of the equipment needed, and having regard to world conditions at the moment, the Government of the United States will give the most sympathetic consideration to requests from the South African Government.

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1951.

745A.56/3–2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, March 21, 1951—3 p. m.

5030. African Dept, Foreign Office, would like if possible know how soon and what action likely be taken on South African request to US for capital equipment for one armored division, which is to be used on outbreak war in Middle East defense. South African commitment provide divisional force and some squadrons to Middle East was made contingent on obtaining necessary equipment.[1] UK concerned lest South Africa find some excuse for changing its mind and therefore extremely anxious equipment needs be filled from some source as quickly as possible.

Australia and New Zealand have also agreed supply troops to Middle East defense in event war and Commonwealth defense talks on Middle East are scheduled for sometime May or June.

GIFFORD

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[1] Regarding the South African undertaking summarized here, see also the editorial note, p. 1427.

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745A.56/3-2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 27, 1951—3 p. m.

4375. Tomap. Urtel 5030 Mar 21.[2] In note Oct 9 confirming Erasmus talks officials this govt, SoAfr Emb divided equip required two categories. Category A equip for training purposes for which SoAfr willing pay cash. Category B equip for expeditionary force to be used in case attack on Af continent. This equip desired on "least onerous terms". Furthermore SoAfrs stated equip not required until arrival force theatre operations, subsequent outbreak hostilities. Clear from conversations SoAfr officials they seeking commitment future availability category B items.[3]

SoAfr now eligible reimbursable mil aid under sec 408(*e*) MDAA, as amended, but has not yet furnished required assurances.[4] Category A equip can be provided as available as reimbursable aid once assurances are recd. Re category B Dept advised SoAfr Emb Feb 5 SoAfr eligible terms existing legis only for reimbursable aid on payment basis as fixed in sec 403(*c*) and 408(*e*)(2) of Act. Dept further stated that in view impossibility giving assurances now that all equip required at indefinite date in future can be made available at that time, this govt unable give any gen commitment or assurances re equipping proposed SoAfr expeditionary force. SoAfr Govt aware its Afr defense pol one of factors in determination eligibility receive reimbursable mil aid from US.

SoAfr apparently still confused this subject. Dept will make further effort explain situation at high level here and will keep you informed.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram, which was repeated to Capetown, was drafted by Shullaw (BNA) and Smith (S/ISA), was cleared by Kopper (NEA), Bonbright (EUR), Bray and Emery (S/ISA), and the Department of Defense.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Regarding the conversations referred to in this paragraph, see the editorial note, p. 1427.

[4] Regarding the reassurances under reference here, see Secretary Acheson's note of February 5 to Ambassador Jooste, p. 1429.

611.45A/3-2851

Department of State Policy Statement[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 28, 1951.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

A. OBJECTIVES

The fundamental objectives of US policy toward the Union of South Africa are: 1) To maintain our present friendly relations, recognizing South Africa's position as a member of the British Commonwealth, its importance as a source of various minerals in which we are interested and its strategic position in time of war; 2) to influence South Africa to adopt a more reasonable attitude toward the difficulties it has experienced in the UN; and 3) to encourage South Africa, as improvement in its foreign exchange position permits, to relax the import and exchange controls which have restricted our access to South African markets in recent years.

B. POLICIES

Relations between the United States and the Union of South Africa have always been friendly, but under the Smuts regime they were subjected to the over-riding considerations of Commonwealth and, more particularly, British interests. The Nationalist Government which came to power as a result of the general election in May 1948 has no sentimental attachment to the Commonwealth. Nevertheless it has participated in Commonwealth conferences when it has considered that South African interests would be served thereby.

South Africa, because of its natural resources, temperate climate and present and potential capacity for economic development, occupies a pre-eminent position on the African continent. Its reactionary racial policies, and the difficulties which those policies have engendered in the UN, impede the full realization of South African potentialities in African and in world affairs. Strained relations with India and Pakistan resulting from the discriminatory treatment of the Indian minority in the Union embarrass the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. This particular conflict, and the effect which it has in the UN of aligning colored nations of the world against white South Africa provides a useful subject for Soviet propaganda against the West. Our interest in strategic South African minerals, in the strength of the Commonwealth and in the unity of the free world are sufficient to justify an effort on our part to influence the Union Government to adopt a more conciliatory attitude in the UN, both with respect to its international responsibilities for the territory of Southwest Africa and the Indian minority question.

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[1] Department of State Policy Statements were concise summaries of current U.S. policy toward a country or region prepared by *ad hoc* working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department. The policy statements, which were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad, were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions for comment and criticism. The statements were periodically revised. For the previous statement on South Africa, November 1, 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, pt. 1, p. 524. In this connection, see also Ambassador Erhardt's letter of January 30, to Shullaw, p. 1428.

Through our USIE activities in South Africa, using information and educational exchanges, friendly relations can be strengthened and South African knowledge and understanding of US policies and attitudes affecting South Africa can be furthered. Since South African good will is conditioned by misinformation on US intentions in political-economic fields and by distortions of American social conditions, such USIE activities can make a useful contribution to the realization of our policy objectives.

1. *Political*

The general election in 1948 brought to power a Nationalist Government representing primarily the nationalist Afrikaner element of the population. This Government has gained in strength since taking office while its opponents have lost ground. A number of the leaders of the Nationalist Government and the majority of its supporters are narrowly racialist both in their attitude toward the colored problem in South Africa, and in their identification of Afrikaner culture with the South African nation. While these racialist ideas, particularly with respect to the relations between the English speaking and Afrikaans speaking sections of South Africa, may no longer claim the full allegiance of more enlightened Nationalist leaders, the basic strength of the Nationalist Party is in the rural areas which for the foreseeable future will continue to regard the English element in South Africa with hostility and distrust. The weak Afrikaner Party, which is generally considered to be more moderate than the Nationalist Party, is having difficulty in maintaining its integrity in the face of Nationalist efforts to effect a fusion of the two parties which now form a coalition government. With the recently concluded agreement between the leaders of the two parties on the question of the colored voters, the principal point of difference or obstacle to amalgamation has been removed. The leader of the Afrikaner Party, Mr. N. C. Havenga, is likely to succeed Prime Minister Malan in the event of the latter's retirement from office because of ill health. Presumably this would mean a fusion of the Afrikaner and Nationalist parties.

Legislative restrictions in racial matters in South Africa, such as regulations regarding native residence, pass laws, and the color bar in industry, have always been more rigid on the books than in administrative application, and, in fact, in many localities have not been strictly enforced. The Nationalist Government has encouraged a harsher administration of existing laws and has enacted the Group Areas Bill providing for territorial segregation in implementation of its *apartheid* program.[2]

Although the natives (Africans) comprise 80 per cent of the population, they are represented only indirectly in Parliament through three European members in the House of Assembly and four in the Senate. The Nationalist Government opposes the continuance of these representatives in the House of Assembly, but their removal has not yet been politically feasible.

The problem of the treatment of Indians in South Africa was first brought to the attention of the UN General Assembly in December 1946. A resolution passed by that session expressed the opinion that the treatment of Indians in South Africa should be in conformity with international obligations under agreements between India and South Africa and relevant provisions of the UN Charter. Discussions in the second and third sessions of the General Assembly did not further a solution of the problem. As a result of discussions between Dr. Malan and Mr. Nehru at the 1949 Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, negotiations were initiated between the parties to the dispute for the holding of a round-table conference. These negotiations were broken off by the Indian Government when South Africa refused to delay enactment of the Group Areas legislation until after the Conference. At the Fifth Session of the General Assembly a resolution was adopted calling on the three governments to hold a round-table conference. In the event of failure to hold this conference before April 1, 1951 or to reach an agreement in the conference within a reasonable time, the resolution recommended that there be established a commission to assist the parties in the carrying out of appropriate negotiations. The resolution also called upon the governments concerned to refrain from taking any steps which would prejudice the success of their negotiations and in particular the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act. The question was also placed on the agenda of the next regular session of the Assembly by virtue of this resolution.

The Assembly's resolution is the strongest passed on this question and is most distasteful to the Union Government. The specific request that South Africa refrain from implementation or enforcement of the Group Areas Act is perhaps the most obnoxious aspect of the resolution from the South African point of view since they have consistently maintained that the question of the treatment of the Indian minority is a matter of their internal concern and barred by Article 2, paragraph 7 (domestic jurisdiction clause) of the Charter from the scope of the Assembly. Since the Union Government maintains that it entered into negotiations looking toward a round-table conference as a result of talks held between Dr. Malan and Prime Minister Nehru and not in response to any previous action by the United Nations it will undoubtedly renew with increased vigor its argument that this question is an internal matter and will probably not proceed to negotiations under this resolution. In view of the fact that it is unlikely that the parties will have agreed to the holding of a round-table conference by the first of April of this year, the question of the appointment of the commission called for by this resolution will arise. The US vote for this resolution caused such resentment in South Africa that it is doubtful whether at the present time efforts on our part to persuade South Africa to comply with its provisions would be helpful, but whenever circumstances permit we should endeavor to exercise a moderating influence.

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[2] Despatch 63, April 16, from Capetown, reported that the Group Areas Act became effective on March 30, 1951 by government proclamation of that date. The despatch, which provided an analysis of the government action, concluded as follows:

"The Proclamation of the Group Areas Act brings the Union of South Africa another step nearer to the present Government's goal of *apartheid*. In the future persons must live and own businesses in areas according to their race. This, the protagonists of the measure claim, will preserve 'racial purity'. . . . Implementation of the Group Areas Act will increase racial tension, lower non-European living standards, and condone such present standards of living as do not conform to the human rights enjoyed in Western democracies, and will stimulate non-European unity." (845A.411/4-1651)

South Africa's refusal to submit a trusteeship agreement for Southwest Africa also resulted in a dispute in the UN. With the exception of Southwest Africa, all territories held under mandate from the former League of Nations either have become independent or have been placed under the trusteeship system. By letter of July 23, 1947 the South African Government informed the UN that it had abandoned for the time being its plan to incorporate Southwest Africa into the Union but would administer the territory in the spirit of the mandate and submit reports to the UN on the administration. However, on July 11, 1949 the Union Government informed the Secretary General that it would not submit any further reports to the UN. The Nationalist Government resented the manner in which its administration of the territory had been criticized on the basis of the initial report to UN. Legally, South Africa argued, the obligations, under the mandate, including the obligations to submit reports and transmit petitions, lapsed with the demise of the League of Nations and had not been transferred to the UN.

Since the status of Southwest Africa was not entirely clear, and since conflicting opinions were held regarding the legal aspects of the Union's obligations under the Covenant of the League and Chapter XII of the Charter, the US supported a resolution in the fourth session of the General Assembly requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The Court's opinion, while stating that South Africa was under no obligation to submit a trusteeship agreement, held that South Africa could not unilaterally alter the international status of Southwest Africa and was obliged to submit reports to UN on its administration of the territory and to transmit petitions.

In the fifth session of the General Assembly the US supported a resolution accepting the Court's opinion, urging South Africa to do likewise and setting up a committee of five nations to negotiate with South Africa on the procedural arrangements necessary to give effect to the opinion. South Africa adopted a moderate attitude in this session and indicated its willingness to give careful consideration to any resolution passed by the Assembly. At the same time it considers that the Court opinion was issued without the benefit of information which has subsequently come to light concerning the transfer of responsibilities from the League of Nations to UN and that the opinion should be revised, particularly in its finding with regard to the submission of reports and transmission of petitions. South Africa is not happy about the terms of the resolution or the fact that the United States does not agree with its legal arguments respecting the Court opinion. There remains in this case, however, the possibility of the views of the United States having some influence with South Africa.[3]

Pan-African aspirations which were voiced by General Smuts during the war have been played down during the past several years, and the emphasis has been placed on closer economic and trade relations with neighboring territories, particularly the Rhodesias. The present Government has evidenced a sensitivity to developments in neighboring African territories and, particularly, has voiced a demand for the British High Commission territories. In recent months this subject has been quiescent and South Africa has made no formal request to the British Government for the incorporation of these territories. Dr. Malan and other Nationalist leaders have also advocated an African defense arrangement which would serve to coordinate plans for the defense of the African continent. The urge to expand the Union's influence northward is evident not only in this proposal, but also in such policies as the closer political association of Southwest Africa with the Union, the transitional customs union with Southern Rhodesia, and, more indirectly, the readiness to participate in and sponsor scientific cooperation in Africa.

2. *Economic*

South Africa is the world's largest producer of gold. Normally, its merchandise imports tend to absorb its gold output but, owing to the reduced volume of imports available from abroad during the war, and to a heavy capital inflow from the UK, the Union's wartime gold output found its way principally into monetary reserves which until 1945 rose by a substantial amount. With the termination of the war and the release of pent-up import demands, a large import surplus developed that was financed out of reserves, sharply reversing the previous favorable reserve movement. This post-war depletion of South Africa's gold holdings prompted the imposition, in November 1948, of controls on imports from all non-sterling countries. A drastic diversion of purchases to the sterling area ensued, however, with a consequent drain on the Union's sterling resources, and in July 1949 the South African Government brought sterling area imports also under control, although in a favorably discriminatory manner. This discriminatory application of import controls was shifted on January 1, 1950 from a sterling area/non-sterling area basis to a soft currency/hard currency area basis, made operative through a system of differential import permits.

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[3] For documentation on the South West Africa question in the United Nations in 1951 and the U.S. attitude thereon, see vol. II, pp. 673 ff.

After the devaluations of September 1949, South Africa's external position began to improve. The reduction in imports resulting from the import control policy reduced the Union's gold and dollar payments. On the other hand, the rapid rise in wool prices increased dollar earnings, and there was a revival of the inflow of capital that was interrupted in mid-1948. In consequence, during 1950 South Africa's hard currency deficit fell to such an extent that some of the Union's gold production became available once more for augmenting monetary reserves.

This improvement in reserve position led the South African Government, on January 1, 1951, to relax the degree of its discrimination against hard currency imports. Although such a step was most welcome some doubt remains whether continued discrimination in any degree against hard currency imports can be justified. The discrimination was represented as necessary to insure South Africa an adequate flow of capital, but the propriety of imposing discriminatory import restrictions to secure capital is open to question.

In addition to the application of exchange and import controls, the South African Government had attempted to improve its balance of payments position by realizing a greater foreign exchange income from its gold output. It instituted the sale of gold for non-monetary (i.e., industrial, professional, and artistic) purposes at premium prices, and in 1949 sought the concurrence of the International Monetary Fund in a proposal that would allow a Fund member to sell one-half of its gold production at market prices for either monetary or non-monetary purposes. The Fund, supported by the US, reaffirmed its objection to premium gold transactions and accordingly rejected the South African scheme. Although this rejection did not prevent the sale of gold at a premium for legitimate non-monetary purposes, such sales being technically outside the scope of the Fund's sphere of interest, the volume of South African sales for what are ostensibly non-monetary purposes has become so large that there is growing concern that South Africa is, in fact, contravening the Fund's gold policy.

In 1949 South Africa unsuccessfully sought to obtain an Export-Import Bank loan of $100 million. In the loan negotiations, the South African Government objected to the gold deposit requirements for that portion of the loan taken by private banks and appeared to be of the opinion that because South Africa had an excellent credit record the Bank should act favorably on the application without going too closely into the purposes for which the loan was to be used. The failure to obtain a loan on terms satisfactory to South Africa created some resentment against the US which lessened with the passage of time. South Africa has recently received a loan of $60 million for transport improvements and expansion of electric power facilities.[4]

Initially the South African exchange regulations required that non-sterling shipping charges be deducted from the importer's exchange quota which placed American shipping lines in a most disadvantageous position vis-à-vis sterling shipping lines. The US informed the Union of its view that artificial changes in shipping patterns brought about by exchange regulations are undesirable in principle and harmful to world trade and that convertibility of exchange in the case of transport should be kept outside exchange regulations. In response to our representations, the South African Government altered the administration of its exchange controls in such a manner as to place all shipping on an equal footing in the carriage of commercial cargoes. US shipping is allotted approximately 45 per cent of Government cargoes. This is an improvement over the situation some months ago when the system of priorities gave an even greater preference in the carriage of Government cargoes to South African and British ships and charters.

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

South African ties with the UK have loosened since the Nationalist victory in the 1948 General Election, primarily in the sense of greater independence of action and alignment with the UK on the basis of self-interest rather than sentiment. The Malan Government, for the time being at least, wants South Africa to remain in the Commonwealth. Dependence on the UK for capital, fear of Communism, and concern for the future of white supremacy in Africa have counterbalanced extreme isolationist and nationalist sentiments. Although the Nationalist party platform favors a republican form of government, Nationalist leaders have reaffirmed the commitment not to introduce a republican constitution until a definite mandate has been obtained from the electorate. Furthermore Nationalist leaders have taken the line that South Africa can follow a similar course of constitutional development to that of India. Thus Nationalist aspirations could be satisfied and at the same time it would be possible for the English section of the population to accept such a solution of the republican issue since the Commonwealth connection would be maintained.

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[4] On January 23 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced two loans to the Union of South Africa totalling $50 million. One loan of $30 million for 20 years at 4 percent interest, guaranteed by the Union of South Africa, was made to the Electric Supply Commission, an autonomous state agency, to assist in the expansion of its 6-year power development program. A second loan of $20 million, for 15 years at 3¾ percent interest, was made to the Union of South Africa for the expansion and improvement of the state-owned transportation system. Simultaneously with the two IBRD loans, a group of eight commercial banks in the United States extended a loan of $10 million to the Union for purposes complementary to the IBRD loan for transportation improvement and development. For a summary description of the loans to South Africa, see *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sixth Annual Report 1950–1951*, pp. 19–20. A digest of the Bank's announcement of January 23 was carried in the Department of State *Wireless Bulletin*, January 23, 1951, No. 22, p. 4. For previous documentation on the negotiations of the loans from the IBRD, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1809 ff.

Although cabinet ministers, including the Prime Minister, have attended Commonwealth conferences at London, the present government prefers bilateral arrangements to multilateral negotiations centering in London. The Malan Government attempts to limit its Commonwealth relations as much as possible to matters specifically affecting South African interests. In the case of African defense arrangements, however, the Malan Government favors a multilateral approach in which South Africa, because of its dominant position in Southern Africa, would be the leader. The UK has discouraged this approach and apparently prefers bilateral arrangements radiating from London.

South Africa which until recently was outside the main currents of international politics except for its membership in the Commonwealth, now feels the need of a more assertive foreign policy. The purpose is multiple: to counteract adverse overseas publicity regarding its racial policies, to ward off charges of isolationism within the Union Opposition, and to influence the colonial policies of other African powers. In an effort to garner support in the UN General Assembly and also to improve its position in Africa, the Union is giving increasing attention to its relations with various countries, particularly Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Commonwealth powers. Its information service in the US, Canada, and countries having African colonies is being expanded.

The South African whites are strongly anti-communist because they are acutely aware of the vulnerability of South Africa's colored population to Communist propaganda. Prime Minister Malan has said more than once that the Union would not remain neutral if war came and the South African Government has taken a decision to regard any attack on the continent of Africa by a Communist power as an attack on South Africa to be resisted by all the force at the Union's disposal. In support of this decision South Africa plans to make available for the defense of Africa an expeditionary force consisting of an armored division. South Africa has also sent an air squadron to fight in Korea.

D. POLICY EVALUATION

The role of the native in South Africa is the omnipresent issue involving the major parties and affecting almost every aspect of South African life. The question of race relations was a paramount issue in the 1948 general election, and the effectiveness of the Nationalist appeal to the fears of the electorate demonstrated that a substantial section of the white population relies on repression as the answer to this problem. South Africa, by reason of the human and material resources which it possesses, should have considerable potentialities for further development. Unless its racial policies can be developed on something other than a substratum of fear and discrimination, however, its progress will be hampered and the development which it has already achieved will be endangered.

The jealous concern of the present Nationalist Government to preserve the culture of the Afrikaner Volk led to a reversal of the policy of encouraging immigration adopted by the previous government. The check on immigration was explained on the ground that the ethnical proportions of the white South African population must be preserved—that is the numerical superiority of the Afrikaners must not be destroyed by unlimited immigration. More recently there have been indications that the South African Government will make an effort to obtain immigrants from Germany who in the opinion of the present Government, would be more readily assimilable in the South African community. Immigration continues to be a political question in South Africa, since both groups, English speaking and Afrikaners, view immigrants as potential voters and oppose or support immigration on the basis of whether particular immigrants are likely to weaken or strengthen their respective positions in South Africa.

Our relations with South Africa have always been friendly but the UN disputes in which South Africa has been involved since 1946 have periodically produced a strain which unfortunately is likely to continue. It is in our interest to maintain friendly relations with South Africa because of strategic considerations and also because South Africa represents a good market for our products. In December 1950, South Africa's ability to defend itself and to contribute to the defense of the area of which it forms a part was determined to be important to the security of the US, and it was therefore found eligible to use the procurement facilities of this Government under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The US and the UK have signed a contract with South

Africa covering the procurement of uranium.[5] South African exports of manganese, diamonds and other strategic materials are also important to the US.

While we are not in a position to influence one way or another the maintenance of South Africa's constitutional relationship with Great Britain, our interests would not be served by the withdrawal of South Africa from association in the British Commonwealth, particularly if such withdrawal were accompanied by a policy of narrow nationalism and isolation. Our policy should take note of the lack of experience in international affairs of many of the leaders of the present Government and their extreme sensitivity to criticism. We should endeavor by the exercise of patience to encourage South Africa to continue her cooperation with other countries, and particularly her participation in the UN.

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[5] For documentation on the agreement of November 23, 1950, under reference here, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 493 ff.

845A.10/4-1951 : Despatch

The Consul General at Johannesburg (Redecker) to the Department of State

SECRET

JOHANNESBURG, April 19, 1951.

No. 239

Subject: Conclusion of Financial Agreement for Uranium Production in South Africa

Wilson L. Townsend, General Counsel of Export-Import Bank; A. A. Wells, Special Assistant to the General Counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission, and R. L. Faulkner, Assistant to the Director of the Division of Raw Materials, arrived as scheduled in Johannesburg on the evening of April 12, 1951. They were met at the airport by Consul General Redecker and Vice Consul Davis and escorted to the Carlton Hotel, where accommodations had been reserved for them. The following evening they attended a large dinner party, which had been previously arranged at the home of Consul General and Mrs. Redecker, in honor of Mrs. Elisabeth Schumann, famous Austrian-American concert singer who has been on a concert tour in South Africa.

The three officials had come to South Africa primarily to finalize financial arrangements for the uranium agreement with South Africa, the technical and commercial aspects of which had been agreed upon in September, 1950.[1]

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[1] Presumably the reference here is to the agreement of November 23, 1950, between representatives of the Combined Development Trust and the South African Atomic Energy Board on the procurement of uranium. For documentation on the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 493 ff.

Negotiations have now taken place between the American officials, United Kingdom officials, and representatives of the South African mining companies concerned, for completing arrangements for the financing of the uranium project. Although some slight initial difficulties were encountered in the negotiations and representatives of the mining companies again showed a certain aversion to the uranium project and, especially, its financing by the United States, the anticipated agreement nevertheless has been reached and it is expected that this will find expression in a formal agreement to be concluded within the next week or ten days.

The essential details of this agreement are as follows:

> The Export–Import Bank, jointly with the U.K. Ministry of Supply, undertake to grant loans for financing the entire uranium extraction project. The Export–Import Bank will be responsible for two-thirds of the loans and the U.K. Ministry of Supply will be responsible for the remaining one-third.
>
> The loans will run for ten years, equal to the duration of the basic uranium production agreement, and will draw interest at the rate of 4 per cent, compounded quarterly. The South African Reserve Bank will serve as intermediary, will convert dollar loans into South African currency for transfer on behalf of the mining companies, and will be responsible for the transfer of payments of interest and principal to the lenders. The loans will be directly to the several mining companies assuming responsibility for the recovery of the uranium and on whose properties and in conjunction with whose mines the uranium extraction plants will be established.
>
> The agreement initially contemplates that a combined loan (U.S. and U.K.) of £ 10 to £ 12 million pounds will be granted, based upon the premise of the installation of four uranium extraction plants at four separate mines on the Rand. However, as it is now contemplated that six uranium plants at six mines will be established, the total amount of the combined loan may possibly be increased a further £ 5 million pounds to a total of £ 15 to £ 17 million pounds. Thus, the total American share of the loan, in dollars, may reach as high as $30 million.[2]

It is understood that the South African mining companies, and notably the Anglo-American group (in which, despite its name, there is little or no American financial participation) showed displeasure not only at the uranium project, but, more particularly, its financing by American capital. This attitude is in keeping with the basic policy of the entire Rand gold mining industry to discourage American or any other non-British affiliation with it and to look to Great Britain exclusively for necessary financial assistance, support and guidance.

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[2] *Export Import Bank of Washington: Twelfth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January–June 1951*, p. 50, indicates that on June 28, 1951, the Bank authorized credits of $35 million to various mining companies in the Union of South Africa for mining equipment, materials, and services. Further documentation has not been found in Department of State files regarding these credits.

The development of the uranium project, closely affiliated with the United States, therefore, marks a completely new era and a new departure in financial affiliations of the major Rand mining companies.

It is clear that the mining companies were opposed to accepting an American loan for the uranium project and much preferred to finance the enterprise themselves entirely independently from their own abundant sterling resources. However, the South African Government intervened and required that the project be financed by a foreign loan, repayable over a long period, rather than by the mining companies privately, since the Government was opposed to the mining companies asking for large amounts of still scarce dollar exchange required for the importation of the necessary uranium plant equipment. It apparently was also feared that, under a blanket foreign exchange authorization, the mining companies might seek to import equipment for purposes other than the production of uranium. By the Anglo-American loan agreement, the mining companies will also lose the possibility of themselves earning large amounts of interest on the heavy capital investment and which they might otherwise charge against the cost of producing the uranium. The foreign loan agreement thus greatly facilitates the heavy payment in dollars for urgent imports of necessary uranium-extraction equipment by enabling payment in foreign exchange to be made over a period of years, rather than immediately, as would be necessary were the plant to be financed by the mining companies in local currency.

The pressure of the Government was thus also evident as regards the financing of the uranium project just as it was in the beginning in causing the mining companies reluctantly to agree to become actively interested in uranium extraction for American and British account. For years the mining companies had shied away from the project, so that pressure from the Government, together with the prospect of reasonable remunerative returns, assured by the agreement with the U.S.-U.K., concluded under the Government's auspices, were necessary to effect the companies positive interest and cooperation. It is generally felt that the uranium agreement, as finalized last year, is reasonable for all parties, and that while the financial returns to the mining companies will not be especially high, still they will be sufficient to sustain the mining companies' interest in and to make the enterprise well worth while for them.

It is understood that at the beginning, at least, only current gold ore production will be processed for uranium extraction as this will amply suffice for the full capacity of the uranium plants. There will, therefore, be no occasion, for the present, to process the vast mine dumps of already processed ore, some of which also contain uranium. It would appear that the uranium-extraction plants will be operated in synchronization with and as extensions of the mines' regular ore processing plants. However, the processed ore dumps will be available for uranium extraction whenever a larger uranium supply, than is possible by current ore production, may be desired.

Equipment for the uranium plants has already arrived on the Rand, and it is hoped that the first plant may be in regular operation within one year. The others will be brought into operation as rapidly as possible thereafter. All of the production of uranium will be delivered to the South African Atomic Energy Board, which has a national monopoly on uranium in all its aspects, including mineral rights, prospecting, production, trade, etc. The Board will then make deliveries to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and U.K. Ministry of Supply at prices established by the basic uranium agreement concluded last year.

All of the now projected six uranium extraction plants will be situated on the Rand. However, it would be possible to extend production to the new large gold mines now in course of development in the Orange Free State, about 225 miles to the south of Johannesburg. The first of these new mines will come into production in 1952 and additional mines progressively in succeeding years. When fully developed, the Orange Free State mines may approximate the current production of gold of the Rand mines, accounting for up to 50 per cent of the present world gold supply. The gold ore in the Orange Free State, like that of the Rand, contains a small percentage of uranium. However, owing to the immense tonnages of ore processed for gold, the total amount of uranium which may be extracted is important. Indeed, it is reported that, when all the projected uranium extraction plants are in full operation, the Rand will rank as one of the leading, if not the leading, at least potentially, source of uranium in the world.

The U.S.-South African uranium agreement accords with a number of other major economic and financial developments, involving American capital and interests, occurring in South Africa during the last year. Others include an £18 million pound contract awarded to an American company for the construction of a large synthetic motor fuel plant at Coalbrook, Transvaal; a $15 million dollar petroleum refinery to be built and operated by an American company at Durban; an $80 million dollar loan by the IBRD and several private American banks to South Africa for financing basic economic developments, such as railways, electric power, etc.; new capital investments by various American companies in branch industrial plants, etc.[3] These developments have greatly strengthened the economic ties between South Africa and the United States and, by causing South Africa to look increasingly to the United States for financial assistance and industrial guidance and support, are harbingers of ever-closer economic relations between the two countries in the future.

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[3] The "$80 million loan" referred to here presumably is the same as the $60 million in credits authorized by the IBRD in January 1951 and described in footnote 4, p. 1439.

Action Requested:

That this report be distributed to all agencies of the Government interested in the specific subject discussed and in general industrial developments in South Africa affecting the United States.

SYDNEY B. REDECKER

601.45A11/4-2051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1951.

Subject: South African Commitment re Defense of North Africa and the Equipping of the Proposed South African Expeditionary Force

Participants: The Secretary
The South African Ambassador, Mr. G. P. Jooste
Mr. Shullaw—BNA

The South African Ambassador, Mr. G. P. Jooste, called on me today at my request. I told him that having learned of his impending departure for South Africa I had asked him to call in order that I might discuss with him South African plans to send an expeditionary force to North Africa in the event of hostilities and the problem of equipping this expeditionary force. Before going into this matter in detail, I told the Ambassador of our great satisfaction with the decision of South Africa to send an air squadron to Korea.[1] I expressed the hope that the Ambassador would convey our appreciation to his Government upon his return to South Africa.

So far as the defense of the African continent is concerned, I said that the South African decision with respect to an expeditionary force was most helpful. We are unable, however, because of lack of legislative authority to give any assurances concerning the equipping of the South African force. In the first place we cannot anticipate where the attack, if it comes, will fall, or where the need for equipment will be greatest. I said that I understood the South African Government had doubts about the desirability of training an expeditionary force in the absence of any assurances that the equipment for it would be forthcoming when needed. I said that I felt certain that if South Africa had in existence at the time of the outbreak of hostilities a force trained with American equipment and ready to go into action there would be every effort made to see that it was equipped. Furthermore it is very obvious that in the event of war our present legislation would be inadequate and would require amendment. I said that I had no desire to be cagey or evasive but was attempting to give the Ambassador a frank statement of why we are unable to give assurances concerning the equipping of the expeditionary force. I added that I understood training equipment could be handled as reimbursable assistance and did not present any particular difficulties.[2]

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[1] A South African air fighter squadron joined the United Nations forces in Korea in October 1950.

The Ambassador said that this explanation of the situation would be most helpful to him in explaining our position to his Government. He remarked that one question which might be raised with him was the matter of eventual payment for equipment received for the expeditionary force, assuming that on the outbreak of hostilities some way were found by which it could be supplied to South Africa. He said that his Government is proud of its financial reputation and would be concerned about the possibility of assuming an obligation in excess of its capacity to repay. He referred in this connection to South Africa's Lend-Lease negotiations after the last war. I told the Ambassador that Lend-Lease had been conceived by President Roosevelt as a method of avoiding the creation of war debts. It was only a step, however, in the development of this concept. I said that in any case there would be an opportunity for the question of cost of equipment to be considered by South Africa at the time the equipment was needed, and in the light of the circumstances and conditions then prevailing.

Following this discussion the Ambassador referred to the subject of Southwest Africa and the appointment of a successor to the late Ambassador Erhardt. These remarks are covered in a separate memorandum.[3]

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[2] In the statement summarized here, the Secretary of State followed the line recommended in a briefing paper submitted by Assistant Secretary Perkins under cover of a memorandum of April 18. (601.45A11/4–1851)

[3] In a separate, briefer memorandum of conversation, Secretary Acheson recorded that Ambassador Jooste expressed his hope that some solution could be found to the problem of South West Africa and stated that he would discuss the matter with his Government during his impending visit to South Africa. Jooste also asked if anything could be said about a successor to the late Ambassador Erhardt who died suddenly in Pretoria on February 18. Secretary Acheson promised to look into that matter. Regarding the designation, appointment, and confirmation of Ambassador Gallman as the new Ambassador in South Africa, see the editorial note, p. 1452.

845A.411/8-2151 : Despatch

The Third Secretary of the Embassy in the Union of South Africa (Dembo) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRETORIA, August 2, 1951.

No. 108

Subject: Race Conflict and the Native Outlook

Native resentment of white *baaskap* (supremacy) and Native disappointment with America's "failure" to oppose *apartheid* were the main impressions made on an Embassy officer after a two-hour talk with a group of Natives in Pretoria. The group was informally brought together to meet the officer by a Native minister. It included a school teacher, a clerk in the Department of Native Affairs, a shopkeeper, a printer, an employee of a non-European affairs department of the Municipality, three others and the minister. Points made by them during this discussion are put under three heads:

I. Inevitability of race conflict;
II. Shortcomings of Native organizations; and
III. Disappointment with United States foreign policy.

I. *Inevitability of Race Conflict*

The group agreed that a compromise solution of South Africa's racial difficulties was impossible. Revolution, they felt, was unavoidable. The whites of all parties were one in their support of white *baaskap*, while the Natives claimed equality of opportunity as their right. They unhesitatingly blamed the Nationalists for inflaming racial feelings to the point where today every Native regarded every white man as his enemy.

II. *Shortcomings of Native Organizations*

The group acknowledged that the bulk of the Native people were unorganized. One said the ANC was like a head without a body. He guessed that the Congress only had about 1,000 active members. Another claimed that the drawback to effective Native organization was the "Native intellectuals", that is, themselves. The educated Natives were only interested in making a good thing out of their education. They did not care to work among the people in rural areas who were ready for leadership. Another observed that dynamic leadership could never be expected from men who were civil servants and who could be sacked if they became too outspoken. Communist prestige, on the other hand, was rising because they were the only ones who appeared ready to stake their all in the struggle against oppression.

The certain feeling of the group was that whenever effective leadership *did* appear the Native people would follow as one man the attack on *baaskap*. Their struggle against oppression, they felt, was a developing one. The present unformed state of Native organizations was not, therefore, a bad sign. This showed the Native pot was bubbling. Fusion would come later. The Native minister here interjected that African religious separation was a case in point. The 1,000-odd separate Bantu churches showed that the Native was rejecting white overlordship. They were essentially a movement away from the oppressor. If it were not for ministers like himself who tried to stem this separatism, the Native religious rebellion by now would have been complete.

III. *United States Foreign Policy and South Africa*

The reporting officer was impressed by the group's disappointment with America's "support" of South Africa at UN. His counterargument to put this issue into perspective was not taken and they predicted that the Native people would sympathize with the Soviets in a war with the West. The Native people were not Communists, they stressed, but the Soviet Union did appear to side with them in their struggle against oppression. America did not and they could not see why. They understood British truckling to Nationalist prejudice. Britain, they said, was a broken power; but America was now the great western exponent of freedom and they expected her to use her influence in their favor.

The group also showed concern with recent press stories of arrests of American Communists. They are afraid that their own advocacy of racial equality might lead to their arrest as Communists under the Suppression of Communism Act. And without fully understanding the American scene, they feared there was a "white supremacy" motive behind these arrests.

Comment:

The Embassy believes the observations reported here are typical of informed Native opinion in South Africa. Native anger and frustration are apparent everywhere in those urban areas which are best known to Embassy officers. Apartheid has only served to intensify their bitterness. The informed urban Native, moreover, assesses world developments in terms of the black and white struggle in South Africa. He may be sophisticated enough to know that there is more to Communist propaganda than appears on the surface but he finds it hard to resist its magnetism because in South Africa communism alone ranges itself on the side of racial equality. Our information task with them is important because the value of South Africa as a secure ally in a war against Russia is weakened to the extent of their susceptibility to Communist propaganda. The system of white supremacy is powerful and effective but, as the thinking here reported reveals, Native anger is growing. An outstanding leader willing to make personal sacrifices or harsh Government action which provoked a large segment of the native people, such as a pass system for Native women, could cause trouble.

MORRIS DEMBO

780.5/9-551

The Chargé in the Union of South Africa (Connelly) to the Dominion Affairs Officer, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Shullaw)

TOP SECRET PRETORIA, September 5, 1951.

DEAR HARRY: John Davis, our Army Attaché, has just showed me a copy of his top secret report of August 17, 1951 to the Department of the Army, No. R-149-51, which gives the latest dope on the Union's commitments regarding defense of the Middle East.[1] You will probably be getting your complete copy in the usual way but as there are certain sections dealing with the purchase of defense equipment I am paraphrasing them for your information.

Most of the equipment for South Africa will be purchased from England. Total orders for this equipment will be placed in the near future and will come to thirty million pounds. This sum will be expended over a six year period. The first yearly budget of five million pounds would be voted during the next session of parliament. All fighting vehicles, medium tanks, light tanks, armoured personnel carriers, will be purchased from the UK. Arrangements are being made with Canada to purchase Ford four and six wheel vehicles without bodies. The bodies will be manufactured in the Union on British specifications. Signal equipment will be purchased from Canada and possibly some from the UK.[2]

John Davis' report also points out the terrific impression which Field Marshal Sir William Slim made on Minister of Defense Erasmus and other members of the Union delegation. Both Mr. Forsyth and General du Toit told me immediately on their return from London what an outstanding job Slim had done in his review of the world military situation.[3]

If South Africa carries through with its plan, as stated in John's report, to purchase from the UK and Canada, it looks very much as though any Union purchases from the United States, other than very minor items such as a few bazookas, will be postponed indefinitely.

With the best of wishes,

Sincerely yours, BERNARD C. CONNELLY

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[1] A copy of the communication cited here is not included in Department of State files.

[2] A similar appraisal was reported by Attaché Davis in a message of May 11 to the Department of the Army, a copy of which Chargé Connelly sent to Shullaw under cover of a letter of June 1. Davis commented that the British hoped that the new South African procurement policy would end the attempt by South Africa to obtain equipment from the United States. (745A.56/6-151)

[3] Erasmus attended the Commonwealth Defense Ministers' Meeting in London in June 1951.

745A.5622/10-2351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1951.

Subject: Equipping of South African Air Squadron in Korea
Participants: The South African Ambassador, Mr. G. P. Jooste
U—Mr. Webb
BNA—Mr. Shullaw

The South African Ambassador, Mr. G. P. Jooste, called on me today at his request to discuss the problem of equipping the South African air squadron in Korea with jet aircraft. The Ambassador recalled that when the South African squadron was sent to Korea a year ago, it was decided that the squadron would be equipped with P–51 aircraft. Subsequently personnel of the squadron, who are all volunteers, were assured by the South African Minister of Defense, Mr. Erasmus, that he would make every effort to obtain jet aircraft to replace this equipment. The Minister's efforts to carry out his pledge by obtaining aircraft from the United Kingdom were unsuccessful and South Africa then sought to buy jets in the United States. Mr. Jooste said that the Department of Defense has now informed the Service Attachés of the Embassy that jet aircraft for the South African squadron will not be available until 1953.

The Ambassador said that the problem of equipping the South African squadron was regarded with extreme seriousness by his Government. South Africa has a commitment to supply certain forces for the defense of the Middle East in the event of hostilities. The Korean operation has provided valuable training for South African pilots who could be used, if the need arises, in the Middle East. Use of jet aircraft by the squadron would increase the usefulness of this training. The question of equipping the squadron, therefore, is related to the Middle East commitment. Because of the limitations in the South African defense law, it is necessary to rely on volunteers for service outside South Africa and therefore the ability of South Africa to carry out its commitments is affected by the willingness of South African personnel to volunteer for service outside the country. The Ambassador stated that his Government was concerned by the effect on enlistments of failure to carry out the pledge respecting equipment made by the Defense Minister to the squadron in Korea. Mr. Jooste stressed the adverse effect on morale of the South African squadron resulting from its being forced to operate alongside Americans and Australians who are using jet aircraft. He acknowledged, however, that some American squadrons were also still using P–51 aircraft.

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[1] Drafted by Shullaw.

The Ambassador said that unless jet aircraft for the South African squadron could be obtained during the first quarter of 1952, his Government might be forced to ground the squadron.[2]

In replying to the Ambassador, I reiterated our appreciation of South African participation in the United Nations action in Korea. I told him it was my understanding that the South African squadron would be equipped with jet aircraft at the same time as the American squadrons now using P–51's. I said that I did not see how it could be possible to do more than this, and I questioned why his Government would consider itself forced to ground the South African squadron if jet aircraft were not forthcoming during the first quarter of 1952. The Ambassador again referred to the commitment of Mr. Erasmus to the squadron and to the morale factor involved. He remarked that he was unhappy at being forced to refer to the possible grounding of the squadron, but that his instructions were explicit on this point. He said that he understood only replacement jet aircraft were being sent to Korea and that none of the P–51-equipped American squadrons had been changed over to jet aircraft. He added that the South African Service Attachés had been informed by the Pentagon that NATO requirements had priority over Korean requirements.

I assured the Ambassador that his representations on this subject would be brought to the attention of the Department of Defense.

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[2] Telegram unnumbered, September 20, from Pretoria, reported as follows on an earlier airing of the same problem raised here by Jooste:

"Cols. Davis and Bland called on Min Defense Erasmus at his request September 10. Erasmus said he was worried over his present failure to purchase either in the US or UK jet aircraft for the Union's Korean squadron. He has money in hand and fears recent mounting casualties in South African squadron will lead to polit attacks by opposition in 1952 session Parliament if he cannot supplement his remarks during last parliamentary session that negots for purchasing jets were underway with assurances that they have been obtained. He hinted that if jets could not be purchased South African squadron might be grounded. Col. Bland is reporting this to Dept of Air Force. FonOff has not approached Emb on matter." (745A.5622/9–2051)

Editorial Note

On June 11 in the course of his meeting with President Truman to discuss important foreign policy matters, Secretary of State Acheson went over the list of proposed Ambassadorial appointments for the immediate future. The Secretary's brief memorandum of the discussion of Ambassadorial appointments reads in part as follows:

"We talked particularly about South Africa. The President is well aware of the delicacy of that situation and the importance of having a proven man there. I think he is most favorable to the suggestion made. I imagine that he will give me his final decision on it either Wednesday or Thursday." (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 238)

At their meeting on June 21 the President and the Secretary again discussed Ambassadorial appointments. The Secretary's memorandum read as follows:

"I raised with the President the list of suggested Ambassadorial changes which I had left with him on a previous meeting. He said that he still had not had time to get to this matter but that he would do so at once. He had been beneath such a vast accumulation of work.

"I particularly stressed the desirability of going ahead, if he should approve, with Mr. Gallman's appointment." (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 238)

Waldemar J. Gallman, a career Foreign Service Officer who had been Ambassador in Poland from 1948 to 1950 and was currently serving as the Department of State Representative at the War College, was formally nominated by President Truman on July 30 to become Ambassador in the Union of South Africa. The South African Government's agreement to Gallman's nomination had been received on July 26. Gallman's appointment was confirmed by the Senate on August 22. The Ambassador-Designate arrived in South Africa on September 25, but he was received for the first time by Prime Minister Malan only on October 9, and he presented his credentials to Governor General E. G. Jansen on October 18. Documentation on the nomination and accreditation of Ambassador Gallman appears in file 123 Gallman. Between October 27 and November 29, Ambassador Gallman called upon all the principal officers of the South African Government. For records of his conversations with External Affairs Secretary Forsyth on October 27, Defense Minister Erasmus on November 5, and Interior Minister Dönges on November 6, see despatches 269, October 30, *infra;* 296, November 5, page 1455; and 302, November 6, page 1457, all from Pretoria. Records of all the remaining conversations with government officials are in file 745A.13.

745A.13/10-3051: Despatch

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 269

PRETORIA, October 30, 1951.

Subject: Memorandum of conversation between the Ambassador and Mr. D. D. Forsyth, Secretary for External Affairs

On October 27 I called on Mr. D. D. Forsyth, Secretary for External Affairs. It was the first opportunity I had had of having a somewhat extensive conversation with him, and I especially wanted to have this talk with him as he was leaving on the 29th for a month's holiday.

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[1] Regarding Ambassador Gallman's nomination, confirmation, arrival in South Africa, and presentation of credentials, see the editorial note, *supra.*

I told him that I was sorry there had been such delay in formally taking over my duties in South Africa. I said I had only now been able to start my calls on the Cabinet Ministers. I interjected here that I was looking forward particularly to my call on Minister Sauer as I was anxious to take up with him the serious problem of the lag in manganese and chrome shipments to the ports.[2] While Forsyth made no observation on this point, he did say it was unfortunate that the Prime Minister's rather long absence from Pretoria had delayed matters for me.

I told Forsyth that I appreciated the warm relations that existed between the Embassy and External Affairs and that I was particularly appreciative of his helpful and cooperative attitude. To this he said that that was the way he wanted it and, after all, there was this same sort of relationship between the State Department and their Embassy in Washington.

When I remarked that it was my understanding that the MDAP agreement was finally to be signed, he said that that should take place any day now. There was one legal question which was still receiving the attention of their legal advisers, he stated. This question arose from legislation affecting the MDAP program which was just recently passed. I told him I knew nothing of this and he admitted he did not have the details but said that he did not think this new development would cause any serious delay. I said that I hoped not, as I had thought that, after agreement in principle had been reached on the phraseology of the agreement, the signing would soon follow.[3]

After stressing that South Africa was anxious to get along with its rearmament program in general, and particularly to get arms for training purposes, he differentiated between purchases in the U.K. and the U.S. In the U.K., he said, the price was more favorable but in the U.S. deliveries, in spite of all the demands, were quicker.

I told Forsyth then that one of these days soon I wanted to go, in detail, into the question of the pending draft Consular Convention with officials of his Department. He immediately said that he did not think the timing was good as the present Government was not very keen about further international agreements. I told him I was surprised by his remark. This seemed to me a somewhat extreme attitude toward a rather common type of agreement designed, on a reciprocal basis, to regulate some practical day-to-day relations. He followed this up by saying that he did not mean to imply that External Affairs was not prepared to explore the situation with me.

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[2] Ambassador Gallman made his first call upon Transport Minister Sauer on November 8. Gallman stressed the possible disruptive effects upon the U.S. rearmament program of any delay in the transportation of essential ores, particularly manganese. Gallman advanced a few suggestions for speeding the transport of ore. Sauer appeared to indicate that all that could be done was being done. In his report on the conversation, transmitted in despatch 310, November 8, from Pretoria, Gallman suggested that Prime Minister Malan would sooner or later have to be approached on the problem, but he indicated he would see Sauer once more before any approach to Malan. (745A.13/11–851)

[3] Regarding the exchange of notes of November 9 constituting the agreement on mutual defense assistance between the United States and South Africa, see the editorial note, p. 1459.

He voluntarily then brought up the question of South West Africa. "What is going to happen now?" he asked. I said that I thought the proposal worked out by the United Nations *ad hoc* Committee seemed very reasonable. To this he said that the present Government, in his view, would never agree to this proposal. It would not go beyond its counterproposal. The reception, he continued, which the first and only report on South West Africa submitted to the United Nations had received, would never be forgotten by the present Government. He said he was merely telling me in a personal capacity what he knew about the temper and attitude of the present Government.

At this point I told Forsyth that as I knew he was extremely busy clearing up matters before his holiday, I would not take more of his time now, but that I looked forward very much to seeing him after his return and to working with him.

I was very favorably impressed with Forsyth's cordiality and frankness.

W. J. GALLMAN

745A.13/11-551 : Despatch

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRETORIA, November 5, 1951.

No. 296

Subject: Conversation between the Ambassador and Minister of Defense, the Honorable F. C. Erasmus

I made my first call on Minister of Defense Erasmus this morning. He received me in a very friendly way. At the very outset he said he remembered vividly the friendly, sympathetic understanding shown him by Mr. Acheson and General Marshall when he visited the States last year and discussed with them South Africa's armament needs.[1]

Erasmus then turned to the MDAP agreement and said he was very happy that appreciation of South Africa's position had been shown in Washington and that the way was now clear for signing the agreement.[2] This would be done any day now, he added. South Africa, he said, particularly because of its present limited manganese supply, could not give a blanket commitment covering assistance on its side. While there were undoubtedly as yet a number of unknown sources of manganese in the country which would in time be developed, the supply from present known sources was limited to about fifteen years.[3] I interjected that the agreement as originally drawn up was, as I understood it, a form agreement of the type generally submitted to countries who had qualified for aid on a reimbursable basis. I was happy, nevertheless, that an understanding had been reached by our two Governments which now made the signing possible.

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[1] For information on Erasmus' meetings with Acheson and Marshall on October 5, see the editorial note, p. 1427.

[2] Regarding the exchange of notes of November 9, constituting the agreement relating to mutual defense assistance between the United States and the Union of South Africa, see the editorial note, p. 1459.

Erasmus then said that he hoped an early start could be made in supplying South Africa with the equipment needed. I asked Erasmus whether the requirements, as given in the original list submitted by him during his visit in Washington, had been materially altered, and he said the list stood substantially as originally drawn up.[4] He hoped progress could also be made with the list which was recently submitted to the British Government. He was very gratified, he said, to have been told that the U.S. and U.K. would coordinate their efforts in supplying the Union.

Korea was then touched upon. Erasmus said that because of the severe losses of machines and men in Korea, he had felt compelled during the last session of Parliament to state in Parliament that the Union Government would undertake to have its squadron in Korea equipped with jets. He said that it was a big disappointment when he was told by both the British and by us that jets were not now available. He said South Africa, in view of public opinion, was in the position where unless jets were made available the squadron would have to be grounded. From Britain word has come that jets would not be available before 1953. From Ambassador Jooste, however, he had just received word that we would give the problem prompt consideration and that hope was held out, according to Jooste, that perhaps by January some jets could be made available. I asked Erasmus from whom Jooste had received this information. That he said he did not know. The situation, he then said, might, of course, be eased if the cease-fire were soon negotiated. In any event, he said even a few jets by January would ease the Government's position materially.

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[3] In a memorandum of November 5, a copy of which was attached to this despatch, Embassy Minerals Attaché Frisbie commented that the estimate of a 15-year supply of manganese ore appeared to be used as an excuse for South Africa's inability to give the kind of materials commitment called for in a mutual defense assistance agreement. Frisbie observed that it had already been reported to the Department of State that recent South African official estimates had established manganese ore reserves sufficient for 50 years of production at the current rate.

[4] In a memorandum of November 5, a copy of which was attached to this despatch, Embassy Army Attaché Col. John Davis said that Erasmus had obviously not been able to keep up with the details of the negotiations and was in error in his observation that the original South African list remained unaltered. Davis commented that most of the equipment originally requested from the United States was currently scheduled to be obtained from the United Kingdom.

Before we left this subject I reminded Erasmus that we had two squadrons fighting alongside the South African squadron in Korea, and that these squadrons, because of the shortage of jets, were equipped no different from the South African squadron.[5]

I then asked Erasmus what steps, if any, were contemplated during the coming session of Parliament to extend the time for compulsory military service. He said that the draft legislation he had in mind would extend compulsory military service (in active citizen force) from three months over a three-year period to twelve months. Manpower shortage, however, he pointed out, would at any time make it somewhat difficult to get such amending legislation through Parliament. He could not say at present whether the question would be opened in the coming session of Parliament. He wished to see first what developments, in the field of disarmament, took place at the forthcoming General Assembly meeting at Paris.

As I was taking my leave, Erasmus said that he must apologize for having, in our first meeting, touched on the two problems, the need of armaments for South Africa and the need for jets in Korea. He would appreciate, he said, any help I could give him. I told him that I would, of course, report our conversation and request that both problems continue to be given sympathetic consideration.

I was very favorably impressed with the friendly, frank way Erasmus received me and talked with me.

Comments of the Army Attaché, Colonel Davis, and of the Minerals Attaché, Mr. Frisbie, on some of the statements made by Minister Erasmus are enclosed.[6]

W. J. GALLMAN

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[5] See Under Secretary Webb's memorandum of his conversation with Jooste on October 23, p. 1451.

[6] Regarding the comments under reference here, see footnotes 3 and 4, above.

745A.13/11-651 : Despatch

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRETORIA, November 6, 1951.
No. 302

Subject: Conversation between the Ambassador and Minister of the Interior, Dr. the Honorable T. E. Dönges, K. C.

I made my first call today on Dr. Dönges, Minister of the Interior. While Dönges was quite occupied getting ready for his departure for Paris the end of the week to attend the General Assembly session, he gave me about an hour of his time. A case before the Cape Supreme Court involving the Separate Representation Voters Bill prevented his departure earlier for Paris (see Embassy's despatch, Cape Town Series No. 43, March 29, 1951[1]).

Dönges received me in a breezy, friendly way. He said he hoped to be back from Paris at least by the latter part of December. While he would not have as heavy a legislative program to look after at the coming session of Parliament as he did last year, he would, however, have to be back sometime before the session opened and, of course, be in Cape Town at its opening. During the session last year he said he was kept very much occupied getting action on the Separate Representation Voters Bill and the Group Areas Act. He anticipated a great deal of his time this year in Cape Town would be occupied with details of the Van Riebeeck Centenary.

Dönges then spent some time telling me about his stay in the States last year.[2] He said he had enjoyed his talks with the Secretary and his association with our delegation at Lake Success. He regretted that he had to spend so much time at Lake Success and had only been able to get to know New York and Washington. He would have liked to have traveled more widely in the States. He said he would have particularly liked to have visited the Middle West and the west coast. We then discussed points of interest which he thought it would be well for me to see in South Africa. He mentioned particularly some of the irrigation projects and I told him that I had already made plans with our Agricultural Attaché Dougherty to visit some of these projects.

Dönges then launched into a discussion of the present General Assembly meeting. The solution for the South West Africa question, he said, to his mind would be an agreement limited to the Union, the United States, Britain and France. South Africa, he said, was not willing any longer to be a "whipping boy". One report on South West Africa had been submitted to UNO and that promptly led to some forty questions. The Union was not going to expose itself to this again. To limit matters to the four nations, as the Union wished, would have one very vital advantage. There are indications, he said, that South West Africa may become an important source for uranium. For that reason alone it certainly was best to keep a large number of foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, from injecting themselves into South West Africa affairs. I told Dönges that a good deal of what he had said about South West Africa I had heard before. I hoped very much that a mutually satisfactory agreement could be reached on this issue soon. At this point Dönges promptly moved on to the question of the Indian minority.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Minister of Interior Dönges headed the South African Delegation to the Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly held in New York, September–November 1951.

South Africa, he said, was a western nation in thought and orientation. South Africa already had enough on its hands with the Native problem without having also to contend with an Indian minority problem. The Indian minority in South Africa constituted a "bridgehead for the east". This bridgehead should be eliminated. In the hope of bringing Dönges to see the practical implications of his statement, quite apart from the moral issues involved, I asked him just how large the Indian minority was. He promptly replied "only 300,000", and then callously stated that the 300,000, added to the millions already in India, could hardly create a problem for India.

Dönges then turned the discussion to U.S.-South African relations. He acknowledged that there was a large measure of understanding and friendship between the two countries. He said he wished though the United States would not, as she so often does, deal with South Africa "on a broad, international, world basis" but would do so more on a "direct basis". This he followed up with the breath-taking remark that he had always been impressed with the firm backing Moscow gave her satellites at international conferences. I reminded Dönges that I had had some personal experience with Moscow's treatment of Satellites, having lived in one of the satellite countries, but Dönges gave no visible signs of appreciation of what I was trying to tell him.

What stood out in my talk with Dönges was his disarmingly frank and friendly behavior, his bland method of talking, and his ability to cloak his obviously narrow nationalistic outlook, for the most part, with smooth language.

W. J. GALLMAN

Editorial Note

On November 9, 1951 in Washington, Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb and South African Chargé Basil Jarvie exchanged notes constituting an agreement regarding the sale of military equipment to the Union under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. The notes set forth those undertakings and assurances required in the administration of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. For the texts of the notes, see 3 UST (pt. 2) 2565; TIAS 2424; 160 UNTS 41. A brief announcement of the agreement was issued to the press by the Department of State on November 10; see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1951, page 825. Department of State Press Officer Lincoln White explained to newsmen on November 9 that the agreement involved no outlay of money by the United States but simply permitted the Union of South Africa to buy military equipment in the United States provided it agreed to certain undertakings including that South Africa would not reexport the equipment without the permission of the United States, that the shipments would only be used for the defense of South Africa, and that they would be used in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations. Telegram 133, November 10, from Pretoria reported the following statement issued by the South African Foreign Ministry on November 10:

> "The Department of External Affairs announces that the Union Government has made an agreement with the United States Government in regard to the supply of military equipment. It will be recalled that it was previously announced that the policy of the Union Government is to range itself in the event of a war against Communism alongside the anti-Communistic powers in the defence of Africa and with a view to ensuring that its military forces are properly equipped with modern arms, the Union approached the United States and other countries for the procurement of its requirements which cannot be manufactured in this country. It was announced earlier this year that South Africa has been declared eligible to receive from the United States reimbursable military assistance under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act 1949 as amended and since then negotiations have been in progress in regard to the terms on which the equipment needed by the Union should be supplied. These negotiations have now culminated in the agreement mentioned. South African Press Association summation above release adds: A State Department press officer said the equipment would be used only for the defense of South Africa and in accordance with United Nations objectives." (745A.5 MAP/11-1051)

The basic documentation on the negotiation of the agreement of November 9, 1951 is included in Department file 740.5 MAP.

845A.411/11-951 : Despatch

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

SECRET PRETORIA, November 9, 1951.

No. 312

Subject: Native Unrest.

A few years ago people in the Union of South Africa speculated on whether or not there would be Native unrest in the future; today the only speculation that is justifiable is when and how the disturbance will come. As the Embassy has previously pointed out, under the various measures for implementing White supremacy and *apartheid* (racial segregation) put forward by the present Nationalist Government, relations between the Natives and Whites have deteriorated to the lowest level in the Union's history. All persons working independently with the Natives, that is to say, persons not connected with the Government, whom the reporting officer has talked with in recent weeks are extremely worried about the possibility of Native disturbances.

No one except the Non-European leaders appears convinced that the Natives have sufficient organization at this time to effect an overthrow of the present system of Government. What is currently under discussion by informed observers is this: Under the Suppression of Communism Act a great many Non-European leaders have been "named" and they anticipate that many of them may be jailed. Those that are not placed in jail will, as a matter of course, be prevented from carrying on their activities in Non-European organizations. Since these Non-European leaders will be prevented, in any case, from going on with their political activities, the danger is that they will attempt some sort of demonstration while they are still able to do so. In recent talks with Non-European leaders, they have dropped a great many hints of trouble in the relatively near future. Embassy officers have been told that Natives in the various locations around Johannesburg have arms; that Non-European leaders have made a list of the "hot heads" in the Youth Congress; and that the "Tsotsis" (Native zoot suit gangsters) will be utilized. A variety of schemes for provoking disorders have been mentioned, the most imaginative of which is one which envisages that on a given signal all the Native petrol attendants on the Witwatersrand would set fire to their petrol tanks. In the confusion that would result, Natives could create considerable damage and intimidate the present Government. Other schemes speak of carefully organized plans for domestic servants to kill their masters and others talk of the mine workers going out and creating havoc by dynamite. The reporting officer has been told by numerous Non-European leaders that the quantities of dynamite stolen each week are considerable. However, many persons close to the Natives are convinced they will take no step until the declaration of World War III.

In the past two weeks a growing number of hints have been dropped that a conference of Non-European leaders meeting on December 15, 1951 in Bloemfontein will map out a campaign for a mass protest. Recent rumors among the more extremist Johannesburg Natives suggest that the day chosen for a protest will be Dingaan's Day, December 16. (This is the day celebrated throughout the Union by Afrikaners as a sort of spiritual protest against the assassination of the Voortrekker leader, Piet Retif, by Dingaan, the Zulu chieftain.)

Embassy Comment:

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the timing of a general Native uprising. About all that the Embassy can do is to notify the Department at times when Native tension is on the increase. This is such a time. The Government authorities are convinced that they can deal with any uprising and are further convinced that there is insufficient organization to arrange a genuine uprising. We believe that the Union has sufficient forces to put down any uprising that does not get out of hand. However, if a Union-wide Native disturbance were to last for

24 hours the Government would have serious difficulty in coping with it, however improbable such an event may appear. If it is true that the Natives are not capable of organizing a serious uprising, then there is something wrong with the Government's statement which claims that in time of war it would be necessary to retain a sizeable force of troops in the Union to maintain internal security.

In short, opinion on a Native uprising is divided into three groups. One group holds that the Natives will never rise and that eventually through the years the Government will be able to control them through *apartheid* or their lot will be bettered by industrial advancement (this point of view includes the majority of White South Africans, and is particularly strong among industrialists). The second group believes that there will be scattered riots which will be put down ruthlessly, but no genuine rebellion, for the foreseeable future, although they acknowledge that it may come eventually. (This point of view is held by "progressive" Afrikaners, and many missionaries and social workers.) The third group believes that a large Native uprising is inevitable and that eventually South Africa will become a black man's country. (This point of view is held by a small minority which includes most of the independent authorities on Native affairs, liberals, and the few white people who are close to Non-European leaders.) No one could prove any one of these three points of view, or give any sort of "proof" that one opinion is more likely to prevail than another. What can be said, however, is that there are less than a half-dozen white people who have any sort of idea of what the Non-Europeans as a whole are "thinking".There is no Non-Communist white person who is on the "inside" of thinking and planning among the Non-European leaders. The gulf between the Whites and Blacks in South Africa is a serious one. And even the Prime Minister recently admitted that the situation was dangerous in that a "spark" could cause trouble. One thing appears certain and that is that the present tension cannot continue indefinitely—it must be released somehow.

For the Ambassador:
JOSEPH SWEENEY
Attaché

745A.13/11-851 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Union of South Africa[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRETORIA, December 29, 1951.

A-72. Reference Embassy Despatch 310 November 8, 1951.[2] The Department and other interested agencies have followed the question of chrome and manganese exports with increasing concern. It was hoped that materially increased shipments would result in the latter months of 1951 after alleviation of winter conditions and labor difficulties, and in view of the repeated assurances from the South African government (Note from the Department of External Affairs dated July 11, 1951 and letter from the Minister of Transport dated October 8, 1951[3]) that an amount equalling or exceeding the 1950 volume would be shipped. Despite these assurances, shipments of manganese ores for 1951 will not only be far below the contracted amount but below the 1950 volume. The total shipments of manganese to the United States in 1951 may not exceed 370,000 s.t. compared to a total of 479,426 in 1950, and the backlog of unshipped manganese ore as of October 31 equalled 315,700 s.t. Chrome ore shipments are closer to the 1950 level but will fall far below the 1951 commitments.

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[1] This airgram was drafted jointly by Armstrong (OMP), Skavang, and Bridgman (MMS), was cleared in BNA, DMPA, and EPS; and Armstrong (OMP) signed for the Secretary of State.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1454.

The Department, therefore, concurs that the Ambassador should renew the discussion with the Minister of Transport at an early date, and should make a vigorous and comprehensive statement of the case. The importance of South African chrome and manganese shipments for the U.S. defense effort and for the security of the free world should be clearly and firmly emphasized. It should be pointed out that stocks of manganese ore are declining in the U.S. and that steel production will be jeopardized by continued delay.

The Department has been informed that one factor which perhaps is responsible for the tie-up of a large volume of rolling stock is the right of port consignees of coal to store it in railroad cars for a period of thirty days. If in the opinion of the Embassy this is a genuine factor, it would be a good point to discuss with the Minister. In addition any other evidence of improper utilization of rolling stock of which the Embassy is aware might be discussed. In the event the Minister brings up the shortage of rolling stock or other railway equipment as a reason for decreased shipments, an effort should be made to obtain details of such orders, i.e. names of manufacturers, and status of deliveries. For the Embassy's information, if rolling stock and other railway equipment comprise the major bottleneck the Department might explore the possibilities of expediting shipments.

If the Minister should refer to technical or administrative transport difficulties as a deterrent to ore shipments, the Ambassador may wish to suggest that a really cooperative approach to such problems might yield beneficial results, and that the United States would be very interested in learning in what way it might be able to assist South Africa in solving such problems.

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[3] Neither printed. The principal documentation on the interest of the United States in production and transportation of manganese ore in the Union of South Africa is included in Department file 845A.2547.

The Defense Materials Procurement Administration has suggested that an American railroad expert as a consultant in South Africa might be helpful. The Department requests the opinion of the Embassy as to whether the Embassy feels the need of a transportation expert to assist in observing the situation and in carrying on discussions with the Government of South Africa. If such a consultant is desirable, his territory should presumably include Southwest Africa, the Rhodesias, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Mozambique and possibly Madagascar.

The conversation with the Minister of Transport should be followed by a formal note to the Minister of External Affairs, unless the Ambassador perceives objection. This note should review fully the matter of manganese and chrome ore shipments, with emphasis on United States efforts to expedite such shipments, and should illustrate graphically the disappointing results. The note should point out that this matter is regarded by the United States Government as of the highest importance in the relations between the two Governments, and as an instance in which the South African Government is in a position to contribute significantly to the mutual security efforts of the free world. The note should omit any reference to an offer of technical assistance, but should inquire as to the Government's plans for increasing ore shipments.

ACHESON

TREATY OF EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

[For text of Treaty signed at Washington December 18, 1947, proclaimed by the President of the United States April 20, 1951, entered into force April 30, 1951, see 2 UST (pt. 1) 884.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA CONCERNING MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE

[For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington November 9, 1951, entered into force on that date, see 3 UST (pt. 2) 2565.]

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